Chapter I

Historical and Theoretical Framework

_We should admit rather that power produces knowledge; that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations._

---Michel Foucault

1.1 Introduction

On 11 September, 2001, the Americans were attacked for the first time, in a long while, in the depth of their own territory by nineteen terrorists claimed to be members of Al-Qaeda, a terrorist network. The attacks were carried out in a random and senseless way that put the majority of American citizens, not just the armed forces, in temporary fear of their lives and the lives of their loved ones. As security was tightened, American nationalism reached its peak to confront the perpetrators of the attacks and the faith they belonged to as appeared in the inauguration speech delivered by Franklin Graham, an American Christian evangelist and missionary, who was chosen by George Bush to deliver the prayers at his presidential inauguration on November 16, 2001: “We’re not attacking Islam but Islam has attacked us. The God of Islam is not the same God. He’s not the son of God of the Christian or Judeo-Christian faith. It’s a different God, and I believe it is a very evil and wicked religion...I believe the Qur’an teaches violence. It doesn’t teach peace, it teaches violence.” While other such statements had been as overt and widely publicized as those of Franklin Graham, plenty of other military leaders and policy makers share similar views.
Soon after the attacks, Muslim scholars across the globe condemned the act and considered it a barbaric one. In North America, American and Canadian Islamic councils issued a statement shortly after the attacks stating: “We are grief-stricken at these horrifying events…the murder of innocents can never be justified and must not be tolerated…Anger and frustration are completely understandable and shared by us all…yet that anger must not be directed at individuals utterly innocent of these terrible crimes.” In Saudi Arabia, the Chairman of Supreme Judicial Council declared the Islamic view on terror that Islam rejects such acts and forbids killing of civilians even during times of war. It called for collective efforts to fight the evil of terrorism.

The first American response to these attacks came soon as George W. Bush declared Crusades against the enemy: “This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.” To the entire Islamic world that rejected the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Bush’s reference to the language of Crusade evoked collective memories of the centuries-old and centuries-long Christian invasion of Muslim Arabia. Subsequently, the United States attacked Afghanistan the same year in October 2001 to eradicate Al-Qaeda and soon after it invaded Iraq under the claim of pulling out the weapons of mass destruction without the approval of the United Nations. At this particular point, crisis began to develop and attempts of reconciliation started fading. Many critics suggested the year 2001 as a “year zero” in Islamic world-American relationship in which the Westerners see Muslims as fanatical, violent and lacking in tolerance. On the other hand, Muslims in the Middle East and Asia generally see Westerners as selfish, immoral and greedy as well as violent and fanatical.
As far as the Arab-U.S relationship is concerned, the tense relationship cannot at all be said to be a result of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In fact, the Barbary Wars fought between Arab pirates of North Africa and the American sailors from 1785 to 1815 are the first actual encounter between Middle East Arab Muslims and the young American republic. Therefore, this period marks the initial important impact of the Islamic Orient on American culture and literature. The American writers’ perception of the Barbary wars generally relied on traditional European views and stereotypes because the East was totally alien to them. These wars along with available European references on the Orient furnished themes of such works as Susanna Rowson’s *Slaves in Algiers* (1794), Joseph Stevens Jones's *The Usurper* (1855?), and Washington Irving’s works such as *Conquest of Granada* (1829), *The Alhambra* (1832), *Mahomet and His Successors* (1849) and Mark Twain’s *The Innocents Abroad* (1869). These works provide reductionist perceptions of all Arab Muslims and introduce them to the Western readers through horrific images.

Therefore, the American Orientalist interest in the Middle East did not originate at home; rather it was as an extension and imitation of a movement that widely prevailed in the European literary scene. Further, catching up with the fervour of the European writers, American Orientalists also got involved in writing and talking about the East. This interest in the Muslim East has a unique significance for American literary scholarship because it coincided with the rise of the American nationalist search for both identity and independence. The East became part and parcel of the emerging American identity. The spirit of this period is embodied in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s *The American Scholar*, a lecture he gave on forming American identity on August 31, 1837: “If there is any period one
would desire to be born in, is it not the age of Revolution; when the old and the new stand side by side, and admit of being compared; when the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope; when the historic glories of the old can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new era? In this particular era, America was a perfect embodiment of longing for identity. This early American Orientalist style remains to be a continuation of what the Orientalists have already started in Europe. Like their European counterparts, the American writers were genuinely interested in identifying with the Orient as a place of romance where exotic people live.

Even though England and France faded away as imperial powers in the wake of World War II, the United States emerged as a neo-imperial power operating in the neocolonial form through newer mechanisms of exploitation and control like transnational corporations and global institutional arrangements on trade and economy. As many Arab countries achieved their independence from the European colonizer, the United States filled the vacuum in the whole region especially the Gulf countries. It is America that ended Europe’s obsession with Islam as its ultimate nemesis and alter ego. Therefore, if Europe was in the forefront of Orientalist scholarship, that position was taken over by the United States since World War II. It is not by accident that imperialism and scholarship dwell on together and traverse simultaneously. A reader of Orientalist discourse must then be aware of the continuity and the change both in imperialism and Orientalism. Further, a reader has to keep in mind that if a change takes place in the nature of imperialism, it is less so in the case of Orientalism because the stream of continuity in representing Arab Muslims remains in European discourses even after European imperialism faded.
As one of the first scholars to systematically analyze the imagery of Islam and Arab Muslims in the pre 9/11 American culture, Edward Said states in his book *Covering Islam* (1997): “‘Islam’ as it is used today seems to mean one simple thing but in fact is part fiction, part ideological label, part minimal designation of a religion called Islam.”\(^5\) Said contends that the image of Islam in the American culture has always been influenced by a framework of politics and hidden interests and is therefore loaded with “not only patent inaccuracy but also expressions of unrestrained ethnocentrism, cultural and even racial hatred, deep yet paradoxically free-floating hostility.”\(^6\) Accordingly, Said finds that this image always involves highly exaggerated stereotyping and belligerent hostility.

If this is the image before 9/11, things take a big turn for the worse after the fateful attacks of 2001 because Arab Muslim’s character and thought become a major subject of perusal for the American public. Bookstores in American are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islamic terrorism and the Arab Muslims’ threat and the Muslim menace; all of them are written by political polemicians. Despite the fact that all Arab countries condemn the attacks, for the most part, many writers fail to differentiate between Arabs and Muslims, on the one hand, and terrorists, on the other. On September 17, 2001, *Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting* (FAIR) reports that American media focused on the theme of retaliation only and did not bother to investigate who bears the brunt of an American attack.\(^7\) For instance, on September 12, 2001, Steve Dunleavy writes in the *New York Post*: “The response to this unimaginable 21st-century Pearl Harbor should be as simple as it is swift-kill the bastards...As for cities or countries that host these worms, bomb them into basketball courts.”\(^8\)
On September 11, former U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger comments to CNN, “There is only one way to begin to deal with people like this, and that is you have to kill some of them even if they are not immediately directly involved in this thing.” On September 13, Bill O’Reilly, a prominent American television host, articulates his opinion to the Fox News Channel: “[I]t doesn’t make any difference who you kill in the process of retaliation against the attacks.” On the same day, Ann Coulter, an American lawyer, writes in Universal Press Syndicate: “This is no time to be precious about locating the exact individuals directly involved in this particular terrorist attack....We should invade their countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity.”

Thus, the media plays an important role in foregrounding issues related to Muslims in the American public domain after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Ten months after 9/11 at a meeting of the Global Policy Forum that aimed at providing a picture of how the world has been portrayed, Directorate of Berghof Conflict Research, criticizes the American media for how it fully attributed blame for the September attacks on the Muslims in general. Prophet Muhammad and religious figures become the focus of these interviews and debates in American media: “This man was an absolute wild-eyed fanatic...He was a robber and a brigand...Adolph Hitler was bad, but what the Muslims want to do to the Jews is worse.” It is apparent that the media has accepted the side effects of a stigmatization of Islam, Islamic states and the Muslims and paved the way for prejudices and offensive statements appearing regularly in televised interviews with leading evangelists and politicians.

American literature of this period witnesses an increase in American awareness to meet the new reality imposed by the 9/11 affair. Literature of this
period assumes that the fight against terrorism is the nation’s first priority. A shift from an aesthetically pleasant literature to a more morally instructional and informative dominates literary texts because consumers after 9/11 wanted literature that would give them information on what had just happened. Feelings of fear, horror and vulnerability help in extending subject matter that aims at realizing and confronting the outside threats and result in a very strong curiosity and eagerness of the American public to know more about their assailants: “After the attacks, people showed greater interest in books which provided them with information relevant to the attacks and books which offered spiritual comfort—both functional characteristics.”

This interest in functional and informative contents after 9/11 enables readers to interpret narratives on real past events which are still alive in their memory, something they can relate to.

On the literary front, Islam and Arab Muslims, particularly religious figures like Prophet Muhammad, his wife A’isha, Abi Bakr, Omar and Khalid become the subject matter for many novels. On September 18, 2001, Emily Eakin, a reporter for the New York Times, notes that the attacks raise the reader’s curiosity to know more about Islam and Muslims: “Within hours after last Tuesday’s terrorist attacks, sales of books related to the disaster surged as people desperate for information and explanations rushed to purchase treatises on terrorism and the Arab world.” Eakin goes on to quote Harabin, a supervisor at a bookstore in Washington saying “Our Islam section has really emptied out.” This inquiry into the history of Islam, Prophet Muhammad, his wives and his Successors becomes the target of many fiction novels such as The Jewel of Medina, Mother of the Believers and Khalifah. This interest in these Islamic figures demonstrates the attitude of writers toward informative literature at this particular time.
Similarly, modern ordinary Muslims are part of the American literary focus because this literary production, argues Gustafson, becomes “an aid of living” in the American society. Texts like *Terrorist, The Scorpion’s Gate, The Teeth of the Tiger, Once in a Promised Land, Finding Nouf, Dawn of Saudi…* etc, share the common image that an Arab Muslim is a terrorist, anti-America and an oppressor of woman. To an Arab reader, how can this generalization be justified when the terrorist attacks are carried out by a very small fraction of fanatic Muslims? Similarly, why do Islam and its sacred figures become the focus of literary inquiry only after the 9/11 events?

No doubt, 9/11 events shape a new era of the relationship between Arab Muslims and the West, particularly, the United States and manufacture stereotypes out of the Muslim: a terrorist, intolerant and violent character. In his evaluation of the American cultural dimensions in the post 9/11 period, Richard Crockatt asserts that 2001 is the year of “the great divide” in the Islam-American relationship: “Events since 9/11 have provided continuous fuel for animosity and mistrust, from the invasion of Iraq, the terrorist attacks across the globe, involving the almost routine use of suicide bombings by jihadists.”

Therefore, the current thesis raises the following questions: what is the impact of 9/11 in shaping the image of Islam and Muslims in literary texts? Are there similarities between Arab images in pre-9/11 and post 9/11? If yes, can a reader consider the post 9/11 representations as part of a long process called Orientalizing the Orient through which post 9/11 writers imitate and follow their European predecessors? Before attempting an answer to these questions, a detailed analysis of the theoretical and historical framework on the same issue is provided in this chapter.
1.2 Historical Background (Literature Review)

Historically, Arabs and Muslims have felt that they are always at the receiving end due to the fact that their religion, culture, and beliefs have been negatively portrayed to the Western audience. This awareness of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim portrayals has been growing ever since Muslims started to have more access to Western writings and Western media, which reveal longstanding modes of representation that the West has used in talking about the East. Historical texts show that representation of Arabs in the West is old and predates the emergence of Islam in Arabia. Prior to the coming of Islam, certain images of Arabs are found in the Bible and historical texts. In his book, *The Sum of All Heresies*, Frederick Quinn, an American diplomat and historian, writes: “The Bible was the great anti-Islamic text. Compiled centuries before the Prophet’s birth, it made no mention of Muslims, but its apocalyptical passages would soon be used against Islam.”

Quinn quotes from the book of Matthew some phrases which certainly indicate the coming of a false prophet [Muhammad]: “Then if anyone says to you, “look! Here is the Messiah!” or “There he is! For false messiahs and false prophets will appear and produce great signs and omens, to lead astray.” Quinn summarizes the Western Christian perceptions of Prophet Muhammad that were common in the Middle Ages and continue to exist in the present in the following words:

...religiously, Muhammad was either the Antichrist or a fallen Lucifer-like figure, a cardinal who failed to be elected pope, so he turned on the church. Personally, he was a flawed human being, unable or unwilling to contain his sexuality; he was polygamous or a predator, depending on the account. Politically, he was either a major leader who united the desert tribes for the first time ever or a
greedy despot. Finally, and contradicting what had been said before, he was an original source of the wisdom of the East.\textsuperscript{19}

Long before the discourse of representing the Eastern people emerges as an “institution” called Orientalism, malicious representations of Muslims and Arabs widely circulated among the Christian religious elites creating a demonic image of Islam and Arabs. Ismail Patel notes that John of Damascus (675-749) can be called ‘The father of anti-Islamic polemics’ for his tradition of demonizing Islam and Muslims: “He claimed, in his book \textit{De Haeresbius}, that the Quran was not revealed but created by the Prophet…He also claimed that the Prophet created verses of the Quran to fulfill his own wants, and these were usually to do with lust and sexual deviancy.”\textsuperscript{20} Similarly, Protestant Christians and Lutherans follow the same approach in their perception of that Islam is a devilish religion that was lapsed from Christianity.

Ania Loomba finds that this racial/religious stereotyping is not a product of modern colonialism alone, rather it goes back to the Greek and Roman periods which provide some abiding templates for subsequent European images of ‘Barbarians’ and outsiders. Loomba argues that “since the Bible held that all human beings were brothers descended from the same parents, the presence of ‘savages’ and ‘monsters’ [Arabs] was not easy to explain.”\textsuperscript{21} In the Biblical narratives Arabs are defined in inferior terms as sons of Hagar, an Egyptian handmaid, from her son Ishmael who are both cast out to the desert by Abraham who prefers the company of Sarah and her son Isaac: “And Sarah saw the son of Hagar the Egyptian, which she had born unto Abraham, mocking. Wherefore she said unto Abraham, Cast out this bondwoman and her son: for the son of this bondwoman shall not be heir with my son, even with Isaac.”\textsuperscript{22} Thus, Arabs are and
should remain as the outcast, the savage, the backward and the inferior race that
descended from Ishmael, the less-favored offspring of the patriarch Abraham
compared to the civilized and superior Westerners, descendants of Isaac.

The earliest Western perception of Islam and Arabs is largely grounded on
religious basis that resulted from the Christian rejection of Islam as a religion in
the eighth century. On this ground, many Christian priests and theologians
consider Muslims as apostates who spread messages closely resembling traditional
Christian beliefs. Moreover, the rapid spread of Islam to areas under the Christian
rule in the East till it reaches the Balkans and sieges Vienna rings the alarm of the
Islamic threat. Hence, Loomba asserts: “In early medieval and early modern
Europe, Christian identities were constructed in opposition to Islam….Above all it
was Islam that functioned as the predominant binary opposite of and threat to
Christianity…The term ‘Moors’ at first referred to Arab Muslims, but although not
all Muslims were dark-skinned.” This rejection of the religion and the awareness
to its threat become the main factors that define the nature of the relationship at the
modern time.

The well-known distorted image in the European writings is reflected in the
usage of the term “Saracens”. The origin of the term remains uncertain but it had
become a sweepingly pejorative term applied to almost all Arabic-speaking
populations. Historical references show that the linguistic origin of the “Saracen”
could be a Latin word and comes with three possible meanings. First, Saracen
could refer to ‘East’ where Arabs lived, which means in Arabic al-sharqiyya.
Secondly, it could be an equivalent to the Arabic word “sarraq” which means thief
or plunderer and the Byzantines used it to describe Arabs. Lastly, it could refer to
the Arabic word “sharika” which means association or treaty signed between the peace-loving Byzantine and savage Arab tribes.

The European literary depiction of Arabs and Islam shares a common ground with the religious Christian viewpoint. This perception of Arab Muslims including Prophet Muhammad, a man who is held responsible for spreading religion that oppresses the woman, has long been projected in the famous work of the Italian poet Dante Alighieri and such a view remains practically unchanged centuries later. Dante’s *Divine Comedy* or *Divina Commedia* is a major literary work with a considerable focus on Muslims and Islamic figures like Prophet Muhammad, his son-in-law Ali, Avicenna, Averroes and Saladin. In this work, Dante considers these figures as sinful and thus he places every one of them in a particular level of the Inferno. Dante, for example, places Prophet Muhammad in the ninth bolgia of the eighth circle of Hell “where heretics, schismatics, and all spreaders of discord are to be found.”

Similarly, Ali, Muhammad’s son-in-law is kept in the same place: with “Mahomet.” Avicenna (981-1037) and Averroes (1126-1198) are great Arab philosophers whose contribution to humanity, virtuous deeds, and lofty codes of ethics intercede for them because Dante has a profound respect for such figures and therefore he places them in hell among great philosophers and scientists like Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Heraclitus, Orpheus, Hippocrates and Plato. Quinn summarizes Dante’s strategy in the following words:

Dante Alighieri awarded Saladin a higher place in the underworld than Muhammad. Whereas the Prophet was to spend eternity in a place of endless torment, Islam’s most illustrious military figure was consigned to a higher place in Limbo along with non-Christians of the past, such as Socrates and Plato. Muhammad was
relegated to the dreaded Eighth Circle, a place reserved for sowers of scandal and schismatics.  

In England, the frustration of Arabs towards their representation in English literature has its roots in historical conflict between the Islamic East and the Christian West. Eighteenth century English literature has served to define, formulate and indeed exacerbate this hostile relationship. Usually, critics look at the seventeenth century as the golden age for the representation of Oriental character, life and history in England. In fact, demonizing Arabs and Islam by literary figures like Christopher Marlowe, William Shakespeare, John Webster, and John Ford etc. has its beginnings in the English Renaissance. As Said suggests, *Robinson Crusoe* advocates the British seventeenth century imperialism. In *Robinson Crusoe*, when Crusoe escapes slavery from the hands of the Turks, he compels the Muslim boy, Xury, to swear by Mahomet, a deformed name of the Prophet, to be faithful to him: “Xury, if you will be faithful to me, I’ll make you a great man; but if you will not stroke your face to be true to me’ - that is, swear by Mahomet and his father’s beard.” Shakespeare’s manifestation of Arabs as “Moors” and “Barbarians” is clear in his *The Merchant of Venice* (1590) where Lorenzo, king of Spain comments on Prince of Morocco in Act 5, Scene 1:

Queen Mother: Your deceast King made war in Barbarie

Won Great Abdela King of Fesse and father

To that Barbarian Prince.

Eleazar: I was but young,

But now methinks I see my father’s wounds.

Poor barbaria! No more.
The European attitude towards non-Arab Muslims is further influenced by the long history of rivalry between Islam and the West. This attitude of depicting Muslims negatively is extended further in the portrayal of non-Arab Muslims in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. For example, Indian Muslims are shown as intolerant, sexually loose and violent in E. M. Forster’s *A Passage To India*. The European colonial rhetoric succeeded in making the concept of Islam synonymous with backwardness, intolerance, inefficiency and bigotry. Muslims depicted by Forster are not faithfully sketched. Muslims in India like Dr. Aziz who, despite the advantages of education they have enjoyed, look down upon Hindus and belittle their culture, and fall below even a reasonable standard of truthfulness and efficiency.

The presence of the Middle East in American literary and cultural work coincides with the beginning of the Barbary wars fought between North African pirates and American sailors. The American imperial growth runs parallel to the progressive distortion of Arab identity. Said notes in *Culture and Imperialism* that “[f]or decades in America there has been a cultural war against the Arabs and Islam: appalling racist caricatures of Arabs and Muslims suggest that they are all either terrorists or sheikhs and that the region is a large arid slum, fit only for profit or war.”

Though little average Americans knew about the Middle East and its peoples in the nineteenth century, Arab Muslims appear with striking regularity in the works of Edgar Allan Poe 1809-1849. Sexuality of veiled Arab women and savagery of Arab men have been the corner stone of American Orientalist discourse of Hawthorne’s tales like *The Blithedale Romance*, *Twice-told Tales*, and *The House of the Seven Gables*:
Hawthorne considers the East as part and parcel of his romance. He finds in the hybrid nature of the romance the right atmosphere that the American romancer needs. And he considers the Orient an essential constituent for such production. The Orient in the romance, thus, becomes a methodology of representation. It is an episteme in the American novelistic discourse.²⁹

As a rising super power, few parts of the world have become as deeply embedded in the U.S. popular imagination as the Middle East. The Middle East begins to loom larger on America’s diplomatic and cultural horizon during what Mark Twain called “the Gilded Age,” not only because U.S. missionaries seek to have more converts but also because U.S. merchants try to expand trade. Douglas Little, an American historian specializing in American diplomatic history and United States’ relations with the Middle East, argues that “[no] one probably did more to shape nineteenth-century U.S. views of the Middle East, however, than Mark Twain.”³⁰ Twain was responsible for projecting the Muslims to his American audience as “a people by nature and training filthy, brutish, ignorant, unprogressive, [and] superstitious” and calling the Ottoman Empire “a government whose Three Graces are Tyranny, Rapacity and Blood.”³¹

Mark Twain’s Travel writings (1835–1910) show a great interest in the description of Arab life style, the houses, the people, the dresses, mosques, coins, rulers, women, landmarks, jails, marriage, slavery, pilgrimage, and foreign relations. In “The Innocents Abroad”, he describes Muslims as brutish savages, ignorant, unprogressive, and superstititious. Therefore, Mark Twain represents the first generation of American Orientalists whose main focus is foreignness, misery and filthiness of the natives: “A Syrian village is a hive of huts one story high (the
height of a man)... When you ride through one of these villages at noonday... you come to several sore-eyed children and children in all stages of mutilation and decay." Washington Irving’s fascination with the Middle East and its people in his *Mohamet and his Successors* shows a very strong account of the Arabs and Islam to the United States in the early years of the nineteenth century when Irving finds Islam to be “one of violence and the sword”. Irving’s manipulation of Muhammad into “Mahomet” and Islam into “Mahometanism” aims at demonizing Islam and defaming the Prophet. This manipulation in words articulates a sharp critique, describing the holy mission of the Muslim prophet as wholly fallacious.

These images of Arabs in American travel writing achieve their Orientalist aims and facilitate production of similar images in other forms of American culture. For example, in the American World’s Fairs in 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition and the 1893 Chicago World Columbian Exposition, Arab culture of Egypt is perceived as “strange, exotic and radically different from American culture” and its people as “primitive or savage peoples” For a curious scholar, this early American preoccupation with the Middle East looks strange and therefore needs to be investigated. In this regard, crucial questions need to be answered such as why was such strong interest in the Middle East evident at these world fairs well before the United States’ economic and political interests in the region crystallized following World War II? To what extent can the Orientalist paradigm help us understand the United States’ cultural encounter with the Middle East as expressed through world fairs? And what impact did these fairs have on American society and its understandings of the region?

Today, especially after establishing the Jewish state of Israel, any study or research on the Middle East-America relationship should have a reference to the
American-Israeli relationship that shapes the American policy and attitude towards Arabs. The many wars fought between Arabs and Israel have further distorted the image of Arabs in American literature. Since establishing the Jewish state of Israel on the Arab land of Palestine in 1948, the Arab image in American literature suffered more distortion, so much so that an Arab is seen as a savage, backward, anti-Israel and anti-America. For example, *The Haj* by Leon Uris, a prominent American novelist, projects Arabs as animal-like, inferior, backward, irrational, untrustworthy and a threat to Israel. This kind of projection becomes a reliable source for the American people to understand Palestinian society and issues.

Edward Said rejects Uris’s discriminative approach in treating the Arab-Israeli issue and labels it as “moral epistemology of imperialism”. In an article, *An Ideology of Difference* published a few months later, Edward Said gives his point of view on Uris’ novel *The Haj*: “I must confess at the outset that I could not finish its six hundred pages, so filled are they with sheer disgusting hatred. This book, which makes the worst Nazi anti-Semitism seem restrained, was nonetheless a best-seller.”

*The Haj*’s premise is simple: that an Arab is a lecherous, deceitful, murderous, irrational, larcenous and utterly reprehensible subhuman whereas the Jew is noble, intelligent, understanding and-above all-deserving of Palestine.

Representation of Arabs in *The Haj* aims to justify colonization by depicting the colonial process as a historically inevitable movement of progress toward bringing civilization to the land of the barbarian. Uris’ writings are anti-Islamic and anti-Arab being constitutive of an Orientalist discourse that aims at distorting Arabs’ identity, religion and their human values, which is clear in his earlier novel *Exodus* published in 1958. In *The Haj*, Uris makes Arabs articulate their own point of view about themselves. His Arab narrator Ishmael begins his
narration with a reference to these voices: “There are times I will speak to you in my own voice. Others will speak in theirs.” On the other hand, at every occasion the Jews are presented as civilized, sympathetic, democratic and peace-loving people who are distinguished from the Arabs. Ishmael, for example, makes a candid confession: “So before I was nine I had learned the basic canon of Arab life. It was me against my brother; me and my brother against our father; my family against my cousins and the clan; the clan against the tribe; and the tribe against the world. And all of us against the infidel.” In 1957 Uris was hired by a Jewish group to write a screenplay which took the shape of the novel *Exodus* which aimed at demonizing Arabs in which Arabs are “lazy and shiftless, dirty and deceitful. They have become dependent upon the Jews.” This representation of the Arabs ultimately confirms Edward Said’s view that the Arabs and Islam exist only as communities of interpretation.

In the American Orientalist discourse, Arab Muslims’ stereotypes are thoroughly negative in nature. The Americans categorize Islam as a threat to the West as a whole. This negative perception of Arabs is an accumulation of a long history of interaction as explained earlier. Since these stereotypes are imperial tools of domination, they have become an essential component of these literary and political mainstreams in a way that indicates no change of its course.

1.3 Theoretical Framework

The last quarter of the twentieth century marks the inauguration of a new era of academic inquiry, namely post-colonial discourse in which Said’s *Orientalism* constitutes one of its main pillars. In *Orientalism*, Said uncovers the negative images that the West uses to portray the Orient with special focus on Arabs and Muslims and tries to defend the entire Islamic culture against a long
mode of representation. In his works, *Covering Islam, Orientalism, and Culture and Imperialism* which constitute the most well known trilogy in post-colonial theory, Said documents numerous instances of how the Western literature, media and politics systematically misrepresent Arabs and the Islamic world. In his introduction to the 1997 edition of *Covering Islam*, Said states: “In short, fundamentalism equals Islam equals everything-we-must-now-fight-against, as we did with communism during the Cold War…The norms of rational sense are suspended when discussions of Islam are carried on.”


In this research on Arab identity, Islam and Arab nationalism, which constitute a major part of the Orient, Said’s post-colonial theory will be applied with special reference to his *Orientalism* which is widely considered as the starting point for all critical discussions of East-West literary relations. This institution of Orientalism is first defined by Said as a system of representation and hegemony invented by the West on the assumption of a strong distinction between East and West. This institution of Orientalism is explained by Said as: “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and “the Occident…a Western style for dominating restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.” Said gives no fixed definition of what “the Orient” is or what “Oriental” means: “I have no “real” Orient to argue for. I do,
however, have a very high regard for the powers and gifts of the peoples of that region to struggle on for their vision of what they are and want to be.”

In Said’s view, Orientalism as a discourse includes every writer who indulges in representation of the Orientals:

Everyone who writes about the Orient must locate himself vis-à-vis the Orient; translated into his text, this location includes the kind of narrative voice he adopts, the type of structure he builds, the kinds of images, themes, motifs that circulate in his text all of which add up to deliberate ways of addressing the reader, containing the Orient, and finally, representing it or speaking in its behalf.

In *Orientalism*, Said argues that the Western political domination over the Orient is greatly assisted by a textualization process, a set of textual practices that a Westerner can become an expert Orientalist without ever leaving home. Similarly, Western readers become more prone or addicted to accepting images of Arabs as terrorists, uncivilized and anti-West with Orientalist materials available to them at home. Orientalism, suggests Said, is an ultimate cultural and political doctrine willed over the Orient because the Orient is inferior to the West; this doctrine forced a “difference between the familiar (Europe, the West, “us”) and the strange (the Orient, the East, “them”)” because “Orientalism depends for its strategy on this flexible positional superiority.”

Further, Said observes that Orientalists make the Orientals narrate their own images and generalize these images on all Muslims like “the Moors”, “the Muslim”, “the Turk” “the Arab” versus “the Westerner”. This imbalance created between the “Muslim East” and the “Christian West” remains an obvious trait of Orientalist writing even today.
In his critique of Orientalist discourse, Said notes that cultural hegemony gives Orientalism durability and strength. Thus, though Said does not adopt Marxist base/superstructure terminology for his own analysis, he clearly cites it approvingly as a valid critique of imperialism. Orientalism thus appears especially indebted to Marxism with an emphasis on the interconnection of political power and cultural phenomena. This connection is more strongly apparent as readers discover Said’s direct reference to the works of Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci who identified Western hegemony as an indispensable concept for any understanding of cultural life in the industrial West. Accordingly, Said reaches to the conclusion that a sizeable part of Western culture is “what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-European peoples and cultures.”

This hegemonic attitude is applied to the United States too as one of the imperial powers who “impart to their civil societies a sense of urgency, a direct political infusion as it were, where and when-ever matters pertaining to their imperial interests abroad are concerned.”

Oriental backwardness and inferiority are essential themes in Said’s *Orientalism*. Orientals, unlike the Westerners, are backward and therefore chances of mutual understanding are slight unless the Oriental learns to be rational”, otherwise there can be no rapprochement between East and West. Said cites Orientalist works that draw binary oppositions between the Orient and the advanced and superior West as reflected in the work of Orientalist William Robertson Smith, a Semitic language philologist who states: “The Arabian traveller is quite different from ourselves…He has no enjoyment in effort, and grumbles at hunger and fatigue with all his might.” Said further quotes Smith
who asserts that “It is characteristic of Mohammedanism...that it has taken under
its protection so many barbarous and obsolete ideas.” Accordingly, the Muslims
are not only the opposite of and inferior to the Westerners but savages and
dangerous.

In the examination of Orientalist discourse on the Islamic world, Said
observes that dehumanizing the Orientals and imperial ambitions are very much
connected to each other. This production on Orientals, Said discovers, does indeed
happen during the British colonialism over Egypt in order to rationalize its
domination. Said gives a key example of Lord Cromer, the British governor of
Egypt: “Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is in fact
the main characteristic of the Oriental mind.” All these binary oppositions drawn
between Orientals and Westerners in the Orientalist discourse will be of immense
help in exploring the same binaries in modern American fiction written about the
Oriental Muslims.

Said’s endeavor in unveiling the hegemonic writing style on the Orient has
recently been a target of criticism by many Western writers. Christopher Bush
observes that there are two main criticisms which are important to point out in this
context: first, Said’s failure to demonstrate a logical binary opposition between the
Orient and the Occident, and secondly, his overgeneralization about the discourses
he is critiquing. Neil Templeton, for example, argues that Said’s creation of a
binary opposition between the Orient and Occident is marked by its reductive
tendencies when he tries to define the East as opposite to the West because “the
West’s component parts be similarly defined in relation to their differences with
each other.” Further, Templeton notes that Said’s binary distinction between
Orient and Occident is further damaged and fractured by his discussion of the
commonality of German Orientalism, Anglo-French Orientalism, and American Orientalism. Said’s tendency to generalize Orientalism as a monolithic discourse is also noted by other critics who argue that Said has overstated his case when he views Orientalism as monolithically constructed and its discourse as an agent of the colonizer: “There are, however, major problems with a Saidian ‘Orientalist’ interpretation of these artistic distinctions. Such attitudes were not monolithic; they did not repeatedly feed off each other; and they were not necessarily related in any close or instrumental way to imperialism and racial attitudes.”

The hypothesis that Orientalist discourse as an imperial tool for dominating and reconstructing the Orient is also challenged by modern scholars. They argue that in his examination of the hegemonic work of Western Orientalists, Said may have fallen into the same trap of Orientalism by producing Occidentalism. The Orientalist monolithic construction of the Orient as the “Other” of the Occident is a major point of Orientalism’s argument. This process of “othering” the Orient results in, firstly, the creation of two distinct identities namely, “Orientals” and “Occidentals”; secondly the dominancy and the authority of the Occidentals over the Orientals in the Occidental point of view. This point in particular comes under much scrutiny and investigation by many critics who have dedicated entire books in response to Said’s contention. Bart Moore-Gilbert for example, wonders if Said “does not himself reproduce the kind of stereotyping which he condemns in Orientalism in making such distinctions.” Many critics of Said’s Orientalism feel that though Said’s analysis of Orientalism is a powerful one, yet it suffers from a disease like the one it seeks to diagnose which may be called anti-Orientalism. Accordingly, as Said tries to expose distortions, he does this so systematically that
he falls into the same trap. This means that while producing a counter-hegemonic discourse to Orientalism, Said produces what may be called Occidentalism.

According to critics Said fails to look at the heterogeneity and the different factors that govern different Orientalist discourses produced by different British, French, German and American scholarship. Orientalism, as sets of colonial discourses, is targeted for being ignorant of the heterogeneities that constitute and redefine them. Porter believes that Said positions himself as a powerful opponent to the Western writers and thus the dichotomy he creates is full of overgeneralizations of his views on all the Western writers:

Can anyone at any time speak of a unified Western discourse [British, French, German and American], even in a specific historical moment, and less throughout the course of centuries of historical change? Should one not at least speak of varieties of discourses about nationality and class that shed light on all sorts of over-determined cultural products?^52

In *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms*, Lisa Lowe tries to show the variations between French and British Orientalisms. By comparing figures such as Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, E.M. Forster, Gustav Flaubert, and Roland Barthes, she shows that different styles and different themes characterize the traditions of both British and French nations.\(^53\) Further, she claims that she “resists totalizing Orientalism as a monolithic” and argues that Orientalism consists of “an uneven matrix of Orientalist situations”\(^54\) across different cultural and historical sites that each of these Orientalisms is internally complex and unstable.
Yet, several contradictions emerge in the course of Western criticism of Said’s theory. It has been more than three decades since Said published his thesis of Orientalism. Unfortunately, many Western readers perceive the book as racist discourse simply because it defends Arabs and Muslims against what Said believes to be a hegemonic attitude towards the Orientals. Regrettably, many Western critics, readers and academics, even up till this moment, do not know that Edward Said is not a Muslim. Obsessed with the content of the book that defends the Arabs and Muslims, Western critics fail to know that Said is a Protestant Christian and not a Muslim, or that not all Arabs are Muslims. For instance, in the Customer Reviews on Amazon.Com, Eric Gartman writes his response to Said’s *Orientalism*: “The central point of Said’s book is that the so-called West cannot truly understand the complexities and intricate nature of the Arab world. Only a Muslim like him can, despite the fact that he himself was educated in the West.”

In addition to viewing the history of Western representation of the Orient, a good part of Said’s theory is an inquiry into the ‘problematic’ representation of another culture. Said concludes his book with an appeal to human sciences to stop providing contemporary scholars with knowledge and ideas that promote “racial, ideological, and imperialist stereotypes” like the sort provided by Orientalism. Said asks very important questions:

- How does one represent other cultures? What is another culture? Is the notion of a distinct culture (or race, or religion, or civilization) a useful one, or does it always get involved either in self-congratulation (when one discusses one’s own) or hostility and aggression (when one discusses the “other”)? Do cultural, religious, and racial differences matter more than socio-economic categories,
or politicohistorical ones? How do ideas acquire authority, “normality,” and even the status of “natural” truth?\textsuperscript{56}

In the first part of \textit{Orientalism}, Said identifies the “scope” of Orientalism and refers to this scope as a construction of the idea of an “Orient” which embraces the world of the Arabs and Islam. In the second part, Said traces the origins of Orientalist discourse beginning with the first Western encounter with Islam. In both parts, Said reaches to the conclusion that the Orient imagined by European scholars is nothing but an invention of the Western “hegemonic power” and aims at controlling the Orient.

Following Karl Marx’s widely famous statement “[t]hey cannot represent themselves; they must be represented,” Said criticizes the whole Orientalist discourse of representing the Orient and its people. Further he notes that this authority of representing the Orient is a result of imperialist power and thus lacks truth. Compared to the more enlightened and civilized European World, the Orient has long been perceived by Orientalists as “a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.”\textsuperscript{57} Said shows the imbalance of power and the absence of a voice given to “Orientals” in the Orientalist discourse by discussing an influential passage from the great nineteenth century French novelist Gustave Flaubert in which Flaubert describes his experience with an Egyptian prostitute who cannot represent herself:

Flaubert’s encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. He spoke for her and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male, and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him
not only to possess [her] physically but to speak for her and tell his
readers in what way she was “typically Oriental.”

Edward Said becomes cynical of how Flaubert represents and speaks of an
Egyptian courtesan with whom he claims to have a sexual relationship. Further,
Said gives examples of the imagined Orient from eighteenth century writing that
he believes to be the approximate starting point of European Orientalist writing.
According to Said, Silvestre de Sacy’s *Chrestomathie Arabe* and Edward William
Lane’s *Account of the Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* mark the
starting point for dealing with the Orient by representing it, authorizing views of it,
describing it, teaching it and ruling over it.

In 1978 and 1981 Said published *Orientalism* and *Covering Islam*
respectively. In both books Said tries to be more specific in showing how Arabs
and Muslims in particular are represented in Western literary writings. Moreover,
he considers his *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) to be an extension to *Orientalism*
in which he tries to broaden the scope of his analysis to make it into a general
of Ignorance* (2001), *Islam Through Western Eyes* (1998), and *Orientalism after
25 years* (2003) are about the modern American Orientalism. Thus, Said’s
*Orientalism* is still valid to be applied to American Orientalist discourse of
twentieth and the twenty-first centuries like that of Bernard Lewis, Samuel
Huntington and Daniel Pipes.

*Orientalism* demonstrates Said’s skepticism towards Middle East studies in
the United States. He notes that “Oriental studies were to be thought of not so
much as scholarly activities but as instruments of national policy towards the
newly independent, and possibly intractable, nations of the post-colonial world.”
Thus, Orientalism is still a productive academia to meet changes in the different parts of the Orient especially those who challenge the Western supremacy. American Orientalist discourse as a theoretical institution emerges with the publication of Bernard Lewis, a committed Zionist historian and scholar in Oriental studies, whose argument is based on the notion that Islam does not develop nor do Muslims. Further, Lewis is the first modern American Orientalist to describe the relationship between Islam and the West with the concept a “Clash of Civilizations”. In his famous essay *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (1990) Lewis describes the Muslims as “enraged nation” opposed to the Western civilization: “This is no less than a clash of civilizations--the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage.”

In *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Lewis seems to have delved into the psyche of the Arabs and comes up with views that largely resemble the European Orientalist attitude towards the Arabs. According to Lewis, Arabs’ hatred for Western culture results from their awareness of their own failure and backwardness, a feeling that creates a revengeful attitude to the West. With the publication of *The Roots of Muslim Rage*, Lewis seems to have laid the foundations for modern American Orientalism.

Thus, Muslims’ rage at the success of Western civilization especially the American one provides further knowledge for the American public. Inquiries into “[W]hat else can justify the Muslim attacks on New York and Washington? And why do they hate us more than other Westerners?” are questions answered by prominent American policymakers and literary writers. In his study of American literature, Said’s advice to the students of modern literature is very pertinent: “take account of the politics of what they study…Texts are protean things; they are tied
to circumstances and to politics.” In his answer to the same question “Why do they hate us?” to the PBS News Hour, Collin Powell, the former US Secretary of State, answers: “They don’t like our value system; they don’t like a system that treats each individual as a creature of God with the full rights of every other individual. They don't like our political system, our form of democracy.”

Similarly, President Bush Jr. gives his own answer for the Muslims’ rage in a speech to Congress on September 20, 2001:

They [Muslims] hate what they see right here in this chamber... Their leaders are self-appointed. They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom... They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa... They stand against us, because we stand in their way.

In most of his writings, Said keeps a good space for dealing with Lewis’ Orientalist work largely because he believes that Lewis’ opinions are taken for granted by all American policymakers as well as the American public. Said, for example, writes extensively about Lewis in both Orientalism and Covering Islam where he describes Lewis as one of the worst offenders in the cultural war against Islam. John Esposito, a professor of International Affairs and Islamic Studies at Georgetown University, echoes Said’s opinion on Lewis’ writings on Arabs and Muslims. He wonders how Lewis generalizes his personal point of view and applies it to more than one billion of Muslims by describing them enraged at the Western civilization. Esposito criticizes the way in which selective presentation of Arabs’ and Muslims’ activities endorses certain negative stereotypes embedded in the Western mind. Esposito asks his Western fellows certain questions:
would we tolerate similar generalizations in analyzing and explaining Western activities and motives? How often do we see articles that speak of Christian rage or Jewish rage? In a similar vein, the nuclear capability of Muslim countries such as Pakistan has often been spoken of in terms of an “Islamic bomb,” implying the existence of a monolithic Muslim world threatening Israel and the West. Do we expect Israel’s or America’s nuclear capabilities to be described in terms of a Jewish or a Christian bomb?  

Bernard Lewis is considered to be one of the important figures in the political world of the Anglo-American Middle Eastern Establishment. Thus whatever he says or writes is backed up by the fact that he is an authority in the Orientalist field, and consequently his views are taken as absolute truths. Islam as a religion of violence is an idea that occupies a good space in his work. Lewis associates the Muslims with whatever he believes to be anti-West and anti-Christian. On these grounds, Said tries to justify his major concern on Lewis’ writings. Hence, Said believes that Lewis’ writing is very close to being propaganda against his subject material. Thus, Lewis’ powerful position in the Orientalist academy establishes him as a truthful source of knowledge about Arabs and their culture.

In Covering Islam, Said notes that Lewis’ argument aims at establishing Islam in a binary opposition to the Judeo-Christian coalition. He summarizes Lewis’s argument in the following words: “‘Our’ world is the world of Israel and the West; theirs is that of Islam and the rest.” This argument here is to show how this binary opposition, created by Lewis, influences the Western media that proliferates the same attitude towards Arabs and Islam. In The New York Times, for
example, the stories on Palestinian-Israeli conflict provided by the newspaper are always written from Lewis’ Judeo-Christian point of view. For instance, the story *Portrait of an Angry Young Arab Woman* highlights terrorism as an inherent quality of Arab men and women:

Darin Abu Eisheh, a devout Muslim college student from this village near Nablus, believed that women should take their place beside men in the fight against Israeli occupation”…her father tells her “Let Sharon the coward know that every Palestinian woman will give birth to an army of suicide attackers, even if he tries to kill them while still in their mother's wombs, shooting them at the checkpoints of death.”

Observers of the Islam-West relationship can easily find that American thinkers and policymakers view Islam as the only remaining threat to their culture and an opponent to the Judeo-Christian tradition. The long history of enmity between Judaism and Christianity seems to have vanished and so did Communism while Islam becomes the only rival. Shylock, the Jew, no longer represents the Jewish wickedness and hatred for Christians while Osama bin Laden becomes the new Muslim Shylock who is taken to represent the entire Islamic world. This shift in modern Western thought can be seen in Europe too. In France for instance, French Muslims, the largest minority with an estimated total of 6 to 10 percent of the national population, are not allowed to practice their religion as their Christian counterparts. President Sarkozy argues that Islamic code of dress is a sign of oppression to women and thus it is banned: “It [burka] is a sign of subservience. A sign of debasement. I want to say it solemnly; it will not be welcome on the territory of the French Republic.” On the other hand, Sarkozy frequently stresses
the centrality of the Western Judeo-Christian values in his policies and his attachment to what he calls “the Western family” which perceives Islam as an alien intruder.

One of the main aims in Lewis’ argument on Islam, Said notes, is to distort the image of Islam in order to sway people away from it. Accordingly, he believes Lewis’ argument is polemical and not scholarly: “[his] purpose is to show, here and elsewhere, that Islam is an anti-Semitic ideology, not merely a religion.”

Said demonstrates his claim by unveiling Lewis’ dogmatic partiality to his Jewish religious heritage that pushes him to view Islam as an “irrational herd or mass phenomenon.” Lewis’ representation of Islam as a threat, according to Said, echoes the early European Orientalist mainstream that both discourses try to corrupt and spoil the name of Islam to the Western audience. Several centuries ago, European Orientalists advised their readers not to read the copy of the Quran that reached to France through England because this reading would expose the reader to danger. Samuel Chew quotes Alexander Ross, a sixteenth century English Orientalist:

Good Reader, the great Arabian Impostor now at last after a thousand years, is by the way of France arrived in England, and his Alcoran, or gallimaufry of errors hath learned to speak English…If you will take a brief view of the Alcoran, you shall find it a hodgepodge made up of these four ingredients: 1. Of Contradictions. 2. Of Blasphemy. 3. Of ridiculous Fables. 4. Of Lies.

Lewis’ hypothesis (1990) of a possible clash between civilizations gained worldwide attention only after Huntington published his *A Clash of Civilizations* in
1993. In this hypothesis, Huntington predicts that the next clash will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic but rather “it will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.” According to Huntington, the post cold war division of the world into the first, second and third worlds is not relevant at the present time and a new division based on culture and civilization will take place.

Islam acquires a central focus in Huntington’s theory. Huntington relies heavily on historical factors that shape Islam-West relationship which culminated in the 1990s when the United States sent a massive army to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression by another. Huntington clasifies Islamic civilization as a civilization that poses danger to the West: “This centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is unlikely to decline. It could become more virulent.” Thus, according to this view, ‘terrorism’ and ‘Arab backwardness’ can be seen as closely connected that the latter explains the former as irrational and violent. According to Huntington, this realization “strengthens anti-Western political forces” represented by “the principal beneficiaries” (Islamist movements). Accordingly, Muslims turn to conspire with other aggressive civilizations like the Confusian one (the Chinese) against the West.

In Clash of Ignorance (2001), Said introduces his view on the Huntington’s hypothesis of clash of civilizations and finds it to be a “vague notion of something Huntington called civilization identity”; and describes Huntington’s argument as a “belligerent kind of thought.” Said notes that the binary opposition created between Islam and the West is an Orientalist phenomenon because Islam is no longer on the fringes of the West but becomes in its center. Moreover, Said observes that Huntington’s hypothesis of Clash of Civilizations is based on the
racist argument of Lewis essay *The Roots of Muslim Rage* (1990) in which Huntington is an ideologist who wants to make civilizations and identities into what they are not.

Said argues that the Orientalist propagation of Islamic-Western clash does not aim to edify but rather to inflame the reader’s indignant passion. All he perceives from these hypotheses is that Orientalist Huntington is propagating war hypotheses: “*The Clash of Civilizations* thesis is a gimmick like “*The War of the Worlds*” and thus Huntington proves himself to be “a clumsy writer and inelegant thinker.””74 Said concludes: “we are all swimming in those waters…And since the waters are part of the ocean of history, trying to plow or divide them with barriers is futile.”75 A state of anxiety from Islam has become a matter of enduring Western preoccupation and one which politicians in Western Europe and the United States have chosen to highlight. In an article titled *Creeping Islamicization of a decadent Christendom*, Niall Ferguson conveys the fear of prominent figures in Christendom from Islam that is creeping towards Christian societies: “The West must decide how its laws and values will shape and be shaped by Islam. For Europe, as well as the United States, the question is not which civilization, Western or Islamic, will prevail, but which of Islam’s many strands will dominate.”76

Islamic rivalry and hatred to Western civilization, especially the American one, as elaborated in Huntington’s thesis forms the basis of modern American Orientalism. American Orientalists Daniel Pipes and Khalid Durán’s joint essay *Muslims in the West: Can Conflict Be Averted?* states that many signs of this clash become visible and the West becomes threatened from inside: “The potential for conflict between Muslims resident in Europe and North America with the
indigenous Christian and Jewish populations is great and multifaceted. Muslim immigrants in America come to be perceived as a threat to the stability of the society and its security and thus they are not welcome. In this essay, Pipes and Durán recommend the American administration to apply strict mechanism through which Muslims and their threat are eliminated.

Since 1990s, Said’s writing shifted its focus from the European to the American Orientalism. His essay written in 1996 *The Devil Theory Of Islam* provides a review of American Orientalist writings by Daniel Pipes, Judith Miller, Samuel Huntington, Martin Kramer, Bernard Lewis, Steven Emerson and Barry Rubin whom he calls “plus a whole battery of Israeli academics” and whose job “is to make sure that the threat [Islam] is kept before our eyes.” In his review of Miller’s book *God Has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a Militant Middle East*, Said concludes that Miller is a writer who “trades in the Islamic threat” and whose “search for a post-Soviet foreign devil has come to rest, as it did beginning in the eighth century for European Christendom, on Islam, a religion whose physical proximity and unstilled challenge to the West seem as diabolical and violent now as they did then.” Therefore, Said observes that American policy in the Middle East and American Orientalist representation of the Arabs are identical and complementary that both view Israelis as more civilized and Westernized while Arabs are uncivilized brutes, savages and terrorists.

Analysis of American discourse on Islam reveals that American identity is formed in relation to the political and cultural changes that take place in the world. If American identity has been once shaped as the opposite of the Communist identity of the Soviet Union; now that the Cold War is becoming a memory, American identity has begun searching for new enemies for the same purpose. The
process of building this imperial identity, thus, takes different shapes of confrontations with the supposed enemies who were Communism during the cold war and Islam today. Hence, a huge number of distorted images by imperial writers are produced on the target whose aim is to convince the public of and facilitate the military action against the terrorists of the Middle East. In *Culture and Imperialism*, Said refers to how the media of the empire produces distorted images of the natives in order to make the military action acceptable among the public: “The media go abroad so to speak, they are effective in representing strange and threatening foreign cultures for the home audience…creating an appetite for hostility and violence against these cultural “Others”.”

The Western discourse about the world of Islam in the late Middle Ages was, strictly speaking, an imperialist project as did the discourse of modern European colonization of the Orient. The European military attempts at dominating the Arab Muslim region that took place during 1095-1295 AD known as *Crusades* were not primarily religious, but rather political, racial, military, and economic, facilitated by the distorted images of Arabs created by early European Orientalists. Therefore, since the main goal of the Crusades “was primarily European, not missionary; not to extend religion abroad, or even defend it from invasion,” the West shows a very early political and economic hegemony over the East while religion is used as a cover for their military intervention. It is also true that the post 9/11 American discourses and military campaigns on some parts of the Arab world have resemblance to the European imperialism and its imperial discourse. The same religious guise is used in 2003 to legitimize the American occupation of Iraq as demonstrated in a speech of former President of the United States George Bush Jr. who states:
I’m driven with a mission from God. God would tell me, “George, go and fight those terrorists in Afghanistan.” And I did, and then God would tell me, “George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq.” And I did. And now, again, I feel God’s words coming to me, “Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the Middle East.” And by God I’m gonna do it.82

Thus, it is undeniable that religion plays an important role in the lives of the American public especially when it comes to issues related to their relationship with the Arabs. Said observes that American society is growing more religious and ideological compared to other Western countries. In a comparison drawn between the Europeans and the Americans, Said opines that religion and ideology play a crucial role in the lives of Americans compared to the Europeans who are viewed as decadent Christians. A possible conclusion, according to Said’s study, is that there is no difference between American fanatics who carry out God’s will in Iraq and other Muslim fanatics who have carried the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

It is also undeniable that American economic expansionism in the Middle East region is primarily carried out by ideological and religious drives. Iraq, for example, which has the second largest oil reserve in the world, becomes a victim of this natural wealth that attracts the scorpion to its gate whiletoppling Saddam’s tyranny is used as an excuse. The entire premise in the Iraqi issue is colonial that for a time America promoted Saddam, then demonized him and at the end destroyed him. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 is used as an excuse to have a foot on a land swaying over huge reserves of oil.

In this situation, a reader can observe the utility of the Orientalist images on Arabs and how they convince the public that military actions are needed against
the uncivilized Arabs. From this imperial perspective, the fate of native brown subjects cannot be decided by their own, rather constructing their fate is the duty of Empire. This is to be applied to all imperial powers who claim that their missions are only to bring light and prosperity to the natives. Iraq’s case can be well appreciated in President Bush’s address to the nation given on March 17, 2003:

Many Iraqis can hear me tonight in a translated radio broadcast…we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and free. In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms.\(^{83}\)

In his critique of Imperialism, Said relies on both Foucault’s and Marxist framework in order to draw a correlation between the Western imperialist ambitions in the non-Western world and the cultural texts that support Western hegemony. Said, for example, uses Foucault’s notion of “discourse” without adopting the whole thesis of structuralism which includes semiotic analysis of texts. His main intention is to expose political intention and interest of the authors: “I have found it useful here to employ Michel Foucault’s notion of a discourse…to identify Orientalism.”\(^{84}\) Similarly, Said uses the Marxist “base and superstructure” in order to explore the strong relationship between the imperialist hegemonic domination over the non-Western natives and the cultural texts which facilitate domination.
Edward Said uses ‘The Latest Phase’ in his *Orientalism* to refer to the American Orientalist style. He argues that the America’s real interest in the Arab world starts only after the Second World War with the rise of Arab-Israeli conflict. Further, the same period witnesses the discovery of the huge Arab oil and gas reserves which arouses the American interests in the area. Accordingly, the most dominant images of the Arabs during that period are anti-Israel Arabs and “oil wealthy Sheikhs.” For Arab critics of American policy in the Arab world, American interference in political and social affairs in Arab societies is covered by many claims such as defending Israel against Arab terrorists, defending modern Arab states against Arab aggressive Arab states, maintaining the peace process in the Middle East and promoting human rights in the Arab world. Thus, Arab terrorism, aggression and backwardness are tools used for producing distorted images.

Modern American Orientalist writing on Islam and Muslims is referred to by critics as neo-Orientalism. The term neo-Orientalism revolves around the American discourse that reduces the whole Orient to make it refer to Islam. So, neo-Orientalism does not basically differ from classical Orientalism in its themes and treatment of the Orientals: “If the language of classical Orientalism was *crusade*, the language of neo-Orientalism is one that battles the soul of Islam.”

Unlike traditional Orientalism that constitutes systems of representation framed by the hegemonic political forces of colonialism, neo-Orientalism facilitates domination through the systems of representations. Another major difference is reduction of the whole geo-political Orient to refer to Islam. This new Orient can be found in Pipes’ essay *There Are No Moderates: Dealing with Fundamentalist*
Islam, in which Muslim countries constitute the Orient where “Muslim countries host the most terrorists and the fewest democracies in the world.”

Neo-Orientalism is a double-edged sword used by the American empire to validate its military presence in the Arab world. In 2005 President George Bush states: “So we will fight them there…and we will stay in the fight until the fight is won…We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed.” Since 9/11 terrorist attacks, the neo-Orientalist connection between Islam and terrorism has grown so rapidly that for many Westerners, Islam becomes synonymous with menace, and Muslims are fanatics who perform God’s work by bombing unbelievers. This neo-Orientalist attitude towards the Arabs and Muslims does not differ from the classical Orientalist thought. Therefore, Said’s Orientalism is still relevant in the context of the analysis of the neo-Orientalist discourse.

Thus, the image of Arab Muslims as terrorists continues in the United States to carry out American imperialist interests in the Arab region. Again, Bernard Lewis, the most well known neo-Orientalist, constructs the most frightening image of Arabs to the American public. In his book Will Terrorists Go Nuclear, Lewis warns the American society against the possibility of nuclear attacks by Arab terrorists if they develop nuclear weapons: “If they get their hands on a nuclear weapon, they will use it without hesitation.” Thus, these terrorists have to remain armless and under close examination. Across the Western world especially in the United States, Arabs and Muslims face individual and systemic negative representation, discrimination and violence especially after 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Though 9/11 attacks are claimed to be carried out by a small fraction of radical Muslims, the retaliation for these acts takes a form of
the collective guilt ascribed to all followers of Islam and anyone who resembled them.

1.4 Plan of the Thesis

The principal objective of the present work is to examine the ideological moorings behind the post 9/11 American fiction. The thesis makes an attempt to come to grips with the dynamics of Orientalist discourse in terms of which the West has appropriated the East. Based on Said’s theoretical framework, the thesis makes an intensive analysis of a few seminal novels. Texts to be discussed in this thesis cover the post 9/11 period from 2003 onwards. Argument in these chapters will focus on how these novels represent Arabs, Muslims and Islam in the period following the 9/11 tragic attacks on New York and Washington. This study does also include an analysis of novels written by Arab-American writers who narrate their own views on the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the lives of the Arab-American community.

Identifying thematic and stylistic differences in the selected novels of this study, the thesis distinguishes between the white American novel and the Arab-American novel. Analysis of the first group of novels focuses on the representation of Islam, Arab Muslims and their ideologies. The second group of novels is a counter-narrative discourse that focuses on the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the life of the Arab-American community. In this context, the study addresses the following questions: how do the 9/11 attacks facilitate the portrayal of Arab Muslims in the contemporary American novel? Do these contemporary novels attempt to break free from the classical stereotypes about Arabs and to what extent have they been different? And how do Arab-American writers define themselves in their counter-narratives?
The study will revolve around the Orientalist/Oriental relationship and deal with the binary division between “us” and “them”. This study will be in the context of the Orientalist as superior and the Oriental and his/her religion as inferior. In the analysis of this relationship, the study will focus on how the Orientals act and how the Orientalists react. This will be the central premise of the thesis.

Moreover, a focal point in this thesis will be the association between Islam and terrorism, Islam and oppression of women and Islam and sexuality. The thrust of this study will be on how Muslim characters go to extremes in issues related to power, woman and sex. The study will focus on the American characters and their response to acts of terror. The study will also spotlight the Muslim female characters who are not silent spectators to the male oppression. The suffering of Arab-American community in post 9/11 America will be examined.

What has been provided till now is an outline of the historical background of the Arab-American changing relationship and a review of the American Orientalist writings. The introductory chapter presents a bird’s eye view of the historical background of the Arab-American changing relationships and examines how representations in literature change accordingly. The first part of this chapter elucidates the American response to the attacks and explores the impact of 9/11 attacks on American fiction. It also provides a brief sketch of the history of the American Orientalist writings. This is followed by a review of previous studies by writers on Orientalist writings. The chapter concludes with a theoretical frame of the thesis in which Postcolonial theory is elaborately explained. The study in this chapter has by and large made an analysis of Said’s seminal works which are related to the Western monolithic representation of the East.
The second chapter of the thesis will study four major American novels written in the aftermath of 9/11 terrorist attacks. These novels are Tom Clancy’s *The Teeth of the Tiger* (2003), Richard A. Clarke’s *The Scorpion’s Gate* (2005), John Updike’s *Terrorist* (2006) and John Elray’s *Khalifah* (2002). These novels were *New York Times* and *Amazon* bestsellers and the novelists have been prominent canonical figures in American literature. The study in this chapter will focus on representation of Islam, Arab Muslims and their ideology. Based on analysis of the characters of the novels, this chapter will provide an evaluation of how Arab characters are projected in relation to other non-Arab characters like the Chinese and the Hispanic characters.

The third chapter will make a study of how Arab Muslim women are represented in Sherry Jones’ *The Jewel of Medina* (2008), Zoe Ferraris’ *Finding Nouf* (2009) and Homa Pourasgari’s *The Dawn of Saudi* (2009). These three novels have been bestsellers for at least three months in *San Francisco Chronicle*, *Los Angeles Times* and *Amazon*. The focal concern in this chapter will be on the role of religion in women’s life and how women react. The study in this chapter aims at evaluating how post 9/11 novels introduce Muslim woman and her position in the society to the reader. Reading in *The Jewel of Medina* will focus on the projection of Prophet Muhammad’s wives and expose the fragile position of woman in the early Islamic society. The study of *The Dawn of Saudi* and *Finding Nouf* will focus on the situation of Muslim women in modern Saudi society and compare the suffering of these women with the suffering of Prophet Muhammad’s wives.

The analysis in the fourth chapter will focus on novels written by Arab-American writers. In this chapter, the novels completely break away from the themes of the previous novels. The selected novels for this chapter, Diana Abu-
Jaber’s *Crescent* (2004) and Laila Halaby’s *Once in a Promised Land* (2007) are counter-narrative texts written by Arab-American writers. These novels offer an exploration of the self and the suffering of Arab-American community. In this chapter, the study will reveal how the Arab-American community becomes exposed to hatred, discrimination and physical assaults after the 9/11 attacks. An exploration of the suffering of Arab-American community will be analysed.

The final chapter apart from bringing all the loose threads together will arrive at certain findings based on the study of post 9/11 American novel. The final chapter also makes an attempt to situate the post 9/11 fiction in the larger framework of the neo-liberal agenda of the West in a globalised world. Since neo-liberalism has become the dominant policy of the United States and literature has an intimate and necessary relationship with politics, it is argued that post 9/11 fiction written by white American writers plays an important ideological role in reinforcing and recirculating the stereotypical representation of the Middle East, Islam and the Muslims as a whole. In this chapter, the American Orientalism will get its shape and be compared with classical Orientalism.
Notes


6 Said LI.


9 Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting

10 Fairness.

11 Fairness.


15 Eakin.


18 Quinn 26.

19 Quinn 126.


22 Bible (King James), The holy Bible, King James Version, (Electronic Text Center: University of Virginia Library, 1995) 21:9-10.

23 Loomba 106.


25 Quinn 53.


31 Little 13.


36 Uris 6.


38 Said *Covering Islam* XIX.

39 Said *Orientalism* 2-3.

40 Said XLV.

41 Said 20.
42 Said 43.
43 Said 7.
44 Said 11.
45 Said 237.
46 Said 236.
47 Said 38.
54 Lowe 89.
56 Said *Orientalism* 325-326.
57 Said 1.
58 Said 6.
59 Said 275-276.


61 Said *Culture and Imperialism* 316-318.


65 Said *Covering Islam* XXXIII.


68 Said *Orientalism* 317.

69 Said 317.


72 Huntington 25.


74 Said 15.
75 Said 15.


79 Said.

80 Said, Culture and Imperialism 293.


84 Said, Orientalism 3.

