Chapter II

SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT NEXUS IN SMALL AND MICRO STATES OF CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the concern for security-development ‘nexus’ has acquired heightened significance in the Circum-Caribbean. The widening contours of security and development have special bearing upon it as both have become ‘humanised’, ‘deepened’, ‘widened’, and ‘globalised’. The concern is especially fuelled by some political and economic developments of international importance in the preceding decades, most important are the end of the Cold War and 11 September 2001 terrorist event in US. These are potent in setting agendas even after critical attacks from various quarters. The problem is that more contemporaneous one is in comprehending the nexus, one risks the efficacy of the programmes and policies designed to address the nexus as narrow contemporariness conceals relevant informations. Security-development nexus is a complex problematique. It calls for caution. Today poverty and insecurity are readily linked as the interaction constraints among numerous variables have been eased. Institutions have also been designed to break the links between security and development. Structural tensions between the global North and South have not disappeared. Therefore, the security-development nexus in the Circum-Caribbean calls for a broader investigation of the relevant issues as the nexus can be articulated and practised in disparate contexts (see, for example, figure 2.1).

The first section of the chapter defines the Circum-Caribbean. The following one describes the various security and developmental issues in the region. The third section attempts to know the meaning of the security-development nexus at a general level. The next part talks about the nature and character of the nexus in the Circum-
Caribbean with two macro level case studies. Lastly, the chapter brings out the virtuous and vicious aspects of the nexus.

**DEFINITION OF CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN**

W. Demas suggests a three-fold inside outward division of the Circum-Caribbean region into three concentric circles: i) English-speaking Caribbean islands; ii) the Caribbean archipelago; and iii) the entire Caribbean Basin (Demas, 1979; cited in Erisman, 1989: 178). The Eastern-Caribbean island countries fall in the first circle. The circle of Caribbean archipelago includes all the islands plus the mainland extensions of Guyana, Suriname and French Guinea in south America, along with Belize in central America. The wider circle of Caribbean Basin encompasses the countries in earlier two circles as well as the coastal states of south America, central America and Mexico. This particular study, however, employs the third circle, i.e., the Caribbean Basin notion of the Circum-Caribbean. Finally, it is to be noted that the terms Circum-Caribbean and Greater Caribbean, along with Caribbean Basin, are interchangeably used.¹

**CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT**

I. **SECURITY ISSUES**

There are several pressing security issues in the tiny states of Circum-Caribbean: traditional and non-traditional; exogenous and endogenous. Most of the times, however, such distinctions are blurred.

First of all, these territorial ‘sovereign’ entities are the creation of the modern system of states. The system itself is the fundamental political dilemma before these states. The small and micro states of Circum-Caribbean and the states system exhibit mutual incognition, yet these are recognised as sovereign entities. Territorial sovereignty is the first existentiality that these states experience with less ambiguity. Thus, territories and borders are crucial to their sovereign being.
Certainly, this fact is not alien to the small and micro entities of the region. Territorial and border disputes between and among these states are as old as their claim and possession of sovereign equality itself. The disputes between Belize and Guatemala, Guyana and Suriname, Guyana and Venezuela etc. are among the most controversial ones.

Domestic political tumults often raise the issue of stability in the central American and the Caribbean archipelago. Political opposition in these countries are viewed as potential insurgence. Controversies too accompany the electoral procedures, ushering disputed legitimacy. Historically, the military has been mobilised by one or another political faction to overthrow the party in power. The military does not remain just a fighting force. It has been deeply involved in the political affairs in the whole of Latin American and the Caribbean region entailing the concern of ‘militarisation’. Militarisation in the Caribbean Basin context conveys two things: i) increasing resource allocation for development, purchase, and deployment of military equipment and forces, and the military influences in the political decisions (Griffith, 1993: 8); and ii) presence of foreign military out-posts. While the end of the super power Cold War rivalry has significantly lessened the military influences in the non-military spheres, the region is experiencing renewed foreign military presence in several forms. According to the US Department of Defense’s Base Structure Report (2010), for example, the presence of the US military forces in the Caribbean Basin in 2009 is 10,646. As the 1991 Report reveals, it was 17,960 in 1990. Furthermore, the US Department of Defense currently owns or uses properties of US$ 7,694.7 million (2010 Report). It was US$ 5234.2 million in 2000 (2001 Report).

In short, various geo-political factors, ideological influences, inadequate political consolidation, and various forms of social and economic unevenness are linked with instabilities in the small and micro states in the region.

Drug trafficking is one of the most complex and multi-layered problems in the region involving a number of security dimensions: social, economic, and political. It includes state and non-state actors with a wide network ranging from local to international connections. Currently, drug trafficking is the most talked of security concern before these state (Griffith, 1993, 2004; Nafey, 1996; Fukumi, 2008; Braveboy-Wagner, 2008).
According to the Organisation of American States’s (OAS) Fifth Evaluation Round, 122,587 kg of cocaine, 51,326 kg of cannabis and 160 kg of heroin were reportedly seized in the central American and Caribbean archipelagic countries in 2009 only (OAS, 2011b). Moreover, the share of illicit drug exports of legal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the Caribbean archipelago accounts for 3.4 per cent (UNODC, 2003). This is 2.3 per cent for Colombia’s GDP. The number of illicit drug users between 15-64 years age in the region is alarming.

The problem of drug trafficking is further entailed with other problems like money laundering, trafficking in human beings, arms, and ammunitions, murder and killings and related organised crimes.

The geo-politics of the region has always fascinated the academics and policy actors. With technical skill, economic base and exceptional determination to pursue the unknown (Skidmore and Smith, 1984/2001: 14-15), the European and American colonial forces have intervened, annexed, and possessed the states in the Caribbean Basin; have also exchanged among themselves to satisfy each other’s imperial claims. After Columbus ‘discovered’ the region in 1492, it witnessed Spanish (1492-1600) hegemonic domination for more than a century. British, French and Dutch colonisers challenged Spanish hegemony in the 17th Century. In the 18th Century, these European imperials engaged each other in intermittent warfare and the small islands of the region changed hands several times among the colonisers. By the end of the 19th Century, US had emerged as a big power. It fought the ‘Spanish-Cuban-American War’ in 1898 and gained effective control of Cuba and Puerto Rico. All of these Euro-American powers considerably shaped the socio-cultural and politico-economic facets of the region. It facilitated the deep drivers of vulnerability that we talk today.

Interventions, especially the US ones during the Cold War, bear direct relationship with the security and geo-politics of the region. The regional security issues share similar connection with the Soviet Union’s pursuit of the so-called ‘international communism’ which fuelled and provided opportunity to most of the US interventions. Guatemala in 1954, Cuba in 1961, the Dominical Republic in 1965, Grenada in 1983, and Panama in 1989 are the witnesses of overt US interventions. The post-Cold War US interventions continue in the name of ‘war on drugs’. ‘Narco-terrorism’ is the post-9/11 geo-economic and geo-strategic US tool causing security
concern for the Caribbean Basin. As Abdul Nafey (2004) and Priti Singh (2004) observed, these are causing further militarisation of the Basin.

Climate change is an additional intruder in the security sphere of the Lilliputs. ‘Titanic’, to use Barnett and Campbell’s (2010: 167-170) word, is another drowning vulnerability achievement associated with the island countries of the region. Tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, and rise in sea-water level cause enormous damage to lives and properties in the Circum-Caribbean Titanic Liliputs. These natural calamities sweep away the hard-earned socio-economic capital. Haiti’s earthquake in January 2010 is an ideal example.

Meanwhile, there is an emerging debate recently delineated by Jon Barnett and John Campbell in their *Climate Change and Small Island States* (2010) in the South Pacific context. They argue that the vulnerability discourse regarding climate change and the small island developing states (SIDS) is a ‘discursive formation’ and there is little consideration of ‘adaptation’ in these states having the potential to transform the larger discursive formation of climate change in small islands (2010: 1-4). The debate would be taken up in the subsequent sections, but it is apt to acknowledge that such a perception to the issues of the small and micro states is an unconventional assertion. It has considerable bearing especially upon the security issues.

The above security issues in the Circum-Caribbean are conventionally understood to produce vulnerabilities. Griffith (1993: 4) declared that the preeminent issue before the ‘Commonwealth’ Caribbean states is vulnerability. In fact, falling in the line of the Commonwealth Study Group’s 1985 observation, Griffith tacitly agreed that these states are ‘inherently vulnerable’ (1993: 5). Moreover, he believed that vulnerability is ‘objective’.

II. DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

On the other hand, tourism, migration, and offshore banking are the most central to the contemporary development discourse in the Circum-Caribbean.

These small and micro entities are discrete and different and this is what makes them attractive for travel and tourism (Butler, 1993). These are separated from the mainland countries. The natural and geographic features lend them different
qualities. For precise reasons, the Circum-Caribbean countries attract millions of tourists who significantly contribute to their GDP. Some of the countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Bahamas, and Saint Lucia earn half or more than half of their income from this sector.

But, with tourism comes various problems. These countries remain dependent on foreign customers. Small size economy is primarily responsible for this. The development fruits are concentrated in the areas which directly cater to the needs of the tourists. And as sensual pleasure is an added item in the tourist menu, sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) tend to increase in these places.

According to the UNAIDS Report of 2010 several of the Caribbean Basin countries are experiencing widespread prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the people. These countries’ human development achievement is already of low standard. In addition, half of the population migrate to different places. Given that situation, one can easily imagine the kind of impacts STDs can have in these countries.

The migratory trend in the Caribbean Basin countries is always high. Foreign remittances constitute a big portion of the income in these countries. According to Ransford Palmer (2009: 70), the region is the fulcrum of a vast and continuing movement of people. In 2000 only Caribbean archipelago alone had a migrant stock of 2.82 per cent of its total population, whereas for the entire world it was 2.88 per cent (UN Population Division, 2002; cited in UN Population Division, 2006). In some of the countries/territories like Anguilla, Aruba, British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands, the stock constituted between 30-35 per cent of their total population. Palmer even considered migration as an integral feature of the economy and culture of the region (2009: 51). At the same time, migration is an indicator of the external dependence of the economies of the Caribbean Basin. International and domestic economic upheavals tremendously impact the conditions of migration and foreign remittances. The US, for instance, receives most immigrants from these countries with maximum share of US tourists visiting in exchange and a recession adversely impacts both the processes.

Palmer (2009: 69-75) counted tourism and migration together as ‘travel economy’. Put together, these two heavily contribute to the income of the small
economies of the Circum-Caribbean. One has to acknowledge, however, the nature of foreign dependence of both tourism and migration. A similar concern is attached with non-diversified economies in many of these small and micro states. Diversified economy helps better manage the economic shocks. Some of these travel economies have significantly invested in offshore banking as a step to diversify the economic base. While Palmer (2009) considers such offshore financial services centres as buffer against competition and strategy for maintaining a competitive edge, Ronen Palan et al. (2010) see these as ‘tax havens’ where a few billionaires, mafiosi, and corrupt autocrats hide their ill-gotten gains.

Meanwhile, the issues of tourism, migration, and offshore banking further exhibit the vulnerability syndrome of the Caribbean Basin countries. In 1990, L. Erskine Sandiford, the Prime Minister of Barbados said in the Eleventh Meeting of the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community:

Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market conditions taken elsewhere; socially, to cultural penetration; and now politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries, and criminals.

(cited in Griffith, 2003: 5)

Smallness in size and the demographic features further add to their vulnerability. These are sovereign equals in the international political order, but one is left to ask about the soundness of statehood of these small and micro states. What kind of states these territorial entities are? Are they, and can they be, states in the first place? Using Barry Buzan’s (1983) conception of state, the component parts of state are i) the idea of the state, e.g., organising ideology; ii) the institutional expression of the state, e.g., entire machinery of government; and iii) the physical base of the state, e.g., population and territory. As far as the Circum-Caribbean small and micro states are concerned, they figure poorly in all the three stated components of state; micro states even more poorly than small states.

There is a different take, however, on the security and developmental issues of these Titanic Lilliputs. It is evidently argued that these small and micro entities have acquired ‘resilience’ against the proverbial vulnerabilities. Somewhere ‘adaptation’ is implied in the resilience debate. One can mention Andrew Copper and Timothy Shaw’s edited The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience (2009) and Jan Barnett and John Campbell’s authored Climate Change and Small
Island States: Power, Knowledge and the South Pacific (2010) which are leading the contemporary resilience/adaptation discourse.

As the preceding chapter argues, the Cold War international relations scholarship has rarely pondered over the security and developmental issues of the small and micro states at their own right. Smallness is viewed as a problem to be solved rather than seeing the political economy of smallness. In today’s globalising world, moreover, the conventional style of treating security and development separately does not promise yield when it comes to small and micro politico-economic entities; so is the case with Circum-Caribbean states. The process of economic globalisation, along with entangled traditional and non-traditional security concerns, have intertwined security and developmental issues. It seems impractical and unfruitful if security and development in the Caribbean Basin are meted out differential scholarly concern.

It does not stop here. With the intermingling concern of security and development, there is a watchful eye to know whether there is a ‘nexus’ between the two. The follow-up sections attempt to delineate the security-development nexus and then bring Circum-Caribbean in the context with two pairs of Caribbean archipelagic issues into the discussion.

UNDERSTANDING SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS

The security-development interaction has become a common point of concern. Conversely, there is an explicit absence of understanding of the interaction and more so with the ‘nexus’. Only some recent academic projects have begun to generate a debate in this regard, leaving enough space for articulation of the security-development interplay. Therefore, few basic anxieties drop into the context. Firstly, the concepts of security and development, as described and explained in the preceding chapter, have acquired complex forms. For precise reason, conceptualising them is far from easy now. Is it possible anymore, therefore, to concretely base the security-development interaction/nexus in definitional or conceptual terms? Secondly, as attempted to demonstrate in the foregoing chapter, there is a ready acceptance of the blurring of the domestic-international divide. To put in normative language, if the
preceding sentence is not untrue, this should be a global phenomenon and should not be restricted to certain regional colour. When we come to analyse the multi-layered complexity of the security-development interplay, the concluding observations are customarily compartmentalised with ‘Third World’ characteristics and ‘First World’ implications. It is conveniently argued that the Third World needs ‘development’ which will yield ‘security’ for the First World. The analysis heavily and effortlessly boils down to the small and micro states and raises the doubt that whether the ‘blurring’ concern is arbitrary. This concern is to be tested in the context of security-development interaction/nexus in the small and micro states of Circum-Caribbean.

The above two anxieties or points of debate create an additional avenue of discourse. Given our undersized but meaningful journey through the trajectories of the concepts of security and development and ready acceptance of the domestic-international interface, these two points of doubt leave ample space first to politicise the interpretation of the security-development nexus, and second to cause for a discursive move towards the same.

The President of the International Peace Institute Terje Rod-Larsen observed, ‘A growing awareness during the 1990s of both the development costs of armed conflict and the impact of economic and social development on security conditions has generated a vast field of research and policy focused on the intersection between security and development’ (Rod-Larsen, 2010: vii). Maria Stern and Joakin Ojendal echoed Rod-Larsen’s concern. They wrote, ‘It is now beyond doubt that attention to the “security-development nexus” has become commonplace in national and international global policymaking’ (Stern and Ojendal, 2010: 6). As will be clear with the subsequent evolution of the chapter, there are significant convergence and divergence between the views that Rod-Larsen subscribed to and the perception that Stern and Ojendal adhered to.

To begin with, the perceived consensus over the security-development intersection is essentially a post-Cold War phenomenon as far as the academic and policy circles are concerned. As ‘from the former Yugoslavia to Somalia and Afghanistan, the international involvement in these countries brought out the inherent problems and risks of compartmentalizing issues of security and development’ (Rod-Larsen, 2010: vii), searching for the intersecting connections became inevitable. It is
then to be noted that intersection was primarily thought of a feature of the ‘post-conflict societies’.

The security-development intersection acquired global visibility with the United Nations’ concern and assertion of the interdependence of security and development. The 2005 World Summit Outcome at the UN proclaimed, ‘Without security there is no development, and without development there is no security’ (Tschirgi et al. 2010: 2; Rod-Larsen, 2010: vii). Before such proclamation, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan had voiced for similar attention. He wrote:

> Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflicts. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals.

(United Nations, 2004: vii; cited by Stern and Ojendal, 2010: 5)

Since then the UN, the World Bank, donor governments, academic and research institutions, and international organisations are promoting an ‘integrated approach’ in achieving security and development. Hence, Mark Duffield remarked that ‘the interconnection between development and security – or the development-security nexus – has attracted a good deal of academic, donor and practitioner interest’ (Duffield, 2010: 54). Several phrases like ‘structural stability’, ‘secure development’, ‘structural prevention’, ‘preventive peacebuilding’ etc. have been coined (Tschirgi et al (eds.), 2010), as a consequence.

It is to be kept in mind that the security-development intertwining is supposedly not only a post-Cold War occurrence but also a phenomenon which is surfacing within a (Third World) state. It is not a surprise as ‘the end of the Cold War, the rise of globalization, and failed governance’, notes Paul Kingston, ‘have all contributed to a weakening of political authority in much of the developing world’ (Kingston, 2004: 1). It too is to be stored in memory that such an intertwining process is arguably cemented by the elements of poverty and ethnic conflicts that plague almost every developing country irrespective of size. Moreover, the watershed of 11 September 2001 further advanced the urgency of meeting this new agenda of security-development intersection. One can add the environmental exigencies imminent upon security and development whose impacts are today seemingly more a case of speculation.
‘Despite the new policy discourse’, Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini wrote, ‘the nature of the interplay between security and development and its policy implications are far from clear’ (Tschirgi et al., 2010: 2) (emphasis added). Another crucial distinction that gets muddied in the context, they argued, is that between i) security and development as societal goals and ii) security and development as policies to achieve these goals. Therefore, they addressed three interrelated questions to prove the critical connections that surround security and development and can hopefully lead to a ‘virtuous circle’ of the two. These are:

A. What are the critical causal interactions between conditions of security and development in societies?
B. What are the basic ingredients of environments of mutually-compatible security and development?
C. What kinds of policies are more likely to achieve these outcomes?

For answers to these questions Tschirgi, Lund and Mancini propose to look into three factors of development – poverty, environment, and demography – and their linkages with security.

With an intention to show the direct links between poverty and security, Fukuda-Parr wrote, ‘Global security threats are inextricably intertwined with the challenges of global poverty and that eradicating one is not only an important end in itself but a means to resolving the other’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2010: 17). Fukuda-Parr maintained that today the wars are concentrated in the poorest and low-income countries. Low life expectancy, high infant and child mortality, and low literacy are widespread in these countries. Hence, they are in the bottom in the Human Development Index (HDI) value. Similarly, Richard Mathew (2010) drew the environment-security links. He noted that the environmental problems can cause or amplify security problems such as violent conflict, population displacement, poverty, and the spread of infectious disease. And for demographic dimension of security, Richard Cincotta (2010) noted that youthful age structure, declining availability of natural resources, rapid growth of urban slums with deteriorating human conditions, high rates of death in the working-age population (largely from HIV/ AIDS), demographic aging and declines in population size, differential population growth
rates among ethnic populations, cross-border and domestic migration, and unusually high marriage-age sex ratio (showing the demographic dominance of males) etc. are important demographic components with security implications.

The aspect of poverty signals that a shift in security focus has taken place from states to the people living within them (Duffield, 2010), poverty is not necessarily a domestic concern. Similarly, though the domestic dimensions of demography are emphasised by Cincotta (2010) (with major focus on youth bulge), it defies the border when migratory patterns are in. While poverty and demography are generating new environmental issues, environmental crisis engulfs both poverty and demography in various ways. Thus, these three factors of development – poverty, environment, and demography – are closely interconnected and interdependent as far as their spill over impacts are understood.

What seems most urgent in the security-development intersection discourse is the search for a nexus between the two and the nature of the nexus (Tschirgi et al., 2010; Duffield, 2010; Pupavac, 2010; Hettne, 2010; Orjuela, 2010; Jensen, 2010; Stern and Ojendal, 2010). This might unfold the distinction between security and development as societal goals and policies to achieve these goals, as expressed by Tschirgi and others.

It is to be meticulously noted that the intersection that is often talked about is not about an ordinary local process in a disconnected remote corner of the world. It is about security and development and these two are among the most crucial and core processes at global level today. These processes are influential enough to alone shadow the entire systemic structure of world politics. Precisely, there are views that do not give tacit acceptance to the security-development interaction. Instead, they espouse a critical take up and press forward a ‘nexus’ between security and development.

The key espousal of the security-development nexus circumvents around three issues. Firstly, putting the nexus vis-a-vis the structural North-South conflict. Secondly, the critical debate of the nexus is largely informed and influenced by colonial experiences. And lastly, the observations of the nexus is primarily focused on and contextualised around the ‘post-conflict’ societies.
There are significant achievements in economic competitiveness in the handful nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean; but they continue to face structural constraints from the global North. Emergence and widening popularity of the World Social Forum (WSF) in the global South is a telling story. And, as elaborated in the preceding chapter, dependency and post-development thoughts further raise the structural tensions between the global North and South. The northern articulation of global poverty, global development, and international security in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 pre-emptive measures underlines the structural tension in various forms, most notable are the policies related to humanitarian aid, health, poverty, and migration. One can understand the recent UN exposition of Somalian famine, for instance. But the rebel group’s justifying position in Somalia precisely attests to the similar structural tensions. Therefore while approaching the nexus, Mark Duffield noted that ‘following the upswing in post-Cold War liberal interventionism, rather than aid being a neutral institution, would-be recipients have come to see international assistance as an extension of Western foreign policy’ (Duffield, 2010: 54). With regard to health policy, Laurie Garrett remarked that tackling the developing world’s diseases has become a key feature of many nations’ foreign policies over the last five years, for a variety of reasons. Some see stopping the spread of HIV, tuberculosis (TB), malaria, avian influenza, and other major killers as a moral duty. Some see it as a form of public diplomacy. And some see it as an investment in self-protection, given the microbes know no borders. (Garrett, 2007: 14)

Thus, bringing criticality of Kofi Annan’s concern into surface that the people in rich countries will be more secure if their governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The North-South divide appears to have deepened in the post-Cold War period on account of two factors as elaborated by Duffield (2010). The first one is global containment of spontaneous and undocumented migration by ‘Fortress Europe’. And, the second one is shifting attention to the (poor) people living within them. Consequently, Stern and Ojendal (2010: 20) saw security and development as mutually reinforcing idioms and techniques of biopower through which subjectivity, imagination, and ultimately life are governed.
Figure 2.1: Security-Development ‘Nexuses’

Source: Stern and Ojendal (2010)
Berger and Weber (2009), however, echoing Vijay Prashad’s (2007) concern, contradicted and problematised such biopolitical reading of the global North and South. They, following Prashad’s line of argument, concurred that history suggests that we live in a world filled with ‘nations-that-never-were-nations’ or nation-states, and furthermore, that social and political relations and experiences have never been confined to boundaries of nation-state (Berger and Weber, 2009: 6). Yet they accepted that the remaining nation-states of the erstwhile Second and Third Worlds are implicitly viewed as unimportant or irrelevant to the wider world economy unless they are seen to directly threaten the security of the core regions (Berger and Weber, 2009: 9).

The colonial experiences of the global South background the structural conflict. Colonialism was not only about market expansion and territorial annexation; it was also about commoditisation of human beings, enslaving the human soul, and sacrificing the human ethics for imperial passions. The end of the World War II, establishment of the UN, and the decolonisation process ended the ‘formal colonialism’ (Berger and Weber, 2009); the colonial legacies of ethnic tensions, territorial disputes along with host of other problems still characterise 21st Century underdevelopment and insecurities in the global South. These problems are further strategised by the Fortress Europe/ America (Duffield, 2010) to sustain high level of material comforts often understood as neo-colonialism. Therefore, Bjorn Hettne (2010) treated the nexus between security and development as static or one-dimensional and proposed for a ‘second great transformation’ as point of departure to know, for instance, the implications of the current global crisis.

Meanwhile, as Stern and Ojendal (2010) pointed out, both security and development have witnessed ‘broadening, deepening, and humanising’ which can be substantiated theoretically and empirically on the grounds of formulation of the MDGs and conceptions of HDI and human security/ rights. Consequently, this led to increasing standardisation of the practice of drawing a close intersection/ nexus between security and development at academic and policy circles. But as the existing works reveal, security-development interaction/ nexus is multi-dimensional, ambivalent, perplexing, and complicated (figure 2.1). And therefore, the above figure
informs us about two things: i) the security-development nexus shifts and slides in meaning and ii) the nexus could be articulated and practised in disparate contexts.

**NATURE AND CHARACTER OF CIRCUM-CARIBBEAN SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS**

It is increasingly clear that the intermingling of security and development is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Precisely, it is indicating several avenues/possibilities of outcomes; before we reach to them, it calls for considerations of some issue specific cases. This section describes and investigates three problem areas with contemporary relevance to identify security-development nexus in the region. These are i) intersection of tourism and HIV/AIDS; ii) interrelationship between democracy and socio-economic disparities; and iii) Cuba’s socialism and development dilemma – both in the Caribbean archipelagic context.

**I. TOURISM AND HIV/AIDS**

Tourism is an important service-oriented industry particularly in the Caribbean archipelagic countries. Its economic contribution to all the countries in this region is well

**Figure 2.2: Trends in International Tourism Arrivals in the Caribbean Archipelago, 1990-2010**

![Graph showing trends in international tourism arrivals in the Caribbean Archipelago from 1990 to 2010. The graph includes bars representing international tourist arrivals in millions and a line chart indicating average annual growth.]

Source: Based on UN World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) Report (2011)
appreciated. The increasing number of the international tourists visiting the Caribbean archipelago (figure 2.2) has acquired a standard trend. Beginning with 11.4 million in 1990, the figure has almost doubled up to 20.1 million in 2010 with 1.6 per cent average annual growth rate during 2000-2010 (UNWTO, 2011). The average annual growth rate during the last decade, however, lags far behind several regions of the world, it has almost come close to that of the growth rate of Oceania (1.9) and the advanced economies (1.8) put together, whereas crossing the growth rate of western Europe (1.0) and north America (0.7) during the decade (UNWTO, 2011).

In most of the countries travel and tourism is the mainstay of the economy. If this industry’s direct and indirect contribution to the GDP is taken into account, according to an estimate for 2008, it is 78 per cent for Antigua and Barbuda, 54 per cent for Barbados, 41.5 per cent for Bahamas, 41.2 per cent for Saint Lucia, 26.5 per cent for Grenada, and 12.8 per cent for Trinidad and Tobago (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2009; cited in CARICOM Secretariat, 2010a).

Figure 2.3: Trends in Travel and Tourism’s Total Contribution to the Caribbean Archipelago: GDP & Employment, 1990-2011

Source: Based on World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC) various reports available at www.wttc.org
A macro look into this emerging sector’s economic gains suggests that the travel and tourism industry’s share to the entire Caribbean archipelagic sub-region in percentage GDP term remained constant at 14 per cent during 1990-2011 (figure 2.3). In fact, it saw an increasing pattern with 14.2 per cent in 1990, 15.7 per cent in 1994 and 16.7 per cent in 1998 only to be altered and brought back to older average of 14 per cent in 2002 that continued even in 2011 (WTTC, 2011). The event of 9/11, it is argued, has contributed to this altered pattern. Evelaw Griffith (2003: 14), for example, argued that the ‘domino effect of 9/11’ has had a deleterious effect on the tourism industry of the Caribbean archipelago. The immediate loss was estimated at US$ 450 million after 9/11, pointed out Abdul Nafey (2004: 30), whereas the negative multiplier effects on the entire regional economy remains incalculable. Though a similar impact of 9/11 was noticed on the tourist receipts (international and Caribbean), the receipts have gone from US$ 9.8 billion in 1990 to a record high to US$ 21.6 billion in 2004 (figure 2.4). And the most recent available data shows a more robust trend if the international tourist receipts are seen separately which is US$ 22.6 billion in 2009 and US$ 23.6 in 2010 according to UN World Tourism Organisation Report, 2011. More importantly, employment generation of the tourism
industry has remained between 10.3 per cent in 1990 to 12.5 per cent in 2011 with ever increasing share in the Caribbean archipelago (figure 2.3).

Undoubtedly, tourism has become crucial not just for harvesting economic benefits in the Circum-Caribbean countries, but playing far reaching role in the political stability as well. It is further important in the context that these states are very small in size and islandic in nature. And as the preceding sections have already covered the argument that these states are vulnerable on account of their size and location, earnings from travel and tourism is crucial for the political and economic health of these states.

But there is a dark side accompanying the tourism industry. Authoritative and official claims by the regional organisations, state authorities, and academic research have clearly established that tourism has contributed to rise in HIV infections in the Caribbean archipelago. Therefore, linked with the vantage point of discussion of security-development nexus, the case of HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Caribbean archipelago necessitates understanding of this epidemic trends which is raising alarming concerns.

UNAIDS (2010) reports that the spread of HIV/AIDS epidemic has halted and begun to reverse the trend at global level with 19 per cent fall in new infections.

Figure 2.5: Trends in HIV Prevalence among Adults in the Caribbean Archipelago (% Ages 15-49), 1999-2010
Source: Based on UNDP’s Human Development Reports (2001-2010)

The Caribbean archipelago too has demonstrated improvements in the UNAIDS score cards. But the overall situation remains precarious. For example, the prevalence of the epidemic among the adult (aged 15-49) at the global level in the last decade is 0.8 per cent. In the case of Caribbean archipelago, even after significant fall, it reportedly remains 1.0 per cent in 2009 which was 1.1 per cent in 2001 (UNAIDS, 2010).

Moreover, during 1990-2009, the number of women living with HIV remains second highest in the Caribbean archipelago only after sub-Saharan Africa. The number of adults and children living with the virus is unchanging. It was 240,000 in 2001 as well as in 2009. The number of newly affected has reportedly fallen from 20,000 (in 2001) to 17,000 (in 2009) with a similar trend in AIDS-related deaths going down from 19,000 (in 2001) to 12,000 (in 2009), however. The UNDP’s country-wise revelation of the HIV percentage prevalence among the adults (aged 15-49) shows (figure 2.5) that during 1999-2010 the epidemic has remained between 1.17-1.2 per cent in Barbados, 4-3 per cent in Bahamas, 1-1.5 percent in Trinidad and

Table 2.1: HIV Trends in the Caribbean Archipelago among Adults (% Aged 15-49), 1990-2009

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Tobago, average 2-2.5 per cent in Belize, 0.71-1.6 percent in Jamaica, 2.8-1.1 per cent in Dominican Republic, 1.26-2.4 per cent in Suriname, 3-2.5 per cent in Guyana, 5.17-2.2 per cent in Haiti and 0.03-0.1 per cent in Cuba. But it is to be noticed that the variation in the HIV figures is of such kind that even after putting them in chart form (figure 2.5), it is difficult to visually spell the HIV trends out in the region. The data and information, however, provided by UNAIDS (2010) in map form (and supplied here in table form in table 2.1) has been of tremendous use in identifying the epidemic trends in a less ambiguous manner.

As it is identifiable from table 2.1 (in percentage terms), during 1990-2009 one country, i.e., Cuba has moved from the category of <.1 to .1-<.5 with increase in HIV cases among the adults. One country, i.e., Trinidad and Tobago has moved forward from the category of .1-<.5 to 1-<2 for the same period. Again one country, i.e., Belize has witnessed alarming rise in the epidemic from .1-<.5 to 2-5. The movement of two countries, i.e., Dominican Republic and Suriname has gone upward from the category of .5-<1 to 1-<2. Two countries, i.e., Jamaica and Guyana have come down to their 2002 position of 1-<2 in 2009 but both had frighteningly gone to the level of 2-5 in 1990 and 1996. Since 1990 to 2009 Bahamas and Turks and Caicos Islands have awfully remained in the category of 2-5. Haiti has maintained a similar trend only recently coming down to 1-<2 in 2009. In short, comparatively large numbers of countries/territories have come under the grip of HIV epidemic in 2000s than 1990s in the Caribbean archipelago. The concern with (un)availability of data could not be cancelled out, however. Table 2.1 too visibly confirms that the cases of HIV infection
have increased in the region and the related factors with tourism have significantly contributed to that.

Wendy Grenade (2008: 24) observed that the apparent tourism-HIV/AIDS relationship in the Caribbean archipelago is shaped by the power differentials between tourists and local people, hedonistic nature of tourism, cultural norms, consequences of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), deficiencies in governance etc. Historically institutionalised practice of slavery and slavery-like practice of indentureship (Erickson, 1934; Cumpston: 1956) have been the principal colonial tools used in the Caribbean archipelago and other parts of the Caribbean Basin for various purposes. In fact, as Eric Williams (1944/1964) forcefully argued, Negro slavery and slave trade financed the Industrial Revolution in England. The power differentials were instilled between the slaves/indentured workers and the plantation/estate masters. Similar power differentials between the tourists and the local people exist within the tourism dependency in the form of negotiation and service exchanges. Tourism has become ‘market’ oriented, commoditising every service available to ‘welcome’ the foreign guest. For precise reason the people in the Caribbean archipelago are displayed as ‘hyper sexual black male stud’ and ‘hot mulatta or black woman’ (K. Kempadoo, 1999; cited in Grenade, 2008: 8). In a similar fashion the tourist spots are portrayed as ‘feminine, yielding, powerless, and vulnerable’ and the women are typified as exoticised commodities to be experienced (A. Pritchard and N. J. Morgan, 2000; cited in Grenade, 2008: 8). These have become approved cultural norms accepted in the ‘market’. And not to be ignored, widespread deprivation, poverty, and unemployment add to the acceptance. The hedonistic nature of tourism engenders and stimulates such market oriented commercial cultural norms. Tourist place is supposed to provide a free and relaxed environment where no social constraints and consequences exist to satisfy the forbidden fruits at home (I. Boxill et al, 2005; cited in Grenade, 2008: 8). Likewise, SAPs have been monstrous for the regional economic health. Structural adjustment packages, as Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton (eds.) (1993: 17-21) argued, were imposed upon many English-speaking Caribbean governments in the 1980s by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Since then, the deprivations and marginalisations of various kinds have gradually followed an upward trend in the region. Decreasing HDI value in the UNDP reports substantiate
the trend (see figure 2.9). The governance, as a consequence, at state and regional levels has faced deficits in terms of political and economic autonomy. In the face of the multi-dimensional vulnerabilities the problems keep on growing as the governments lack ability to deal with them efficiently.

II. DEMOCRACY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISPARITIES

The project of state-building has received enormous attention in the Third World. It is normally thought that a liberal/modern state with strong institutional base can provide a better shelter and secured living conditions to the people. Even some of the acclaimed authorities have recognised the state as final form of socio-political institution (Fukuyama, 1992b). This institution is also authorised to protect the inhabitants and provide security to them. Therefore, the dual project of state-building is seen not only as securing the people but also reaching out to a final stage of socio-economic arrangement. The project is, however, not unquestioned. It is revealed that the nature and content of state that we talk about is part and parcel of the modernisation tradition which seeks to understand the politico-economic and socio-cultural processes in a monolithic manner. It privileges certain developments and favours assured certainties. Noticeably, it undermines the politico-economic and socio-cultural pluralities and diversities which are present within and among the territorially designed sovereign political entities especially in the Third World. And as we have learned, in the case of the small and micro states (especially in Circum-Caribbean), the pluralities and diversities further take numerous forms.

Meanwhile, the terms ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘democracy’ are synonymously used as the former has become popular and widespread. Democracy, after the end of the Cold War, has become the standard norm of intra- and inter-state formal political organisations. The norm has penetrated societal, familial, and inter-personal behaviours and exchanges. Any deviation from the norm is considered undesirable. The end of the Cold War is also voiced as the ‘victory’ of democracy and all of these has been of equal concerns in the Caribbean archipelago as well. Therefore, increasing democratic profile of the small and micro states in the Caribbean archipelago, as a comparative look into UNDP’s (2002, 2010) and others score cards suggests, bears considerable attention.
The number of states with democratic political set up has amplified in the Caribbean archipelago. Democracy and democritisation in this sub-region, according to Trevor Munroe (1997: 33), have vindicated Huntington’s optimism and Fukuyama’s triumphalism. According to the available statistics of a short span of one decade, the democratic profile in the region has recently shot up from one

**Figure 2.6: Polity Score in the Caribbean Archipelago: from -10 (Authoritarian) to 10 (Democracy), 2002**

![Polity Score](image)

Source: Based on UNDP’s Human Development Report (2002)

**Figure 2.7: Democracy in the Caribbean Archipelago, 2008**

![Democracy Score](image)

Source: Based on UNDP’s Human Development Report (2010)
(Trinidad and Tobago) as full democracy with 100 per cent score (i.e., scoring 10 out of 10 points) to 13 full democratic states (scoring 2 out of 2 points) in the sub-region (figures 2.6 and 2.7). Other countries, except Cuba, are in transition with various degrees of democratic credentials. A similar inclination can be inferred from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index Reports of 2007 and 2010 (figure 2.8); however, it exemplifies these states as ‘flawed’ democracies. Freedom House too in its Freedom of the Press Rankings ranks the status of the press as ‘free’ in 13, 12, and 12 archipelagic countries respectively for 2002, 2006, and 2010. It reports 2, 2, and 3 countries as ‘partly free’ for the respective years while scripting only 2, 2, and 1 as ‘not free’ again for the given years; only Dominican Republic changing its status from ‘free’ to ‘partly free’ and Haiti from ‘not free’ to ‘free’. The countries are maintaining a constant free press democratic profile in the Freedom House score cards.

There is a classical notion associated with democracy that it promotes betterment in living conditions or, in other words, it is an enabling condition for development (Huber et al., 2006). Conversely, there is a similar age-old argument that development leads to democracy (Huntington, 1991) and not vice versa. The debate of democracy vs. development constitutes of sizable grey area and the
Caribbean archipelago seems to significantly contribute to that. The democracy-development debate is to be contextualised here with the significance that this work, following the tourism-HIV/AIDS interplay, seeks to add socio-economic disparities with expanding democracy profile in the region and finally come out with an appreciation of the problematique of security-development nexus.

Almost every single country in this sub-region, contrary to democratic profile, has exhibited a downward tendency in its socio-economic profile. A survey of UNDP’s Human Development Reports (HDR) during 1991-2010 attest to the fact that these countries are losing in HDI rank and value and this has been the upwardly rising tendency for at least last two decades (figure 2.9). During the stated period, for instance, Barbados, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago lost 20 ranking points each, Bahamas and Guyana lost 15 points each, Belize had to lose 11, Jamaica 21, Dominican Republic 8 and Suriname registered the highest record loss of 39 ranking points. Further, in the UNDP’s HDI ranking list (of total 169 countries in 2010), some of the countries like Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Guyana, Haiti etc. remain between the rankings of 80 to 150 displaying appalling socio-economic
disparities. Of course, most of these countries figure with full democratic profile in the 2010 HDR of UNDP itself.

Before one ventures into unfolding the paradoxical trends between democracy and socio-economic disparities identified here in the Caribbean archipelagic context, it must be noted that the interplay between the two is not as finite and obvious as between tourism and HIV/AIDS. Lack of ‘undeviating’ quantification is one of the major reasons for this. Therefore, UNDP reminded us:

... even when countries make progress in the HDI, they do not always do well in the broader dimensions. Countries may have a high HDI and be undemocratic, unequitable and unsustainable – just as they may be a low HDI and be relatively democratic, equitable and sustainable. ... we cannot assume that good things always come together.

(UNDP, 2010: 65)

Thus, given the broad contours of development-democracy debate, it would be fruitful to focus on the socio-economic disparities to take in hand the pressing concern of this particular chapter. To add further to it, as there is no profoundly established direct causal link between development and democracy, so is the case with democracy and inequalities including in the Caribbean archipelago. The curious quest for any such link has become more difficult especially in this sub-region due to historical and contemporary reasons. However, an attempt is made here to search for a causal link with the proposition that the link needs further correlation with other politico-economic variables.

Given the context, it is worthwhile to note that democracy and democratisation in the Circum-Caribbean, like other parts of the Third World, have been concomitantly accompanied by economic opening, downsizing of state responsibilities, globalisation, and structural engineering by the international economic players.

A glance at figures 2.6 and 2.7 informs that democratic regimes in the archipelago gradually began to replace the non-democratic ones in the 1990s and particularly after the end of the Cold War. The ground for this had been prepared in the 1980s only with emphasis attached to democracy as a political mechanism and structural adjustment on the economic front (Payne and Sutton, (eds.) 1993: 18). Therefore, political and economic openings were freed simultaneously. In fact, the political developments were liked with the need to promote associated changes in the
economic life of the region (Payne and Sutton, (eds.) 1993: 20). The US announcement of the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the IMF, World Bank and USAID imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were integrated developments in these states. Further, contrary to the expectations that democratic opening will extend the reach of the political regimes towards betterment of the living conditions, it led to downsizing of state responsibilities. The political initiatives were now linked to the market regulations which demanded ‘free play’ of the economic factors in a competitive milieu. To further add, as Evelyne Huber et al. (2006) indicated, largely the rural/ agricultural/ informal base of the archipelagic economies even currently engender high concentration of labour force in the primary sector with higher degree of socio-economic inequalities. Accordingly, the social spending of the government favours and benefits the relatively small upper income groups in the formal sector.

These countries in this sub-region share a number of common features. Among them are small domestic market, dependence on foreign trade and capital, and a narrow export base; and furthermore, the economies are undergoing a kind of metamorphosis as they struggle to break free from their ties to the land to become service economies (Palmer, 2009: 1-12). These features bear specific importance in the age of globalisation with its own kinds of opportunities and challenges. Therefore, the democracy-disparity discussion necessitates much-talked of globalisation to be brought under the purview of the concerned problematique. This is especially due to the reason that smallness compels external co-operation for reasons of communication, development, environment, security, and technology (Cooper and Shaw, 2009: 3). And, as explained above, the narrow base of formal and industrial sector with large concentration of work force in the informal/ agriculture, one can only hope decrease in the distributional probability and adversely contributing to socio-economic well being. The history of dependent development in the entire region is self explanatory.

A Circum-Caribbean country like Cuba has avowedly followed a different path of economic development. How far is it true; and how far it has succeeded in its socialist pursuits? Is the Cuban unique trajectory, if any, shows a way out of the stated security-development nexus? Or, the fate of the Cuban post-Revolution ‘socialist’
experiments reinforces the proverbial dilemmas that the small and micro states of the region exhibit?

III. CUBA’S SOCIALISM AND DEVELOPMENT DILEMMA

Cuba saw a Revolution in 1959. It was the time when the world was coloured in an ideological warfare between two competing principles of social organisation, economic development and ways of life – capitalism and communism/socialism. In 1962, the Cuban ‘rebels’ declared to have embraced the latter one and said to have pledged to realise the same at the cost of sacrifice of any height. The post-Revolution declaration of Cuba, more than the incidence of the Revolution itself, made the global community to sit up and take note of. Cuba had declared itself a ‘socialist state’.

Fidel Castro, a celebrated hero of the Revolution and the charismatic leader of the ‘socialist regime’ in Cuba, dreamed to achieve several goals in the country. The goals of i) sustained economic growth, ii) diversification of production, iii) relative external economic independence, iv) full employment, and v) more equal distribution of income and social services (Mesa-Lago, 1981) were among the most prominent ones.

A ‘small’ state inhabited by roughly 11 million people by 2010 (UNDP, 2010) and a territory with slightly more than 100 sq. km. in size, Cuba attracted global attention because of its close physical proximity to the leader of the capitalist bloc, the United States. Cuba is located barely 90 miles away from US.

After three decades of its cherished Revolution and socialist proclamation, Cuban state declared a ‘Special Period in Peacetime’ in 1990. It was a strategy of ‘survival and development’ based on national efforts (Xianglin, 2007: 95). The Cold War had ceased to exist by the time Cuba declared the special period and so did its special economic ties and security cover under the Soviet-led socialist bloc. In the 4th National Congress in 1991, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) announced that its goal is to ‘save the motherland, the Revolution, and socialism’; and a process of reform and economic opening was launched (Xianglin, 2007: 95).
Cuba’s post-Revolution socialism and post-Cold War development choice cause one to solicit, first of all, whether these two are complementary or antagonistic. How is one to comprehend, if complementary, the process of reform and opening in a socialist state? Why is it to characterise itself as socialist at all, if antagonistic, after executing more than two decades of structural reform and economic opening? Finally, what is the context, if any, of 11 million people and 100 sq. km. physical property of Cuba in the case of the Circum-Caribbean security-development nexus?

After the rebels had overthrown Batista government, a large number of Cubans left the country between 1959 and 1989, and reached US in several waves. As figure 2.10 exemplifies, they were more than half a million between 1959 and 1973. Roughly quarter a million Cubans again had reached the American shore by 1989. Cubans migrating to the American land was not a unique phenomenon, however. People had migrated to US before the 1959 Revolution and, as figure 2.10 shows, continued in the 1990s and after. But the waves of migration between 1959 and 1989 had a significant dimension. These migrants were from the well off section of Cuban society and arguably had little sympathy with the post-Revolution socialist regime. Cuba-US trade, on the other side, was flourishingly high during the pre-Revolution Batista regime. Cuba, for example, exported half of its sugar to US market till 1955 and the quantity was considerable even in 1959, only to disappear in 1961 (see figure 2.11a). Much before the Revolution, American firms were controlling 75 per cent of Cuban sugar industry by late 1920s (Robert Smith, 1962: 29-33; cited in LeoGrande

Figure 2.10: Cuban Arrivals in US, 1959-2000

Source: Based on the work of Chun and Grenier (2004: 2)
and Thomas, 2002: 325-26) and Cuban trade with US was 69.1 per cent a decade before the Revolution (LeoGrande, 1979: 1-29; cited in LeoGrande and Thomas, 2002: 326).

The political economic interests of the large Cuban immigrants and of US coincided, whereas the same diverged vis-à-vis the post-Revolution socialist regime of Cuba. Serious efforts were made by US, as a consequence, for regime change in Cuba. Cuba, a small state only 90 miles away of US, was invaded in 1961 by the militia trained and funded by US. The invasion is known as the Bay of Pigs Invasion in which the Cuban ‘exiles’ in US had played special role (Connell-Smith, 1981: 155-56; Gleijeses, 1995: 1-42; Divine, 1999: 154-56). The invasion, however, was foiled by Cuba. The following year Cuba declared itself a socialist state in 1962 and had also aligned with the Soviet Union to place latter’s nuclear missiles in its homeland targeting US to prevent recurrence of Bay of Pigs. Whether Cuba was actually sandwiched in a situation of ‘triangular’ (Belking and Blight, 1991: 727-45) mutually assured destruction (MAD) between the two rival super powers and had risked its own existence while an unprecedented security crisis was created known as ‘Cuban missile crisis’; or it was a case of Cuba playing off one super power against another and thereby enhanced its own security cover and political bargaining power remain moot point of academic debate. Either way, it was an exemplary security dilemma of a small state (between two rival giants) that the world has ever witnessed.

On the economic sphere, after the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis, Cuban development choice took an altogether different turn (see figures 2.11a and 2.11b). By the late 1980s, Cuba had plunged into an acute economic dependence rather than achieving its goals of economic independence and diversification. Cuba’s dependence on mono-cultural sugar economy has a history of its own. After sugar displaced tobacco as Cuba’s principal crop in the late 18th Century, Cuba had come to dominate the global sugar market by producing 25 per cent of its share by 1856 (LeoGrande and Thomas, 2002: 325). Given the historical prominence of sugar in the economy, Fidel Castro once again declared Cuban option of return to specialisation in sugar to generate wealth and finance development of the rest of the economy (LeoGrande and Thomas: 2002: 327). With the experience of failed diversification attempts in the late
Figure 2.11a: Cuban Sugar Exports by Destination, 1952-1961 (in thousand tons)

*include Albania, Bulgaria, Peoples’ Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Vietnam and Yugoslavia

Source: Extracted informations are based on Sugar Year Book (1982 and 1985); cited in Perez-Lopez (1988: 125)

Figure 2.11b: Cuban Sugar Exports by Destination, 1970-1985 (in thousand tons)

*include Albania, Bulgaria, Peoples’ Republic of China, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, Vietnam and Yugoslavia

Source: Extracted informations are based on Sugar Year Book (1982 and 1985); cited in Perez-Lopez (1988: 125)
1960s, the 13-year period socialist regime unequivocally had now eschewed diversification, one of its prime goals of the development. In 1964, William LeoGrande and Julie Thomas (2002: 327) pointed out, the Soviet Union was buying considerable quantity of Cuban sugar at a fixed price higher than the world market; and by 1970, Cuba’s Soviet debt had amounted to $2.5 billion. Cuba was admitted to the socialist trade bloc called Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1972 and was assured a reliable market for its sugar and other exports; during the global oil crisis in the 1970s, Cuba was buying Soviet energy at a price lower than market rate due to special arrangement. Until the late 1980s, Cuba was doing 85 per cent of its foreign trade with CMEA out of which the Soviet Union’s share was 70-75 per cent, and Soviet aid and credits had amounted to 20-30 per cent of Cuba’s gross domestic product (GDP) (Xianglin, 2007: 94). Assured higher price of sugar and lower price of oil, as a consequence, made Cuban sugar specialisation more lucrative; created disincentive for trade with other countries; and deepened structural weaknesses in Cuban economy (LeoGrande and Thomas, 2002: 331-32). In other words, the socialist economy had all the characteristics of a delayed and dependent mono-cultural economy.

Much before Cuba’s Revolution of 1959, on the other hand, its economy was closely knitted with that of US when Cuban sugar production had one fourth of global share. By the late 1920s, as stated above, US firms were controlling 75 per cent of Cuban sugar industry. A decade before the Revolution, Cuban trade with US was 69.1 per cent and 54.8 per cent of Cuban sugar was sold in US market (LeoGrande, 1979: 1-29; cited in LeoGrande and Thomas, 2002: 326). By 1962, that is, after the Bay of Pigs and missile crisis, Cuba’s trade with US had come down to zero and has dramatically reached to 49.3 per cent with the Soviet Union. Cuba-Soviet trade, on the other side, was negligible before 1959 (LeoGrande and Thomas, 2002: 326). Scholars have alluded of Cuba having alternated its dependence on US with its socialist dependence on the Soviet Union.

While reviewing Carmelo Mesa-Lago’s book The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two Decade Appraisal (1981), Peter Gregory (1982: 505-07) outlined Mesa-Lago’s words that Cuba had promoted greater equality in distribution of income and social services and elevated the lot of those at the bottom of the pre-revolutionary social structure; but had sacrificed, on the other side, the other goals of the socialist regime
such as economic growth, diversification, economic independence, and full employment. Moreover, Mesa-Lago had pointed out that even after two decades of the Revolution, Cuba could not regain the pre-revolutionary productivity levels (Gregory, 1982: 506).

The post-Revolution socialist dreams of the anti-Batista rebels and Cuba’s deepening dependence by special arrangements with the Socialist bloc of CMEA largely reinforce, rather than showing a way out of, the security-development nexus and the proverbial dilemmas that the Circum-Caribbean small and micro states of the region exhibit. Often constrained in undertaking independent development initiatives and mired between the global changes, like most other regional counterparts, post-Cold War Cuba is facing the dilemma to walk between its cherished ‘socialist principles’ and pinching economic imperative of today. Mesa-Lago’s (1981) two decade appraisal of Cuba’s economy, for instance, is understandable from economic point of view; Cuban economy, as LeoGrande (1981: 197) would observe, was being directed by political rather than market forces. Cuba’s socialism and development dilemma, therefore, is well premised in the context when the dichotomies between political and economic and between security and development are blurred in the small and micro states. One can prefer post-Revolution Cuban socialism as the point of departure or the cold-warriors’ ideological rivalry be the framework of analysis in comprehending the nexus and various dilemmas; the reality is that dichotomous vantage points would hardly yield desired outcome as the tails of the security and development issues are mutually interlocked. As Cuban socialist regime further advances its reform agenda, it is therefore less like to eschew the tag of post-Revolution socialist principles. Limited domestic market and inadequate resource endowments cause a small state like Cuba to search for economies of external scale; and the same in turn solicits challenging domestic political and economic adjustments without which international actors of today do not heed to the call of any kind. Therefore, as Mao Xianglin (2007: 104) pointed out, every time an important structural reform has been conceived in Cuba, massive popular discussions have been conducted to ensure its viability. In the line of the Circum-Caribbean proverbial vulnerabilities, a dilemma between socialism and development choice thus occurs in Cuban context that further helps appreciate the Circum-Caribbean security-development problematique.
CONCLUSION: SECURITY-DEVELOPMENT NEXUS: VIRTUOUS AND VICIOUS

The cases of tourism-HIV/AIDS, democracy-disparity, and Cuba’s development dilemma in the Caribbean archipelago context, first of all, authenticate that various issues have come close in the wake of the domestic-international interface which is the patent reality of the world today. These simultaneously endorse the security-development interlocking. Economic globalisation, technological revolution, and structural engineering of the international political economy have forcefully pushed the interfacing and interlocking forward into other dimensions such as epidemics, narco trafficking, and offshore banking in the entire Circum-Caribbean region.

The twin processes of interfacing and interlocking have undergone various evolutionary stages. But there are legitimate concerns for caution about the nature and character of these processes. The domains of security and development remain frustratingly separated in the institutional bodies and organisational structures designed to ‘provide’ development and ‘ensure’ security, as well as in the enactment of security and development in particular and localised sites (Stern and Ojendal, 2010: 7; Jensen, 2010; Orjuela, 2010). There are various travel and tourism related bodies and structures in the Circum-Caribbean, for instance, designed to steer the industry but, at the same time, there are severe deficits in the policies to eliminate the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Moreover, the state governments hesitate to adopt certain measures that might be effective to curb down the menace but will lower the tourist receipts. Likewise, since democracy has become the global norm of legitimate governance, no country in the Caribbean Basin (like anywhere in the world) would explicitly proclaim that several of today’s pressing problems are by-products of the twin architectural works of political and economic liberalisations (as both make two sides of a single coin). A democratic state which is built upon the optimism of security and stability, while mixing up with global ‘structural’ business, divulge the institutional and organisational disconnectedness in terms of security and development. Cuba, on the other side, is said to be following a unique socialist trajectory but the post-Cold War reforms in turn are reinforcing the proverbial vulnerabilities that any other Circum-Caribbean country exhibit. It is not easy to behold the danger zones of the grey areas especially in the small and micro states created by intermingling of security
and development. The same is simply unfathomable when it comes to drug industry and offshore banks in the region.

Correspondingly, security and development can be seen as the tools of scholars and policy analysts to describe and analyse macro processes in international affairs and to generate knowledge. On the other, they are used by actors applying these concepts to prescribe processes and determine outcomes (Stern and Ojendal, 2010: 6-7) (emphases in original). The political contents inherent in the concepts of security and development with ever expanding usages and multiple meanings (see figure 2.1) are already known. The ever increasing difficulty with precision and concretisation of the concepts in the Titanic Lilliputs too is clear. Then the concerted comprehension of the nexus between the two – as concepts and processes – is not less than attempting to demystify two grand mysteries of the global political economy. Yet currently, the scholars and analysts have achieved commendable success in this regard and the discourse on the nexus has acquired ‘discursive’ illustration to generate scholarly debates. Conversely, the actors in the concerned region remain orthodox and ‘structurally adjusted’ in their political economic approach in directing and achieving what they think rightful by justifying the nexus in a certain colour. This leads to securitisation of development and developmentalisation of security (Kuhn, 2008) and ultimately favours security issues over developmental ones. This is further linked with Third World (underdevelopment) characteristics and First World (insecurity) implications warranted by domestic-international interface. Moreover, both the scholarly and actors’ take on the nexus focuses narrowly on the post-conflict societies. This bears considerable repercussions for the small and micro states in the Circum-Caribbean as i) it visualises contemporary security and developmental issues simply as problems of managerial inability; ii) failure of state-building; and iii) conceals associated historical/colonial fallacies. This diminishes efficacy of the programmes and policies designed to address the nexus.
See Chapter VI: Regionalism and Circum-Caribbean Security and Development for a detailed understanding of the definition and meaning of Circum-Caribbean.

This ‘vulnerability-adaptation’ debate is given considerable exposition in the ‘vulnerability-resilience’ discourse by Andrew Cooper and Timothy Shaw in their edited work The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience (2009).


This is not the case with small and micro states. All the time these states seem to be in post-conflict situation. How is one to explain, for example, the links between ethnic conflict, violence, and political instabilities in some countries in Caribbean archipelago.

Cincotta (2010) observed that a youthful age structure or youth bulge offers the most serious challenges to the political stability of states.

Duffield further observed that ‘for most of the post-Cold War period, the promise that development can promote international security has been embraced in a spirit of aid industry optimism born out of feelings of policy and mandate renewal.

That is after 9/11.

Therefore, in order to understand the nature and implications of the contemporary security-development nexus, Duffield proposed to conceive development and underdevelopment biopolitically.

Prashad wrote, ‘The battles for land rights and water rights, for cultural dignity and economic parity, for women’s rights and indigenous rights, for the construction of democratic institutions and responsive states – these are legion in every country, on every continent’ (Prashad, 2007; quoted by Berger and Weber, 2009: 2).

Hettne (2010) makes sense of the current period as a ‘second great transformation’ with globalisation establishing a market on a global scale and the counter-movements searching for alternatives. This transformation indicates a more interventionist developing thinking in its way.

But tourism is not the only reason behind increasing HIV.

Huber et al. (2006) contributed to the tradition and reinforced the argument stating that democracy reduces inequality. But they added to the argument that the same is possible if the left parties grow sufficiently strong to achieve legislative influence in favour of interests of the underprivileged.

The imposed measures were liberalisation of foreign exchange and import controls, devaluation of the currency, and deflation of domestic demand (Payne and Sutton, (eds.) 1993: 21).

However, mainly confined to offshore banking and tourism (Narayanan, 2004: 3).