CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPT OF AN ISLAMIC STATE IN THE CONTEMPORARY
ISLAMIC THOUGHT

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1.1. Introduction

The contemporary Islamic thought is a reflection of the ideology introduced by Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) in the first quarter of the seventh century. This ideology is none other than Islam, often represented by its adherents as a comprehensive and complete code of life encompassing all sectors of it. Islam, being a socio-political religious system, incorporates both temporal and spiritual affairs. The various aspects that are necessary for human existence are not conceptualized and analyzed distinctly but are inter-related and interconnected in the Islamic thought. Nevertheless, the question that strikes the contemporary mind is about the definition of Islamic thought or simply what is the criterion for a thought to be Islamic? In response to the question, Abdelilah Belkeziz (among others), argued that the Islamic character of any thought could be determined by its conformity with the confirmed aspects of Islam and its usūl. In addition, he maintains that “the thought of modern and contemporary thinkers of Islam would not have been ‘Islamic’ thought except in the sense that it retained its intense connection to a marja’iyah (authoritatively referential) order which is Islam.”

Invoked by the central precept of Tawḥīd, Muslims believe in the idea of the divine connectedness of all things where there is no room for the separateness of religion from any other domain of life. As such, Islam is not considered a religion of mere rituals rather its scope is wider and incorporates every action of a Muslim, both at individual and collective levels, as ‘Ibādah (worship) if divine guidance is followed. Scholars argue that Islam is meant for practical implication and it demands of believers to actively participate in the affairs of the world, to display a pious and honest character in all temporal activities and to struggle to establish the supremacy of the righteous moral code in all spheres of life. Accordingly, this Divinity (Tawḥīd) based intellectual ideology motivated those who accepted it (a) to have complete submission to the Will of Allah, (b) to disseminate the message of Islam and (c) to strive to establish Islam as a complete socio-economic and political system.

1.2. Political Thought in Islam

Since the advent of Islam, the adherents of Islam believed in the divine connectedness of all things. They consider it their obligation to relate and check their affairs in the light of Qurʾān and Sunnah. They are in constant struggle to change the
socio-economic and political perspectives of the time on the patterns of the Islamic guidance. Often relating to their exemplary model, Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ), who, after a long-hard struggle succeeded and proved how the society and all its departments should reflect the manifestation of Islam. He (ﷺ) made Islam dominant over its immediate environment and proved the Qur’ānic ruling which indicate the purpose behind sending of the prophet as “īzḥār al-Dīn ‘alā dīni kullihī” (causing Islam to prevail over all other ways of living).

This dominance of Islam and its preservation continued even after the Prophetic period. His immediate successors and those who followed them extended its dominance to the shores of Atlantic and the Pacific with smashing the two superpowers of the time, Byzantine and Sassanid Empires. Being a perennial message, blessed and protected by Allah (ﷻ), inspired and informed by Sīrah of the prophet (ﷺ) and constantly carried out and on by the indefatigable struggle and striving of the members of the Islamic Ummah, it has survived throughout the history though facing many challenges from within and without. Consequently, until the surprise invasion of the colonial West in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Islamic civilization remained dominant in the affairs of man.

The Prophetic period (until 632 C.E.) and Rāshidūn period (the period of first four caliphs who succeeded the Prophet and ruled from 632 C.E. to 661 C.E.) followed by Umayyads (661-750 C.E.), Abbasids (750-1258 C.E.) and finally Ottomans (until its demolition in Oct,1923/1924 C.E.) were solely responsible for the development of humanity. During the nineteenth century the preserved unity of Muslims—stretching from Egypt, Syria, Tripoli, and Algiers in the North to the Yemen on the southern end of the Arabian Peninsula—could not hold long against the conspiracy of the West. The Muslim world was divided because of Western imperialist conspiracy and the new colonial powers then established their hold on its different parts and ultimately created different countries in the Arab world. These powers successfully inculcated the sentiments of nationalism against the universal brotherhood advocated by Islam. Gradually, majority of the Muslims absorbed the civilization of the west without its proper qualification and, thus, derailed from its right path. The Western powers were unable to overcome Islam until they dismantled the political manifestation of Islam, the institution of Khilāfah in the first quarter of Twentieth century. The institution of Khilāfah, a symbol of pan-Islamic unity, was fragmented into several nation-states that were now directly or indirectly under the colonial rule. In this way, the Western civilization has taken care to destroy all the traditional pillars of Islamic civilization. The political, military, social, economic, cultural, and educational structures and institutions...
that were the supports of the Islamic civilization have been either destroyed entirely or removed from the mainstream of the life.13

1.3. What is an Islamic State?

Since the “concept of Islamic state” forms an essential part of this study, therefore it seems necessary to explore and analyze the concept with reference to different approaches of contemporary scholars in understanding the concept. The concept was alive in the early years of Islam and continued until today engaging scholars from all sectarian divides of Islam (especially Shiite and Sunni) to prove its validity with debating the nature, characteristics of Islamic state, and its place in Islam. However, before the usage of the term “Islamic State”, the Islamic concepts used to designate the Islamic system of governance were Khilāfah, Imāmah, Sulṭān, Imārah, Mulk, al-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah, Ḥukūmah.14 According to El-Effendi, the debate on the “Islamic state” has been conducted against the background of two unprecedented and interconnected developments—the colonial era and the collapse of the caliphate and the conversion of Islam into a stateless religion for the first time in its history.15 This implies that Islam, in the course of history, Islam nourished under a system of government that was responsible for its protection from internal and external dangers. Muhammad Rashid Rida, in first quarter of the twentieth century, made similar observation about the Islamic system of government but it was not debated as it is today. He maintained that the Young Turkish revolution break the silence over the concept of Khilāfah and today it is the mother of all questions subject to research.16

Despite showing the presence of Islamic system of government in the history, the debate over the nature of Islamic system of government and its salient features are still contested. Nevertheless, the Islamic state, whatever the designation it has/had, has been described as a type of government primarily based on the application of Sharī‘ah, dispensation of justice, maintenance of law and order.17 Being ideological and intellectual in nature, Abdul Rashid Moten,18 argues, the Islamic state comprises, as it was in classical times, the community of believers and is concerned with implementing the will of Allah (ﷻ), preserving order against internal and external threats and striving positively for the achievement of social justice, promotion of good and eradication of evil.19 This description is akin to that of al-Mawardi when he maintained, “the Imāmah is the matter of the Prophetic Khilāfah in safeguarding the religion and the politics of the world.”20
Mawardi further maintains that Islamic state (*Imāmah*) is the sole foundation on which rests the whole premises of the *Sharī‘ah* and its establishment in a religious duty as well as the rational necessity demanded by human society and reason.\(^{21}\) Another definition of similar kind is presented by Shah Waliullah (1703-1763), a great Islamic scholar and reformist of eighteenth century that helps in understanding the present concept of Islamic state. According to him:

*Khilāfah* (the Islamic state) is the general authority exercised on behalf of the holy prophet for the establishment of the Din through the revival of religious sciences, establishment of the pillars of Islam, carrying out the Jihād and what pertains to it of organizing the armies and paying the salaries to the soldiers and allocating the funds to them, administration of justice, implementation of Ḥudūd (or Islamic capital punishments), elimination of injustices, enjoining the good and forbidding the evil.\(^{22}\)

The definition is comprehensive in nature as it contains almost all the salient features of the Islamic state. However, the classical Islamic political order is above the modern formal and material structures (like geo-political restrictions). Such system of governments never depended on any qualification to denote to be Islamic. The use of such qualifications and adjectives emerged when these governments were replaced by those structures where human interests are counted alone. Likewise, state is a modern invention that refers to a ‘nation or territory having an organized political community under one government’ or simply “a politically unified people occupying a definite territory”.\(^{23}\) Observing the limited nature of a state, some scholars show reservations for using ‘Islamic state’ to describe Islamic system of governance. Among such scholars comes the name of Prof. Wael B. Hallaq\(^{24}\), a famous scholar of Islamic law and Islamic intellectual history. In his famous book, *The Impossible State* (that has won Columbia University Press’s *Distinguished Book Award* for 2013-2015), Hallaq maintains resorting to the usage of “Islamic state” is erroneous because “state” is a modern invention. Such efforts are also difficult to understand (and more often lead to misunderstanding) the structural and qualitative differences between Modern states and Islamic governance, the term which he prefers to describe the Islamic political order in general.\(^{25}\) For him, “Islamic governance rests on moral, legal, political, social, and metaphysical foundations that are dramatically different from those sustaining the modern state”.\(^{26}\) This definition is akin to the comprehensive nature of Islam that has made it obligatory upon Muslims to shape the world (in every sector) according to the divine pattern through establishing and
spreading Islamic order. Accordingly, Muslim believe the world (or any part of it) is either a domain of Islam (Dār al-Islām), where Sharīʿah is applied as the paradigmatic law or a Dār al-Ḥarb—where Sharīʿah does not operate and is potentially subject to conversion by peace or war.\(^27\)

Despite the differences between ‘modern state and government’ and ‘Islamic system of governance,’ the Muslim scholars try to present political teachings of Islam by using the known concepts of statecraft. In modern and contemporary times, especially after the fall of Ottoman Khilāfah, as discussed above, there have been many attempts to revive and restore the Islamic system of governance in the form of an Islamic state. Many of the Muslim thinkers presented their theories of Islamic state—either in line with the classical theories and models or against them with supporting the Western concepts of state and governance. Some advocated the synthesis between the two with accepting the modern concepts of statecraft so long as these does not contravene with the clear-cut injunctions of Islam. Muhammad Rashid Rida agreed with the classical justification of Khilāfah and argued in the absence of this institution, the Islamic laws cannot be enforced and the welfare of the community will not be protected.\(^28\) After the Young Turk Revolution (in July 1908), Rashid Rida made his observations as: “Today the Ottomans breathed the air of political and social life and tasted the sweetness of liberty ... The difference between the past and the present is like the difference between day and night.”\(^29\) After the disappearance of the religio-political institution just after the world war I, Rashid Rida took the pragmatic stance, to put his theories, initiating with his treatise “al-Khilāfah wa al-Imāmah al-‘Uẓmā” that necessitate the advantages of restoration of caliphate. Consequently, after Rashid Rida, Islamic state meant for many, as it was before, “a demand for rule (al-Ḥukm) by what Allah (ﷺ) has sent down.”\(^30\) Shaykh Hasan al-Banna regarded it as a ‘system of Sharīʿah’ or simply ‘constitutional system’.\(^31\) He argued Islam is perfect system of social organization, encompassing every sector of human life; therefore, it is not genuine to separate politics and religion.\(^32\) He maintained constitutional nature of the state as:

Every nation has a body of law to which its sons have recourse in their legal affairs. This body of law must be derived from the prescriptions of the Islamic Sacred Law, drawn from the Noble Qur‘ān, and in accordance with the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence. For the Islamic Sacred Law and the decisions of the Islamic jurists are all-sufficient, supply every need, and cover every contingency, and they produce the most excellent results and the

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most blessed fruits. If the punishments prescribed by God [note omitted] were carried out, they would be a deterrent dismaying even the hardened criminal.33

Like Hasan al-Banna, Yousuf al-Qaradawi (b.1926), an eminent Egyptian Muslim scholar also says Islamic state is a “constitutional state” (dawlah dusturiyah) where the constitution represents the principles and rulings of Sharī‘ah.34 He further elaborates the Islamic state, as such, is neither a replica of that of Khosrow or Caesar nor a state of succession privileged for a certain dynasty, or a branch of a family where descendants inherit it from their forefathers as if they inherit properties or a fortune.35 He described the Islamic state in the following words:

The Islamic state which Islam brought, and as is known in the history of the Muslims, is a civil state (dawlah madaniyah); political power is set up in it on the basis of the pledge of allegiance (al-bay‘ah) and choice (al-ikhtiyār) and al-shūrā (consultation), and the ruler in it is the agent (wakīl) of the ummah or its employee (ajīr). It is the right of the ummah—represented in the people of authority (ahl al-Ḥal wa al-‘aqd) among them—to take him to account; to supervise or censure him; to command him and prohibit him; and to rectify his course if he deviates, and if not—to remove him. It is among the rights of every Muslim, rather of every national citizen (muwāṭin), to disavow him if he sees him sinning and engaging in reprehensible actions, or failing to enjoin what is just. Rather, it is incumbent on the people to declare revolution (al-thawrah) against him if they see that he is a kāfir according to the criteria of Allah.”36

As far as the constitutional nature of the Islamic state is concerned, Mawlana Mawdudi also described Islamic state as such. For him, the Islamic state is a government where individuals accept the supremacy of the laws of Allah (ﷺ) and his messenger (ﷺ) and perform their administrative functions under the limits prescribed by Sharī‘ah.37 Arguing wherever Allah (ﷻ) gives human beings control over any part of the earth, it means he has to rule according to His will as His vicegerent. If he transgresses or do not take account of the Divine Will, it would never be then a legitimate Khilāfah.38 He puts the same in “The Islamic Law and Constitution” by saying:

An Islamic state must, in all respects, be founded upon the law laid by God through His Prophet. The government which runs such a state will be entitled to obedience in its capacity as a political agency set to enforce the laws of God and only in so far as it acts in that capacity. If it disregards

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the law revealed by God, its commands will not be binding on the believers.\textsuperscript{39}

His writings repeatedly stress the need and importance of an Islamic state and at the same time distinguishes it from the democratic form of governments. Unlike the western concept of democracy, he argues, Islam rears its polity on the foundations of the sovereignty of God and the vicegerency (\textit{Khilāfat}) of Man.\textsuperscript{40} Regarding the vicegerency of man, he maintains that after the sad demise of the final Prophet (ﷺ) of Islam, the individual-vicegerency (so far as polity is concerned) shifted to popular-vicegerency.\textsuperscript{41} Mahmood A. Ghazi asserts this fact by saying that the Ummah inherited the divine authority “as the vicegerents of Allah (ﷻ)" initially delegated to the prophets to put the Islamic ideals into practice both at spiritual and corporeal levels. This collective authority entails the selection of one person as the leader (commonly called as \textit{Khalīfah}) as a symbol of the practical vicegerency of the \textit{Ummah} and the chief executor of the collective divine authority.\textsuperscript{42}

Sayyid Qutb, one of the influential personalities of the twentieth century justified the nature of Islamic state by coining the terms like \textit{Jāhiliyyah}/neo-\textit{jāhiliyyah} and \textit{Ḥākimiyyah}. His political views always centered on Islam. He defined Islam as a complete system of morality, justice, and government, whose \textit{Sharī'ah} laws and principles should be the role bases of governance and everything else in life. This evinces his aim of establishing an Islamic state and he advocated it obligatory to wage jihad against the obstacles in the way of an Islamic state.\textsuperscript{43}

Dr. Israr Ahmad, the founder of \textit{Tażīm-e-Islāmī} and a former member of Jamā’at-e-Islāmī, basis his concept of Islamic state on the comprehensive nature of Islam. Arguing Islam obliges a Muslim certain duties to fulfill which he categorizes into three—‘\textit{Ibādah} (unconditionally obeying the commandments of Almighty Allah (ﷻ) with an attitude of love and adoration), \textit{Shahādah al-Ḥaq} (spreading the message of Islam to every nook and corner of the world) and \textit{Iqāmah al-Dīn} (strive for the establishment of the ascendancy of Islam).\textsuperscript{44} The last level necessitates the establishment of \textit{Khilāfah} which, he argues, is a government run on the pattern of prophetic model (‘alā \textit{Minhāj al-Nabūwah}) where sovereignty belongs to Allah (ﷻ), \textit{Sharī’ah} the rule of the land, implementation of \textit{Ḥudūd Allah} and no legislation can be done at any level that is totally or partially repugnant to Qur’ān and Sunnah.\textsuperscript{45}
Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote the book Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner. This book outlined three goals for the newly mobilised ‘revolutionary fundamentalist movement’. These goals were: 1) to organize ideological clarity and coherence, 2) resist the current secular regimes within the Muslim world, and 3) establish an Islamic state. al-Zawahiri introduces three tenants of al-Qaeda’s political ideology: 1) the establishment of an Islamic state governed through Sharia law, 2) the liberation of the homelands – al-Zawahiri maintains that until Muslim lands are liberated and free from aggression, reform and free elections cannot take place, 3) the liberation of the human being, a social contract that would “specify the power of the Shariah-based judiciary, and insure that no one can dispose of people’s rights, except in accordance with this judiciary.”\[46\] This statement by al-Zawahiri is profoundly significant in that it acknowledges and gives credence to a Shariah-based democratic system as well as reforms of traditional Islamic states.\[47\]

1.4. The Shiite View of an Islamic State

The Shiite concept of Islamic state is different that of Sunni concept. The difference occurred over the question of rightful succession of Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ). Unlike Sunni view, the Shiite scholars argue the right to become the Khalīfah was vested in Ḥaḍrat Ali (May Allah (ﷻ) be pleased with him). Muhammad Husayn Ṭābāṭabā’ī (1903-1981), a modern Shiite scholar from Iran, supports the validity of the sources endorsing such view. He also believed that the designation was the turning point of the dispute between the Sunnis and the Shiites over the concept of Islamic state.\[48\] Generally, Shiite scholars believe Islamic state (Imāmah) is a system in which the leaders are divinely chosen, infallible, and sinless. Accordingly, the Shiite concept of Islamic state revolves round the basic principles of ‘Ismah, Taqiyyah and Walāyah.\[49\] They consider Islamic state as a mercy of God (Lutf) supporting their argument with divine sources and rational thinking (’aql). ‘Allāmah al-Ḥillī (d.1325), a medieval Shiite scholar, has presented this notion in the following words:

The imamate is a universal leadership (riyāsah) by a single individual in religious and secular matters. It is a matter which is incumbent upon God, for it is a divine mercy (Lutf), and every divine mercy is incumbent upon Him, so the imamate is incumbent upon Him.\[50\]

They disagree with the Sunni view of choosing the leader by majority opinion,
Shūrā, or election. According to Shiite belief the claim of Imāmah transferred to the descendants of Ḥaḍrat ‘Alī (May Allah (ﷻ) be pleased with him). However, with the passage of time, as their number increased, they got divided into several sects such as Imāmiyyah, Ismāʿīliyyah, al-Kaysāniyyah and Zaydiyyah. Through the course of history, the Shiite attempted to establish an Islamic state according to their own beliefs, teachings, and practice. According to Shiite belief, the last of the valid Islamic ruler (The Twelfth Imām) disappeared who is believed to reappear before the end of the world. To fill the gap, some Shiite scholars felt it necessary that a system of Shiite Islamic government should be established that would run the affairs of Muslims on behalf of the Disappeared Imām (Imām al-Ghāʾib). In this regard, Ayatollah Rohullah Khomeini (1902-1981) presented the doctrine of to Velayat-e Faqih (The Government of the Jurist) where an Islamic jurist or Faqīh takes the charge of governmental affairs as well.

Prof. Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1959), a leading intellectual reformist, and a philosopher, is a critic of Velayat-e-Faqih doctrine. According to him, Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih signaled a landmark shift in Shiite political thought. With the help of this doctrine, Ayatollah Khomeini succeeded in transforming Iran into an Islamic state in 1979. Following the 1979 revolution, the direct engagement of jurists in the political sphere, according to Kadivar, was introduced for the first time in Shiite history. The concept was then articulated by Khomeini in his lectures in 1971 which were later compiled and published as a book titled Islamic Government, constitute the major theological case for the Islamic state. Khomeini insisted on the primacy of the endorsement of the presidency by Velayat-e Faqih over the people’s vote. According to him:

Islam has made Velayat-e Faqih compulsory. If the president is not endorsed by Valey-e Faqih, [his presidency] is illegitimate and when it is illegitimate, it becomes taghut [oppressive government]. Thus obeying this sort of government is obeying taghut.

He also maintained:

“A government which is a branch of the Prophet Mohammad’s absolute guardianship is one of the primary Islamic precepts and takes priority over all subsidiary precepts, even over praying, fasting and pilgrimage. … [I]f
necessary, [a] governor can close or destroy mosques. … [T]he government can unilaterally terminate its religious agreements with the people if an agreement violates the expedience of the country or Islam. And [it] can abandon every precept—both worshipping and non-worshipping precepts—which is against the expedience of Islam”.

Prof. Mohsen Kadivar suggests that the political notion of Velayat-e Faqih is rooted in Molla Ahmed Naraghi’s thought: “Molla Ahmad Naraghi (died 1829), a jurist during the Fath-ali Shah Reign (1797–1834) was the first to propose the idea of jurists managing Muslims’ worldly affairs, a proposal not previously advanced by any jurist. Thus, the notion of political guardianship of jurists has only been countenanced over the last 150 years”. Ayatollah Montazeri (1922–2009), Iran’s highest-ranking reformist jurist and one of the key rhetoricians of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih, conceptualized a quasi-democratic notion of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. He supported the inclusion of Velayat-e Faqih into the constitution and argued for the direct engagement of the clergy in politics by saying:

The jurists’ ignorance of sociopolitical issues and their reluctance to engage in improving people’s situations and to assume responsibility in an Islamic government is not acceptable before God. It is vajeb [wājib] for jurists to acquire the necessary sociopolitical knowledge and to bear some responsibility in an Islamic government.

Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945) argues that Velayat-e Faqih is a jurisprudential and not a religious state. For him a jurisprudential state is a political system in which the jurist, as ruler, makes sure that the jurisprudential regulations, as they appear in the Shari’ah, are practiced by all subjects and “sacrifices human rights for ideological purity” without enriching religion. Such a state compels its citizens to conform with the Shari’ah. According to Soroush, the government is a worldly matter, which cannot be extracted from the holy texts of Islam. Similarly, Morteza Motahhari, a key ideologue of the Islamic revolution also distinguished an Islamic state from an clerical state by maintaining that by no means did the term “Islamic state” suggest the right of clergy to rule the country. He advocated the supervisory role of clergy and maintains:

Velayat-e Faqih does not mean that a jurist becomes the head of state and rules [the country]. In an Islamic country … a jurist possesses the role of an ideologue not the position of ruler. The responsibility of an ideologue is to supervise correct application of said ideology.
Despite the disagreement on the doctrine of *Velayat-e Faqih*, many Shiite senior clerics including Ayatollah(s) Mesbah-Yazdi, Makarem-e Shirazi, Nouri Hamedani, Javadi-e Amuli, Sobhani, and Safi-Golpayegani are driving the Islamic state with considering the notion of *Velayat-e Faqih* as sacred one. Ayatollah Mesbah-Yazdi, the spiritual mentor of President Ahmadinejad, argues that because the notion of Velayat-e Faqih is a core Islamic principle, opposing it “is like opposing the holy Imams and is equal to becoming an infidel”\(^{63}\)

**1.5. Promotion of the Islamic State Discourse**

The dominating fact of the life of the Islamic world in the twentieth century was the impact of Western imperialism over all its various dimensions—military, political, economic, and cultural.\(^{64}\) The main themes of the century were: (1) European imperialism; (2) the struggle to achieve independence from the colonial rule; (3) the aspirations to reestablish *Khilāfah*, the Islamic political order; and (4) the application of *Sharī‘ah* in the newly independent states. According to Muhammad Asad the century is “marked by a world-wide violent transformation and confusion—ethical, political, social and economic—a confusion endangered by two world wars and the subsequent breakdown of the centuries-old social, ethical and economic forms.”\(^{65}\) The Ottoman Empire, that had ruled continuously since 1299 C.E. and spanned three continents—Southeastern Europe, Western Asia and Northern Africa,\(^{66}\) was now divided into several new nation-states by the colonial powers and with the help of League of Nations and Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916 C.E.), gave England and France the power to govern different parts of it.\(^{67}\) Consequently, the shape of the international order changed significantly. After the World War I, the changed map of the Muslim world under foreign dominance is presented by John L. Esposito as follows:

[... the French in North, West, and equatorial Africa and the Levant (Lebanon and Syria); the British in Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent; and in the Southeast Asia, the British in Malaya, Singapore, and Brunei, and the Dutch in Indonesia.\(^{68}\)

This change of geo-political scenario was a severe catastrophe the Muslim world witnessed and engaged the Islamic scholars to overcome this situation by reviving the institution responsible for political unity of Ummah. This fragmentation of the Muslim world was resisted almost all of the Muslim scholars, the majority of whom emerged
either from Egypt or from Indian sub-continent—the then prominent centres of culture and learning in the Muslim world. The first (famous) personality\(^{69}\) from the Indian sub-continent was Abul Kalam Azad (1888-1960) who called for the establishment of “Hukūmat-e-Ilāhiyah” (God’s Kingdom on Earth) through his pioneering magazines, al-Hilāl, and al-Balāgh. In order to actualize this cause he formed a group known as Hizbullah (The Party of God). His involvement in the Khilāfat Movement (1919-1924), his fascinating writings and lectures that conquered the hearts of Indian Muslims, made him a well-known public figure throughout the subcontinent. In his Masʿala-i Khilafat (The Issue of the Caliphate, 1920), Azad has discussed comprehensively the issues of Khilāfah; its need in the contemporary times and how it united the Ummah through ages. Distinguishing congregation from crowd, he appealed the Muslims of the subcontinent to be united under a single leader (who is Muslim in practice and competent in leading the Jamāʿat), be obedient to him and whatever he orders in consonance with Qurʾān and Sunnah follow and obey him without hesitation.\(^{70}\) From the beginning to the end of the book he tried to convince Muslims to form a strong power under one Khalīfah that only suffice the demand of Muslims to establish the Divine laws on Earth. Similar views has been presented by him in Islāmī Jumhūriya (The Islamic Republic) in a modern tune as to convince the contemporary people who asses the world in democratic perspective. He argues that the government established by Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) and carried on successfully by the rightly-guided Caliphs can be termed as Islamic Republic where Sharīʿah is the rule of land and government is run by mutual consultation and accordingly guarantees and protects the human rights. These include provision of basic needs, social security, and establishment of punishments (Ḥudūd) for crimes and penal ordinances to safeguard human dignity and freedom.\(^{71}\) It is important to note that since 1920, with the strong opposition from the traditional scholars, he gave up his mission altogether and later dedicated himself to the nationalist politics of India until his death in 1958. During the years 1919-1924 a movement, namely Khilāfat Movement “sought to influence the British government to preserve the spiritual and temporal authority of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph of Islam.”\(^{72}\) Nevertheless, none of the efforts could stand against the conspiracy of the West and internal weaknesses to save the institution of Khilāfah from dismantling in 1924.

The Republic of Turkey based on pure secularization concept developed in the West succeeded the Ottoman Empire on October 23, 1923 whereas British and France
controlled its major parts. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the first president of modern Turkey attempted to change altogether. Claiming Islam backward, anti-modernist and an obstacle to the Westernizing future of Turkey, Mustafa Kemal banned the adoption of Islam publically, proscribed Islamic dress, and encouraged Western clothes. The cultural, bureaucratic, economical, and military reforms were set on Western lines. Even the Turkish ‘Arabic-script’ was replaced with ‘Latin-script’ and call for five-times prayers was also forced to be recited in Turkish instead of Arabic. However, seeing it difficult to eradicate Islam totally from the society, he brought Islam submissive to state as an alternative to fulfill his dream. For this Directorate of Religious Affairs (The Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi or simply, Diyanet) was established by the government to oversee all religious institutions within the country. The Mosques had to be registered in the Diyanet and the selection of Imam’s and the speech for Friday sermons were managed by the state. The educational institutions were forced to adopt a curriculum that would emphasize private nature of religion as if it has nothing to do with public affairs that eventually evolved into a degree of alienation between religion and state. Thus, the Kamalist state ideology of Turkey represented the most extreme form of nationalism adopted by a Muslim state.

In Egypt, the condition was different that of Turkey and the debate over the restoration of the institution of the Khilāfah, its essence in Islam, its validity and invalidity was in focus, though majority of the Muslims were attracted to nationalism. One of the famous disciples of Muhammad Abduhu, Muhammad Rashid Rida took the cause of Khilāfah and wrote his book, al-Khilāfah aw al-Imāmah al-‘uzmā (The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate, 1923). Considering the book “as the authoritative pronouncement on the attitude of modernism to politics”, argues Rosenthal, “has lost nothing of its topical character.” Rashid Rida outlined in the book, the role of this institution throughout the Islamic history and argued the desirability of a renewed caliphate. He stressed up on the restoration and preservation of the caliphate in order to put Sharī‘ah into practice. He has exercised a great influence on the later Islamic movements and his views are echoed from those who seek to establish Islamic state throughout the Muslim world. It is pertinent to note that his concept of Khilāfah works under the framework of modern nation states. These views about the restoration of the Khilāfah were challenged by his contemporary Ali Abd al-Raziq in his al-Islām wa usūl al-Ḥukm (Islam and the Principles of Governance) published in 1925. His core point, in
the book, was to deny not only the necessity, but also even the authorization for a caliphate in the canonical sources of Islam. He argued that *Sharī‘ah* does not present any particular form of government, therefore any form of government that does not violate the core principles of Islam is acceptable. A comparative analysis entails that these scholars agreed on the point that there must be a political order to enforce the *Sharī‘ah*, they only disagree about the form of government suitable for Muslims. Rashid Rida advocates *Khilāfah* as the best option where as Abd al-Raziq argues Muslims are free to choose any form of government that does not violate Islamic principles.

Apart from such intellectual foment, the following decade of the Muslim fragmentation, the resistance was shown in the form of some analogous political organizations in the form of a number of Muslim Congresses that were convened between 1924 and 1931. These academic and political endeavors discussed and debated the contemporary Islamic Issues and attempted to determine a solution to the predicament of Muslim leadership. They have assumed, as in the words of William Shepherd, that the truth of Islam would be reflected in the military, political, and cultural success of the Muslim *Ummah*. They were searching for the answers to the questions like, ‘what went wrong?’ in the Islamic history that caused the fall of Islamic civilization. According to Wilfred Cantwell Smith:

> The fundamental malaise of modern Islam is a sense that something has gone wrong with Islamic History. The fundamental problems of modern Muslims is how to rehabilitate that history, to get it going again in full vigour, so that Islamic society may once again flourish as a divinely guided society should and must.

In corresponding to Egypt sponsored Islamic Congresses, Hasan al-Bana initiated the Rashid Rida’s model with its goal to establish an Islamic state in Egypt. To actualize this cause, he established *Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun* (Muslim Brotherhood) in 1928 to establish an Islamic order in the society. Beginning as an educational and cultural organization, The Muslim Brotherhood became involved in politics and by the late 1940s was the largest mass political and social organization in Egypt, spreading to other Arab countries. The circumstances in Egypt and around the globe, forced al-Banna to think about the necessity of the *Khilāfah* and accordingly, worked for the establishment of a true “Islamic government”. He used to say:
The Muslim Brotherhood believes that the *Khilāfah* is the symbol of Islamic unity, and a feature for the connection of Islamic states; it is an Islamic ritual that Muslims contemplate and in which they should take an interest. [...] It is the Muslims’ duty to think of the issue of their *Khilāfah* from the times when it was distorted, passing through the times when it was revoked, and up to now.°

However, an avowed intellectual and a contemporary of Hasan al-Banna, namely Syed Abul Ala Mawdudi, better elaborated the ideas about the necessity of an Islamic state in a systematic and consistent manner. Unaccompanied in the mission for almost seven years he presented, as a journalist, methodology for the establishment of “God’s Kingdom”, and the revival of Islam as a complete way of life. Later to actualize the cause, he founded *Jamat-e-Islami* in 1941 as an organized movement. Describing the nature of Islamic state, Mawdudi writes:

The foundation upon which building it rests is the concept of the idea of the *hākimiyah* of Allah, the one and only, and its basic theory is that the earth—all of it—belongs to Allah, and He is its Lord intervening in its affairs. Command (*al-amr*) and rule (*al-ḥukm*) and legislation (*al-tashrī’*) are all the particular province of Allah alone; and it is not for any individual or any family or class or people nor for human kind to have any authority in command or in legislation. There is no scope in the confines of Islam or the locus of its implementation except for the state wherein man engages in the function of khalīfah Allah.

The discussion would be incomplete without the mention of Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), a great poet-philosopher and one of the most influential figures of the twentieth century. He sought to reinvigorate Islam by detaching it from all other non-Islamic practices and ideologies, which he thought, is possible by establishment of Islamic state. Though his ideas reflect the every dimension of human existence, Muhammad Iqbal vehemently discussed the issue of *Khilāfah*. He emphasized in his poetry, written in Urdu and Persian languages, the need of restoration of the *Khilāfah*. He expressed his sorrow on the fall of the institution of *Khilāfah* as:

*پاک کر کوئی ترک ناہوں لنے غبار کی قیم*  
*سابل سمل کی دکھای اور کی عیانی گھی دکھ*  

*The imprudent Turk has torn the cloak of the Divine Khilāfah*  
*Look at Muslims’ simplicity at other’s cunningness also look*°°

-*43-*
He considers the restoration of the institution necessary for the establishment of Sharī‘ah and for the welfare of the humanity. To actualize this cause, he emphasized Muslims to show their commitment to Islam like their ancestors:

So that the foundation of the Caliphate may be once again firm in the world,
Search for and bring from somewhere the heart and spirit of your ancestors.  

To him the contemporary forms of government are a kind of poison for humanity because these institutions have separated religion from the daily business. However, the religion-based government (Khilāfah) is an elixir for humanity. He puts this idea as:

Divorced from faith a poison strong, when propped by faith and true belief
‘Gainst poison works with speed, and proves the source of much relief

In order to overcome the predicament, Muhammad Iqbal felt the need of reconstruction of Islamic law in order to respond the new queries posed by the modern economic, political, social, national, and international developments. He was the primarily ideologue of the concept to have a separate state for Muslims in the sub-continent. He was more worried about the interior factors including ‘Arab Nationalism’ than that of exterior ones. For him the establishment of separate Muslim state would be an opportunity for Islam “to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the spirit of modern times.” Accepting the positives of Western democracy, he argued Muslim democracy is impossible until they developed their potential as Muslims and as such became active participants in the betterment of society. Once this happened, Muslim countries around the globe could form their own ‘League of Nations’. Having such observations, he writes. “It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the Truth that Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a league of nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinction of reference only and not for restricting the social horizons of its members”.

*44*
The Indian sub-continent witnessed the different political circumstances in this regard. The Muslims, who developed anti-colonial and pro-independence stance alongside Hindus, sensed the conspiracy of Hindu and accordingly rejected the viability and desirability of ideas like ‘Hindu-Muslim unity’ of ‘Multi-religious Indian Nationalism’. Muhammad Ali Jinnah presented the thesis of “Two-Nation Theory” according to which “Islam and Hinduism represent two separate moral and social orders that, while they may manage some minimal coexistence, will never successfully integrate.” Interestingly, many prominent figures included Mawlana Mawdudi initially rejected Jinnah’s proposal of ‘Muslim Nationalism’ arguing that nationalism is incompatible to Islam but after creation of Pakistan, they accepted a separate homeland for Indian Muslims. By the creation Pakistan, according to Muhammad Asad, it was “desired to establish political forms in which the Muslim world-view, Muslims ethics, and Muslim social concepts could find their full expression.” However, within few years after its creation, there was a controversy and confusion about whether or not Pakistan was an Islamic state.

1.6. Concept of an Islamic State after Post-Colonial Period

After a long-hard struggle, most of the Muslim lands were decolonized, but the Islamic activism could not succeed to gather sufficient political momentum against the rising tide of nationalism and govern these independent states on purely Islamic lines. At the end of its first half, the century witnessed the end of colonial rule and the emergence of modern Muslim nation-states.

In the second half of the twentieth century, the Muslims were engaged in deciding the future of their newly independent territories. The stage was set for a debate between two distinct and incompatible approaches to Muslim political independence—the renewal of Khilāfah or the nationalism option. The leading Muslim intellectuals since the beginning of the century debated the merits of these two options. At the same time there were some who proposed a model seeking to combine the elements of each. The most popular western-derived ideological ideas such as nationalism and democracy are rejected by Islamic scholars such as Sayyid Qutb as “giving to human the authority and loyalty that belongs only to Allah (ﷻ)”. However, many Islamic scholars accept such ideas so long as they are subordinated to Islam such as Shaykh Ali Abdul Raziq.
The Egyptian post-1952 secular nationalist order, under Gamal Abdel Nasser—a key figure of Pan-Arabist Movement (Arab Nationalism)—provides another example of nationalist politics. Nasser, like Mustafa Kemal downplayed the importance of religion. Initiating the alliance from religious forces like Muslim Brotherhood, he turned against them on realizing they would not compromise to make Islam subservient to the state. The Muslim Brotherhood also opposed him when it became clear to them that he did not intend to establish an Islamic government. The organization was banned in 1954, many of its activists were imprisoned, and a number of its key leaders were executed. Despite these activities, he increasingly manipulated religion to legitimate his state socialism and broaden his popular support and accordingly he was cautious in managing his foreign policies to counter and control Islamic oppositions. Saudi Arabia, the heartland of Islam condemned Nasser’s pan-Arabism leadership and advocated nationalism based on pan-Islamic ideology and leadership. Claiming keepers of Sacred cities of Islam, they promoted themselves as patrons of Islam and to encourage Muslim solidarity. They created international organizations such as the World Muslim League (1966) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1969), through which they distributed funds for the promotion and preservation of Islam.

Importantly, the 1967 Arab-Israel war changed the political environment in the Arab world. Islam remerged as a potent global force and since 1970s and 1980s the Islamic movements became more prominent and widespread. Heads of the Islamic governments as well as the opposition groups increasingly appealed to religion for legitimacy and to mobilize popular support. The Islamic activists have held cabinet-level positions in Jordan, Sudan, Iran, Malaysia and Pakistan. Islamic organizations constitute the leading opposition parties and organizations in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, the West Bank and Gaza, and Indonesia. The Muslim Brotherhood, banned in 1954, was allowed to resume their activities. In 1971 and have participated indirectly in four elections. Under the Islamic pressure, a provision was included in the Egyptian Constitution that “the principles of the Islamic Sharī‘ah are the primary source of legislation.”

Parallel to these facts, during the second half of the century, the quest for an Islamic state was an aspiration common to most Islamic thinkers and movements across geographic borders and sectarian divides. The figures like Mawlana Mawdudi, Sayyid...
Qutb, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, Dr. Israr Ahmad and their corresponding movements Jamāʿat-e-Islāmī, al-İkhwān al-Muslimūn (Muslim Brotherhood), Ḥizb al-Taḥrīr al-Islāmī (The Islamic Liberation Party) and Tanẓīm-e-Islāmī (The Islamic Organization) are pioneers of the idea and call for the Islamic state and the application of the Sharīʿah. They insist that Islam (Islamic Sharīʿah) must be followed as a guide for all areas of life—public as well as private.¹⁰⁸

Dr. Israr Ahmed (1932-2010), was a Pakistani Islamic theologian and the founder of the Tanẓīm-e-Islāmī (1957), an offshoot of the Jamāʿat-e-Islāmī.¹⁰⁹ Formerly a member of Jamāʿat-e-Islāmī, founded his own organization arguing that the former derailed from its guiding principles. With the ultimate objective of establishing a Khilāfah, he engaged in reviving the Qurʾān-centered Islamic perennial philosophy and world-view.¹¹⁰ He argues that Khilāfah is a government run on the pattern of prophetic model (ʿalā minhāj al-Nabūwah) where sovereignty belongs to Allah, Sharīʿah the rule of the land, implementation of Ḥudūd Allah and no legislation can be done at any level that is totally or partially repugnant to Qurʾān and Sunnah.¹¹¹ His organization is meant to achieve the goal of “Taḥrīk-e-Khilāfah Pakistan” that is to make Pakistan a base for the universal Khilāfah as Medina was chosen in the classical period.¹¹² His views on Khilāfah are available in his books, booklets, and audio-video lectures available on internet with easy access. Justifying his arguments from Qurʾān and Sunnah, he believed in the establishment of the Khilāfah over the entire globe—the universal Khilāfah.¹¹³ Influenced by Dr. Iqbal and Mawlana Mawdudi, he vehemently stressed on the establishment of the Khilāfah and systematically discussed the issues of Khilāfah as (a) The Tidings of Universal Khilāfah; (b) The Reality of Khilāfah and its Historical Background; (c) Its Constitutional, Socio-economic, and Political Structures in the Contemporary Period; (d) Establishment of Khilāfah on Prophetic Pattern.¹¹⁴

Similarly, Sayyid Qutb restructured the ideology of The Muslim Brotherhood advocating the establishment of an Islamic political and social order through the adoption of an Islamic constitution based upon the Qurʾān and Sunnah. Being critical to the Arab nationalism and Nasser’s regime, he wrote al-Maʿālim fi al-Tariq (Milestone) as a result he was executed by the Egyptian government in 1966.¹¹⁵ It is pertinent to say that movement, though the having widespread influences, due to lack of unanimous policy and methodology in achieving the goal caused dissatisfaction among its members that
lead to the formation of various smaller parties and organizations.\textsuperscript{116} Although some groups turned to violent struggle, in 1980s the main Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt emerged as a respectable opposition group that had demonstrated its ability to stand up without resorting to terrorism.\textsuperscript{117}

However, the aspiration to create an Islamic State climaxed with the establishment of ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran’ in 1979.\textsuperscript{118} The organizations from all sectarian divides—Sunni as well as Shi‘a—drew inspirations from the examples of Iran. The Iranian Revolution provided lessons “to awaken Muslims and to restore their confidence in their religion and their adherence to it, so that they may assume the reins of world leadership of mankind once again and place the world under the protection of the esteemed Islamic civilization.”\textsuperscript{119} Unfortunately, this zeal was short-lived because, as Naser Ghobadzadeh maintained, “the very foundational legitimacy of the Islamic state remains contested, the reality being that the Islamic Republic is riddled with sociopolitical, economic, and theological contradictions”.\textsuperscript{120}

1.7. Islamic State Discourse in the 21th Century

The quest for an Islamic state was not satisfied in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century nor was the beginning of the 21th century able to witness a viable model for the Islamic state. However, many religious groups/movements continue to aspire for building of Islamic state, though receiving many challenges. The events like 9/11 attack and other like events have played a crucial role in the contemporary Islamic thought. Accusing al-Qaeda behind the attack, the US invaded Afghanistan and the Islamic state created by Taliban in 1994 was demolished in October 2001. However, the Taliban-connected forces continued to enforce Islamic Justice and public virtue in pockets of southeastern Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{121} After the Afghan war, the USA, in the name of “war on terror”, attacked another Muslim country (Iraq) to put an end to the Ba‘ath Party of Saddam Hussein. Accusing Iraq of having ‘weapons of mass destruction’ and a supporter of al-Qaeda, US-led invasion under George W. Bush raised the developed Muslim country (Iraq) to the ground; executed Saddam Hussein and humanity witnessed a horrible genocide in addition to thousands of causalities and billions of dollars expenses.\textsuperscript{122} By 2003, the a new dynamic arose in the Muslim countries and scholars analyzed the terror attacks in the name of Islam and US-invasion of Muslim states. These events contributed in the democratization of the Muslim states on one hand and on the other hand ignited the aspirations of the Islamic states.
among Islamic organizations—like \textit{Anṣār al-Sharī‘ah}, \textit{Ḥizbullah}, \textit{Ahlīr al-Shām}, \textit{Jabhat al-Nuṣrā} and \textit{al-Shabāb}—that identified so-called ‘war on terrorism’ as an attack on Muslim states.\textsuperscript{123} By the end of the decade, in December 2010, the Muslim politics took a new turn when there crept uprisings against the Muslim leaders who held the power for many years. These uprisings succeeded in overthrowing the rulers at least from four middle east countries—Tunisia (Zine el Abidine Ben Ali ousted on January 14, 2011), Egypt (on February 11, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak ousted from the power), Lebanon (the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi ended with his death on October 20, 2011), and Yemen (President Ali Abdullah Saleh was made to step down in November, 2011 after being in power for thirty-three years). While events in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen dominated the headlines, demonstrations also broke out in other regional countries including Bahrain, Syria, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{124} The uprisings came with a question whether these events meant to democratize the Muslim countries by overthrowing Muslim rulers from the office or to put obstacles for them. These questions emerged after analyzing the US-interference in Libya and ousting of democratically elected president, Muhammad Morsi followed by comprehensive dismantling of MB as a social and political force at the hands of military-led state.\textsuperscript{125}

In the second decade of the twenty-first century the world witnessed the rise of the Islamic State (IS) that is quoted by the academicians and journalists as the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) or the ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant). It is believed the factors that led the emergence of ISIS include the mayhem in Iraq following the 2003 US invasion, the internecine \textit{Shī‘ah-Sunni} sectarian war, the al-Maliki government’s anti-Sunni policies, and the Syrian civil war.\textsuperscript{126} On 29 June, 2014, its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi officially announced that the Muslim world should recognize him as a Caliph in order to return to \textit{Sharī‘ah} and the reestablishment of Islam as a global force. In first issue of its official magazine, Dabiq, ISIS claims ‘\textit{The Return of Khilāfah}’ and declares, “The time has come for the Ummah of Muhammad [ﷺ] to wake up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonor, and shake off the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has gone, and the dawn of honor has emerged anew”.\textsuperscript{127} Despite expanding its territorial boundaries, the ISIS does not receive any concrete or official support from any of the Muslim country. The US, in coalition with Gulf Arab allies and other European states, has aimed to ‘degrade and destroy’ the ISIS and the latter is struggling against the US-led air strikes, and Iran supported counterattacks by the Iraqi...
and Syrian armies.\textsuperscript{128}

1.8. Islamic State Versus Nation-state Discourse

The Islamic ideology having harmonious integration between different sectors of life is reflected, according to Abdul Rashid Moten, in its emphasis on the vocation of a Muslim, as Khalifah of Allah (ﷻ), to shape the world according to the divine pattern through establishing and spreading an Islamic order.\textsuperscript{129} Non-Islamic forces, seeing it against their interests and conceit, challenged this notion since the advent of Islam in seventh century. The serious of all challenges, the Muslims faced was the European colonial invasion in the form of political and economic domination during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It destroyed the institution of Khilāfah and fragmented the united Muslim world into various nation-states. Before the colonial era, the concept of nation and the call for nationalism was considered as an effective engine of the process of decolonization.\textsuperscript{130} But after decolonization, the newly born so-called ‘sovereign’ nation-states could not achieve real independence rather were governed by post-colonial, secular military-bureaucratic elites. Thus, the former colonized nations became victims of “neo-colonialism” which permitted the former colonial powers to continue to exploit them.\textsuperscript{131}

By the fall of Ottoman Khilāfah, the Muslims all over the world engaged in discussing about the political order to be adopted—either the political universalism represented by Khilāfah and or Nationalism as the foundation for political order. By the middle of the twentieth century, the dominant discourse among Muslims remained confined to decide how to control their collective lives and to link the past to the future. Some suggested Western concepts of governance while others advocated Sharī‘ah-governed polity best for governing the newly independent states. The establishment of nation-states in the Muslim world was challenged by those who advocated the establishment of an Islamic political order where governmental principles, institutions, and legal system would be derived directly from the Sharī‘ah. The scholars debated the merits of these two options that has been the subject of various scholarly and popular publications. This paved way to the two strongest trends—Islamization and Democratization—of Muslim political order.\textsuperscript{132} Majority of the Muslim countries were attracted to the establishment of nation-states, believing such states as “essential prerequisite for the development of democratic forms of governance based on social contracts that bind both the governors and the governed”.\textsuperscript{133} On the other hand, the Islamic

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activists—who held Khilāfah system only valid—continue to criticize and challenge the modern models of state and government, not because having their un-Islamic origin but because these failed to serve goods and benefits to the humanity as a whole. The conceptualization and re-conceptualization of important Islamic principles—Tawḥīd, Risālah and Khilāfah—are dominant in the Muslim politics and it is on the basis they reject and accept any contemporary forms of governments.  

Interestingly, many Islamic concepts—like Shūrā (consultation), Ijmā (Consensus), and Ijtihād (Interpretive Judgment)—are treated to show the democratic nature of Islamic polity. However, Khurshid Ahmad (b. 1932), an Islamic economist and political activist opposes the democratic form of governments where religion is marginalized and will of people is considered as supreme. He maintains that an Islamic political system opposes the concept of ‘the sovereignty of people’ because it contradicts Muslims’ conviction of God as the ‘Supreme Law-giver’. Before Khurshid Ahmad, the idea of accepting modern forms of state and government were nullified by the influential scholars like Muhammad Rashid Rida, Hasan al-Banna, Mawlama Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb are few to mention. Sayyid Qutb rejected the western derived ideas of secularism and democracy ‘as giving to humans the authority and loyalty that belongs to God’. Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani and Abdul Qadim Zallum, the primary ideologues of Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (The Islamic Liberation Party) went extreme by maintaining democracy to be the ‘System of Blasphemy’ (Niẓām al-Kufr) with no connection with Islam whatsoever. According to Zallum democracy completely contradicts the rules of Islam whether in the comprehensive or partial issues, in the source from which it came, in the ‘Aqeedah from which it emanated, in the basis on which it is established and in the thoughts and systems it has brought. That is why it is definitely forbidden for the Muslims to adopt, implement, or call for it. In the same line, Ayman al-Zawāhirī (b. 1951, an Egyptian Al-Qā’idah leader) and considers democratic forms of government as western blasphemy against Islam, and considers it Shirk bi-Allah—assigning partners with Allah. He argued the participating in the process of democracy (elections etc.) as harām (unlawful) and those committed such practices as apostates and infidels.

Contrary to Islamization, some Muslim thinkers and countries advocated the process of democratization by representing the claim of Islam-democracy compatibility. Many scholars of this trend qualify democracy by the term ‘Islamic’ (Islamic democracy) and held that democratic ideas can be accepted only when subordinated to Islam. Rāshid
al-Ghannūshī, believed Sharī‘ah and Shura as the two pillars on which the building of Islamic democracy rests and Sharī‘ah should be given priority because Allah (ﷻ) is the original Law-giver and governor. He maintains:

To uphold his [Allah (ﷻ)’s] rule is obligatory for every Muslim and this is why Muslims should organize themselves politically and form an Islamic state. The Islamic state’s raison d’être is the implementation of the Sharī‘ah, which is also the source of its legitimacy; if it is not implemented, then it cannot command the obedience of the people. 140

Ghannūshī also argued that in democracy he finds the appropriate instruments to implement the Islamic principle Shūrā. 141 In the same line Dr. Abdelwahab El-Affendi, a contemporary Muslim thinker from Sudan presents a valuable contribution in democratization of Islam. He argues Muslims propose Shūrā as an authentic Islamic model against democracy. 142 However, he maintains ‘democracy’ is neither rule of God, nor Shūrā, nor Islamic democracy rather it is “the self rule of the people through their freely chosen institutions and representatives”. 143 However, in his “Do Muslims Deserve Democracy”, El-Affendi demonstrates how the wave of democratization has swept over many parts of the Muslim world like Syria, Malaysia, Indonesia and Turkey and argues that Turkey is often cited as the only genuine democracy in the Muslim world. 144

In his Who Needs an Islamic State? El-Affendi advocating the acceptance of modern democracy for it is suitable for the application of Islamic principles on the basis that “the central value governing the Islamic polity and giving it meaning is freedom”. 145 For him democracy is an option for an enlightened revival based upon the implementation of the Islamic Shari‘ah and a righteous Khilāfah; otherwise, the lack of accountability would be responsible for another despotic rule. 146 Claiming the principles of democracy akin to Islam, he proposes Muslims to work hard to ensure that democracy must not only prevail in all Muslim lands, but must also put in deep roots, 147 the failure of which is, otherwise, the “indication of a serious crisis in the Muslim world”. 148

Javed Ahmad Ghamidi (b. 1951), a controversial figure, has challenged the arguments of those who advocate the notion of the establishment of Khilāfah. He has dedicated a part of his book, Mizān entitled, Qānūn-e-Siyāsat (the Political Sharī‘ah) in his famous book, discussing Islamic political system, its fundamental principles, basic

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responsibility, religious duties and rights and duties of living under Islamic rule.\textsuperscript{149} In a response to a question regarding establishment of Islamic state he rejected the opinion of those who support the establishment of \textit{Khilāfah} on Prophetic model. He argued that Islam does not guide on the strategy of establishing a state, neither did the Prophet (ﷺ) ever undertake the task of establishing an Islamic state nor was he ever directed by the Almighty to do so. However, he argues it a human urge and a matter to common sense and experience.\textsuperscript{150} However, in \textit{The Political Shari`ah of Islam}, Ghamidi has attempted to derive the political \textit{Shari`ah} of Islam from the Qur’an and Sunnah. Therefore, one of the main conclusions—that shows both Ghamidi’s stand regarding the place of democracy in Islam as well as his opinion about the Islamic form of government—is summarized as: “the form of government envisaged by Islam is \textit{neither a theocracy nor a monarchy. It is more akin to democracy} as a Muslim government comes into existence on the basis of a public mandate and continues to exist as long as it commands the support of the majority.”\textsuperscript{151}

Dr. Israr Ahmad (1932-2010), a critique of modern democratic form of governments, argued that Islam and democracy could never co-exist in a country.\textsuperscript{152} Considering the democratic principle “\textit{sovereignty belongs to the people}” as incompatible with “\textit{Divine Sovereignty}”, He argues, however, other higher values of the democracy are (\textit{Mubāḥ}) and can be incorporated in the Islamic political system of \textit{Khilāfah}.\textsuperscript{153} Similarly, the proponents of Islamic state condemn the concept of nation-state on the following grounds:

a) Nation-state is a result of nationalism that was used as a tool by the colonialists ‘to shatter the religious unity of Islam in pieces’.\textsuperscript{154}

b) Nationalism is considered as a form of glorified tribalism, which is rejected outright by the Prophet of Islam, by saying “He is not of us who claims and who dies in the cause of tribal partisanship”.\textsuperscript{155}

c) Nationalism is contrary to the Islamic concept of Ummah that transcends geography, language, colour, race or any other man made borders.\textsuperscript{156}

d) It destroys the bonds between human beings.\textsuperscript{157}

e) Nation-state demands the promotion of its own interests at the cost of all

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Majority of the Muslims, according to A. R. Moten, denounce nationalism as an imported heresy undermining Muslim unity. Mawlana Mawdudi rejects nationalism because he considers it the root cause of all those calamities and troubles in which humanity is involved today. Mawlana Mawdudi condemns those who people engaged in prattle of Islam-democracy compatibility have no clear idea about the Islamic way of life. Such people have done great disservice to Islam and have reduced the political theory of Islam to a puzzle. Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-1997), an influential personality and exegete of the Holy Qur’ān, accumulated in his political views in Islāmī Riyāsat, wherein he discusses the basics of an Islamic State, the nature of the authority and rights and duties of its citizens. For him, an Islamic state does not differ much from an ordinary state in its formal and material structure rather it differs in principles and objectives. He regards both contemporary parliamentary and presidential systems against Islam. He differentiates between an Islamic State and the irreligious democracies by saying that the former demands citizens’ loyalty to Allah (ﷻ) whereas the later wants this right reserved for the national constitution.

The concept of nation-state receives criticism from non-Muslim scholars as well. Dr. Glen T. Martin, a Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Radford University in Virginia, founder of the Radford University program in Peace Studies, and Secretary-General of World Constitution and Parliament Association, maintains that nation-states are the real source of terrorism. According to him the claim of all nation-states to be sovereign with having control over its internal affairs and independence with regard to external other states, is extremely irrational and morally perverse as well. This nature of the nation-states has disturbed the democratic nature of so-called international law and all want to be entirely “independent” in a lawless, chaotic world of international relations. He has provided statistics how powerful nation-states like USA has used violence to achieve its political or social objectives. All major policies of USA including military interventions in foreign countries are meant to politically manipulate or control the world order in its own interests and, thus, fit perfectly this FBI definition of terrorism.

According to Wael b. Hallaq, “the ‘Islamic state’ judged by any standard definition of what the modern state represents, is both an impossibility and a contradiction
in terms.” He has logically demonstrated how the modern nation-states contradict the very fundamental Islamic principle—Tawḥīd. Moreover, he maintains that the concept of nation of the modern state is displaced by Islamic concept of “community (Ummah) which is both abstract and concrete, but in the either case it is governed by the same moral values.”

1.9. Why Muslims Need an Islamic State?

The present conditions of the world order does not permit Muslims to practice their religion as it must be, summarizes the argument of those who aspire for establishment of an Islamic state. Whenever they attempted so, they either were and are victimized or faced any other severe punishments by the so-called democratic states. In such a state of terror and insecure environment, the establishment of Khilāfah becomes necessary not only for Muslims but for the welfare of the general humanity and for those who become victims of nation-states irrespective of religious differences. It is important to note, as argued by many Islamic scholars through ages that “Islam is not only a religious creed (‘aqīdah), but rather it is also a social and political system, which cannot exist or persist without a state to express it and to impose its rulings.” Islamic state is inseparable part of the totality of Islam, to quote the expression of Dr. Kalim Siddique. He argued, “Islamic state is the Muslims’ natural habitat and their dependence on the Islamic state is as complete as that of fish on water”. Claiming Islamic state as the chief instrument of Divine purpose on earth, Kalim Siddique argued there are only two options for a Muslim; either he lives in an Islamic state or he is engaged in the struggle to establish one. According to him:

It is almost impossible to be a Muslim without either living in an Islamic state or being engaged in a struggle to establish an Islamic state. If one or other of these conditions is not met, I fear that perhaps the bulk of the Sunnah of Muhammad, upon whom be peace, is ignored. […] Islam is incomplete without the Islamic State. […] The Islamic state is Allah’s chosen framework in which the moral, political, social, economic and cultural goals of Islam are pursued by the Muslim Ummah.

Thus, the execution of Islamic rulings makes the existence of Islamic state obligatory because, as argued by Dr. Mahmood A. Ghazi, “it is a legal maxim in the
Islamic jurisprudence that “the thing which is indispensable for the execution of a religious obligation is also obligatory” (ٌمَالِمْ يَتَمُّ الواَجِبِ الاِيْتَٰمْ فَهُوَ وَاجِب) ١٧٢ Hasan al-Banna and those who called for the ‘Islamic state’ consider the establishment of Khilāfah an obligatory act (۱ِ۱ لْوَاجِبِ) in Islam because it is among the matters specified by the requirements of Islamic commandment. ١٧٣ In the same line, Muhammad al-Mubarak says:

The state is necessary in Islam because it is not possible to execute the rulings of the Qur’ān without a state (in what there are among the rulings of al-zakāt and the Ḥudūd penalties and the like of these) because in the Quranic understanding of existence, there is no doubt that there must be a social sphere in order for it to be realized and that is the Islamic state; and secondly, because the Prophet himself set up a state. ١٧٤

According to Rashid Rida, the existence of a strong Islamic state (capable of enforcing the Sharī‘ah without opposition or foreign control) without which Muslims are unable to practice their religion completely. ١٧٥ Muahmmad Asad argued that Islam really expect from the Muslims to strive at all the time under all circumstances for the establishment of an Islamic state. ١٧٦

Al-Qaradawi based the necessity of Islamic state on the basis of religion and the reason. He supported his arguments by citing proofs from the texts (nuṣūṣ) and nature of Islam as well as from the history of Islam. ١٧٧ He maintains though the Islamic injunctions did not directly express the obligation of establishing a state, it is in need of the state to embrace Islam in order for it to express its attendant teachings in organization and responsibility. ١٧٨ This evinces, as maintained by his contemporaries, that Islam needs power to manifest in every socio-political sectors of human existence. According to Mawlana Mawdudi:

[T]he reforms that Islam wants to bring about cannot be carried out merely by sermons, political power is essential for their achievement. … [T]he struggle for obtaining control over the organs of the state when motivated by the urge to establish the din and the Islamic Sharī‘ah and to enforce the Islamic injunctions, is not only permissible but is positively desirable and as such obligatory. ١٧٩

Hasan al-Banna asserted, along with the rest of those who called for the ‘Islamic state’ after him, that establishing the state was an obligatory act (۱ِ۱ لْوَاجِبِ) in Islam which is specified by the requirements of Islamic commandment. ١٨٠ Hasan al-Turabi (b. ـ٥٦~*
1932), a religious and the most influential figures in Sudanese politics, presents the uniqueness of Islam in his book, *al-Islām wa al-Ḥukm* say for political Muslims, “Islam is the solution, Islam is religion and government and Islam is the Constitution and the law”.\(^\text{181}\) Regarding the need and importance of Islamic state he maintains:

An Islamic state cannot be isolated from society, because Islam is a comprehensive, integrated way of life. The division between private and public, the state and society, which is familiar in Western culture, has not been known in Islam. The state is only the political expression of an Islamic society. You cannot have an Islamic state except insofar as you have an Islamic society. Any attempt at establishing a political order for the establishment a genuine Islamic society would be the superimposition of laws over a reluctant society.\(^\text{182}\)

Dr. Muhammad Hamidullah maintains an Islamic state is a religious obligation and a social necessity. His areas of specialization include constitutional law and international law in Islam and concept and conduct of Islamic State. With reference to the *Qur’ānic* verses and Prophetic traditions, he argues it is incumbent on Muslims to follow the Prophet (ﷺ) and his rightly guided caliphs that does not exclude founding and governing a state.\(^\text{183}\)

1.10. An Estimate

The whole twentieth century was spent to discuss the nature, definition and functions of Islamic state and accordingly the struggle to establish one. Beginning with the colonial invasion followed by abolition of *Khilāfah* till the Arab-uprisings and then followed by the emergence of ISIS as an Islamic state, the Muslim world saw many ups and downs in restoring their political stability. The Islamic state displaced the subject of *Khilāfah* in the Islamic political thought. However, this displacement, as observed by Abdelilah Belkeziz, is not a contradiction rather it is a modification of its sacrosanct content and an attempt to slash open a possible path leading to it.\(^\text{184}\) The debate on the Islamic state engaged the Muslim thinkers across sectarian borders to prove its validity and invalidity in contemporary times. The Muslim scholars who propose the restoration of the *Khilāfah* prove its validity and necessity by religion and reason and justify mainly by reference to *Qur’ān, Ḥadīth,* and *Ijmā*’. Meanwhile, some Muslim scholars like that of Abd al-Raziq deny such claim by arguing basic sources of Islam are silent on the subject. Despite theological differences, the establishment of an Islamic state was a common

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aspiration of all religio-political thinkers and Islamic movements of both Shiite and Sunni backgrounds. Moreover, the spirit of Islamic revivalism and reformation, and the awareness of the restoring the institution of Khilāfah in the name of Islamic state based on the Sharī‘ah proves that Muslims have never abandoned or forgotten the essential idea of the Islamic state. The issue of Islamic state is further discussed in the fourth chapter with special reference to and comparative analysis of Muhammad Asad and Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani. However, before going to analyze how these scholars deal with the concept of Islamic state, its nature, structure, and necessity in the contemporary period, the two chapters are dedicated to their biographical accounts that would be helpful in identifying the position and approach of these scholars in the Islamic political thought.

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3 Ibid., p. 277


6 Dr. Israr Ahmad, Dīnī Farā’īz kā Jāmi’ Taṣawur, (Lahore: Maktabha Khuddam al-Qur‘ān, 2005), 40pp.


10 Siddique, Issues in Islamic Movement (1981-82), op. cit., p. 5


12 Pan-Islamism has been defined as “the ideational subscription to a unification, or integration, of Muslim peoples, regardless of divisive antecedents such as language, ethnicity, geography, and polity.” See Naveed S. Sheikh, The New Politics of Islam: Pan-Islamic Foreign Policy in a World of States, (New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2003), p. 16

13 Siddique, Issues in Islamic Movement (1981-82), op. cit., p. 5

14 The terms—Khilāfah, Imāmah, Sultan, Amarah, al-Dawlah al-Islamiya, Hukumah—are interchangeably used throughout the study to denote an Islamic state.

16 See Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic Thought*, op. cit., p. 71

17 Engineer, *The State in Islam: Nature and the Scope* op. cit., p. 91

18 Prof. Abdul Rashid Moten is a Professor of political science in Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia. He writes profusely on the Islamic political thought and its compatibility with the western political thought.


20 Belkeziz, *The state in contemporary Islamic Thought*, op. cit., p. 71


23 See the meaning of State in the dictionary(ies) available at the following link addresses: [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/state](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/state); [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/state](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/state)

24 Wael B. Hallaq is a scholar of Islamic law and Islamic intellectual history. His teaching and research deal with the problematic epistemic ruptures generated by the onset of modernity and the socio-politico-historical forces subsumed by it; with the intellectual history of Orientalism and the repercussions of Orientalist paradigms in later scholarship and in Islamic legal studies as a whole; and with the synchronic and diachronic development of Islamic traditions of logic, legal theory, and substantive law and the interdependent systems within these traditions.

Hallaq’s writings have explored the structural dynamics of legal change in pre-modern law, and have recently been examining the centrality of moral theory to understanding the history of Islamic law and modern political movements. He is the author of more than sixty scholarly articles, and his books include Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians (Oxford, 1993); A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunni Usul al-fiqh (Cambridge, 1997); Authority, Continuity and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge, 2001); Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge, 2005); and An Introduction to Islamic Law (Cambridge, 2009). His Shari’a: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge, 2009) examines the doctrines and practices of Islamic law within the context of its history, from its beginnings in seventh-century Arabia, down to the present. His latest work, *The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity’s Moral Predicament* (Columbia University Press, 2013), has won Columbia University Press’s Distinguished Book Award for 2013-2015. Hallaq’s work has been widely debated and translated into Arabic, Hebrew, Indonesian, Italian, Japanese, Persian, and Turkish, among others. Retrieved on 12/09/2015 from the following link: [http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mesaas/faculty/directory/hallaq.html](http://www.columbia.edu/cu/mesaas/faculty/directory/hallaq.html)


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26 Ibid., p. 49
27 Ibid.
30 Belkeziz, The state in contemporary Islamic Thought, op. cit., p. 145
31 Ibid., pp. 127, 130
33 Ibid., p. 89
34 Yūṣuf al-Qaraḍāwī Min Fiqh al-Dawlah fi al-Islām (Cairo; Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1997), p. 32. As quoted in Belkeziz, The state in contemporary Islamic Thought, op. cit., p. 127
35 Ibid., p. 35
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38 Ibid., pp. 33-35
40 Ibid., p. 139
41 Mawdūdī, Khilāfat wa Malākīyat, op. cit., pp. 35-36
42 Ghazi, Studies in the Political and Constitutional Thought of Islam, op. cit., pp. 25-26


49 Fadzli Bin Adam, *The Concept of Khilāfah according to Selected Sunni and Shi‘ī Qur’ānic Commentaries*, Ph.D. diss., Department of Theology and Religious Studies, The University of Leeds, April, 2001, p. 20


56 Ghobadzadeh, *Religious Secularity*, op. cit., p. 56


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Ghobadzadeh, *Religious Secularity*, op. cit., p. 146

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Ibid.


It is pertinent to note that the concept of *Ḥukūmat-e-Ilāhiyah* was first adopted by Ḥaḍrat Mawlana Muhammad Miyan alias Mawlana Mansur Ansari Muhajir Afghanistan who was a contemporary and friend of Ḥaḍrat Shaykhul Hind. The British government forced him to leave India and he spent his exiled life in Afghanistan. He has published a brief but comprehensive treatise on the concept. See Mawlānā Qārī Tayyib, *Fiṭrī Ḥukūmat*, (Deoband, India: Idārah Tāj al-Maʿārif, 1949), p. 4


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