CHAPTER II

ARMED FORCES OF INDIA AFTER PARTITION

(a) Defence Structure of the Armed Forces.

(b) Mercer of Indian States - The Armed Forces.

(c) Defence Structure of the Armed Forces - The New Constitution.
armed forces of india after partition

(a) **Defence Structure of the Armed Forces:**

The higher defence organisation of a country is concerned with the 'counsel and wise management' of its Defence Forces. An efficient and rational defence high command is the base on which the whole edifice of national defence rests. In all forms of national government, except military dictatorship which are aberrations, the supremacy of the Civil over the Military is a well established practice. A higher defence organisation should be conducive to this supremacy being exercised in a most efficient and cost effective manner. Also a fine blending of political and professional considerations, taking into account inevitable financial constraints, should be the mechanics of a sound defence management.

The pre-partition defence set up continued upto 1947 with minor modification like introducing the post of Defence Secretary, a civil servant in place of Army Secretary and converting Army Department into Defence Department. It was based on the Esher Committee headed by Lord Esher who had reorganised the British War Office on the Council System. The British gave a new design of unity to the
THE KEYS OF THE KINGDOM

On June 3, 1947, in an historic meeting in his study in Viceroy's House (above), Louis Mountbatten secured the agreement of the Indian leadership to divide India into two separate, independent nations. Present, at Mountbatten's left, were Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan and Rab Nishtar for the Moslem League, and, at his right, Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Acharya Kripalani for Congress and Baldev Singh for the Sikhs. Seated against the wall behind Mountbatten were his two key advisers, Sir Eric Mieville (left) and General Lord Ismay.
sub-continent cast in the mould of their economic and imperial interests throughout (1910-1945) evading an accord on Indian independence.

The defence problems of free India called for an altogether new outlook giving the armed forces a national complexion affording a feel of direct participation in the defence of the country by the whole lot of population without hurting the sentiments of privileged classes of the past. Earlier no Indian had reached rank beyond that of a Brigadier.

In 1950, India was proclaimed Republic. In consequence to this, the supreme Command of the Armed Forces was vested in the President. The prefix 'Royal' was dropped and the three services were redesignated as Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force. The designation of the C-in-C was changed to Chiefs of Staff of the respective Service. The state forces of the former rulers were later integrated with the Regular Armed Forces of free India.

The excessive compelling circumstances created by the most talented, intellectual, enduring and fearless Indian leadership could not have been relished by the international Colonialists. Departing from the scene so unceremoniously wasn't a graceful event, however, for a 'Royal' people
who had ruled the World at one stage very recently. It was but natural. Winston Churchill once mentioned during the Gandhi Irwin parleys, "The loss of India\textsuperscript{9(b)}... would be final and fatal to us. It could not fail to be part of a process that would reduce us to the scale of a minor power". The natural reaction was to manifest in the form of something brittle left behind as a token of 'Anglo-Anguish'. In February 1947 the British had declared their intention rather reluctantly of leaving India by June, 1948 and charged the new Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten to carry out the transfer of power which led to a communal violence in the country. That resulted in preparing\textsuperscript{10} of the British retreat from India. If only the British were sincere enough, they could have easily organized a proper transition of power for a harmonious, trouble free and lasting self-governance. Instead, they preferred 'Divide\textsuperscript{11(a)} and Rule' theory and chose to fragment the British Indian Empire the conceptual seeds of which had been sown as long back as in 1940\textsuperscript{11(b)} itself. Proper division\textsuperscript{12} of geo-politically important territory, economic resources, financial assets, demarcation of international boundaries, etc. were perhaps deliberately left as planted bones of constant contention between the Hindu and Muslim ignorant masses.

Ultimately, in 1947, a disjointed Pakistan was created out of the portions of the Indian Empire. It
A MAN WHOSE HANDS DIVIDED THE HOMELANDS OF EIGHTY MILLION PEOPLE

Sir Cyril Radcliffe (in the white suit, above) a distinguished British jurist assigned the agonizing task of fixing the boundary lines between India and Pakistan in the enormous province of the Punjab and Bengal.
consisted of West and East Pakistan divided by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. It was most probably the worst moment in the history of Muslims of the Indian sub-continent when Mr. Jinnah once the hater of Pan-Islamism and the harbinger of Indian secularism 13. All of a sudden he discovered that Hindus and Musalmans had emerged as two separate nations—fanaticism became the order of the day. Jinnah was, however, obliged to create his Islamic State in a region where Muslim Culture and religion were till then least threatened and where the Muslim majority already staying never liked their culture and traditions to be contaminated by any sort of Muslim influx. In the process of migration, as everyone knows, hundreds and thousands of Muslims like their Hindu brethren of the same fate were butchered 14 on the altar of the two nation theory. And those who escaped to the holy place—'Pakistan', found to their amazement that they were not at all welcome. They were threatening the economic and cultural interests of the local natives. Hence, they got the status of merely refugees (Muhajreen) in a purely Islamic sense and not as an integral part of Unmat-ul-Muslemin (Islamic nationalism). That meant that they had to go back to their 'homes', i.e. India, in due course of time.

The plan 15(a) to partition of India was endorsed by the British Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten on behalf of the Muslim League, whether the authority to do so was conceded to him
by the latter is not known but the fact that he exercised it is a matter on Britain's own official\textsuperscript{15(b)} records.

There were particular plans soon after independence to reduce the Indian Army to 150,000 or even to 100,000. But as the independence came, the security environment of India took on dimensions not envisaged before. As the British left the sub-continent divided into India and Pakistan, got plunged into unresolved issues. The dawn of independence was marked by a never heard of communal carnage. Within the framework of the constitution the Armed Forces, however, proved themselves an effective instrument of enforcing law and order as also restoration of peace. Unlike what happened in Pakistan which became a theocratic state, India's social fabric was maintained with the secular character of the Indian Armed Forces, and the manner in which the assignment was carried out.

(b) Merger of Indian States - The Armed Forces

As many as 565\textsuperscript{17} princely states ruled by various princes governing their semi-independent provinces having been granted a blanket option of joining either-dominion were technically speaking, free to assume full fledged independence depending upon the individual province's might to resist merger. Of these, as many as 349 were expected to join India simply on a common premise of
territorial contiguity which yardstick was not laid down by the generous Royals on the eve of their departure that lacked grace.

Quite a few of the princes were aspiring to declare independence at a crucial time when the inexperienced self-government was confronted with a tedious task of integrating the various fragments and getting hold of the country—India, the Bharat of today. But for the shrewd statesmanship and efficient tackling by political leaders of free India at the time, and of course the unflinching loyalty of the Armed Forces to the Indian Polity at a crucial moment of crisis and above all the most calculated and clean military effort employed in the situation, the map of today's India would have been anyone's wild guess!

Defence forces had been divided between India and Pakistan. Hats off to those who cast their lot for retention with parent organisation within India alone and through thick and thin, maintained their commitment to Mother-India! Before organisation of the independent nations' forces was put in the right key the Indian Armed Forces had to be employed in aid of the Civil authority for maintaining internal security, or for that matter, to counter
any likely external threat. That lent a lot of strength to the Indian polity just in infancy since the forces were round the clock at the beck and call of the Civil administration in true sense of the word. With the exception of Junagadh, Hyderabad and J & K, all other princely states merged accordingly with the Indian union in more or less a desirable manner. Those who offered resistance and created viable problems for accession were tackled with the help of the Armed Forces who gave a highly disciplined account of themselves delivering the goods in exactly a befitting manner as behoves own country troops unlike those from the Imperialist organisation.

**Accession of Junagadh:**

A small province of Junagadh on the Western coast posed a serious problem to newly liberated India due to Pakistani vested interests perhaps for bargaining over Kashmir, or else it would have been a liability to them being 240 miles apart by sea from the nearest point in Pakistan. The Nawab of Junagadh with unstable flamboyance was cunningly played upon for accession to Pakistan, regardless of the territorial contiguity. Initially the plebiscite sought after by India was outrightly rejected by Pakistan. Disorders broke out like anything and intervention by the Indian troops was requisitioned. The
troops carried out the task very effectively thus paving way for a plebiscite in February, 1948. The public overwhelmingly opted for India and the state was rightly merged with the Indian Union. That eliminated a big source of likely constant security hazard to the country once for all.

**Merger of Hyderabad:**

And yet another difficult province, Hyderabad, posed an extremely dangerous and altogether typical situation let alone the integration. The Nizam declared himself as 'his Majesty'. It became an instantaneous national security threat only awaiting the balloon to go up; the vulnerability being from the fanatical Razakar local volunteers group patronised by the Nizam and an organised communist plot. The Nizam of Hyderabad, a stubborn and fabulously wealthy autocrat ruling the largest of the princely states had been encouraging communal violence fanned by his militant Razakars ever since, 1935. Meanwhile, the communists manipulated the ancient land grievances and played on the regional nationalism of Telgu speaking people organising peasant revolts. By the organised communism they exploited the volatile situation capitalising the opportunity with sufficient skill for launching a full scale guerrilla campaign at a particularly inopportune moment for young India.
A guard of honor is given to the delegates as they enter II, housed after the takeover in 1949.
Gen. Chauvel shown here with the Nizam of Hyderabad.
Anticipating a general revolution in the country the communists were well set for using Hyderabad as their base for expanding the military conquest in alliance with the Nizam as also the Pakistanis who had been hob-nobbing in their desperate bid to arrange the status of a ruler of a sovereign political entity. Pakistan managed a loan of huge amount (62 million dollars), thus attempting to jeopardise the already starving/denuding economy, political structure and security of newly liberated Bharat.

In the event of a total failure of the on going negotiations for an agreement with the Nizam, Indian troops were ultimately pressed into service on September, 13,1948 to restore order. Before the Nizam's appeal could be heard by the UN Security Council, the Indian Armed Forces under Maj Gen JN Chaudhuri (later on General and Chief of the Army Staff during 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict) had already effected a 'five prong entry' into Hyderabad in a well planned Police action which was executed with almost a surgical precision. The Nizam's Army surrendered and thus the unmanageable province was sub-dued in a 'Hundred Hour operation'. Consequently, the Nizam ceased to be a ruler as desired by Pakistan and was left as ruler under an Indian Administration. He withdrew his appeal from the UN and Hyderabad merged with the Indian Union accordingly.
Liberation of Goa:

Even after the British had left India in 1947, the country was not entirely free from foreign rule. The French- and the Portuguese still clung to their colonial possessions. These were small bits of land—Pondicherry and Chandernagore in the case of France; Goa, Daman and Diu in the case of Portugal. It was repugnant to the Indian sentiment that foreign flags should fly over them. The French later decided to quit, but not the Portuguese. They were not even prepared to discuss the issue. The people of Goa organised Satyagraha and Civil disobedience in a bid to join free India but the Portuguese put it down with a heavy hand. There were persistent rumours in 1961 regarding negotiations between Pakistan and Portugal for the establishment of a joint base in Goa. The fact that Pakistan was a military dictatorship in close alliance with certain members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) gave credence to the idea. Our relations with China being already strained there was the danger that the country might be required to fight on more than one front if Goa continued to be a trouble spot.

The Portuguese in Goa were expected to use their wisdom to emulate the French and peacefully walk out of their tiny colonial outpost in Goa. Finally the Indian Armed Forces had to help them out to see reason, the
counselling having resulted in a full fledged military operation carried out with nearly a surgical precision, with a delivery of only a calculated blow\(^3\).

The situation deteriorated when in November, 1961 about 4,500 Portuguese and Goan troops, supported by armoured cars and some artillery became aggressive forcing the Indian Government to employ its defence forces to meet the challenge. Operation 'Vijay' in December, 1961 with a two-pronged drive from the North and the East was launched. The Navy was to capture Anjidiv Island and ensured that no Portuguese ships escaped from the harbour. The IAF besides giving tactical support to the ground forces, destroyed the hostile air fields. The remarkable feature of the operation was the speed with which the troops and military stores were moved\(^3\). Another aspect of this operation was that the military activity constituted an accumulated contribution by all the three services in liberating the Portuguese enclaves of Goa, Daman and Diu\(^3\).

North East Frontier:

As regards the Insurgency problem in the hill districts of the eastern parts of the country, in 1954 the entire region was reorganised excluding Naga Hills\(^3\). It was divided into six frontier divisions and named as North East Frontier Agency (NEFA). Subsequently, the Tuensang Frontier Division
Phizo's guerrillas had won the first round
Three youths decked in the traditional garb of Naga warrior armed with spears.
was amalgamated with Naga Hills. In 1945 the Naga National Council in one of its resolutions asked for local autonomy to safeguard the Naga interests. Later in 1946 its stand further shifted, for placing the Naga Hills District of Assam under Central Administration. The proposal could not be accepted as its approval would have created problems for Assam, of which Naga Hills was an integral district. When Mr. Phizo took over the Presidentship of NNC, threatening demand for independence of Naga Hills emerged and Phizo declared an armed conspiracy/conflict against the Government Officials and those Nagas who did not show sympathy for his plan of action. After the climax of the hostility Mr. Phizos popularity began to wane, as fast as it had waxed, since he proved a nuisance to his own people. Hence Naga Peoples convention (NPC) that categorically rejected the demand for independence, and lack of faith in the leadership of NNC and a general awakening that the Nagas were as much Indians as the Punjabis or Gujratis. The new organisation moved gradually towards the fulfilment of the objective for which a section of Nagas had gone on the warpath.

Prestige of the rebels was further damaged when President Radhakrishnan officially inaugurated the state of Nagaland as the 16th State of Indian Union at Kohima on December 1, 1963. But the underground element carried
on their struggle and showed their presence quite off and on creating typical problems for security forces. The insurgency activities proved the involvement of Pakistan via the erstwhile East Bengal as also the Chinese. Though the British had introduced a military system in India improving it from time to time with technical developments in the best armies of the European countries that was not enough to help tackle the insurgency in a hilly and jungle terrain of the Eastern parts of India, nor was the subsequent experience gained by the Indian force in internal security duties sufficient enough for counter-insurgency role. Fighting insurgency within the country also became the prerogative of the armed forces. They had to evolve counter-guerilla concepts in keeping with the typical unorthodox means employed by the Naga hostiles trained and armed by Pakistan and China experts. The Indian army had been constantly called upon to tackle the turbulence along the North Eastern Frontier. In Nagaland and the Mizo Hills, they have been up against a regular guerilla activities.

By 1956 the Naga rebels earlier numbered about 5000 rapidly reached 15,000 calling for intervention by the Indian Army. Located mainly along the lines of communication and generally perched up on the highest points available near villages, the security commitments were to watch for
While activities, patrolling the neighbourhood and keeping the roads open for vehicular traffic especially convoys!

The government orders had been very strict — "you could shoot only if shot at" and any arrest of suspects was discouraged. All odds were in favor of the other side.

First of all, impossible to tell friend from foe since all Nagas looked alike. At times, even the whole lot of villagers sided with the hostiles giving active or passive support due to fear of reprisal by the hostiles. Under disguise, the underground would suddenly ambush military convoys and then only the security forces could react by which time the hostiles would quickly get away through the dense jungles.

Actually the Nagas are as it is very tough and fearless.

They attack their enemy with the most daring effort and

unusual fortitude of mind superior to the sense of danger of fear of death. They are used to living a hard life.

- sympathizers in every village and good walking skill

- Local Naga rebels to whom every short cut and subsidiary trail in the area was well known, combating the insurgency while fully taking care of the non-aligned, loyal and also the distinguishing all suspects from the 'all Nagas' had been quite a tricky affair which was tackled effectively with much desirable care and caution. The terrain could
A typical Naga village with terraced paddy fields in the foreground
hostile activities, patrolling the neighbourhood and keep-
ing the roads open for vehicular traffic especially convoys.
The government orders had been very strict—"you could
shoot only if shot \(45(a)\)at" and any arm twisting of suspects
or villagers believed to be sympathisers with the hostiles
were discouraged. All odds were in favour of the other side.
It was first of all, impossible to tell friend from foe since
all Nagas looked alike. At times, even the whole lot of
villagers \(45(b)\) sided with the hostiles giving active or passive
support due to fear of reprisal by the hostiles. Under dis-
guise, the underground would suddenly ambush military convoys
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the hostiles would quickly get away through the dense jungles.
Physically the Nagas are as it is very tough and fearless.
They attack their enemy with the most daring \(47\) effort and
possess fortitude of mind superior to the sense of danger
or fear of death. They are used to living a hard life.
With sympathisers in every village and good walking skill \(48\)
of the local Naga rebels to whom every short cut and subse-
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had been quite a tricky affair which was tackled effectively
with much desirable care and caution \(49\). The terrain could
turn impartially treacherous at any moment. The Naga rebels having been trained in East Pakistan and China would return with improved version of sophisticated \(^{50}\) arms on each mission to these anti-Indian nations regardless of the fact that Nagaland had formally become a state of the Indian Union in 1960.\(^{51}\)

In 1957 Phizo escaped through East Pakistan and stayed there for nearly two years in Dacca from where he went to Karachi and further flew to London\(^{52}\) via Zurich in 1960 on an El-Salvador passport provided for him by Pakistan. He obtained British citizenship and maintained hostility relentlessly. The Indian Army did the utmost to carry out job faithfully and its role on record has been singularly clear of the conventional crimes\(^{53}\) — looting, cruelty and rape. That does not mean, of course, that the innocent would not have suffered in the large scale counter-insurgency operations against the rebels, undertaken by the forces. Indeed, the basic concept of guerilla affair is to embroil the civilian population in the conflict and thus convert the people into their partisans and sources of sustenance.

Counter-guerilla forces represent the Government. The conduct of the troops in the field can ruin any Government's plan, also they could tell no lies since the concrete facts would manifest themselves. Immediate and successful military
operations are the best means of persuading the public that support of the anti-nationals who are normally misguided is unwise. This cannot be achieved by totalitarian techniques, terrorism or indiscriminate brutality against own public, but more dedicated and determined counter insurgency action over a period of time, by the Indian Force was bound to produce desirable results. Phizde armed conflict against the Government officials and those who did not follow him was well checked by the security forces, who in the process lost over 200 officers and men killed and another 400 wounded in hostilities during brief period 1956 to 1964. The hostiles choosing the best suited moments fought the troops on ground with which they were familiar with every nook and corner of the 16th full fledged democratic State of the Indian Union. The underground elements were divided to end the insurgency and consequently the security forces continued to check the threat. Peace talks between the Government and the underground began in September, 1964. Several rounds were held and the underground didn't budge. The cease-fire continued to be extended thereafter ever since September, 1964. By and large, the counterinsurgency role in Nagaland remained an unending commitment.
Defence Structure of the Armed Forces: The New Constitution:

After independence, with a Defence Minister at the apex of the defence structure underwent major changes catering for the supremacy of the civil as also proper coordination of functioning of the three services. The new constitution adopted a kind of organisation as suited best to any civilized modern community going in for the subordination of the military to the civil. The most essential aspect of the Government Primary over forces functioning under the authority of the Head of the State and the Parliament was ensured. The Defence Minister and the Service Chiefs drew delegated power from the Cabinet. It was most noteworthy feature, unusual in a newly independent country soon after its centuries of subjugation under foreign rule. It sounded almost strange at the time in the beginning, that the defence forces of India functioned under a parliamentary form of government with elected representatives of the people exercising the desired control over the development, direction and employment of the Armed Forces. Unlike what happened elsewhere, the pre-eminent position of the Civil power was never even doubted let alone being ever questioned no matter what crisis confronted the country. Loyalty and a staunch commitment to democratic set up of the
nation became the hallmark of functioning of the independent India's Armed Forces.

The principal link between the Cabinet and the Military was created through Defence Minister's Secretariat, a senior civil servant, the Defence Secretary started with the innumerable details of Finance, Administration and Supply that concerned civil and military officials at all levels of the Defence hierarchy. The chiefs were made responsible to the Minister for proper management and efficiency of each of services. They combined advisory and executive functions of the forces. These roles were reflected in the working of the Chief of Staff Committee, which was meant to study military problems and advise on the action to be taken. Once Government approved that the committee became a Planning and Coordinating body. The fact that the Chiefs were accountable for their action on the basis of advice made what is termed as responsible planning. That was by all accounts a salutary practice that could do much to bring a sense of realism to military matters. The chiefs developed the operational concepts on which precise military plans were drawn up by their respective Headquarters. Their subordinate formations were further, divided under various field Commands for the ease of administrative management and operational cum functional control. The chiefs of staff Committee and its inter-Service Committees subordinate to it
had to consider varied inherent contingencies. That ensured proper division of operational tasks by subordinate formation throughout down the chain in each service. Military matters of non-operational kind were dealt with jointly under the Defence Ministry and Service Headquarters.

The structure catered for an ideal and practical sharing of responsibilities between the Ministry of Defence and the Services Headquarters in keeping with the requirements of accountability to Parliament, exercise of Cabinet control and decentralisation of functional authority to the Service Chiefs. Under the system, the political leaders lay down policy and the national goals to be attained, the Defence Minister and his Secretariat attended to the physical needs of the services, and it is ever since left to the Chiefs, in their role as Military Commanders, to define the aims and objectives of each of the services, formulating plans and collaborating with the Ministry, maintaining the forces in a high state of operational readiness. That became a continuous and dynamic process, since preparations would be affected by changing threats and the development of new weapons and implied tactics.

The intelligence gathering depended upon the formations concerned with Joint Intelligence Committee. Prior to the Chinese invasion of 1962 the Intelligence organisation
functioned in isolation. After the 1962 experience it was reformed with wider representation and brought under the direct control of the Cabinet Secretariat, where it has access to intelligence from every source — civil and military.  

Changing requirements of the time, of necessity called for a scientific approach to defence. This essential ancillary is the Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister. Though not directly involved in the business of fighting this post was given appropriate berth in the hierarchy. He has under him a sizeable Research and Development organisation assigned the task of improving and indigenising military hardware on long term basis. Strong and reliable indigenous R and D effort is not only essential for the development but also inescapable for the defence technology which assumed sophisticated forms rather fast. Even in moderately industrialised countries defence R and D is the vanguard. In 1948 the organisation for defence scientific research was set up in India, apart from atomic energy and space, sophisticated technology is largely in the Defence field. The Indian Army also replaced its very old calibre of normal rifle with Ishapore's SLR, 7.62 mm which became a standard weapon in the forces. Supersonic aircraft, both production and design, electronic computers, missiles and guidance systems etc.
are all now a part of our Defence Research and Production. An interesting example of collaboration between defence and Institutions of Higher Education is provided by research and training relating to radar and troposcatter phenomenon which is an encouraging sign of such a large scale collaborative defence oriented scientific programme operating in educational institutions. The programme mentioned through relevant agencies has a far wider scope and potential both for defence as well as civil use. The collaborating organisation like, Indian Institutes of Technology, the Institute of Science (Bangalore), and the National Physical Laboratory (New Delhi) as also the Institute of Radio Physics of the Calcutta University/the University of Roorkee have all contributed a lot not only to defence related research but also a continuous stream of young persons in a new overall frontier technology.

Apart from the R and D aspect of the Defence, Structure also called for catering to the needs like military supplies which were produced through London, though a few articles mainly Quartermaster items like clothing and foodstuffs/small arms - ammunition for the army, were produced locally in Ordnance factories. The fact that supply to troops at the fighting front depends on effective provisioning, production or procurement, storage and maintenance and prompt movement to the point of fighting was
ensured under the new defence structure. Though the British had started producing a few items in the country due to compelling circumstances of the war in 40s, the production went into reverse gear once the war was over. Fortunately for India the partition left almost a good share of ordnance factories in India, they had a limited range of product and were outdated. The Kashmir operations and subsequently the 1962 experience put the country wise about risks of reliance on foreign sources of supply much monopolised by the leading industrialised nations. The momentum of achieving satisfactory situation was however on a low key. The Air Force and the Navy had to be built and expanded from a scratch. There was a marked change for the first time that the equipment was acquired from outside the UK and the US. The Army, however, continued to manage by and large on its inheritance from the Second Great War. The armour was augmented by the purchase of a limited number of tanks. After the Chinese invasion the government decided to expand the nation's armed forces considerably. The indigenous production of equipment was also increased to a large extent. The defence production within the country picked up to meet the needs of the forces to the tune of Rs. 42.84 crores in 1961-62, Rs. 64 crores in the following year and Rs. 111 crores in 1963-64. Arms, ammunition, vehicles and similar equipment alone amounted to Rs. 63 crores in 1963-64 that rose to
Rs. 84 Crores in 1966-67 and by 1970-71 the same was estimated as Rs. 118 Crores—the extent of 87% increase. In terms of the complex threat to our national security and the fulfilment of our national objectives the expenditure on defence by and large usually stands at approximately 3% of our GNP, a far smaller percentage than that of other nations. The concept of a systematic planning for the defence was first adopted in the year of 1964.

India's Defence Production Policy was first described in the Defence Ministry's Annual Reports, being based on the assumption that for the nation's size/defence problems, any policy not working for self reliance would result in a let down at critical junctures. Also the country could not in any case afford the resources to purchase its defence requirements from abroad, the indigenous base specifically catering to the needs of local terrain and climate was much essential consideration. It contributed towards area development apart from our economic growth. It was felt that the large difference between the quantitative requirements of peace time training and of war time consumption had to be taken care of while planning capacity. Having met the normal reserves needs of the services, both the production plants and human skills must be maintained in proper ratio so that in a war situation they would be
brought into action for amplified production without much loss of time. To the extent possible the production also catered to the needs of civilian economy — resulting in fuller utilisation of valuable capital investment. That facilitated replacement of machines with the latest models.

The policy has also been largely followed, though due to intervening emergencies, not much surplus capacity could be available for civil economy in the initial stages. In 1967 India's defence expenditure precisely stood at 3.3 per cent of the GNP.

Complementarily, a Department of Defence Supplies was set up in November, 1965 to mobilise facilities in civilian industry for meeting defence requirements of components/sub-assemblies in the field of armaments, electronics, vehicles instrumentation, engineer stores and the like. That help bridging over the gap likely to be created by stoppage of such items of foreign importing. Consequently indigenous production also increased meeting the requirements of the services to a full extent, our defence expenditure being 3 per cent or so only.

With the introduction of the Border Roads Organisation set up after 1962 many inaccessible frontiers areas in the North, West and East were provided with roads and thus opened up facilitating logistical backing for the defence
forces' requirements as also the general growth of some of our most underdeveloped areas.

Our normal five year plans ran into difficulties due to certain major developments that took place in our security environment. Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO and brought the Cold War into the subcontinent. The country's integrity was challenged in Nagaland and Kashmir. In these developments the international alignment of forces was also a factor. India was however able to obtain assistance for her economic development in a considerable measure from both blocks since the country had proved that it was a cohesive nation and was capable of organising its development and administration in an orderly fashion. Moreover, the country's image and strength convinced the aid givers who could not subject it to international pressures and monopolised conditions. After 1962 conflict our image suffered and we were obliged to seek military aid to meet the increased threat from the northern borders. That meant lot of external pressures to the extent of compromising our stand on Kashmir issue with Pakistan. Military aid promised to India in the wake of 1962 invasion was on a modest scale which ceased at the time of Indo-Pak conflict in 1965. Earlier the US had stationed a supply mission of 100 persons in India among other things to see that this country did not divert the aid equipment to any area
other than the northern front. This condition was the price which the nation had to pay for receiving the said military aid. Even the equipment manufactured with production machines received under the aid could not be issued to our armed forces deployed on the border except the northern ones. During this period the aid givers also exerted pressures in regard to India's development plans as well as its defence preparations; as a result a number of schemes instead of being helped by the aid programme were in fact delayed.

India's five-year Defence Plan\(^\text{93}\) was formulated for the first time in 1964. It related to the period 1964–69. This was not however based on a long term basis. Nor was it fully linked with indigenous defence production programmes. Thereafter a five-year plan on a revised basis was prepared in 1969 for the period 1969–74 considering the changes in intrinsic needs and technological concepts as well as a 10-year forecast of requirements. It was formulated in consultation with the Service Headquarters of the Armed Forces and the Department of Defence Production catering to defence needs over 10-years, and in some cases even longer periods. It was a 'role on' plan and was followed by another Plan in 1970 to cover the period 1970–75. However, the events of 1971 Indo-Pak War upset the planned
development and service priorities. After the 1971 war the slogan 'cut the defence expenditure' in favour of development faded away.

Independent India's Armed Forces took a special care of three essential factors — training, discipline and leadership by creating effective training institutions of every kind bearing in mind the incorporating aspects of experience of other nations apart from learning through conflicts with China and Pakistan. Special institutions for giving specialized training and experience like the Regimental Schools for various arms and services, mountain warfare, winter warfare, jungle warfare and miscellaneous schools of instructions. The main centres of basic training common throughout the forces were properly organized at Khadakvasla, near Poona known as National Defence Academy (NDA), at Dehradun, Indian Military Academy (IMA), at Madras, Officers Training School (OTS) and the National Defence College for Senior Officers. The Defence Services Staff College at Wellington not only maintained the traditions of the original Quetta College of British period but also developed much further along the new thinking. Similar institutions for Navy and Air Force in keeping with the service requirements came up giving a boost to defence preparedness of the Armed Forces especially after the 1962 and 1965 with the nation's viable adversaries. Our senior
military leaders felt through experience that though machine counts a lot in battle but basically it is the man behind the gun who matters and does wonders, hence the emphasis on training — 'an ounce of sweat in peace— a pound of blood in war' practice. They considered Military Science an area in which specialised competence acquired by professional training is necessary for decision and action. This field which concerns the implementation of the state policy by the Armed Forces, deals with strategy, tactics and logistics based on the immutable principles of war. A military professional has also to harness new technology to the act of war and managing violence. They strongly felt and maintain that a well trained Officers Corps is professional—only to the extent its loyalty is to the Military ideals. The most effective corps is one which is motivated by pride and loyalty to the Regiment, the corps or the essence of the credo—'the country first, the men the officer class commands — next and they themselves last 'always and every time'.

At home within the country the Armed Forces especially the Army came handy to combat natural calamities like floods, drought etc., or to maintain law and order and essential services. As a result of riots, communal disturbances and strikes/Bunds etc., civil Administration often requisitioned the services of ever stand by troops.
At times developmental projects too need the assistance of the Armed Forces. Increasing violence in the society and politicisation of the Civil Police resulting in demoralisation in their ranks have necessitated the employment of the defence forces to tackle its own citizens in additions to fighting the enemy. Between 1951 to 1970 the Indian Armed Forces particularly the Army has been called in aid to the Civil Authority as many as 476 times. Outside the country Indian paratroopers and other elements were flown to Egypt in response to a resolution of the UN General Assembly to maintain peace between the Arabs and the Jews.

In keeping with the neutralist policies Indian troops represented the country abroad on peace keeping missions to various other nations under the UN Charter. The places included Korea, Indo-China, Gaza, Cyprus, Yemen and Congo. The conduct, turnout and discipline of the Indians were deservedly appreciated all over. The image of international impartiality and earnestness of purpose as displayed by the Indian soldier on foreign soil won much of an acclaim abroad.
References:


8. Ibid., p.453.

9(b) Collins, ibid., p.55.


15(a) Photograph of the British distinguished jurist who was responsible for fixing the international boundaries between India and Pakistan in Punjab and Bengal. Source — Collins, Freedom at Midnight, Op.Cit.

15(b) Khan Abdul Mali Khan, "Facts are Sacred", Indian Express, (New Delhi: October 24, 1986).


44. P.D. Stracey, Nagaland Nightmare, (New Delhi: Allied Pub. 1968) p.82.

45(a). Ibid., p.115.


48. Ibid.


50. Ibid., p.196.

51. Ibid., p.352.


64. A.L. Venkateswaran, Op.Cit., pp.139-140.


82. *ibid.*


86. *ibid.*, p.47.


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