Presumption is the assumption of an explanatory fact (upapādaka) from a knowledge of thing to be explained (upapādyā)\(^1\). Here, the knowledge of the thing to be explained is the instrument and the knowledge of the explanatory fact is the result. For instance, on hearing that a person 'A', who is alive, is not at home, one can assume that 'A' is somewhere outside. The fact of a living person not being at home is otherwise inexplicable. He must be in his house or somewhere else. Since he is not at home, the only alternative explanation is that 'A' is outside his house. Presumption (arthāpatti) is of two types:

(1) Presumption from what is seen (that is perceived) and;

(2) Presumption from what is heard (that is known from testimony)\(^2\).

The second type of postulation (arthāpatti) has again two different forms (1) that due to incompleteness of verbal expressions, (abhidhāna) and that due to incompleteness of meaning (abhihita), drṣṭārthāpatti is employed to explain something which is perceived, such as health and strength in a man who is fasting by day and srutarthāpatti which is used to explain the meaning

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1. Upādhyāya, I, p.117.
2. ibid., p.118.
of words heard, such as when we hear somebody saying 'shut up', then by arthāpatti the words 'your lips', are supplied, because without this the meaning remains incomplete.

Knowledge obtained by arthāpatti is distinctive, because it is not reducible to perception or inference, nor is it a case of testimony or comparison. Such knowledge cannot be explained as perception, since we do not perceive 'A' outside his house. It is not a case of inference because there is no invariable concomitance (vyāpti) between absence from house and living outside it.

The Advaita Vedānta and the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā establish arthāpatti (presumption or postulation) to be a separate source of valid knowledge as different from anumāna (inference). According to the Naiyāyikas, if we comprise arthāpatti within anumāna, it is rather rendered into anumāna from circumstances or disjunctive hypothetical syllogism. While the Advaita Vedānta and both the Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas accept arthāpatti (presumption) as an independent source of valid knowledge and do not reduce to any other source; the Naiyāyikas, the Sāṁkhyas, the Buddhists and the others object to this view of arthāpatti as a separate means of valid knowledge.

The word 'arthāpatti' goes under various translations as presumption, postulation, supposition, implication and assumption. It is a process of assuming some unknown fact in order to account for a well-known fact which is otherwise inexplicable. Knowledge thus obtained is distinctive, since it is not to be reduced to Pratyakṣa (perception) or anumāna (inference), and it is not of course, a case of āgama (verbal authority) or upamāna (comparison).
'Arthāpatti' derivatively means imagination of something in a different way. When something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is designed 'arthāpatti'. As for instance, 'there is rain when there are clouds' is known from the fact that there is no rain when there are no clouds. One may object that this arthāpatti is invalid because when clouds are present there is no rain. It is not acceptable. The argument in the objection runs from the observation of the coherence of lack of rain with lack of clouds to the conclusion that clouds are necessary but not sufficient condition for rain.

The Naiyāyikas refuse to acknowledge arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa. According to the Naiyāyikas, arthāpatti may be reduced to an anumāna (of the vyatirekī type). Those, who hold arthāpatti to be a form of anumāna put forth the stock example, i.e., 'The living 'A' is not present in his house', in the form of the following syllogism:

(a) The living 'A' exists outside the house,
(b) Because he is living and is not found in the house,
(c) Like myself.

Here, 'living A' is the minor term; 'exists outside' is the major term and 'non-existence in the house' is the middle term.

3. अर्थात् आपत्तिरथ्यापति: आपति: प्राप्ति: प्रसंग: चानाभिधाय्यमानेः योः तर्कः सोऽर्थापति: । यथा मेषेच्यस्ततु वृड्धिं भवति-किमश्र प्रसंगोऽसदित । N Bh., (II.2.1), pp.573-574
4. ITK., p.266
Jayanta Bhatta, however, holds that *anumāna* and *arthāpatti* are identical; but, he is in favour of reducing *arthāpatti* to *anumāna*\(^5\). It is not indeed any 'anvayi' type of *anumāna* in which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agreement in presence between the middle and major term. For example, 'whenever there is fatness, there is eating at night'. On the other hand, it is a 'vyatireki anumāna' in which the major premise expresses a universal relation between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle. As *arthāpatti* may in this way be reduced to *vyatireki anumāna*.

As such, the Sāmkhyas explain *arthāpatti* as a form of *anumāna*. Taking the following example of it, Vācaspati points out that it can be reduced to *anumāna*: if a living individual is absent somewhere, he is present elsewhere; Devadatta who is living is absent from home; so, he is somewhere outside his home. Here, a man's existence outside his home is inferred from 'his absence from home' as the *āṅgīga* or the middle term. There is a relation of *vyāpti* or universal concomitance between a man's presence somewhere and his absence elsewhere. Therefore, when we know the one from the other we simply infer fire from smoke\(^6\).

However, the Vaiśeṣikas hold that *arthāpatti* is *anumāna* to which it is contrary, whether based on perception or on verbal authority\(^7\).

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The Vaiśeṣikas point out that in either case presumption is a variety of *anumāṇa*, since in one case the reasoning depends on invariable coherence between being alive and not being in the house and being outside the house. The Mīmāṁsakas argue that such knowledge is not *anumāṇa*, for here we have an apparent contradiction in the premise, viz., 'A is in this world which includes this room too and he is not in this room'. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas object that one part speaks of an undistinguished presence of 'A' while the other part speaks of a distinguished absence of him. In this way there is no contradiction. Hence, it is a case of *anumāṇa* with a negative premise according to them and other opponents also.

The Bhaṭṭas and the Prabhākara Mīmāṁsakas both regard *arthāpatti* as an independent source of valid knowledge, but both the schools differ in the details regarding some aspects, as the nature and the range of *arthāpatti*. Both the schools depend upon Śabara Bhāṣya regarding this problem. Both the schools interpret it in their own different ways.

Śabara Svāmin defines *arthāpatti* as the supposition or presumption of an unperceived object on the ground that a fact already seen or heard cannot be explained without that presumption. For instance, Devadatta who is alive is not found at home then there arises an assumption that Devadatta is outside the house. Unless this is assumed, the fact of his being alive, stands unexplained.

8. [Arthaarthāpatti](#) अर्थार्थापत्ति: श्रुतोच्चार्योऽपि नोपपाछ्यंते इत्यथाकल्पना यथा जीविति देवदत्तेऽगृहभवदश्च न विभृवव्यवस्थास्य परिकल्पना । Śb.,1.1.5, p.38.
According to the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas, as a pramāṇa, arthāpatti consists in the assumption of an unperceived fact in order to explain two apparently inconsistent things. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, unlike Prabhākara, does not change the sequence of words in Śabara's definition but elaborates them in his own way. According to Bhaṭṭa, the concept of arthāpatti lies not in doubt but in mental irreconcilability between two established facts. That inconsistency is removed by the cognition of a third fact and it is this last cognition that settles arthāpatti. In the previous example, if the man's existence is doubtful then it is not treated as the basis for the arthāpatti. If the person's living is certain then only the arthāpatti operates. Hence there cannot be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. Only the certainty of his life associated with the cognition of the absence from the house, gives us the arthāpatti that, he is outside the house. Kumārila illustrates several kinds of arthāpatti in his Śloka Vārtika.

Prabhākara explains arthāpatti as follows: We observe some fact and if that fact is to be proved, another thing is to be assumed. Then that assumption of the thing is called arthāpatti. Prabhākara holds that there must be an element of doubt as to the truth of the two inconsistent facts perceived. The element of doubts is removed by the arthāpatti. This is the fact which distinguishes arthāpatti from inference. The person Devadatta is alive and his absence from the house is perceived.

9. प्रमाण-पद्तक-विभाजी वयाथार्य नान्यथा भवेत्।
अदृश्य कल्पयद्यं सार्थापतिस्वदाहता। सV, p.320

10. ibid., p.390.
By this perception, a doubt as to whether the person is alive or not strikes the mind. This doubt will exist till it is assumed that he is outside. Hence his existence outside removes the doubt. This is the function of the presumptive cognition. But this is not acceptable to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.

According to Advaita Vedānta, arthāpatti which is to be accomplished is effected through the knowledge which has already been accomplished. It is the assumption of an explanatory fact, i.e. 'upapāda' 'from a knowledge of the thing to be explained, i.e. 'upapāda'. When a given phenomenon in such that we cannot understand it in any way without supposition of other fact, we have to presume this fact by way of explaining the phenomenon. This process of explaining an otherwise, inexplicable phenomenon by the affirmation of explaining fact is arthāpatti. A stock example that this stoutness of a man who does not eat at day-time is inexplicable unless we assume his eating at night; so, such stoutness is the thing to be explained. And in the absence of eating at night such stoutness is in explicable; so, eating at night is the explanatory fact.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra explains arthāpatti following the view of Mīmāṃskas. Arthāpatti is the presumption of a fact to account for an (otherwise) unintelligible fact. A person is known to be stout, though he fasts

11. उपपादपावनातक-कल्पनम् अर्थापत्ति: | Vp., p.117.
12. राजिभोजननस्विद्वा अभुज्ञानम् पीनत्वम् अनुपत्तम्, इति तादृशं पीनत्वम् उपपादम्; यथा वा राजिभोजनस्वाभावे तादृशपीनत्वस्तुपति; इति राजिभोजनमुपपादकम् | ibid., p.118
during the day. Then the stoutness becomes unintelligible without the assumption of his eating at night.

Therefore, eating at night makes the fact 'stoutness' intelligible. It may be observed here that 'upapādyajñāna' should be taken as 'upapādyajñāna' only when we consider this point. Otherwise, there will be overlapping on the apperception, i.e. 'anuvyavasāya' of the 'upapādyajñāna' which is produced from the 'upapādyajñāna' itself. According to the Paribhāṣākāra, arthāpatti does not overlap on the 'vyatirekyanumāna' for, the later has been rejected by the Advaitin 13.

Here Rāmakṛṣṇa, the author of the Śikhāmani with a soft corner for the Naiyāyika's point of view suggests that, in the alternative of 'vyatirekyanumāna' (as stated by Naiyāyika) being admitted, it is possible to arrive at the 'anvayavyāptijñāna' from the 'vyatirekisahacārijñāna'. Whatever is unintelligible when some other fact is not known, that particular fact is the 'upapādaka'. In the present example unless eating at night is assumed the fact of being fat in the case of a man who does not eat by day is not intelligible and as such to make the statement intelligible eating at night should be assumed. Here eating at night is the fruit of the presumption and the cognition of what is to be made intelligible 'stoutness' is the special cause.

13. ibid., pp.117-122.
With regard to the (resulting) valid knowledge, viz., the assumption of eating at night, the word 'arthāpatti' is a compound of the class known as 'saṣṭhī-tatpurusa', meaning the assumption (āpatti) of a thing (artha). When the result is intended to be stated it should be viewed as a genitive compound 14 as the 'the assumption of a thing' (eating at night).

Here the meaning of the word 'āpatti' is kalpanā. When the special cause is intended we have to consider it as a compound of bahuvrīhi, 15 meaning that from which a thing is assumed. Here the word means that by which kalpanā is made 16. With regard to the instrument of the assumption, the word is a bahuvrīhi compound, meaning 'that from which a thing is assumed'. Therefore, the word arthāpatti applies both to the result and the instrument.

The Paribhāṣākāra described that this arthāpatti (presumption) is of two types 17, namely:

1) Drṣṭārthāpatti (presumption from what is seen) and
2) Śrutārthāpatti (presumption from what is heard).

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15. cf. अर्थस्यापति: यस्या: सा I (bahuvrīhi compound).
16. रात्रिभोजनकल्पनारूपां प्रमिले 'अर्थस्यापति:' कल्पना इति वाङ्गीसमासेः 'अर्थपति' शब्दे वर्तते... ibid., p.118.
17. सा चार्थापतिधिविधा-दूष्टार्थापति: श्रुतार्थापतिस्वचेति I ibid., p.118
The former type of *arthāpatti* is the assumption of a third fact to explain the apparent incongruity contained in the two perceived facts. *Drṣṭārthāpatti* can be illustrated from the example of illusory silver. A person first apprehends something else as silver (*'idam rajatam'*). Afterwards he denies that it is not silver (*nedam, rajatam*). Discarding the silver, he assumes that the silver appearing as such is false. The other type of *arthāpatti* is the assumption of a sense on account of the unintelligibility in the sense. For instance, in support of his stand Dharmarāja quotes from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*; as it is stated: *tarati śokam ātmavit* 18 (the knower of the self transcends grief).

This is unintelligible since the bonds represented by the word (*śoka*), 'grief cannot be thrown out by knowing the self'. Hence the sense of falsehood (of the bond) is to be presumed in order to make it intelligible.

According to our author, the *Śrutārthāpatti* is again of two types 19:

(i) *Abhidhānānupapatti* (non-intelligibility due to incompleteness of verbal expression and *Abhīhitānupapatti* (that due to incompleteness of the meaning)).

Of these, the first case occurs where on hearing part of the sentence, in order to get at the intention of speaker. The word *'dvāram'* (door) when uttered does not have any syntactical relation. Therefore we have to supplement the word *'pidhehi'* (shut) in order to make it intelligible; or as with the words :

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18. *MS.*, IV.1.15.

19. *Mahābhāṣya*–*Adbhuta-Abhidhānāṇupapatti*: *Abhīhitānupapatti* 1 *VP.*, p.120

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'visvajitā yajeta' (one should perform visvajit sacrifice), the words, one who desires heaven are supplied. This is a Vedic example as the other is a conventional one. It is an accepted principle with the Mīmāṁsakas 20.

The second type of Śrutārthāpatī is the abhihita type which is explained as: When it is stated 'He, who desires Heaven, should perform Jyotistoma'; then there is a doubt as to how a momentary sacrificial rite leads one to heaven which is after life. There we have to assume the existence of the unseen, i.e. 'apūrva' between the present act and the ultimate result 21.

The problem of Śrutārthāpatī is much more complex than the general theory of arthāpatī. The Nyāya does not accept arthāpatī as a distinct way of knowing and hence the form of arthāpatī is reducible to anumāna. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa enumerates it as one of the two main types of arthāpatī and tries to establish its distinctness not only from other pramāṇa, but from other types of arthāpatī also. Prabhākara does not find any propriety either in assigning an independent role to it or in considering it a distinct variety of arthāpatī. According to Kumārila, the words 'dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vā' refer to two kinds of arthāpatī, but Prabhākara interprets the words as meaning the same thing. 'Dṛṣṭaḥ' means well-known and 'śrutaḥ' is another word meaning the same thing in common usage.

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20. MS., IV.1.15

21. श्वर्गसाधनतत्वस्य क्षणिकयागतत्त्वा अवगतस्मानुपपत्तया मध्यवार्त्यपूर्वं कल्प्यते। VP, p.121
Dharmarāja accepts Śrutārthāpatti as a distinct type of arthāpatti but he goes a step further and propounds two sub-varieties of Śrutārthāpatti and in a way makes a reasonable improvement in the theory of Śrutārthāpatti. Thus, arthāpatti being proved to be distinct means of valid knowledge. Inference of the negative form is not a variety of inference.

He argues that in the statement 22: 'Earth is different from the other elements' (for it has smell, i.e. 'gandhavattva') the knowledge that the possession of smell is impossible without difference from the other things, is the instrument (of presumption).

It is assumed that the earth has (i.e. 'itarabheda) difference from (other entities like) the earth. He has also pointed out that the apperception (i.e. 'anuvyavasāya') in this case is only of the form ('prthivyāmitarabhedam kalpayāmi'), 'I am assuming difference (from other things) in the earth'. The point has been well noted by the Paribhāṣākāra that in the absence of inference based on negative concomitance (i.e vyatirekyānumāna), in the Advaitin's point of view, it is quite essential to admit arthāpatti without which falsehood cannot be established in the case of silver (rajata) 23 etc. in invalid knowledge.

The Vedāntins hold that even if we arrive at the conclusion of an anumāna through arthāpatti, we have to depend for our data on a previous anumāna.

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22. अतएवानुमानसार्य पृथिव्यामितरभेदं कल्पयामि | ibid., p.123.
23. रजतस्य सदभिषितं सत्यत्वायत्नाभावत्वं वा मिथ्यालें कल्पयति | ibid., p.118.
So, *anumāṇa* cannot be reduced to *arthāpatti*. Our author, however, seems to hold that ‘vyatirekyanumāṇa’ is reducible to *arthāpatti* and here, at this point, there is a face-to-face conflict between Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in particular and the *Vedānta* and *Nyāya* in general. The *Nyāya* does not regard *arthāpatti* as a distinct means of valid knowledge. Jayanta, however, holds that *anumāṇa* and *arthāpatti* are identical; but, he is in favour of reducing *arthāpatti* to *anumāṇa*. It is not indeed an ‘anvayi’ type of *anumāṇa* in which the major premise expresses a positive relation of agreement in presence between the middle and major term.²⁴

The Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas try to establish the distinctiveness of *arthāpatti*. Pārthasārathi holds that *anumāṇa* would have been reduced to *arthāpatti* if by some means other than *anumāṇa* it could be understood that all places having smoke have fire. Whereas the fact is that it is only the minor term wherein the association of smoke with fire has been perceived and not in all places. Moreover, in *anumāṇa*, concomitance is a major factor but in *arthāpatti* the emphasis is on apparent contradiction. The Mīmāṃsakas frequently use *arthāpatti* for explaining the Vedic texts by presuming missing words and meanings without which the Vedic texts cannot be correctly understood. They also base their beliefs on *arthāpatti* in such cases as survival of the self after death.

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The Advaita Vedantins regard arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa, because in their opinion it provides us with the knowledge of facts which cannot be explained otherwise. The Advaitins hold arthāpatti useful for explaining the Vedānta texts. For instance, the Upaniṣads sometimes speak of the creation of the world by Brahman and out of Brahman, but sometimes teach that there is no multiplicity and hold that Brahman is the only reality. This conflict is resolved by supposing that creation is not a real transformation (i.e. pariṇāma) of Brahman, but only an apparent change (i.e. vivarta) like the appearance of a rope as a snake. The supposition of māyā as the power of Brahman to create and apparent world is a kind of arthāpatti and which can not be established by the anumāṇa of the Naiyāyikas.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, a versatile scholar both in the Nyāya and the Vedānta system, try to establish the distinctiveness of Arthāpatti Pramāṇa in the ‘Arthāpattipariccheda’ of his unique work, the VP.