We read epistemology and will continue to read, because they fascinate us by raising questions, opening perspectives, challenging and illuminating with regard to episteme i.e. knowledge. The epistemology in Vedantic thoughts as treated by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra in his master-work, *Vedanta Paribhasa* has reached a climax. The philosophical precision of this manual to the system of monistic thought has been spectacular.

*Pramanäs* or the sources of valid knowledge refer to the epistemology which is one of the important topics of Indian philosophy. Consciousness that is expressed in the form of modification of the intellect being in contact with an object is called *Prama*. The modification of the intellect that is instrumental cause of *Prama* is technically known as Pramāña. According to Advaita Vedāntins *Pramanäs* are of six kinds.

The treatment of six *Pramanäs* in the *Vedanta Paribhasa* needs a critical and comparative study which has been explicitly made in this dissertation. We are obliged here to critically examine human knowledge, its means, its various nature and various kinds. Most of the epistemological problems were discussed by the *Vedantins* and there is more of less agreement even now as to how they should be solved or otherwise disposed of. As such our primary intention is quite explicit.
I have taken up the problem and tried to analyse according to the following plan and design.

Chapter one which is an Introduction to the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* takes into account the six philosophical orthodox systems and the three schools of heterodox systems. It also attempts to trace the development of monistic thought in Indian philosophical context.

Chapter two discusses in some detail about the Indian theory of Knowledge as advocated by different schools of Indian philosophy. It prepares a critical survey of valid and invalid knowledge as well as the sources of valid knowledge in a nutshell.

In chapter three Perception is examined in detail as a means of valid knowledge, enunciating kinds of consciousness, varieties of mental mode and the two fold divisions of perception along with dream perception elaborately.

In chapter four Inference is defined. A comparative study between the definition of Vedānta and the definitions offered by the other schools is scrutinized. The concept of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra is also elucidated in it.

Chapter five is concerned with Comparison as a means of valid knowledge. It systematically deals with the view points of different schools as well as the interpretation of Dharmarāja Adhvarindra exhaustively.

The sixth chapter enumerates how almost all the Indian philosophical schools have accepted verbal authority as a source of valid knowledge except the Cārvāka, the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣika along with the exegesis of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. 
Chapter seven analyses Presumption as a separate means of valid knowledge with regard to the Advaitins, the Bhaṭṭas and Prabhākara School of Mimāṁsakas. It shows how Dharmarājā tried to establish the distinctiveness of presumption.

In the eighth chapter Non-apprehension is analytically discussed. Divergent opinions so as to its acceptance or rejection are scrutinized. It shows how Dharmarājā accepts Non-apprehension as a separate pramāṇa.

In the epilogue all the various ideas discussed in the previous chapter are briefly brought together. Fairly and objectively it presents our observations in course of study to vindicate the title of the present dissertation.

It is fitting that I should thank all those whose enlightened teachings and writings have been used in this thesis, the frequency with which the names of some pioneers occur in the text or footnotes indicates those to whom I owe most.

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I am really conscious of the probable shortcomings. If any sort of inadvertent mistake is there, it is mine, but in fine. I still echo Jayanta Bhatta’s words:

"कुटो वा नूतन वस्तु वययुद्धश्चिन्नम् क्षणमः।
वचोविन्यासंशैवविचिन्तायार्थमन्त्रविचारार्थाताम्।"

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