CHAPTER III

ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING JAMMU & KASHMIR OPERATIONS; 1947 - 1948

(a) Geostrategical and Geopolitical Considerations.
(b) Military Revolt and Setting up of Azad Kashmir.
(c) Merger of Kashmir with India.
(d) Reorganisation of Indian Army for Kashmir operations.
(e) Results and Conclusion arrived at.
ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIA DURING JAMMU &
KASHMIR OPERATIONS: 1947-1948

(a) Geostrategical and Geopolitical Considerations:

Strategy is an art of projecting and directing the resources in a campaign at the right place and time. It is concerned with those measures which serve to bring the different forces into play at the decisive front under the most plausible and favourable conditions. Geostrategy is, thus, the study of geographic phenomenon in relation to the projecting and directing of a campaign in a particular area.

The geographical features of landscape play a major role in modern warfare. Landscape feature may provide for a good camouflage to military forces. Therefore, geo-strategy is known as the science of military calculation of geographical elements within a certain area related to the formulation of its defence plans and policies. For which purpose official as well as miscellaneous non-official aspects of geographical and military conditions like the size and composition of Armed Forces for the land, sea and air operations, technological and geographical extent of war as also military objectives for the destruction of enemy’s will to use force effectively are considered. The predominant factor however, remains the destruction
of the enemy war machines. In addition, geographical objectives which include pushing out the enemy from a strategically significant territory through military action. The physical elements which pose problems of combat is yet another aspect worth consideration would include the economic/technological capability of the nations.

Geostrategy is closely related to the tactical and logistical plans of operations suited to a particular area. The military plans conform to the geographical factors. Strategy and polity are reciprocal and interlinked. Strategy and foreign policy can not be isolated from each other. Hence the effect of politics on military actions.

The concept of Geopolitics is as old as civilization but it has very recently developed into a subject of organised study. Like new disciplines of Geography, Economics, History etc., it requires a systematic approach. A regular scope of Geopolitics is wider than other disciplines of humanities. The term Geopolitics, itself has an inalienable relationship between geography and politics. When people act upon space in the process of moulding the civilisation, geopolitics automatically comes into play. This study, has therefore acquired a comprehensive and integrated system since the beginning of
civilization. People and the civilization are products of geography which in turn is the products of nature. The search for theoretical basis of Geo-politics thus, has to begin with an analysis of the relationship between nature, Geography and the Human beings. The methodology of 'Geopolitics' is same as of the historical studies. Both deal with the basic aspects of the growth of civilization and incorporate major aspects of the growth of the same.

Geopolitics is concerned with the so far gone by time, the present and the coming time. On the basis of this analysis of the recent past and the actual present and at the same time on the basis of an assessment of people's historical experience, the geopoliticians can evaluate the futuristic geopolitical trends, which also indicate as to the policy of a particular country or region as a whole with a view to seek the safety and welfare of its land and the citizens.

"Kashmir is like a cap on the head of Pakistan...... If I allow INDIA to have this cap on her head, then I am always at the mercy of INDIA...... The very position -- the strategic location of Kashmir is such that without it PAKISTAN cannot defend herself against an unscrupulous government that might emerge in India", said Shri Liaqat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan while
addressing the public in that country. The problem of Kashmir as it arose after the independence of India was in many ways a product of the political history of the Indian sub-continent. The clash over Kashmir was symbolic of the conflict of the two independent states which succeeded British authority in India. This conflict was largely a result of the forces of jealousies, rivalries and the fears that marked the political processes at work in India before freedom and culminated in the partition of the sub-continent. India and Pakistan inherited the old antagonisms between Hindus and Muslims. Though the primary struggle had been basically against the British, the final stages of the same were framed in religious differences, which further deepened after the partition.

The British had found India divided when they came and left it divided when they departed. After partition the two successors began to function in relation to each other with a number of compulsions which they had inherited from the past. Behind the conceptual unity of India, there had always been various kinds of divisions and divisive forces at work. Religion constituted a centrifugal force of considerable potentialities, although it was by no means the most important single divisive factor. Such
Such elements however, apart from cast, language and regional loyalties also divided India. The feeling by a small section of the Muslim elite that their community was left behind in the early years of the British rule led to the conclusion that the rectification of the situation could be sought through emphasis on the separateness of the Muslims.

The communal situation in India had worsened considerably after limited power was transferred to Indian hands in the provinces during 1937 under the Government of India Act, 1935. Muslim League gave up its demand for 'minority' rights and suddenly began to claim a status of parity with the Congress based on the theme that there were two nations in India. Accordingly, in March, 1940 at Lahore meeting the League committed itself to the realisation of a sovereign Muslim State, a homeland for the Indian Muslim in the sub-continent. Unfortunately the partition of the sub-continent solved few problems, as conceived by the league. For India it left behind the problem of cultivating the secular way of life and for Pakistan it created a fundamental problem as felt by the elite of the Muslim state, of identity seeking. As it emerged later it didn't represent all the Indian Muslims nor it served as a homeland for the Muslims of Pakistan or
the Muslims of the entire subcontinent as propagated. Instead it resulted in strained relations between the two states.

As regards the accession of the former Princely States of J & K, India adopted purely a democratic, conciliatory, accommodating and humane approach while Pakistan tried political and economic pressure over the Kashmiris for opting in favour of merger with that country. Till the accession, Pakistan coerced the J & K Ruler, aroused communal hatred among the people of the state, provoked terrorism and applied economic sanctions against the region. Till the last moments the British on the other hand had practised divide and rule theory and had handed over the territory around Gilgit in the North-West Frontier of India to the local Muslim Chief. Under the conditions prevailing at the time, the partition of the country had been accepted as a lesser evil, much against the will of the people, rather than allowing a continued foreign control over India any further.

Soon after the partition, however, Mr. Jinnah the founder of Pakistan, wanted Gen. Gracey, the then C-in-C of the Pakistan Army to march to Kashmir and occupy it. But Gen Auchinleck, the then Supreme Commander of Pakistan and Indian Army forbade that. The British threatened to withdraw all of their officers
from Pakistan Army if Jinnah made a move as that. Jinnah then plotted with the tribemen and started the bogey of spontaneous internal uprising. He got them trained, equipped and supported by Regular Pakistan Army in activities against Kashmir in 1947-48.

When Britain announced independence and partition in 1947, the princes were told that paramountcy would lapse and they could either join one of the two new Dominions or attempt to maintain their independence. If they chose the latter path, no British help would be forthcoming. In making decisions, the princes were expected to pay due regard to the religious composition of their people, as also the geographical contiguity with new dominions. This posed larger problems for India and almost none for Pakistan, hence Jinnah espoused the cause of the rulers and supported the British policy on their right of the states to independence. He assured autonomy to those opting for Pakistan knowing fully well that he could not entice the Hindu princes nor even the Muslim rulers of the states well within India's territory to join Pakistan, but if they chose independence, it would weaken India and indirectly strengthen Pakistan. In a book 'The Myth of Independence', Bhutto points out, "The Indian leaders agreed to Pakistan only when it had became clear to them that partition was inevitable and that they had to concede to this division as a price for the transference of power from British." The partition,
had to be consistent with British residual interests, successor states being established in a manner favourable to Britain's post imperial objectives\textsuperscript{14}.

(b) **Military Revolt and Setting up of Azad Kashmir:**

While the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir temporised, armed rebellion broke out in July, 1947 in the Sudhnuti tract of Poonch province. It resulted from many factors, including heavy taxation. Essentially, it was a straightforward peasant revolt and instead of the religious beliefs of the participants it was an uprising against ancient feudal tyrannies. By August, the revolt picked up momentum. Its leaders proclaimed independence and established the first Azad (Free) Kashmir 'government'. Arms came from factories which had long been maintained by Pathan tribesmen across the border. By October, the rebellion was receiving Pakistani support and weapons. In the far North-West of Kashmir, a territory administered by the British as the Gilgit Agency was nominally handed back to the Maharajah in late July. There were few ties between the remote mountain area and Srinagar, and the revolt became swift. Muslim soldiers deserted, pro-Pakistani sentiment made its appearance and the area was taken over quickly by pro-Pakistani elements. Within a week, the
Gilgit lot occupied Baltistan, the area lying to the east, giving Pakistan control over a large piece of strategically important mountainous portion in the northern Kashmir. When the Maharaja of Kashmir retaliated with counter-measures a large number of Muslims fled the area and took refuge in the territory of Azad Kashmir. These episodes and the continuing large scale law and order problems all over the sub-continent created tension along border areas. These areas were inhabited by a number of Muslim tribes known for their fighting prowess. The British had been unable to control them. From this district and from a base somewhere within Pakistan proper a tribal invasion of Kashmir began on October, 19. Separating the plains of the Punjab from the highlands of Afghanistan in the west and north-west are the high barren mountain of the Sulaiman and Hindu ranges. They stretch north and south for some 700 miles, and have since ages been the home of fierce semi-savage tribes which look upon plunder as a lawful means of livelihood. To gain his ends, Jinnah decided to use these men. The bait of easy loot was dangled before the basically greedy eyes of these people. vested interests of Pakistan added a religious fervent to that. These men would go to Kashmir as soldiers of a "jehad, waged for releasing their Muslim brethren from an 'infidel's Rule'.

There was a well thought out planning for the capture of Kashmir. The first preliminary moves took place
conceiving a propaganda campaign to create unrest and rebellion within the state. Its Muslim population was incited to rise against the Hindu Maharaja and the Muslims in his army were urged to mutiny. This was followed by a series of raids beginning in early September all along the State's frontiers with Pakistan, the aim being to disperse its armed forces so as to make them ineffective for meeting the main assault on October 22. Five thousand tribesmen in 300 civil lorries set out for Srinagar following the Murree—Baramula road. Crossing the state border at Garhi Habibullah, they attacked Ramkote. The small garrison, their strength being hardly few men, was soon overpowered and the tribesmen swiftly moved to the prosperous town of Muzafferabad which was guarded by a Battalion of State-troops, with mixed composition of Dogras and Muslims from Poonch. The Muslim element of the Unit prevailing from Poonch areas got hold of all the Battalion arms and ammunition. After killing their unsuspecting Commanding Officer and most of their Dagra Comrades they got in touch with the waiting tribesmen who immediately fell upon Muzafferabad. After looting and burning the town, they pushed on towards Srinagar.

'Operation Gulmarg', a thorough operational plan to merge J & K with Pakistan in 1947 had been planned by Pakistan. It was to be launched on October 22, 1947. While
discussing the J & K affair with Mr. Nehru, Sheikh Abdulla pointed out that the British were very much behind the plot since the then C-in-C of Pakistani Army, Sir Frank Messervy had signed the papers. The British had a hand in the conspiracy in creating the Kashmir problem at the very start of independence since they never wanted India to be a stable country.

The tribesmen were to discard all semblance of army rank and uniform and were to live and dress up the way their regular army leaders of Pakistan desired, who themselves lived like the Pathans. Each Lashkar of about 1000 men was to be commanded by a Sardar/Malik but for operational control he was commanded by regular army officer of Pakistan and the entire force was commanded by General Akbar Khan. In the overall plan arrangements were made for the detailing of guides, informers and local sympathisers from the so called 'Azad Army'. General Akbar Khan was also given the task of organising the Azad Army, the major portion of which was to come from the Muslim element of the J & K state forces. Administrative dumps for arms, ammunition and clothing (Pathan type) were to be established forward of Abbottabad by 15th October. These were later to be moved forward to Muzaffarabad and Domel after 'D' day which was 22nd October, 1947 for crossing into J & K. 19(b) 7th Infantry
Division of Pakistan army was to concentrate in area Murree-Abbottabad by last light on 21st October for backing up the tribal Lashkars and consolidating their hold on the valley. One Infantry Brigade was also held in readiness at Sialkot to move on to Jammu.

(c) Merger of Kashmir with India:

After a lapse of British paramountcy, the state of Jammu and Kashmir became independent like all other states within the erstwhile British India. The state was free to accede to either of the Dominions of India or Pakistan. By August 15, 1947, the instrument of accession to India had been signed by rulers of all the states geographically continuous to it, with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. The accession of other two states has been dealt with in the preceding chapter. Till October 1947 the Maharaja of J & K entertained the vision of becoming the sovereign ruler outside the Dominions of India and Pakistan. He had been informed by Lord Mountbatten, when he was still a Viceroy of undivided India, that it was not a feasible proposition and that he must accede to the Dominion of his choice. The Maharaja did not even cater for the feelings of majority of the population of Kashmir, whose political organ, by the name of National Conference comprising mostly of Muslims and led by a
popular leader Sheikh Abdullah, was more inclined to join India. Rulers of the States had an option to accede to either of the two newly formed nations. It was not necessary for them to ascertain the wishes of the people of the State. However, contiguity of the state was to be an important factor to be taken into account. Ironically the state of Jammu and Kashmir was contiguous to Pakistan as well as to India. It suited Pakistan to deny the ruler his option and harp on the religious composition of Kashmir—Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Syed Mir Hasim, to mention the foremost, who voluntarily rejected the two nation theory and called for accession to India since it was a Modern Democracy more suited for achieving their people's progress in the condition of the twentieth century than 'Theocratic Pakistan'. But Pakistan was very keen to annex the territory of J & K by all possible means. They cut off the supplies of essential commodities like food and petrol etc., reaching the Kashmir valley only from one source i.e. Pakistan. In the North two major roads converged at Domel and thereafter the road to the valley ran along-side the river Jhelum via Chinari, Chakothi, Uri and on to Baramulla where the Kashmir valley starts. On the other hand, the road from South i.e. from Jammu to Srinagar was worst of the two routes leading into the valley.
Furthermore, the well armed/equipped tribals, supported and led by Pakistan Regulars under the famous Major General Mohammad Akbar Khan with the pseudonym General Jebal Tariq carried out raids\textsuperscript{23} all along the border of Jammu and Kashmir as a part of a well organised operation 'Gulmarg' ostensibly following the crusade undertaken by a Moorish hero who had defended Islam\textsuperscript{24} in Spain more than 1,000 years earlier. Pakistan thus made an attempt to bring pressure on the Maharaja of J & K for the accession to that country. They intervened by Violating the term of 'Stand still' Agreement.

Confronted with the rapidly developing great situation obtaining at the time the J & K state forces could not hold back the herds of tribal-raiders a large body of selected men commanded by professionally sound regulars, using automatic weapons tactically. They forced their way to Muzaffarabad on 20/21 October, 1947. Within a week they took control of Baramula. The Ruler of the State Maharaja, Sir Hari Singh got worried about the future of his kingdom as well as his own. He was prevailed upon by Sheikh\textsuperscript{25} Abdullah a popular nationalist leader of the state to approach Government of India for help. The Maharaja responded soon on October, 25 and sent an 'SOS' to Govt. of India. The Maharaja's appeal was discussed at length.
and the general consensus was in his favour (the last Viceroy Lord Mountbatten inclusive); hence the accession of J & K to the Indian Union with formal documentation was completed on October 27, 1947. Apart from the ruler of the state Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah leader of Kashmir who had all along till then been opposing the J & K ruler for seeking democratic reforms in the state, also joined his opponent in that hour of peril for obtaining military assistance from India, that lent full authenticity to the instrument of accession. The first appeal for help from India came on October 24 when information also came in from the Supreme Commander regarding the raiders' ingress. The situation was discussed at a meeting of the Defence Committee on October 25 with Lord Mountbatten presiding. Shri V.P. Menon, Secretary States Ministry, the Civil servant who had presided over so many princely accession to India, Colonel (later on Field Marshal) Sam Maneckshaw of the Indian Army and an Air Force Officer were sent to Srinagar by a DC3 of the Royal Indian Air Force landing them on the abandoned strip of Srinagar Airport to study the first hand account of the situation on the afternoon of October 25.

The feedback from Menon's mission convinced the Government of India of the inescapable requirement of accepting the Maharaja's appeal for help. The Defence Committee's
recommendations for considering the accession of J & K also lent credence to the formal consideration. The instrument of accession was duly signed by the Maharaja in a good state of health on October, 26, 1947. The accession had been accepted by the British Governor-General of India on October 27, 1947. The accession thus became legally and constitutionally complete. Prior to his departure from the valley, the Maharaja had handed over the reins of administration to Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the National Conference. The popular Muslim leaders of the area like Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Mirza Afzal Beg, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and Syed Mir Qasim welcomed the accession to India.

(d) Reorganisation of Indian Army for Kashmir Operations:

Consequent upon the legal accession of J & K to India, the nation was to rescue the state from the Pakistani tribal invasion despite many burning problems at hand. Pakistan had planned invasion of Kashmir in two phases. The first phase commenced in September, 1947, when she carried out several border raids along five hundred miles of the Pakistan border. This along with the economic blockade were considered enough pressure on the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan. The second phase was launched on October 20, 1947 when thousands of raiders equipped with small arms, machine guns and mortars, crossed over from Pakistan into the valley.
At this time in Kashmir, the State Forces had only one Division, approximately ten to eleven thousand worth of troops under the command of Major General Scot. This force was distributed all over Kashmir in small groups extending from Gilgit to the whole of Ladakh. The main column of the raiders advanced along road Domal-Uri, Srinagar and headed for their super-objective Srinagar. The State forces did put up a stiff resistance but failed primarily because of Pakistan inspired desertions. Two days after the fall of Muzaffarabad the authorities at Delhi learnt about the situation which the Maharaja had been trying to seek to redress through the accession to India. Till then there were no talking let alone planning for employing the Indian Armed Forces, in the impending contingency. The first moves came the next day when plans were hastily made and an Infantry Battalion was alerted for possible movement to Kashmir. This was in the wake of turning down the proposal of the Supreme Commander Sir C. Auchinleck to air lift a Brigade of British troops to Srinagar to protect and evacuate hundreds of retired Britishers. If they weren't got out, he warned, they would be the victims of a frightful orgy of rape and massacre. But the Governor-General Lord Mountbatten ruled out the employment of British soldiers on the soil of a sub-continent which had become independent. If there was going to be military intervention in Kashmir, he declared as far as he was concerned it would have to be by Indian alone and not by British Forces. Hence the contingency.
That initiated the VP Menon mission of reading the situation in response to a frantic request for help from the Maharaja. But the Governor General insisted for documentary and legal approach for stepping in. Based on the written record of formal accession of the state to the Indian Union, the Indian Army was pressed into service to rescue the J & K state.

Even while the fluid situation was at its climax, the Indian Army took on the heart-rending duties in shepherding thousands of uprooted refugees, many of them relatives, on the move to and from Pakistan. The Army was rushed by air, at 24 hours notice, to Kashmir. They had to be plunged into action hastily in dribbles. They were not prepared nor were they equipped properly. There was no intelligence of the terrain, the enemy movements, deployment plans, composition, strength, weapons and host of other connected bits of essential pre-operation minimum requirements of preliminary information. They had never operated in the past in show-bound area as that, yet they gave a commendable account of themselves. A small garrison at Sakardu next to Kargil on route to Gilgit faced the enemy for months on end. They asked for air demands to drop ammunition in preference to rations. It was only when the last round of ammunition was exhausted that the Sakardu garrison fell to the Pakistanis. Later on, the Garrison Commander and his personnel were exchanged as Prisoners of War after the cease-fire in January 1949.
Jawaharlal Nehru on arrival at Leh airport (4 July 1949) being greeted by Kushak Bakula. The late Brigadier K.L. Atal is to the left of Mr Nehru.
When Dakotas first landed in Leh as a risky trial landing, the locals came from far away places to see the aircraft. The Ladakhis even offered grass and respects to the aerial horse! Similarly the tribals of North East Frontier Agency also called the aircraft 'Patang Gadi'—the winged horse or winged wagon. Strangely enough those days the people of such remote areas as that saw aeroplanes much earlier than motor vehicles or other modern means of travelling like trains etc. The local population of Ladakh had come to the rescue of Indian troops over there by offering their own local warm clothing and rations for which the soldiers signed credit chits for the supplies like 'Sattoo' (barley flour), chicken etc. which had been supplied to them in various villages.

Launched within a month and half of Cononial freedom, without any prior planning for the operations in J & K the Indian Armed Forces stood the test of time and put the invading forces on retreat. Their failure would have resulted not only into unending violence and lawlessness but also endangered the very security and safety of India. In fact they had to be halted at the instance of the United Nations. They intervened sometime at the end of October 1947 at a push-button-notice when the state forces of the Maharaja of J & K had been holding against heavy odds for more than a couple of months without any communications and directions.
from their Headquarters. First Battalion of the Indian Army was landed at Srinagar at 9.30 AM on October, 27, 1947. While defending Batal - Baramulla, the gallant commanding officer's dash took the initial contingents as close to the invaders as only five miles which barely saved Srinagar and rescued the state. In the process the Commanding Officers fell to raiders bullets. At the time of independence, the British withdrew their officers simultaneously from the Indian Army which till then had been led by them. The vacuum created by that was predicted to prove that the Indian Army devoid of the superior command quality of the Britishers would fall apart. But the national cause and the fighting quality of the Indian soldier and airmen proved things rather other way round. The same jawans fought even much better under the Indian Commanders.

Pakistan never expected so quick response and high performance by much underestimated Indian forces, who set new records by using tanks across the ice fields in the 11,000 foot Zojila Pass, North East of Srinagar. This step completely surprised the Pakistanis since it was a highly calculated risk. Military Air Travel to remote areas as Leh and Ladakh was introduced by late General KS Thimmayya who himself set the example by making a pioneer flight over an uncharted area at 23,000 feet without using oxygen. The road communications were very poor.
The very presence of the Air Force along side the army produced good effect on the overall performance by the Indian forces that completely surprised the raiders in J & K who had come to loot an unarmed population. It also earned a momentary respite for the army. They contributed much by mounting a sizeable air lift that carried a steady stream of troops and supplies into the Kashmir valley where our troops had been outnumbered by the enemy.

(e) Results and Conclusion arrived at:

The Indian Armed Forces not only repelled the invaders but steadily surged forward to a position that allowed taking whole of Kashmir in a go. But for the breaks applied by the Indian leadership to the highly disciplined and mighty Force of India, the persistent bone of contention would have been dealt with once and for all. Perhaps, we went by our national conscience to avoid the use of force even in hard earned favourable opportune time and preferred rather a democratic approach instead, only, aspiring for stability much in the larger interest of a lasting peaceful atmosphere in the affected region. Even the critics of India at the time, must have found it hard to believe. The magnanimity of this apparently a generous Indian step could be interpreted and found linked only, later, when the non aligned World willingly reposed its confidence in the statesmanship and leadership of the Indian favourite leaders. The fighting in 1948/49 when turned into
India's favour had to be called off to the dislike of all those involved and cease-fire effected in J & K; some experts felt that the fighting could not have carried on because of monopoly of the US and the UK in supply of war material. After hectic deliberations on either side Karachi Agreement was signed by India and Pakistan on July 27, 1949.

The Indian Army proved itself national in character in the true sense of the word, during the British period the general public had looked upon it with suspicion and there was hardly any regard for its achievements. But the campaign in J & K changed the outlook and the common man in India than began looking upon the army as a true symbol of national force.

After the cease-fire in J & K in 1949, Pakistan was categorically told that any attack on J & K would be treated as an attack on India. Pakistan, however, continued to maintain that possession of Kashmir was vital for their physical security. If there were concern in Pakistan for the spiritual welfare of the Kashmir Muslims, she should have facilitated fulfilment of the conditions proposed by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan in mid-forties for the holding of a plebiscite. But the fact remains that Pakistan failed to do so, because, at the time, it would lose the plebiscite thereby losing all the prospects of future options to keep the issue alive till the attainment of her objectives.
Operations between 27th of October 1947 and midnight 31st December, 1948, i.e., till 1st January, 1949, hours were neither akin to a mere police action limited to exclusive internal security nor were they comparable with any major campaign of then recently fought World War II. Security Forces in the border state of India continued to make a positive contribution in winning the hearts and the minds of the people. A sizeable force of Indian Armed Forces deployed along the line of control continued defending the state’s territory, never again to allow the enemy to walk over straight into the Indian state without being checked.

In a desperate bid to improve its military might, Pakistan joined the South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in September 1954 and by September, 1955 the Baghdad Pact, which later was known as Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Such has been the persistent desire of Pakistan to possess Kashmir by any possible means.
References:


6. Ibid, p.64.

7. Ibid, p.70.


12. ibid., p.37.
14. ibid., p.171.
16. ibid., p.70.
18. ibid., p.117.
20(a) Map of J & K.


41. *Indian Armed Forces Year Book, 1974-75*, (Fourth Year of Publication), p.459.
43. ibid., p.197.