Chapter VI

CONCLUSION:
BETWEEN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT

There are numerous security and development issues in the Circum-Caribbean. These include migration, tourism, offshore banks, poverty, socio-economic inequalities, HIV/AIDS, organised crimes, and trafficking in narcotics, small arms, and human beings. The issues are having their respective tails further interlocked at several directions. Significant tails and directions are, for instance, between amplifying democratic credentials and increasing socio-economic disparities in the Circum-Caribbean states. Another could be ever increasing importance of travel and tourism industry in the region on the one hand and spreading of HIV/AIDS on the other. Dissecting and identifying them is a task of great undertaking. But such undertaking, as this monograph cautions throughout, has to avoid sub-disciplinary exercise. That was a Cold War scholarship practice. Today the issues are interacting at a faster rate. Now different (sub)disciplines have to dialogue in order to appreciate the security-development problematique in the Circum-Caribbean. If the (sub)disciplines such as Security Studies and Development Studies remain isolated, the complicated problems in discussion cannot be comprehended at their best. Ideas and words, therefore, have to be communicated across the (sub)disciplines to bring the stated problematique on the solution table.

Clear definitions of security and development are often claimed to be attempted. If the project of definitions is glanced carefully, it has only defined the security and development policies or policy goals in last two decades or so rather clarifying what these concepts actually are; thus elaborating that the concepts of security and development are deepened, widened, humanised, and globalised. Given
the reasons, this work too does not advocate for definitions. That is not the subject-matter of this monograph either. But looking at the Circum-Caribbean context, it attempts to bring the processes of security and development together in the light of the post-Cold War globalised era. It argues that these two ‘different’ processes cannot be kept separated as has been done so far in the Circum-Caribbean context. This is how this work arrives at an understanding of security and development which is de-specialised and built more into the tradition of International Relations than of Security Studies. This has practical relevance in today’s time when the Circum-Caribbean states are searching for alternative safeguards against their proverbial vulnerabilities.

Security and development in the Circum-Caribbean have followed their own trajectories. To be brief, these are tsunami, earthquake, and volcano that have defined its geography; conquest, slavery, and indentureship have shaped the history. Circum-Caribbean exposure to the international political economy (IPE) was ‘pre-globalisation’. Today the perceived impacts of climate change are existential threats to the region; economic competitiveness is increasing the security and development dilemmas. Therefore, it argues, as a consequence, that the issues are developing a ‘nexus’. It further complicates the security-development intersection and causes interdisciplinary dialogue, as stated in the outset.

While discussing the nexus, it points out a caution to be exercised. The difficulties in unambiguously concretising security and development background this caution. It maintains therefore that the security-development nexus is both virtuous and vicious.

Tourism is the mainstay of the Circum-Caribbean economies. Natural beauties combined make the region an exotic place for foreign visitors. Given the structural constraints historically engineered in the region tourism has become a ‘natural choice’ of revenue generation. But one has to re-call what happened in Tobago island few years back. A foreign female tourist visitor went on having physical intimacy with at least 50 local Tobagonians. She was HIV/ AIDS infected that she claimed to have acquired from her Tobagonian boyfriend.\textsuperscript{1} She was in a ‘mission’ to ‘punish’ the Tobagonian African masculinity.\textsuperscript{2} The correlation between tourism as an option for development with the human dimension of (in)security, i.e., HIV/ AIDS should act as an eye-opener to recognise the virtue of the stated nexus.
But the correlation is not as straight as it is normally stated by some UN actors and subsequently supported by others.iii There is a vicious dimension of the nexus. The pattern of drug trafficking in the Circum-Caribbean, for example, is viewed as a security problem. It creates insecurity with development consequences that are often inappropriately measured. There is a ‘drug economy’, on the other side, which has gone deep into social psyche as a mode of living. This point of mode of living is routinely shadowed while pointing at the regional geography as conduit for narcotic traffickers between the north and south of Americas. It definitely appreciates the nexus but privileges security over development and undermines (under)developmental routes to (in)security. This is an example of a one-sided reading and the vicious efficacy of the nexus is further promoted when it is studied through the lens of ‘post-conflict’ societies. A post-conflict society is that which faces security and development problems primarily due to some recent crisis that precedes the problems. Post-conflict refers to a short term relationship between the crisis and the resultant problems. Moreover, security concerns predominates development ones. This perspective, therefore, risks understanding of the Circum-Caribbean dynamics which have been longer and have much complicated dimensions. On the contrary, post-conflict approach takes a relatively short span of time in consideration which conceals relevant informations when seen in the Circum-Caribbean context. The trajectories of conquest, slavery, and indentureship, for example, are matters of long term consideration and crucial to understand many ethnic and political economic issues in the region with contemporary importance.iv

The monograph further argues that the security-development nexus in the Circum-Caribbean has thickened due to post-9/11 US ‘homeland security’ measures. US went for significant restructuring of its administrative mechanism in the wake of the events of 9/11. Jorge Bush Jr. proclaimed that the Caribbean is the ‘third border’ of US. This proclamation was not an isolated event. In 1997, as pointed out in chapter III, Bill Clinton had announced that ‘US is a Caribbean state’. Even if the security angle is thought over, US homeland security concern would date back to the early 20th Century when the Roosevelt Corollary to Monroe Doctrine was added in 1904. Since then, US has been playing the politics between security and development to fulfil its own national interest in the region. The events of 9/11 and the consequent measures gave US a chance to ‘smartly’ re-assert the Roosevelt Corollary in its third border.
This had become the call of the time as its own economic might is in decline; the recent crisis is causing further economic strains; and it wishes to engage with the Circum-Caribbean in the fashion that suits its 21st Century diplomacy.

The post-9/11 US projection of power in the Circum-Caribbean is ‘smart power’ strategy that combines all forms of policy tools and fuses ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power together. Since the strategy is said to be ‘smart’, it even obscures some of its impacts in the region. Terrorism, drugs, and migration are said to be three main US security concerns in the region. US is a country that receives maximum immigrants in the world; the Circum-Caribbean largely depends on the migrant remittance. US has to work hard to satisfy itself with symptoms of terrorism in the Circum-Caribbean society, therefore it camouflages terrorism with narcotics and makes it ‘narco-terrorism’; and its eventual impact is felt over migration. It is difficult to contest that drug is a serious social problem in the Circum-Caribbean countries; these countries are true victims of trafficking between the north and south of Americas. If US is not able to detect the traffickers in its national border, how it will catch them in its third border! How will it stop the turf-war, for example, that routinely goes on among the gangs of traffickers possessing small arms in the capital city of Trinidad and Tobago? Bringing the ghost of terrorism in is not the solution for sure; it rather securitises the social sphere and the culture of the Circum-Caribbean migration which is vital for the regional economies. The Circum-Caribbean economies have already received negative shocks due to post-9/11 US anti-immigration and homeland security measures.

‘Domestic’ instabilities in the Circum-Caribbean inform US security measures in the region; therefore American concerns for security, democracy, and development. ‘Third World’ underdevelopment causing ‘First World’ insecurities is the paradigm that explains third border-homeland arrangements. But one has to walk into the deep economic interests that US has been advancing in the region along with its changing geo-political strategies. Obama’s announcements of Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and Central American Regional Security Initiative are both post-9/11 and post-subprime crisis of 2007.

Therefore, security-development nexus in the Circum-Caribbean has two sides: i) the nexus as scholarly tool of analysis and ii) as tool to prescribe processes.
and determine outcomes. The former would dissect the problematique and help clarify the minute variables. It might explain, for instance, that making tourism hedonistic would risk the supply side and even cause epidemics. The latter one would emphasise, for example, on the material gains that any such service to the foreign guest might generate. Similarly, the latter would indicate the perceived benefits out of certain US package in the Circum-Caribbean and would duly justify the same. The former might explain both sides of the package and indicate the dependence that it might further perpetuate in the region in long run. It is to be asked, however, if there is anything independent that makes the region appear as, for instance, third border of US. And, what makes the security-development intersection more intensive in the Circum-Caribbean context?

If seen through the size of territory and population, the Circum-Caribbean states are readily defined as ‘small’ and ‘micro’ states. The size generates problems in the sphere of practice of international relations where the capacity and capability to influence are crucial for ‘survival’. Exclusion of these small states from the general IR discourses and real and perceived vulnerabilities have marginalised the Circum-Caribbean voices. If anything, this is what appears to be independent that renders the region a third border or a ‘backyard of instabilities’; the same consents to intersect security and development more intensively. It causes for discursive articulation of ‘smallness’ in the Circum-Caribbean.

‘Small is dangerous.’ This is the perception that informs the study of small state in the Circum-Caribbean. These states are seen as dangerous not only to ‘non-small’ entities but even to themselves. This is the dominant ‘Guliver-Lilliput’ archetype that perpetuates the image that small states are ‘stupid by birth’ and therefore a ‘bold, benevolent, and intelligent’ Guliver is required to teach them the relevant ways to organise the society, polity, and economy. This is the construction of a social psychology that hides the historical fallacies in the region and attempts to convert these states as followers of the system of states that creates and re-creates the Circum-Caribbean identity of instabilities. Therefore, ‘what constitutes smallness’ is to be debated rather than ‘what is a small state’. How can a certain amount of population living in a territory define and decide the fate of a state? A society – national or international – is bound by shared values. One has to acknowledge the
post-colonial international legality in the form of ‘law of sea’ that the small states, along with other, have contributed to the world. These are the small states that do not walk into the arena of world politics with baggage of violators of international norms rather are seen as peace-loving societies. Again, these are the small states that firmly stand for international law, democracy, and multilateralism without which a society of states is beyond imagination. A small society, as in the Circum-Caribbean states, is a dynamic place where the local-national-regional interface is apparently the strongest. Thus, a careful study of such dynamism can lead us to develop useful insights into many contemporary security and development issues that the globalised world is facing.

Discursive formation of smallness in the Circum-Caribbean is not an end in itself but opens various ways to engage with the proverbial vulnerabilities; the most important is the ‘detached criticality’ that is said to entail. The case of ‘democracy and socio-economic disparities’ in the Caribbean archipelago, discussed in chapter II, serves the stated purpose. The UNDP Human Development Reports between 1991-2010 attest to the fact that disparities have widened in the region. Several scorecards, on the other side, display that the Circum-Caribbean democratic profile has dramatically amplified in last two decades. Is there a democracy-disparity paradox in the region? Or, are the two antagonistic? The chapter links the case with classical ‘democracy-development’ debate and argues in a discursive manner that additional contemporary factors are to be brought in to fan the grey area between democracy and disparity in the Circum-Caribbean. The Circum-Caribbean societies have witnessed simultaneous opening of the polity and the economy. The political space is roofed by democracy and the economy is exposed to free play of market forces. As Evelyne Huber et al. (2006) pointed out, the Circum-Caribbean economies are overwhelmed by rural and informal base with high concentration of labour. Therefore, the government social spendings mainly benefit a small income group in the formal sector. Further, these countries have been competing to become service economies due to vitality of tourism and opportunities and challenges engendered by economic globalisation. vi Democracy in the Circum-Caribbean, on the other hand, has shot up; one can debate the nature and character of these democracies. Therefore, UNDP might qualify a given country as ‘full democracy’, the Economist Intelligence Unit might exemplify it as ‘flawed democracy’ and vice versa. Nevertheless UNDP (2010:
65) reminds that a country can be high in developmental parameters and yet can be undemocratic, inequitable, and unsustainable and vice versa.

The simultaneity of political and economic openings and the consequent disparities are not unique to the Circum-Caribbean societies including to Cuba where smallness causes ‘socialist principles’ and development choice to confront each other. It applies on the entire global South. Hence, the problematique of democracy and development/disparity in the Circum-Caribbean context prompts one to ask that why the ‘instabilities’ in these societies are to be taken seriously. Obviously, the reading of small as dangerous determines the outcomes.

Regional developments in the Circum-Caribbean small states have always been closely contingent upon the world order. Therefore, the changes in the world order after the Cold War and 9/11 have deeply impacted the policy choices in these states. Whatever the reasons are, the Europeans and American aids and trade preferences for the Circum-Caribbean have progressively shrunk and the states have been compelled to go for reciprocity. As a result, the region seems to imitate a ‘new’ economic thinking of ‘resilience’ as opposed to vulnerability (see chapter IV). Some symptoms of resilience thinking are found in the Circum-Caribbean itself, its intellectual spirit is coming from Malta whereas the ‘Singapore Paradox’ is behind policy optimism.

The post-1990 changes incurred upon the world order cannot be negated and the Circum-Caribbean societies have to prepare themselves to face it. The point is, however, the modality that has to be adopted by them. How resilient the Circum-Caribbean states are? Do they have the managerial capacity, marketability, and the prerequisites to adapt themselves according to the fast changing IPE? The strategy of resilience is informed by irrelevance of smallness, power of information and communication technologies, and knowledge skills. All these are said to be entailed by the current phase of economic globalisation. Chapter IV peers the relevance of the strategy through culture industry and offshore banking in the region. While both the options of culture and offshore are lucrative, there are serious issues attached to them. Culture industry in the region requires fine managerial skills and significant state investment and both are in deficit in the region. Offshore banks, on the other side, are functioning as new geo-political tools in the hands of the American post-9/11
homeland security managers. Therefore, it can be argued that if cautionary measures are not adopted, instead of reaping the fruits of economic globalisation, the strategy of resilience can further deepen the Circum-Caribbean security and development dilemmas.

Again, it would be perilous if resilience is thought to be a region-wide phenomenon. There are notable economic and political differences among the states and territories in the region. There cannot be single line of resilience thinking, for example, for Panama, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago. Even in the context of a single country, co-operation with other entities has to be sought due to specific reason of local-national-regional interface of risks and benefits in the Circum-Caribbean.

The Circum-Caribbean is marked by strong sentiment of regionalism due to federal experiments at sub-regional levels separately in the central America and in the Caribbean archipelago. Geography, ethno-history, and political economy add to the Circum-Caribbean regional identities.\(^\text{vii}\) Even the Caribbean experiments with regionalism progressively marks the changes in world order attesting to the fact that though they have competed in the economic sphere and national sovereignty, the Circum-Caribbean has always upheld the importance of regional integration. This is optimistic, as chapter V notes, that the sub-regional and regional forums have time and again taken cognisance of the emerging security and development issues of various kinds; however, appreciation of the security-development intersection is conspicuously absent.

This absence of appreciation of the intersection at (sub)regional level is reflective of a deeper crisis of thinking and acting at academic and policy circles in the Circum-Caribbean. The crisis originates at individual country and follows up at larger scale. May be the geographical appearance of insularity is responsible at first place; ethno-history and political economy of the region run antagonistic to it. The region has suffered in both security and development parameters due to insularity in thinking and acting. The Circum-Caribbean has to identify itself with the world of post-1990. The events of 9/11 have altered the world further. The Caribbean thinking and acting has to come close to the new realities. Security and development have rarely been two different realities for the Circum-Caribbean. These two processes have always intersected; now the intensity of intersection has been thickened with
some new facets in the problematique. Fragmented approach to security and development is obsolete. A concerted approach to the intersection holds the key to pressing problems of the time.

As outlined in the discussion of the ‘security-development nexus’, the intersection is delicate with negative and positive consequences. Keeping it in mind is instructive as one set of solutions to an issue breeds another set of problems in the Circum-Caribbean. The current strategy of resilience is fitting into the context. Often the availability of resources at disposal is at stake that forces the decision-makers to make a choice. The choice often becomes dilemmatic when security and development feed each other.

Soon after the Cold War the Circum-Caribbean states realised that they had lost the strategic importance as the bipolar ideological antagonism had ceased to exist. They suddenly felt the pinch of economic burden as aids and other benefits had dwindled. The choice between security and development was not decisive at that time. Therefore, the wisdom of free trade competition and private investment stormed the debates in the parliaments and universities in the region. Of course, the background of failure of import substitution strategy in the 1960s was equally responsible for the emerging development wisdom. In the middle of the 1990s the countries soon realised that they had to go slow. The option for economic openness in the economy was sustained with some critical reasoning. The Circum-Caribbean society was witnessing an increasing gap between the rich and poor. The wise development choice of the 1990s could not solve the problems of poverty rather it was vitiated. Today the issue of poverty, as discussed in the problematique of democracy and socio-economic disparity, has moved far from its stated direction. The abolition of poverty, after 9/11, has been turned into the pronounced goal of achieving the security indices rather realising developmental targets. Poverty is bound to further complicate the choice as the Circum-Caribbean moves ahead towards service economy. The move will cause greater downsizing of the role of state and shrinking of welfare programmes.

The choice between security and development is delicate. It again depends upon the individual national, sub-regional, and regional actors that what between the two is to be mixed up and at what degree. If the delicate problematique is adequately planned, call it the skill of diplomacy or the quality of leadership, it can help the
region compensate the lost strategic advantage and can strengthen the identity and unity of the Circum-Caribbean itself which is crucial in managing the serious issues of the day.
The story was revealed by Nicholas Hardwicke, President, Tobago Hotel and Tourism Association in Scarborough, Tobago on 19 July 2012. He further stated that many incidents have occurred in the island when he had to personally rush to ‘rescue’ the foreign tourists – males and females – from the wrath of the local people because of their (tourists’) alleged involvement in acts of sexual abuse.

Tourism, however, is not the only factor contributing to increase HIV/AIDS in the Circum-Caribbean.


See Chapter II: Security and Development Nexus in Small and Micro States of Circum-Caribbean for more information to understand how the recently articulated idea of ‘post-conflict’ society is inappropriate in the Circum-Caribbean context.

US President Barack Obama’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (2009) and Central American Regional Security Initiative (2010) make good examples of ‘smart power’ strategies but are hardly helpful in hiding the narrowing differences in Circum-Caribbean policies that are said to be existed between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party (see chapter III for more informations).

The Circum-Caribbean tourism economies are financed by private capital. Even the facilities of/ in hotels, restaurants, and beaches are owned by a handful of people and most of them are foreign entrepreneurs. Since the per capita income in these economies are higher, the number of Asian workers in the hotels and restaurants are increasing because they are willing to work at a much lower rate than those of their Circum-Caribbean counterparts. Moreover, as Nicholas Hardwicke, President of Tobago Hotel and Tourism Association said that the Asian workers show ‘proper manners’ and therefore they are better fitted into the industry.

Wendy Austin, Director of the Rand Sea Divers and a European national, shared her experience and said, ‘Tobago islanders, though their life is surrounded by sea, can’t swim and dive into the sea’. Therefore, she does not employ Tobagonians in her diving company. (She was interviewed in Scarborough, Tobago on 19 July 2012).

See chapter V for more information on the Circum-Caribbean identities.