Chapter I

CONCEPTUALISING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL AND MICRO STATES

INTRODUCTION

At least four wars – First and Second World Wars, the Cold War and the recent global ‘war on terrorism’ – have sought justifications for ‘security’.

Still the term security remains unexplained to a satisfactory level. Security as a concept has been more neglected, abused, and misused than used and explained. Even to say that the term security is contested could itself be put to contestation; such has been the misery with the concept of security so far.

Barry Buzan (1983: 6-9) offered five explanations behind the underdevelopment of security as a concept such as: i) idea of security has proved too complex to attract analysts, and therefore has been neglected in favour of more tractable concepts; ii) overlap between security and the concept of power; iii) nature of the various revolts against the ‘realist orthodoxy’ – none of which was sympathetic to the idea; iv) nature of Strategic Studies which as a sub-field produced a large volume of empirical literature on problems of military policy; and v) the argument itself that compelling reasons exist for the practitioners of state policy to maintain symbolic ambiguity of security. As a consequence, logical development of the concept has suffered to the extent that conceptualisation of security has been largely abandoned. Moreover, the earlier attempts of conceptualisation have been ignored which have lowered the efficacy of the policy design itself.

Even for most Security Studies specialists, security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used (D. Baldwin, 1997: 9). And, ironically, even the ‘efforts of redefining security are more concerned with redefining
the policy agendas of nation-states than with the concept of security itself” (D. Baldwin, 1997: 1). Nevertheless, there have been numerous contemporary efforts to broaden and deepen the security (Buzan, 1983; Lipschutz and Holdren, 1990; Rosenau, 1994; Ottone, 1997; Mathew and Shambaugh, 1998; Aradau, 2010; Liotta, 2002; Chandler, 2008; Ginty, 2010; Vuori, 2010); but they have hardly made the concept of security lucid and unambiguous, though they have encouraged a ‘broad concept’ (Winslow and Eriksen, 2004) and a ‘political sociology’ (Weaver, 2010) of Security Studies.

Till the end of the Cold War realist school of thought largely dominated the world of security thinking and practice. Security was articulated as a matter of survival for the states. No state was there to help the other. It was a game of ‘self-help’. Therefore, only the military build-ups supplied security to the sovereign states. Realism theorised a system of states characterised by ‘anarchy’. Idealism/ liberal internationalism, on the other hand, thought differently. It theorised a language of ‘co-operation’. Promoting institutions of international importance, encouraging trade among the states, and adopting democratic norms of governance were given prominence. The spirit was filliped by the end of the Cold War.

Constructivism came ‘out of the box’. It argued that the system of states is a constructed one. It has an inter-subjective identity. It has a social psychology. Thus, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’. Precisely, the opposite is also possible. As a result, constructivist ideas were able to generate a ‘discursive’ approach to security. Both realism and idealism, at the same time, yawned with constructivism. It is instructive to see in the post-Cold War era, however, as to what is happening with the idea of security itself.

‘Development’ theories, on the other side, are in question today. ‘Globalisation’ is one of the most potent factors behind it. There are agreements and disagreements with the meaning of globalisation; nobody denies that there is globalisation. Similarly, there are significant convergent and divergent opinions about the meaning of development; all seem to be concerned with the ways development is to be achieved. Globalisation has increased the appetite of engagement with various theoretical dimensions of development. The traditions of development thoughts and
theories are often looked back with the expectation that it could lessen the dilemmas in achieving development.

The term development was popularised and shaped by modernisation development discourse in the late ‘40s. This discourse set the orientation of development which was certain not only in terms of direction but also in terms of promised abundance. The tone of this development discourse was western while the consequences were global. It was basically the narrative of the western experiences of the trajectories and stages of development that one can understand with W. W. Rostow’s explicit articulation in *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960/1971). But it failed, with significant exception, to take off and to deliver the abundance that it had promised for the non-western world. In turn, it vitiated the problems of alleged ‘underdevelopment’.

Dependency discourse took up the task of exposing the international division of labour and consequent inequalities that modernising practices had created. With core-periphery binary this discourse revealed that the modernising development practice is associated with a single capitalistic production structure at global level and therefore the accumulation of wealth in the core is not autonomous. Through the chain of exploitative processes the dominant development discourse and practice had produced abundance in the core and had created the structure of dependent development in the periphery. Hence, delinking, autonomous national development, self-help, and import substitution were prescriptions advanced by dependency discourse to catch up with the west; due to precise reasons dependency could not break away itself from the influences of the modernising practices. It could only substitute the import of consumer goods by the capital ones.

The modernising development discourse was not just an economic package. It had political and cultural projects skilfully nested with economic programmes. Therefore came up the requirement of dissecting the political and cultural consequences embedded with modernising development state. Post-development took up the task. It challenged the dominant modernising state and also exposed the dependency’s ‘catch up’ syndrome. Using discourse analysis, post-development centrally posited ‘local cultural communities’ in its ‘development as discourse’ and claimed to provide *alternative to* development. It also tried to articulate ‘First World’
relevance of the ‘Third World’ local autonomy. Post-development, however, potentially remained susceptible due to its lack of local cultural autonomy in ‘relational term’.

A journey through these traditions enriches our understanding of development. The concern here is to investigate the idea of development itself; more so in the light of the process and the idea of globalisation.

In the following sections, the chapter traces the concepts of security and development. Security section peers through the realist, liberal internationalist, and constructivist schools of thought, bringing the idea of security in the post-Cold War era. Modernisation, dependency, and post-development schools of thought figure in development section bringing globalisation into development discourse. Lastly, the chapter looks into the specificities in/ of small and micro states aiming at conceptualising security and development considering relevant interactive variables.

**CONCEPT OF SECURITY**

Given the long tradition of Security Studies, along with apparently deliberate hesitation to engage with the concept of security itself, one is left with a difficult point of departure. While living in an age which is unequivocally global, can a standard notion of security be ever achieved? Or the vagueness of the unexplained term is the real strength of the discipline of International Relations/ Security Studies itself? The quest for a satisfactory answer calls for a journey along with three established schools of thought of International Studies and their engagement with the concept of security:

I. Realism
II. Liberal Internationalism
III. Constructivism
I. REALISM AND SECURITY

Edward Hallett Carr observed that realism is the impact of ‘thinking’ upon ‘wishing’ which, in the development of a science, follows the breakdown of its first visionary project, and marks the end of its specifically utopian period (Carr, 1946: 14). This point of departure purports that realism as a school of thought began with its constructive countering of idealistic vision of the world order after the First World War. Thus, the realist quest for security began with understanding and concern of a world order between the ‘satisfied’ and ‘dissatisfied’ powers. But as a structured school of thought, realism emerged with the advent of the Second World War and remained relatively unchallenged until the end of the Cold War. It dominated the discourse of inter-state security for five decades. The school is made up of various streams of thoughts known as classical realism, neo-realism, structural realism etc.

The realist quest for security is essentially ‘national’. State or nation-state as a unit of realist analysis constantly struggles to maximise its security which is measured in terms of power. Realist states as territorial sovereign entities perpetually threaten each other’s survival and therefore they are ever engaged in exploiting military capabilities to balance each other’s arsenals. It is only the constant advancement of new technology and increase of additional capabilities in the armouries that seemed to secure the sovereign units in the anarchical states system where no central authority prevails. For realism, hence, security is for ‘national interest’. ‘Power’ is the vanguard of national interest which is to be championed in the ‘self-help game’.

The concept of security received broader treatment in Hans Morgenthau’s famous Politics Among Nations (1948/2007) for which the title of manifesto of the realist school would not be an exaggeration. Morgenthau is widely regarded as the architect of classical realism. His insights on security issues can be broadly inferred from his book.

When he wrote this classic on inter-state relations, the world was in search of an order and Morgenthau addressed to that which subsequently shaped the realist school of thought. He dealt with the dimensions of security through the ‘problems of peace’. Peace was highly valued as the world had already witnessed immense perils on account of the First and Second World Wars in a span of only three decades. In the
backdrop of devastating impacts of two world wars, Hans Morgenthau speculated on the ways to achieve peace. He cancelled out the idealist options of disarmament, collective security, and international police force to achieve peace because the international order at the time had seemingly rendered them obsolete. Carr in his *Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1946) too depicted them as utopian because these were inspired by a ‘purpose’ without rigorous thinking and analysis of the reality. Morgenthau placed hope on diplomacy. He claimed, ‘The existence of conflicts among nations makes the realization of international peace through disarmament, collective security, and an international police force impossible’ (1948/2007: 463). Morgenthau further opined that armament occurs due to certain psychological factors, i.e., fear of attack or feeling of insecurity and the option of disarmament does not address that. Even the new device of collective security, i.e., one for all and all for one, though Morgenthau considered it flawless, did not work due to political inevitabilities. ‘Collective security expects the policies of the individual nations to be inspired by the ideal of mutual assistance and a spirit of self-sacrifice which will not shrink even from the supreme sacrifice of war should it be required by that ideal’ (1948/2007: 454). When collective security operates under less than ideal conditions mentioned above, it makes war rather than peace inevitable, underlined Morgenthau. The idea of international police force, emanated from an analogy with the police force in domestic societies, was also declared misleading by this realist architect.

Morgenthau wanted to reach peace through accommodation by skilful use of diplomacy. He outlined three means at the disposal of diplomacy: persuasion, compromise and threat of force (1948/2007: 565). A country’s foreign office as the brain, and its diplomatic representatives as eyes, ears, and mouths are the organised instruments of diplomacy.

Security for realism was the highest common good of the system of states when Kenneth Waltz published his book *Man, the State and War* in 1954. By this time, war was recurring theme in the literature of international relations. Initially, Waltz was mainly concerned about knowing the causes of war that he located into three images of international relations i.e., man, state and international system. Waltz asked himself and then clarified:
Where are the major causes of war to be found? The answers are bewildering in their variety and in their contradictory qualities. To make this variety manageable, the answers can be ordered under the following three headings: within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system.

(Waltz, 1954/1959/2001: 12)

He asserted that the combination of these three images, rather a single one, is necessary to investigate the causes of war. ‘The vogue of an image varies with time and place, but no single image is ever adequate’ (Waltz, 1954/1959/2001: 225). His analysis dwindled between war and peace as he believed in increasing the possibility of peace to reduce the chance of war. He was least interested to know the causes of peace, however. Waltz’s security concerns got vividly expressed through advancement in warfare technology in country ‘A’ and consequent increase in fear in country ‘B’. Fear was an important dimension of security/war in Waltz’s writing. He wrote, with reference to the second image, that

State A may fear that if it does not cut state B down a peg now, it may be unable to do so ten years from now. State A becomes the aggressor in the present because it fears what state B may be able to do in the future.

(Waltz, 1954/1959/2001: 234) (emphases added)

In the concluding part of his book fear seemingly becomes synonym to security, but left without giving sufficient exposition. Similarly, the ‘chessboard’ of world politics takes precedence on the face of the ‘chessmen’ which constituted the core substance in his *Theory of International Politics* (1979). In this book the international anarchy is sufficiently structured in which the units, i.e., the nation-states, play the self-help game because domestic integration is difficult to be upgraded at international level where only interdependence works. According to Waltz:

Integration draws the parts of a nation closely together. Interdependence among nations leaves them *loosely* connected.

(Waltz, 1979: 105) (emphasis added)

Waltz believed that integration *among* nations seldom takes place because of the structure of international politics itself which limits co-operation. This structure is conditioned by the i) condition of insecurity, i.e., the uncertainty of each about the other’s future intentions and actions and ii) units worry about their survival (Waltz, 1979: 105).
Thus, the security of the nation-states takes the shape of supreme good in Waltz’s writing so much so that ‘in a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest’ (1979: 107). Security also hinders collective actions because ‘everybody’s business is nobody’s business’ (1979: 197) and consequently ‘self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic order’ (1979: 111). Therefore, power promises to bring security because power i) provides the means of maintaining one’s autonomy in the face of force that others wield; ii) greater power permits wider ranges of action; iii) more powerful enjoys wider margins of safety in dealing with the less powerful and have more to say about which games will be played and how; and iv) great power gives its possessors a big stake in their system and the ability to act for its sake (1979: 194-95). Power, however, it does not end uncertainties.

POST-COLD WAR IMPACT ON REALIST SECURITY ASSUMPTIONS

The realist intellectual tradition set by the writings of Morgenthau (1948/2007) and Waltz (1954/1959/2001, 1979), it is to be noted, changed the structure of world politics and structured the perspective on security in a hegemonic manner. The tradition was further strengthened by addition of forceful writings of Stephen Krasner, Barry Buzan, Richard Little, Charles Jones and others into the school of thought with several variations. The monopolistic security consequences of the school could be seen throughout the Cold War period, when the world polity got trifurcated between three ideological blocs – socialist, capitalist, and non-aligned. These coalitional blocs, first of all, were defiants of the realist assumptions of competition and national self-help. Yet realism dictated and directed the superpower rivalry.

Hayward Alker (1992) said that turbulent changes are catalysts to the reconstruction of theories.iii Two decades back this is preciously what happened. ‘Realism found a hospitable home in which to flourish during the conflict-ridden fifty-year system between 1939 and 1989 when lust for power, appetite for imperial expansion, struggle for hegemony, a superpower arms race, and obsession with national security were in strong evidence’ (Kegley, 1993: 133). The end of the Cold
War in the early 1990s and simultaneous disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) put the core realpolitik security assumptions in questions.

Though the intellectual lineage of realism is usually traced with Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War, the outbreak of the Second World War, juxtaposed with the inability of Wilsonian peace programme, helped structuring the realist security worldview. Unambiguously, warfare and national security constituted the core of realist language. The aftermath of the Cold War naturally proved fatal to realist assumptions on international relations and security alike.

‘High politics’ of military security dominated the ‘low politics’ of economic and social affairs. Keohane and Nye claimed that the realist emphasis on the ever-present possibility of war among sovereign nations is one-sided view of reality (1977: ix). Its understanding of the western political order is limited and it is unable to provide policy tools for the post-Cold War order (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 196).

The Cold War ended without significant violence and bloodshed. Soviet Union’s retreat from military power and competition paved the ‘peaceful’ transition of the world order in favour of the American side. Much before this, the formation of the United Nations, Bretonwoods Institutions, and the alliance formation itself were the developments which defied realist assumptions of anarchic security.

Maximising military power for (national) security through self-help in the anarchical world was the uninterrupted flow of realist linguistic structure. It aimed at balancing the rivalry by stockpiling lethal weapons so that the rival power is under constant fear of threat. In realism power equalled security. In reality it turned out to be the other way round. Balancing through mutually assured destruction (MAD) produced more insecurity and it could never solve the security dilemma. Its presumed means for survival became threat to survival itself. Ullman assumed that defining national security merely (or even primarily) in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality. That false image is doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous. First, it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps even more harmful dangers. Thus it reduces their total security. And second, it contributes to a pervasive militarization of international relations that in the long run can only increase global insecurity.

(Ullman, 1983: 129)
Therefore, as Arnold Wolfers (1952: 491-92) pointed out that not only the perception of national interest varies but also the means to achieve it. The pursuit of a uniform and therefore imitable policy of national security by the nation-states is guided by sweeping generalisations.

Almost two decades before the Cold War ended, the blurring of domestic-international had recognisably started taking place. Keohane and Nye expressed that ‘foreign policy and domestic policy as we repeatedly emphasize, are becoming increasingly difficult to disentangle’ (1977: ix). But realism not only ignored it rather it facilitated the language of coherent domestic and anarchic international structure. Weber recently explained:

Theory of International Politics might be described as a book in which Waltz both builds upon and forgets much of what he wrote in Man, the State, and War. What Waltz builds upon is the weight which he gives to international anarchy in explaining international conflict. What he forgets is to include first and second image explanations in his analysis of why war occurs. In this later book, then, there are no serious discussions of individuals or of the internal arrangements of states and society. Sovereign nation-states are Waltz’s principle actors, but instead of the complexity they had in Man, the State, and War, Waltz now discusses them as (at worst) billiard balls that knock one another around or (at best) firms that freely compete with one another in the international system.

(Weber, 2010: 20) (emphases in original)

In short (neo)realism exaggerates the autonomy states enjoy from their domestic conditions; overstates the importance of structure; and underestimates the potential for states to transform the international system (Burchill et al., 2001: 99).

II. LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM AND SECURITY

Liberal internationalism has been the very core in the evolution of the International Relations (IR) as a discipline via the quest for security. Along with the devastating war-consequences, it was the idealist world-view during the First World War that encouraged the systematic study of international order (Carr, 1946) and subsequently led the emergence of what came to called recently called liberal internationalism. The liberal international perception grew up with the ideals of world society, peace, and justice. The tradition of liberal international thinking predates the First World War (Sylvest, 2005); but its first global concern was echoed by the US President Woodrow Wilson during the war. The current form of liberal internationalism encapsulates
varieties of intellectual trajectories and legacies from idealism to the recent structural realism.

The First World War had caused unmatched loss of life and property out of which ‘peace’ was voiced to save the humanity. This voice was transcendental. It appealed for a community of states for a peaceful and harmonised order of states system. Thus, the pursuit for lasting peace characterised the post-war security arrangement in a liberal international order. This was in tandem with Kant’s perpetual peace associated with his Republican Constitution. vi

The organisation of liberal internationalism in the war context made peace its natural goal to realise. The US President Woodrow Wilson’s vii Senate address in 1917 catches the pulse. He spoke:

Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not only a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

(Hurd, 1959: 174)

Exercising the highest authority of his country, Wilson held:

May I not add that I hope and believe that I am, in effect, speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty? I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no place or opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and the homes they hold most dear.

(Hurd, 1959: 175)

Liberal international quest for security was viewed through the permanent peace of the world. It dreamed of a general association of the nations in the form of the League of Nations to guarantee and maintain world peace. Outlining his vision in the Hall of Mirrors of France Wilson spoke in 1919, ‘It seems to me that we must concert our best judgement in order to make this League of Nations a vital thing – not merely a formal thing, not an occasional thing, nor a thing sometimes called into life to meet an exigency, but always functioning in watchful attendance upon the interests of the nations, and that its continuity should be a vital continuity...’ (Hurd, 1959: 187-88). Wilson shared Kantian notion of the deciding voice of the people to have or not to have war because they only carry the cost of destruction. Immanuel Kant had ventured to assume in the 18th Century that ‘the human race is continually advancing
in civilization and culture as its natural purpose, so it is continually making progress for the better in relation to the moral end of its existence, and that this progress, although it may be sometimes interrupted, will never be entirely broken off or stopped’ (Kant, 1793/1970: 194) (emphases added). Wilson, in his epochal speeches, was constantly touching the Kantian ‘purpose of the nature’ which throughout the history of human race, aims at attaining a higher stage. Moreover, Wilsonian community of power was also at par with Kantian ‘providence’ which was the means to progress of human race to a higher stage that the nature has foreseen. Kant wrote, ‘For, it is from human nature in general, or rather – since supreme wisdom is requisite for the accomplishment of this End – it is from Providence alone that we can expect a result which proceeds by relation to the whole and reacts through the whole upon the parts’ (Kant, 1793/1970: 196) (emphasis in original). The universal federation or cosmo-political constitution constituted Kantian providence which recurred in ‘Wilsonian utopia’ (Carr, 1946) during and after the First World War.

In the liberal international context, interconnection of peace with democracy predominantly surfaced during the Cold War and continues with today’s liberal security conceptions with much vitality. It is widely believed that ‘democracies do not (or virtually never) go to war with one another’ (Griffiths and O’Callaghan, 2007: 66). People’s resistance to bear deaths and costs of war, diversity of institutions creating checks and balances and cross-pressures upon the belligerents and the presence of a democratic culture of negotiation and conciliation (Griffiths and O’Callaghan, 2007: 66-68) were cited as the factors cementing peace with democracy. This democratic symptom seems to be in contrast with Kant’s perpetual peace arrangement. Kant cautioned, ‘The Republican Constitution is not to be confounded with the Democratic Constitution’ (Kant, 1795/1970: 208) (emphasis in original). Kant was more concerned with the ‘representative system’ rather the form of government. Therefore, he opined that ‘of the three forms of the State, a Democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism; because it establishes an Executive power in which All resolve about, and, it may be, also against, any One who is not in accord with it; and consequently the All who thus resolve are really not all; which is a contradiction of the Universal Will with itself and with liberty’ (Kant, 1795/1970: 209) (emphases in original).
One needs to plough deep into the Kantian Republican Constitution which is founded according to the principles of liberty of all members of society, dependence of all members as subjects on a single common legislation and law of equality of all members as citizens. Moreover, the consent of the citizens is vital to determine whether there shall be war or not. These are the principles and conditions that are theoretically and constitutionally most identical with today’s liberal democratic states. And therefore one need not be surprised while reading Wilson’s speech delivered in 1917 which he delivered before a Joint Session of the US Congress. He spoke that ‘a steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations’ (Hurd: 1959: 179) (emphasis added). Wilsonian government with the consent of the governed and Kantian deciding voice of the people are complementary to each other. In fact, Wilson was the heir of Kantian philosophical legacies. The contradictions between democratic and perpetual peace seem to further come down with few lines of Paul Robinson which he invokes while describing negative peace. He writes, ‘Negative peace can also be interpreted in terms of forcible pacification, such as the Pax Romana, or in terms of more utopian ‘perpetual peace’ or democratic peace theory, which derives from the writings of German philosopher Immanuel Kant and which suggests that the spread of democratic forms of government will eventually eliminate wars between states’ (Robinson, 2008: 156). Thus, liberal democratic states are entangled with the liberal international concept of security.

Viewed through the Kantian and Wilsonian legacies, the concept of security in liberal internationalism is ‘co-binding’ (Deudney, 1995; Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999) where liberal states create structure for mutual benefits and minimising risks and uncertainties. ‘Liberal states practice co-binding – that is, they attempt to tie one another down by locking each other into institutions that mutually constrain one another’ (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 182). As Deudney and Ikenberry assumed, co-binding can be asymmetrical as well as symmetrical. They maintained that ‘democratic and liberal states are particularly well suited to engage in co-binding, because their internal structures more readily lend themselves to the establishment of institutions that constrain state autonomy’ (1999: 183). The above link of security and democracy finds an affirmative turn with co-binding security practice.
In liberal international order, the contour of security moves well beyond the traditional view of power and use of force to achieve national interest and security. The national is often interfaced between domestic and international. It adopts a comprehensive and yet nebulous shape of interconnection between ill-defined interests and goals. There is an absence of clearly defined hierarchy of interests and issues. Military security does not dominate the list of hierarchy. States are not necessarily the coherent and dominant actors in the international affairs, and use of force does not stand as an effective instrument. This complexity of phenomena causes for ‘complex interdependence’ (Keohane and Nye, 1977) which broadens and multiplies the channels for pursuit of security interests because the ‘contemporary world politics is not a seamless web; it is a tapestry of diverse relationships’ (1977: 4). While ‘interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries’ (1977: 8), complex interdependence, as they further write, is characterised by i) multiple channels of informal and formal ties at transgovernmental and transnational levels; ii) agenda of interstate relationships not arranged in a clear and consistent hierarchy and different issues generate different coalitions involving different degrees of conflict at various levels; and iii) military force is not used. In such a situation international organisations play pivotal role in agenda setting and politicising the issue areas around which coalition formation and securitisation take place. In complex interdependence the economic and political interests are intensely intersected with security interests and therefore, in the liberal international context, security acquiring a wide notion that is stretchable to any number of issues and interest as, after the end of the Cold War, Kegley (1993) attempted to link peace with democracy, trade, international law, international organisation, human rights etc. in a neo-idealistic/ neo-Wilsonian manner.

POST-COLD WAR REVIVAL OF LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THINKING?

The end of the Cold War revitalised liberal international thinking more in a neo-idealistic line and had a direct impact on the concept of security. The end of the Cold War not only ended the Soviet project of communism, but also generated a unipolar
moment of US hegemony. It is also to be kept in mind that both the Cold War great power rivals were competitively ‘international’ in their orientation and were simultaneously realist in their politico-economic outlook. These too had obvious impacts on the notion of security. The post-Cold War liberal international security, as a consequence, did not and could not afford to altogether shun the realist pragmatism. Kegley’s list of concerns with the aftermath of the Cold War is instructive. Kegley underlined i) collapse of Balkan order; ii) Yugoslavian breakup and slowing of momentum toward Euro-integration; iii) continuing protectionism among regional blocs; iv) possible advent of a multipolar system; v) Boris Yeltsin renouncing communism but neither sovereignty nor military power; and vi) fall of Berlin Wall and behaviour of Russia and the United States (1993: 139); and these are obvious reasons for caution. Like Fukuyama (1992a), Kegley too believed that there are good reasons for examining aspects of the liberal international legacy once again but he added that

we must not rush prematurely into acceptance of rediscovered theory. As noted, many recent developments do not fit the world Wilson visualized, and it is too early to tell if the emerging world will be cast more in the Wilsonian than the realist image. Like realism, Wilsonian idealism rests on suspect empirical foundations, and it is a possibility but not a certainty that the world will develop in a way that does not fit with the realist paradigm.

(Kegley, 1993: 139)

On account of the post-Cold War complexity Kegley suggested melting of liberal international approach with realism (1993: 140). This pragmatic approach is identical with the post-Second World War situation. Carr had a similar opinion. He pointed out that

utopia [i.e. liberal international order in our case] and reality [i.e. realism] are [ ] the two faces of political science. Sound political thought and sound political life will be found only where both have their place.

(Carr, 1946: 15)

Keohane and Nye, though they developed an ideal type complex interdependence contrary to realism, did not claim their ideal type to faithfully reflect world political reality. They thought that most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes (1977: 24). Moreover, the post-Cold War security characterises point of convergence of the ideas from diverse sources which Booth (1991) calls ‘utopian realism’. Analogous to Bartelson’s words that anarchy is both real and imagined (1995:258), our assumptions about world politics profoundly affect what we
Realism and liberal internationalism are two important theoretical strands to understanding the concept of security. But a gap remains between realist security practices and liberal international security ideals. Constructivism acts as a means to narrow down the gap between these two poles by disputing their explanations of security and world politics.

III. CONSTRUCTIVISM AND SECURITY

As the term constructivism conveys, security, like anything else, is constructed. It is not something objective or given. Therefore, for constructivism security is a construction out of the inter-subjective identity among the states. Interaction among the constitutive units of world politics is important to understand security. Precisely, Alexander Wendt thought that Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist explanation of the structure of international relations is problematic. Waltz treated the self-regarding identities and interests of states as given prior to interaction among the units. He did not see the self-regarding identities and interests as socially constructed function of interaction (Wendt, 1992a: 182). Wendt raised the point that whether systemic theory should explain only the behaviour of units of analysis or also their identities and interests (Wendt, 1992a: 181). Wendt argued that the realist competitive security system, in which states identify themselves negatively with each other’s security so that ego’s gain is seen as alter’s loss (Wendt, 1992b: 400). (Neo)liberals too took the self-interested states as the starting point (Wendt, 1992a: 392). The goals of liberals are also to achieve physical safety and material well-being (Rourke, 2007: 31). And like realists, liberals treat the identities and interests as exogenously given (Wendt, 1992b: 391). But for constructivism the behaviour of the states is an interactive process in which the ideas of communication among agents serve to create structure. Structures in turn influence the ideas and communications of the agents (Rourke, 2007: 30).

Alexander Wendt (1992b) claimed that constructivism is a new way of thinking about the organisation of the system of states and their security arrangement.
It disputes the realist and liberal/liberal internationalist explanations of security interests. It demonstrates how security is socially engineered to produce certain outcomes. Thus, it is about construction of the politics of security itself. It is about identity of the agents, the institutions and the structures. It shows that the world politics is constructed via the interactions of the self and the other or ego and alter. Therefore, like identity of an individual and societal group, the identity of the actors, the actions and the structures are mutually constitutive. Constructivism ventures ‘to know’ the process and the logic of security interaction in the society of states. It desires to collect the security ‘knowledge’ that the ego/self/state acquires about alter/other/another state and how this security knowledge is mutually constituted through interactions.

Wendt put up his constructivist security conceptions on the line drawn by Nicholas Onuf (1989) which were based on two principles that i) people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them (Wendt, 1992b: 396-97); and ii) the meanings in terms of which action is organised arise out of interaction (1992b: 403). Therefore, Wendt adopted essentially a social psychological approach while explaining security in international politics.

A very significant contribution of constructivism in the sphere of security studies is its transcendental feature. It believes that the existing structure of inter-state security can be transformed through institutional arrangements because ‘the process of creating institutions is one of internalizing new understandings of self and other, of acquiring new role identities, not just of creating external constraints on the behaviour of exogenously constituted actors’ (Wendt, 1992b: 417). States can even escape a Hobbesian world of their own making of identity and security (Wendt, 1992b: 412).

Further, the idea of social construction in constructivist theory is analytically neutral between conflict and co-operation (Wendt, 1995: 76). This is of tremendous value in the field of security studies. As Barry Buzan (1983) had pointed out that development of the concept of security itself has suffered because of research emphasising on war and peace – which are two extremes of state behaviours. Constructivism succeeds in breaking this barrier and therefore Wendt stated, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’. Wendt explained that a security dilemma, for
example, is a social structure composed of inter-subjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other’s intentions, and therefore see their interests in self-help terms. Security community has an opposite social structure and go for resolving disputes without war (Wendt, 1995:73). This feature of constructivism enables one to adopt a ‘discursive’ approach to understand security.

The discursive feature of constructivism is so well-grounded that it has invited responses for and against the constructivist explanation of the structure of international relations. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, in response to Wendt’s reading of their Explaining and Understanding International Relations, conveyed to ‘beware of Gurus’ (Hollis and Smith, 1991). On the other hand, Samuel Barkin has claimed to find out compatibility between constructivist epistemology and classical realist theory and has termed it ‘realist constructivism’ (Barkin, 2003). May be that is why Hidemi Suganami (2002: 36) wrote that the difference between Wendt, on the one hand, and Waltz and Keohane, on the other, is a matter of degree.

IV. POST-COLD WAR SECURITY

The end of the Cold War ended the centrality of the military-based conception of security; bringing a notable alteration in the thinking of security interest and favouring the non-military issues. ‘The end of the Cold War ... [was not only] arguably the most momentous event in the international politics since the end of the World War II and the dawn of the atomic age’ (Baldwin, 1995: 117), but also the most opportune moment for revisiting the pre-Cold War security thinking. It was particularly important given the narrow dimension of security pursuit of national interest in military terms during the Cold War period. Earlier this was never the case with security imagination (Baldwin, 1995).

In the post-Cold War (PCW) security scenario military aspect is one among several competing equals. Emergence and revival of non-military issues in the security discourse are the most striking development in the PCW international politics. After reviewing PCW security opinions of over 50 scholars expressed in four books, Baldwin identified three themes in the PCW security debate. He wrote:
Despite the disparity of views among the authors, three themes emerge. First, military power has declined in importance in international politics. For some this means that military threats are less prevalent, while for others it means that military force is less useful as a tool of statecraft. Second, there is a need to reexamine the way we think about international relations and national security. For some this need stems from the changed circumstances of the post-cold war world; for others it grows out of the collective failure of scholars to anticipate either the timing or the nature of the end of the cold war. And third, there is a need for a broader view of national security. For some this means including domestic problems on the national security agenda; for others it means treating nonmilitary threats to national well-being as security issues.\textsuperscript{xvii}

(Baldwin, 1995: 118)

Whether we characterise them as non-military or non-traditional threats and issues, the security debate recognises that there are \textit{relatively} new security problems with today’s system of states around which the Cold War was not fought.\textsuperscript{xviii} These issues – poverty, illiteracy, economic backwardness, trafficking in narcotics/arms/humans, money laundering, organised crimes, terrorism, migration, environmental hazards and natural calamities, ethnic conflicts etc. – are increasingly gaining weight in the international sphere. As a consequence, the non-state actors too are performing several key functions in the process. These actors are both ‘causes’ and ‘consequences’ in the process; and are significantly contributing in tilting the puzzle of ‘gun and butter’ in favour of the latter. We are no more puzzled that ‘a state without armed forces to protect it from external attack may not survive, but a state without breathable air or drinking water will surely not survive’, wrote David Baldwin (1995: 128).

The Cold War maintained a shadow of ideological conflict over the non-traditional issues that we are debating today. The resources and energies were channelised from both the rival camps to further their ideological influences while keeping military capabilities in the frontline. The ‘balance of power’ was oriented to balance the ideological weight against each other. The ‘Third World’ was made to function only as means to achieve the hegemonic dreams of the superpowers of the time. As the Cold War got over, the entire security arrangement across the world faced crises. In addition, the problems which were either suppressed or overshadowed by the military-ideological warfare suddenly waged their heads. These were more acute in the Third World. The underdeveloped and developing counties of the world were yet to consolidate their post-colonial political gains which were already plagued by poverty, illiteracy, ethnic tensions, and numerous other problems including border
disputes. The catalytic phenomenon of globalisation further complicated the security issues across the world.

Emergence of the non-traditional issues in the security discourse has several companions with it. Globalisation accompanied to make it more intricate. It is again a wary that the term ‘globalisation’ too is ill-conceptualised, but the process is well-accepted. Christopher Hughes points out that ‘globalization and security vie individually for the status of the least well-conceptualized, but yet most controversial, of academic and policymaking issues’ (Hughes, 2001: 407). Together with the end of the Cold War, the new dimensions of security owe much to the process of globalisation. Globalisation is creating new security actors, problems, and responses (Hughes, 2001). Thus, ‘in a world defined by globalization, new set of complex and interrelated risks force states to redefine their security needs’ (Kay, 2004: 9). ‘Globalization is best understood,’ Sean Kay maintained, ‘as the creation of a variety of transboundary mechanisms for interaction that effect and reflect the acceleration of economic, political and security interdependence’ (Kay, 2004: 10). Putting in a different way, globalisation represents de-territorialisation or supra-territorialisation of social interaction (Scholte, 1997; Hughes, 2001).

Globalisation has paved the path not only for cultural inter-penetration, economic interdependence, and international civil society but also has acted as lifting machine for organised crimes, trafficking in various forms, and many other problems which are yet to be identified and named. It has simply rendered the state borders obsolete. The process has blurred the domestic-international divide. ‘This increasing porosity of state borders, [along with] relative decline in the de facto sovereign authority of states over social interaction and corresponding increased exposure of ‘international’ societal groupings to ‘external forces’ (or even, indeed, the removal of the traditional domestic-international divide to create an inter-mestic arena for social interchange) has a number of outcomes for security’ (Hughes, 2001: 410).

The impacts of globalisation on the discourse and practice of security are felt deeply to the extent that the deepening and broadening of security are being taken over by the concern of international security. The literature on international and global security (Lipschutz and Holdren, 1990; Rosenau, 1994; Biersteker, 2010; Buzan and Hansen, 2010; Russett and Arnold, 2010; Vuori, 2010; Weaver, 2010) is
flooding the centres of security studies. This process is accelerated by the 9/11 phenomenon which furthered the global security imagination in an unprecedented manner. Such imagination is broadly institutionalised again by environmental exigencies which cut across all the modern political arrangements. The common heritage, common responsibility, and a global community with shared destination hardly miss out today’s security predicament.

The Cold War was ended by the conscious leadership of the time and provided opportunity to Alexander Wendt (1992b) to frame the phrase that ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ and thus following the corollary, security was subjected to similar treatment. The Cold War in the early 1990s and globalisation too in its nascent phase could be subjected to a constructivist approach. But the question is whether globalisation in its ‘transformative’ and ‘transcendental’ phases, along with the post-Cold War security predicament, can be understood as what states make of them, concerns us most today. A Wendtian security analysis incorporates both the realist and idealist/liberal stand points. Both Carr (1946) and Booth (1991) with their ‘mixture of utopia and realism’ (before the onset of the Cold War) and ‘utopian realism’ (after the Cold War ceased to be) respectively, very much captured the constructivist pulse of the international politics. Constructivism provides us vital theoretical insights in appreciating the 21st Century security discourse; the post-Cold War international security problems sharply expose the limitations with all the available theoretical perspectives. As a result, the English School, the Copenhagen School, and the Critical IR Theory, for example, look like melting pots of various theoretical traditions. Therefore, the issue of conceptualising security seems more pressing today; purporting another question that given the history of the concept of security so far, whether we can re-fashion conceptualising security in today’s context.

We are striving to securitise the acquired values in a world which is globalised and where our conventional ontological wisdom is being made and re-made. It is a world which prohibits compartmentalisation of knowledge into sub-disciplines and into theoretical frameworks which are non-interactive. This globalised world with delicate division of labour is compelling us to de-specialise and then to re-specialise in a manner so that the emerging and emerged security issues in a ‘world of polities’ (Ferguson and Mansbach, 2008) can be comprehensively dealt with. This causes for a similar healing with the subfield of Security Studies.
The emergence of Security Studies as an identifiable subfield of International Relations was closely related to the Cold War (Baldwin, 1995: 141). The dominance of the realist paradigm and primary focus on military threats during the Cold War did not allow broadening of security agenda. Security Studies were devoted to learn the art of offensive and defensive warfare. Earlier this had not happened with the teaching and practice of security. Before the onset of the Cold War, none of the paradigms were so exclusivist. Both the realist and liberal internationalist schools of thought (with several variants), for instance, respected each other’s views. More importantly, the study of security was not cut off from the broader discipline of International Relations. Before the Cold War national security mania, security was neither compartmentalised nor kept aloof from foreign policy, international relations, and international political economy (IPE). The Cold War security scholarship too was the weakest phase in the development of IR as a discipline.

It was inevitable that the legitimate dimensions of international relations would meet again as soon as the preoccupation with military security would wane with the aftermath of the Cold War. As Knutsen argued, ‘The post-Cold War world is in need of a new, broad approach which incorporates both the balance-of-power theory of the realists and the division-of-labour principle of the idealists’ (Knutsen, 1994: 248). The PCW international relation is again attracting and inviting the subfield of Security Studies to acquire a broader curriculum and to freely mingle with other subfields. The PCW world is again giving chance to a host of security issues to interact and dialogue and to give and take from each other’s treasury. The PCW globalising world is becoming a meeting ground of various subfields. It is encouraging a holistic scholarship of Security Studies and of International Relations. Therefore, the question arises that as the emergence of security studies as a subfield of International Relations was closely linked to the Cold War scholarship and diplomacy, ‘is there a role of security studies now that the cold war is over?’ (Baldwin, 1995: 141).

A direct answer to the question raised above is unlikely both in negative and in affirmative stipulations because ‘the answer to that question depends partly on one’s view of the state of the subfield and partly on one’s vision of the post-Cold War world’ (Baldwin, 1995: 141). Perhaps, one way to comprehend the issues in question is to bear in mind that the security scholarship is increasingly avoiding
conceptualising and defining the term ‘security’ itself and favouring inclusion of more threats and issues into the domain of Security Studies, calling it broadening and deepening of security. It does not necessarily convey that the conceptualisation of security is no longer possible, but the scholars are very much aware of the complexities of the political contents of security. Instead of conceptualising, the necessity of reintegrating the subfield of security studies with foreign policy, international relations and IPE is being preferred. Perhaps, this is the re-fashioning and the art of 21st Century security conceptualisation which meets the urgency of the PCW security practice. This is also the lesson for the new century from the scholars of older generation who understood the quest of security in a broader and de-specialised discipline of International Relations.

CONCEPT OF DEVELOPMENT

Given the plurality of development discourse, making sense of the concept of development is not an easy task. This is more so in the age of globalisation from where there is no going back. This section of the chapter looks at different development discourses – modernising, dependency, and post-development. At the end it proposes to adopt a notion of development which is hybrid in nature. This hybridity entails due to relevance of the respective discourses for the international political economy and the relative interventionist capacity of the international, national, and local in the globalising economic and cultural spaces.

The section aims at exposing the dimensions of development with three perspectives:

I. Modernisation
II. Dependency
III. Post-Development

I. MODERNISATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The tradition of modernisation thinking, since its inception, has been concerned with the issues of ‘development’. As modernisation itself is perceived as a set of related
developments in education, employment, urbanisation etc., development and modernisation seem to logically and mutually flow from each other. To be more specific, modernisation seeks to understand development as increasingly sustainable levels of well-being and affluence in which technology plays the most crucial role.

To understand the concept of development in the modernisation tradition, this section journeys from the seminal work of W. W. Rostow (1960/1971) to the works of Jeffrey Sachs (2005) and David Landes (1998/2002) which are built on as well as expanding the Rostowian arguments of modernising development.

W. W. Rostow in his seminal work *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (1960/1971) presented an economic historical generalisation of national and regional economies by breaking them down according to a set of growth stages. The stages constituted ‘a theory about economic growth and ... a theory about modern history as a whole’ (Rostow, 1960/1971: 1) (emphases added). Therefore, Rostow understood development as ‘economic growth’. He acknowledged, however, that his sequence of modernisation (since about 1700) is a dramatised/limited way of looking at the uniqueness of each nation’s experience (Rostow, 1960/1971: 1).

Rostow (1960/1971: 2) understood growth as ‘compound interest’, that is, growth normally proceeding by geometric progression (unlike Malthus’ mathematical one).

In economic dimensions, Rostow argued, it is possible to identify all societies lying within one of five categories:

### A. TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

Rostow explained that a traditional society was based on pre-Newtonian science and technology and pre-Newtonian attitudes towards physical world. In this society a ceiling existed on the level of attainable output per head due to limited production function. Productivity was limited because of inaccessibility of modern science, its applications, and its frame of mind.

In this society existed a hierarchical social structure which flows from agricultural system with narrow scope for vertical mobility and long-run fatalism. The
centre of political power gravitated along the line of ownership and control of the land. Thus, ‘traditional society’ encapsulated the whole of pre-Newtonian world: the dynasties in China; the civilisation of the Middle East and the Mediterranean; and the world of Medieval Europe. It also added those post-Newtonian societies which remained untouched by later manipulations (Rostow, 1960/1971: 5).

**B. PRECONDITIONS FOR TAKE-OFF**

It was the second stage of economic growth. It transformed the traditional society to achieve the compound interest of modern science.

The preconditions for take-off, said Rostow, were initially developed in western Europe in the late 17th and early 18th Centuries when the insights of modern science introduced new production functions in agriculture and industry (Rostow, 1960/1971: 6). Lateral expansion of world markets and international competition, he added, was crucial in this regard. Britain was the first among the western European states, for instance, to fully develop the preconditions for take-off favoured by geography, natural resources, trading possibilities, and social and political structures.

Rostow maintained, more importantly, that in ‘more general case ... preconditions arise not endogenously but from some external intrusion by more advanced societies’ (Rostow, 1960/1971: 6) (emphasis added) to construct modern alternative out of the old culture.

‘But’, he pointed out, ‘all this activity proceeds at a limited pace within an economy and society still mainly characterised by traditional low-productivity methods, by the old social structure and value, and by the regionally based political institutions that developed in conjunction with them’ (Rostow, 1960/1971: 7).

**C. TAKE-OFF**

It was the third stage in the sequence. Here the forces of economic progress expanded and dominated the society. Growth was normalised and compound interest was institutionalised. A significant factor, along with build-up of social overhead capital
and technological development, was the emergence of ‘political ... group ... prepared to regard the modernisation of the economy as serious, high-order political business’ (Rostow, 1960/1971: 8).

These developments transformed the basic structure of economy, society, and polity in one or two decades to sustain economic growth.

D. DRIVE TO MATURITY

Now the society was ready to extend modern technology in the entire economic settings. 10-20 per cent of national income was steadily invested resulting into output overstriping the increase in population (Rostow, 1960/1971: 9). The economy gained international importance. Therefore, Rosotow defined maturity as:

the state in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original industries which powered its take-off and to absorb and to apply efficiently over a very wide range of its resources – if not the whole range – the most advanced fruits of (then) modern technology.  

(Rostow, 1960/1971: 10)

E. AGE OF HIGH MASS-CONSUMPTION

High mass-consumption or consumers’ sovereignty was the last economic historical stage in the five-ladder scale of economic growth. In this stage the society shifted towards durable consumers’ goods and services, said Rostow. Further, the society chose to allocate increased resources to social welfare and security as it passed post-maturity phase leading to welfare state. This is what happened in the western society, Rostow affirmed. This signified society’s move beyond technical maturity through political process.

Jeffrey Sachs’s *The End of Poverty: How We Can Make It Happen in Our Lifetime* (2005) is a contemporary addition to the generalised history of compound interest of economic growth. Sachs adopted the Rostowian approach and methodology to ‘end’ poverty and to climb the ‘ladder’ up.
He begins with Malawi, an African country. This country is plagued by ‘climatic disaster, impoverishment, the AIDS pandemic, and the long-standing burdens of malaria, schistosomiasis, and other diseases’ (Sachs, 2005: 10). As if it is a typical Rostowian ‘traditional society’, Sachs imagined Malawi as representing the extreme kind of poverty and poorest of the poor. He maintained:

If economic development is a ladder with higher rungs representing steps up the path to economic well-being, there are roughly one billion people around the world, one sixth of humanity, who live as the Malawians do: too ill, hungry, or destitute even to get a foot on the first rung of the development ladder. These people are the “poorest of the poor,” or the “extreme poor” of the planet.

(Sachs, 2005: 18)

Sachs moved on to Bangladesh. He argued that ‘Bangladesh has managed to place its foot on the first rung of the ladder of development...’ (Sachs, 2005: 14). The heroic domestic NGO efforts and foreign donor assistance and investments helped reap the gains of economic development. He further continued with India by portraying it as a ‘centre for an export service revolution’. ‘If Bangladesh has one foot on the ladder’, writes Sachs, ‘India is already several steps up the ladder’ (Sachs, 2005: 15). Sachs was astounded by the 25 years old young woman whose computer he peered over in an information technology centre in Chennai, India. While the women in Malawi are helplessly watching their near and dear ones dyeing of AIDS, Bangladeshi women are fast changing their socio-economic outlook. But IT revolution is creating jobs in India which are unknown in Malawi and unthinkable in Bangladesh. IT is becoming the norm for education of the young women in India, Sachs argued.

Sachs continued with China by describing it as the ‘rise of affluence’. He went on to write that ‘Beijing has emerged not only as a major capital of the developing world, but also as one of the world’s economic capitals’ (Sachs, 2005: 17). When Sachs attended a stage performance of Mao-era revolutionary opera in Beijing, he saw the room was filled with ‘very well-dressed young business executives’. ‘Every table had at least one, and usually half a dozen, cell phones lying on it in case any of the hotshot young businessmen and –women received calls from clients or the office’, Sachs (2005: 17) continued.
Sachs in his journey from ‘AIDS to cell phones’, put Malawi as ‘extreme poor’, Bangladesh as ‘the poor’ and India and China as ‘middle’ and ‘high’ income worlds respectively (Sachs, 2005: 18-19).

Sachs went on to explain what causes stages/ ladder of economic growth and the spread of economic prosperity in compound interest as can be seen in countries described above. Instead of providing a direct reply, being an economic historian, Sachs chose an indirect way through the demonstration of Britain’s economic prosperity which was realised due to mobilisation of energy for production at scales that had never before been achieved. He outlined the confluence of favourable factors: relative social openness, strengthening institutions of political liberty, centre of scientific revolution, crucial geographical advantages, an island country with lesser risk of invasion, and coal and invention of steam engine (Sachs, 2005: 32-35), which together helped Britain getting the foothold on the ladder up and up. But, more importantly, he pointed out that the other parts of the world were not as fortunate to have the confluence of such factors (Sachs, 2005: 35); therefore delaying the modern economic growth in those parts. It emerged first in Britain only but eventually reached the entire planet through ‘diffusion’ of modern economic growth in three main forms, Sachs argued. The first was direct spread of the industrial revolution from Britain to its colonies in north America, Australia, and New Zealand. The second form of diffusion took place within Europe itself. It was made possible by the great explosion of ocean-borne trade, more favourable natural resources, and favourable political and social conditions. The third and last form of diffusion involved the spread of modern economic growth from Europe to Latin America, Africa, and Asia. It was a tumultuous process, according to Sachs (2005: 38-41).

In this whole process of the spread of economic growth and prosperity, Sachs (2005: 41) expressed his ‘belief’ that ‘single most important reason why prosperity spread, and why it continues to spread, is the transmission of technologies and the ideas underlying them’.

So far the description of the modernisation tradition reveals that it understands ‘development’ in terms of spread of economic growth and prosperity fuelled by scientific and technological innovation. David Landesxxv in his Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (1998/2002), for example, traced
the economic advance and modernisation by mentioning three great achievements in rich industrial nations which together contributed to decline of disease and death: medicine, industrial innovation, and better nutrition. Landes further stated that these together ‘exemplify a much larger phenomenon: the gains from the application of knowledge and science to technology’ (Landes, 1998/2002: xix).

The works of both Sachs and Landes explicitly indicate an addition of a new element in the tradition of modernisation thinking on development. This is ‘security’, and the incident of 9/11 has primarily contributed to this. Poverty and related problems in the poor countries are particularly linked with the security issues after 9/11. Sachs, for example, wrote:

Since September 11, 2001, the United States has launched a war on terror, but it has neglected the deeper causes of global instability. ...societies are destabilized by extreme poverty and thereby become havens of unrest, violence, and even global terrorism.

(Sachs, 2005: 1)

While writing the foreword for Sachs’ book, Bono too made it clear that:

In a world where distance no longer determines who your neighbour is, paying the price for equality is not just heart, it’s smart. The destinies of the “haves” are intrinsically linked to the fates of the “have-nothing-at-all.” If we didn’t know this already, it became too clear on September 11, 2001.

(Bono, 2005: xvi-xvii)

Therefore, ‘the task of the rich countries’, Landes advised (1998/2002: xix-xxi), ‘is to help the poor become healthier and wealthier. This is in the interest of both rich and poor countries as the peace and prosperity of the former depends on the well-being of the latter’.

II. DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT

Modernisation concept of development faced first academic challenge from dependentista scholars. The sophisticated dependency analysis of various aspects of development proposed by modernisation school, highlighted the effects that shook the development discourse and shaped it to a new direction. Dependency’s development notion was the first response not only to the traditional economic thinking but also was an irrefutable revelation of the historically large scale colonial exploitative
processes. The process of decolonisation and the bipolar Cold War environment worked as aids to the forceful incarnation of dependency school as a new development thinking. Moreover, it supplied the concrete base on which a Third World identity was formulated with shared past colonial experiences. Some Third World countries with small geographic existence and lesser natural endowments took special advantages of this new thinking as their mono-cultural export economies got direct expression into this school.

Though it was originally the result of Latin American scholarship in the late 1950s, the dependency school made gradual dent into the academic discourse and political practices across the world. Again, this school does not represent a homogenous scholarly interest. Dependency is largely considered a school rather a theory; embracing varieties of thought streams. The school got impressive acceptance and appraisal in Asian and African continents as well. The European and north American scholars too were attracted towards the rigour of the dependency thought which was further enriched with their scholastic endeavours. A. G. Frank, a German dependency stalwart, still commands high regards from his academic opponents. The dependentista scholars are classified as conservatives, moderates, and radicals. Some are clubbed as Marxists and neo-Marxists whereas others are without any explicit identification. Some of the scholars emphasised on the economic aspects, some on the socio-political ones, while some adopted mixed style of interpretations. But, all kinds of dependency interpretations as a whole highlight the misconceived process of modernising development while i) proposing a ‘new geography’ of (under)development in terms of metropolis-satellite relationship; ii) tracing a historical-colonial process of (under)development; and iii) emphasising on the exogenous and non-economic variables of (under)development).xxvi This sections looks at the interrelated arguments of some of the dependency scholars.

To begin with, A. G. Frank in The Development of Underdevelopment (1966/1989), for example, argued that for an adequate formulation of policies for development, it is important first to understand the causes of ‘underdevelopment’. He urged to look into the past economic and social history for an answer. When we ignored the history, it led us to wrongfully assume that the past and present of the ‘underdeveloped’ countries resemble the earlier stages of the history of the now
developed countries. Therefore in order to build the thesis of ‘development of underdevelopment’, Frank generated three major hypotheses:

A. In contrast to the development of the world metropolis which is no one’s satellite, the development of the national and other subordinate metropolises is limited by their satellite status.

B. The satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest.

C. The regions which are the most underdeveloped and feudal-seeming today are the ones which had the closest ties to the metropolis in the past.

Frank geared these hypotheses to formulate the theory of development of underdevelopment. The first hypothesis deals with a chain of satellites finally linked with the world metropolis that sucks the economic surpluses. The second hypothesis of the greatest economic development in the satellites when their metropolitan ties are weakest is the direct attack on the diffusion thesis of modernisation development.

Five periods of crisis in Latin America – the European depression of the 17th Century, the Nepoleonic Wars, the First World War, the depression of the 1930s, and the Second World War – confirm the second hypothesis (Frank, 1966/1989: 44). Similarly, the third hypothesis is qualified by the underdevelopment of the once sugar exporting West Indies, northeastern Brazil, the ex-mining districts of Minas Gerais in Brazil and other places whose names had become world famous due to availability of silver (Frank, 1966/1989: 48).

Frank’s thesis is instrumental in demonstrating that underdevelopment is a distinct phenomenon. Thus he argued:

...underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process which also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself.

(Frank, 1966/1989: 43)

Again, in the words of Celso Furtado:

Underdevelopment is, then, discrete historical process through which economies that have already achieved a high level of development have not necessarily passed. To grasp the essence of the problem of contemporary underdeveloped economies this peculiarity must be taken into consideration.
The very understanding prompted Franks to maintain that ‘the now developed countries were never underdeveloped, though they may have been undeveloped’ (Frank, 1966/1989: 38) (emphases in original).

The compound interest of economic growth that the modernisation tradition wished to diffuse for the poor countries becomes dependent development in the dependency tradition. This dependence, Theotonio Dos Santos in *The Structure of Dependence* argued, cannot be overcome with a qualitative change in the internal structures and external relations (Dos Santos, 1970: 231). He defined dependence as:

...a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected. The relation of interdependence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant ones) can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which can have either a positive or a negative effect on their immediate development.

(Dos Santos, 1968: 6; cited in Dos Santos, 1970: 231)

This dependence takes three historical forms as Dos Santos (1970: 231-32) outlined. These are: ‘colonial dependence’, ‘financial-industrial dependence’, and ‘technological-industrial dependence’. Colonial and financial capital in alliance with colonialist state dominate the economic relations in the first form of dependence. The second one is characterised by the domination of big capital in the hegemonic centres and its expansion abroad through investment. The third form of dependence is sustained by the investment of the multinational corporations in the internal markets of the underdeveloped countries. Therefore, ‘attempts to analyze backwardness’, he concluded, ‘as a failure to assimilate more advanced models of production or to modernize are nothing more than ideology disguised as science’ (Dos Santos: 1970: 235).

III. POST-DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT

Like dependency, post-development was another Third World articulation of cultural and economic marginalisation with a radically different fashion. Post-development constructed the Third World as the ‘Other World’ which was non-western and non-
European. It emphasised on the ‘otherness’ of this world and demarcated the ‘local’ as the unit of analysis. However, the post-development discourse was the extension of and was built upon the legacy of dependency thinking, it went beyond dependency. There were pivotal convergences and divergences between these two schools of thought.

Post-development school scathingly criticised the ideas of modernity and development. Wolfgang Sachs penned down one of the strongest criticisms. He wrote:

The last 40 years can be called the age of development. This epoch is coming to an end. The time is ripe to write its obituary.

(Sachs, 1992: 1)

Development dominated the post-war history. No matter whether democracies or dictatorships, writes Sachs (1992: 1), ‘the countries of the global South proclaimed development as their primary aspiration, after they had been freed from colonial subordination. Development reached its zenith with the end of the Cold War. Imitation of the development goals vitiated the problems more than they were solved. Sachs explained:

The result has been a tremendous loss of diversity. The worldwide simplification of architecture, clothing, and daily objects assaults the eye; the accompanying eclipse of variegated languages, customs and gestures is already less visible; and the standardization of desires and dreams occurs deep down in the subconscious of societies. Market, state, and science have been the great universalizing powers; admen, experts and educators have relentlessly expanded their reign.

(Sachs, 1992: 4)

Therefore in the Third World context, Sachs understood ‘development as a particular cast of mind’. For him it was much more than just a socio-economic endeavour. It was a perception which modelled reality; a myth which comforted societies; and a fantasy which unleashed passions (Sachs, 1992: 1). And therefore he called for ‘apostasy’ from the faith in development in order to liberate the imagination for bold responses to the challenges humanity was facing (Sachs, 1992: 2).

The aspirations for development were integral to the efforts to mitigate underdevelopment. Both development and underdevelopment were like twins interwoven with a homogeneous cord. Both the concepts were brilliantly explained by dependency and post-development. But while dependency vigorously tried to overcome underdevelopment by reaching the destiny of development, post-
development questioned development itself and while advocating for an end of development, it took underdevelopment in a different light. Gustavo Esteva explained:

Winfred Benson, a former member of the Secretary of the International Labour Organization, was probably the person who invented it when he referred to the ‘underdeveloped areas’ while writing on the economic basis for peace in 1942. …Two years later, Rosensein-Rodan continued to speak of ‘economically backward areas’. Arthur Lewis, also in 1944, referred to the gap between the rich and the poor nations. …But it only acquired relevance when Truman presented it [in 1949] as the emblem of his own policy. In this context, it took on an unsuspected colonizing virulence.

(Esteva, 1992: 7)

‘Since then’, Esteva further expressed, ‘development has connoted at least one thing: to escape from the undignified condition called underdevelopment’ (Esteva, 1992: 7) (emphasis added). Thus in an implicit way, Esteva critiqued dependency’s notion of underdevelopment too. While explaining development Arturo Escobar also made a passing comment. He wrote, ‘It [development] is implicit in expressions such as First and Third World, north and south, center and periphery’ (Esteva, 1992: 9). Esteva (1992: 7) explained, ‘For those who make up two-thirds of the world’s population today, to think of development – of any kind of development – requires first the perception of themselves as underdeveloped, with the whole burden of connotations that this carries’. The aspirations of development and avoidance of underdevelopment carried the Darwinian image of a germ which had to evolve respecting the natural causation else had to get extinct if followed the ‘pathological’ behaviour. Development with the image of a germ has taken two centuries of its social construction.

Esteva brought multiple meanings of development in. He urged to see at Nyerere’s proposal that development be the political mobilisation of a people for attaining their own objectives because Nyerere was conscious that it was madness to pursue the goals that others had set. Esteva brought Rodolfo Stavenhagen’s proposal of ‘ethnodevelopment’ or development with self-confidence because he was conscious of the need to look within and searches for one’s own culture instead of using borrowed and foreign views.

In the line of post-development thinking, Arturo Escobar’s *Encountering Development* (1995) was a milestone which brought out detailed analyses of development discourse. Built in Foucaultdian tradition as he claimed, Escobar treated
development as a ‘discursive’ practice which constructs the image of Third World. He proposed to speak of development as

a historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action, by analyzing the characteristics and interrelations of the three axes that define it: the forms of knowledge that refers to it and through which it comes into being and is elaborated into objects, concepts, theories, and the likes; the system of power that regulates its practice; and the forms of subjectivity fostered by the discourse, those through which people come to recognize themselves as developed or underdeveloped. The ensemble of forms found along these axes constitutes development as a discursive formation, giving rise to an efficient apparatus that systematically relates forms of knowledge and techniques of power.

(Escobar, 1995: 10) (emphasis added)

Escobar’s construction of development discourse received wide publicity as he linked the discursive practice with the history of colonialism and the European scholars alike because they observed the colonial world as object ‘from a position that [was] invisible and set apart’ (Timothy Mitchell, 1988; cited by Escobar, 1995: 7). And, he further elaborated, ‘It is reflected in an objectivist and empiricist stand that dictates that the Third World and its peoples exist “out there,” to be known through theories and intervened upon from the outside’ (1995: 8). Escobar substantiated his line of argument by the words of Homi Bhabha (1990) that colonial discourse was the most theoretically underdeveloped form of discourse.

Painting the anthropology of modernity described in a post-structuralist approach Escobar opined that instead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theories and politicians in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its opposite: mass underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression. These were most pathetic signs of the failure of the 40 years of development. And treating developed as a geopolitical imagination he further stated that ‘despite the correctives introduced to this geopolitics – the decentering of the world, the demise of the Second World, the emergence of a network of world cities, the globalization of cultural production, and so on – they continue to function imaginatively in powerful ways’ (Escobar, 1995: 9-10).

This is how with due recognition of Mudimbe’s (1988) study of Africanism and Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), Escobar vows to unveil the foundations of an order of knowledge and discourse about the Third World as underdeveloped. He expresses that the ‘production of the Third World through the articulation of knowledge and power is essential to the development discourse’ (Escobar, 1995: 12).
And ‘discourse is not the expression of thought’, he wrote, ‘it is a practice, with conditions, rules, and historical transformations’ (1995: 216). Escobar’s understanding of discourse was guided by Foucault’s influence which he applied on development. Thus, analysing development as a discourse was ‘to show that to speak is to do something – something other than to express what one thinks; …to show that to add a statement to a pre-existing series of statement is to perform a complicated and costly gesture’ (Foucault, 1972; cites Escobar, 1995: 216).

With the application of discourse analysis, Escobar went on unmaking development and simultaneously unmaking the Third World. It was explicit in his work that post-development was not a development alternative but an ‘alternative to development’ which was informed by a relatively coherent body of work. This was the beginning of a new regime of representation and construction of a new Third World identity which is no longer superimposed from outside. This was an inside expression of autonomous identity with ‘complex semiotics of protest and of the hybrid and inventive character of popular daily life’ (Escobar, 1995: 219). This aimed at providing alternative to development.

Further, Escobar (1995: 222-23) advised to formulate alternative to development by investigating the ethnographies of discourses and practices of modernity and development at concrete local settings in the specific communities. This theoretical moment would potentially destabilise the dominant mode of living and would diminish the most violent forms of ‘translation’. Ethnography, Escobar maintained, was the sole method of pursuing this goal which will unmake and unlearn development. This has meaning and relevance not only for the Third World, but for the world in entirety. He explained:

This moment [ ] can be crafted not merely as a moment pertaining to the Third World but as a global moment, the moment of cybercultures and hybrid reconstructions of modern and traditional orders, the moment possibly (truly) postmodern and posthumanist landscape. The Third World has unique contributions to make to these figurations and intellectual and political efforts, to the extent that its hybrid cultures or “rejected selves” may provide a vital check and different sense of direction to the trends of cyberculture now dominant in the First World.

(Escobar, 1995: 224)

The theoretical moment of global relevance had to be strategised and organised around two mutually inclusive principles which Escobar underlined (1995: 226) and which were already seemingly taking place. These were:
A. The defence of cultural difference, not as a static but as a transformed and transformative force; and

B. The valorisation of economic needs and opportunities in terms that are not strictly shoes of profit and market.

The first principle, while treating cultural difference not as a static, recognised the already undergone changes in the local cultural settings due to dominant modernising development practices. Therefore, the existing hybrid nature of culture which combined traditional and modern traits was the transformed hybridity and had inventive potential to transform the dominant discourse of development itself. This entails the second principle which did not allow profit and market to occupy central place and therefore enabling alternative to development.

Counting the ‘local’ as the unit of analysis, post-development differs from dependency’s ‘state’ level analysis. Yet both converged while imagining self-determining and self-realising political communities whether local or state. Notwithstanding extension of and corrective to the dependency legacy, post-development invited critical response. In the following year of Escobar’s milestone work, David L. Blaney (1996) responded to post-development’s autonomy arguments.

Blaney warned about ‘…the temptation in post-development thinking to lapse into a language of self-production or self-subsistence that impairs our ability to conceive of autonomy in relational terms’ (Blaney, 1996: 475). Blaney’s concern with this temptation was informed by the dependency legacy which constructed autonomy in ‘relational terms’. Sachs had already accepted that ‘it is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success’ (1992: 3). This way the approach runs contrary to dependency’s development discourse. And while dependency’s formulation of autonomy is relational, i.e., simultaneously national as well of global so that the global inequalities get exposed, it was surprising that how could post-development negate the relational importance of autonomy which itself was a post-dependency construction in a globalising world. One could vouch for Escobar as he underlined above that ‘the defense of cultural difference, not as a static but as a transformed and transformative force’ (Escobar, 1995: 226) and he advocated it as the first organising principle of post-development theoretical moment, despite his acceptance of the cultural hybridity his formulation of cultural autonomy remains
one-sided. He opined that ‘the connection between the Third World within and without can be important in terms of building a cultural politics in the West’ (1995: 245) (emphasis added), it was local cultural autonomous setting which could spur the theoretical moment with global relevance. Thus, ‘the autonomy and difference of local communities stand in need of defense from development itself’ (Blaney, 1996: 476). Blaney argued that Escobar did not essentialise local difference, his language of autonomous action appeared to highlight the exteriority, self-production, and self-organisation of the local at the expense of the local’s necessary relation to the wider world, however.

Blaney quoted Wolf’s (1982) words that although the history of global political economy certainly involves the suppression of local histories and local difference, it is clear that local histories cannot now, if they could ever, be written but in relation to these global processes (Blaney, 1996: 480); questioning the absolute autonomy that post-development posits on local communities. ‘Where localities are nested within localities, the problem of inside/ outside remains unresolved’ (1996: 480); and ‘where no location of political community is innocent’ (1996: 480), local community too is not an innocent construction. ‘We could proliferate examples of local oppression, perhaps many perpetrated in the name of local resistance’ (1996: 480).

Blaney voiced the words of T. Todorov (1993) and S. Krishna (1993) to raise the concern that by giving up an appeal to a common moral language in the form of strong claims of local autonomy or otherness, we risk a general ‘inaudibility’ – an incapacity to condemn injustice, violence, and suffering. Here he echoed the words of Z. Sardar (1993) that pluralism has meaning only when the participants in plurality have equal representation, equal access to resources and opportunities, modicum of equality in terms of power.

**IV. GLOBALISATION AND DEVELOPMENT**

Development discourse has entered into the 21st Century. This is a century of possibilities. We entered this century with five decades’ experience of modernising development. Despite exceptional inventions and achievements, modernity remains
susceptible and intriguing. We also have, in a loose sense, the experience of dependency-induced development for a considerable period. This has generated less hope for development; still it continues to inform us about the causes of underdevelopment. In less than two decades, post-development seems to express inability to sustain the vigour with which it envisioned a new moment. This is a globalising world; and, to a large extent, a globalised world. In this world anything stated withstands the chance of acceptance more than rejection. This fact is true with regard to development too. Therefore, ‘globalisation’ entails the cross-breeding of development discourses of varieties of traditions. What is developmental cross-breeding; and how is it to be contextualised within globalisation? This calls for a brief appreciation of the term globalisation.

Though there is no agreement on the meaning and concept of globalisation, the actuality of the process of globalisation is uncontested. If we do not know what globalisation is, we have little doubt that there is globalisation. Sharing the words with Gill (1991), Luke (1993) and Bauman (1998), Jens Bartelson expressed:

“Today few doubt the reality of globalization, yet no one seems to know with any certainty what makes globalization real. So while there is no agreement about what globalization is, the entire discourse on globalization is founded on a quite solid agreement that globalization is. Behind the current and confusing debates about its ultimate causes and consequences, we find a wide yet largely tacit acceptance of the factuality of globalization as such, as a process of change taking place ‘out there’: even otherwise constructivistically minded scholars tend to regard globalization as an undeniable and inescapable part of contemporary experience.”

(Bartelson, 2000: 180) (emphases in original)

Bartelson presented three concepts of globalisation – ‘globalisation as transference’, ‘globalisation as transformation’, and ‘globalisation as transcendence’. Bartelson signified transference as exchange across existing unit boundaries and between units and system; but the system as well as the units remain identical with themselves. Transformation implies turning the units into reproductive circuits for those systemic processes and forces which ultimately alter their identity and, eventually, the constitutive rules of the system in which they are situated. Transformation proceeds transference. Bartelson’s conceptualisation of globalisation culminates with transcendence which defies the standard ontologisation of the world into units and system. This implies dissolving the distinctions that together condition units and system and also bringing change to the conditions of existence of objects of inquiry and the fields where they are situated (Bartelson, 2000: 180-196). In the
contemporary critical literature on globalisation and development, it is Bartelson’s concept of ‘globalisation as transcendence’ that surfaces frequently.xxx

The transcendental impacts of globalisation are most acute and crystallised in development discourses and practices. Escobar and Zakaria provided quick grasp of the impacts and great divide caused by globalisation. Escobar explained:

The industrialized countries, with 26 percent of the population, account for 78 percent of world production of goods and services, 81 percent of energy consumption, 70 percent of chemical fertilizers, and 87 percent of world armaments. One U.S. resident spends as much energy as 7 Mexicans, 55 Indians, 168 Tanzanians, and 900 Nepalis. In many Third World countries, military expenditures exceed expenditures for health. The cost of one modern fighter plane can finance forty thousand rural health centers. In Brazil, the consumption of the 20 percent richest is thirty-three times that of the 20 percent poorest, and the gap between rich and poor is still growing. Forty-seven percent of the world’s grain production is used for animal feed. The same amount of grain could feed more than 2 billion people. [...] Third World workers who are in the textile and electronic industries are paid up to twenty times less than their counterparts in Western Europe, the United States, or Japan for doing the same job with at least the same productivity. Since the Latin American debt crisis broke in 1982, Third World debtors have been paying their creditors an average of $30 billion more each year than they have received in new lending. In the same period, the food available to poor people in the Third World has fallen by about 30 percent.

(Escobar, 1995: 212-213)

Escobar’s statistics tell the story of the 1980s. Zakaria described the ‘transformation’ in the 21st Century which is tilted more towards Third World. In his own words:

...great transformation [is] taking place around the world, a transformation that, though often discussed, remains poorly understood. This is natural. Changes, even sea changes, take place gradually. Though we talk about a new era, the world seems to be one with which we are familiar. But in fact, it is very different.xxxi

(Zakaria, 2008:1)

Nederveen Pieterse too echoed the sentiments of Zakaria. He acknowledged that ‘with the onset of the twenty-first century, new trends are the rise of the global south, the growth of south-south relations in trade, energy and politics (UNCTAD speaks of ‘a new geography of trade’), and the growing role of the leading emerging societies and sovereign wealth funds’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010: 205). But he cautions that ‘what is at stake in contemporary globalization is both different national capitalisms, each of which is dynamic and in flux, and the interaction of capitalisms, which is mediated through complex layers of technology, international finance, international trade, international institutions, macroeconomic policies, knowledge systems, legal standards, and proprietary arrangements’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010:
He further added that ‘the terms of [...] interaction [of capitalisms] are generally set by hegemonic powers and institutions’ (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010: 170). So understood; and if, as Acharya and Buzan (2000) argued, the current rise of non-western powers suggests a return, after the few-centuries aberration of western dominance, to a more multicultural world like that of the ancient and classical era, with several powerful centres of civilisation (Acharya and Buzan (eds.) 2010); how is one to perceive development in contemporary world?

The history of development discourse unfolds itself into two hypotheses. The first one is about emphasising on the role of the domestic factors/ conditions to achieve development; while the other one is about relatively putting more weight on the external causes of (under)development. Modernising discourse represents the first kind of hypothesis; the second one is represented by dependency and post-development discourses. Putting in a different way, understanding the endogenous and exogenous exigencies is central to the causes of and means to development. Hence, the crux lies in analytically dividing, if possible, the endogenous and exogenous; asking the fundamental question that whether they can actually be divided in the age of globalisation.

A. Hite and T. Roberts, in a recent effort to comprehend development in globalisation context, captured the developmental contradictions. They narrated:

A luxury cruise ship the size of a small city steams into a tropical harbor where residents live in dirt-floored shacks equipped only with pit toilets. An Islamic woman doctor works in a hijab headscarf. Massive hydroelectric dams inundate vast fields and rainforests to fuel export factories and modern city life; its power lines pass directly over the head of poor villagers in darkened hamlets. Taiwanese businesspeople pass hand-cultivated rice fields on their way to tour their athletic shoe factory in mainland China that produces for a major US brand. Street children without shoes polish a new Mercedes outside government and corporate high-rises, returning to shacks along drainage ditches or sleeping on discarded cardboard on downtown storefront steps. Masai herdsmen move their scrawny cattle across drought-stricken lands, past Land Rovers loaded with tourists on their way home to eco-tourists hotels in game preserve parks.

(Hite and Roberts (eds.), 2007: 1)

These contradictions that Hite and Roberts highlighted are the gifts of or are made explicit by puzzling process of globalisation. The reality of globalisation and the contradictory facts that it is producing and making explicit are being widely recognised.
These scholars are only few among many others who have expressed similar concerns while unfolding and elucidating developmental issues within globalisation framework. Such elucidations, with significant convergence and divergence, are increasingly recognising the fact that the exogenous and endogenous are getting blurred. The external and internal are nested. The inside-outside dichotomy and the units-system distinction are gradually becoming insignificant. The domestic-international interface is gaining ground. The end of geography is replacing the end of history. ‘As a result’, state David Held and Anthony McGrew, that even the ‘political communities can no longer be considered (if they ever could with any validity) as simply ‘discrete worlds’; they are enmeshed in complex structures of overlapping forces, relations and networks’ (Held and McGrew, 2007: 4). This is a global phenomenon and ‘global phenomena are neither systemic nor unit-level phenomena but cut across this distinction’ (Bartelson, 2000: 190). This entails a relatively new approach to development which takes into account not only the past legacies of development discourses (modernisation, dependency, and post-development) but also sees the global complexities in relational terms. This may not be theoretically well-structured as our conventional wisdom of modern social sciences are in crisis; and are unable to grasp the ‘deep drivers’ of contemporary globalisation which defy unidirectional thinking on which modern scientificity is dependent. Globalisation is remaking the human world; and new international division of labour is taking place. The international is giving way to the global; the conditions of existence are being questioned. Globalisation is surpassing the conventional human wisdom. It is ‘escap[ing] the strictures of modern social thought by defying the [theorisation] and standard ontologisation of the world into units and system and by disputing its compartmentalization into sectors or dimensions’ (Bartelson, 2000: 189).

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN SMALL AND MICRO STATES

The concepts of security and development take a U-turn in the world of the small and micro states. These states are as different as geographical and political entities in various ways that application of the term state itself seems puzzling. The puzzle is deepened as ‘smallness’ in the IPE has been approached as a ‘problem to be solved’ rather viewing smallness as a ‘discursive’ practice. The Cold War IR scholarship has
rarely pondered over the necessity of looking into the small and micro states’ security and development in their own right. These small and micro states have usually worried the ‘big’ states as if the former are problems for the latter ones. These states have invariably been conceived as unviable entities due to their perceived lack of abilities to secure and advance ‘national interests’. The post-Cold War politico-economic developments too are seemingly not favouring to disentangle the security and developmental issues in these states. The Third World small and micro states are especially mired in the post-Cold War and, particularly, in the post-9/11 security and development discourses.

I. SECURITY DIMENSIONS

The security issues that the small and micro states face can be separated into two – exogenous and endogenous – for analytical purpose.

The exogenous security issues are largely of the Cold War origin. Thereby, the vitality of these issues has considerably been weakened with the aftermath of the Cold War. The most potent threat to the security of these states constituted the superpower rivalry. The geographical location of the states provided great strategic value to the Cold War power politics. Even if a country’s location was not of actual importance, the aim was to deflect the attention of the rivalry and gaining some other strategic weights. Espindola, for example, explained:

They [were] no longer interested only in those countries with strategic values. Low-cost operations to destabilize a country or effect a change in its affiliation to a superpower [were] now undertaken, even if the country in question [was] of little real strategic value. The object [was] to make the other superpower blink, force it to stretch its political and military resources away from the main theatres of conflict, and acquire additional bargaining pawns.

(Espindola, 1987: 65)

With the closing of the Cold War, the possibility of foreign invasions in these states definitely waned but did not cease to exist. Ever possibility of mercenary attacks and presence of foreign military bases rather increased the intensity of ‘insecurity’ felt by these states. The regional powers and regional groups and organisations too were seen posing security threats to these states (Espindola, 1987: 66-67).
Besides, the small and micro states face endogenous threats which are intrinsically linked with them and characterise their security dilemma. As obvious with the naming, these states form tiny physical entities and are scarcely populated. Calling them state itself is mystifying. The location of these states too is perceived as constituting a security threat to them. The natural calamities and seismic activities like volcanic eruption, earthquake, and tsunami threaten their physical existence.

Due to poor institutional bases, the small and micro states suffer from political and economic instabilities that often turn their own military and police personnel against the weak political establishments as they lack resource and capability to control domestic security and administrative arrangements. The military and police forces too are weakly trained to nab the traffickers in narcotics/arms/money/human beings that are plaguing most of the Third World states where smallness is closely associated with security analyses.

Poor infrastructure and meagre resources at the disposal of these Lilliputs facilitate intermingling of the exogenous and endogenous security threats. This is habitually expressed as ‘proverbial vulnerabilities’ in these states’ context. These vulnerabilities have arguably got accelerated in the post-Cold War globalising world. The phenomenon of 9/11 has ever heightened the vulnerability imagination giving smallness a further fillip to be problematised.

11. DEVELOPMENT CONTEXTS

The size of these Lilliputs is said to entail a unique set of economic consequences too that further intricate the security concerns. In addition, there are special implications drawn on behalf of the smallness on the Third World developing countries. Thus, the development dimensions of smallness are as crucial as its security counterparts.

The developmental consequences of the size of the small and micro states get immediate occurrence with the small size of domestic market. Knox concluded that ‘small states have small home markets and were likely to have at their disposal less diverse resources than might be found in larger states’ (Knox, 1967; quoted by Payne, 1987: 51). These states experience high degree of specialisation (Payne, 1987: 51) owing to monocultural economic pattern. Time and again the proverbial phrase
‘banana republic’ is invoked (in the Circum-Caribbean context) to characterise the specialised or undiversified economic activities. These engender additional issues with significant developmental impacts. Payne explained:

Small states [are] therefore likely to be more heavily dependent on foreign trade than large states. Associated with this [is] a concentration in both the sources of their imports and the destinations of their exports, as well as in the range of commodities typically exported.

(Payne, 1987: 51-52)

On account of the meagre resources at their disposal, little surplus is left to be invested in human skill development. Several of the Third World small and micro states now face demographic crises as the migratory pattern is emptying their resourceful population. It further lowers the possibility of emergence of independent entrepreneurship and industrial activities. Capital is invariably owned by foreign economic conglomerates with budgets several times those of most Third World countries have at their disposal (Espindola, 1987: 69). Tax havens, offshore banking, and money laundering are further intriguing problems that these tiny states face in association with transnational enterprising activities.

Notwithstanding, there are efforts to portray ‘small as beautiful’. Smallness is arguably projected as irrelevant in the age of globalisation in achieving developmental goals. The point of ‘small but smart’ (Prasad, 2009) is emphasised to boost up the confidence in the small and micro states. Yet the special case of the dilemma of smallness cautions to remain ‘between vulnerability and resilience’ (Cooper and Shaw, 2009).

Thus, ‘smallness’ stimulates a number of debatable issues in the spheres of security and development. The claim that these Lilliputs are interpreted as objects rather than subjects of international relations is justifiable to a great extent as these entities are rarely represented in the ‘mainstream’ IR traditions. Discourses on small and micro states are premised with smallness as problem rather than means to solve international problems; and constitute the hegemonic security and development perspectives.

Perhaps, we do not heed the colonial project and its newer forms (post-9/11 security articulation, for instance) of construction of the smallness which have continued for so long that the Third World smallness has acquired inherent material
characteristics. The monocultural export oriented economic pattern, for example, was engineered by and for the colonial interests. These tiny ‘sovereign’ states are the creations of the similar interests. Colonial ‘civilising’ brutalities are not accounted while counting the demographic features in these countries. Even the Cold War superpower competition handicapped these states of any independent consideration of their problems.xxxv In short, we interpreted the problems as given and ignored the discursive practices of unequal power structure. Lee and Smith recently observed that

discourses of inherent vulnerability present small states as problems to be solved and, as such, detract attention away from uneven power relations (and, indeed, material inequalities) in the international political economy. Such inequalities need not be seen as the natural consequence of smallness but can instead be viewed as the contingent outcome of strategies pursued by political actors.

(Lee and Smith, 2010: 1095).

Lee and Smith do not deny that discourses of vulnerability and weakness reflect the relative structural power of many small states in the international political economy. They contend that such discourses prescribe small state internal policies and external behaviour consistent with the language of vulnerability. Therefore, they advocate to make sense of the discursive construction of ‘smallness as a prescription for (as opposed to simply a description of) small states’ (Lee and Smith, 2010: 1095) (emphases in original). Such a discursive approach may enable us to argue that smallness is not always an insurmountable problem. The commendable strategic coessional achievement by the small and micro states in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Francis, 1989), and promoting economic interests in the international economic regimes such as United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Lee and Smith, 2010), and also regarding harvesting Tuna Fish in the South Pacific are shining examples of overcoming the constraining problems of smallness. Thus, Neumann and Gstohl note that ‘following the idealist school of thought, international law and multilateral organizations were considered of greatest importance to small states’ (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006). Though the ‘dominant images of weakness cannot be completely set aside, as witnessed by the number of failed or fragile states that fit the small state category (case such as East Timor and Haiti are in the forefront), but this representation needs to be balanced by attention towards the innovating character of
small states’ (Cooper and Shaw, 2009: 2). Therefore, a discursive approach to the political economy of smallness can yield significantly different outcomes.

CONCLUSION

The post-Cold War world is largely a globalised world. It is a world of close interactions of the security and developmental issues. Similarly, it is difficult to disentangle the international issues from the domestic ones and vice versa. In fact, Braveboy-Wagner (2008) takes a longer period in consideration of this domestic-international interface. This is more so in the context of the small and micro states.

Globalisation is causing inter-processual dialogue as the discrete phenomena have come more closer and getting expressed into various forms of ‘paradox’ – economic, political, and cultural – and generating necessity of innovatively wider and inclusive approaches. This requires new ideas, concepts, and languages in today’s domain of security and development discourse.

The various security and development traditions continue to struggle towards better precision into their respective conceptual domains. The project of precision is getting more complex as globalisation is causing strain in understanding the processes/practices of security and development. Globalisation is a mega process involving myriads of heterogeneous economic, political, cultural, and technological processes. New concerns are being generated while the older ones are being modified. Thus, the conventional concepts and theories are not able to keep pace with the unconventional issues. The conceptual binaries adopted by the earlier theoretical traditions are becoming obsolete as those binaries are communicating with additional factors/actors in a given process. This is causing crisis in traditional mode of security and development thinking; calling for new ways of understanding in a changing world. The issue is how to reach there! Perhaps, assimilating security and development in the line of integrating sub-disciplines of international relations may yield better results in conceptualising security and development.
And all the times state’s survival has been invoked which informs major IR literature.

Carr (1946) referred Great Britain, US, France etc. as ‘satisfied’ powers while ‘dissatisfied’ powers were Italy, Germany etc. after the First World War.

Kegley upheld Alker’s assertion with the examples of theoretical revolutions following the Thirty Years’ War (the Peace of Westphalia, 1648), the Napoleonic Wars (the Congress of Vienna, 1815), World War I (the League of Nations, 1919), and World War II (the United Nations, 1945) (1993: 132). And Kegley pointed out whether the early 1990s is a ‘neoidealism moment’ (1993: 132).

These phrases – high politics and low politics, are borrowed here from Keohane and Nye (1977).

Along with Immanuel Kant, Dante Alighieri, Erasmus, King George of Bohemia, the Abbe de Saint Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are included in the perpetual peace tradition (Griffiths and O’Callaghan, 2007: 241); but Kant’s articulation is most famous.

President Wilson was the first internationally recognised academic politician who, during the First World War, advocated and actively pursued an international order based on collective security and international police force for peace. His fourteen points peace programme still reverberates in the international community.

Deudney and Ikenberry (1999) clearly bring out the ‘civic’ aspirations of the western liberal democracies which limits realist assumption of war and, in turn, produces co-binding security.

By democracy, while describing Democratic Peace Theory, Robinson in his recent work on security refers to ‘established liberal democracies’ (2008: 59-61) (emphasis in original).

Kant’s Republican Constitution contains two sections of articles – Preliminary and Definitive – for perpetual peace between states (Kant, 1793/1970: 200-216).

The Preliminary Articles state that:
1. No conclusion of Peace shall be held to be valid as such, when it has been made with the secret reservation of the material for a future War.
2. No State having an existence by itself – whether it be small or large- shall be acquirable by another State through inheritance, exchange, purchase or donation.
3. Standing armies shall be entirely abolished in the course of time.
4. No National Debts shall be contracted in connection with the external affairs of the State.
5. No State shall intermeddle by force with the Constitution or Government of another State.
6. No State at war with another shall adopt such modes of hostility as would necessarily under mutual confidence impossible in future Peace; such as, the employment of Assassins or Poisoners, the violation of a Capitulation, the instigation of Treason and such like.

The Definitive Articles contain that:
1. The Civil Constitution in every State shall be Republican.
2. The Right of Nations shall be founded on a Federation of Free States.
3. The Rights of men as Citizens of the world in a cosmo-political system, shall be restricted to conditions of universal Hospitality.

And Kant outlined Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy.

Deudney and Ikenberry cited North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as the most important co-binding institutions in the West. And as the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay famously put it, the purpose of NATO was to keep the ‘Russians out, the Germans down, and the Americans in’ (1999: 183).

Deudney and Ikenberry (1999) explained liberal international order with a distinctive perspective that they frame as ‘Structural Liberalism’ and security co-binding, penetrated hegemony, semi-sovereignty and partial great powers, economic openness, and civic identity and community are its five components.
Keohane and Nye wrote, ‘We do not argue, however, that complex interdependence faithfully reflects world political reality. Quite the contrary; both it and the realist portrait are ideal types. Most situations will fall somewhere between these two extremes. Sometimes, realist assumptions will be accurate, or largely accurate, but frequently complex interdependence will provide a better portrayal of reality. Before one decides what explanatory model to apply to a situation or problem, one will need to understand the degree to which realist or complex interdependence assumptions correspond to the situation’ (1977: 24).

And the principles are derived from Herbert Blumer’s (1969) symbolic interactionism.

In his response to ‘agency-structure’ debate Alexander Wendt (1992b: 183-84) observed, ‘A behavioural approach to systematic theory, in other words, does not give us a vocabulary for theorizing about the impact of intersubjective process on identity and interest; in order to do this we need a type of systematic theory informed by the holistic metaphors of sociology and social psychology, not one based on the in principle agnostic but de facto individualism of rational choice theory’ (emphasis in original).

Wendt explored three ways in which identities and interests are transformed:

i. By the institution of sovereignty;
ii. By an evolution of co-operation; and
iii. By international efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective identities.

And, this process of transformation takes place into four stages, wrote Wendt:
Stage I: Breakdown of consensus about identity commitments;
Stage II: Critical examination of old ideas about self and other and, by extension, of the structures of interaction by which the ideas have been sustained;
Stage III: New practice; and
Stage IV: Reward by alter which will encourage more such practice by ego.

(Wendt, 1992b: 412-20)

In his response to John Mearsheimer’s (1994/95) ‘false promise of international institutions’, Wendt (1995: 72) admitted, ‘I share all five of Mearsheimer’s “realist” assumptions: that international politics is anarchic, and that states have offensive capabilities, cannot be 100 percent certain about others’ intentions, wish to survive, and are rational. We even share two more: a commitment to states as units of analysis, and to the importance of systematic or “third image” theorizing’.

Baldwin (1995) positively negated the military aspect of security in favour of non-military ones. His overall thrust was on national security, however. His non-military emphasis could be translated as pursuit of national security interest by other means. Perhaps, he was writing just after four-five years of the post-Cold War new world order. Probably, this was not supplying sufficient non-military confidence to shun his preoccupation with national interest by other means. Still the effort is praiseworthy. But when we move ahead to the 21st century the confidence is manifestly bolder and clearer.

This argument is not to convey that these new security issues are altogether new. This could be new for the system of states with Westphalian juridical equals; these security issues could be as much ‘pre’ as ‘post’-Cold War exigencies for the states whose existence hinges on these issues only.

The proliferation of diverse and loose definitions of globalization, as well as readiness to use a variety of seemingly comparable levels [universalisation, liberalisation, westernisation, Americanisation, for instance], are not so much a reflection of evasive confusion as they are an early stage in a profound ontological shift, a restless search for new ways of understanding unfamiliar phenomena’ (Rosenau, 1996:248).

Patman wrote that the ‘post-Cold War world has been subject to deepening globalization, a process that is associated with the growth of international linkages, an erosion of the autonomy of the sovereign state, and the creation of a new security environment in which the pattern of conflict has moved beyond the protection of state’ (Patman, 2006) (emphasis added).
As Bartelson (2000) conceptualised (the concepts have further been elaborated in the ‘development’ section of the chapter).

Wendt wrote, ‘Critical IR “theory,” however, is not a single theory. It is a family of theories that includes postmodernists (Ashley, Walker), constructivists (Adler, Kratochwil, Ruggie, and now Katzenstein), neo-Marxists (Cox, Gill), feminists (Peterson, Sylvester), and others. What unite them is a concern with how world politics is “socially constructed”’ (Wendt: 1995: 71).

For Ferguson and Mansbach (2008), a ‘world of polities’ (rather than of ‘polity’) is a ‘post-International’ world where state is one of the systems of governance claiming legitimacy.

Even Buzan suggested integrating the concept of security with the fields of International Relations Theory, International Political Economy, Area Studies, Peace Studies, Human Rights, Development Studies, International History etc. (Buzan, 1983). Kirshner too believed that there exists a sharp distinction between IPE and Security Studies which needs to be reintegrated because the distinction is largely false and a product of particular circumstances associated with the Cold War (Kirshner, 1998: 64-91).

Landes is an important contemporary scholar in the Rostowian modernisation tradition. In the preface only David Landes outlined, ‘I thought to trace and understand the main stream of economic advance and modernization: how have we come to where and what we are, in the sense of making, getting, and spending’ (Landes, 1998/2002: xi).

The term ‘(Under)development,’ in the dependency parlance, underscores the twine processes of the metropolis ‘development’ and satellite ‘underdevelopment’ as by-products of a single historical process. In the words of Osvaldo Sunkel (1972: 520), ‘Development and underdevelopment...are simultaneous processes: the two faces of the historical evolution of the capitalist system’.

There are at least two advantages of thinking of development in terms of discourse. Firstly, it becomes possible to maintain the focus on domination (Escobar, 1995), and secondly, it enables detached standing from the development discourse (Foucault 1986).

And Escobar mentioned Ashis Nandy (1983, 1989); Vandana Shiva (1989); Orlando Fals Borda (1984, 1988); Orlando Fal Borda and Anisur Rahman (1991); Gustavo Esteva (1987); and Pramod Parajuli (1991). This body of work was interested in local culture and knowledge, critiquing the established scientific discourse and defensively promoting localised, pluralistic and grassroots movements.

Escobar was aware of the caution that Homi Bhabha (1990) made with regard to Edward Said’s Orientalism that there was always, in Said, the suggestion that colonial power was possessed entirely by the coloniser, given the intentionality and unidirectionality. This was a danger Escobar sought to avoid by considering the variety of forms with which Third World people resist development interventions and how they struggle to create alternative ways of being and doing (Escobar, 1995: 11). But Escobar did not extend this line of argument to a satisfactory level. It could only be linked (with best possibility) with his idea of cultural hybridity which Blaney (1996) already problematised.

In this regard, one can quote Friedman’s The World is Flat (2007), Roberts and Hite’s (ed.) The Globalization and Development Reader: Perspectives on Development and Global Change (2007), Held and McGrew’s (eds.) Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies (2007), Zakaria’s The Post-American World (2008), Haynes’s Development Studies (2008) are Nederveen Pieterse’s Development Theory: Deconstructios/Reconstructions (2010). These texts refer to globalisation as ‘transcendence’ in overt or covert manner.

Zakaria went on describing. He wrote, ‘We are not living through the third great power shift of the modern era. It could be called “the rise of the rest.” Over the past few decades, countries all over the world have been experiencing rates of economic growth that were one unthinkable. While they have had booms and busts, the overall trend has been unambiguously upward. This growth has been most visible in Asia but is no longer confined to it. That is why to call this shift “the rise of Asia” does not
describe it accurately. In 2006 and 2007, 124 countries grew at a rate of 4 percent or more. That include more than 30 countries in Africa, two-thirds of the continent. Antoine van Agtmael, the fund manager who coined the term “emerging markets,” has identified the 25 companies most likely to be the world’s next great multinationals. His list includes four companies each from Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan; three from India; two from China; and one each from Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and South Africa.’

He continued, ‘Look around. The tallest building in the world is now in Taipei, and it will soon be overtaken by one being built in Dubai, and it will soon be overtaken by one being built in Dubai. The world’s richest man is Mexican, and its largest publicly traded corporation is Chinese. The world’s biggest plane is built in Russia and Ukraine, its leading refinery is under construction in India, and its largest factories are all in China. By many measures, London is becoming the leading financial center, and the United Arab Emirates is home to the most richly endowed investment fund. Once quintessentially American icons have been appropriated by foreigners, The world’s largest Ferris wheel is in Singapore. Its number one casino is not in Las Vegas but in Macao, which has also overtaken Vegas in annual gambling revenues. The biggest movie industry, in terms of both movies made and tickets sold, is Bollywood, not Hollywood. Even shopping, America’s greatest sporting activity, has gone global. Of the top ten malls in the world, only one is in the United States; the world’s biggest is in Beijing. Such lists are arbitrary, but it is striking that only ten years ago, America was at the top in many, if not most, of these categories’ (Zakaria, 2008: 2-3).

xxxii Held and McGrew explained the ‘deep drivers’ of contemporary globalisation. These are the changing infrastructure of global communications linked to the IT revolution; the development of global markets in goods and services, connected to the worldwide distribution of information; the new global division of labour driven by multinational corporations; the end of the Cold War and diffusion of democratic and consumer values across many of the world’s regions (alongside some marked reaction to this); and the growth of migration and the movement of people, linked to shifts in patters of economic demand, demography and environmental degradation. These deeply structured processes generate dense patterns of global interconnectedness, real and virtual (2007: 4).

xxxiii The colonial thirst of empire building had already deeply constructed the background of the problems of smallness in the Third World, however.

xxxiv Espindola (1987) observed that regional powers can behave as expansionists or proxies for a superpower; whereas the regional groups and organisations can impose particular alignments, standards of international behaviour, or forms of internal political organisations.

xxxv Wolfer’s view that these states could play the role of promoting peace in the international relations was an exception.

xxxvi ‘Perhaps most important is the fact’, Braveboy-Wagner wrote, ‘that the distinction between the domestic and the international has been nibbled away since the 1970s in such a way that domestic issues have become internationalized and international issues have taken on domestic importance. The term “intermestic” has been devised to denote these issues – issues such as environmental degradation, health, poverty alleviation, and sustainable development. The post-cold war rise to centrality of nonmilitary issues has simply confirmed a trend that began much earlier’ (Braveboy-Wagner, 2008: 1).