CHAPTER I

ARMED FORCES OF INDIA BEFORE PARTITION

General Background:

(a) **Army**: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation

(b) **Navy**: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation

(c) **Air Force**: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation
THE HALF NAKED FAHIR

Wrapped in the simple homespun cotton cloth that was his personal uniform, Winston Churchill's 'half naked fakir' arrives in London for the 1931 Round Table Conference. A few days later, similarly dressed, Gandhi arrived at Buckingham Palace to take tea with the King. Chided for his dress, he later remarked: 'the King was wearing enough for both of us'.
General Background:

When and whether a transition will ever be made from a system of states to a non-violent world order on the earth is the gravest question humanity confronts. The answer can only come with time, the wishes of Mahatama Gandhi notwithstanding. The answer can only come with time. Human nature being what it is, peace is the dream of the wise, war is the history of man. War is inevitable human phenomenon. Clash among human beings can not be ruled out as long as they hate, love, and fear one another and form into groups whose cohesion and survival is expressed and supported by mutual rivalry, outbreak of terrorism, guerilla action and handitry would continue to give expression to human frustration and anger. The fall out is 'War'. The ultimate purpose of war and armed-conflict is to impose one's will on the opponent. Sun Tzu (400-320 B.C.) felt that, supreme excellance in the art of war consists of breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. Defence operates at a passive level when it seeks to dissuade an adversary from initiating war convincing the
potential opponent that his attempts to impose his will upon oneself would not be cost effective or constitute a rational act. The active component of deterrence arises out of the capabilities of inflicting pain and punishing in case deterrence at the passive level fails. And another dimension of deterrence is related to one's own ability to withstand the pain and punishment in the resultant conflict. And yet we find that in about 5,000 years of recorded human history there have been nearly 15,000 wars at an average of about three per year. The present age has been characterised as an age of conflict. Between 1945-75 there have been according to the SIPRI Report, 119 wars (both internal and international). The total duration of these conflicts adds up to 350 war years. In other words, as a statistical average, at any time a war or conflict was going on in 12 theatres (till 1975). Territories of 69-countries and armed forces of 81 states out of 145 members of the United Nations were involved. This means, that nearly a half of the countries of the world, and the armed forces of 56 per cent were affected by the conflicts.

The profession of arms first at sea then on land, and then in the aerial warfare in the early twentieth
century led to the specialization of a third type of armed service\textsuperscript{7}. The next generation of weaponry may act from space, with the speed of light as the control and guidance systems in use do.\textsuperscript{8} Stabilization of weapon systems is ruled out due to rival research and development. Even if a global sovereign power attains monopoly of atomic weaponry, clash of arms would not cease. William James over seventy-five years ago felt that when whole nations are the armies and the science of destruction vies in intellectual refinement with the science of production one sees that war becomes almost impossible from its own monstrosity\textsuperscript{9}. Though the conditions postulated have undoubtedly arisen and it may even he said that the science of destruction more than vies in intellectual refinement with the science of production, war has by no means become impossible from its own monstrosity. True, the logical conclusion of scientific warfare is each other's total destruction by nuclear weapons. This however, is not very much of a possibility now, since a balance of power has been achieved between the two giants, the most powerful nations possessing nuclear weapons. But that does not exclude war with conventional weapons, helped no doubt by new processes based on nuclear energy, for instance, nuclear
powered submarines remaining submerged for long periods. Again inter-continental ballistic missiles, even if they do not carry nuclear war-heads, have so enlarged the range of warfare as to revolutionize it altogether. While therefore, a total nuclear war may be ruled out altogether, the idea that limited wars would also cease and the human beings for ever more live in an atmosphere of peace, would seem to be no more than a wishful thinking. The strategy of war would no doubt undergo radical changes. The changed nature of weapons will undoubtedly lead to new tactical conceptions and important organizational changes. But the objectives of defence would not be seriously changed for defence is legitimate resistance to force applied for gaining the objectives. This objective has never changed any more than the object of offensive warfare which is to force the enemy to yield to demands which the state considers to be important for achievement of its policy. If Machiavelli's soul still guides the foreign secretariats of the Western countries, the Kautilya concepts have been a source of thrilling inspiration for the Indian mind down the ages. Instead of the modern conception of co-existence, the rulers of the medieval and early modern periods of history
had more faith in what was going to be the famous
Dravidian theory 'the survival of the fittest'.
The result was an ever lasting continuity of intrigues
and wars which often ended in a formal, though nominal,
acceptance of overlordship of one ruler by another.

Admittedly, the best way to know the present
is to know the past and to visualize the future, one
must know the present. So, the present is but only a
link in the long chain of thought and activity of man.
This applies even more forcefully to the art of war.
Full scale war is no longer regarded as an acceptable
instrument of policy by most governments. In future
traditional military principles and aims must be
adjusted to consider alternatives such as deterrence, pre-
emption, and containment, eg. such armed conflicts as
occur might be conducted by small groups of special force
employing manoeuvre theory as well as clandestine
elements of every kind. The idea that the object of war
is the destruction of the enemy's forces, as Clausewitz
states in a famous passage, is only half true for the
real object of war is to achieve peace which secures the
objects one has in view such as territorial acquisition
and weakening of the economic and political position
of the enemy. Sometimes these objects could be achieved without ever fighting a battle. Similarly, the best defence often is to foil the enemy's plans against one's own security or interest without ever striking a blow. Such a position can arise only when the policy of a state is directed with wisdom and foresight and the military organisation to meet any enemy attack is known to be adequate. Security of a country can be ensured only if two conditions are satisfied: first, if its policy is guided with an appreciation of its permanent security interests and secondly, if its defence forces are organised in a manner capable of either alone or with the help of its allies of withstanding all attacks. This means in the first place that the foreign policy of a country must be based on an awareness of power relationships and must at all times be directed to the primary object of ensuring the security of its borders.

Warfare in India is known the world over for the ancient heritage from the recorded history of human-clash is contained in the ages old world famous Indian epics of Ramayana and Mahabharata. Prior to the British era, the armed forces in India were organised on altogether a different system based on the traditions of the past which
underwent only evolutionary changes with the exception of minor modifications, perhaps due to the limited requirements of the time. Major changes in the forms of warfare due to the introduction of stirrup and consequently the cavalry, and subsequently the cannon, had negligible effect on the set up of the armed forces in India. By and large the same old system of defence continued till the time of introduction of the Sepoy Army in India by the European powers.

**Army: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation Before Partition:**

Defence set up of the armed forces of India during the ancient period was unique and totally peculiar from the point of view of comparison with today's scientific warfare. The warriors were accoutred in mail and rode chariots drawn by horses. War elephants of India were world famous and their pre-eminence was unchallenged. The kings maintained standing armies. The warriors were highly trained in the use of weapons. Every ruler was supposed to go on campaigns of conquest after Desserah. Rules of war were a special code of conduct itself. During the war, the cultivator, women and cattle were not to be disturbed. Monarchies
were not without adequate cause to be uprooted but only reduced to vassalage, and an enemy who offered tribute was not to be molested. In the battle, the elephant did most of the havoc as the weapons available at the times were ineffective against that giant animal if properly protected against arrows by mail. The reputation of Indian war elephants was so great that the Selucus obtained from India 300 of them and it was by their use that he won his great battle against Phileolphus, for the Asian heritage of Alexander. So long as the pre-eminence of the elephant remained and the horse was used in war mainly for drawing chariots, Indian military methods were adequate for India's own security. In fact no-conqueror may be said to have set foot in the Gangetic Plains as long as the pre-eminence of the war elephant remained unchallenged. The Persians for a time occupied the Indus region which was known to them as India. It was this territory that Alexander conquered, and the kings that he claimed to have defeated were petty chieftains living under the protection of the Persian Satrap. From the middle of the Punjab Alexander withdrew to Persia. Nor did other invaders at any time before Mohammed Ghori in 1194 effectively conquer the Gangetic Valley. The Sakas, the Huns and other predatory tribes
tried but vainly to break through to the Gangetic valley but the Indian security system stood the test of the time.

The most important of all the factors which led to the failure of Indian defence at the end of the twelfth century, leading to the conquest of North India by the Muslims, and subsequently the British arrival during the period of Moghul breakdown, was her failure to develop a theory of war and defence. From the earliest days, as even the Vedas bear witness, bloody wars were fought on the soil of India by parties contending for territorial authority. Some of the battles such as the battle of the Ten kings described in the Rig Veda, and that of Kurukshetra, around which the epic of Mahabharata was written, were indeed of far-reaching consequences, decisive in many respects to the development of Indian history. But even these celebrated battles and others of which we have knowledge prove to us two indisputable facts. The battle was not between regular Armies trained in warfare but between tribes under their tribal leaders or between champions representing the two sides. Also, though the warriors were accoutred in mail and rode chariots and used many effective weapons, there is no evidence that the simple principle that men formed into a unit, supporting mutually and
functioning as a unit, are many times stronger than mere numbers, a principle on which all scientific warfare developed, was even known to them. Indian armies till the time of the Muslim invasions consisted of trained war elephants, a formidable and almost invincible weapon in those days, warriors in horse drawn chariots, and masses of infantry carrying every kind of weapon but with no effective training or discipline. The warriors were highly trained in the use of weapons, but the soldiery consisted mainly of peasants impressed at the time and provided with arms. Even kings who maintained standing armies paid no attention to their training, grouping or discipline. In the fighting among Indian powers this system did no particular harm, as it would appear war was not with the Hindu monarchs a serious occupation. Though every ruler was supposed to go on campaigns of conquest after Dassera, mainly to overcome feudatories, to put down difficult nobles and, if situation allowed, to enlarge his own territory by sorting out his neighbours.

The invention of the stirrup by the Central Asian nomads brought a revolution in the military strategy. That could be compared to the invention of the
combustion engine. That proved disadvantageous to Indian defence. Before the stirrup the horse had remained a conveyance alone. It gave the rider great mobility. But it was not as effective as the elephant for the rider of the elephant could shoot his arrows from his seat on the animal or throw his javelin and other weapons. With the coming of the stirrup the situation was entirely changed. The rider on the horse was thus able, with his feet firmly in stirrup, to stand up while riding and shoot his arrow. This was effective. The cavalry became the major weapon of offence, incomparable, till the development of the engine, in speed, manoeuvrability and flexibility and mutual support. Till the rise of the Mahrattas, the Hindus didn't develop cavalry of their own. The superiority of the Muslims in Indian wars was the mastery of the horse which they inherited with the central Asian traditions. The Muslim armies which held the Gangetic region, Malwa and Bengal under them and raided the kingdoms of South India under Allauddin Khilji consisted mainly of cavalry. For lightning raids over long distances this was the ideal arm. The Muslim invaders who time and again from Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan infiltrated in to India seeking loot a more hospitable
climate, riches and territorial gains. India at the
time was fragmented into many a small kingdom, existing
in rivalry against one another. They defeated and
conquered individual Rajput princes or the rulers of
Delhi. However, it would be wrong to consider that
they were always victorious. Mahmud of Ghazni was
defeated many times but each time he was spared by the
Chivalrous Rajput Prithvi Raj, thus enabling the invader
to come back next with a larger army. Finally, when
Mahmud won he gouged out Prithvi Raj's eyes. The Rajput
code of honour requiring the warrior either to win or to
die in battle also helped the invaders for when defeated
the Rajput killed themselves. Indian valour in any case
was throughout the bout evident to the opponent even till
the last drop of blood.

Though Babur introduced cannon in India, his
infantry lacked training and discipline. It became only
too evident when the Moghul armies came into conflict with
better disciplined forces. Not only was the infantry
untrained, inefficient and not properly organized in
regiments, but the artillery, which gave the Moghuls
their victory against the Rajput was hardly better. He had
brought with him technicians capable of founding cannon.
His followers could not do away with foreign technical
dependence. The Moghul Artillery was effective only against the local resistance. It enabled Akbar to conquer Hindustan and his immediate successors to hold it, but against foreign troops equipped with field guns the Moghul artillery was altogether ineffective. Also, the Moghul artillery highly cumbersome for carriage as such lacked flexibility on the battle field.

Due to lack of uniformity in arms /equipment and proper training the Armed Forces of India under the Moghuls too remained more of a mob rather than an organized force, with the exception of their marshalling of forces. The skirmishers were infront. Behind them was a line of artillery with supporting columns, on either side. The Commander-in-Chief took his position in the centre and to the right and left there were reserves which could be thrown into the battle. Behind the C-in-C was the Rear Guard. Actually, though the armies were arranged in this formal fashion, once the battle started it had a tendency to become converted into a series of skirmishes. Victory was decided not by superior strategy or tactics but by numerical factor. In any case, the art of managing of violence however, showed a marked improvement under the Moghul period as compared to what was obtaining before.
Then came the turn of the Europeans to shape the Armed Forces in India. They considered a smaller force, trained and disciplined to fight in formation, could defeat the unorganized masses which constituted the armies of Indian rulers. It is this appreciation and knowledge that led Dupleix, and following him the English East India Company, to organize the Sepoy Army. It was the instrument with which the company conquered India. They were drilled, disciplined and trained in the use of arms. They were organized in Units, Battalions, Regiments and Brigades. The units functioned in peacetime Cantonments and in war under their own officers. The soldiery was honoured by a regular pay, and accommodated in proper barracks. Their comforts were well looked after. The European officer Corps constituted the real leadership of the Sepoy armies. The Indian officer cadre had only what may be called training in drill and in the use of arms. They were ignorant of tactics and strategy, hence the retention of British officer lot continued. The Indian rulers began to organize their own troops in the same manner and to build up considerable forces under European leadership. Haider Ali took the assistance of the French, the Nizam that of Raymond, Mahadaji Scindia from de Boigne
and Perron' and above all, Ranjit Singh took the help of Avitabile.

Mid 18th century is taken as a critical period in the development of Indian Military Thought\(^{19(b)}\). Indian rulers gradually transformed their armies supported by adequate cavalry and artillery. It is with reorganized force that Mahadaji Scindia\(^{20}\) established and maintained his authority over North India. The regiments that Avitabile raised for Maharaja Ranjit Singh\(^{21}\) held their own in the Sikh War against the East India Company, and the war against the Sikhs included some of the most ferociously fought Indian battles.

The basic drawback of the forces of the Indian rulers was that they lacked a properly organised and trained officer cadre with the exception of Mahratta Army of Shivaji where a system of direct recruitment was tried an officer cadre selected and appointed by the C-in-C\(^{22}\) but the system passed away with Shivaji\(^{23}\).

Besides though the Indian rulers adopted many good points of the organization of the East India Company's armies, they were unable, generally speaking, to understand either the strategy or the tactics of large scale warfare. The Indian leaders of the eighteenth century with the exception
of Haider Ali, an untutored genius, did not understand strategy fully. They did not follow Western tactics in battle. For great geniuses like Ganges Khan and Taimur, previous training may not have been necessary. But geniuses apart it is only by careful and prolonged training of officers that an army could be effective. One of the foremost and inescapable requirements of any modern force capable of meeting a well trained enemy in the battle, is, to have an educated officer Corps which studies warfare as a science and understands all aspects of it learning from Military History. Though organized and equipped on the pattern of the East India Company 24, their men were trained in a similar manner but had no effective corps of officers, educated in the profession.

The strategic area around the Indian subcontinent became the centre of Britain's interest in safeguarding the territorial integrity of India. Any threat to India's borders from anywhere, Britain planned to meet half way, unlike the Indian rulers of Delhi who fought their major battles at Panipat far in the interior of India. In keeping with the situation obtaining at the time, the British introduced an integrated conception of the defence of India, and a doctrine of Indian defence supported by a
consistent foreign policy as suited to their imperial interests. They conceived the Indian defence based on the Persian Gulf in context of the Indo-Gangetic valley which remained an area of strategic interest of Britain till the end. They developed powerful forces in India on European system and the Indian Army constituted the main arm of their Armed Forces in India. The army itself was typically organised. It consisted of two parts, a British Army in India and the Indian Army proper, and it was only when the two were combined that it made a major instrument of war. After the Mutiny (1857-58) the British, quietly reorganized the Indian army to make it ineffective as a striking force without the active cooperation of the British. It was recruited from what the British termed the martial classes, Pathans, Baluchis, Punjabi Muslims, Jats and others. Whatever the motive it created a gulf between the army and the people, especially as the British Government took the greatest care to keep the troops isolated from the rising spirit of nationalism.

Till the first World War the Indian army remained an instrument of British sectionalism in internal politics and an instrument of imperial policy. Apart from the expansionist campaigns in Afghanistan and Burma
which Britain undertook with the Indian Army as its main instrument, it became the force on which the colonial system in Asia was based. The Indian army in that sense was not exactly national but served as colonial helper. The Indian empire itself was organized as a continental system. Apart from the British Navy, the force on which this great system depended was the Indian force. The British Indian Empire, that extraordinary organization which though subordinate to Whitehall carried on within its own range an imperial policy, played a strange and important part in the politics of Asia.

After the First World War a subtle change came over. With the rise of an integral nationalism in India the situation underwent a radical change. Indianization of the army leadership was accepted and eight regiments were gradually officered accordingly. Initially they were trained at Sandhurst but as the number increased a similar arrangement was made in India. The Indian officers trained at Indian Military Academy, Dehradun did well in the Second World War and came up to the British expectations. They gained sufficient experience to take over the Army from the British commanders in 1947. When the war broke out in 1939,
there were 10 British to every Indian officer in the Army. The impetus of war corrected the balance to a large extent and by its close the ratio was 4:1. Nationalization of the army was a commitment the British had made as part of the overall policy of handing over gradually the functioning of the Indian force. The War had hampered further progress in that direction, but the British had promised full self-government after its end. The elections in the UK in July 1945 brought a Labour government that was willing to help the Indian cause championed by Mahatama Gandhi, Nehru and other Indian leaders of the time.

The task of fixing the size of the post-war Indian force was apparently the most straining for the British. By June, 1945, three sets of figures had been worked out, the upper limit, a lower one and the lowest below which there was a problem. As the War progressed, the Indian Army came to be ranked as the finest fighting machine of the allies and won honour, both in the western and the eastern theatres of War.

To a certain extent the British Indian force kept pace with development elsewhere in respect of armament, organisation, training, but that was in consequence of its dependence on Britain. Though there were
Ordinance factories in India, and equipment of different kinds manufactured in the country, for the more complicated arms and heavier equipment the army was dependent on the British industries. There was of course no organization for research in arms or equipment, or even an industrial potential capable of supporting the forces in time of war. The army was not adequately mechanized. In spite of the fact that the human material was superb and from the point of view of courage, endurance, ability to act with discipline and self-control the British Indian Force proved themselves to be second to none. All the existing Indian Armed Forces were placed under the supreme command of Field Marshal Auchinleck for administrative control till they could be finally divided into two distinctive forces and placed under their respective governments. He had no responsibility for law and order nor would he have operational control over any units except those in transit from one Dominion to the other. Military Evacuation organisation was set up to evacuate Non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan and escort Muslim refugees to that country. The newly formed Indian Army also contributed in the administration of refugee camps which were set up at various places. This organisation did a commendable job. On the eve of partition of the country Pakistani and Indian Forces parted in a spirit of friendship and
Maritime warfare is different from other forms of warfare. In clashes at sea there are no battle-lines along which forces are ranged in almost constant contact. A naval task force or ship may spend many days moving widely in international waters searching for or stalling the enemy. When contact is made, the engagement may last a couple of hours or even less. If all weapon systems and equipment are not at peak efficiency during that short period, it may spell disaster for the force or unit. Thus, the high operational availability and efficiency of naval combat forces is an important factor and naval development must cater for it fully. As per Admiral Mahan, the great American theorist and writer, the object of any maritime strategy is to control the seas so as to utilise them to one's own advantage and deny their use to the enemy. He visualised 'control of the seas' as a direct opposite of the peace time notion of freedom of the seas and hence an automatic transition from peace to conflict.

The neglect of the sea during the Mughal period led to the conquest of India by the foreign powers. India's independence was clenched firmly in their hands. The British
power with the prevalent slogan that Britannia ruled the waves had created formidable naval strength before and in the second world war. Being essentially trading nation, they carried the Indian raw materials to the U.K. The Navy protected the right of way of merchant shipping on the high seas and defended the colonial coastland and attendant naval bases from hostile seaward invasion, thus, by and large the naval role had been generally akin to that of the British Indian Army as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.

Any independent country is expected to be conscious of its sovereignty and will not willingly allow foreign forces on its soil. An aircraft carrier or even a cruiser stationed 300 miles away from the territorial waters can afford some protection. The famous tactics of gun boat diplomacy was resorted to for sorting out difficult elements. The British till the end of the first Great War didn't feel the need of defending India from the sea, as she saw herself till then the unchallenged mistress of the seas and her predominance in the sphere was overwhelming. The Indian Navy came into existence more as a symbolic force than as an arm capable of defending India's coastline. In World War II the Indian Navy as a small regional force played a notable part. It was basically the Army that constituted India's
major force as in the other two Services British India could depend upon the strength of the Royal Fleet and Royal Air Force.

On independence, the Royal Indian Navy too like the Army was divided between India and Pakistan, with an approximate rough ratio of two to one. The sharing further reduced the Anglo-Indian Empire's local Navy which was otherwise only meant to support larger fighting ships in coastal waters, in mined stretches, and to perform other odd jobs.

Air Force: Set Up, Functions, Role and Organisation Before Partition:

There is no limit to human innovations. That applies both to constructive as well as destructive purposes. Ever since Homo Sapiens threw the first internecine brick, soldiers have been continually looking round for bigger and better offensive means. In the stone age, the invention of the sling increased both range and weight. The discovery of iron and the catapult further improved these advantages while the advent of gunpowder, originally invented for fireworks, spectacularly increased the weight, range and destructive capacity of projectiles. Likewise, the development of the art of flying was one of the few great innovations in military history since the first use of gunpowder. It disrupted the conceptions of the time-
honoured canons of warfare.

The development of Air Forces offered the possibility of striking at the enemy's economic and moral centre without having first to achieve the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battlefield. The World War-I demonstrated the offensive characteristics of the aeroplane with its speed and manoeuvrability and the effectiveness of its penetration deep into the enemy territory. The period intervening the two World Wars saw considerable progress in the design and armament of military aircraft and in the organization of the modern air forces of the world. The technique of landing by parachutes in enemy lines and for reinforcement was developed in a variety of forms. The air power proved an essential factor in the overall strategy/combined operations. The Air Force exerts pressure within the enemy's country by attacking any objective the destruction of which must have an important bearing on the war. Successful development of a land/naval campaign/conflict against a well equipped enemy is possible only if the air power, through its dynamic air force elements provides the conditions under which the land/naval forces can fight.

The career of the IAF (Indian Air Force) as an offshoot of the British Air Force System began in the year
1933. A small family of airmen, Indian technicians, called 'Kawai Sipahi' who had been trained in aeronautical engineering were posted to service the aircraft. In the Second World War the IAF was in fairly good shape and had received its baptism of fire. Indian airmen went all out to prove their capacity to man units efficiently although leadership at the command and administrative levels till the end remained by and large with British Officers seconded from Royal Air Force. To form a nucleus for urgent expansion, five Volunteer Reserve Flights were raised on a modest scale at Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi and Cochin as also the sixth one was formed later at Visakhapatnam as in case of other two services.

In fact the first Japanese fleet off the east coast of India was sighted by a coastal defence unit. In 1945, as recognition of services of the IAF in war it received the title 'Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF)'. Its pilots won Distinguished Service Order (DSO) and also a number of other decorations. Suite a few like Mazumdar and Baba Mahar Singh became flying legends. The IAF had fought side by side with some of the best equipped and trained crew of England and America in the last war but this small Air Force had some inherent limitations which rendered the force completely unbalanced with the departure of the Allied Air Forces from this country. In the building
up of the IAF during war time no provision was made by the British for transport and bomber aircraft. The maintenance organisation like the industrial resources of the country was most inadequate. These amongst others, were the problems that faced the Indian Air Force during 1947. The emerging national government was to work out its own strategic needs. With the partition of the country, the strength of the Air Force was reduced. Partition of the country on the eve of Independence changed the entire context in which the British assessment of the force levels of the services had been made. In the division of assets India retained roughly two-thirds of the old RIAF, comprising some seven fighter squadrons and one transport squadron. Almost all its permanent training establishments and air bases, located in present Pakistan were lost. An important step in the history of the IAF was that it became an independent Force with its own C-in-C.

At the birth of the Air Force, when it came into being in World War - I a tradition seemed to grow up in the British forces that the Navy would keep to the sea, the Army to the land and the Air Force to the air. As with all such unwritten traditions, the three services concerned, seemed to resent encroachment on their prerogatives, and if one service cut across the sphere of
another there was a certain amount of acrimony. It continued to persist thereafter, sincere efforts notwithstanding. Indian Navy was lucky enough to take a cue from the British Naval Aviation. The tradition, however, did not support the Indian Army's case except for Air Observation Post Squadrons for artillery spotting jointly manned by the Army and the Air Force.

An essential common factor of a modern campaign is continued air superiority. Control of the skies above is an essential pre-requisite for jurisdiction and freedom of action over land and water surface. Air power balance provides the yardstick with which to measure the efficacy of air dominance. Any defence service has to plan to meet the threats from internal as well as external sources. As far as Air Force is concerned, generally speaking, the internal threat can be discounted because normally, the Air Force is not asked to quell domestic troubles, leaving the air power free to take full cognizance of the external threat. In the context of Indian affairs as they obtained at the time of partition of the country this was not to be the case with the Indian Air Force. No account of this force can be complete without a mention of the part played by IAF in the tragic events that took place at that time. The IAF flew out refugees from isolated
WITH NO JOY IN MY HEART

His personal emblem, a freshly plucked rose, in the buttonhole of his tunic, a pensive Jawaharlal Nehru poses for a moment in the garden of Viceroy’s House (above). Anxious to reconcile on Indian soil the parliamentary democracy of Britain and the economic socialism of Karl Marx, Nehru agreed with Mountbatten that the only alternative to dividing India was civil war. Reluctantly he turned his back on his old leader, Gandhi, and ‘with no joy in my heart’ commended the Viceroy’s plan to partition India to his countrymen.
places in Pakistan area and dropped rations apart from other necessities of life to the great mass of humanity on the march.

World War-II accelerated the pace of Indianization for all avenues of feeding the armed forces in India with British officers had been closed, owing to the needs of the British Army itself, extensive recruitment in India to the officer ranks was resorted too. The Indian armed forces which were basically army predominant, served in many regions. They fought in various theatres and thereby contributed both to the defence of their country against invasion and the victory of the United Nations over Nazism and Fascism. They had thus helped the success of liberty and democracy in the world. Air Force and Navy still in infancy yet in their toddling stages, made immense effort to retrieve the situation in many phases of the war and gave brilliant account of themselves. The Indian defence personnel drawn from whatever region falsified the British notions of martial/non-martial class proving their mettle and firmly stood alongside their companions in the field, on water and in the skies. When the foreign elements of the British Indian force finally left the soil and after partition those who cast their lot with the Jinnah creation parted ways, the thoroughly filtered 'Only Indian' element stuck to the mother land to defend its integrity fulfilling the wishes of the Mahatama and Nehru.
References:

1. Photograph of Mahatma Gandhi wrapped in his personal uniform—simple homespun cotton cloth in which he had appeared in London for the famous 1931 Round Table Conference and later at Buckingham Palace for tea with the English King. Winston Churchill's 'half naked fakir' when chided for his dress had remarked: "The king is wearing enough for both of us". Source: Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight. (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1976).


3. Ibid.


6. H.C. Sarin (Former Secretary Department of Defence Production, Defence Supplies and Defence), Defence and Development. (New Delhi: The United Service Institution, 1979), p.3.


27. Ibid, pp. 102-103.


38. *Ibid*.


51. ibid, p.26.

52. ibid., p.29.


56. ibid., p.289.


68. ibid., p.260.

69. ibid., p.261.
70. Photograph of Jawaharlal Nehru—a very sad mood after he agreed with Mountbatten that the only alternative to dividing India was 'Civil War.'