CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

Vedānta Paribhāṣā is a magnificent monograph, a commendable contribution to the Vedāntic philosophic approach specially intensifying on the Pramāṇas. On the observations of our study, at the outset, it appeared to be a compendious compendium of Advaita Vedānta but in fact, its author Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has tremendously exhibited his superb scholasticity and primodical impulses to the treatment of kindred topics of Vedāntic epistemology or instruments of knowledge.

This hand book is a master-work, a stepping stone to the higher authoritative texts of the school of Advaita Vedānta. It recognizes six means of valid knowledge. They are Perception, Inference, Verbal testimony, Comparison, Presumption and Non-apprehension. Pertaining to the discussion on various pramāṇas prolifically, it is implied that the author was a preeminent disciple of Advaita Vedānta and a follower of Vivaraṇa school.

The Manual deals with our prime concern, the instruments of valid knowledge (pramāṇas), objects of knowledge (prameyas), subject matter (viṣaya) and the fruit (prayojana). Epistemology deals with the function of the characteristics of pramāṇa, pramiti, prameya and pramāṭr. These four cover the nature of things. In the process, the reality from the standpoint of the Advaita is also enunciated. The same is the case with the Vedānta Paribhāṣā. It has great contribution on elaboration of the function of these issues.
The dialectical skill of Dharmarāja was a stroke of genius. He has shown a great originality in the interpretation of the *VP*. He was a voracious reader, a versatile scholar and a prolific author. He has attempted to systematize the central tenets of *Upanīṣads*, the *Brahma-Sūtras*, Śaṅkara's *Sūtrabhaṣya*, the *Vārtika* of *Sūtrabhaṣya* of Śaṅkara, the *Pañcapāḍikā Vivaraṇa*, the *Citsukha* etc. As and when warranted, the author used the citation from all these works.

To sum up the concluding observations of our comparative study as thus:

- The *Nyāya* theory believes that knowledge has four separate sources. Those are perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

- According to the *Vaiśeṣika* system means of valid knowledge are of four kinds. Those are perception, inference, remembrance (*smṛti*) and intuitive knowledge (*ārśajñāna*).

- The *Śaṅkhya* philosophy recognises three sources of valid knowledge. That are: perception, inference and verbal testimony.

- The *Yoga* theory admits the three pramāṇas viz. perception, inference and verbal testimony.

- The Prabhākara school of *Mīmāṃsā* admits five pramāṇas. viz. *pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, śabda, upamāṇa* and *arthapatti*. The Bhaṭṭa School accepts all these five pramāṇas with an addition of *anupalabdhī* or *abhāva* to them.
According to Advaita vedāntins, the means of valid knowledge or pramāṇas are of six kinds. Those are pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, śabda/āgama, upamāṇa, arthāpatthi and anupalabdhi, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra discusses these means of valid knowledge from the Vedānta stand point of view.

(i) Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra seemed undaunted by all the opposition especially the Naiyāyikas to the point of view of his Advaita school on any topic. Through out the work we find expertised tirades made by him frequently against the Naiyāyikas and in some places against the Mīmāṃsakas. He attacks the Mīmāṃsakas on the question of śabda (Veda) - nityatva and refutes it tooth and nail. This displays his knowledge of Mīmāṃsā, while commenting upon expectancy; while discussing the relative importance of śravaṇa, manana and nīdhiyāsana, he accepts them as primary and secondary causes; he also speaks of the six pramāṇas which reveal subsidiariness (āṅgatva). Of course, on the pramāṇa side the author mostly accepts the Bhaṭṭa argument. It is customary with the Advaitin that according to the of quoted maxim Pramāṇe Bhaṭṭanayah.

(ii) The entire Pratyakṣa pariccheda appears to be a product of the author's own ingenuity where he speaks of 'jñānagata-pratyakṣatva-prayojaka' and 'viśayagata-pratyakṣatva-prayojaka' lucidly, the justification of the different epithets included in the definition of pratyakṣa etc. Much against the Naiyāyika stand point, Dharmarāja argues on the basis of the Vivarana.
how *śabda* can give immediate knowledge. Dharmarāja advocates non-difference (*abheda*) between *viṣayacaitanya* and *pramāṇacaitanya* for the production of immediate knowledge but not simple contact. He does not accept the view that production forms a sense organ contributes to *pratyakṣatva*. He also contradicts the views of the Naiyāyika that inferential knowledge is entirely of an inferential nature. The subject part of it is immediate and the other part is mediate and thus he contradicts the Naiyāyika’s view.

Concept of *nirvikalpaka* according to the Vedantins is quite different from that of the school of the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. *Nirvikalpaka* is a kind of knowledge but is different from *pratyakṣa* as the knowledge of the object is not determinable. The *VP* has objectively included the *nirvikalpa* under *pratyakṣa* to establish the identity of the individual self with universal self. It is an innovative interpretation and has the quality of peculiarity.

*Nirvikalpaka jñāna* according to the school of Naiyāyikas is neither *pratyakṣa* nor *anumiti* nor any kind of *anubhava* and can hardly come under *buddhi* itself as it gives rise to know *vyavahāraḥ*. *Pratyakṣa* comes under *pramā* (*tadvati tatprakārakatvam*) but *nirvikalpaka* cannot be *pramā* as it is not definite. Hence it cannot be *pratyakṣa*. It is a *jñāna* of peculiar kind and quite distinct from other cognitions. Thus *nirvikalpaka* having no *prakāra* is discriminated from all the determinate cognitions such as percepts, judgements, analogies and verbal knowledge.
The vedāntic writers are satisfied by including nirvikālpa under pratyakṣa. According to them the proper meaning of nirvikālpa will be known from thinking of a judgement like "This is that Devadatta". The very judgement expresses nirvikālpa perception. In this case there is no difficulty in understanding the concept of nirvikālpa. The Vedāntic writers have tasked themselves to demonstrate the non-relational (nirvikālpa) character of the judgements. It seems as if they are not interested in what other schools call nirvikālpa pratyakṣa to be. It is also clear that the Vedāntins neither accept the nirvikālpa stage as conceived by Naiyāyikas nor refute their views. For others the distinction between savikalpa and nirvikālpa means one between undeveloped or indefinite perception and developed or definite perception. Advaitins distinguish them as perception of the identical or the non-related (saṁsargānavagāhin) and perception of the related (saṁsargāvagāhin).

(iii) The author makes a clear distinction of Jīva, Īśvara, Jīvasākṣin and Īśvarasākṣin with the help of the technical words upādhi and viśeṣana while speaking of delusion (bhrānti) he rejects the jñānalakṣaṇaprattyāsatti advocated by the Naiyāyika. Dharmarāja clearly distinguishes between pramāṇa and vivarta from two different points of view. Dharmarāja raises a number of doubts in the theory of illusion and solves them from Advaitic standpoint. As a follower of the Vivaraṇa school, our author refutes the Naiyāyika view that mind is a sense organ and discusses the subject from Vedic and Smṛti evidence.
(iv) In *Anumāna* Dharmarāja rejects the established theory of the Naiyāyika that the recollection of *vyāpti* is the intermediary activity of *anumāna*. The author also rejects the Naiyāyika division of the mark (*hetu*) into three and establishes his own point of view as the one of a form 'anvaya' only. He rejects the 'kevalavyatirekin' also. He applies his knowledge of *anumāna* to establish the unreality of the universe quoting *Citsukha* and vindicating his theory from possible attacks.

In the chapter on *Upamāna* the author follows the *Mīmāṃsā* theory and criticises the Naiyāyika. There are quite a few different theories about precisely what kind of knowledge this resulting knowledge is.

(v) In the *Śabdakhaṇḍa* the author gives his own definition of ākārṇkṣā. Dharmarāja criticises the theory of capacity for a word in the individual (*vyaktisakti*) and accepts the theory of the Mīmāṃsaka *is* 'jatisakti'. As against the tradition of many other theorists, he maintains that implication is two-fold—pure (*kevala*) and 'lakṣitalakṣanā'. In this context, the author has a special contribution in respect of implication while interpreting sentences like 'Soyam Devadattaḥ', 'Tattvamasi'. He suggests that there in no need to take recourse of lakṣanā. He agrees with the Mīmāṃsaka that implied sense (lakṣanā) may be present in a sentence also and not only in a word. As regards purport (*tatparya*) Dharamarāja gives a definition of his own and rejects the Naiyāyika's view.

(vi) The author upholds the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas view regarding *arthāpatti* and *anupalabdhi*. According to the Naiyāyikas, *arthāpatti* may be reduced to *anumāna* (of the 'vyatireki' type). According to the *Paribhāṣākāra*,
**arthāpatti** does not overlap on the 'vyatirekyanumāṇa' for, the later has been rejected by the Advaitin. According to the Māṃsaka, as stated earlier, the absence of the five *pramāṇas* is held to be *anupalabdhi*. That is to say that by *anupalabdhi* is meant as non-cognition (the cognition may be of any type, *pratyakṣa* etc.) in which case *abhāva* should be viewed, as *pramāṇa*.

(vii) In the context of discussion the validity of knowledge (*pramāṇya*), the *Paribhāśākāra* rejects the Naiyāyika stand-point that merit (*guna*) is the cause of validity (*pramā*) and fault (*doṣa*) is the cause of invalidity (*apramā*). The author includes absence of fault in the definition of *pramā*. He advocates the theory of self validity of the Māṃsaka and creates a possibility for a doubt also that may arise.

(viii) In the *prameya* part of the work, Dharmarāja discusses the essential and the secondary characteristics like subject-hood and shows how Brahman is the cause of the universe. The author also argues skillfully how misery which is superimposed on Brahman is not a source of happiness. In his statement of creation of the Universe he rejects the Naiyāyika view: *Śabda* is a *viśeṣaguna* of ether alone'. He gives a clear description of creation in a logical way. In point of destruction he does not accept the Naiyāyika view that the destruction of the non-inherent cause is the cause of the destruction of the effect. Dharmarāja views the *adrṣṭanāsa* is necessary to be accepted even by the Naiyāyikas. His argument that sentences of the Holy Texts have their import in Brahman is very interesting and illuminating.
The *Paribhāṣākāra* gives arguments for and against the views that 'Jīva' and 'Paramēśvara' regarding their being either 'bimba' or *pratibimba*; while discussing the meaning of 'Tat'. While discussing the word 'Tvam', he discusses *mukti* and its utility in detail. The various views thereon are discussed. Theory of one soul and multiplicity of souls etc., dream, waking state etc. have been defined. He also shows how *Śabda* can set aside *pratyakṣa* in point of validity. Dharmarāja accepts the beginningless nature of this world.

In the chapter on *Prayojana* the author makes it clear how *śravaṇa* etc. are necessary though liberation has always been there. He does not accept the *Bhāmatī* view that *manana* etc. are the direct causes. Dharmarāja agrees with the *Vivaraṇa* that *śravaṇa* etc. are the direct causes, *karma* leads to knowledge (*jñāna*) and knowledge leads to the final goal (*mukti*). The author discusses the *saguṇopāsana* and *nirguṇopāsana* as forms of worship. He also discusses the 'Oneness' of *Avidyā* and *Karmamuktī* (gradual liberation), liberation with the body.

These are the valid points on which different schools of Indian philosophies as well as Dharmarāja Adhvārīndra put forth the analysis on means of valid knowledge or *pramāṇas*. In the present study we have tried to encompass the divergent views of the distinguished thinkers analytically to discern the epistemological concept of *pramāṇas* with a comparative observation.