In the sixth chapter of the *VP*, the author, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra tries to establish the sixth means of valid knowledge which is accepted by the Advaita Vedāntins as *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) "The means of valid knowledge known as non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) is the extra-ordinary cause of that apprehension of non-existence which is not due to knowledge as an instrument 1. It means that the non-existence of a thing is apprehended by its non-perception. 'By not seeing a jar in its place one knows that it is not there'. Here the cognizer is aware of the absence of the object by means of non-perception or non-apprehension (*abhāva*). It may seem paradoxical that the non-apprehension of a thing is means to the apprehension of its non-existence (*abhāva*). But in fact, non-apprehension as well as perception serves as a means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to the knowing self (*pramāṭṛ*) who is aware of both. They lead to positive and negative experiences. We know both the presence and absence of things, the one by perception and the other by non-perception.

That non-existence is of four kinds -previous non-existence (*pragabhāva*), non-existence as destruction (*pradhvamsābhāva*) absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) and mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) 2. *Pragabhāva* is

2. स च अभावः चतुर्विधः प्रागभावः प्रध्वंसाभावः अत्यन्ताभावः अन्योन्याभाववर्चेति । *ibid.*, p.137
the absence of an effect such as a jar in its cause, a lump of clay, for example, before the effect has originated. It is the object of cognition that the thing will come into being. Pradhvamsābhāva is the absence of the jar being destroyed in such a manner that the re-appearance of the jar will be impossible. Absolute non-existence in a particular substratum is for all times to come; as, the absolute non-existence of colour in air.

The mutual non-existence (anyonyābhāva) possesses a beginning when its substratum has a beginning; as, the difference a jar has from a cloth.

Mutual non-existence is again divided into two categories, i.e. conditioned and un-conditioned\(^3\). An example of the first is this; the one sun is manifold according to different water vessels. Unconditioned difference is the difference a jar has from a cloth. A thing is perceived by perception and absence of a category is known through non-apprehension. Before stating the exhaustive explanation of Dharamarāja Adharindra on the above, let us examine how he deals with the repudiation of other system of philosophy like the Nyāya etc.

In the Nyāya philosophy, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers only to the views of Bhaṭṭas, the Prabhākaras and Buddhists and comes to the conclusion that though anupalabdhi or abhāva (non-apprehension or negation) is a reality,

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3. सोपाधिको निरुपाधिकर्षेति | ibid., p.140.
anupalabdhi is not a distinct way of knowing. The Advaita Vedāntins accept anupalabdhi as a distinct source of knowledge.

'In Indian Philosophy, abhāva (negation) has been discussed in two forms, viz., as an ontological reality and as a way of knowing. In the first form it is mentioned by such words as asat, alīka, nirupākhya, nīṭsvabhāva, etc., and in the second form it is referred to as anupalabdhi. A general epistemological notion of the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas regarding negation is that there is some reality known as abhāva and there is a way ascertaining it which is known as anupalabdhi. Here we are primarily concerned with the problem of abhāva as means of knowledge" 4.

The Advaita Vedāntins and the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas accept anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) as an independent source of knowledge. They hold the view that the absence of an object or its attribute from a locus is known only through the means known as non-apprehension by its non-perception. Non-apprehension i.e. 'anupalabdhi' but not by any other means of knowledge like perception. The non-existence of a thing is apprehended by its non-perception. Non-apprehension of a thing is a means to the apprehension of its non-existence. In this context, the term non-apprehension stands for non-perception.

4. ITK., p.272
Different theories of anupalabdhi are found in oriental epistemology. Some systems deny anupalabdhi as an additional pramāṇa. There is a difference of opinion between the Naiyāyika and the Vaiśeṣika about the method of cognizing this pramāṇa. The Naiyāyikas maintain that abhāva is an object of perception (pratyakṣa); on the other hand, in the opinion of the Vaiśeṣikas it is cognized through inference (anumāna). The Naiyāyikas hold that non-existence of a jar on the ground is not identical with the bare ground, it is rather adjectival to it. Abhāva is the character of the ground and it is perceived in the same ways in which the colour, size, etc., of the ground are perceived with the perception of the ground. To avoid these difficulties, the Naiyāyikas have assumed special type of contact between the sense and abhāva which they call viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva. The Naiyāyikas who hold that abhāva is a reality but it can be cognized through perception and that there is no need of accepting anupalabdhi as an additional pramāṇa.

The Prabhākaras do not admit anupalabdhi as a separate pramāṇa. They maintain that though it has no objective reality, it is capable of being cognized through perception. According to Prabhākaras, the non-existence of an object is not different from its actual locus that it is to say that the absence of a jar on the floor is not different from the floor itself. The knowledge of the sustainer by itself (tanmātrādi) is what replies to negation. There is no distinctive
category to be named as non-existence\(^5\), hence there is no requirement of an extra-sixth *pramāṇa* termed *abhava*.

The *Sāṁkhya* view is identical with that of the Prabhākara *Mīmāṁsakas*. The *Yoga* also does not accept *anupalabdhi* as a distinct means on the same ground on which the *Sāṁkhya* rejects it. The Sāṁkhyaśas maintain that the non-existence of a jar on the ground is nothing but the ground that is devoid of any content and the bare ground is nothing but the ground itself. Thus, the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground is the cognition of the ground. Hence, the Sāṁkhyaśas conclude that the non-existence of the jar on the ground can be cognized through perception.

According to the Buddhists, *anupalabdhi* is a kind of either perception or inference, but not an independent means of knowledge. They hold that non-existence is directly perceived by the sense organs and no separate source of knowledge is required to apprehend it. The knowledge, there is no jar on the ground means the apprehension of the ground with the absence of the jar. Therefore, the ground and the absence of the jar is perceived through the sense organs. Thus the Buddhists agree that the negative facts are real, as the Bhaṭṭa *Mīmāṁsakas* and the Naiyāyikas do, but unlike the former, they do not believe in negation as an additional source, as it is directly perceived by the external sense organs.

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5. प्रमाणेऽखलो तत्त्वावधि प्रभेदस्याब्वत्वोपभोक्तम् ।
तत्राभावस्य किं तत्त्वात् प्रभेदयति चिन्त्यताम् ।
मेयापावे ततो मानमू अभावायः कथं भवेत् । PP., pp.12,14
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa speaks of *anupalabdhi* as nothing but the absence of the five previously stated *pramāṇas*. That is to say that, in a case where the *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa* fail to operate efficiently in bringing about the knowledge of the existence of an object, we have the idea of the non-existence of an object and the means is called *anupalabdhi*⁶ (non-apprehension).

Kumārila's analysis of the metaphysical as well as the epistemological aspects and is largely responsible for formulating the theory of *anupalabdhi* as a distinct way of knowing. The basis of Bhaṭṭa's theory is that in the case of an object where other *pramāṇa* do not function towards the comprehension of its existence, we have *anupalabdhi* as the only means of cognition. The ascertainment of the non-existence of an object depends on the validity of negation as a way of knowing. The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas believe that every object has two forms: one of existence and the other of non-existence cannot by any means be reduced ⁷ to non-existence and existence respectively. When a jar has existence in a room, it can be cognized by means of perception or by some other *pramāṇa* and when no such means yield any knowledge of the object, the object is judged by the very absence of knowledge *anupalabdhi*.

Dharmarāja Adhvrīndra defines *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) in his *VP* as: The means of valid knowledge known as non-apprehension is the

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⁶ *Śrīvijayamānānī, pramāṇapakṣe, prasthāpita vatsūrupeṇa n jayate vatsusātvabhāvabodhayāh tatra bhāvapramāṇata* | *ŚV*, p.409.

⁷ *ŚWX*, p.160
extraordinary cause of that apprehension of non-existence which is not due
to knowledge as an instrument. In this definition, the clause 'which is not
due' etc., is inserted to preclude the definition from unduly extending to an
anumāna (inference) or the like which causes that apprehension of the non-
existence of imperceptible objects which is due to anumāna etc. The word'
extraordinary' is used to prevent a too wide extension to such general causes
as merit and demerit. The qualifying term 'apprehension' is for precluding a
similar unwarranted extension to latent impressions, which are the
extraordinary cause of a recollection of non-existence. That is to say the
simple word 'jñāna' has been used in the definition since (abhāvasmṛti)
recollection of non-existence which has got 'sāṃskāra' for its efficient cause
will have to be considered as anupalabdhi. Anupalabdhi or abhāva is the
means through which we come acquire knowledge about the non-existent. It
is remarkable that the Vedānta recognizes abhāva as 'bhāvapadārtha', as
abhāva does not mean a 'void'. Actually we know non-existence by non
apprehension. For example, we perceived the locus of ground (adhikarāṇa) of
a jar, when the jar is removed from its locus, we perceived the locus
(adhikarana) of the non-existence (abhāva) of the jar, and not the non-existence
itself. Anupalabdhi enables us to know the non-existence of a particular
cognition.

8. ज्ञानकरणन्याभावानुभवसाधारणकारण अनुपलब्धिरूप प्रमाणम्। VP, p.125.
As Citsukha states⁹, anupalabdhipramāṇa itself is to be cognized by another anupalabdhi and so on ad infinitum. He also clarifies that if ‘anupalambha’ by itself is the cause of a knowledge even in deep sleep there should be a knowledge of non-existence. In order to avoid this contingency if we include the phrase ‘yogya’ as an epithet of anupalabdhi, it does not save the situation far from ‘yogyānupalabdhi’, it must be stated the knowledge of non-existence is produced as fire from smoke. A second valid objection raised by Citsukha is that anupalabdhi cannot be an efficient means of valid knowledge because its intermediate activity is not stated: neither the recollection of the counterpositive (pratiyogī-smarāṇa) nor cognition of its locus (adhikaraṇagrahāṇa) cannot be considered to be its ‘vyāpāra’, and hence cannot be generated from ‘anupalambha’, a negative object.

In this context, a question naturally arises whether anupalabdhi is a separate pramāṇa. According to the Naiyāyikas non-existence is cognized only with the help of the sense organ and comes under the scope of pratyakṣa. They hold that where anupalabdhi is not cognized the cause it is a case of pratyakṣa where it is cognized, it is a case of anumāṇa.

The author of the VP holds along with the other theorists that competent, i.e. ‘yogyānupalabdhi’ non-cognition is the efficient means. Here an interesting

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⁹. TP., p.435.
question has been raised by the author as to the formation of the term 'yogyānupalabdhi'—whether this term is a: (a) genitive compound, cf., 'yogyasya anupalabdhīḥ' of the non-cognition of the competent or (b) locative compound, cf. 'yogyē (adkhikaraṇe) anupalabdhīḥ'. Our author is of the view neither of these alternatives serves the purpose for, on the first alternative 10 there is the contingency of the difference from the demon existing in the post (stambha) becoming non-perceptual. Nor is the second alternative 11 valid since there is the unwelcome contingency of the negation of merit (dharmābhāva) etc. existing in the soul becoming perceptual. In this way, Dharmarāja scores out the possibility of either the genitive compound or the locative compound and resorts to the karmadhārāya 12 compound when he speaks of 'yogyānupalabdhi'. The idea is that the means of valid cognition of non-existence is only a competent non-cognition (yogyānupalabdhi but not any 'anupalabdhi'). So much so a definition of 'yogyatā' in the 'anupalabdhi' concerned has to be carefully defined. The Paribhāṣākāra accepts the Naiyāyika definition of 'yogyatā' of 'anupalabdhi' as: 'being possessed of a cognition of a counterpositive which has been imposed by the existence of the posited counterpositive' 13.

10. योगवस्त्र प्रतियोगिणोन्नुपलब्धिः । VP., p.126.
11. योगे अधिकरणे प्रतियोगिणोन्नुपलब्धिः । ibid.
12. योग्या चासानुललम्बः चेति । ibid., p.127
13. य: प्रतियोगी तस्य सत्तेनाधिकरणे तर्कितेन प्रस्यन्योग्यमापादनयोग्यं प्रतियोग्युपलब्धिः। ibid., p.127

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The idea is that when we apprehend the non-existence of the jar, there is the possibility of supposition (apādāna) that the jar would have been perceived had it been on the floor (of course when there is aid of light etc.) and so there is 'yogatā', present in the 'anupalabdhi'. As a result of this the absence of the jar is cognized. On the other hand, it is not possible to make such a supposition because of the absence of light. Similarly in the non-existence of a demon (piśāca) in the pillar; there is the competent non-cognition and thus the absence of a demon in the post is arrived at by non-cognition. In the case of the absence of merit, and the absence of demerit in the soul, since these two are supersensuous and the concerned supposition is not rendered possible, it cannot be stated the absence of merit and demerit etc. (dharmādharmanādyābhava) is arrived at through non-cognition. Thus the supposition (apādāna) of the cognition of the counterpositive is different in different places, sometimes due to the subject being incompetent (ayogya), sometimes due to the absence of necessary perceptual causes and other reasons.

The Naiyāyika's view is that the sense organ be taken as the already established means and 'anupalabdhi' as its aiding cause (sahakārikaraṇa). To this the Advaitin replies that, though the presence of the established sense organ is a condition precedent in cognizing non-existence, it should not be taken that it is the efficient means even in the case of mental mode in the form of non-existence.
The reason given by them is that, since non-cognition also is an established reason, it is considered by him to be the instrument (karaṇa), for this reason that the sense organ has no contact with the negation; even the activity of the sense organ which the opponent speaks of as inevitable ceases with the perception of the locus of the negation (abhāvādhikaraṇa) and therefore the sense organ becomes a superfluous, i.e. ‘anyathā-siddha’. Anyathā-siddha is an attendant circumstance not to be confounded with a cause, which must be a necessary invariable antecedent, e.g. a potter's father with regard to a jar made by the former.

In this connection, another subtle point has been raised by our author. He states prima facie that the opponent may hold that, as the resulting knowledge of abhāva (e.g. there is no jar on the floor) is a sense percept according to both; it may be argued that consciousness limited by the non-existence of the jar (ghatābhāvavacchinna caitya) has become non-different from the pramātā as with the consciousness limited by the floor (bhūtalāvacinna caitya) and as such knowledge of the absence of the jar (ghatābhāvajñāna) should be a case of perception. Dharmarāja finally rejects the view by stating that though knowledge of abhāva is pratyakṣa there is no rule that its instrument (karaṇa) also should be pratyakṣa.

14. ibid., p.130
15. ibid., p.132
For example, Dharmarāja quotes the well known instance of 'daśamastvamasi' (you are the tenth man), where its knowledge though perceptual, its 'karaṇa' happens to be verbal testimony which is different from the means of Perception. It should not be urged that a particular knowledge should result from one particular efficient instrument (karaṇa) only. A different mental mode (vṛtti) is enough to deem something to be a pramāṇa. Thus according to the Paribhāṣākāra, a knowledge of the absence of the jar is not produced from the sense organ as there is no contact but it is produced from the non-cognition of the jar (ghaṭānupalambha) which is a different pramāṇa.

The author raises another question here that, even in the case of non-cognition being a different pramāṇa, since the cognition of non-existence is pratyakṣa, there is the strange contingency of in-describable non-existence of the jar (anirvacanīya ghaṭābhāva), where in a particular spot there is a jar, the invalid knowledge of non-existence of the jar also becomes pratyakṣa. The objection here states 16 that this position cannot be accepted by the Vedāntin for, if this indescribable non-existence of the jar be considered to be produced from māyā (cosmic illusion), the efficient cause, it cannot be a non-existence. If it is not produced from māyā, then there is the contingency that all products are not produced from māyā which stand that Vedāntin cannot take.

16. ॥तत्त्व मायोपादानकत्वे अभावत्वानुपस्ते: ॥ ibid., p.134
To this Dharmarāja replies here that the invalid knowledge of the absence of jar (ghaṭābhāva) does not relate to the absence of jar which is produced at that particular moment, but it is a phenomenal non-existence of the jar (laukikaghaṭābhāva) which is superimposed on the floor. In this case, Dharmarāja accepts 'anyathākhyāti' alone and not 'anirvacanīyakhyāti'. This is the case in all places where there is sense contact (sannikarṣa) of the superimposed object 17.

This is a major divergence from the Advaitic point of view. Even accepting that, in such cases, the non-existence of jar etc. is considered 'anirvacanīya' (indescribable), he argues that māyā alone is the efficient cause (upādāna kāraṇa). The author boldly asserts that there is not necessary for entire similarity (sājātya) between the material cause and its products as the thread hood (tantutva) and clothhood (paṭatva). If it is insisted that some similarity should be there then between māyā and 'anirvacanīya' there is similarity in the form of falsehood 18.

In this connection, another doubt is raised. As if the Advaitin accepts the objects of two different classes (jātis) could be material cause (upādāna) and effect (upādeya), then he is forced to accept that Brahman is the material cause of the World.

17. SM., p.324
18. यत्किंतिः साजात्यस्त्र मायाः अनिर्वचनीयस्त्र भावस्त्र च मिथ्यापरमेय विद्यमानल्वाः। VR, p.135
To this doubt, Dharmarāja replies that this is acceptable to him for Brahman can be the *upādāna kāraṇa* (material cause) of the world, as it is the substratum of the false knowledge of the world. Though he does not accept Brahman to be the material cause by the process of evolution as Brahman has no parts 19.

Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of the commentary *Śikhāmani* gives ample argument to contradict the *Paribhāṣākāra* on non-cognition being advocated as a separate 20 one. He raises a question why *anupalabdhi* is considered as a separate *pramāṇa*. According to him, as without a sound obstacle the same sense organ can produce a knowledge of non-existence, and hence non-cognition cannot be a separate *pramāṇa*. On the other hand, Amaradāsa, the author of the *Maniprabhā* (the sub-commentary of the *Śikhāmani*) tries to establish the author’s view in his commentary 21.

19. तथा च प्रपञ्चस्य परिणामेऽपदानं माया, न भ्रम, इति सिद्धान्त इत्यत्तमतिप्रसंगेन । *Op.Cit.*
20. *SM.*, p.331
21. *MP.*, p.332
Four Kinds of Anupalabdhi or Abhāva:

The Paribhāśākāra accepts the fourfold division of abhāva or anupalabdhi as follows:

(i) Prāgabhāva (previous non-existence)

(ii) Pradhvamsābhāva (destructional non-existence)

(iii) Atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence),

(iv) Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence).

Of these, the absence of an effect (e.g. a jar) in its cause (clay etc.) before the effect is produced, is known as previous non-existence, i.e. prāgabhāva. This is cognized by a statement such as "there will be a jar". It is the object of a cognition that the thing will come into being. Rāmakṛṣṇa gives a more comprehensive definition of this absence. Unless this type of absence is accepted the same jar should be produced again and again.

Pradhvamsābhāva (destructional non-existence) is the absence of a thing. For example: a jar is congnised by statements like 'the jar is destroyed'.

According to the Naiyāyika due to destruction of the 'asamavāyikāraṇa' in an

22. स च भविष्यति इति प्रतीतिविषय: I VP, p.137
23. कार्यसमवायकालायाब्रूतिः सति कार्यात्पतिपूर्वकालीनाभावत्वम् I SM, p.325
object a thing is destroyed ever. Dharmarāja is of the opinion that pradhvarṁsābhāva itself a destruction, is destroyed when its locus (kapāla) is destroyed. Here the view of the Naiyāyika is that the absence of an absence is of the form of the counterpositive and as such the Naiyāyika cannot accept destruction in the case of the pradhvarṁsābhāva or dhvarṁsābhāva, for, in that case the destroyed jar should be produced again. On the other hand, the Advaitin is of the opinion that even the destruction of the jar should be destroyed since both pradhvarṁsābhāva and prāgabhāva are, as a rule, present in the locus of the counterpositive and thus as the kapāla also becomes the locus of destruction. The idea is that this destruction (of the jar) is destroyed by having no locus when the kapālas are destroyed. It is an established fact in Advaita Vedānta that the destruction of any particular thing produced is nothing but one remaining in the form of its substratum.

Similarly, the destruction of silver appearing in a nacre is nothing but Caitanya limited by this. As such the Advaitin argues that even the destruction of the jar is a destruction whose counterpositive is the jar. If this be not accepted, when the jar which is of the form of the destruction of the previous non-existence should reappear. The author further questions how, when the locus of the destruction happens to be permanent (nitya), the destruction connected with it can be destroyed. To the question he replies that if such

24. अधिखानावशेषो हि नाशः कल्पितवस्तुन: | VP., p.137
a locus be different from consciousness, then it is not 'nitya', for in the Advaitin's opinion all that is different from Brahman ceases to exist, when Brahmajñāna25 dawns.

That whose non-existence in a particular substratum is for all time--------past, present and future in a place, has atyantābhāva (absolute non-existence) ; e.g. there is absolute non-existence of colour in air. The Advaitin accepts this non-existence also as the counterpositive of destruction. The Naiyāyika thinks that atyantābhāva is nitya. Here the idea is that atyantābhāva is destroyed at the time of annihilation though it is long standing like ether etc. But our author differs from the Naiyāyika point of view.

Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence) popularly called 'bheda' (difference) is the object of cognitions, like 'idamidam na' (this is not that). So far he agrees with the Naiyāyika but differs from him in holding the view that 'vibhāga' (disjunction) and 'prthaktva' (separateness) are not different from anyonyābhāva whereas the Naiyāyika views that 'vibhāga' and prthaktva' are two different 'guṇas' and anyonyābhāva is a substance coming under the abhāva category. The Paribhāṣākāra holds that there is no proof to hold that these two are different from anyonyābhāva. It is all the same whether he says that is different from that or this is other than that etc.

25. ibid., p.137
The Advaitin divides *anyonyābhāva* (mutual non-existence) or 'bheda' (difference) into two types, viz., (i) one with a beginning and (ii) the other without a beginning. The examples respectively are (i) the absence of cloth in jar and (ii) the difference of Brahman from *Jīva*. In the view of our author, both these differences are the counterpositives of the destruction. When the nescience (*ajñāna*) is removed this consequential difference is also removed.

The Advaitin speaks of another division of *anyonyābhāva* or 'bheda' into two varieties, viz., (i) *Sopādhika* (conditioned) and (ii) *Nirupādhika* (unconditioned).

Of these, *sopādhika* (conditioned) difference is that the existence of which is the subordinate concomitant, i.e. *vyāpya* of the existence of its limiting adjunct, i.e. *upādhi*. As an example of this type is: one and the same ether is differentiated by different limiting adjuncts such as a jar. The one ether on account of the *upādhi* gets the difference as room-defined ether and jar defined ether. Or as the one Sun is manifold according to different water vessels. Similarly one and the same Brahman appears as different owing to different minds. *Nirupādhika* (unconditioned) difference is that which has not this kind of existence. An example of this type is the difference of a jar from a piece of cloth etc. According to the Advaitin, it does not admit a real difference between the two-just as ether limited by jar is not different from the ether

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limited by the room because both are ether. Thus the world is only superimposed on Brahman, the One without a second. In support of this the author quotes Śureśvārācārya's Vārtika passages.\footnote{smT ^cT: -T Wit I Br.U. I/a., I.IV.1279 as quoted in VP., p.142}

The cognition of the above four kinds of non-existence is through non-apprehension that is possessed of capacity. Therefore, anupalabdhi is a separate pramāṇa. From the above discussion and also from the clear expression in the VP, it is explicit that according to the Advaita Vedantins anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) or abhāva (negation) is a separate pramāṇa and is not included in other pramāṇās.

The Paribhāṣākāra concludes the chapter on non-cognition by accepting the ontological category abhāva in the Advaita Vedānta. After the pramāṇas have been discussed there arises a question whether the knowledge obtained by these pramāṇas is valid intrinsically or extrinsically. The question of the definition of pramāṇya (validity) also arises. The validity of knowledge generated by the above-discussed pramāṇas originate by itself and is self-evident. The invalidity of knowledge is not due to the totality of causes of knowledge in general. It is perhaps keeping in view these status for pramāṇas, Dharmarāja Adhavrīndra discusses in brief these points alongwith the pramāṇa. We have already explicated the validity of knowledge and the Vedāntic view on validity in a preceding chapter (cf. Chapter one). Therefore, we have just mentioned here the topic of discussion in a nutshell.

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\footnote{अक्षमा भवतः केवल साधकत्वप्रकटये ।
कि न यथाज्जीवाणकल्पतम् । Br.U.Va., I.IV.1279 as quoted in VP., p.142}