CHAPTER VI

STRATEGICAL AND TACTICAL STUDY OF FAMOUS BATTLES
6. THE LIGHT OF ANCIENT INDIA

6.1: POLITICAL CONDITION

Harsha Varman (606-647 A.D.) was the last imperial ruler of Northern and Central India in the ancient period. Kanauj (Kanyakubja), situated in the heart of the Gangetic valley, was his capital. His nearest rival in the south was Pulakesin II (c.610-642) the Chalukya ruler of Maharashtra. He wielded matching imperial power over the territories lying to the south of Narbada. Both of them could not, even collectively, claim paramount power over the whole of the Indian subcontinent. During their times, there flourished about seventy regional rulers whose possessions were either interlocked between the two imperial states or situated along the periphery of their dominions. Some of them of course, acknowledged the supremacy of either of the two monarchs.

The exit of Harsha and Pulakesin II closed the era of ancient Indian imperialism. There started a scramble for territorial possessions among their ex-feudatories and other princes, leading to further political disintegration of the country and the spread of near anarchy.

Abortive attempts were made by a number of individuals, backed by their respective clans and communities to revive the
us in the so-called 'rajun period' (647-1200) of Indian history. The states were usually identified with their ruling clans, tribes or communities. Beyond the 'home-lands' (used here in a very narrow and parochial sense) of such clans, the frontiers of these states were fluid and their territorial possessions underwent violent fluctuations under stress of continuous fratricidal wars. The frequent changes in the ruling dynasties of princes within the same ruling house, were not conducive to the development of a feeling of loyalty or emotional attachment towards them especially among the large mass of their subjects.

In the face of territorial claims and counter-claims of the rival chieftains, 'right' became the 'supreme right' and the 'dispute' as to that was right was decided 'by the arbitrement of war'. A petty principality, on having got an ambitious and capable prince, could throw off the overlordship of its mighty neighbour and, in turn, claim some sort of dominion over the weaker and smaller states. Such claims of paramountcy were seldom well-defined and usually not pushed beyond tolerable limits. The weaker states, therefore, did not always dispute or offer much resistance to the vague imperial claims of their powerful neighbours. The whole process had a demoralising effect on all the rulers, big or small. There was no military power in the country strong enough to keep the warring princes in check and coordinate their activities against foreign aggression.

A brief description of these regional states and their prominent rulers on the eve of the invasions of Mahmud of Ghazni may be given.
6.1.1-2: Northwestern India: Afghanistan and Punjab: Modern Afghanistan (Anekevavta (Sanskrit) Askandvi (Greek)) was a part of ancient India; the Afghans belonged to the path of Indo-Aryan civilization (C. E. Teo, 1973). In the eighth century, the country was known by two regional names: Kabul and Samul. The northern part, called Kabul (or Kabulistan) was governed by a Buddhist dynasty. Its capital and the river on the banks of which it was situated, also bore the same name. Lalliya (C. E. Sachan; 1964), a Brahmin minister of the last Buddhist ruler Tagaturman, deposed his master and laid the foundation of the Hindu Shahi dynasty (Yugendra Mishra; 1912), in c. 865. Samul (or Subutilistan), the southern region of modern Afghanistan, was then ruled by the Rajputs of the Bhatti clan probably.

The word 'afghan' is Persian in origin; it means 'to cry'. The term originated according to Khund Darvaza, a learned Afghan saint of Akbar's reign, in the first battle (986-87) of Sabuktugin with Sahib, the Hindu Shahi ruler of Kabul. Then the encounter took place, the Hindu soldiers raised such a loud noise that they non-plussed the army of Sabuktugin and gained the appellation of 'afghan' from the latter. It is said that besides warfare, even otherwise, the same rehearsal of fierce and piercing shriek in chorus was made by the Hindu soldiers of Kabul amid singing and dancing in feasts (Muhammad Hosein Khan; 1937). The term 'afghan' finds mention for the first time in the chronicles of the eleventh century when the entire valley of Kabul had passed under the rule of the dynasty founded by Sabuktugin.
The Muslim arms penetrated into Afghanistan under the Arab leader Yaqub ibn Abbas, the founder of the Samanid dynasty. He conquered Sistan, Hormat and Zabulistan during 957–70. The fort of Kabul was wrested by him from the Khiljis in 676–71, though the main valley of Kabul was held firmly under their control by the Hindushahis. Yaqub is said to have laid the foundation of Ghazni by building a fort there. Alptagin was the first Turkish general who conquered Ghazni from the last Arab chief Abu Bekr Jawik in c. 962.

The boundaries of the Hindushahi kingdom stretched from the river Chenab in Punjab to the Hindukush. Its rulers acted as a bulwark against the Arab and Turkish onslaught on their western borders for a long time. Under constant pressure from the Muslim invaders, they were, however, compelled to move their capital to the east of Khyber pass at Budhanjapur or Waimand (Bachan, p.c.: 1964), on the western bank of the Indus near Attock on the ancient highway from Fesahan to Lahore in about 995. Jaipal, the king of Waimand, was a contemporary of Babuktagan and his son Mahmud, the Turkish rulers of Ghazni Jaipal and his family bore the brunt of Turkish invasions from 997 to 1021.

**Sind and Multan:** The lower Indus valley, to the south of Multan and including Sind and Makran, comprised an independent kingdom during the times of Harsha. It was ruled by a Sudra dynasty. Its ruler Sahiras, a contemporary of Harsha, was killed.
by the Persian invaders. His son and successor Rai Sahabi II had a brahman minister, called Chach. On the death of his master, Chach usurped the throne and married the widowed queen. The majority of his subjects were Jats by race and Buddhist by faith. The new ruling dynasty was, therefore, 'alien' both in race and religion. Its rule was oppressive and hence unpopular. Dahir, a son of Chach, ascended the throne in c. 706. He faced the Arab invasion of Sind in 711-12 and perished with family in the struggle.

Kashmir: The Himalayan valley of Kashmir constituted a part of Mauryan and Kushana empires. During Harsha's reign, it was ruled by Karkota dynasty (c. 627-855), founded by Durlabha Vardhan, a Kashmiri brahman. The kingdom underwent a few dynastic changes but all through it remained under the control of brahmans till the fourteenth century. Being surrounded by huge mountains and isolated from the plains, it did not play any significant role in the country's politics. On the eve of Mahmud's invasions, it was ruled by a notorious lady, queen Didda (History & Culture of the Indian People: 1963). On her death in 1003, her brother Sangramraja, son of King Jaya-raja of Rohara (Lohkot, mod. Lohrin in the territory of Goonch), laid the foundation of a new dynasty known after Rohara. It produced a number of powerful and capable rulers who foiled all attempts of the Muslim invaders to establish their foothold in the valley during the next three centuries.
Thaneser: Most probably, Thaneser, constituted an independent principality in the beginning of the eleventh century. Having been the ancestral estate of Harsha Varman, it might have retained its separate identity long after his fall. Firishta's statement that Thaneser was included in the kingdom of Delhi is wrong; Delhi had not yet come into prominence in the first quarter of the eleventh century. Alberuni has mentioned Thaneser but not Delhi in his geographical chapter of Tarikhul Hind.

6.1-I-(b) Eastern India:

Bengal: It constituted the hub of Mauryan and Gupta empires but fell out of the imperial fold on the decline of the latter. It saw a brief rise and fall of the regional kingdoms—such as Gaud in the northwest, and Vanga in the central and eastern parts. In the ninth century, Gopal laid the foundation of the Pala dynasty in Bengal (A.D. Nanji: 1973). Its rulers extended their control over the whole of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Under the weak successors of Devapala (833-78), the kingdom declined but its fortunes were restored to some extent by Mahipala I (988-1038). When Mahmud was trampling northern India under his feet, Bengal was invaded by Nandula Chula, the Tamil ruler of the south. The political and military condition of Bengal was deplorable but it escaped destruction at the hands of Mahmud because of its long distance from the north-west frontier.

Assam: The Brahmaputra valley in Assam, known as Kamrup (Kamarupa) in ancient times, had been under the control of a
Brahman family since ages. Its rulers had been the feudatories of imperial Guptas. King Bhaskarvarman of Kamrup was a vassal of Harsha Vardhana. After the latter's death, Kamrup secured the independence under its hereditary chieftains. In the beginning of the eleventh century, Brahmapala ruled Kamrup with his capital at Purjaya (mod. Gauhati). He and his successors safeguarded their independence against the repeated attacks of Yasawas of eastern Bengal and other adversaries.

Apart from Kamrup, another regional kingdom was in existence in the lower valley of Brahmaputra in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its capital was Srinatia or modern Sylhet.

Nepali The valley of Nepal constituted a part of the Mauryan and Gupta empires. After the disintegration of the Gupta empires it got its local rulers in the fifth century. A Rajput chief, Raghudeva established his rule in Nepal and laid the foundation of Thakuri dynasty in 879 and commemorated the event by starting a Nepali era (Tapa, Metra 3: 1973). One of his successors, Gunamadeva (949-954) is said to have founded a new town named Kantipur (mod. Katmandu) at the confluence of Bagmati and Vishnu Pati rivers. He was succeeded by Shoideva (994-1023) (Tapa, Metra B: 1973). Because of its isolation from the plains it remained aloof from the political upheavals of the country over the centuries.

6.11-(c) Central and Western India: The four clans of Chauhans occupied a premier position among the ruling chiefs
of central and western India. They were foreign immigrants who became Indianised and were included in the fold of Hinduism.

The Pratihars belonged to the Gurjara tribes. It is said that one of their ancestors had once served the Pastrakutas (753-973) as a doorkeeper (pratihara). They set up a couple of independent principalities in Rajputana and Malwa and, ultimately, came to acquire Kanauj as well.

The Parmars were feudatories of the Gurjara-Pratiharas at one time. They set up an independent kingdom at Dhar (Ujjain). The Parmar ruler Shouja (K.C. Jain 1972) was famous for his military prowess, scholarship and patronage of art and literature. He was known to the Muslim chroniclers as Parmardeo, 'one of the greatest kings of Hindustan'. When he heard of Mahmud's invasion of Somnath (1025-26) he marched out of his capital with a huge force to intercept the invader. Mahmud also got wind of it and rushed back to Ghazni along the extreme western route to avoid clash with the rajput forces.

The Chalukya Rajputs had provided two major dynasties to south India since the sixth century— the Early Chalukyas of Vatapi (c. 550-753) and the Later Chalukyas of Kalyani (founded, 973 A.D.). Yet another Chalukya chief, Mulraja (960-95) set up as an independent ruler at Ahhilwara (Anahitapataka). He entered into an ugly conflict with the Parmars of Malwa which proved harmful to both in the long run. Durkabharaja Chalukya (1000-21) was
a contemporary of Mahmud of Ghazni. On his death, his nephew Shindeo ascended the throne of Amhilara. When Mahmud invaded Somnath, he fled the capital and took shelter in a fortress in the Rann of Kutch.

A Chauhan (chahamana) chief Jamanta, founded the kingdom of Sambhar, around modern Ajmer, in the eighth century. He became famous by offering strong resistance to the Arab invaders from Sind (c. 750). In the beginning of the eleventh century, the town of Ajmer had not yet been founded nor Delhi shot into prominence as a political entity. Like the Hindushahis of northwestern India, the Chauhans of Sambhar (later Ajmer) stood forth as a bulwark against the penetration of Muslims into the heart of India and maintained the struggle 'with great vigour and obstinacy'.

Sambhar was ruled by Govindraja II, nicknamed Chandu, son of Birlabhraja, at the dawn of the eleventh century (History and culture of the Indian people: 1963). He and his successor Vakpati II (c. 1003-33) were contemporaries of Mahmud of Ghazni but do not seem to have come into direct clash with the latter. Mahmud did not reach Sambhar, the then Chauhan capital, during his plundering raids. It is, however, probable that they had supplied troops to the Hindushahi rulers to fight the Turks on two different occasions.

Some rajput clans were direct descendants of ancient kshatriyas or aboriginal Indian tribes.
The Chandel principality of Sajjakshukti (mod. Bundelkhand) was founded by Nanak, a scion of the Gonds, in the ninth century. He was a feudatory of the Gurjara-Pratiharas of Kanauj, his successors became independent in the first half of the tenth century. His son and successor Yasovarman, born of his Chauhan queen, captured Kalinjar, Yasovarman was succeeded by Dhyanraj on the throne of Kalinjar; he sent a contingent to Peshawar to support Jaipal against Sakaktin (1000-01). He spent a lot of money to get two Shiva temples constructed at Khajuraho. His son and successor Gandaraja (1018-22) and the latter's eldest son Vidyachara fought Mahmud of Ghazni.

Arjuna, the Kachchapaghata (later Kachhwaha) chief of Gwalior, was a feudatory of the Chandels of Kalinjar. He also fought against Mahmud of Ghazni in 1022-23.

The Kalachuris of Dabala or chedi (Madhya Pradesh) were pure Kshatriyas. They belonged to the lunar race, and were orthodox Hindus. Subsequently, they established their capital at Tripura (or Tripuri) near Jabalpur. It was ruled by Gangaya in the beginning of the eleventh century. He expanded his kingdom at the cost of the Gurjara-Pratihara neighbours. Banaras was included in the Kalachuri dominions. The Turkish invaders under Mahmud did not reach Gangaya's territories.

The guhilot or guhila Rajput chief Bappa Pawal had set up a small kingdom in Mewar. Its rajas did not attempt to expand
their dominions at the cost of their neighbours but, at the same time, zealously safeguarded their own independence. The kingdom of Mewar was neither very powerful nor rich but its rulers played a glorious role in the medieval Indian history as patriots, the defenders of their independence and self-respect.

6.1.E-(d) Northern India: Fulakesin II (c. 810-42), the imperial ruler of the Deccan (Dakshinapatha or the Deccan was the name given to the northern most part of south Indian peninsula; It comprised the land between the Vindhyas mountains and the Sunghbhadra river) belonged to the Early Chalukyas or Solanki dynasty of Vatapi (mod. Beedan, near Bijapur). It had risen into prominence about the middle of the sixth century. The Chalukyas constituted a part of the gurjara immigrants from central Asia who were Indianised, and became famous as one of the four agnikula rajput clans. The dynasty was founded by Jayasimha. His successors expanded their possessions into a mighty empire. Incidentally, Fulakesin II, the contemporary of Harsha Vardhman in the north, also proved to be the last imperial ruler of his dynasty. He was defeated and killed at the hands of Narasimha, the Pallava ruler of Kanchi. Fulakesin's successors, however, continued to rule for another century, when they were liquidated and supplanted by the Rashtrakutas.

The Rashtrakutas were once the feudatories of the Early Chalukyas. Their chief Dandivarman defeated his suzerain Kirtivarma in 753 and laid the foundation of Rashtrakuta supremacy in the Deccan. This dynasty produced a number of capable
The last Rashtrakuta king Kakka II was overthrown by Tailapa (973 A.D.), the founder of the new Chalukya dynasty, known to history as the Later Chalukyas. Their capital was Taliyani in modern Andhra Pradesh. Tailapa fought successful wars against the Chalukyas of Amhikera, the Pānars of Malwa, the Kalachuris of Chedi and the Cholas in the south; he ruled up to 1017 A.D.

The Cholas constituted the second greatest kingdom in the south at the dawn of the eleventh century (P.C. Bhandarkar: 1957 & K.N. Venkata Ramanujagopal: 1975). They became prominent towards the close of the ninth century, originally, the three Tamil states of the far-south— the Cholas, the Cheras and the Pandyas, belonged to the pre-Christian era. They maintained their separate entities even during the days of the Mauryan imperialism. Later on, they came to be dominated by the Andhras and then by the Pallavas. Towards the close of the ninth century, the Cholas established their hegemony over the Pallavas. Rairaja I (985-1012) laid the foundation of the imperial Chola empire by his extensive conquests. His empire included Kalinga (mod. Crissa) in the north and Ceylon in the south. Tanjore was his capital. His son and successor Rajendra Chola I (c. 1012-42) consolidated the empire carved out by his father and further expanded it. He was the greatest Indian ruler of his times. While the Turks under Mahmud of Ghazni were defeating and humiliating the mighty Hindu rulers of northern India, a bitter struggle was going on between the Later Chalukyas and the Cholas for the domination of the south.
They seemed to have been least bothered about the happenings in
the north.

6.11: (e) Political condition of Northern India: A survey of
the political condition of Northern India during the beginning
of the 9th century A.D. reveals the utter instability that was
prevailing in the region due to the continued struggle for
supremacy between the three contemporary powers— the Gurjara-
Pratiharas, the Paurakutas and the Palas of Bengal (H.C. Ray:
1931). During these troublesome days it might have been possible
for a local tribal leader in the Bundelkhand region to establish
an independent chieftainship, not necessarily owing allegiance to
any suzerain power. It need not be supposed that the Caudellas
during this period wrested Mahoba region from the Pratiharas, as
suggested by Smith. In fact, there is no positive evidence of
any direct conflict between early Caudellas and the Gurjara-
Pratiharas. It may be assumed that Karmuka, the leader of a
local tribe, found a suitable opportunity in the prevailing
circumstances to organise it on a military basis, and that it
was under his leadership that the nucleus of the Caudella State
was founded in the region, which later came to be known as
Jejubhukti or Jejakabhukti (Mahoba Inscription, Epigraphic Indica:
I, p. 221). As the Pratiharas were preoccupied with deadly
struggles against their powerful enemies, it may have been possible
for the Caudellas to lay the foundation of their chieftainship.

But the picture of the Pratihara power, as drawn by
Dr. Ray, seems to be, I am afraid, a little exaggerated. The
so much sentido has been warmly subscribed to by the work of

easternized, north-western. It is important to understand the role of
rural production and society in determining the balance of
power. The Pratiharas, however, were able to establish a significant
presence in the region, which contributed to their chieftainship.
Curjara-Pratihara power did not rise to its height even by the end of Nagabhata II's reign. Dr. F.C. Majumdar (1941) thinks that the evidence of the Jain text Prabhavaka Carita, connecting Kausalya with Nagabhata II, is not reliable. Thus Kausalya may not have formed a part of the Curjara-Pratihara dominion even during Nagabhata II's time, i.e., 633 A.D. He was followed by Rasabhadra (633-35 A.D.) on the Pratihara throne, who again was a weak ruler. Down to about the middle of the 9th century A.D. the Pratas were still a considerable power in Northern India. If all these circumstances are taken into account it does not become necessary to presume that the Candellas could not have existed except as a feudatory to the Pratiharas.

In V. 13 of the Khajuraho Inscription of V.S. 1011, however, it is stated that the Vindhya became the pleasure-mountain (Krishna-giri) of Vakpati, where he was entertained by the Kirata women. Dr. H.G. Ray (1931) concludes from it that Vakpati succeeded in extending to some degree the limits of his small ancestral principality. He has not however specified the extent of this increased power. There were hills connected with the Vindhyas in the territory which later came to be known as Jejaka-bhukti. It is quite probable that some of these ranges may have been meant, and comprised in the territory originally held by the Candellas. The passage need not necessarily be taken as indicating any definite advance of territorial power without concrete details.

Vakpati had two sons, Jayasakti and Vijayasakti, both of whom appear to have been closely associated in the task of consolidating their political status. In connection with Vijaya-
nakti, it may be observed that he is described as having carried on expeditions to the far south to help the cause of an ally.

ruhred-upakrti-daksaka daksinasa jiqisah.

punaradhistya payodher-bandha vaichuyamaryah/v.20 (Epigraphic India: 141-142).

If Jayasakti and Vijayasakti were feudatories to the Pratiharas, then to whom should this epithet 'ruhred' be applied? It would not be an appropriate epithet for a Gurjara-Pratihara king, if he was their overlord. Further, nothing is known about any expedition of the Pratiharas to the extreme south of India, in which they may have been helped by the Candalas. B.C. Majumdar (1941) thinks that the Canda chief, Vijayasakti might have helped Devapala in the latter's southern expedition, and earlier Vakpati might have similarly been associated with Devapala in his exploits in the Vindhyas region. If this view is accepted it will appear that the Candalas were free to help other powers, such as the Pala, who were the bitter enemies of the Pratiharas.

If the Candalas were really feudatories to the Gurjara Pratiharas, as supposed by some scholars, it would have been unusual for them to do so. Thus it appears that the feudatory status of the Candalas in relation to the Gurjara-Pratiharas during the early stages of their history, is not clearly established.

Dr. Majumdar suggests that the Candalas had helped Devapala in his fights against Bhoja (Pratihara) and were rewarded, after the latter's defeat, with the sovereignty of the territory.
near Khajuraho, perhaps under the suzerainty of Devapala. In the absence of positive evidence, I am afraid, it is difficult to accept the view that the early Candella rulers were feudatories of the Pala of Bengal (R.C. Majumdar 1941).

The Candella ruler, Yasovarman, however, was a feudatory of the Pratiharas. Before him Harsha had helped the Gurjara-Pratiharas, possibly in a domestic strife. There is no definite indication of his status in relation to the Gurjara-Pratiharas. Then, then, did the Candellas first accept the position of a feudatory to the Pratiharas.

From about the middle of the 9th century A.D., there was a progressive weakening of the Pala power (R.C. Majumdar 1941) and a temporary cessation of the Rashtrakuta attacks. The Candellas in all probability, may have accepted the suzerainty of the Pratiharas during this time, as no other power was stronger than the Pratiharas in Northern India then. By doing so they gained for themselves a recognised political status, though it was that of a feudatory. Jayasakti’s importance in the family is indicated in the statement found in its records that Jeja gave his name of Jejabhakti as Prthu did to Prthivi.

Jejakhyayatha nrpatih sa babhu a Jejabhuktih
Prthoriva yatah Prthiviyarmm-asit.
(Mahoba Inscription)

Further it may also be observed that the later Candella rulers generally invoke Jayasakti and his brother, Vijayasakti.
as the early ancestors of the family in the opening verse of their records.

Jayatishladayan-visvam Visvesvara-siroddhrrtah
Candratreyan narendranam vamsascandra iv-ojjalah
Tatra pravardhamane virochi vijaya bhrajismu
Jayasakti-Vijayasaktyadi-viravirahava bhasvare

(Indian Antiquity, IX, 261)

The importance appears to have been due to the fact that he (Jayasakti), by submitting to the overlordship of the Pratiharas, the greatest power in Northern India in his time, was able to win a recognised status for his family. But this must have happened sometime after Vijayasakti's expedition to the south, when he might have been assisting the Palas as suggested by Dr. Majumdar.

Nanuka founded the nucleus of the Candella dominion, but he was a tribal chief only. For about fifty years the Candasellas profited by the political disturbances in which other powers were seriously involved. Afterwards when the superiority of the Pratiharas was firmly established they submitted to their overlordship, as there was no other alternative.

Rahila, the son of Vijayasakti, is mentioned in two of the Khajuraho Records. He is, however, only vaguely eulogised as a great warrior - 'never tired at the sacrifice of battle (Epigraphic Indica, I, V. 17, p. 131), and 'thinking of whom the enemies enjoy little sleep at night' (nidra daridratam yanti
Pahila undertook works of public interest, viz., excavation of tanks and lakes and construction of temples, remnants of which are still visible at Ajaygarh and Mahoba. At Ajaygarh a temple bears some stones inscribed with his name (Archaeological Survey Report, vii, p. 41), and an old lake with a fine cruciform granite temple on its bank, near Mahoba, is still called 'Pahilya Sagar' after his name (G.A.S.B.: 1861).

The traditional account of the Parmal Raso, ascribes to him the construction of the township of Rasau (Parmal Raso, v. 86, p. 17) which is now identifiable with a village of the same name in the Jargana Bazzar, 20 miles north-east of Kalanjar, where A. Cadell noticed some old fortifications and a temple of the usual candella type (G.A.S.B.: 1861).

It was during the time of Harsa, who succeeded Pahila, that the Candellas appear to have made a steady progress towards the attainment of a significant status in the political history of Northern India. Their position seems to have been greatly strengthened by matrimonial alliances with other contemporary rulers. Khajuraho Records eloquently refer to the marriage between Harsa and Kanchuka of the Cahamana dynasty (Cahamana kulodbhavam). The Seneres Grant of Laksmi-Karna (Kalacuri) alludes to the marriage of the Kalacuri king Kikkela I with Natta or Nattakhyadevi, a princess of the Candella lineage. As Harsa, mentioned in the same record, is identical with Candella
Harsa, Natta was possibly related to him. The Kalacuris appreciate this marriage as an ideal one like the celestial unions of Saci with Indra, Kamala with Upendra, and Uma with Candramauli.

An additional indication of friendly relations between the Kalacuris and the Candellas during this time is furnished by the same record, which states that Harsa, along with three other rulers including Dhoja II of the Pratihara dynasty and Vallabhara- raja (i.e. Pastrakuta Krishna II) had been granted freedom from fear by the Kalacuri king Kokkala (c. 775–925 A.D.). It seems that Kokkala assured Harsa of his intention not to injure the interest of the Candellas, and at the same time to secure indirectly protection for them by allying himself both with the Gurjara Pratiharas and the Pastrakutas, who had been bitterly opposed to each other for a long period.

It is, however, well-known that the hostilities between the Pratiharas and the Pastrakutas took a serious turn after 915 A.D., when Indra III sacked even the Imperial city of Mahodaya (Kanauj). But the Gurjara Pratiharas were able to recover substantial portion of their dominions after the death of Indra III. Kautilya (Mahipala) in his attempt to rebuild the Pratihara power, was aided by some of his feudatories including the Candellas. The Chatsu Stone Inscription refers to an expedition of conquest led by the Guhilot prince, Shatta, against the kings of the south, evidently the Pastrakutas, at the behest of his overlord, generally identified with the Pratihara ruler, Mahipala. The Khajuraho
inscription similarly claims for Candella Narra the unique distinction of restoring Kasipaladeva on the throne. It is therefore quite reasonable to believe that the Candella king Narra by his successful intervention in the affairs of the sizarain power enhanced his status in contemporary politics, which, as pointed out by Dr. H.C. Ray (1931) in the end proved fatal to it (the Imperial Pratiharas). An almost similar situation developed in the history of Bengal in the latter half of the 11th century A.D., when Ramapala secured the help and cooperation of his 'Samanta-cakra' (feudatory powers) to recover 'Varendra' (North Bengal) from the clutches of his enemy (S.C. Sen: 1941).

The allusion to this important political incident in the Khajuraho record is a clear indication of the growing power of the Candellas. It provides the missing link to the circumstances that led to the rise of the Candellas as an independent power free from political subservience to the Pratiharas. Henceforth the Candellas retain only a nominal show of allegiance to their overlord, which continued till the days of Yasovarman.

6.2 AUXILIARY TACTICAL IMPORTANT OF ARMY IN THE FIELD

6.2.1: Importance of Position: Ancient military opinion appears to have attached great importance to the position of an army in the theatre of war. A pre-Kautilyan teacher stresses the importance of position by means of the following homely analogy.
A dog seated in a convenient place may drag a crocodile, and
the a crocodile seated in a low ground can drag a dog (Kautilya
Arthasastra, Bk. IX. ch. 1). In the Arthasastra (Bk. X. ch. 4),
Kautilya says: "Favourable positions for infantry, cavalry,
chariots and elephants are desirable both for war and camp. For
men who are trained to fight in desert tracts, forests, valleys,
plains, and for those who are trained to fight from ditches
or heights, during the day or night, and for elephants which are
bred in countries with rivers, mountains, marshy lands, or lakes,
as well as for horses, such battle-fields as they should find
suitable are to be selected." It is thus evident that according
to Kautilya the primary consideration which should weigh with
a general in selecting a position must be the character and
composition of his forces. It was universally recognised that
the different arms required different grounds for the proper
discharge of their functions (Santiparwa 100, 21, 23; Agastya
242, 30; Kanishka, 1056). A commander was expected to keep this fact
persistently in view, and dispose troops in harmony with the
ground on which they were to act. In another context, however,
Kautilya says: "That part of the country in which his army finds
a convenient place for its manoeuvres and which proves unfavourable
to his foe is the best; that part of the country which is of the
reverse nature is the worst; and that which partakes of both
the characteristics is a country of middling quality (Kautilya
Arthasastra, Bk. IX. ch. 1). In other words, the amount of
advantage which a position offered to the belligerent was to be
the sole criterion of its merit or demerit. A general command must have the military insight to recognise whether a particular position would be advantageous for the evolution and manoeuvre of his troops.

5.2.2: **Battle-orders**: When two hostile armies faced each other, and conflict was imminent, it was the usual practice to draw them up in battle-orders (Kamandaka, XIX-441). The term for battle-order in Sanskrit is yuga; and the ranging of an army in battle-array was one of the essential qualifications of the commander-in-chief. Battle-orders were many and various, and they have been dwelt upon at considerable length in all ancient texts on war.

The testimony of military writers reveals three stages of tactical evolution among the ancient Hindus. The first stage is probably represented by the code of Usanas, according to whom an array should consist of three divisions, viz. wings (pakṣau), vanguard (dvarasyam) and rear-guard (pratigraha). The next stage is marked by the code of Ārahaṅga, who added flanks (pakṣau) to the above list (Kutilya, bk. X. 6). In later works like the Kamandakīya (XX, 30), the Agni Purana (241, 41-2), and the Niti-prakasika (VI, 11) a battle-order has been described as consisting of seven divisions (saptanga), viz. wings, flanks, vanguard, centre (madhya), rear-centre (pūrva), rear-guard and koti.
Descriptions of battle-orders occur in the Mahabharata, the Arthasastra of Kautilya, and later manuals on niti and Dhamurveda. For instance, we are told in the Mahabharata, that on the first day of the war, the Pandus arrayed their troops in a "needle-shaped" (sucil) order, and on the day following in the form of a 'heron' (krunda or krundaruna). On the third day Bhismā led off with a 'rhomboid' (garuda) array, while the Pandus drew up in order in the shape of a crescent. On the fifth day we have the 'hawk' (syena) array on the Pandu side, and the 'crocodile' (mūkara) that of the Kurus. On the seventh day Bhismā, 'skilled in battle-orders' drew up a 'circular' (mandala) array, while the Pandu king formed the 'thunderbolt' (vajra). The day following Bhismā drew up an array 'like the sea'; and to meet it the Pandu commander was ordered by the king to array his hosts in the arṇgatakā order. On the next day, Bhismā disposed his troops in the 'sarvatobhadra' array, the Pandus too formed a strong counter-array, but it is not given any name. The most ponderous of all arrays, however, came on the fourteenth day. Drona formed an array, half of which was in the shape of a 'wagon' (sakata), and the other half in that of a 'lotus' (gaṁga). The 'wagon' extended over twelve gavutis in length and covered the front, while the 'lotus' forming the rear was five gavutis deep. And within the 'lotus' was formed another solid array called the 'needle' (sucil). In other words, the 'lotus' at the back of the 'wagon' served as an enclosure for the 'needle'. We have thus three different arrays made and perfected into one composite
manner-array. On all other days we have either no names for the arrays formed, or mere repetitions of the orders previously devised on one side or the other (Mahabharata: 1919).

When we come to study the details of these epic battle-orders, we find ourselves on more shaky ground. The poet here seems to give free scope to his fancy; and the metaphors used in the names of the 'orders' are usually kept up in the narration of the details. Let us, for instance, take the case of the 'rhinoceros' (garuda) array formed by Bhima on the third day of battle. The commander, we are told, was on the 'beak' (tunda), two chiefs on the head (sirsa), two more made the 'eyes' (aeksusi) others were on the neck' (griva) and still others in the rear (pracna), tail (pracna), right wing (daksinam aeksam) and left flank (vamam aersam). Similarly the 'beak' array formed by the inconstant on the fifth day had the following parts: face (nakha), eyes head, neck, wing and rear. In the same way, the sixth day's crocodile's array had its head, eyes, mouth, neck, back, feet and tail. Similar details are repeated in connection with the orders (Shakambar, 51, 1, 69-7, 75-4, 67-18).

We get, however, a more rational discussion about battle-orders in the Arthasastra of Kautilya and post-Kautilyan texts on war. Broadly speaking, battle-orders are divided under four main heads, viz. danda (staff), bhoga (snake), madala (circle), and asamhata (detached order). Each of these, again, is subdivided into several varieties. Thus the danda comprised seventeen, the bhoga five, the mandala two, and the asamhata six varieties of
arrays. But apart from these, there were various other arrays known (Kautilya Arth. Bk. x. ch.6).

Usanas and Bṛhaspati defined a danda (staff) as an array in which the troops stationed in the different divisions were arranged in curved lines or columns. According to Kautilya, however, it meant a kind of battle-order in which the wings, flanks and vanguard of the army were maintained in equal strength. The seventeen varieties of this order were as follows:

A dandaśyayana is called pradara (breaking the enemy's army) when its flanks are made to project in front. It is, again, known as dṛdhaka (firm) when its wings are stretched back. It is called asahya (irresistible) when its wings are stretched forward towards the enemy. Then after the formation of the wings, the front is made to bulge out, it is called syena (hawk). These four varieties are called cāpa (bow), cāpaśūkṣi (the centre of the bow), pratiśṭha (hold) and supratiśṭha (a stronghold) respectively when they are arranged in the reverse order. That variety of the dandaśyayana in which the wings are arranged in the shape of a bow is called saṃjaya (victory). The same with a projected front is called vijaya. The array which has its wings drawn up in the shape of a flat ear is called asthulekha; the array in which the wings are made twice as flat as those of a vijaya is known as viśalaviṣaya (great victory); that in which the flanks and the vanguard are stretched towards the wings is called caṇṇumukha; and the same is called ihasahya when it is arrayed in the reverse form. That variety of danda in which the troops are made to stand one behind another, is called suśimukha (needle-faced).
called valyga; and when of four lines, it is called durjaya (invincible). (Kamandaka, xx-55: 1912).

According to Usanas and Arhaspati, the bhoga meant a battle-order in which the troops in the different divisions were arrayed in one continuous chain. Kautilya says, however, that the chief distinctive feature of this battle-order was the fact that its wings, flanks and front were of unequal depth. The five varieties of this order were: sarpasuri (which has a serpentine movement), gomatrika (course of a cow's urine), sekata (wagon), nakara (crocodile) and paripatantaka. Some of these have been defined. Thus the 'wagon' is explained as 'that variety of bhoga in which the front is divided into two parts, and the wings are arranged in the form of staffs'. The reverse of this is described as the 'crocodile' array. The paripatantaka, again, is said to have been a variety of the 'wagon', having in its columns a large number of elephants, horses and chariots (Kamandaka: 1912, xx, 48-49).

The mandala (circular array) has been defined as a battle-order in which the wings, flanks and front stood in close proximity to one another, without having any intermediate space between them. Its two varieties were known as servatobhadra and durjaya. When the battle-order was so arranged as to face in all directions, it was called servatobhadra. When, again, though having the flanks as usual, its front was split up into two halves and the wings into four, it was termed durjaya (Kautilya Arth. Bk. x, ch.6).
The seamhata has been explained as an array in which the wings, flanks and front were stationed apart from each other. The six varieties of this order were known as the 'thunderbolt' (vajra), 'alligator' (gurha), 'park' (udyanaka), 'crown-footed' (cukkapadi), 'branched' (artha-candrika), and karkata-srangi (kransanga, sk. sl. 1912).

Besides the above, battle-orders might be formed in various other ways. In the Arthasastra (bk. x, ch. 6), Kautilya writes: "The array in which the chariots form the front, the elephants the wings, and horses the rear, is called arista; that in which infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants stand one behind the other is called asala; that in which elephants, horses, chariots and infantry stand in order one behind the other is known as agrasihata. Then, again, the wings were occupied by elephants, the flanks by horses, and the front by chariots, it was called a sakra (wheel) array. Then the front was occupied by elephants, the flanks by chariots and the wings by horses, it was known as a madhya-bhedai array. There was also what has been described as an antardhedi array. In this the flanks were occupied by elephants, the wings by chariots and the front by cavalry (Kautilya Arth. bk. X, ch. 5).

It is needless to expand the list further. From the foregoing enumeration it is clear that the disposition of troops on the battle-field might in fact take any form or shape. The nature of the battle-order to be adopted by a general on any
particular occasion was determined by various considerations. In
the first place, the composition of the forces at his disposal
was a factor to reckon with. A second determining factor was the
character of the theatre of operations. Kautilya says: "The even,
uneven and complex nature of the ground in the front or on the
sides or in the rear should be examined. On an even site the danda
and the mandala array should be formed; on an uneven ground bhoga
and asamhata arrays should be made; and on a site of a complex
nature, the battle-order should be of the visama type." He have
a re-iteration of the same view in the later Sukraniti, where the
author maintains that "the ruler should devise one, two or more
of these vyuhas or a mixture of them according to the number of
troops and the character of roads and battle-fields (Sukraniti,
ch. IV, sec. viii-li, 566-67). The third factor which decided the
nature of the array was the strength and character of the
enemy's battle-order. "One should", says Kautilya, "assail the
pradha by means of the capa, pratistha by means of the supratistha,
sanjaya by means of the vijaya, sathulakarna by means of the
visala-vijaya, and paripatantaka by means of the sarvatobhadra.
One may assail all kinds of arrays by means of the durjaya
(Kautilya Arth., Sk. X, ch. 6). In several texts, again, it is
enjoined that a large force, fighting against a small one, should
be arrayed in extended lines, but a small force, in order to
confront with a large one, should charge in one long narrow column,
concentrating all its strength at one point (Nandasmitti, vii-191).

Besides the formation of battle-orders, ancient writers
provide us with a few other details regarding the disposition of
the army on the field of battle. It is stated, for instance, in
the Arthasastra (bk. x, ch. 3) that foot-soldiers should be so
arrayed that the space between any two men might be equivalent
to one sama (fourteen finger-breadths); horses should be arrayed
with three sames (two and one-third feet) as the intervening
space; while chariots and elephants should be stationed five
sama (three and eight-ninth feet) apart. In more extended arrays,
however, the intervening space between any two individuals should
be doubled or trebled. When the army consisted of a large conti-
agent of archers, the rules appear to have been slightly different.
Thus the space intervening between any two bowmen was to be
equivalent to a dhamus (five cubits), that between horses fifteen
cubits, and that between war-cars and war-elephants twenty-five
cubits. This increase in space was probably necessitated by the
fact that archers required more room for the effective use of
their weapons. With regard to the different divisions of an array,
Vatitila holds that in ordinary circumstances they should be
ranged twenty-five cubits apart from each other. The Agni Purana
(236, 35) maintains that care should be taken in every case to
provide ample space for the free movement of the different divi-
sions, and that neither en masse nor individually should the
troops be inconveniently crowded.

Qualitatively, troops were considered as falling under
four classes: viz. saran (best), anusaram (second best), tertiya-
saram (third in rank), and phalgu (rank troops). Vatitila lays-
it down that in drawing up an array the general should place the weaker troops (phalgu) in the fore-front of each division. Then should come the tritiyam, and then the best. The second best (amañan) is to be placed in the rear line. The reason offered for this arrangement is typically illustrative of the intensely practical nature of Kautilya military precepts. If the weakest troops be placed in the front line, he argues, the first shock of the enemy's charge would fall upon them, and not a single troop of the better type would perish. When the enemy is thus grappling in an encounter with the rife-reef of the army (phalgu-balā), the general should manoeuvre his best troops, swoop down upon the enemy and annihilate him (Kautilya Arth. Sk. X, ch. 5).

This was also the advice of later writers like Varanā (v. 34) and Somesvara (v. 169-191). The Agni Purana emphatically (236, 41-42) maintains that weak troops should never be placed in the van, for then attacked they would easily give in and thus create confusion in the rest of the army. On the other hand, if brave troops be placed in the front line, their example would serve as an inspiration to the weaker troops in the rear.

6.2:3 Conduct of battles: Though much ingenuity was expended on the formation of battle-arrays, it does not seem that they had any decisive influence on the conduct of battles. The epics give one the impression that after the first plunge into the fight, no order whatever was maintained. "As soon as the armies meet", says Hopkins, "we read that there was complete disorder."
This is caused in three ways. The mass is helpless and impotent left to itself; the knight is reckless and foolhardy. Instead of remaining to attack the division allotted to him at the outset of the day, he rushes about wherever he pleases, and the slightest incident sends him shooting transversely across the field, discomforting his friends almost as much as his foes. The knightly proficiency in 'manoeuvres', either of weapon-skill or of chariot-skill, leads directly to this individual excellence and weakness of the mass. It is a contest of duels and push. Each knight flings himself in front of another, and the two then 'circle', or wheel about each other, in the method admired by the Greek observer, until one is confused or weakened; for the charioteers do the twisting (except incidentally), while the knights have to keep the balance and shoot. As the cars constantly tip over, the shooting must have been as described rather wild. Meanwhile the regiments led by the knights into the field either stand stock-still and look on at the spectacle, or they fling themselves against each other, two unheeded masses, and cutting and chopping each other in a promiscuous manner, lend their weight against the foe. More than weight we can scarcely call it. No individual common man is important. While this by-play goes on, one knight is slain or flees. Then all his soldiers run away, since they fight not for a cause but for a leader (F.W. Hopkins: 1910)

Nothing could have been a better description of the manner in which battles were conducted in the so-called epic period. But it is doubtful whether the description is applicable
to ancient Indian warfare in general. We have indeed a few accounts
of battles in post-epic literature and inscriptions, but as
they were written mostly by priests and literary men, without
military experience, they appear to follow a conventional standard.
It will, therefore, be risky to make any deduction from these
accounts. On the other hand, we have in the Arthasastra and other
military texts, a clear enunciation of some fundamental principles
of tactics, which perhaps prove that commanders of armies followed
some definite plan in conducting a campaign. For instance, it is
laid down that when an army is drawn up in battle-order, the
general must not move it en masse against the foe but should
rather assail the latter with one or two divisions, and when the
enemy is thrown into confusion, should follow up the first onset
with the remaining divisions (Kautilya Arth. Bk. X, ch. 5). A
second principle enunciated is that a commander must begin a battle
by striking that portion of the hostile army which is occupied
by weak and treacherous troops (Kautilya Arth. Bk. X, ch. 3).
Thirdly, it is emphasised that he should make a rear-attack on
the enemy, when a frontal attack is considered disadvantageous,
and a frontal attack under contrary circumstances. Similarly
when an attack on one wing or flank is deemed unwise, the other
wing or flank may be assailed. Having struck the front of the
hostile army, the commander should follow it up by an attack
from the rear. He may also strike at the enemy's rear, and then
when it has wheeled round, must attack it from the front. Finally
it is laid down that a commander must not press hard a weak but
desperate foe, secure in a strong position; for "when a broken army, reckless of life, resumes its attack, its fury becomes irresistible" (Kautilya Artha Shastra, Sk. X, Ch. 3).

It may be presumed that these and other similar principles of tactics, which we find embodied in ancient military manuals, were not merely reproduced from foreign copy-books, but learnt from the school of hard experience, and that once learnt they were not easily forgotten. But we have no sufficient data to appraise the extent to which they were a controlling factor in military operations. There is reason to believe, however, that some of the characteristics of epic warfare persisted till almost the close of our period. It is probable, for instance, that to the last a battle was often a combat of duels and push; it is certain that there was always an element of single combat in the sense that when the king, who usually commanded in person, fell or fled, his army also fled. Thus, as we have already seen, the fight for Sind in 712 A.D. was decided by the fall of Dahir, the King of the Country; while an important victory gained by Sultan Mahmud in 1008 A.D. was due to the flight of the elephant on which his opponent was mounted. To kill, or put to flight, the opposing king was thus the primary object in each battle (Manusmriti, vv.136).
All fighting was done according to certain laid down principles and dharma, the accepted ethical code. The sastras did not allow the liberty of striking 'below the belt'. At times it was also ensured that if one of the parties having signed a treaty of peace showed signs of infidelity it was to undertake another oath by fire that a contrast to the present day ethical standards where a peace treaty has no value and the document is thrown aside if it suits either party as soon as it is written. In spite of these guiding principles other means were also employed. Warfare could be open-prakasa, treacherous-kuta, silent tsunami or by intrigue that is winning over the principal officers of the enemy or killing them by employing spies when there was no talk of war, asura. When wholesale weapons of destruction were used and daivika in which many a charm were employed. For an open battle the tactics employed were: threatening in one direction, assault in another and destruction of the enemy while he was careless. It was claimed that an arrow shot by an archer may or may not kill even a single man but skilful intrigue could destroy even those who were in the womb. Great stress was laid on obtaining a favourable position for own side at all costs. Even sun tzu has emphasised that supreme excellence consisted in breaking the resistance of the enemy without fighting one form of feint was: make a false impression of defeat by retreating against the enemy who was entrenched and having lured him into
an unfavourable position on own ground of choice launch an
attack when frontal attack was considered unfavourable one was
required to strike from behind. Then attack from the rear was
inadvisable one was to strike from the front.

Cutting of the tail or the line of communication and
capturing or harassing the rear forces are some of the time-worn
injunctions in strategy. Even a slight annoyance in the rear has
its effect and must be pressed home. Constant harassing by
dominating the area between the opposing forces has also paid
many a divided. At the present time when the implements of war
have be come very advanced, harassing of the enemy is done by
artillery and motor fire at all hours of the day and night,
bombing and strafing from the air, constant patrolling deep
inside the enemy territory and employment of fifth-columnists.

6.4 CHANDELA'S ECONOMY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

Chandela's empire's met to our enemies on the plain
field or fortified area. At its broadest it was few miles wide
and had low hills. Chandella's deployed his army in the form of
a Vyhuha. He placed his elephants in such a manner so as to form
the front of his main defences. These were deployed in some ranks
and they were to strike terror in the hearts of the enemy groups.
Placed one hundred feet apart they looked like bastions in a wall
formed by the infantry. Some gaps were left at regular intervals,
for the infantry to charge through and at the same time to check the enemy cavalry and infantry from penetrating the defences. The infantry was also projected on both sides and in the rear. The cavalry were deployed on both the flanks. The Amir was himself in the centre of this strong formation (Fig. 6-1).

6.5 Chandela's Battles

Chandela's fought more than 26 battles. The list are being given on the next page.

According to list, we describe here only two battles i.e:

1) Battle of Kalanjara 1022 A.D.
2) Battle of Mahoba 1162-63 A.D.

6.5:1 Historical background: Abdul Hasim Mahmud, the oldest son of Sabuktigin, ascended the throne of Ghazni in 996 A.D. at the age of twenty seven. Within a year, he secured recognition from Al Qadir Billah, the Caliph of Baghdad, as the ruler of Afghanistan and Khurasan. The latter bestowed on him the titles of Amirul Millat and Yamin-ud Daulah. Mahmud thus came to occupy a status, similar to that of the Saljuqids, his former suzerains, in direct allegiance to the caliph. He was the first Muslim ruler to be credited with the title of the
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<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>916-17A.D.</td>
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## Chandela's Battles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Chandela</th>
<th>Name of Opposite Ruler</th>
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<td>Paramaras &amp; Cedis</td>
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<td>Naravarman &amp;</td>
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<td>20000 cavalry, infantry, 10000 infantry, 20000 under Alha &amp; Udai</td>
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<td>Soncha, Juubal, etc. 1208, Kalanjara, Ajaygad 1308</td>
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Sultan's (A.D. M. Itabibullah: 1961). At the time of his investiture by the caliph's planipontiff, Mahmud took a vow that he would wage jihad on the Kafirs and organise annual expeditions into India "the land of idolaters". He could not undertake this work all at once because of a revolt in Khurassan (998-99). A great warrior and brilliant military commander, he carved out a vast central Asian empire by conquests, interspersed with his Indian Invasions.

Mahmud led seventeen expeditions into India from 1000 to 1027. The number and frequency of these raids throw light on the tireless energy, ambition and fixity of purpose of the invader. He left Ghazni generally at the end of the Indian rainy season, in September-October, and spent the winter here which was not as cold as in Afghanistan. He returned to Ghazni in March-April before the beginning of the next rainy season, laden with every type of booty, including gold, silver, precious stones, horses, elephants, men and women as slaves and all that he and his marauders could carry with them. Having acquired full knowledge of the climate and topography of India, he usually tried to avoid the scorching heat of the northern plains, and particularly the rains which blocked the passage of the armies. Obviously, even the shortest of his campaigns has to be indicated by two years of the Christian era.

After the consolidation of his hold over the Ghazni kingdom, Mahmud turned his attention towards the Indian frontier;
He initiated the campaign with the dawn of the eleventh century (1000-01). He crossed the Khyber Pass and occupied some hill territories and fortresses in the vicinity of Kashgar. He stayed on the bank of the Indus for a couple of weeks and had a good look at the vast stretch of the Indian plains along the river. He returned after stationing a strong contingent on the Indian side of the pass. This was his first visit to the pass which he garrisoned and made safe for his future expeditions.

Nahmud marched against Jaipal the year following, at the head of 15000 select cavalry and a large number of Ghazis (The Ghaznavids; 1963) and encamped near Rehbar. Jaipal crossed the Indus with 10000 cavalry, 30000 infantry and 300 elephants, to meet the invader. The battle took place on November 27, 1001. Jaipal was defeated and taken prisoner along with his chief officers and ringmen; fifteen thousand of his men lay dead, spreading like a carpet on the ground and providing ample food for beasts and birds of prey. Anandpal, the son of the Jaipal, who had been left behind at Valian to look after the affairs of the state, had to pay a heavy ransom to secure the release of his father and others. Jaipal could not bear the disgrace and burnt himself to death on a self-lit pyre. He was succeeded on the throne of Valian by Anandpal. Nahmud returned to Ghazni with a huge booty and a large number of the Indian captives as slaves. This initial victory over Hindushahis, the guardians of the northwestern frontier of India, encouraged him a great deal.
After the conquest of Siestan (1002-4), Mahmud led his third expedition into India in 1004-5. He marched with his victorious army through Baluchistan, crossed the Indus and started loot and plunder in the Multan region. He met with stiff opposition at the fort of Bhatiya, situated on the trade route from the Khyber pass to Multan. Its ruler Saji or Baji Rai gave a heroic fight but was defeated, instead of falling into the hand of the invaders, he saved his honour by committing suicide; All the inhabitants of Bhatiya who refused to embrace Islam were put to the sword.

Mahmud returned to Ghazni along the Indus via the Khyber pass, his men took time to move and were caught in the rains before they could clear the pass. The swollen Indus and its tributaries took a heavy toll of life and booty of the invaders, who were also pillaged by the Indian tribals. It made Mahmud wiser in planning his subsequent expeditions.

Mahmud led his fourth expedition (1005-6) against Abdul Fath Daud, the Kamatia ruler of Multan, dubbed as heretic by the Turks. Anandpal refused to give a passage to the invaders through his dominions and had to suffer a heavy loss. Daud capitulated without a fight and pleased Mahmud by the surrender of his treasure, horses and other valuables. He was allowed to retain Multan on the promise to pay annual tribute and follow the principles of the Sunni faith.
While returning to Chazni, Mahmud appointed a Hindu convert Nawasa Shah, to look after his conquered territories in Hindustan.

About this time, the Turks under Ilak Khans, invaded Khurasan. Mahmud, therefore, remained busy on his central, Asian frontier for about two years. Taking advantage of his long absence, Nawasa Shah renounced Islam and tended to behave as an independent ruler of the northwestern frontier. Semi Sultan also began to collaborate with him. The fifth expedition of Mahmud (1067-8) was accordingly directed against Nawasa Shah. The latter attempted to escape towards the Kashmir hills but was taken prisoner and deprived of his personal treasure of about four lakh dinars.

The ever-increasing frequency of Mahmud's raids made Anandpal, the Hindushahi ruler, extremely anxious about the safety of his state. All along, Mahmud had been striking at the fringes of the Hindushahi kingdom, subjugating and humiliating the petty chieftains and demoralising their people. Sooner or later the hindushahis must settle their scores with the invader; in spite of the successive defeats having been suffered by its rulers, the hindushahis constituted yet the most formidable stumbling block in the way of Mahmud. Anandpal was fully conscious of the gravity of the situation. Mahmud launched a full-fledged invasion of the hindushahi kingdom in (1068-9) (sixth expedition). Anandpal was prepared to meet the coming danger. He had received some aid in men and material from the rulers of Delhi, Ajmer, Kalanjar,
Gwalior and Kanauj. There was great enthusiasm among the people of the northern India; many Hindu-ladies sold their ornaments and the poorer among them worked hard at their spinning wheels, to provide money for the soldiers. A united effort was made by the Indians to face the foreigner. The two armies met on the banks of the Indus. Mahmud resorted to strategy to meet the situation. With back to the Thar desert, firmly secured and made safe for retreat in case of defeat, he entrenched his main army in the plain of Unhachia near Gazru on the east of the Indus (C.V. Vaidya, 1923). The armies remained encamped face to face with each other for 'forty days' without engaging themselves. Meanwhile the troops of Anandpal daily increased in number. Ultimately, Mahmud sent 6000 archers to provoke the enemy to move forward and attack his entrenchments. It had its desired effect; Anandpal’s forces dashed forward and a bloody battle ensued. To quote Sirishta, during the heat of the 30000 infidel Khodars, with their heads and feet bare, armed with spears and other weapons, penetrated on two sides and forcing their way into the midst of the cavalry-slaughtered three or four thousand Muhammadans. They carried their success so far that the sultan, observing their feary retreated from the thick of the fight that he might stop the battle for that day. Defeat stared him in the face, but to his good fortune, just at that crucial moment, the wounded elephant of Anandpal got out of control and fled the battlefield, carrying the monarch along with him. It spread panic among the Hindu fighters, who
treated it as a signal for the flight of their leader, broke the engagement. According to the Muslim chroniclers, no less than 3000 of them were killed in the retreat. This broke the backbone of the national resistance movement against the Turkish invader. Mahmud did not stay put at the battlefield after this glorious victory. A part of his army spread over the plains and took possession of the entire upper valley of the Indus including Harano; he himself moved speedily, at the head of select cavalry, along the foothills of Punjab, apparently with the object of giving a hot chase to the fugitive Hindu soldiers. As a matter of fact, he had a sinister design up his sleeves. To the great chagrin and bewilderment of the hill chiefs, he, all of a sudden, thundered at the gates of Nangalot which had one of the most sacred and richest temples of National fame. Mahmud won an easy victory over the defenders of the fortress plundered the temple as well as the populace and returned to Chazni laden with booty. The temple alone yielded 70,000 minted gold coins, 700 mounds of gold and silver ingots and jewellery and twenty mounds of precious stones, pearls and rubies of incalculable value. Many rare trophies of the war had never been seen or heard of by the people of Central Asia. Mahmud held a grand exhibition of the booty in the imperial lawns at Chazni for many a week, the ambassadors from the Muslim countries and the people from far and near poured into Chazni to have a glimpse of the fabulous wealth.

This made Mahmud famous as a Muslim crusader and conqueror of Hindustan—“the golden sparrow of Asia”. He established
his undisputed military dominance over northern India and played havoc there during the next two decades; the Indian rulers trembled to hear his name. The Nagarkot exploit provided due to the centuries-old accumulated wealth of India in the holy shrines. It sharpened Mahmud's avarice for the precious metal and encouraged him to strike at other famous Hindu temples with a still greater ferocity.

In his seventh expedition (1009-10), Mahmud penetrated deep into the heart of India up to Harayana. Its ruler was defeated and had to part with his entire treasury, armoury and other valuables. He promised further to assist Mahmud with men and material in his future campaigns against the neighbouring rulers.

Next year (1010-11), Mahmud took a punitive expedition against King Baud of Sultan who had failed to act as his faithful satellite and reverted to "the old heretic practices." Baud was taken prisoner and deposed; hundreds of Karmatias, dubbed as heretics, were put to the sword. Mahmud appointed a Turkish military officer as governor of Sultan before his return to Ghazni.

In his ninth expedition (1012-13), Mahmud laid his hands on Thanasar- 'the Mecca of Hindus'. It was then an independent principality Mahmud knew that, given the warning millions of Indians might be willing to shed their blood for the protection of the holy place. He therefore, kept his plan a closely guarded secret, even from his own camp-followers. As usual, he moved with
his well disciplined cavalry along the foot-hills of Shivaliks. On reaching the table-land near modern Chandigarh he made a sharp detour towards Thanesar and took its inhabitants by surprise. On the way, only one Indian chief wasa attempted to check his advance on the bank of a stream and perished with all his men on the battle-field. Before the Hindu princes, it was all over, the town and its holy shrines lay in ruins—the heaps of debris covered with rotting corpses. Like a hurricane Mahmud had made a clean sweep of his target and was already beyond the reach of the Hindu forces; treading his way to Ghazni with the same swiftness with which he had come. It was nothing, short of a highway robbery, accompanied by unsurpassed vandalism.

Since the fall of Lnawand (1008-9), Anandpal had set up his headquarters at Kandana in the salt range. On his death (c. 1011), Mahmud made a determined bid to liquidate the hinduahins. He marched upon Kandana (1013-14) at the head of a large cavalry force and besieged the fort. Trilochanpal, the son and successor of Anandpal, left the defences of the fort to his son Shimpal and himself retreated towards the Kashmir hills. Shimpal gave a heroic fight to the invader, in the true spirit of his forefathers, but his army was routed by the latter in a pitched battle, fought outside the fort. He escaped to the hills thereafter. Even then the handful of the besieged shahi soldiers refused to surrender until Mahmud planted wives under the walls of the fort and threatened them with total annihilation. An
An Indian convert named Barug was appointed governor of Bannana by him.

In 1015-16, Mahmud invaded the Kashmir valley. Trilochanpal and his son Animpal gave him a slip and returned to Punjab to salvage whatever portion of their territories had escaped the fury of the invader. Mahmud laid siege to the fort of Lohekot but the besieged garrison gave a stubborn fight and compelled the invader to raise the siege. Severity of winter, accompanied by heavy snowfall incapacitated Mahmud’s army. It lost its way in the valleys and hills and was reduced considerably in numbers. This was, incidentally, the only expedition of Mahmud which proved unsuccessful.

It would be appropriate to narrate here the subsequent efforts made by Mahmud to finally liquidate the Hindushahi dynasty. Chronologically, these were intervened by some other campaigns of Mahmud. After encamping in the neighbourhood of modern Srinjand for a short while, Trilochanpal sailed to Lahore which became the capital of the Hindushahis. The people of central Punjab rallied round him in thousand, ready to lay down their lives for the defence of their homeland. Mahmud also could not rest at care until he had delivered a final blow to the Hindushahis. He invaded Lahore (1021-22) during his fourteenth expedition and gave yet another defeat to Trilochanpal. Lahore fell into the hands of the invader as also 270 war elephants. The whole of Punjab up to the bank of the Sutlej was declared annexed to the Ghazni
emprise. Trilochanpal escaped once again and attempted to form a junction with Vijayshara the Chandela prince of Ulanjara (Manikha-Prana). On his way Trilochanpal was probably assassinated by some of his own selfish men who had become sick of his unending struggle against the Turks. His son Champa outlived his father by six years without claiming any royal title with his death (c. 1226). As a fugitive, the hindushahi dynasty came to an end.

To resume the main story, after his unsuccessful expedition to Kashmir, Mahmud remained busy for about two years (1016-18) on his western front which proved to be a temporary bulwark before the terrible storm that he let loose over the Gangetic valley in (1018-20). He invaded Yanaulj, then ruled by Ajaypal; the Surjara-pratihar chief, on the say, Hardut, the king of Tulandshaunar surrendered without a fight; he embraced Islam along with his ten thousand soldiers. Pulchand, the ruler of Nathura, lost 50,000 of his soldiers at the battlefield of Jahanara. Instead of falling into the hands of the invaders, he saved his honour by committing suicide along with his wife. Mahmud desecrated about one thousand temples in Nathura and its neighbourhood. His forces spread themselves in the Gangetic Doab, carrying fire and sword wherever they went. Ajaypal fled Yanaulj on the approach of the invaders. According to Ubhi, the latter ransacked and destroyed 10000 temples in that region. Mahmud carried back with him two million gold coins, invaluable quantities of gold, silver and precious stones: 350 elephants and 53,000 Hindu slaves.
Rajyapal was permitted to take charge of his kingdom as a vassal of Mahmud.

On Mahmud's return, Rajyapal reappeared in Kanauj, to be hated and despised by his act of cowardice. Mahmud, therefore, directed his next expedition (1020-21) against Kalanjara. On the way he laid siege to Gwalior but failed to conquer it. Its ruler Kirtiraja of the Kachhapagnata clan, accepted nominal suzerainty of Mahmud and got rid of him by offering thirty-five war elephants only.

According to Cardizi, Candraja challenged the invader with 145,000 infantry, 36,000 cavalry and 640 elephant he was supported by some other Hindu chiefs. Before the actual fight Canda became, however suspicions of treachery on the part of his colleagues and fled the field at night, leaving behind immense baggage and armoury which fell into the hands of the invaders, the booty included 580 war elephant also. Canda took refuge in the fort of Kalanjara which was promptly besieged by Mahmud. In spite of his best efforts, he failed to conquer it and was obliged to raise the siege on the offer of 300 war elephants by the chancellors. About this time; Vidyadhara the illustrious son of Canda, seems to have been in charge of the Kalanjara fort who pleased Mahmud of Ghazni by sending him a self-composed poem in praise of his suzerain. The campaign against Gwalior and Kalanjara was not very successful. Mahmud returned to Ghazni in a hurry so as not to be caught in the rainy season in the midst of the
BATTLE OF KALANJARA (1022 A.D.)

Battle formation and Battle

Kalanjara

BATTLE FORMATION

- INFANTRY Vidyajñara
- CAVALRY MAMMUD
- INFANTRY MAMMUD

FIG: 32
unbeaten Hindu rulers and hostile population.

6.5.1-(g) EMPIRICAL MILITARY STRATEGIES:

1. Vihachara - According to Al-Rashid bin al Ahmad (p. 216); Vihachara possessing an army of:

- 56000 cavalry
- 164000 infantry
- 746 elephant

2. Mahmud - According to the Ghaznavids: Their empire in Afghanistan and eastern Iran 994-1040 (1963); Mahmud marched with 15,000 select cavalry and a large number of Ghazis; according to Clifford H. Bosworth, 10,000 ghazis accompanied Mahmud in 1001-2 against Seipal and 20,000 in his Kanauj campaign. Their number was much larger on the occasion of the Kahanjara expedition.

6.5.1-(g) EMPIRICAL MILITARY STRATEGIES:

Fig (6.2) - According to Dr. S.K. Singh (Varanasi: 1966);

History of Indian warfare, Section II.

The Kahanjara fort situated on the lofty crag of a precipitous rock of hard stone on an outlying branch of the Vindhyas, was deemed impregnable. This fortress now came under the siege of Mahmud's forces. According to Nizamuddin "the siege lasted for a considerable time, when Sana, the ruler of the fort offered 300 elephants as a tribute and begged for safety. Evidently like
the Cottier fort the Kalangara also could not be stormed by 
Mahmu in spite of his all out efforts. It may be remembered that 
Nunn set out on this expedition with a specific object of 
punishing Visjachata but as is evident from the statements of 
Muslim historians this was hardly achieved. Both the strongholds 
of Cottier and Kalangara remained unconquered and on both occasions 
the sultan raised the siege on receipt of a formal submission, 
followed by exchange of gifts and presents, which in the hands 
of the Muslim chroniclers of a later period came to be depicted 
as tribute. The mode of presentations would also reveal that there 
was an element of challenge in it. In the words of Firishta 'the 
Mehra haka (tegen) in order to show the bravery of the sultan's 
troops at the last, introduced and aligator which drags, and 
let them loose without riders, into the camp. Mahmud seeing the 
animals advance, and perceiving their condition by the wildness 
of their manner, ordered a party of his best horses to seize or 
kill them, or to drive them from the camp. Some of the Parças, 
zealous of displaying the bravery in the presence of their king, 
fearlessly approached and mounted some of the elephant and drove 
the rest into an adjacent wood, where they were all soon reduced 
to obedience. The troops in the fort were astonished at this 
spectacle and felt much awe for the prowess of the Turks. Nanda 
then sent to him a panegyric in the Indian or Hindu tongue, in 
praise of the sultan and bravery of his troops. The sultan felt 
much elated at the compliments which were very highly spoken of 
by the learned men of Hindusthan and other poets of Arabia and
versa who, were in attendance on him. In return Mahmud also
sent his congratulations to Vidyadharma and conferred on him the
government of 15 fortresses and other presents before returning
to Chazna "with victory and triumph", according to Tabakat-i-Akbari.
The Samudal Akbar even goes the length of recording payment of
'Jiziyah' by Nanda as one of the condition for peace. But as has
been mentioned earlier these statements are to be taken with a
grain of salt as the expedition could by no means be regarded as
successful as Mahmud's earlier invasions. Though there was a
formal submission by the Chandela ruler, the real fact was that
both sides retired with honours even.

Bruce and Ed. Iqbal suggest that this friendship between
the ruler of Talanjar and the sultan of Chazni continued till
at least 1029 A.D. when Mahmud sent a former prince as a prisoner
to the fort of Talanjar in India. Dr. M. O. Adam (1931) rightly
feels sceptical about the identification of the fort of Talanjar
as has been suggested by Bruce and Iqbal. According to him, it
seems more likely that it should be identified with the Talanjar
of Kahan or Kalunjir of Firishta, situated on the frontiers of
Kashmir.

6.5.II [\(\text{AD}1102-03\) AD]

6.5.II-(a)- **Historical Background:** The account of the conflict
between the two dynasties: Saurav ruler of Delhi, Prithviraj-
Chamana and Chandela king Sama, is as
follows:
The Cauhan ruler of Delhi, Prithviraj, had abducted the daughter of the prince of Sameta. Some of the wounded soldiers who had helped the retreat of the Cauhan ruler, took refuge in a garden of Jaraj, but were assailed and put to death by the Chandela king. To avenge the death of his soldiers, Prithviraj invaded the territory of the Chandela's whose soldiers were cut to pieces at Sirsa, the advanced post of Jaraj's kingdom. The Chandela called a council and by the advice of Jaraj's wife (the Chandel queen) Maladevi demanded a truce of the Cauhans on the plea of the absence of the Bahoba heroes Alha and Udal. Prithviraj accepted the proposal and a temporary truce was made.

Then they arrested the story of Alha and Udal, the two great Bahoba heroes, and the cause of their banishment from Mahoba. According to Chand, Jaraj, the Bahoba, once saved the kingdom of Mahoba from the wild race of Chauhans and captured their capital. In gratitude, Jaraj bestowed many presents on Jaraj, and the queen Maladevi made no distinction between Alha and Udal the two sons of Jaraj, and her own son. Now the king of Alha and Udal was the fortress of Mahajara, where their sovereign Jaraj happened to see a fine mare belonging to Alha, desired to possess her, and being refused compelled the two brothers to leave the Chandela country. On their retreat the two brothers burnt the estates of the Bahoba chief, who had instigated their banishment with their mother and families they went to Kanauj, where Jai Chand, the Chandela king received them cordially and assigned lands for their maintenance.
Chand's account now refers back to the actual conflict between the Cauhans and the Chandela; Jagrak, the Chandela bard, reached Yanauj and stating all facts to Alha and Udal and their mother Dewadi begged them to return at the behest of Jitendra. At first Alha and Udal, remembering the injustice done to them, refused to go back to Mahoba and fight for Parmal. Alha said that for the Chandela he had beaten the Sulasams ten times subdued Dhara, Antarvedi Malava and half of the Punjab but in return for all these triumphs they were banished by their sovereign. Their mother Dewadi, however, rebuked her son and persuaded them to go back to Mahoba. They all went back after a warm send off from Dalchand, who also gave them, 50000 soldiers and many valuable presents on their return home. Alha and Udal were heartily welcomed by the Chandela king and the queen and the people.

The historical story of the lay of Alha is similar to that given in the Prithviraj Raso in its earlier part but it differs in the later part. According to this tradition, Mahil, a Parihar chief, who was the brother and Parmal's queen Malhun (Nalandevi in the Raso) was an arch enemy of the Chandela and continually conspired with Prithviraj and other enemies of the line to overthrow them. In the Prithviraj Raso also Mahil is described as a conspirator against the Chandela, but it does not mention so many incidents of his conspiracy as does the lay of Alha. The lay of Alha states that Parmal's son Brahma (Brahmananda) and Brahmajit in the Raso) married Bela; the daughter of Prithviraj,
BATTLE OF MAHOBA  (1182-83 A.D.)

BATTLE FORMATION

CHANDELA KING PARAMARDI

PRITHAVIRAJA CAHAMANA

CAMP

FIG: 3.3
against the latter's wishes. But once the marriage was solemnised Prithviraj and Parmal were on friendly terms and the former even helped the Chandelas against one of their enemies.

6.5.11-(b) Real cause of the conflict between the Ladanas and the Chandelas as indicated by the lay was Prithviraj's desire to capture Sirsa, a strategic point between Panjula and Patial, where a number of roads met. In this respect the lay of Alha agrees with the Prithviraj Tasso. Parmal was a vassal of Jalandhar and was helped by the latter with a large army. Even Jalandhar the nephew and heir of Raychand joined Alha and Udal to fight against Prithviraj.

6.5.11-(c) Lay Version (Ladana version):

1. Sisupaladari: According to Prithviraj Tasso, the Sendari has an army of 120,000, and in his army was his son Brahmananda and a general named Talhan Khan with 20,000 cavalry. Jalandhar helped with 50,000 soldiers and in the fort of Kalanjara 20,000 soldiers. Total army more than 200,000.

2. Prithviraj: According to tradition Prithviraj had 200,000 cavalry, 3000 elephants and more than infantry, army against the battle of Chandel's.

6.5.11-(d) Battle formation and battle: Fig(6.3) Battle formation according to tradition.

6.5.11-(e) Battle against the Chandelas: This Prithviraj's battles
against the Chandel are very famous and have been described at length in folklore. The Prithviraj Pasö (Pandit H.V. & S.J. Das; 1913) the Banmal Pasö (J.C. Das, 1926) and Alha Pasö (K. Watersfield; 1926) refer to serious hostilities between Prithviraj and the Paramēdī in some details, but these are later on fabricated by different popular poets who were either interested to glorify Prithviraj or Paramēdī.

It is said that Alha was the commander of the forces of the Chandel Paramēdī of Mahoba (Kalanjara). However, later on, he left the capital and went to Manavj as one of the ministers of Paramēdī hatched a plot against him. Then the Chandel's were engaged in an encounter with some enemy. Prithviraj invaded as per tradition was the Prithviraj Pasö the Chauhan army passed through Jaswa (near Chandel) there Malikhan a relative of Alha was ruling. To save Malikhan requested Paramāl for a decisive help. But Paramēdī being intimated to him restrained from sending any reinforcement and sent a message that Malikhan was competent enough to confront the Chauhans successfully. His Malikhan defending stoutly was slain and his wife became sole proceeding chance Prithviraj went to Mahoba. The Chandel army was then engaged at Naṣarānī (on the bank of river Betwa). On receiving intelligence of advancement of Chauhan army Paramēdī deputed Janashver Shatt to bring back (Gauri Kumar Mitra; 1958) Alha and Udal. At first Alha and Udal resented but due to constant persuasion; they agreed to come to help of Paramēdī.
Cañapada Cauhanand also (Sisir Kumar Mitra: 1958) deputed an army consisting of his 32 generals for the help of the Chandelas. In the mean time finding himself unable to cope with the Chauhan army Paramal requested for truce.

At last on receiving reinforcement Paramal prepared himself for battle. The decisive battle was fought at Urai. Alha displayed conspicuous gallantry. Paramal ran away and took refuge in the fort of Melanjera. The above account of Manasa Khand and Alha Khand, is probably a mixture of fact and fiction but for want of other authentic evidence, we cannot say anything definitely however it is true that Prithviraj invaded the territory of the Chandelas. There are 3 inscriptions (Progress Report of Archaeological Survey of Eastern Circle: 1963-4) of S.R. 1239 inscribed in the hill temple of Vrindavan:

(i) The first inscription mentions that Prithviraj Chauhan invaded the territory of the Chandelas belonging to Paramardhi.

(ii) The second inscription simply mentions of the antecedents of Prithviraj. He had been described as the son of Someshwar and great son of Anuraj. It is also said that he had successfully carried out depositions in the country named Rajakhata.

(iii) The third inscription contains simply the names of Shiv as Trayambaka Chandra Snekker and Tripuranta.
On the basis of these epigraphs it is apparent that
Ptihviraj proceeded unto Haudpur, which is 30 miles away from
Bhocht, 35 miles away from Lalitpur and 30 miles from Sagar.
It is quite obvious that these inscriptions do not mention of
defeat of Parsvardi. There are literary references which may
clarify sufficient light on this point. The Prabandh-chintamani
of Surupa mentions that in a battle fought against Ptihviraj
Parsvardi's forces were badly defeated. It is also indicated in
a concluding verse that Parsvardi could save himself by putting
a piece of straw in his mouth in presence of Ptihviraj. This
verse is also referred in the Sarangadhar-Paddhati. It seems
that Ptihviraj's victory was in the shape of digvijay. On his
return Parsvardi re-conquered this territory. His inscriptions
(1308-1310 AD) 1240 are known from Kanou and Kalanjara
in the Kalanjara inscription dated v.e. 1238 (1261 A.D.), he is
also described as the ruler of the Sarasba country. In this way,
we have to look changes to the account of complete victory of
Ptihviraj-Titi over Central territory as mentioned in the Rasop.

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Rev. K. K. Malhotra, 1952: p. 335
7. History and Culture of the Indian People (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan's catalogue, 10, 1953), pp. 119-120, V, pp. 81-82.