CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF WAR
4.1: INTRODUCTION

Wars arise because of the changing relations of numerous variables—technological, psychic, social, and intellectual. There is no single cause of war. Peace is an equilibrium among many forces; change in any particular force, trend, movement, or policy may at one time make for war, but under other conditions a similar change may make for peace. A state may at one time promote peace by armament, at another time by disarmament; at one time by insistence on its rights, at another time by a spirit of conciliation. To estimate the probability of war at any time involves, therefore, an appraisal of the effect of current changes upon the complex of intergroup relationships throughout the world. Certain relationships, however, have been of outstanding importance. Political lag deserves attention as an outstanding cause of war in contemporary civilization.

4.1.1: POLITICAL LAG

The lack of invention or will to make occasional mistakes

There appears to be a general tendency for change in procedures of political and legal adjustment to lag behind economic and cultural changes arising from intergroup contacts.
The violent consequences of this lag can be observed in primitive and historic societies (W.F. Ogburn and M.F. Nimkoff, 1940: Sociology, Boston, pp. 865, 884ff.) but its importance has increased in modern times. The expansion of contacts and the acceleration of change resulting from modern technology has disturbed existing power localizations and has accentuated the cultural oppositions inherent in social organization. World-government has not developed sufficiently to adjust by peaceful procedures the conflict situations which have arisen. Certain influences of this political lag upon the severity and frequency of wars will be considered in the following paragraphs:

War tends to increase in severity and to decrease in frequency as the area of political and legal adjustment (the state) expands geographically unless that area becomes as broad as the area of continuous economic, social, and cultural contact (the civilization). In the modern period peoples in all sections of the world have come into continuous contact with one another. While states have tended to grow during this period thus extending the areas of adjustment, none of them has acquired world-wide jurisdiction. Their growth in size has increased the likelihood that conflicts will be adjusted, but it has also increased the severity of the consequences of unadjusted conflicts. Fallible human government is certain to make occasional mistakes in policy, especially when, because of lack of universality, it must deal with conflicts regulated not by law but by negotiation.
functioning within an unstable balance of power among a few large units. Such errors have led to war.

War tends to increase both in frequency and in severity in times of rapid technological and cultural change because adjustment, which always involves habituation, is a function of time. The shorter the time within which such adjustments have to be made, the greater the probability that they will prove inadequate and that violence will result. War can, therefore, be attributed either to the intelligence of man manifested in his inventions which increase the number of contacts and the speed of change or to the unintelligence of man which retards his perception of the instruments of regulation and adjustment necessary to prevent these contacts and changes from generating serious conflicts. Peace might be kept by retarding progress so that there will be time for gradual adjustment by natural processes of accommodation and assimilation, or peace might be kept by accelerating progress through planned adjustments and new controls. Actually both methods have been tried, the latter especially within the state and the former especially in international relations (Ogburn & Nimkoff:1940).

Sovereignty in the political sense is the effort of a society to free itself from external controls in order to facilitate changes in its law and government which it considers necessary to meet changing economic and social conditions. The very efficiency of sovereignty within the state, however, decreases the efficiency of regulation in international relations. By eliminating tensions
within the state, external tensions are augmented. International relations become a "state of nature." War therefore among states claiming sovereignty tends to be related primarily to the balance of power among them.

Behind this equilibrium are others, disturbances in any one of which may cause war. These include such fundamental oppositions as the ambivalent tendency of human nature to love and to hate the same object and the ambivalent tendency of social organization to integrate and to differentiate at the same time. They also include less fundamental oppositions such as the tendency within international law to develop a world-order and to support national sovereignty and the tendency of international politics to generate foreign policies of both intervention and isolation. Elimination of such oppositions is not to be anticipated, and their continuance in some form is probably an essential condition of human progress. Peace, consequently, has to do not with the elimination of oppositions but with the modification of the method of adjusting them.

With an appreciation of the complexity of the factors involved in the causation of war and of the significance of historic contingency in estimating their influence, caution is justified in anticipating results from analytical formulations of the problem. An effort will, however, be made to draw together some of the conclusions arrived at in the historical and analytical parts of this study.
Warfare cannot exist unless similar but distinct groups come into contact. Its frequency and its intensity are dependent upon the characteristics of the groups and are roughly proportionate to the rapidity with which these contacts develop so long as the groups remain distinct and self-determining. However, when these contacts have passed a critical point of intensity, sympathetic feelings and symbolic identifications tend to develop among individuals of different groups sufficiently to permit the functioning of intergroup social, political, and legal institutions, adjusting conflicts and broadening the area of peace. The smoothness of this process is greatly influenced by the policies pursued by groups and the degree of the consistency of these policies with one another.

It is in the relation of political groups to one another and to their members and in the relation of group policies to one another and to the world-order that the explanation of war is to be found. War may be explained sociologically by its function in identifying and preserving political groups, psychologically by the conflict of human drives with one another and with social requirements, technologically by its utility as a means to group ends, and legally by inadequacies and inconsistencies in the law and procedure of the whole within which it occurs.

4.2:2: SOCIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONS OF WAR

Animal warfare is explained by the theory of natural selection. The behavior pattern of hostility has contributed to
the survival of certain biological species, and consequently
that behaviour has survived. In the survival of other species
other factors have played a more important role. The peaceful
herbivores have on the whole been more successful in the struggle
for existence than have the predators and parasites.

Among primitive peoples before contact with civilization warfare contributed to the solidarity of the group and to the
survival of certain forms of culture. When population increased,
migrations or new means of communication accelerated external
contacts. The war-like tribes tended to survive and expand;
Furthermore, the personality traits of courage and obedience
which developed among the members of these tribes equipped them
for civilization.

Among peoples of the historic civilizations war tended
both to the survival and to the destruction of states and
civilizations. Its influence depended upon the stage of the
civilization and the type of military technique developed.
Civilized states tended to fight for economic and political ends
in the early stages of the civilization, with the effect of
expanding and integrating the civilization. As the size and
interdependence of political units increased, political and
economic ends became less tangible, and cultural patterns and
ideal objectives assumed greater importance. Aggressive war
tended to become a less suitable instrument for conserving these
elements of the civilization. Consequently, defensive strategies
and peaceful sentiments developed, but in none of the historic civilizations were they universally accepted. War tended toward a destructive stalemate, disintegrating the civilization and rendering it vulnerable to the attack of external barbarians of younger civilizations which had acquired advanced military arts from the older civilization but not its cultural and intellectual inhibitions.

In the modern period the war pattern has been an important element in the creation, integration, expansion, and survival of states. World-civilization has, however, distributed a singularly destructive war technique to all nations, with the consequence that the utility of war as an instrument of integration and expansion has declined. The balance of power has tended to a condition such that efforts to break it by violence have increasingly menaced the whole civilization and yet this balance has become so complex and incalculable that such efforts have continued to be made.

4.1:3: **PSYCHOLOGICAL DRIVES TO WAR**: Human warfare is a pattern giving social sanction to activities which involve the killing of other human beings and extreme danger of being killed. At no period of human development has this pattern been essential to the survival of the individual. The pattern is a cultural acquisition, not an original trait of human nature, though many hereditary drives have contributed to the pattern. Of these, the dominance drive has been of especial importance. The survival of
war has been due to its function in promoting the survival of the
group with which the individual identifies himself and in remed-
ying the individual problem arising from the necessary repression
of many human impulses in group life. The pattern has involved
individual attitudes and group opinion. As the self-consciousness
of personality and the complexity of culture have increased with
modern civilization, the drive to war has depended increasingly
upon ambivalences in the personality and inconsistencies in the
culture.

A modern community is at the same time a system of
government, a self-contained body of law, an organization of
cultural symbols, and the economy of a population. It is a
government, a state, a nation, and a people.

Every individual is at the same time subject to the
power and authority of a government and police, to the logic and
conventions of a law and language, to the sentiments and customs
of a nation and culture, and to the caprices and necessities of
a population and economy. If the fights in war, he does so because
one of these aspects of the community is threatened or is believed
by most of those who identify themselves with it to be threatened.
It may be that the government, the state, the nation, and the
people are sufficiently integrated so that there is no conflict
in reconciling duty to all the these aspects of the community.
But this is not likely because of the analytical character of
modern civilization which separates military and civil government
The administration and the judiciary, church and state, government and business, politics and the schools, religion and education. Furthermore, it may be that the threat is sufficiently obvious so that no one can doubt its reality, but this is also seldom the case. The entities for whose defense the individual is asked to enlist are abstractions. Their relations to one another and the conditions of their survival are a matter of theory rather than of facts. People are influenced to support war by language and symbols rather than by events and conditions.

It may therefore be said that modern war tends to be about words more than about things, about potentialities, hopes, and aspirations more than about facts, grievances, and conditions. When the war seems to be about a particular territory, treaty, policy, or incident, it will usually be found that this issue is important only because, under the circumstances, each of the belligerents believed renunciation of its demand would eventually threaten the survival of its power, sovereignty, nationality, or livelihood. War broke out in 1939, not about Danzig or Poland, but about the belief of both the German people and their enemies that capacity to dictate a solution of these issues would constitute a serious threat to the survival of the power, ideals, culture, or welfare of the group which submitted to this dictation.

When a buffalo is attacked by a hungry lion, there is no doubt about the immediate survival problem involved for both the lion and the buffalo; however remote may be the bearing of
the incident upon the survival of the species of buffalo and lion. Somewhat more remote is the bearing upon his own or his tribe's survival when a primitive tribesman goes on the warpath to avenge an intratribal murder, to vindicate a taboo, or to fulfill a ritual; but the relationship seems clear to the tribesman because the requirement of tribal mores in the situation has the aspect of a fact. The tribe consists in the unquestioned reality of these customs and in the conviction that it would cease to exist if they were neglected.

Even more remote from the needs of the individual and the state was the bearing of a campaign to expand the Roman frontier into Gaul, the Moslem frontiers into Africa, or the Christian frontiers into Palestine. The meaning of Rome, of Islam, or of Christendom has to be understood by a considerable public. The importance that they increase in territory, population, and glory had to be inculcated by education, even though the willingness to support the campaign, derived from a belief in the survival value of such expansion, was buttressed by the prospect of immediate rewards to the active participants.

In the modern situation far more conceptual construction is necessary to make war appear essential to the survival of anything important. War, therefore, rests, in modern civilization upon an elaborate ideological construction maintained through education in a system of language, law, symbols, and ideals. The explanation and interpretation of these systems are often as
remote from the actual sequence of events as are the primitive explanations of war in terms of the requirements of magic, ritual, or revenge. War in the modern period does not grow out of a situation but out of a highly artificial interpretation of a situation. Since war is more about words than about things, other manipulations of words and symbols might better serve to meet the cultural and personality problems for which it offers an increasingly inadequate and expensive solution.


The power of the government refers to its capacity to make its decisions effective through the hierarchy of civil and military officials. In a balance-of-power structure of world politics even a minor change in the relative power position of
governments is likely to precipitate an accelerating process, destroying some of the governing elites and augmenting the power of others. If a government yields strategic territory, military resources, or other constituents of power to another without compensating advantage, it is quite likely to be preparing its own destruction. The theory which considers war a necessary instrument in the preservation of political power is relatively close to the facts. The most important technological cause of war in the modern world is its utility in the struggle for power.

The sovereignty of the state refers to the effectiveness of its law. This rests immediately on customary practices and on the prestige and reputation for power of the state rather than upon power itself. Sensitiveness about departures from established rules about honour and insult to reputation has a real relation to the preservation of sovereignty. A failure to resent contempt for rights or aspersions on prerogative may initiate a rapid decline of reputation and increase the occasions when power will actually have to be resorted to if the legal system is to survive. Thus in the undeveloped state of international law self-help and the war to defend national honor have a real relation to the survival of states.

Nationality refers to the expectation of identical reactions to the basic social symbols by the members of the national group. It has developed principally from common language, tradition, and of identifying ourselves in national traditions, customs, and ideals and has often persisted through
political dismemberment of the group. While national minorities have usually resisted the efforts of the administration and the economic system of the state to assimilate them, these influences may in time be successful. Thus, the use of force to preserve the power of the government and the sovereignty of the state supporting a given nationality may be important to the preservation of the latter. War, however, is less certainly useful to preserve nationality than to preserve power or sovereignty.

Living refers to the welfare and economy of a people. The argument has often been made that war is necessary to assure a people an area sufficient for prosperous living. Under the conditions of the modern world this argument has usually been fallacious. The problem of increasing the welfare of a people has not depended upon the extension of political power or legal sovereignty into new areas but rather upon the elimination of the costs of war and depression, improvements in technology and land utilization, and a widening of markets and sources of raw materials far beyond any territories or spheres of interest which might be acquired by war. Population pressure, unavailability of raw materials, and loss of markets more frequently result from military preparation than cause it. While it is true, in a balance-of-power world, economic bargaining power may increase with political power, yet it has seldom increased enough to compensate for the cost of maintaining a military establishment, of fighting occasional wars, and of impairing confidence in international economic stability. Through most of modern history people, even
if conquered, have not ceased to exist and to consume goods. Recent tendencies toward economic self-sufficiency and toward the forced migration, extermination, or enslavement of conquered peoples have, however, added to the reasonableness of war for the preservation of the life of peoples.

Modern civilization offers a group more alternatives to war in most contingencies than did earlier civilizations and cultures. Resort to war, except within the restricted conception of necessary self-defense, is rarely the only way to preserve power or sovereignty and even more rarely the only way to preserve nationality or economy. War is most useful as a means to power and progressively less useful as a means to preserve sovereignty, nationality, or economy. That economic factors are relatively unimportant in the causation of war was well understood by Adolf Hitler:

Whenever economy was made the sole content of our people's life, thus suffocating the ideal virtues, the State collapsed again.... If one asks oneself the question what the forces forming or otherwise preserving a state are in reality, it can be summed up with one single characterization: the individual's ability and willingness to sacrifice himself for the community. But that these virtues have really nothing whatsoever to do with economics is shown by the simple realization that man never sacrifices himself for them; that means: one does not die for business, but for ideal (Mein Kampf: 1939).
which men fight is most important for men? Is there any
criterion by which they may be rationally evaluated? Political
power has been transferred from village to tribe, from feudal
lord to king, from state to federation. Is it important today
that it remain forever with the national governments that
now possess it? The transfer of power to a larger group, the
creation of a world-police, whether under a world federation
or empire adequate to sanction a law against aggression,
appears a condition for eliminating the first cause of war.

Legal sovereignty also has moved from city-state to
empire, from baronial castle to kingdom, from state to feder-
ation. To the individual the transfer of authority over his
language and law to a larger group, while it has brought
nostalgia or resentment, has assured order, justice, and
peace in larger areas and has increased man's control of his
environment, provided that authority has been exercised with
such understanding and deliberation as to avoid resentments
arising to the point of revolt.

Nationality, in the broadest sense of a feeling of
cultural solidarity, has similarly traveled from village to
tribe, city-state, kingdom, nation, empire, or even civilizat-
ion; but, when it has become too broad, it has become too thin
to give full satisfaction to the human desires for social
identification and distinctiveness. There is no distinctiveness
in being a member of the human race. Few would contemplate a
world of uniform culture with equanimity. Geographical barriers
and historic traditions promise for a long time to preserve
cultural variety even in a world-federation, though modern means
of communication and economy have exterminated many quaint
customs and costumes. The need of cultural variety and the love
of distinctive nationality suggests that a world police power is
more likely to be effective if controlled by a universal federat-
on rather than by a universal empire.

The area from which individuals have obtained their livi-
ing has expanded from the village to the tribal area to the
kingdom and empire, until, in the modern world, most people draw
something from the most remote sections of the world. This wid-
ening of the area of exchange has augmented population and
standards of living. Diminution of this area, such as occurred
when the Roman Empire disintegrated into feudal manors, has had
a reverse effect. The economist can make no case for economic
walls, if economy is to be an instrument of human welfare rather
than of political power, except in so far as widespread practices
on the latter assumption force the welfare-minded to defend
their existing economy through utilizing it temporarily as an
instrument of power.

It may be questioned whether a rational consideration
of the symbols, for the preservation of which wars have been
fought, demonstrate that they have always been worth fighting
for or that fighting has always contributed to their preservation. The actual values of these entities as disclosed by philosophy and the actual means for preserving them as disclosed by science are, however, less important in the causation of war than popular beliefs engendered by the unreflecting acceptance of the implications of language, custom, symbols, rituals, and traditions. It is in the modification of these elements of national cultures so that they will conform more precisely to the ends accepted by modern civilization and to the means likely to secure those ends that a more peaceful world-order can gradually be developed. Such a work of education and propaganda cannot be effective unless it proceeds simultaneously in all important national cultures. A minimum acceptance by all of certain world standards is the price of peace. The definition and maintenance of such standards require the co-operation of international education, international jurisprudence, international administration, and international politics.

4.2: OPINIONS ON THE CAUSES OF WAR

The phrase "causes of war has been used in many senses. Quincy Wright have declared the cause of world war I to have been the Russian or the German mobilization; the Austrian ultimatum, the Sarajevo assassination the aims and ambitions of the Kaiser Poincare, 12 Volsky. Berchtold, or some one else, and in the historic and practical sense (Quincy Wright 1954), the desire of France to recover Alsace-Lorraine or of Austria
to dominate the Balkans, the European system of alliances, the activities of the munition-makers, the international bankers, or the diplomats, the lack of an adequate European political order; armament rivalries; colonial rivalries, commercial policies the sentiment of nationality; the concept of sovereignty; the struggle for existence; the tendency of nations to expand; the unequal distribution of population, of resources, or of planes of living; the law of diminishing returns; the value of war as an instrument of national solidarity or as an instrument of national policy; ethnocentrism or group egotism; the failure of the human spirit; and many others (Barnes H. E.: 1926 & Johnson E. Julia: 1926).

To some a cause of war is an event, condition, act, or personality involved only in a particular war; to others it is a general proposition applicable to many wars. To some it is a class of human motives, ideals, or values; to others it is a class of impersonal forces, conditions, processes, patterns or relations. To some it is the entrance or injection of a disturbing factor into a stable situation; to others it is the lack of essential conditions of stability in the situation itself or the human failure to realize potentialities. These differences of opinion reflect different meanings of the word "cause". The three sentences, respectively, contrast causes of war in the historic and scientific senses, in the practical and scientific senses, and in the historic and practical senses (Quincy Wright: 1954).
In the scientific sense the cause of the changes in any variable is a change in any other variable in a proposition stating the relations of all the factors in a process or equilibrium (Quincy Wright: 1954). Sometimes the statement itself is elliptically spoken of as the cause of variations in any of its factors. Thus it is sometimes said that heavenly bodies and falling apples behave as they do because of the law of gravitation or the rent is paid because of the law of diminishing returns. A scientific statement usually asserts that if all factors can be ignored, except those observable, controllable, and presumptively measurable factors which it deals with as variables, parameters, or constants, a specified degree of change in any variable tends to be followed immediately or in a specified time by a specified degree of change in the other variables.

In the historic sense a cause is any event or condition figuring in the description of the relevant antecedents of an effect. Such a description is usually called a history and is confined to events within a time or space sufficiently near to the effect to be presumably related to it. Proximity in time or space thus establishes a presumption of causal relation, though this presumption ought to be confirmed by other evidence to avoid the post hoc fallacy. Evidence may indicate that proximate events were unrelated, and it may also indicate the transmission of influence from remote times and distant places (J. Bouvier: 1872).

In the practical sense a cause is any controllable element in the statement of the origin, treatment, solution, or
meaning of a problem or situation. Such statements in medicine are called diagnoses, prognoses, prophylaxes, or treatments, and in social affairs, reports, interpretations, programs, policies, or plans. Such statements of social problems usually emphasize the human actions responsible for the situation and the human actions deemed to be the most effective for realizing desired ends in the circumstances of the time and place where the statement is made (G. K. Link: 1932).

It will be observed that in none of these cases is the word "cause" used as something which exists in phenomena but as something which exists in statements or propositions about phenomena. If one is convinced that a proposition is true (L. Oppenheim: 1937) he means that he is convinced that the proposition accurately describes the phenomena. Consequently, if the truth of a proposition has been established, then the word "cause" can be considered either a term of the proposition or a phenomenon designated by the term. While superficially the scientific, historic, and practical senses of the word "cause" appear to be very different, fundamentally they are merely different approaches to the same concept. A cause of an entity, an event, or a condition is a term of a true proposition capable of explaining predicting, or controlling its existence or changes (Abraham Wolf: 1937).

a) Scientific causes of war - Scientists, in searching for the causes of phenomena, assume that the universal and the
particular are aspects of one reality. They attempt to classify, combine, or analyse particular events into general concepts or ideas which represent measurable, controllable, repeatable, and observable phenomena capable of being treated as variables or constants in a formula.

While scientists realize that there are events in any field of study which have not yet been included in classes which can be precisely defined or measured, they are reluctant to believe that any factors are permanently "vague" and "imponderable"—a belief frequently held by practical men, historians, and poets. In dealing with war, scientists prefer concepts such as military forces, public opinion, attitudes, population, and international trade, which have been measured, even though crudely, or concepts such as jurisdiction, arbitration, war, aggression, and right, which have a precise meaning in a body of law, rather than such concepts as personal influence, civilizing mission, imperialism, accidental events, and social potentialities, which have neither of these characteristics. They prefer concepts which denote things which can be manipulated and experimented with, though this is often difficult in the social sciences. They prefer concepts which represent series of events that appear continuously or in regular cycles or oscillations in history, so that interpolation or extrapolation is possible where data are lacking. They prefer concepts which represent classes of facts that are abundant in the records or in the contemporary world, so that the properties of these classes can be verified by the use of histo-
rical sources or observation (Leonard Bloomfield: 1938).

The scientifically minded have attempted to describe the normal functioning of the forces, interests, controls, and motives involved in international relations and to formulate abstract propositions relating, respectively, to the balance of power, to international law, to international organization, and to public opinion (David Hume: 1854). While they have sometimes included war as a periodic recurrence in such normal functioning they have usually attributed war to the high degree of unmeasurability, uncontrollability, incompleteness, or uncertainty of the factors which they have studied. Thus they have attributed war (I) to the difficulty of maintaining stable equilibrium among the uncertain and fluctuating political and military forces within the state system (C.J. Friedrich, New York: 1938), (2) to the inadequacy of its sources and sanctions continually to keep international law an effective analysis of the changing interests of states and the changing values of humanity (Sir J.F. Williams (Oxford: 1932), (3) to the difficulty of so organizing political power that it can maintain internal order in a society not in relation to other societies external to itself (Lasswell, London: 1927) and (4) to the difficulty of making peace a more important symbol in world public opinion than particular symbols which may locally, temporarily, or generally favor war (Norman Angell: 1937). In short, scientific investigators, giving due consideration to both the historic inertia and the
inventive genius of mankind, have tended to attribute war to
immaturities in social knowledge and control, as one might attrib-
ute epidemics to insufficient medical knowledge or to inadequate
public health services (H.F. Darby: 1904).

b) Historical causes of war - Historians assume that
the future is a development of the past which includes, however,
forward-looking intentions and aspirations. They attempt to
classify events into ideas which represent commonly observed
processes of change and development. Because of the common
experience of small incidents releasing stored forces - the match
and the fuse - they frequently distinguish the occasion from the
causes of war (K.E.H. Lecky: 1876). Because people ordinarily
think they are familiar with biological evolution, with psycho-
logical and sociological processes, with economic, political,
and religious interests, historians have customarily classified
the causes of war under such headings (H.F. Barnes: 1928).

This method may be illustrated by the causes of the Franco-
Prussian War set forth in Floetz's Manual of Universal History
(Karl Floetz: 1915). These are divided into "immediate causes",
"special causes", and "general causes". The first were said to
be certain events which shortly preceded the war, including
the election of the prince of Hohenzollern to the throne of
Spain, the French demand that the Prussian king should never
again permit the candidacy of the prince for the Spanish crown,
and the Ems telegram from Bismarck announcing the king's refusal.
The special causes were said to be the internal troubles of the French government, the controversy concerning French compensation for the Prussian aggrandizement of 1866, and the news of new German infantry weapons threatening the superiority of the French chassepot. The general causes were stated to be the French idea of natural frontiers as including the left bank of the Rhine and the long struggle of the German nation for unification, together with the French anxiety over it.

Historians have thus sought to demonstrate causes by drawing from a detailed knowledge of the antecedents of a particular war events, circumstances, and conditions which can be related to the war by practical, political, and juristic commonplaces about human motives, impulses, and intentions. When they have written of the causes of war in a more general way, they have meant simply a classification of the causes of the particular wars in a given period of history. Thus certain of the causes of the Franco-Prussian War have been described by such words as "aggressive policies," "Changes in military techniques," "domestic difficulties," "unsettled controversies," "dynastic claims," "aspirations for national unification," "historic rivalries," and "insulting communications." Even broader generalizations have been made classifying the causes of war in the Western world as political, juristic, idealistic, and psychological. This is a generalization of a generalization and so on to the point where it is not unlike the scientific approach, for such words as "an
ideal," "a psychological attitude", "a policy", or "a law" represent concepts which, though limited by the historian to a historic epoch, are universals which may be manifested in varying degrees in all times and places. They are, in fact, variables susceptible, in theory, to mathematical treatment, however difficult it may be practically to measure their variations.

c) practical causation of law - Practical politicians, publicists, and jurists assume that changes result from free wills operating in an environment. They attempt to classify events according to the motives and purposes from which they seem to proceed. Their assumptions have thus resembled those of the historians, though they have formulated their problems toward practical ends and have often excluded events and impersonal forces which the historian frequently considers. Because men like to rationalize their actions, publicists have often distinguished the pretexts from the causes of war (E. de Vattel: 1916). Because they recognize that no free will ever really acts without antecedents, and therefore the origin of a series of causal events has to be determined arbitrarily, they have distinguished proximate from remote causes. While they have sometimes attributed wars to the failure of society to adopt particular reforms or to modify certain conditions, (Quincy Wright: 1925) they have usually distinguished causes attributable to a responsible person from impersonal conditions and potential reforms. In the same way physicians more frequently attribute an illness to a germ
rather than to the susceptibility of the patient because of a run-down condition or to his failure to take preventive or remedial precautions.

Practical men have, then, usually thought of war as a manifestation of human nature with its complex of ambitions, desires, purposes, animosities, aspirations, and irrationalities. They have insisted that the degree of consciousness or responsibility to be attributed to such manifestations is an important factor in devising measures for dealing with the problem. Classification of human motives from this point of view is familiar in law (J.R. Salmond: 1902) and economics. Publicists have often distinguished necessary, customary, rational, and capricious acts in the causation of war. They suggest that wars arise in the following situations: (i) Men and governments find themselves in situations where they must fight or cease to exist, and so they fight from necessity (Friedrich Bernhardi: 1912), (ii) Men and governments have a custom of fighting in the presence of certain stimuli, and so in appropriate situations they fight (N. Lloyd Warner: 1931), (iii) Men or governments want something—wealth, power, social solidarity—and, if the device of war is known to them and other means have failed, they use it as a means to get what they want (Clausewitz: 1911), (iv) Men and governments feel like fighting because they are pugnacious, bored, the victims of frustrations or complexes, and accordingly they fight spontaneously for relief or relaxation (John Carter: 1926).
Thus among each class of writers, whether the effort has been to construct a formula relating measurable factors, to narrate a comprehensible process of change, or to describe the reactions by which the generally recognized human motives affect the environment, the process of generalizing from concrete events has developed similar categories. The historian, however, has usually kept closest to the events, and the scientists have been most bold in generalization, often resting to a considerable extent on the shoulders of the historian and the publicist.

(1) Scientists, historians, and publicists have each generalized about material forces in the state system, though they have referred to them, respectively, as the balance of power, political factors, and necessity. (2) So also each has generalized about ideological influences under the names of international law, juristic factors, and custom. (3) They have generalized concerning sociological structures, respectively, under the heads of international organization, idealism, and reason. (4) The reactions of personality have, finally, been generalized by the three classes of writers under the names of public opinion, psychological or economic factors, and caprice or emotion.

Whether evidence is sought in the study of wars themselves or in the study of competent generalizations about war, the same classification of the causes of war is suggested. War has politico-technological, juro-ideological, socio-religious, and psycho-economic causes. The following sections of this part...
of the study conform to this classification. They assume, respectively, that the belligerents are powers which become involved in war in the process of organizing political and material forces in ever larger areas, that they are states which became involved in war in the attempt to realize more complete legal and ideological unity, that they are nations which became involved in war in the effort to augment the influence of particular political, social, and religious symbols, and that they are peoples which became involved in war through behaving according to prevailing psychological and economic patterns. These four points of view emphasize, respectively, the technique, the law, the functions, and the drives of war (Quincy Wright:1954).

4.3 CAUSES OF CHANDELA'S WAR

The historians of each of these wars have usually distinguished idealistic psychological, political, and juridical elements in their cessation (Q. Wright & Jackson, H.R.: 1941). They have frequently referred to changes in climate, resources, economy, technology, and other material conditions; but they have usually assumed that such changes can cause war only in so far as they influence one or more of these socio-psychological patterns.

(i) Moslem conquests.
(ii) Prestige of the Chandela's family.
(iii) Chandelas to be ranked among the leading contemporary powers of Northern India.
(iv) Extent of the kingdom.
(v) For political influence
(vi) For help to other rulers.

4·3·1: War for Moslem Conquests: Islam carried on wars of conquest in the seventh century. The new religion, by fixing attention upon common symbols, had inspired many of the Arabs with a missionary zeal. Many successive invaders—Greeks, Parthians, Scythians, and Huns—had entered India through the north-western passes; they exercised; however, but little influence on Indian life in general. They all either returned when they came, or were indue time absorbed in the general population. The religions and social life of the Indian people has remained through all the centuries under the direction and control of the Brahman priesthood. For some centuries it seemed as if the Buddhist revolt would succeed in introducing a leaven into Indian life and thought destined to change permanently Indian social and religious conditions; but the Brahmanical influence proved too strong. But just at the time when Buddhism was being steadily superseded in India by the accommodating Brahmanical faith, and a new prophet had arisen in Arabia and launched on the world a new faith destined to supply a youthful energy and fanaticism which should sweep the country from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from the western to the eastern seas. The Chinese pilgrim Hiven Tsang was still on his travels in India when Muhammad the founder of Islam; died in Medina (632 A.D.). Islam had taken on a
military aspect even before the death of its founder. The political work of Muhammad consisted in the subjugating and uniting of Arabia; until this time a varied collection of cities and tribes under different governmental systems in perpetual conflict. The prophet took the further step of summoning the great king of the surrounding nations to recognize Islam, and threatening them with punishment in case of refusal. The task of carrying out these threat fell to the lot of his successors. In a few years Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt and Persia were compelled to submit to the Khalifas, the successors of Muhammad and to embrace the new religion.

4.3.1: *Turk's Invasions* : The Arab invasion of India thus proved to be a failure. The Arabs ceased to hold exclusive control over the movement of Islam, and they had no hand in its spread into India. Another race, the Afghan Turks, advancing from another direction assumed the burden of conquering India in the interests of the new faith and the great store of plunder awaiting them. In the latter part of the tenth century, Sabukttagin, a former Turkish slave, in connection with the Samanid dynasty of north-east Persia and Transoxiana under the suzerainty of the Khalifas of Bagdad, succeeded to the semi-independent rule which his father-in-law Alptagin, another Turkish slave, had established at Ghazni, between Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan. Sabukttagin's son and successor, Mahmud, began his reign in 999B.C. and became the greatest Muhammadan ruler of his time. Soon after
succeeding to his father's dominions; Qadir, KHALIFA of Bagdad
recognised his sovereignty and conferred on him the titles
Yaminaddaula (Right hand of the state) and Amin-ul-millat
(Guardian of the faith) these new honours aroused in Mahmud a
new zeal on beholaf of Islam, and he resolved on an annual
expedition against the idolaters of India. He did not carry out
to the full this intension; but during the thirty-two years of
his reign he made no fewer than fifteen in cursions into India.
The Arabs had come by way of the sea and the Saluchistan route;
and as a result found little in India but the desert of Sindh.
Mahmud and his successors made their way through the north-
western passes into the rich cities and plains of the Punjab and
the Ganges valley.

3.1: Mahmud’s Raids: The first raid took place in 1000 A.D.,
the last in 1026 and during these campaigns he ranged across
the plains of northern India from the Indus to the Ganges; taking
the strong and wealthy cities of Peshawar, Thanesar, Kanauj,
Mathura and Kalinjar.

3.1c: Afghans of Ghori—The Rulers: The Afghans of Ghori thus
rose to power on the downfall of the turks of Bhasni. Ala-ud-din's
nephew, Muhammad Ghori is the second of the great Muhammadan
conquerors of India, and it was he, rather than Mahmud, that
laid the foundations of permanent Muhammadan rule in India.
Becoming sultan of Ghazni in 1174 A.D., he at first made a number
of incursions into India. After the manner of Mahmud, but in
1191 he gathered together a great host for the conquest of India, and met in battle Prithviraj the famous ruler of Delhi and Ajmir. Ghore capital of Delhi became the centre of Muhammadan rule; Aibad ‘Uth-ud-din, an able and trusted slave of Muhammad, was made Viceroy of Delhi; Muhammadan power became rapidly extended in the south, west and west. Kanauj was stormed and Saindh, its king slain. Kalinjar, Jana and Gujarat were reduced, and Muhammad Salabiyar, the lieutenant of the Ghori king, conquered Oudh, Juna, and Bengal by 1204.

A3:112: 'For the prestige of the Chandi...

was practically the first independent ruler of the Chandella dynasty who may be regarded to have laid the foundations of the greatness of the family. The Chandellas as has already been shown become feudatories of the Gurjara-Pratiharas. But the imperial power had to fight the 'rastrakutas of the Deccan repeatedly. This must have heavily told on their resources, compelling them to seek the aid of their feudatories, the Guhilots and the Chandellas. The feudatories felt that their help was of paramount importance in maintaining the Pratihara over lordship and would naturally seek the earliest opportunity to shake of their allegiance.

The Chandella by their successful interference in the affairs of Kanauj had earned for themselves a distinction in north-Indian politics and carried themselves one step forward such was the position of the Chandellas when Ysowarman came to
the throne, succeeding his father, Harsa. The Vakataka dynasty had in the meantime been enfeebled by disruptive dynastic quarrels which made it difficult for them to play a decisive role in northern India. The dismemberment of two great imperial dynasties of India almost simultaneously in the middle of the 10th century C.E. offers a golden opportunity to subsidiary powers to take the best advantage of the resulting situation. Yasovarman, the Chandalas ruler, did not miss this chance of increasing his family's power and prestige; he began to engage himself in military operations with a view to extending his territorial possessions.

4.3: III: Ver for the Chandelas to be ranked among the leading contemporary powers of northern India. We have seen, laid the foundation of the greatness of the family and Dhanga, it must be admitted ably and steadfastly followed the footsteps of his father and by his own achievements established the claim of the Chandelas to be ranked among the leading contemporary powers of northern India.

It was during the reign of Dhanga that we meet with for the first time a definite demarcation of the limits of the Chandelas kingdom, as indicated in the Khajuraho inscription of v.s. 1011 V. 45 of which read as follows (Tras). He playfully acquired by the action of his long and strong arms, as far as Kalinjar and far as Bhavat situated on the banks of the river of Malwa, from here also to the bank of the river Kalindi and
from here also to the frontiers of the Cedi country, and even as far as the mountain called Gopa.

Chandela kingdom during the reign of Dhanga included two strategic fortresses of Northern India, viz. Kalinjar and Gwalior. The territory thus brought under the control of Dhanga.

4.3:IV: War for the Extent of the Kingdom: Dhanga like his father, undertook expeditions over a wide range indifferent parts of India beyond the limits of the territory actually held by the Chandelas. His achievements in this respect are mentioned in verses 45 and 46 of the Khajuraho inscription of V.S. 1059. These verses refer to Dhanga's possible invasions on some portions of the Peninsular India, beyond the Vindhyan as well as on some of the states of Eastern India, viz. Kosala, Krath, Kuntala, Simhala, Andhra, Anga and Radha. In this case too like that of his predecessor in verse 23 of the Khajuraho inscription of V.S. 1011, there are some obvious exaggerations. But in spite of that it is generally admitted that Dhanga's military potentiality helped him to rise to an important position in the history of Northern India.

4.3:V: War for Political Influence: The account of the Chandela ruler is undoubtedly as exaggerated description of the court poet. But the study of the history of the period would reveal that the condition of the powers mentioned in the verse, viz. the Kasiraja, the Malavesa and the Cedis, particularly during this period was
not quite strong to withstand the onslaught of a vigorous ruler of the Chandela family. As such, it may not be a mere Prasasti to describe that the Chandela king, Madanavarman was able to exert his political influence over those powers. There was no question of any expansion of the Chandela dominion at the cost of any of these powers, but they might have had to submit before the military might of the Chandela ruler.

4.3:VI: *lar for the Help of Other Ruler:*

(i) The Chandela had helped the Pala ruler Devapala in his war against Bhoja-Pratihara.

(ii) The Chandela ruler Harsa had helped the Mahipala and saved his life in his war against Rastrakuta's.

(iii) The Chandela ruler Dhanga had helped Jayapala, the Sahi ruler of Bhatinda, with troop and money.

(iv) Kirthiraja, who commanded the fort of Gwalior at the time of Mahmud's invasion in A.D. 1022. He further suggests that the reference by Nizamuddin to the Prince of Gwalior at the time of Mahmud's invasion as Hakim and the statement that Mahmud reached the fort of Gwalior after invading the territories of Nanda, indicate that the ruler of Gwalior was subordinate to the ruler of Kalinjar. He (Kirttiraja's) success against the Paramara ruler was achieved with the help of the mighty Chandela king.

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CHAPTER IV

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