IV. 0 *Anumāna* is the instrument of inferential knowledge (*Anumiti-karaṇam anumānam*). Literally *anu* means after and *māna* means knowledge, *anumiti-karaṇa* means the instrument of inferential cognition and so *anumāna* means knowing after. It means the knowledge that follows from another knowledge. This is the knowledge that is derived from the knowledge of an invariable relation between what is perceived and what is deduced. This relation is termed as *vyāpti* (extension or pervasion). In Western logic it is called 'the invariable concomitance *vyāpti* which is gained from experience. The core of inference (*anumāna*) is the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) which is gained from experience.

Except the Cārvāka almost all the systems of Indian philosophy have admitted *anumāna* (inference) as a means of valid knowledge. *Anumāna* is a means of arriving at truth not directly but through a previous knowledge of concomitance (*vyāpti*) between the major term (*sādhyā*) and the middle term (*sādhana*). Therefore, unlike *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference) yields mediate knowledge. *Anumāna* is the process of reasoning in the course of which from one's invariable relation with the other found previously, a new type of knowledge is deduced.

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1. अनुमितिकरणमनुमानस् | *Vṛ*, p.68
The result of such knowledge is called *anumiti* which is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some mark having the universal relation with the 'śādhyā' and being present in the 'pakṣa'; and 'anumititva' is a kind of genus or universal ². In this way, when the word stands for an abstraction, it means a source of inferential cognition. Thus, *anumāṇa* in a general sense means the cognition coming into being after perception of *parāmarśa*.

*Anumāṇa* is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some sign or mark (*līṅga*)³. The previous knowledge is the knowledge of the *līṅga* or mark as having a universal relation with the *śādhyā* or major term and as being present in the *pakṣa* or minor term ⁴. Hence *anumāṇa* has been not by direct observation, but by means of the knowledge of *līṅga* or sign and that of its universal relation (*vyāpti*) with the inferred object.

*Anumāṇa* is the instrument of inferential knowledge, i.e. *anumiti*; and the latter is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance, i.e. *vyāpti* purely in its character as the knowledge of invariable concomitance. The instrument of inferential knowledge is the knowledge of invariable concomitance⁵.

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2. अनुमितित्वं ज्ञाति-विशेषः । *PR.*, p.44
3. मितेन लिङ्गेन लिङ्गेनोधरस्य परचान्मानमनुमानम् । *NB.*, I.1.3
4. व्याप्तिविशिष्टक्षर्यतान्तरान्तरम् । *TCM.*, II.p.2
5. अनुमितिकरण्यः व्याप्तिज्ञानम् । *VF*, p.69
The latent impression of that knowledge is the intermediate operation i.e. vyāpāra. In the Nyāya system, vyāpāra is defined as that which is caused by something else and yet helps to produce the result of that something; the intermediate cause.

Here, in the Vedānta, is another point of difference with Nyāya, according to which the operation is parāmarśa (consideration). Let us now compare the Vedānta definition of anumāna (inference) with the definition offered by the other schools.

The Buddhist says of anumāna from the stand point of causality or the principle of identity (cf. tadutpatti and tādātmya). Kaṅḍa, the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system, holds that anumāna is the knowledge of probandum derived from the knowledge of the probans (hetu). According to the Vaiśeṣika system anumāna is the knowledge that is produced from the pratyakṣa (perception) of the mark (liṅga or hetu) which is uniformly connected with something else. The Sāṁkhya, the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta define anumāna as 'the knowledge of one term of a relation which is not seen (while the other term is seen and known) as invariably connected with the first term'. Thus, the definition of Anumāna as propounded by Śabara runs as follows:
'Anumānam jñātasambandhasyaikadesadarśanād ekadesāntare sannikṛṣṭe buddhiḥ'. This is not the basis of only Kumārila's theory but Prabhākara also. The Naiyāyikas define anumāṇa as the means of the knowledge of the mark (liṅga) and that of its universal relation (vyāpti) with the inferred object. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa says that the cognition of the liṅga which is of a five-fold nature, combined with the recollection of the law of invariable concomitance, is anumāṇa.

According to the Paribhāśākāra anumāṇa is the instrument of inferential knowledge, i.e. it is the special cause of inferential cognition. Inferential knowledge is generated by the knowledge of pervasion as knowledge of pervasion (not as another). In order to exclude overpervasion on apperception or reflective cognition (anuvyāvasāya) vyāptijñāna is to be construed as vyāptijñāna only.

Vyāpti is the co-existence of the probandum with the probans, i.e. hetu. Between the things to be inferred (sādhyā) and the reason or ground from which we infer (hetu), the latter being the subordinate concomitant, i.e. vyāpya. In the sentence, 'The hill has fire, because it has smoke,' fire is the thing to be inferred, the hill is the subject or thing in which it is inferred, i.e. pakṣa, and

6. SBh.,1.1.5
7. NTK., pp.233-235.
10. व्याप्तिज्ञानलेन व्याप्तिज्ञानज्ञयं.... I VP., p.68
smoke is the reason. We know from experience that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. In other words, smoke never exists where fire does not. This is invariable concomitance, i.e. vyāpti.

Thus, the Advaitin defines vyāpti as the co-existence of the major term with the middle term in all the loci in which the middle term may exist. This definition of Paribhāṣākāra applies in the case of valid vyāpti. For example, when we infer fire from smoke; smoke, the mark is co-existent with fire, the sādhyā, which is found in all the loci of smoke because we invariably find fire wherever there is smoke.

It does not apply in the case of an invalid vyāpti. In the reverse of the above case if we wish to infer smoke from the fire we find that fire, the mark is not co-existent with the sādhyā in all the loci of fire (the mark). For example, in a hot iron ball where fire only is present but not smoke.

Thus, Paribhāṣākāra's definition holds good in the case of correct vyāpti but does not apply in the case of incorrect vyāpti. It is also to be observed that his definition applies in the case of all positive concomitance.

Dharmarāja clearly states in his VP, his rejection of the theory of the logician that there are three types of liṅgas (marks), namely: kevalānvyayin

\[11. \text{ibid., p.72}
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\[12. SWK, pp.215-216.\]
(purely affirmative), kevala-vyatirekha (purely negative) and anvaya-vyatirekha (both affirmative and negative). He believes that there is only one affirmative mark (anvayiliṅga). The reason why Dharmarāja rejects the exclusively affirmative type of liṅga is, as he himself states, that in the Advaita point of view all properties, i.e. Dharmas are the counterpositive of the Absolute negations, i.e. atyantābhāva existing in Brahman. There is no other property (dharma) which is not one such. In this way, even jñeyatva, prameyatva etc. which are considered to be as pervasive as Brahman in the Naiyāyika point of view, are not considered to be such by the Vedāntin. Brahman is All pervasive and the only entity that exists in the real sense of the word. Therefore, one cannot speak of the Kevalānvayiliṅga.

The author refutes the anumāna based on Kevalavyatirekiliṅga also because it is not capable of establishing a positive type of concomitance between the two objects, i.e. the mark and the inferred object, e.g. even if the negative type of concomitance between the absence of fire (sādhyābhāva) and the absence of smoke (sādhanābhāva) is known by the negative concomitance, the presence of fire when the smoke is present is not possible to be cognized from the above.

Where by the knowledge of negative concomitance between two things we infer the presence of the thing from that of the other. For example, when we infer fire from smoke by the knowledge, 'where there is no fire, there can not be any smoke', as in a lake. It includes the second form of inference admitted by the logicians, viz., kevalavyatirekha (purely negative), illustrated
by the proposition, 'Earth is different from other things, because it has smell'. This knowledge, can, however, be arrived at through the means of *arthāpatti* (presumption) according to Advaitin. It is the Advaitin's point of view with regard to the *kevalavyatirekin* on the lines of the Mīmāṁsākās. Thus, *anumāna* has no such form as both affirmative and negative, i.e. *anvaya-vyatirekin*, for the knowledge of negative invariable concomitance is not a cause of inferential knowledge. Since negative inference (*anumāna*) is repudiated by the *Vedānta*, this third form of *anumāna* admitted by the logicians, which involves negative *anumāna*, is also inadmissible.

According to the logicians, how *anumāna* is generated that a knowledge of concomitance (of the *liṅga* with the *sādhyā*) is the efficient cause, i.e. *karaṇa* of inferential knowledge. The knowledge of concomitance produces in its turn a recollection of *vyāpti* which is considered as the *vyāpāra* or activity and the resultant is Inferential knowledge. The *Paribhāṣākāra* for the first time, refutes this theory from the stand point of *Pañcapāḍikā*¹³ that it is not necessary to consider recollection of *vyāpti* (*vyāptismṛti*) as the activity of *vyāptijñāna*.

It is enough if we accept impression of *vyāpti* (*vyāptisamskāra*) alone as the activity concerned. This cannot, however, be urged that since

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¹³. *PCP.*, p.53
vyāptisāṃskāra is always present in the individual anumāna should always exist, for, its udbodha is stated to be essential for inferential knowledge. In this way, vyāptisāṃskārodbhodha is enough to be accepted for the generation of anumāna. It appears to be very deft argument advanced by our author in the case of anumāna.

After that Dharmarāja argues that a doubt may arise as to whether the vyāptisāṃskāra is the cause of anumāna when the recollection of vyāpti (vyāptismṛti) exists in the individual. Even in such a case vyāptisāṃskāra alone produce inferential knowledge. He does not accept the view of some logicians that smṛti destroys sāṃskāra in as much as we see cause of recollection (smṛti) in a series (dhāra). As stated earlier sāṃskārodbhodha is an auxiliary cause (sahakārin).

He agrees, on the lines of the Mīmāṃsaka view, with on the point that paksadharmatājñāna and vyāptisāṃskārodbhodha are capable of producing inferential knowledge. Therefore, it is not necessary either to admit vyāptismarana as stated earlier or even to accept tṛīyālingaparāmarsa. Where there is a qualified knowledge since it is cumbersome on the one hand and there is no accepted pramāṇa for it on the other.

Now Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra raises another original issue and states that in anumāna like 'there is fire because of smoke', vyāptijñāna is an

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14. न चानुषोधसंस्कारादारपि अनुमित्यापति: तद्भोधस्यापि सहकारित्वात्। VR, p.71
efficient cause (karana) only in the cognition of the fire part but not in the mountain part of the knowledge. The author also argues that there is no difficulty even if ‘anumitiitva’ as a ‘jāti’ is not rendered possible because the mountain part of the knowledge is pratyakṣa and the fire part is anumāna and as such the same knowledge has two dharmas, viz., ‘pratyakṣatva’ and ‘anumitiitva’ and the knowledge as such, cannot have the category ‘jāti’, for, the Vedāntin does not believe in the existence of ‘jāti’ or ‘upādhi’ which cannot be established by any means of knowledge. As to the way in which vyāpti is to be cognized, Dharmarāja states that the cognition of concomitance, when there is no cognition of its vyabhicāra, is the cause of the vyāpti 15. Non-cognition of its vyabhicāra (a departure), is meant absence of a knowledge of the presence of the liṅga is something other than that possessed of the ‘sādhyā’. It is in consonance with the Naiyāyika point of view also.

The Paribhāṣākāra does not attach much importance to whether this ‘sahacāradarśana’ is arrived at either in one observation or many observations 16. May be, ‘sahacāra’ is cognized sometimes by one observation and sometimes by frequent observations. What is required is only a knowledge of concomitance (‘sahacāra’).

15. सा (= व्याप्ति:) च व्यभिचारदर्शनि सति सहचारदर्शनेन गृह्वते । ibid., p.72.
16. तत्च सहचारदर्शनं भूयोदर्शनं सकृतं दर्शनं चेति विशेषो नादर्शाय: । ibid., p.72.
When the hetu accompanies sādhya without any exception, then it is called accompaniment or coexistence, i.e. 'sahacāra'. We may say that this view is in conformity with the Naiyāyika view, and Prabhākara accepts that even a single observation is enough for arriving at a knowledge of vyāpti.

IV.1 DIVISION OF ANUMĀNA

According to the Advaita Vedānta there are two types\(^*\) of cenumāna (inference), viz., svārthānunumāna and parārthānunumāna. This classification of anumāna into svārtha and parārtha is also acceptable to the Naiyāyika. An anumāna is known to be svārtha when it is aimed at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the part of a man who employs that anumāna. For example, when a person sees smoke on the mountain, he infers for himself the presence of fire on the mountain. The other type of anumāna is known as parārthānunumāna, i.e., inference for the sake of another person. That is to say one infers fire on the mountain from the smoke that is present and argues out the same for the benefit of another.

Here he has to take recourse to a membered syllogism (avayava) in order to make him infer the presence of fire. The controversy, however, lies in the point of the number of member of a syllogism (avayavasamkhya). Five

\(^{17}\) ibid., p.75
members have been enunciated in syllogistic inference by the Naiyāyika. According to them the component parts are: the proposition to be proved, i.e. *pratijñā*, reason i.e. *hetu*, example, i.e. *udāharana*, application, i.e. *upanaya* and conclusion, i.e. *nigamana*.

The following are illustrations of these component parts in order:

i) The hill has fire.

ii) Because it has smoke.

iii) Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as a kitchen.

iv) This is also like that.

v) The hill has fire, which is always present where there is smoke.

On the other hand, the Advaita Vedāntin does not accept the stand taken by the Naiyāyika but faithfully accepts, with the Mīmāṃsāka, that a three-membered syllogism is enough for *parārthānumāna*. These three component parts are: *pratijñā* (the proposition to be proved), *hetu* (reason), *udāharana* (example), *upanaya* (application) and *nigamana* (conclusion).

According to them, a syllogism is a group of component parts, these are three in number but not five; for, since it is possible to exhibit the invariable

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18. *NS*, I.1.32
19. प्रतिज्ञाहेतुउदाहरणरूप: उदाहरणोपनयन-निगमनरूपो वा | *VR*, p.75
concomitance and the presence of the reason in the subject, i.e. *pakṣa* by three component parts only, two additional component parts are useless. Dharmarāja argues that 'anumiti' is of the essence of 'pakṣadharmaṭājñāna'. These two are secured by the 'hetu' and the *pratijñā* and as such there is no need for the other members, e.g. 'udāharana', 'upanaya' and 'nigamana'. In the alternative, this same purpose is served by the last three members also. Therefore the Advaitin criticises the logician's five-member syllogism.

**IV.2 ANUMĀNA OF THE UNREALITY OF THE UNIVERSE**

In this way, after *anumāna* (inference) has been set forth, it will prove the unreality of the entire universe, which is other than Brahman. For example: All that other than Brahman, whatever is such, i.e. other than Brahman, is like this, i.e. unreal, as silver in a nacre. This is as: (i) Everything other than Brahman is unreal, (ii) because of otherness from Brahman, (iii) whatever is such, i.e. other than Brahman is unreal like nacre-silver. Quite in accordance with the three membered syllogism propounded by them, our author shows only three members and not five as the Naiyāyika does. The word Brahman has been used in the *anumāna* in order to avoid Brahman from the minor term.

The word 'all' (it is different from Brahman) has been used in the *anumāna* in order to avoid the fault of establishing what is already established. In this way, though in *suktirūpya* etc., the *sādhyā* is established, the *sādhyā* unreality has not been established in all the things of the world and therefore in it (*anumāna*) there is no fault of *siddhasādhana*. It should not be urged how
nacre-silver which is one of the entities other than Brahman (Brahmabhinna) can be an illustration (drṣṭānta) since it has already been otherwise established to be unreal.

The opponent argues that the example given nacre-silver is not established, because there is no pramāṇa to establish the unreality of nacre-silver. This objection has been set aside by Dharmarāja by arguing that it is not secured by anumāṇa but by stating nacre-silver to be mithyāvastu (hallucinational substance) being produced from an external fault by pratyakṣapramāṇa. Here another objection is raised by the opponent that the nature of being other than Brahman is not the determinant of unreality as the cause because the particular mark i.e. līrīga, given here does not set out the expected sādhyā. The objector argues that a reason like avidyākārya is really what is capable of establishing the falsehood of nacre-silver. To this the author gives a fitting reply: ‘Just like ‘nacre-silver’ (suktirūpya) which is false even avidyā is a false entity.

The unreality has been defined by our author as being the counter positive of the absolute non-existence that abides in the totality of whatever is supposed to be its substratum. Here in the definition, the word ‘sva’ has reference to

20. fawned | ibid., p.77
21. I ibid., p.77
159
the particular object whose unreality is spoken of, the word ‘abhimata’ (supposed to be) has been used in order to ward off the fault of impossibility i.e. ‘asambhavadosa’, the word ‘yāvat’ (totality) has been used in order to preclude other undesired objects. In order to avoid contingency the author uses the word ‘yāvat’.

It is notable that if it is supposed that there is a particular object in a particular substratum then its absolute non-existence can possibly exist since by delusion (bhrānti) an object may appear to exist in a place where it does not. In support of his stand Dharmarāja quotes citsukha, he is indebted to him on this point. Hence, it has been said that the unreality of all things whatsoever consists in their being counterpositive of the absolute non-existence that abides in what is supposed to be their substratum 22.

In the well known nacre-silver example, there is the unreality of silver. In the totality nacre which is supposed (by the conceiver) to be the substratum of silver, there is the absolute non-existence of silver and thus silver is the counterpositive and therefore it is false. It is possible in the case of unreal objects of the world including ether. This should not be urged that the substratum of ether is not known and as such the definition of unreality is not applicable since the holy text speaks of Brahman as it substratum.

22. सर्वेषामपि भाजवानं स्वाश्रयत्वें सम्मते।
प्रतियोगिताविवर्त्तापं विरत मृष्टालता। ibid., p.77; TPd., p.67
The Paribhasakara is not satisfied with the anumāṇa of unreality stated previously probably because, there is the fault of mutual dependency in the case of the falsehood of the universe of ether etc. and gives an alternative anumāṇa of unreality avoiding this fault of mutual dependency, when otherness from Brahman is taken as the deciding factor of unreality. This second type of falsehood runs as that it takes up individual cases and establishes unreality.

The anumāṇa runs as: 'This (piece of) cloth is the counterpositive of the absolute non-existence existing in this thread because it is a (piece of) cloth just as another piece of cloth'. Thus, Dharmarāja Adhvarindra states establishing the anumāṇa of unreality. In this particular thread there is the absolute non-existence of this piece of cloth and therefore this piece of cloth is the counter positive. Thus all wholes are stated to be the counterpositive of the non-existence existing in parts because the wholes are possessed of parts. In this way the unreality of all things in the world including ether can be established. This point of view is taken from citsukha as Dharmarāja Adhvarindra himself cites. It should not be urged that if 'jar' etc. be inferred to be unreal then there is contradiction with our pratyakṣa 'the jar is existent'. To this Dharmarāja cleverly replies that it is only the existence of Brahman, the locus (of the jar) that is the object of our pratyakṣa but jar etc. are false.

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23. परिभाषाकरं अनुमाṇेण न निदर्शनम् प्रति त्वम् । VP., p.78
24. अथ श्रवणात्मकयत् प्रतिपत्तिनिवृत्तम् ।

अशिशवदितसर्वोपलोक्तम् गुणाविश्वम् श्रवणात्मकम् । ibid., p.78 and TPd., p.69
There should not be urged that if 'jar' etc. be inferred to be unreal then there is contradiction with *pratyakṣa*: 'the jar is existent'. To this Dhārmārāja cleverly replies that it is only the existence of Brahman, the locus (of the jar) that is the object of *pratyakṣa* but jar etc. are all false. It cannot be urged, the *Paribhāṣākāra* says, how Brahman devoid of colour, is an object of ocular *pratyakṣa* for even in the opinion of the Naiyāyika, colour itself is an object of *pratyakṣa* though it has no colour in itself.

The idea is that Brahman being qualityless, i.e. nirguṇa, He cannot be considered to be a 'dravya'. Nor can Brahman be viewed as a 'samavāyikāraṇa' of any particular thing as 'samavāya' is not admitted by the Vedāntins. Even accepting this no 'parināma' is accepted in the case of Brahman. Even then since Brahman is considered to be both the material and the efficient cause (abhinnanimittopādāna) of the universe, somehow substancehood, i.e. 'dravyatva' will have to be accepted in the case of Brahman. On account of this Dharmārāja cleverly shifts to another type of argument that, though Brahman is a colourless 'dravya', still he is an object of ocular perception (*pratyakṣa*) just like time which is colourless 25.

Dharmārāja very deftly comes to the point by stating that there are three levels of existence (sattā) 26, viz., (i) Pāramārthikasattā, (in the real sense,
as in the case of Brahman alone), (ii) *Vyāvahārikasattā* (pragmatic existence, e.g. in the case of objects of the world) and

(iii) *Pratibhāsikasattā* (hallucinational reality, e.g. in the case of nacre-silver)

and as such though there is empirical existence in usages like 'the jar existent' it is valid only at the 'vyāvahārika' level, but in reality it is not there. Thus the 'jar' etc. are not existent in the real sense; therefore, there is no contradiction in a statement 'the jar is existent' on the one side and is non-existent on the other side.

Thus, our author is careful enough to make a note that the definition of unreality should be accordingly modified by giving an epithet in the form of *'Pārmatthikatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākatva'*, the additional idea, 'the counterpositive-ness relating to which is characterised by absoluteness'. Hence the *anumāna* about the unreality of the universe is valid.

It is seen in the *anumāna* (inference) *pariccheda* that the *Paribhāṣākāra* rejects the established theory of the Naiyāyika that the recollection of *vyāpti* is the intermediary activity of the *anumāna*. From the analysis above, it is also made clear that the author rejects the Naiyāyika division of the mark (*hetu*) into three and establishes his own point of view as the one of a form

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27. *ibid.*, p.81
'anvaya' only, i.e. affirmative mark (‘anvayiliṅga’). He rejects the kevalānvayin (purely affirmative) also. Dharmarāja applies his knowledge of anumāna to establish the unreality of the world quoting citsukha and vindicating his theory from his own point of view. In his argument, according to the Naiyāyika, colour which itself doest not possess colour in it, is an object of sense pratyakṣa.

According to the thinkers it is a very notable argument. Dharmarāja speaks of the three kinds of realities from the Advaita standpoint. Consequent upon the discussion made above we may arrive at this conclusion that the validity of anumāna as an independent source of knowledge is accepted by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in the ‘Anumāna pariccheda’ of the VP.