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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar for his guidance during those many hours of consultation spent in his office. I benefited greatly from his insightful comments which always move me to improve my work. This dissertation would not have been completed without his constant help.

I am grateful to Ramon Torredemer and Mariano Iturbe for their unfailing support and encouragement. Their firm faith in the value of research and richness of academic life sustained me in my years of graduate studies.

I express also my deepest gratitude to all my friends at Kamet Study Centre; their company made my stay at Hauz Khas happy and memorable.

I dedicate this work to my mother Nanay Finas, who continues to inspire me, and to my brave and beautiful sisters Ben, Christine and Myra, whose works and prayers never failed to amaze me.

Generous financial support from Indian Council for Cultural Relations is also gratefully acknowledged.