CHAPTER V

ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT - 1965

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ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING
INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT - 1965

(a) Causes of Conflict, Geo-strategical and Geo-political Considerations:

Soldiers do not make wars; they fight them. Defence policy in its widest interpretation, can encompass practically all activities of a modern government. A country's security needs a strong economy and industrial base and a cohesive social structure imbued with an elan or idealism of its own. A modern armed force is a highly technical and sophisticated organisation, very costly even for the affluent nations of the world. Developing countries like our own, suffer, as well as strive hard despite many constraints in building up an efficient and powerful military machine, including the important factor that a country's development needs will have to be correspondingly sacrificed. Therefore, somewhat modifying the famous dictum of the Clausewitzian times that war is a continuation of state policy by other means, in the case of a developing nation, like India diplomacy must be geared to step in to close the gaps in the security screen. Unfortunately the country's efforts at containment through diplomacy did not succeed in view of the invasion by the Chinese.
Since the 1962 debacle, an earnest effort was made to bring up and modernise our armed forces. Early in 1964 a Defence Five Year Plan to raise army — 825,000 with modern weapons and equipment, a 45 Squadron Air Force re-equipped with modern aircraft and provided with suitable ancillary facilities, and in the Navy, replacement of obsolete vessels with new foreign or Indian ships.

The five year plan also envisaged the establishment of production facilities in order to reduce dependence on external sources of supply and construction/improvement of communications in the border areas as also expansion of the research organisation. Consequent upon the bitter experience with Chinese while India was seriously looking into the country's Defence problems by reorganising and re-equipping its forces, Pakistan engineered an incident involving an Indian border post in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch. They made a sizeable incursion in that region using tanks supported by a large number of artillery guns. Their choice of the time factor and place for this military venture apparently seemed to have been guided by obvious considerations like change in India's political leadership due to the expiry of Mr. Nehru in May 1964 and the vacuum having been filled by a less internationally known figure Lal Bahadur Shastri whose mettle was yet to be measured by a Pakistan conducted test.
The Rann of Kutch being situated at one end of the country offered maximum delay due to long distances and difficult communications the reaction time by the Indian forces by that time, the well prepared Pakistani incursion would be an accomplished fact proving Pakistani superiority in arms. The flow of superior foreign weapons did add to the Pakistani military might and there appeared a pressing urge to demonstrate the same rather openly for a psychological edge over the Indian leadership. Contrary to Pakistan's expectations the new Indian Prime Minister responded with a firm and open declaration that any attack on Indian territory would be considered a violation of its territorial integrity, and that India would therefore, reserve the right to retaliate when and where it suited its military means. Nehru was Pakistan's greatest well wisher in India and yet Pakistan rulers maligned him. He had realised that the deeper interests of the two countries lay in the internal political and economic stability of both and in their freedom from entanglement in the power struggles of other powers. He realised equally that these interests, as real today as they were then, could not be safeguarded and protected without mutual cooperation. He persevered in his quest for Pakistan's cooperation but was frustrated by Pakistan leaders who often misled their people as they constantly seek to mislead the world at large by holding up India
is out to annul the partition. On the other hand, India had been repeatedly stating that annulment of the partition even by mutual consent, would be nothing short of a disaster for both countries. Reversal or trimming of social, political, economic, defence and foreign policies, pursued by decades, would create stresses and strains of unmanageable proportions for both. To give only one example the clamour of millions of refugees to go back to their original homes and lands would be enough to wreck the state. But the slogan of India's opposition to partition is raised to silence the critics in Asia, Africa and the West who counsel cooperation between the two countries who see much in common between their peoples. Pakistan also misrepresents India as being opposed to the existence of Pakistan. This is done to promote the aim of achieving parity with India in military and other terms, a notion as unrealistic as it is dangerous. Neither country is in any way subservient to the other and each enjoys political and diplomatic parity, eg., in the UN every member state enjoys parity irrespective of its size, population and power, having only one vote — the USA and Bhutan both for an instance, being on equal footing. In economic field nothing prevents Pakistan from progressing depending upon its resources even out of proportion, to their area or people like Japan and Switzerland. Nevertheless, by no effort short of successful invasion of its
neighbour's territory could Pakistan acquire parity with India in terms of area, population, and resources. Complete parity with India is, therefore, an impossibility. Military parity can be dangerous not only because it is bound to rouse in India suspicions of Pakistan's intentions and force the latter to spend much more on defence than the Indian government need otherwise do. A craving for military parity with India also suggests that Pakistan harbours ambitions of colonial conquest at India's expense.

13% Mud flats of Kutch held high hopes of economic gains due to a rumour that they contained large resources of oil buried under them. That suddenly revived Pakistan's interest in Kutch in 1963 much after the 1960 Ministerial level talks between the two countries which could not settle the Kutch issue where Pakistan had been claiming an area of about 3,500 square miles. But instead of asking for resumption of the discussions postponed in 1960, Pakistan, perhaps realizing that the talks would not give it what it must have, chose the method by which it had occupied part of Kashmir. But unfortunately for Pakistan, 1947 was dead and gone and so did 1962 —— India was now fully prepared to meet a Pakistani attack. This time Pakistani rulers adopted a different method. It was a method of 'Quiet Penetration'. In January 1965 they
intruded into Indian territory a mile and a half on the Indian side of the border between Surai and Ding. Pakistan established a standing post at Kanjarkot which was neutralised with the establishment of an Indian post at Vigokot. Mutual settlement between the two sides followed. Under the cover of the story of usual frequent minor pulls and pushes between the paramilitary forces manning the border between two countries Pakistan concentrated its troops along the Kutch-Sind border and in the early hours of April 9, the Indian border post of Sardar in Kutch (Gujrat) was attacked with heavy Mortar and Medium Machine Gun fire. That followed by Artillery fire from 25 Pounder Guns under the cover of which two Battalions of the Pakistan regular army belonging to 51 Infantry Brigade advanced towards the post. They revealed through their prisoners of war and the captured documents and the investigations of these Pakistani POWs that the attack was pre-meditated and pre-planned. They had been resorting to periodical border clashes, intrusions and firing at several points on India-Pakistan border both in the East as well as in the West months before this attack. That resulted in sending for the Army by the Indian authorities.

The Indian Army took over the operational control of the border. Pakistani firing and shelling, however, continued till they were thrown back when the Indian Army reoccupied
the Sardar Post on April 10. Peace talks at diplomatic levels followed; in the midst on April 24, Pakistani attack of a Brigade supported by heavy artillery came at West of Chhda Bet. Yet on April 26, they attacked Bilar Bet Post with tanks and armoured vehicles.

Since Pakistan had nothing substantial to justify herself before the world, it was difficult to continue falsifying both geography and history facing the Indian proof carefully supported by all elements of evidence, i.e., maps, gazetteers and exercise of jurisdiction. Having demonstrated and tested her newly acquired military stuff, Pakistan chose May to hold out the olive branch. She was no longer interested in the Rann —— her eyes were turned elsewhere. Britain made efforts to end the fighting between two members of the Commonwealth. On June 30, an agreement was signed between India and Pakistan, accepting a ceasefire from 6 A.M. the next day, withdrawal of forces by both sides and arbitration of the Kutch dispute by a tribunal. But even before the proverbial ink was dry on the agreement, Pakistan had planned a more dangerous and massive operation on India in Kashmir. The ceasefire restoring status quo as on January 1, 1965 was achieved with the implementation of the withdrawal schedule but the other aspects like demarcation of border and forming of
tribunal etc. were marred by subsequent events.  

Pakistan apart from testing the Indian will to resist and repel a full scale attack also desired to feel the American reaction to the Pakistani use of US arms and equipment against India who were much expected to raise the matter. And rightly too, India did produce a photographic proof as to the use of American weapons and equipment against India in the Kutch dispute which sufficiently belied the assurances given by the US that these weapons were instead meant for use against the communists. Any way, that gave full liberty to Indian forces for retaliation with similar US arms too, that had been received as 'American aid'.

As things emerged later, Kutch incident was a part of Pakistan's Master Plan to seize Kashmir by force. A few months earlier Pakistan Foreign Minister, Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, had said that Pakistan had a "Master Plan" for Kashmir and that they proposed to follow this plan step by step. Their first step of the mission did not go wholly against their expectations. India had been taking only a defensive action all along till the cease-fire in Kutch including the response in the Kargil sector in May 1965. India displayed an intense desire for peace prompting her to agree to a cease-fire even though the aggression called
for stronger countermeasures. And even though India had produced irrefutable proof of the use by Pakistan of US arms and equipment in the operations, the US authorities had found themselves helpless to prevent their use. Hence, Pakistan confidently and fearlessly embarked upon the second phase of their mission — second step of the Master Plan. Fortunately for India the Indian forces were not lured to the Pakistani trap, the main theme of which was to induce them for an entanglement on a limb like the Rann of Kutch and thus with a free hand execute Pakistan's designs in J & K. Indian Commanders committed only a reasonable number of regular troops to contain the enemy in that strategically unfavourable area as the Rann of Kutch. Instead the Indians reacted by concentrating their regular forces opposite the Punjab border which forced Pakistan to do likewise while also compelling them to agree to accept a settlement of the Kutch affair. They desired to avoid confrontation in Punjab to enable them to exercise their master plan in J & K.

Geographically, Kashmir is encircled in the East by Chinese Sinkiang and Tibet. In the West, Northern Kashmir is separated from the Soviet Union by a strip of Afghanistan some forty miles wide. The prevailing strategic situation around both Moscow and Peking had made the fighting a
potential fuse in enlarging Sino-Soviet struggle for influence in the sub-continent. Great Britain and the United States also had a major security interest in the hostilities. The possibility of a foreign involvement was great. Without prompt counter action the conflict could have become nearly another world war right on the Indian sub-continent's door steps, involving the great powers. Washington and Moscow followed parallel courses; in this instance to restore peace, their temporary cooperation and restraint much in their own interest made a truce possible almost within time. Feeble efforts by Peking to aid Pakistan and to enlarge its own position by propaganda threats against Eastern India were muffled largely by timely American warnings. Pakistan developed closer relations with China by undertaking state visits early in March. Much high sounding statements were made describing and highlighting the Chinese backing for the Pakistani cause, they maintained the tempo of pressure over India by employing all possible means ranging from the steady drum fire of internal 'Hate India/Anti India' propaganda campaign to present India as hostile as also isolating India internationally. Pakistan appeared determined to force a showdown over Kashmir. For this Pakistan placed great reliance over the support of China. On the other hand, the Chinese, bestowing a lot of hospitality upon the visiting Pakistanis, subscribed to supporting a plebiscite in
Kashmir. The Chinese Foreign Minister used this occasion to make the first of several equivocal statements implying Chinese military support for Pakistan, of course without a pledge. The evident purpose was certainly to intimidate India —— "China would go to the assistance of every friend if asked for in the event of an aggression". The Chinese further asserted that, "The friendship and cooperation of two viable Asian nations, i.e., China and Pakistan are an important factor in the prevailing international situation". They further added that the solidarity of the 750 million people of China and Pakistan constituted an important force for the defence of world peace. In April 1965, President Ayub and his Foreign Minister Mr. Z.A. Bhutto paid a state visit to Russia. Soviet officials also went out of their way to impress Pakistani leaders and declared their resolute support to the peoples’ fight for their so called right of 'self determination'. It is, therefore, not surprising, that everything had developed against the Indian cause in diplomatic circles.

(b) **Pakistani Infiltrations, preparations and Pakistan President’s Declaration of War with India:**

By July 1965, Pakistan was all set for a determined offensive against India having well tested its recently acquired sophisticated weaponry as also the pulse of
India's changed leadership and the level of preparations and alertness of Indian forces in the Rann of Kutch. Since independence, Kashmir had been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan. India's stand on the issue had all along been legal, based on secular character of its polity. Where as Pakistan's self-seeking politicians and military Junta desired a Jehad against India followed by an armed offensive. Authority of the UN and its resolutions were progressively undermined over the last decade in the above background, Pakistani infiltrators and Mujahids entered J & K at widely separated points during August 1965. Before Pakistan launched the infiltration campaign into J & K, intelligence agencies had fed information about raising and equipping of paramilitary forces in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. We had no idea of Pakistan's intention of large scale infiltration campaign in J & K. A large number of infiltration on August 5, 1965 surprised the Indian Commanders. That is not to say that they were caught off guard, for the intensified cease-fire line violations, small scale raids, sabotage and spreading of consternation amongst the local population since the beginning of the year had sufficiently alerted them to meet any emergency. Linking up the Pakistani activities later it was possible to state with hindsight that the training and briefing of infiltrators had commenced as early as May 1965. These infiltrators
entered the J & K in early August, 1965 at several points along the periphery simultaneously with the object of creating an all pervading law and order situation for the civil administration of the state. They had planned to pin down the Indian military and para-military forces earmarked for the security of the cease-fire line all along its length, and to deplete any reserves that might have been kept centrally. In addition, especially trained agents and saboteurs had been inducted into J & K for mass scale subversive activities. The infiltrators were equipped with Pakistani arms and fully briefed and rehearsed in their missions. These were destruction of bridges and ambushing of vehicles/convoys with a view to disrupting lines of communications; raids on military Headquarters, civil installations and administrative centres; distribution of arms and ammunition to civilians across the cease-fire line and their enrolment as Razakars; creating situations which would result in paralyzing the J & K administration and encourage open rebellion in the state. While J & K was to be plunged in a state of chaos, a strong task force of infiltrators based at the Hajipir salient, was to make its way to Srinagar so as to mingle unnoticed with thousands of people due to congregate in the town for celebrating the festival of Pir Dastgir Sahib on 8th of August 1965. The next day
was the anniversary of the first arrest of Sheikh Abdullah and to commemorate the event, the Action Committee of the Plebiscite Front had already arranged a processional demonstration in the capital of the state. The raiders proposed to sneak into the procession, fully armed, and to stage an armed revolt and capture important installations, such as the radio station, the telegraph and telephone offices, the Police Headquarters, and so on, and wrench the seat of Government in J & K. This done, it was planned to constitute a Revolutionary Council, proclaim it as a lawful government and broadcast an appeal for its recognition and armed assistance from all Muslim countries, especially Pakistan; that was to be the signal for Pakistan's armed forces to walk into the state.

In a contingency of this nature, to offset the Pakistani design, Indian forces planned to capture the Hajipir Salient as a counter-measure. This was to be achieved by moving from the direction of both Uri and Poonch. It was intended to be the main base of Pakistan's infiltrators at Hajipir and also to break the physical contact between the infiltrating forces and Pakistan. Consequently, as soon as the vital areas and installations in J & K were sufficiently secure against infiltrators, on August 25, 1965 the Indian forces launched their two-pronged attack on the Hajipir Pass. The success of this attack had the desired effect, for after the capture of Hajipir Pass on August 28, 1965 there was a
distinct reduction in the tempo of attacks by the infiltrators in the valley who were all rounded up subsequently. Going by the previous experience as to the importance of Tithwal, a small town on the Pakistan occupied Kashmir side of the cease-fire line and a short distance from the Pak base Muzafarabad, Lt General Harbhajan Singh realised that if Tithwal was captured, the Pakistanis would obviously begin to think defensively as their own territory would then be threatened. The occupation of Tithwal was also part of the Indian plans and the seizure of this town had the results as anticipated.

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Twenty two days war of 1965 began on 1 September, 1965 with an attack by Pakistan in the Chamb sector once their design on J & K by clandestine means was foiled by the Indian armed forces as also the people of the state. They very cleverly selected the point of attack. There was plain country wedged in by rough mountainous terrain to the West and a formidable obstacle, the river Chamb, to the East, that would enable Pakistan to use its armour and heavy artillery in the area, whereas, due to cease-fire restrictions and a weak bridge over the Chamb, we would be unable to induct our own armour and artillery into the area of counter attack. An attack here allowed the nearest approach to the only bridge over the Chamb at Athnur, a vital bottleneck along our communications with Rajauri and
Poona, from Akhnur\textsuperscript{21} operations could be developed towards Jammu and the life-line to the valley of Srinagar completely severed. It lay at the intersection of the cease-fire line and the intersection boundary between the districts of Sialkot and Jammu. While crossing their armour over the international boundary, where the terrain was favourable, Pakistan could claim to have violated the cease-fire line. The area was governed by the cease-fire agreement and India could station only limited forces there. A full scale attack in this area with a whole Infantry Division supported by two Regiments of Medium Tanks against a truncated Indian Infantry Brigade was launched by Pakistan early on the morning of September 1, 1965. Initial success in such a case was inevitable.

The Indian forces retaliated with a full-fledged assault across the international border in the Punjab so as to compel Pakistan to withdraw her forces from the Chnab area to re-inforce those depending Lahore and Sialkot. The Indian forces advanced on a broad front towards Lahore and Kasur with the object of securing the Khogil Canal from its junction with the Ravi River in the North to its termination opposite Peshawar. By so doing, we intended to convert this formidable obstacle, which had been specially constructed by Pakistan for the defence of Lahore, to our advantage. Our Armoured Division
and a sizeable force of Infantry had concentrated opposite Sialkot for an offensive to neutralise Sialkot, and to drive a wedge between Lahore and Sialkot Sectors. The advance on the Lahore Sector began at 4 AM on September 6, 1965 and met with immediate success. By midday, the Ichogil Canal had been reached at nearly all points along the axis of advance. Although Pakistan had taken measures along the Punjab for a contingency of this nature, its reaction to our moves on the day of attack was weak and tardy except from the air, obviously due to the fact that they had been taken by surprise, with regard to the volume and the timing of the attack.

We too had set-backs in the Kasur Sector by losing the Bridge Head, when faced with 200 US supplied Patton tanks which had boasted of perfection in all three essential attributes required of a tank, i.e., mobility, armour protection and fire power. Its primary armament was supposed to be the best, consisting of a Range Finder, a stabiliser and a computer. A well trained and courageous crew was guaranteed a sure kill at the very first shot. The Pakistan plan as captured later, revealed that they had planned a three pronged attack spear-heading towards and capturing the only two bridges across the river Beas, at Mariki and Beas, behind our forces advancing towards Lahore and then roll us up from the Rear. Once this was achieved, all territory West of Beas
including Pathankot, would have been captured. That would have cut off J & K the only aim of Pakistani design. They were so sure of the success of this master blow that Pakistan High Command launched their Armoured Division prematurely on September 8, 1965. The Indian forces beat back the Pakistan Armoured Division by September, 10; the enemy leaving behind on the battle field nearly one hundred Patton casualties of which 32 were found to be perfect runners.

Our offensive on the Sialkot sector was launched on September, 8, 1965. It met with initial success but there was not enough time to develop its potential as the cease-fire came on September 23, 1965. Meanwhile, after having been thwarted in the Kasur sector, Pakistan had been able to transfer the remnants of the Armoured Division to oppose our forces in this sector. On September, 23, we had a distinct advantage over Pakistani forces. It was a war of attrition at the end of which India was in possession of nearly 700 square miles of Pakistani territory against a loss of about 210 square miles of Indian territory as stated by General Chaudhuri, the then Chief of the Army Staff at a news conference on September 24, 1965. Ultimately, as on September 23, 1965 with effect from 3.30 AM a cease-fire at the instance of vigorous efforts of UN came into effect.
(c) Part played by Naval and Air Power:

One of the major considerations which affect any service is the importance it is accorded by the government there has to be a feeling that Navy or for that matter Air Force or Army is essential to the scheme of the country's defence and it enjoys the justified patronage of the highest leadership in the country. She must also have the encouraging support of the people at large. All round cooperation in the Navy's progress is possible if the political leadership, the bureaucracy, the press, industry and trade are well informed of its role and functions. Planning is essential for any service, naval planning to be worthwhile must be long term in character. It takes 8 to 10 years from the conceptual\textsuperscript{23} to the commissioning stage of the prototype of a modern warship. It takes several years to develop a modern naval weapon system. It takes a decade or more to establish modern naval base facilities. Naval development plan is formulated on the basis of a realistic evaluation of the war time danger to be faced in relation to what must be guarded.

India has a coastline as long as, and perhaps as vulnerable as her land portion. Also the Indian Coastline is the longest in the world facing navigable waters. After independence, the main defence problem lay between India and Pakistan and it is not surprising that the Indian
attention remained confined to the land frontiers and not much interest was taken in the Indian Ocean or its significance which came to limelight only much later.

The Royal Navy's Hercules, a light-fleet carrier purchased in 1957 and joined the fleet in 1961 after thorough refitting and modernisation and was rechristened INS Vikrant. With its commissioning in August 1961, the naval reequipment and expansion programme had completed. But the force was greatly dependent for spares, repairs, training and other facilities on the Royal Navy which was in view of the leading British role.

At the outbreak of hostilities in 1965 our warships were not fully prepared because the policy was to keep the navy out of the conflict. But the Pakistan Navy out of sheer sadism — and there could be no other excuse for it, bombarded the nearest, smallest and innocent Indian port of Dwarka which had neither naval nor air importance. The Indian Navy on the other hand not tasked to participate in the 1965 war due to the country's naval policy of not escalating the war at sea, was caught unfortunately, unaware by the unexpected development. 'Ghazi' the US gifted Pakistani submarine, was found lurking around Bombay waters for a few days. The Indian Navy, however, defended the shores and insured that the sea lanes were kept free from the enemy piratical and barbarous acts. Retaliation by the Indian Navy was, however, out of the purview of the national scheme of operations of 1965 Indo-Pak Conflict.
The Air Force did not play as crucial a role in this conflict as it did, for instance, in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. The IAF gave an effective air support in Chhamb Sector and forced Pakistan to regroup their forces who were planning to exploit the surprise element hoping to take Akhnur and Jamera without much opposition by Indian Armour and the Air Force. The enemy advance was halted. Pakistani Air Force (PAF) appeared on September 3, 1965 with Sabre Jet (F-86) of American origin. The matching IAF aircraft, fighter, which was switched into operations for the first time using conventional guns. The PAF weapon system for the air element was much superb. Squadron Leader T. Keeler shot down the first Sabre in a dog fight. Then on September 4, Flight Lieutenant US Pathania also shot another Sabre, thus, displaying not only a superior technique and skill of handling the aircraft. A miniature Battle of Britain was fought in Chhamb-Jaurian Sector and the IAF established its definite superiority over the enemy air force. On September 6, IAF in view of Indian Forces having crossed Wagah for Lahore and then having opened another front in the Sialkot area, carried out brilliantly the tasks given to it for attaining air superiority over various battle zones, giving close air support and to blunt Pakistan's war machine by strategic bombing. The targets were military, lines of communications, supply dumps and other installations that might have contributed
towards Pak-war effort directly or indirectly. By 0930 hours on September 23, 1965 at cease-fire Pakistan had lost 73 aircraft, a little more than half of its fleet of 140 combat fighters, Sabres 104. IAF losses were 33 all types. 471 Pak-tanks were rendered out of action and 36 were captured intact. Perfect understanding between the services both at the top and operational levels were responsible for the outstanding total performance of India in defence of her honour, territory and integrity against a bellicose, belligerent and otherwise over confident enemy.

Regarding reducing Pak-military effort on the western front by extending the war to the Eastern Front in 1965, India had a very limited capability to switch over the required quantum of force a sizeable portion of which was well contained by the Chinese threat. Also the other front in the East did not appeared politically sound enough and had hardly any rewards worthwhile rather it was the contrary. From military point of view as well it would have meant undue expenditure of equipment and reserves, already in acute shortage. The threat perceptions were analysed with a joint effort of political/military leadership. This was a cue taken from the 1962 issue. However, there was much scope for more closer understanding between interservice elements.
(d) **Results of the Conflict and Inferences Drawn:**

Tangible successes in war are but passing gains that in peace, sooner or later, are obliterated. The success on the battle-fields, the loss and gain of territories, the loss in men and equipment are the inevitable tragic results of war, but these in themselves do not matter much. It is in the intangible that wars' great impact is felt. To India, the impact had been far reaching and whatever history's verdict on the war may be, there is no doubt that 1965 war was the turning point in India's history. The decisions by India in Kashmir and Punjab were firm and quick in their own right whatever the outcome of the conflict. Needless to say, the successes in the area that followed will have established that the nation was equally robust to carry out the decisions. In future, there was going to be no fear of defeat and no defeat because of fear. India was no more to be intimidated by threats. The nation resolved to meet force by force. It was a major experience which the country went through in the weeks of August and September, 1965.

India would not seek war, but fighting she would not shirk if it was forced on her. The events of August and September, 1965 served as proof of this resolve. They demonstrated how the Indian nation would react to an
aggression. The prophets of disunity were greatly disappointed by heart-warming display of united resolve transcending regional, linguistic, sectarian and political considerations. The armed forces themselves were a mirror of the rich mosaic of India's national life, held together by an overwhelming loyalty to India's secular modern democracy which was fighting the world's battle against medievalism, bigotry, and war-mongering. Out of this baptism of fire the ancient Indian nation emerged with a new lustre. India, for the first time saw a national wave for a united response to a crisis confronting the nation. The readiness to sacrifice displayed by the people in 22 days war serves as an ample testimony. The famous slogan 'Jai Jawan-Jai Kisan' was the normal feeling obtaining during and immediately after the 1965 war which was in total contrast to 1962.

To all those people whose kith and kin were fighting the war, the war painted a grim picture — uncertain future may be in store before them while the country's freedom hung in balance. They suffered pangs of anxiety which meant every day dawned with fear: is he still alive?, has he lost a limb? During the war 'Main rajai' aur 'Khushi' hun, was the slogan of the jawans, may be they were lying in bed with any limb/leg/foot missing.
Operations by emotion was the theme underlying the 1965 conflict with Pakistan. Their plan was based on first getting India to panic and move down heavy re-inforcements from the main Punjab Theatre to Kutch. Once they had got us there, then the so-called raiders would have gone into Kashmir, supported by Pakistan's regular army capturing the key point of Akhnur. Though the first part of the Pakistan plan misfired, the enemy was so intrigued with the ingenuity of the second part, that they put it into action anyway, and that part also failed. The larger pattern of Pakistan's intention to seize Kashmir in the process became apparent only on May 5, 1965. Though the actual details of the plan's execution were not clear at that time for the initiative lay, as it always does with the aggressor.

In J & K, the infiltrator technique was designed to form a backing for a guerilla uprising among the local people. In the Kashmir valley it failed as none of them was a Kashmiri, which fact violated the first principle of guerilla-warfare. The movement designed by Pakistan failed because after all it was not of the State but imposed. The failure attributed to many other reasons. Without a political goal, guerilla warfare must fail as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained. Ayub's Mujahids played the central role in attempting to carry out the famous 'Three step Formula' of General Vo Nguyen Giap.
Ho Chi Minh's guerilla expert. For a sure success the aggressor must always be prepared to intervene with conventional forces in support of the paramilitary units or guerilla allies.

Pakistan Army had opposed the operations 'Gibraltar' for which were finalized in the second week of May, 1965 pointed out that if only the Kashmiris themselves rose to the fore front and continued the struggle relentlessly there after perhaps in that eventuality Pakistani involvement in relation to Operation conceived was expected to be much in keeping with the moral/legal values in the international relations. Also the army submitted that the preparations for the guerilla activities for the first time in the valley were not enough. The Pak Army Chief General Mohammad Musa also pointed out that five Indian Infantry divisions deployed in the theatre would pose quite a lot of problems. The administrative backing for the infiltration was not feasible. The Pak Army also submitted the fact about the vast imbalances between the two countries armed forces. They had not included Akhnur in the Gibraltar plan. When the Indian forces struck them in Tithwal and Hazipur and oriented towards the so called Azad Kashmir, General Musa states that, to contain the Indians over there and release their pressure on the North, Pakistan resorted to attack on Akhnur from the Chhamb side to take revenge.
The sketch shows the PAKISTAN 1 Arm Div’s fifth and the final attack on our Division carried out on 10 September 1965. The attack broadly proceeded as follows:

(a) By 0630 hrs, 4 Arm Bde appeared in the vicinity of the village MANAWAN with a view to luring our armour away from Divisional Defence Sectors, so that the enemy could deal with our defences unhindered.

(b) By approx 0830 hrs 5 Arm Bde struck against the Divisional Defence Sector. It tried to overrun defence locations, bypass, and infiltrate through them.

(c) By 1330 hrs 4 Arm Bde’s out-flanking move towards DIBBIPURA was noticed. By 1800 hrs, it was trapped in MAHMUDPURA area.
An unbiased and critical examination of the situation in the Chamb sector during 1965 operations reveals that the Pak success would have enabled them to capture not only Aknur and cut out J & K from the Indian defence system but also threatened an easy fall of Gurdaspur via Dera Baba Nanak Bridge and ultimately Pathankot as well. The 22 days war proved it beyond doubt that in his supreme arrogance and conceit the military dictator underestimated the Indian armed forces both in strategy and tactics. Militarily speaking, two battles of Twenty two day war —— the Battle of Assal Uttar in the Khem Karan Sector and the 15 day tank battle in the Sialkot sector proved to be the most decisive that fully humbled Pakistan's overestimating military leadership. Professional comments and detailed assessment of foreign neutral observers and various military experts adjudged the professional competence and capabilities of the Indian Armed Forces during 1965 operations unlike 1962 period, as second to none in the world. The very fact that most of the fighting took place in Pakistan territory was by itself in support of the Indian performance in relation to totally contradictory/false claims by the strictly controlled Pakistan media. Pakistan leaders going to the extent of stating on the floor of the UN that they would wage 'a war for 1,000 years' only indicates the urge they had harboured to teach India a military lesson as also seize Kashmir.
In 1965 India faced crisis on three fronts—the internal security was difficult to maintain due to a state of lawlessness created by divisive forces and communal disturbance. During August 1965, twelve major incidents and many minor ones took place throughout the country, their frequency and violence unaffected by the start of the guerilla war. On the external front, Pakistanis bucked up by the Chinese were all set to force a showdown on the country, anticipating that India was weak and divided and that a push would oust the central government. Yet the war had a profoundly unifying effect on India, for the first time particularly after the start of the Punjab offensive, giving lot of moral backing to the armed forces. The Indian Prime Minister Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri made a statement in the Lok Sabha on September 22, 1965 relating to the Security Council's demand for a cease-fire, said: "The nation has recently been going through its greatest trial. The times have been difficult but they have served a great purpose. The whole world knows now that the people of India—Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Parsis and others—constitute a United Nation with a determined common will and purpose. On the battle front, the supreme sacrifice has been made by the members of all communities, who have shown that they are Indians first and Indians last. . . . . To our armed forces I would like to pay, on behalf of this Parliament and the entire country, our warmest tributes. By their valour
The 'Late Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri addressing the Jawans in a forward area.
and heroism they have given a new confidence of strength
to the people of India. Those who have lost their beloved
on the battle front, have made a contribution to the
preservation of our independence, which will never be
forgotten by a grateful nation. "Their sorrow and their
pride are shared by the whole country.................". 55

In yet another statement of the Indian Prime Minister, on
November 5, 1965, he said, "Hon'ble Members would be grati-
fi ed to know that when I visited the forward areas in the
Lahore and Sialkot Sectors three weeks ago, I found the
soldiers and the airmen imbued with the highest morale
57 . Most of them had fought in the battle field and had seen
some of their colleagues laying down their lives heroically
in defence of the motherland. On behalf of this House, and
indeed on behalf of all the people of India, I conveyed to
them our feeling of highest appreciation and deep grateful-
ness and gratitude and told them how the entire nation was
United in its determination to fight the invader...........". 58

(e) **Tashkent Agreement:**

The Soviet Union offered its services to mediate
between two non-communist adversaries for the first time
and carefully chose Tashkent as the place situated only at
a two-hour flying distance from New Delhi. It combined
bustling modernity with a past that was familiar to both
Indians and Pakistanis. They being known for their penchant
for symbolism bore in mind the historical significance
59 of Tashkent as the place from which the great emperor Babar
came to India to establish the Moghal dynasty and which was the base for the ill-fated communist expedition against British India in the 1920s. The Soviet Premier Kosygin sent a note to the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on September 18, 1965 proposing a meeting in Tashkent between Pakistan President Ayub Khan and him. Based on India's acceptance, an invitation was conveyed to Ayub Khan who, after expressing preference for a settlement through the Security Council, eventually accepted. They met Kosygin as mediator.

After six days of hard bargaining on each side, the Tashkent declaration was signed on January 10, 1966. When the conference had opened on January 4, 1966, the battlefield areas were still unspecified, economic relations were suspended and diplomatic contacts were negligible. For several weeks beforehand, Ayub and Shastri had maintained public attitudes of rigidity, with no sign of compromise. Shastri originally insisted that Kashmir could not be discussed at all, Ayub on the other hand insisted that a political settlement of Kashmir was of fundamental necessity and made this a prerequisite to a 'no-war' agreement, which the Indians greatly hoped to obtain. In short, India's hope from the meeting was to clean up the aftermath of the war, by agreeing on such matter as the withdrawal of forces, whereas, Pakistan's purpose was unchanged desire to keep the Kashmir question alive.
Kashmir issue, however, was the most dominating hurdle for the talks. The USA, on the other hand, had categorically mentioned that America regarded peace on the subcontinent as an essential pre-requisite for reviving assistance. Ayub's visit to Washington also had not fetched any thing. The uncertainty over the future of foreign aid and the possibility of renewed hostilities with India worried him. India, suffering from her worst drought of the century and facing near-famine had requested heavy emergency American food grain shipments in early December. Shastri, who had planned to visit Washington early in 1966, had been given a definite indication that he also would be told that peace was essential for resumption of direct economic assistance, and that self-help was needed for long term food commitments. Nevertheless, both leaders had gone to Tashkent under severe domestic pressures which they believed required implacability, as had been true so often in the past. Neither Mr. Shastry nor Ayub had the political blessings to sell in their respective countries any solution which may even remotely look like a compromise. The mood within India for example, strongly favoured permanent Indian occupation of the territories in Kashmir which had been won during the fighting, and this had been an impediment against reestablishment of the August 5 positions. An extremely fearful and suspicious environment had created a highly dangerous situation because even if neither side had any desire for further fighting the 'hysteria' might have driven the two countries to war again.
By Sunday, January 9, 1966 the Conference came to a halt 65(a) over the question of including Kashmir in any final joint statement to be issued. The Indian delegation made plans to leave on Tuesday, January 11 and it appeared possible that the meeting would end with no formal communiqué. The conference at Tashkent spelt an unmistakable note of disagreement, 65(b) also a détente on any basic issue was otherwise considered impossible.

After the usual pledges of not resorting to force to settle their dispute and non-interference with each other affairs, military both sides agreed to withdraw their armed forces not later than February 25, 1966 to the positions 66 they held before August 67, first week (5th day). Till then both countries were to observe the terms of the cease-fire serupulously. Prisoners of war would be repatriated without delay. Diplomatic relations were restored. On the whole the declaration achieved hardly anything worthwhile, and relations between the two countries reverted to what they were before. The armed forces had made tremendous sacrifices in 11,000 men killed, wounded, and missing, and it was felt that these sacrifices had gone in vain: The burden of running a war at the rate of Rs. 250 million a day affected Indian economy without adequate recompense and was therefore believed to have been a forced wastage. There were compelling reasons for both sides at Tashkent to avoid the displeasure of the hosts who had done their best to bring in the opposing neighbours to the negotiations on their own soil,
and this in turn became a subtle but significant pressure for a successful finale.

The strain of the Conference and, particularly, the final negotiations showed on all the participants. The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri who had apparently bore up and endured the strain well displaying remarkable physical fitness appeared in good spirits when he attended the final banquet on the night of January 10, 1966. Leaving at about 10 PM, he returned to his 'Villa' and remained alone. At 1.20 AM he awoke with severe coughing and died ten minutes later of a severe heart attack, despite the efforts of his personal physician and a team of Soviet doctors who quickly arrived. His death saddened the diplomats and brought genuine condolences as, it appeared at that moment and he came forward as one of the pallbearers being Ayub himself at Tashkent. The Prime Minister's body, returned to New Delhi, was cremated on January 12, 1966, with a million mourners in the streets.

War had brought Shastri from the shadows, had made him a popular public figure and a resolute political leader of such toughness and determination that the government soon missed his firm control. There were doubts in many circles within India as it emerged at the time of endorsement of the Declaration in the Lok Sabha on February 21, 1966 that Shastri was under strong Soviet pressure. The then Foreign Minister Mr. Swaran Singh denied it categorically.
References:


9. Ibid.

10(a) Map of Kutch.


11. Ibid., p.6.


20. (c) Map showing Pakistan Aggression in J & K and other related areas in India. Source: D.K. Hanarkar, *Twenty Two Fatal Days, Pakistan Got to Rise* (Bombays


28. (b) Personal interview – with Air Vice Marshal D. Koelar.


43. *Ibid.*, p.77


49. ibid., p.157.


51. The Hindu, Madras, August, 15, 1965.

52. The Statesman, New Delhi, August, 17, 1965.


54. Hindustan Times (New Delhi: August, 15, 1965.).


56. ibid., p.221.


61. ibid., Tashkent Declaration, (Vol.XII. No.5), p.6896.


64. ibid.

65. (b) Hindustan Times, January 10, 1966.


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