CHAPTER –V
Relationship between Political and Non-Political Executives

In the previous chapter, we have studied development administration, the issues and challenges of development administration. We have also studied development administration in Mizoram and the NLUP implementing board, the Rural Development Department and Urban Development Department of Mizoram are studied. In this chapter, the theoretical aspects of the relationship between the political executives and the non-political executives will be studied and our study will be narrowed down to Mizoram situation.

The political and permanent executives are regarded as the foundation for the functioning of government. The smooth functioning of government depends on the harmonious relationship between the two.\(^1\) The relationship between the ‘elected officials’ and the ‘appointed officials’ is the starting point for understanding the governing process and has always been a controversial issue in public administration literature.\(^2\)

The political executives and the non-political executives both contributed in their own different ways towards the functioning of the government. Political executives have to formulate policies according to the needs and aspirations of the people. The bureaucrats cannot be biased in implementing policy decisions of the political leaders as they are the ‘public servant.’ The conventional concept of the relationship between the administrator and the politician envisaged an orderly separation of labour between the

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two; the politician formulates the policy and the administrator executes them. The determination of public policy is the responsibility of political leaders and the bureaucrats as the instrument for realizing the policy.³

The basic distinction between the political executives and the permanent executives originated from the concept of policy-administration dichotomy. In 1887, Woodrow Wilson made a distinction between politics and administration in his paper “The Study of Administration”. ⁴ Wilson argues that administration and politics are separate. He felt that administration lies outside the sphere of politics. Administrative questions are not political questions. He further says that politics is the special province of the statesman and administration that of the technical official. Later in his essay, he said that ‘bureaucracy can exist only where the whole service of the state is removed from the political life of the people, its chief as well as its rank and file. Its motives, its objects, its standards, must be bureaucratic”. Thus, he tries to establish a distinction between administration and politics.⁵

The relationship between politics and administration has been one of the most topics of discussion in public administration since the writings of Woodrow Wilson and Max Weber. For many years, it was believed that there should be a clear distinction and hierarchy of labour between politicians and bureaucrats: the politician works as a sovereign representative of political values and interests; the bureaucrat is a subordinate

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policy executor whose major concern is efficiency. According to Max Weber, the bureaucrats have to be ‘neutral’ and impartial in the implementation of the policies formulated by the politicians no matter what. The public responsibility for the goals of administrative action should devolve on the politicians and not on the administrators. Weber’s analysis has to be viewed in the context of his ideal-type construct of bureaucracy, whose features lead logically to the concept of neutral competence. Weber always appeared to prefer a political system which would not be monopolized by any one particular group, but instead would be regulated by some patterns of checks and balances among various components of the system. Weber showed great awareness of the difficulty of dichotomizing politics and administration in empirical situations, and recognized that constant competition among the politicians and the bureaucrats was a common feature of a polity with a legal rational character. Weber recognized that while a democracy needed an efficient bureaucracy, it could still be threatened by this bureaucracy. However, he also saw that bureaucracy had a leveling effect on the socio-political system by broadening the base of people’s participation in government. The legal basis of bureaucracy provides the quality of calculability and predictability. The ‘technical knowledge’ that the bureaucrats possess also contributed towards its superiority. The combination of knowledge itself or the control of knowledge leads to power. Max Weber argues that bureaucracy gained domination through knowledge. It is these base which pass on to its rationality.

In its most strict version neutrality applies to politics whether it is defined as ‘partisan politics’ or formulating policy. But at a minimum, neutrality applies to partisan


neutrality. This version of the dichotomy stresses insulation from politics by positing that elected officials cannot interfere with the administration or implementation of policy. Administrators rely on their technical competence to develop the best way to administer the policy and goals set by elected officials, and they must be insulated from political pressures as they exercise discretion based on professional competence to carry out policies set by the governing board or legislature.9 The Politics-administration is based on the view that administration can remove itself from the day-to-day influence of politics. In theory, administrators are autonomous, guarded from the political turmoil and ‘free to apply principles of resource optimization neutrally in the management of public sector.’ The politics-administration is summarized by the view that specific skills, which are essential for good government, can be learned and implemented. The Wilsonian focus on principles of neutral competence corresponded to the “specific management” perspective adopted by the private sector in the late nineteenth and twentieth century.10

Post-war students of public administration have widely rejected the politics-administration dichotomy, but they have not rejected the historical and conceptual related value of political neutrality of administrators. Rather, they re-conceptualized the classical politics-administration dichotomy as a policy-administration dichotomy.11


http://mesharpe.metapress.com/app/home/contribution.asp?referrer=parent&backto=issue,5,9;journal,19,32;linkingpublicationresults,1:120054,1, accessed on 3.3.2010
The conventional norms failed to provide or guide the behaviour of either the administrator or the politician in complex situations of interaction between the two. The nature of relationship between the Political Executives and the Non-Political Executives depends on the types of normative referents each of them feels himself bound to take into account while adopting a course of action and how each defines his role in regard to the institutional set-up he operates as well as in relation to the person occupying the counter position. Both the administrator and the politician have their separate universe of role-sets. When they interact, only a part of their role universe becomes relevant for relationship between the administrator and the political leader.12

The political executives sometimes lack ‘the required expertise and professional skills for development planning. This enhances the importance of the senior administrators in the formulation of development policy. The role of the bureaucrats go beyond the conventional norms of implementation of policy, it also includes the formulation of policy, coordination and improvement of administrative machinery, and the exercise of general administrative control over departments of public services. Further, senior administrators are required to assist in the preparation of legislative measures and to ensure that government decisions are properly implemented. In many instances, their advisory role transforms itself into virtually the most effective factor in the determination of policies. The senior administrator has the responsibility of advising on the financial and administrative implications of different policy alternatives. Being more aware than the politicians about the financial resources and possible expenditure involved, administrators determine the allocation of funds for the implementation of plans according to priorities.13 Even though the formulation and implementation of policy are two separate functions of the government they are closely related to each other. Policy originates from the legislature or the political authorities who gives policy the legal authority. The bureaucrats do not possess the power of making a policy; they give

assistance to the political executives in policy-making. Their task lies in the execution of policy. 

The relationship between the political and the administrative sphere should be viewed as a variable, opening up for the possibility that it may vary among contexts, formal structures, demographic, and over time. The interaction between the spheres is mainly a function of the position politicians and administrators have within the formal structure.

The British established bureaucracy in India and it was through this institution that the Britishers maintained their hold in India. During the British period, bureaucracy was free from political control and the bureaucrats were accorded full protection to sustain his authority as the pivot of colonial administration. Although the Governor-General was at the helm of affairs and was vested with the power of supervision and control, he was not given the authority to initiate disciplinary action against a delinquent bureaucrat. That power was reserved with the crown exercisable through the Secretary of State for India. Secure within this framework, a bureaucrat had little or no problem in assisting the government with diligence, probity and to the best of his ability. However, the Indian political leaders hold them as the agents of foreign imperialist rulers, working in the interest of foreign power at the cost of national interest. They were critical of the bureaucratic machinery and had a feeling of suspicion, distrust and hostility towards it.

After the introduction of Dyarchy in the wake of the Montford reforms, the elected Ministers were vested with limited and restricted powers of governing. The


period after 1935 witnessed frequent clashes between the Indian Ministers and British officials\textsuperscript{18}

After India gained Independence, the planners in India subscribed to the Weberian ideal of neutral civil service. In our country, the Civil Service Conduct Rules prohibit the government employees from active participation in political activities. Except for the limited right of voting in secret, a government employee cannot participate in any way in any political movement or activity including election campaigns. He cannot join a political party even as an inactive member or contribute financially to its funds; he cannot express any opinion on political issues; and he cannot stand for election to any legislature. An impersonal, strictly rule-bound, neutral bureaucracy was expected not only to provide the necessary administrative objectivity but also enhance the democratic principle of equality and provide protection from arbitrary rule.\textsuperscript{19} The Indian Constitution provides for separation of powers between the legislatures, executive and judiciary with well-defined roles and responsibilities for each one of them. Since India is a parliamentary democracy, there is an interface between the legislature and the executive at the level of the Council of Ministers, which is collectively responsible to the legislature. The Constitution separates the executive into two parts. In terms of Articles 53 and 154, the executive power of the Union and the States vests in the President or Governor directly or through officers subordinate to him. These officers constitute the permanent civil service and are governed by Part XIV of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{20}

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\item \textsuperscript{18} ‘Lost glory of bureaucracy in India-When?’, http://latasinha.wordpress.com/2010/02/24/when-did-bureaucracy-lost-its-good-image-in-india accessed on 4.3.2010
\item \textsuperscript{19} Political Executive and Bureaucracy, http://www.nios.ac.in/srsec317newE/317EL35.pdf accessed on 28.02.2010
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The President and Governor frame rules for the conduct of business in the government. Work is allocated among Ministers as per the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules and the manner in which the officers are required to help the President or Governor to exercise his executive functions is governed by the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules. What this means is that though officers are subordinate to the President or Governor, they carry out the orders of the Council of Ministers in accordance with the rules framed in this behalf. The Rules of Business of Government do provide for the Secretary to the Government to advise his Minister about the course of action proposed in a particular matter and to submit to him a note which tells him about the propriety or legality of his orders and suggest that either such orders not be given or that they be suitably modified. The relationship between the Secretary and the Minister is organic. The Minister has the mandate of the people to govern, but the Secretary has an equivalent constitutional mandate to advise the Minister. Once his advice has been suitably considered, unless the Minister passes an illegal order, the Secretary is bound to implement it. The Minister, on his part, is required to support the Secretary who is implementing his order. Once a law is framed or rules and regulations are approved, they apply to everyone, whether a member of the political executive or of the permanent civil service. A civil servant is required to implement the Orders of government without bias, with honesty and without fear or favour.21

In the years after independence, political neutrality of the bureaucracy was, by and large, respected, both by the political leadership. As a result of one party domination (Congress Party) both at the Centre and in most States, during the first two decades after independence (till the late 1960s), the bureaucracy escaped becoming a victim of ‘inter-party political rivalry’.22 However, in the 1967 elections to the State legislatures, several non-Congress parties came to power. “This resulted in the bureaucracy being caught in


the political cross-fire between competing parties.”  

23. In many States promotions, giving prized postings, and transfers to unattractive places followed the new government. The political party, thus, started the process of political interference in the internal working of the bureaucracy. Consequently, bureaucracy also started losing its political impartiality. 

24. Indira Gandhi gave a call for a committed bureaucracy during the internal Emergency (1974-1977). The concept of committed bureaucracy was a controversial issue in the political and administrative circles. It was alleged that it would permanently hamper the fabric of the services. It was feared that it would create a civil service who would always say ‘Yes Minister’ and would be ready to do anything for the political masters. It was also alleged that in the name of commitment the ruling party was seeking bureaucracy’s alignment with the party’s ideology in order to perpetuate its rule. However, it was later clarified by the government that commitment did not mean attachment to the ideology of the party in power, but a commitment to the development of the country and personal involvement of bureaucracy in the tasks. 

25. The Administrative Reforms Commission (A.R.C) in their report make certain recommendations to streamline the relationship between the minister and the civil servants, nothing much seems to have changed because of political and administrative indifference in India. 

26. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission observed that in a democracy, the civil service has to be answerable to the elected government. There is criticism, however, that increasingly partisan intervention and cronyism are undermining the rule of law, 


27. Ibid.
distorting incentives and condoning corruption. This is adversely affecting the morale of public servants. The relationship between the political executive and the civil services needs to be transformed on the basis of mutual understanding, respect and recognition of each other’s distinct roles and responsibilities.\(^{28}\)

Every civil servant, high or low, has his own position in the administrative set-up, a role to perform and duties to discharge. He has to discharge his duties according to the provisions of law, and rules and regulations there under. The Rule of Law requires that every civil servant is able to discharge his functions without let or interference. If this is the correct position, then there is no scope for any politician to interfere with the actions and decisions of the civil servants just because the civil servant is ultimately accountable to the political executive.\(^{29}\) A developing nation cannot afford contradictory ethos between the political executive and bureaucracy because it strikes at the root of a progressive administrative culture. The roles of political and administrative elite are complimentary and in the interest of public welfare they must work in harmony with each other.\(^{30}\)

5.1. The Relationship Between the Political and Non-Political Executives in Mizoram: During the British period, the superintendent was the real authority having maximum power even in the matter of taxation and administration of justice. Since there was a single line of administration in the district, he was the official head of all departments in the district. The chiefs, in their turn, had supreme powers in the village administration. Thus, the superintendent and the chiefs used to rule over the people as virtual dictators. As hardly any act or law was enforced, the opinion of the superintendent


\(^{30}\) *Political Executive and Bureaucracy, Op.cit.*
became law. Every village was ruled by the village chief and the political system was such that no one could dare speak against their activities or criticize any act of theirs.\textsuperscript{31}

The Superintendent was really powerful within this period. The Superintendent issued orders without mentioning relevant rules and orders however, since Mizoram was an excluded area, even those orders were relevant.\textsuperscript{32}

With the set up of the advisory council in the Lushai Hills, the council advised the district superintendent on various administrative problems and development schemes of the district. The Pawi-Lakher Regional Advisory Council also used to advice the S.D.O on various aspects of development administration in the region.\textsuperscript{33}

With the set-up of the Autonomous Mizo Hills District Council and the Pawi-Lakher Regional Council, the designation of the Superintendent was changed and the district administration was put under a Deputy Commissioner and the Chief Executive Members of the District and Regional Councils with much reduced powers after independence. The role and responsibilities of the Deputy Commissioners in post independent Mizoram have expanded while their powers were curtailed.\textsuperscript{34} Rule 8 of the Mizo District Council Service rules (As amended in 1969) provides that all appointments to the service of the Mizo District Council shall be made by the Executive Committee or by such officer duly authorized in this behalf by the Executive Committee subject to the provisions laid down in the Rule 14 and 19(1) of the Assam Autonomous District (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951 and Rule 7 (1) and 11 of the Lushai Hills

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} Information gathered from personal interview with Bualhranga. Ex-MLA (1979-1984), and current treasurer of SOSA (Society for Social Action), date of interview: 22-23\textsuperscript{rd} March, 2010.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Lalneihzovi, \textit{District Administration in Mizoram-A Study of the Aizawl District, Op.Cit.}, p.28-29.
\end{itemize}
Autonomous District (Administration of Justice) Rules, 1953, and rule 35 of these rules.

Rule No. 9 of the Mizo District Council Service rules (As amended in 1969) also provides that the Executive Committee shall fix the strength of permanent and temporary posts for all the departments and such fixation shall be placed before the District Council for approval. Rule No.15 of the Mizo District Council Service rules (As amended in 1969) states that unless otherwise provided for, or without the special sanction of the Council, the whole time of an employee under the Council is at the disposal of the Council which pays him, and he may be employed in any way the Council likes consistent with the terms and conditions of his appointment. Rule No.21 of the Mizo District Council Service rules (As amended in 1969) provides that the Executive Committee may transfer an employee from one post to another, provided that except on grounds of inefficiency or misbehaviour or on his written request, the employee shall not be transferred substantively to any post the pay of which is less than the pay of the permanent post on which he holds a lien or would hold a lien has it not been suspended.35 However, the Pawi-Lakher regional council had not framed such rules in respect of the recruitment of its employees. The employees of the Council were, however, appointed by the Executive Committee.36

The Deputy Commissioner and the District Councils are two sets of authorities working independently of each other in judicial sphere. The councils have neither the expert officials and technical experts nor can it utilize the services and experiences of the Deputy Commissioner and other technical experts posted to headquarters, especially for development schemes going on within the areas of the councils due to lack of coordination. The District Council has framed service rules to manage and regulate the service of their employees. Despite the rules framed by the Councils, the staffs had increased in a most haphazard manner and no relevance to the necessity. Most of the staffs were not qualified. Most appointments are, sometimes, made for various posts with


a view to extending political patronage without any care or consideration for the rules, necessity, and availability of funds or qualification of persons. Thus nepotism and favouritism in the matter of recruitment seem to be rampant in the District Council.37

In an attempt to study the nature of the relationship between the political executives and the non-political executives in Mizoram under different administrative settings, we have conducted personal interviews with concerned personnel including politicians, bureaucrats and civil society representatives. Based on our interviews, some of the respondents have observed that during the Mizo District Council period, there were certain issues regarding the relationship between the Mizo District Council and the Assam Government employees since the latter somewhat viewed the District Council as a 'fake government.'38 Other respondents also observed that since the Government of Assam did not meet up to the demands of the Mizo District Council during the Mautam famine, there were constraints in the relationship between the Mizo District Council and the then Deputy Commissioner.39 Some of the respondents also hold opposing views regarding the relationship between the Mizo District Council and the Assam Government employees. Some respondents mentioned that the activities of the government could not be carried out properly in the rural areas during insurgency. During the first three to four months of insurgency, employees attended offices just as a routine only, after which normalcy was maintained. The District Council and the Deputy Commissioner had their own respective responsibilities which did not clash with each other.40 There are also other respondents who observed that the members of the Mizo District Council did not always


38. Information gathered from personal interview with C.Pahlira, Executive Member of the Mizo District Council (1965-1969) and Ex-MLA of the Union Territory of Mizoram (1982-1983), date of interview: 23.3.2010.


40. Information gathered from personal interview with J.Malsawma, MCS (Retired 1962-1988), date of interview: 24.3.2010
have good academic backgrounds and the bureaucrats had to guide them. The Assam relief measures were not sufficient due to the fact that Mizoram is located in the remote corner and transportation was a big issue at that time. So, under such circumstance, it was difficult to provide adequate relief measures. About 90 p.c. of the Chiefs supported the MNF insurgents because it was the Mizo Union Party who abolished Chieftainship in Mizoram. The government could not function properly in the rural areas due to insurgency for a long time. As Mizoram is located in a remote corner, there was a perception that the ‘less-favoured’ bureaucrats were appointed as Deputy Commissioners during this time.\(^{41}\)

Some of the respondents further observed that during the District Council period, the Mizo District Council had limited role to play in development. As such, the jobs under the District Council were very limited which did not leave much chance for favoritism and nepotism. During the early stage of the District Council, ‘politicization’ of postings, transfers and promotions of the District Council employees were never an issue. Since the Council did not have adequate money during this period, salary of the District Council employees was a major problem. There were times when the District Council had to borrow from private sources since there were no bank facilities during this time.\(^{42}\) It has further been observed by the respondents that postings, transfers and promotions of the District Council employees were never politicized.\(^ {43}\) Other respondents also observed that a few people who did not belong to the Mizo Union party were also given certain opportunities under the District Council era.\(^ {44}\) However, there are other respondents who held opposing views and observed that there were ‘party feelings’ regarding the allotment

\(^{41}\) Information gathered from personal interview with Zosiama Pachuau, Ex-

Minister (1993-1998), Current Vice-President, MPC political party, Mizoram, date of interview: 28.3.2010.

\(^{42}\) Information gathered from personal interview with H.Raltawna, I.A.S (retired 1975-

1993), Ibid.


\(^{44}\) Information gathered from personal interview with H.Vanlalauva, (L), (Ex-Minister

of land. It was very difficult to get allotment of land for Non-Mizo Union party members. Some of the respondents further mentioned that there was not enough money in the District Council which did not leave much chance for corruption. However, the Mizo Union Party members and their friends and family were given more opportunities regarding the District Council jobs and allotment of land. Some other respondents also mentioned that it was very difficult to get an employment under the District Council and it was also difficult to get house-site allotment for those who did not belong to the Mizo Union party.

Based on the information that we have gathered, it has been found that there were only few departments under the Mizo District Council. The budget of the Mizo District Council was rupees three lakhs for one year and rupees three lakhs as grants-in-aid from the government. For the recruitment of the Circle Assistants during the District Council period, all the candidates were drawn from the Mizo Union party. Under such circumstance the District Council had to recruit the members of the Mizo Union party under the absence of candidates belonging to other political party. The Mizo Union had ‘unwritten laws’ during those days, which included:

- Since the Mizo Union was somehow responsible for the abolition of the ‘Cheiftainship’ in Mizoram, the sons or daughters of the Chiefs had to be given priorities regarding job opportunities and allotment of land, and
- Priorities had to be given for retired army officers, pastors etc regarding the allotment of land


47. Information gathered from personal interview with Bualhranga, Ex-MLA (1979-1984), current Treasurer of SOSA (Society for Social Action), date of interview: 22\textsuperscript{nd} -23\textsuperscript{rd} March, 2010.

When Mizo Hills District was elevated into a Union Territory of Mizoram in 1972, ‘Absorption’ of the dissolved Mizo District Council was provided in part-VIII of the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, 1971. Officers and other employees who served in the Mizo District Council were employed in the administration of the Union Territory of Mizoram.  

Promotion to higher posts was offered to the Assam Government employees to be absorbed under the Union Territory of Mizoram under Memo No. SMG.1/72/112 dated 28.11.1972 and No. MAP. 32/72/47 dated 18.11.1972. After Mizoram became a Union Territory in 1972, the Deputy Commissioner being the head of the executive, judiciary and the revenue, was also entrusted with several other functions by the Government. The first term of the UT went smoothly, the employees of the Mizo District Council were absorbed in the Union Territory of Mizoram and Retired Assam Government employees were also re-employed in the Union Territory of Mizoram. Several Departments were also newly created and ‘politicization’ of postings and promotions were unknown within this period. The respondents mentioned that since the political executives had lacked experience in the administration; the bureaucrats had gained more power during this time leaving chance for corruption. ‘Corrupt bureaucrats’ and ‘Corrupt businessman’ can expose the political executives to corruption luring them with money etc. During the UT period, since the Lieutenant Governor was superior to the Chief Minister, based on his moral and personality, he can prevent the misuse of money in the government. Several non-Mizo Officers were employed in the UT government, having no relatives etc in Mizoram, leaving less chance for favoritism and nepotism. The Superintendents issued orders without mentioning relevant rules and regulations, the trend somehow continued in the District Council period and the UT


period under which the bureaucrats were less acquainted with rules and regulations.\textsuperscript{53} It has further been observed by another respondent that during the early period of the Union Territory, political pressure on the bureaucrats could hardly be seen. As the political executives lacked experience in administration, the bureaucrats somehow guided the political executives in the first term of UT. There was a good cooperation between the political executives and the non-political executives. However, it emerged from the field study that some bureaucrats might find efficient and capable political executives hard to work with.\textsuperscript{54} It has also been observed by the respondents that discontinuation of policy after the formation of new government was a problem not known until the collapse of the Thenphunga government in 1984.\textsuperscript{55} Further, some respondents mentioned that during this period, even the ‘voters’ did not put much pressures on the political executives for undue favours.\textsuperscript{56}

During the UT period, it has been observed by some other respondents that the difference of opinion between the MNF and Mizo Union Party deeply affected the working of bureaucracy. There was a deep misunderstanding of the MNF party by the Mizo Union Party and the ‘anti-MNF’ persons got more favours in the government. This created an underlying pressure on the bureaucrats and the supporters of the opposition political party were victimized.\textsuperscript{57} Further, it has also been observed by other respondents that the political executives lacked experience and education during those days. Regarding the postings and transfers of the government officials, those officials and staff

\textsuperscript{53.} Information gathered from personal interview with Bualhranga, \textit{Op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{54.} Information gathered from personal interview with Clement Lalrema, \textit{Op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{55.} Information gathered from personal interview with J.Malsawma, \textit{Op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{56.} Information gathered from personal interview with C.Vulluaia, \textit{Op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{57.} Information gathered from personal interview with Thanhawla, IAS (1968-2005 Rtd) date of interview: 26.3.2010.
who were suspected to be the sympathizers of the MNF were posted in less favourable positions.\(^{58}\)

When Mizoram was elevated to statehood, the Lt. Governor was replaced by the Governor in the State. The Governor is the head of the State and he is endowed with legislative, executive, judicial and other miscellaneous powers. The Governor can summon, prorogue and dissolve the Legislative Assembly of Mizoram and he is advised by the Chief Minister in all these matters. The Governor of Mizoram, like that in other States, is the nominal executive head of the State. The real power lies with the Council of Ministers of which the Chief Minister is the Chairman.\(^{59}\)

According to the Government of Mizoram (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1987, Rule 3 states that the Business of the Government shall be transacted in the different Departments specified in the First Schedule. Rule 4 states that the Governor shall, on the advice of the Chief Minister, allot among the Ministers, the business of the Government by assigning one or more Departments to the charge of a Minister. Rule 5 states that each Department of the Secretariat shall consist of the Secretary to the Government or some other Government officer who shall be the administrative head of the Department, Provided that:

(a) more than one Department may be placed in charge of the same secretary.\(^{60}\)

(b) the work of a department may be divided between two or more secretaries.  \(^{61}\)

\(^{58}\) Information gathered from personal interview with H.Vanlalauva, \textit{Op.cit.}\n


Rule no. 8 of the Government of Mizoram (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1987 also provides that the Minister-in-charge of a Department shall be responsible for the disposal of business pertaining to his Department and the secretary of the Department shall assist and carry out the instructions of the Minister-in-charge in this regard. Rule no. 9 (1) states that no department shall without previous consultation with the Finance Department, authorized any orders (other than orders issued under any Act of Rules made thereunder, or pursuance to any general or specific delegation made by the Council of Minister) which-\textsuperscript{62}

a. either immediately or by their repercussion, will effect the finances of the State, or which, in particular-\textsuperscript{63}
   i. involve any grant of land or assessment of revenue or concession, grant, lease or license of mineral of forest right to water or any easement of privilege in respect of such concession;\textsuperscript{64} or
   ii. in any way involve any requirement of revenue.\textsuperscript{65}

b. relate to the numbers or grading of cadre of posts or the emoluments or other conditions of service or post;\textsuperscript{66}

c. involve the addition of a post in the public service in the variation of emoluments of any post.\textsuperscript{67}

provided that all group ‘A’ or posts on fixed pay which is equivalent or more than that of the starting of Group ‘A’ scale of

\begin{itemize}
\item[63.] \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
\item[64.] \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
\item[65.] \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
\item[66.] \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
\item[67.] \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
\end{itemize}
pay per month shall be created in consultation with the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms. 68

d. involve an expenditure for which no provision has been made in the Appropriation Act or which is in excess of the provision made in the Act. 69

e. involve the sanction of an allowances or special or personal pay for any post or class of posts or to any employee to the Government of Mizoram. 70

Rule no. 9 (2) of the Government of Mizoram (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1987 provides that no proposal which requires the previous consultation with the Finance Department under this Rules, but in which the Finance Department has not concurred may be proceeded with unless a decision to that effect has been taken by the Council of Minister or the Chief Minister. Rule no. 9 (3) states that no re-appropriation shall be made by any Department other than the Finance Department except in accordance with such general or specific delegation as the Council of Minister may have. Rule no. 9 (4) provides that except to the extent that power may have delegated to the Departments under rules approved by the Council of Ministers, every order of an Administrative Department conveying a sanction to be enforced in audit shall be communicated to the audit authorities by the Finance Department. Rule no. 9 (5) also provides that nothing in this Rule shall be construed as authorizing any Department including the Finance Department, to make re-appropriation from one grant specified in the Appropriation Act to another such grant or from a charged Appropriation to a votable appropriation. 71

Regarding the Procedure of the cabinet, the Government of Mizoram (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1987, Rule no.12 provides that the Chief Secretary, or such other


69. Ibid., p.3.

70. Ibid., p.3.

71. Ibid., pp.3-4.
Officer as the Chief Minister may appoint, shall be the Secretary to the Cabinet. Rule no. 13 also provides that all cases referred to in the second schedule shall, after consideration by the Minister be sent to the Chief Secretary for obtaining orders of the Chief Minister for bringing it up for consideration at a meeting of the Cabinet or for Circulation of the case under Rule 14 which provides that the Chief Minister may direct that any case referred to in the Second Schedule or otherwise may instead of being brought up for discussion at the Cabinet be circulated to the Minister for their opinion. The Chief Minister may refer such matter for discussion at a meeting if he may consider necessary.\textsuperscript{72}

A healthy relationship between the Political Executive and the Non-Political Executives is the central key for the functioning of a government. As the study points out, it is difficult to demarcate clear-cut functions between the two. Under a democratic framework, the political executives are responsible for fulfilling the demands and aspirations of the public and the non-political executives have to serve the public. This clearly highlights the importance of maintaining a healthy relationship between the two.

In this chapter, the theoretical concept of the relationship between the political and non-political executives is discussed in the first part of the chapter including the issues and challenges in the relationship. In the later part of the chapter, the study is narrowed down to Mizoram situation. Regarding the relationship between the political and non-political executives in Mizoram, besides the existing literature on the topic, information are also collected through personal interview from sample respondents to get an insight on the nature of the relationship between the political and non-political executives in Mizoram under different administrative settings.