The Sanskrit term Šabda, in its widest sense, denotes sound, articulate and inarticulate, called varṇa and dhwani respectively. Šabda means an articulate sound, that is a word with meaning, and applies to a verbal expression consisting of one or more words. It may be uttered or written. Every word is a symbol of thought or an idea. Šabda as a means of valid knowledge is called šabda-pramāṇa which is usually rendered into English as 'verbal testimony' or authority. It is called āpta-vākya (the statement of a trust-worthy person) or āgama (authentic word). Any combination of words that is an incomplete expression or thought is not a sentence.

A sentence is the unit of šabda-pramāṇa, which has been thus defined: That sentence is a means of valid knowledge in which the relation (among the meanings of the words) that is the object of its intention is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge. The significance of a sentence is the relation amongst the meanings of the words syntactically conjoined. The apprehension of this relation (šabda-bodha) means the verbal cognition of

1. BP., 164
2. यस्य वाक्यस्य तत्पर्यविश्वायभूतसंसर्गामानान्तरेण न बाध्यते तद्वाक्यं प्रमाणम् I VP., p.86
the fact or truth communicated. It is valid if un-contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge. The comprehension of the meaning of a sentence arises in the following manner.

The cognition of words is the instrument (of verbal comprehension), the recollection of the meaning of words is the operation there, verbal comprehension is the result and the knowledge of denotative function is an aid.\(^3\) Denotative function is the relation of a word with its direct meaning. The meaning of the constituent words being known through recollection, one has to apprehend the relation among them. It is the apprehension of their mutual relation that brings out the significance of a sentence.

As sentence must have these minimum features to convey a sense, the word a unit of the conveyer of the sense should also have the capacity to convey the sense. A word is capable to convey the meaning when it has the powers like *abhidhā* and *lakṣanā*. A word or a sentence of trust worthy authority is regarded as an instrument of proof.

To the Advaitin, as to some other philosophers, *āgama* or *śabdapramāṇa* is a very potent source of valid knowledge. Among the six *pramāṇas* or means of knowledge traditionally accepted by the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas, the priority

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3. *ibid.*
in terms of inference is clearly with verbal testimony (āgama or śabda), which, for the Advaitins, mainly means śruti, i.e. scripture. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his philosophic manual the VP treats āgama or śabda (verbal testimony) as the most important source of valid knowledge.

The sentences we have heard or read are nearly infinite in number, and many of them would require years of investigation before their validity would be ascertained. Therefore, we take on authority the vast majority of the claims to validity that comes in our way, otherwise our empirical usages are not possible. Such is the case with scripture (śruti). Either in common parlance or the Vedic sentence, every assertion we make must be in some way testable.

The knowledge arising out of the empirical and the Vedic sentences must make some difference to our perceptual and inferential ones. In this way, we are led into another criterion or means of knowledge which is called śabda (verbal testimony or verbal authority).

Śabda or āgama (verbal testimony or Verbal authority) has been accepted as an independent source of knowledge by all Indian philosophical schools except the Cārvāka, the Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika. The Cārvāka refutes the validity of śabda (verbal testimony), since they are opposed to believe anything on others statement because, in that case, the Cārvākas think that they would have to believe the utterances of any fool. Even if the authority is restricted to the statement of a reliable person, it would be, in their opinion, at the most included anumāna which also they do not accept on account of
the fault of regressus as infinitum in the evidence that the logicians propose for the ascertaining concomitance.

The Buddhists opine that śabda may be accepted as an independent means of knowledge if it agrees with the external object without any other relation. They reduce śabda to anumāna if it is based upon the statement of a reliable person and to pratyakṣa if it is used to prove that there are actual facts corresponding to a statement.

The Vaiṣeṣikas reject śabda as a distinct means of knowledge on the ground that it is nothing but anumāna since in both the cases one has to know an unperceived object from the pratyakṣa of some related object.

Gautama defines śabda, the fourth means in the Naiyāyikas list, as the assertion of a trustworthy person. According to him, śabda is the 'upadeśa' (instruction) of an 'āpta' (reliable person). The authority is not restricted to noble men, so the meaning of the sentence is grasped by the authority. Here the validity of the knowledge derived from this depends upon mainly the reliability of the person concerned. Any statement made by a person is liable to error and as such a human utterance cannot be relied upon as legitimate testimony. On the other hand, the Naiyāyika believes that Vedic testimony is

4. आपोपदेशः: साव्यः । नस्त, १.१.७
valid in as much as it is uttered by the omniscient (sarvajña) and therefore in it there can be no error. The Sāṁkhyaśas hold the same opinion as the Naiyāyika.

The Mīmāṁsaka view is that *bhrama‘and *pramāda‘etc. are possibilities of human utterance, and hence Mīmāṁsaka argues that the testimony of a being other than a human being is valid. Kumarila Bhaṭṭa rejects the Nyāya view and defines verbal testimony as a statement which produces in the mind of the hearer, who knows the meaning of words, a knowledge of facts that lie beyond the range of his perception. They state that it is the verbal knowledge which is brought about from the known words through the operation of the meaning of the words.

The instrument of such a knowledge is named as verbal testimony or merely testimony or authority in philosophical term and therefore the verbal knowledge is an indirect one. It is explained by the Pārthasārathi Miśra as the knowledge obtained through the statement depending on the meaning of the words, and this knowledge must be a new one.

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5. शास्त्र (शब्द ज्ञान) शब्दविज्ञानात् असलिकृतं विज्ञानम् | MB, (1.1.5), p.12
6. विज्ञाताच्छन्दातु पदार्थविज्ञानम् यदूस्तवाधिकारिणे विद्याविचारिने तत्त्वगत्वा नाम प्रमाणम् | SD, p.51
The Prabhākaras, like the Vaiśeṣikas, believe that the statement of a non-Vedic authority produces knowledge through inference based upon the reliability of the authority. Verbal testimony is of two types, viz. (i) personal i.e. the knowledge arising from the words of a reliable person and (ii) impersonal i.e. the knowledge arising from words of an impersonal origin (apauruṣeya). The Prabhākaras accept only the validity of impersonal authority but not human because there is possibility of infinite defect in human authority.

The Advaita Vedānta gives an independent status to śabda (verbal testimony) pramāṇa. Though the Paribhāṣākāra does not state this verbatim, he treats āgama (śabda) as the most important pramāṇa. Now let us observe how our author is interested in establishing a separate śabdapramāṇa. In the final view of the Advaitin, even the entire holy text comes under the domain of unreality since Brahman is the only real existent for them. Then how could it be that he favours verbal testimony as a means of valid knowledge.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra defines śabda (verbal testimony) in the ‘Āgmapariccheda’ of his VP as follows:- That sentence is a means of valid knowledge whose syntactical connection is arrived at by its import and which is not stultified by another means of valid knowledge. 7.

In this definition, the word ‘abādhita’ or ‘na bādhyate’ (not stultified) is used to avoid overlapping of the definition in case of sentence like ‘vahninā

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7. यस्य वाक्यस्य तत्पर्यविषयीभूतसंस्कृतो भावायते तद्वाक्यं प्रमाणम्। VP, p.86
The word ‘tātprayaviṣayibhūta’ has been used in the definition in order to avoid inapplicability in the case of sentences like Prajāpati has taken out his own omentum’ (c.f. ‘sa prajāpatirātmano vapaṃudakhidat’) where there is stultification even the ‘vyāvahārika, (conventional) level.

Here in order to avoid this stultification of Prajāpati taking out his own omentum it has to be explained in accordance with the ‘tātparyaviṣayibhūta saṃsarga’ (the relation that is the object of import) by stating that the taking out of the omentum of ‘yajamāna’ in the holy text has its import in taking out of the omentum of the ‘tuvara’ (a cow without horns) animal which is possible to be removed by the sacrificer.

In the definition, the word ‘by another means’ (māṇāntara) has been used as an adjective of relation (c.f. ‘saṃsarga’) since, otherwise the syntactical connection of sentences like ‘jyotiṣomena svaṃgakāmaḥ’ etc. would be stultified (bādhita) by sentences like ‘neha nānāsti kiṃcana’. Here it may be not be questioned how then the syntactical connection between ‘yāga’ and ‘svarga’ is not stultified by sentences which speak of the reality of one Supreme

8. EVPD, pp. 57-58
Brahman, for the author replies that 'by another means' in the definition means only one of its own kind.

That is to say a sentence giving a meaning at the vyavahārika level etc. If it is stultified by a sentence at the pāramārthika level it does not matter, e.g. in the above objection the (sādhyasādhanābhāva) nature of probandum and probans between the sacrifice and Heaven (svarga) at the conventional level is stultified only by a sentence at the absolute level which speaks of the truth of one Brahman but not by another means of the same type (sajātiya pramāṇāntara) at the conventional level (vyāvahārika) level.

The author of the VP then states that the knowledge arising from a sentence has four causes. They are: (1) expectancy (ākāṃkṣā), (2) consistency (yogyatā), (3) contiguity (āsatti) and (4) the knowledge of the purport (tātparya jñānam). Expectancy (ākāṃkṣā) is defined as 'the capacity of the meanings of the words to become objects of enquiry regarding each other'. The second condition for the combination of words in a sentence is consistency (yogyatā) of their meanings. This is defined as 'non-contradiction' of the relation (between the meanings of the words that is intended). Contiguity (āsatti) is the apprehension (recolletion) without an interval of the

9. आकांक्षायोग्यतासत्त्वं: तात्पर्य-ञानश्रेणि चतुर्विंशि कारणानि। ibid.
10. तत्र पदार्थानां परस्परनिज्ञासविषयत्वोप्यत्त्वम् आकांक्षा। VP, p.86
11. ibid.
meanings of words that are produced by those words. Purport (तत्पर्याज्ञानम्) is defined by Vedanta as ‘the capacity of a sentence to convey a particular meaning’.

The Advaitin refutes the theory of the Vaiśeṣika by arguing that these four causes are the necessary antecedents of a knowledge of sentence-meaning, i.e. वाक्यर्थाज्ञान. Here Dharmarāja probably intends to say that these four causes of ‘सांबद्धज्ञान’ distinguish sabda (verbal testimony) from inferential knowledge.

Because these causes are not present in the case of inference (अनुमान). Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra now tries to define the four causes of the knowledge of sentence-meaning (c.f वाक्यर्थाज्ञान) in detail. According to him by ‘अकार्ण्क्षा’ (expectancy) is meant the competence of being the object, for a mutual knowledge of the desire for the objects signified by the words. The word ‘योग्यत्व’ has been used by Dharmarāja in the definition in order to make it applicable even in the case of a person who has no desire to know.

Though there is no desire on the part of the listener, still there is the competency in such syntactically connected words and that is what is called अकार्ण्क्षा. He speaks of the ‘अवच्छेद’ (determinant) of ‘योग्यत’ mentioned

12. ibid., p.83.
13. ibid., p.90.
14. SM., p.241
15. WTfai 3TTW I ibid., p.86
above without which it is incomprehensible. The determinant of such a competence is 'kriyatvam' (action) 'kārakatvam', 'likartavyatātvam'; etc. and it is also because of this expectancy of the determinant that there is no overlapping on statement like 'gauḥ' 'aśvaḥ', etc. In these cases since after 'gau', there is no agreement with action, i.e., kriyā, the definition of ākāṃkṣā does not apply here and therefore there is no overlapping in these cases. In cases of sentences like 'Tattvamasi', where there is relation by identity, there is no overlapping since in apposition (abhedānvaya) the determinance of competence (yogyatvāvacchedaka) is 'being signified by a word having a same case ending'. So our author accepts the fact of 'being signified by words having the same case ending' also as the determinant of 'yogyatā'. In support of his arguments Dharmarāja tries to show that the Naiyāyiaka definition of ākāṃkṣā is not acceptable to him.

The Paribhāṣākāra agrees with the Mīmāṃsakas that it is not the words that have ākāṃkṣā but the objects denoted by the words. Here in the light of his knowledge of Mīmāṃsaśāstra, the author discusses in detail the Vedic sentence 'vaiśvadevyāmikṣā', 'vājibhyo vājinam' (those curds belong to the 'vaiśvadevas' and the whey is for the vājins) where he argues that the Vaiśvadeva sacrifice is not connected syntactically with 'vājin'.

In the first part of the sentences the word 'vaiśvadeva' is a 'taddhita' and by 'śruti pramāṇa' it argues with 'āmikṣā' and becomes a simple sentence. But in the next part the word 'vājibhyah' is in the dative case and here in the case of dative the agreement in a single sentence is with 'vājin' and of these
two the 'śruti and the 'vākya', there is controversy, and 'śruti' gains precedence over vākya and hence the āmikṣā vākya fits in with the 'Viśvadeva' deities but not with 'vājin'16.

The second condition of the combination of words in a statement is their mutual or semantical fitness, in short, 'yogyatā' as non-contradiction of the relation (between one thing and another signified by two words) that is intended 17. In a sentence like 'vahninā' siñcati' (he drenches with fire) there is stultification since fire is not an implement in drenching.

Āsatti (contiguity) is the third condition of verbal testimony. The author defines 'āsatti' as: contiguity is the apprehension (recolleciton by association), without an interval, of the meanings (the things signified by them) of words that is produced by those words 18.

The word 'produced by these words' is inserted in order to exclude objects secured by pratyakṣa etc. and for the same reason he accepts that in cases like 'pidhehi' (shut/close) the particular word 'dvāram' (door) etc. (but not the object door) that is to be supplied. In this regard he agrees with the Naiyāyika who holds the same view. If the word is not supplied then the meaning of the sentence cannot come under the scope of 'śabdabodha'. So the Naiyāyika accepts that the word should be supplied. The Mīmāṃsakas are, however, of

16. ibid., p.88.
17. योग्यता तत्त्वस्विभवभूतसंसर्गाभागः | ibid., p.90
18. आसतिचायवधानन पदन्यपदायपस्थिति: | ibid., p.91
the opinion that it is enough that the meaning is supplied. In support of his argument Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra states that in the variant sacrifices when ‘Sūryāya juṣṭam nirvāpāmi’ is to be sacrificed he supplies the word ‘Sūryāya’ (‘for the Sun’) in the case of Sūryāya juṣṭam on the lines of ‘to agni’ (agnaye), ‘I offer these so as to please him’. Thus in the ‘vikṛti’, in the place of ‘Agni’, with the help of ‘ūha’ the word ‘Sūrya’ is to be used.

The Paribhāṣākāra along with some later Naiyāyikas and pseudo-Mīmāṃsakas adds a fourth requirement, that a string of words must be uttered with intent to communicate a proposition and that it is the nature of this intention or purport, i.e. ‘tātparya’ which unequivocally identifies the meaning of the constituent words. Dharmarāja states that ‘tātparya’ is the capacity to produce cognition of a particular thing 19. As for example, the sentence, ‘gehe ghatah’ (there is a jar in the house), is capable of producing a cognition of the relation of a jar, and not that of a cloth, to the house.

Therefore, that sentence is said to mean the relation of a jar, and not that of a cloth. Thus he defines ‘tātparya’ by modifying the statement of the Naiyāyika. He criticizes their standpoint that ‘tātparya’ is meant being pronounced, with the desire of producing a particular knowledge 20. Here, the idea is that a person who has no knowledge of meaning also pronounces

19. ibid., p.106
20. TSD., p.330
words (like the Vedic words) but we find that there is meaning comprehended, through the man who utters the word does not know the meaning. Since there is the knowledge that the meaning is not understood by the pronouncer even ‘tātparyabhrama’ cannot be said to be present. Nor can it be urged that the knowledge of import of God is responsible for ‘tātparya’, for even one who does not accept God gets at the meaning of the sentence.

He raises an objection that in case of words having more than one meaning, there is possibility of the other meaning relevant, e.g. ‘saindhavamānaya’ (bring the saindhava). In Sanskrit ‘saindhava’ means salt or horse. Saindhava is a product of Sindhu which, among other things, means a sea as also the territory called Sindha; so the word means both salt and a species of horse. It is possible to read the meaning even horse to be brought at the time of eating since there is potentiality by its own nature (‘svārupayogyaḥ’) for the word (in that sense).

The understanding of a statement depends upon the understanding of its intended meaning. Our author cleverly meets this objection by adding another phrase in the definition ‘while not being pronounced with the desire of producing a different knowledge’ 21. At present, there is no ‘avyāpti’ for this definition in a sentence uttered by a person who does not know its meaning or in the word uttered by a parrot since the word ‘Tatpratīticchā’ has been avoided.

21. तदित्तप्रतीतिष्ठन्ताः न ज्ञातित्वस्यात् तात्पर्यं। VP., p.107.
Dharmarāja raises another objection that in a sentence, where knowledge of two things is desired to be expressed in a sentence there is 'avyāpti', since here, the idea is that the phrase used in the definition, signifies not being uttered with the desire of producing only one knowledge which is different from that. Next an essential issue is raised by our author regarding whether 'tātparya' is one of the causes of 'śābdabodha' at all. This has arisen on account of fact that in the fourth 'varṇaka' (chapter), the Vivaranākāra, i.e. Prakāśātman has rejected the view that 'tātparya' is a cause of 'śābdabodha'. Therefore, the Paribhāṣākāra explains the refutation of intention or Purport (by Prakāśātman) as defined by the Naiyāyīka.

Dharmarāja also gives some other views that the refutation in the Vivaranagrāntha aims only at refuting the knowledge of import as a cause of 'śābdabodha' itself. In case of the understanding the hymns of the Vedas, we are to take the assistance of the logical rules of interpretation systematized by the Mīmāṁsakas 22.

On this view knowledge of 'tātparya' is a cause of 'śābdabodha' viśeṣa' consequent on a doubt about the 'tātparya' or an illusion about the 'tātparya'. In such cases only they hold that 'tātparyajñāna' is a hetu. This 'tātparya' is ascertained with the help maxims enunciated by the Mīmāṁsakas on the other hand, in daily life it is done with the help of 'prakaraṇa' (context) etc.

22. तत्त्व तात्पर्य वेदे मीमांसापरिशोधितन्यायादृ एवान्ध्याति, तोके तु प्रकरणादिना। ibid., p.111

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The difference is that sentences spoken are simply translations of what is already known through other means of valid knowledge, but in the Holy text the meaning is something novel but not a mere translation. Context is the accumulation of the text or the subject. Then an important question raised by the Paribhāṣākāra is whether injunctive sentences (cf. 'kāryaparāṇī vākyāṇi') alone are valid, since they produce 'vyutpatti' or whether assertive sentences (cf. 'siddhāparavākyas') also are valid though they do not help activity. Our author is of the opinion that even 'siddhāparavākyas' have a valid import. He agrees with the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṁsaka view that assertive sentences have an import of their own. As a matter of fact, we find that the statement: 'putrāste jātah' ('a son is born to you) definitely produces some import; otherwise, we cannot account for the bloom in the face of the father, Caitra on hearing the birth of the child. Hence Vedāntic sentences like 'Tattvamasi' and others prove the import in Brahman.

The next question is whether the Holy text is eternal or not. According to the Naiyāyikas, the Holy text, i.e. the Vedas are means of valid knowledge because they are manifested by God, who is eternal and omniscient. According to the Mīmāṁsakas the Vedas are means of valid knowledge because they are eternal and as such free from all human error. In our author's view, however, the Vedas are not eternal, for they have an origin, which is proved by such śruti texts as 'The Rg-Veda, Yayur-Veda, Sāma-Veda, Atharva-Veda are the breath of this infinite Reality'.

The Vedāntin does not admit a momentary nature for Vedas. Nor on this account can it be said that the Veda being created by God becomes connected
with a person (*pauruṣeya*) and the theory of not connected with a person. Even Dharmarāja clearly points out, 'pauruṣeyatva' does not mean being uttered by a person. He defines 'pauruṣeyatva'(connection with a person) as 'being the object of utterance that is independent of any utterance of the same kind' 23.

In this way, according to Dharmarāja Adhvarindra, words mutually having the link of these above mentioned four conditions or causes express their meaning. It is said that these four attributes have been regarded as accessory or auxiliary causes in verbal knowledge. The *Paribhasakāra* also like most other schools of philosophy and the *Mīmāṃsā* school in particular, admits only potentialities for 'word-śakti'. Here, 'śakti'(significance) means the direct reference (relation) of words to their meanings 24.

According to our author, the meaning of words are of two kinds, viz. (i) śakya (primary) and (ii) lakṣya (implied). As for example, the word 'jar' refers to a particular thing of form having a large bottom and body etc. According to the *Vedānta*, that significance is a distinct category, for, any power in a cause tending to produce an effect comes under a distinct category. According to Dharmarāja, 'śakti' is not of the form of desire of God (cf. Ṣvarecchā) as the Naiyāyikas hold.

23. ibid., p.111
24. Slfanfa <-KHR% "gw I ibid., p.93.
Therefore, the Vedāntin accepts śakti as a separate substance, i.e., 'padhārtha'. In all causes we can infer the existence of 'śakti' by the effect produced. Similarly from the words used we can infer the 'śakti' present in them from the verbal knowledge produced. Scholars of different philosophies are very much at variance whether 'jāti' (generic attribute) or 'vyakti' (individual) is the meaning signified by a word. Our author hotly debated on this point. 'jāti' means the common property of a class which characterizes all the individuals comprised in that class. As for example, 'jar-hood', which is found in all jars.

Dharmarāja is in agreement with the Mīmāṃsā point of view as usual. According to the Mīmāṃsaka generic attribute alone is the meaning signified. He argues along with them that there is great prolixity if individual be the meaning signified.

Therefore, 'jāti' alone has a rightful signification. In this matter, the Naiyāyika is of the opinion that, though a word a like 'gau' may mean an individual cow, he argues that there is no prolixity (of each cow being signified separately) since the word cow signifies that which is determined by cowhood. Dharmarāja rejects this view of the Naiyāyika as it is too prolix. Our author is obliged to argue that implication may be accepted in the case of the individual meaning of a word on the strength of the statement the meaning of a word is
to be obtained from no other source (but from the word itself). Therefore, the individual is secured by taking recourse to implication 25.

Now Dharmarāja turns his attention to the capacity of implication (lakṣaṇā) by which the implied meaning is made known. An implied meaning is the object implied by a word. Lakṣaṇā 26 is of two types, viz. (i) kevala-lakṣaṇa (pure) and (ii) lakṣita-lakṣaṇa, (double). He divides lakṣaṇa (kevala and lakṣita) on the lines of the Navya Naiyāyika theory. He is of the opinion that a direct relation with the 'śakyārtha' is what is called kevala-lakṣaṇa 27, e.g. 'a cowherd colony (hamlet) on the Ganges' (Gaṅgāyāraṁ ghoṣaḥ) where the word 'Gaṅgā' has its implication in the bank which is connected with the word 'Gaṅgā'.

On the other hand, where a different meaning is known by an indirect relation with the primary or denoted meaning, there is lakṣita-lakṣaṇa 28, e.g. the word 'dvirepha' has connection with a word having two 'repha's (i.e. bhramara) and this word 'bhramara' is again connected with its meaning bee and as such the word 'dvirepha' is said to signify by indirect implication a bee. What is called figurative use is also nothing but lakṣita-lakṣaṇa. As for example, 'simho māṇavakaḥ' ('the boy is a lion'), here the boy is known through

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25. अनन्यस्वम्: शब्दार्थः - ibid., p.95.
26. जातिवाचकस्य तद्विशेषे लक्षाणात् - ibid., p.95
27. शक्यस्वाच्छास्सम्बन्धः: केवललक्षणा - ibid., p.96
28. शक्यपरम्परासम्बन्धेनार्थातः तत्रतत्त्वित्तितश्च लक्षितलक्षणा - ibid., p.96
his relation to ferocity etc., which are associated with what is primarily meant by the word 'lion'. Dharamarāja does not accept 'gauni' as a separate type of lakṣaṇā as is done by the Mīmāṃsaka. He includes it under the comprehensive group, lakṣitalakṣaṇā since the relation here is indirect, e.g. in the sentence 'the boy is a lion'.

Next the Paribhāṣākāra divides lakṣaṇā from a different point of view into three types, namely, (i) jahallakṣaṇā (exclusive implication): where the denoted meaning of the word is excluded and a different meaning is known there is the jahallakṣaṇā type of implication, e.g. the statement (viṣarṇ bhūṅkṣva) 'take poison'; here the meaning is you should not eat in your enemy's house. (ii) ajahallakṣaṇā (non-exclusive implication): where the denoted meanings as well as another meaning are known, similar is the case with the statement 'svetah' 'a white jar', and (iii) jahadajahallakṣaṇā (exclusive, non-exclusive implication): where a word excludes a part of its denoted meaning and retains the other part, e.g. 'this is that Devadatta'.

The author observes that here, the identity between Devadatta as qualified by the present time and as qualified by the past time cannot be established with the help of the denoted meaning since they are contradictory. So, both the words by implication retain the substantive part (cf. viśeṣyamātra) only

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29. ‘शक्यमन्त्तरभावः यज्ञाध्यान्तरप्रतीतिसत्त्र जहाल्लक्षणा’ | ibid., p.97.
30. यथा शक्याध्यान्तरभावायाक्ष्यातप्रतीतित: तत्राजहाल्लक्षणा | ibid.
and not their adjective part. This type of *lakṣaṇa* has much to do in *Advaita Vedānta* especially in explaining the meaning of the *Mahāvākyas* as 'Tattvamāsi' etc. Here he has a very solid contribution to the explanation in the denoted meaning signified by the words by not taking recourse of *lakṣaṇa* and by explaining it successfully otherwise. He does not accept that *lakṣaṇa* is necessitated in such cases while fully agreeing that these words denote only a part of their meaning. His confirmed opinion is that where there is no possibility of agreement by identity between two qualified objects denoted by words there is no difficulty in establishing identity between the two substantive parts (omitting the attributes) denoted by the word. In support of his argument he cites the sentence 'ghato' nityaḥ (the jar is transitory) where the transitoriness is in agreement only with the individual jar which is a part of the denoted meaning of the jar, but it does not agree with the other part of the meaning 'genus' (ghatātvajāti) because jāti cannot said to be transitory.

So also in the case of 'Tattvamāsi', it can be argued that the substantive part (*caitanya*) of the denoted meaning of the word 'tat' agrees with the substantive part of the meaning (*caitanya*) of denoted by the word 'tvam'. In the case of sentence 'Tattvamāsi' even though the substantive parts of the denoted meaning are syntactically connected by non-difference there is not sublation.

31. यत्र हि विशिष्टवाचकः शब्द एकदेशः विहाय एकदेशे वचति तत्र जहदनहल्लक्षणः। *ibid.*

32. शाक्तसृष्टिविशिष्टोः अभेदान्यानुपप्ती विशेष्ययोऽथ...अभेदान्याविरोधात्। *ibid.*, p.99.
In support of the above connection the author cites examples of sentences like ‘ghaṭamānaya’ (bring the pot) where both the meanings of jarness and jar which are the viśeṣaṇa and viśeṣya respectively cannot syntactically agree by ‘karmatvasambandha’ (relation of objecthood) with jarness since ‘ghaṭatva’ cannot be brought separately and as such the Naiyāyika will be obliged to accept lakṣaṇā in case the above is not accepted, but the Naiyāyika does not actually accept lakṣaṇā in such cases. Therefore, the citation above of the Advaitin is justified33.

Now there is another question which remains to be answered since lakṣaṇā has not been accepted by our author in cases like ‘Tattvamasi’, what could be an illustration for a lakṣaṇā of the jahadajahad type? To this our author replies an instances like ‘kākebhyo dadhiraksyatam’ (protect the curds from the crows) are illustrative of the jahadajahallakṣaṇā. When we say the curd is to be protected from the crow, it means that the curd is to be protected from all animals that destroy the curd.

Our author calls it as jahadajahallakṣaṇā because the denoted meaning crow is completely omitted in his import. Along with the Navya Naiyāyikas Dharmarāja believes that inconsistency of the import (tātparya anupapatti) is the cause of lakṣaṇā and not the unintelligibility of syntactical relation (anvayānupapatti)34.

33. आचार्यां लक्षणोक्तिबद्धगुणमवादेन चोथ्या | ibid., p.99.
34. लक्षणाविभेदनु तात्पर्यानुपपत्तिरेष, न तु अन्वयानुपपत्ति: | ibid., p.102.
Next the author takes up the strongly debated point whether *lakṣaṇa* is only in a word (*padavṛtti*) or in sentence (*vākyavṛtti*) also. He cites the stock example: ‘*gambhirāyāṁ nadyāṁ ghoṣah’* (the cowhered colony in the deep river) where he accepts *lakṣaṇa* (the cowherd colony in the deep river) where he accepts *lakṣaṇa* for both the words ‘*gambhīrā*’ and ‘*nadi*’ in *gambhīrānādiṅṭira*. Therefore, he concludes that *lakṣaṇa* is present in sentences also. This is on the lines of the Mīmāṃsaka viewpoint. The objection is ruled out by Dharmarāja on the ground that though the word meaning is signified by ‘*sakti*’, the ‘*vākyārtha*’ also like ‘*padārtha*’ is indirectly signified and since the implied meaning is connected with that, *lakṣaṇa* can be accepted in a sentence also. As such, both the verities of the meanings of words have been determined. Contiguity is the knowledge of these. It is also a cause of verbal comprehension, for we observe just that kind of agreement and difference between them.

Thus, Dharmarāja Adhvaraṅdra establishes *āgama* or *śabda* (authority, verbal testimony) as an independent source of valid knowledge in his *VP*. In this ‘*Āgamapariccheda*’, the *Paribhāṣākāra* shows a great imagination as well as erudition.