CHAPTER-IV

FAITH AND REASON
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The concept of reason stands in need of elucidation. Reason means ground, support or justification of an act or belief. An action, belief an event or occurrence is said to be reasonable when it is endowed with reason - rational as contradistinguished from irrational. Reason does also mean the ability to think. It is in this sense that man is a rational animal. The concept of reason is an old and familiar. Among many crucial questions, one concerning faith in "Is faith rational"? has been engaging the serious attention of philosophers. They seem to have reacted differently, some affirming or accepting faith to be rational, others denying or dismissing them to be irrational or a-rational and still others tend to show unwarranted antagonism between faith and reason. Philosophers are widely divergent in their views.

Although attempts have been made to define faith it has not been quite fruitful is shedding sufficient light on the concept. But meaning comes out of their use in language or their conceptual behaviour. Generally, faith is understood as belief in God and reason as the rational faculty of human mind. Anthony Kenny offers three senses in which faith as belief in God have been understood in religion:

1. Belief that there is a God, that God exists.
2. Belief in a doctrine on the word of God, as revealed by God.

3. Belief in God as trust in God and commitment to Him.¹

The three senses may be precisely, the unquestioned belief or mere belief that God exists, the revealed truth (vouched by God) and the trust or love of God above all things. Kenny examines whether faith in the last two senses are 'rational' or "worthy of a reasonable human being".

Kenny dwells upon the issue by suggesting a meaning of rationality as a mean between credulity and scepticism or a balance between dogma and doubt:

If you believe too much, your mind will be cluttered with many falsehoods, if you believe too little you will be deprived of much valuable information.²

Further it is enlightening that Kenny labours vigorously in pointing out:


² ibid., p.6.
It is easy to formulate criteria for the credulous person; e.g. "believe everything you are told". It is easy to formulate criteria for the sceptic; e.g. "believe only what you see with your own eyes".  

In this situation, it might be suggested that one should believe only what one knows. Kenny harps on the issue of evidence in justification of belief. What, then evidence is? A proposition may itself be evident, or be evident to the senses (as that \(2 + 2 = 4\)) or self-evident or made evident by other propositions providing evidence to it. Things which are evident may be said to be believed without evidence. It is clearly rational to believe what is self-evident, or evident to the senses. In this sense, it is rational sometimes to accept propositions without evidence. A belief is rational if it is in a proposition which is self-evident or evident to the senses. Rational belief, then will either itself be evident, or be based directly or indirectly on what is evident. Kenny is commendably straightforward in his finding:

Many philosophers, both theists and atheists, have accepted this criterion

for the rationality of belief...
Common to theists like Aquinas and Descartes and to an atheist like Russell, is the premise that the rationality of a belief must be tested by its relationship to a set of basic propositions which form the foundation of knowledge. This common belief has been given the apt name foundationalism by Alvin Plantinga.  

Kenny like Plantinga rejects the classical definition of rationality as the proportioning of one's belief to the evidence. Now three meanings of rationality come up and have been utilised by many critics including Swinburne, who seems to have made the point amply clear and vital to philosophical scrutiny of the concept of faith:

Interest in the question of the rationality of the belief in the existence of God often originates from a desire to short-circuit the forbidding task of examining the arguments for and against the existence of God. If I am right, there

cannot be any such shortcut. Individuals may believe in the existence of God as something basic, but they are rationally justified in doing so only if it is in general possible to offer sound arguments for the existence of God and refute argument against it.\textsuperscript{5}

The main purpose of our scrutiny is to be refreshed about the efficacy of faith and reason and the consequences of religious rationality or rational religion. We are not however particularly or directly involved in looking into proofs for or against the existence of God in theology. That is after all a different issue. It may aptly be pointed out that the varieties of proofs have been shown to be equally engendering failures: God's existence cannot be decisively proved or disproved:

There it appeared that we cannot decisively prove the existence of God; here it appears that neither can we decisively disprove God's existence.

We have yet to consider what it is, for many people, the most powerful

reason for doubting the reality of a loving God, namely the immense weight both of human suffering and human wickedness.⁶

In view of the fact that proofs or disproofs are quite irrelevant to faith from the standpoint of rational criticism, this aspect of religion is either irrational or a-rational but surely not rational. So is the case with respect to the language of the attributes of God⁷ which have been found to be quite beyond rational nexus turning it out as other than being factual propositions.

It is therefore, in this context, quite relevant to examine the candidature of varieties of the language of faith briefly:

Faith in religion may be a "willed commitment" to some type of behaviour; it is a conviction in certain absolute values beyond the rational, scientific and logical activities...⁸

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Pascal understood and interpreted 'faith' as wager suggesting a way by which wagering that God is, could be done, to gain. In an overwhelming appeal he proposes:

Let us weigh the gain and the loss in taking heads that God exists. Let us weigh these two cases: If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, that He is, without hesitation.9

The wager theory being extremely hypothetical and improbable has been criticised widely and the assumption that God will be pleased by such a calculating and self-regarding attitude, is profoundly irreligious. Pascal wants to advance an appeal, which lacks in rational justification and does not rid the enigma by a calculation of gain and risk.

Tennant observes, faith always involves risk, but it is only by such risk that human knowledge is extended. Science and religion are alike in requiring the venture of faith. But his bracketing together religious and scientific faith is highly questionable. Ultimately religious faith as

Tennant conceives it is reduced to an unverifiable hope. Tennant rests faith on pragmatic verification to establish certitude of the unseen. But such verification falls short of objective certainty as to external reality. Hick rightly comments:

This admission reduces religious faith, as Tennant conceives it, to an unverifiable hope, and thereby undermines his attempt to assimilate religious to scientific cognition.10

In this context, it is relevant to rethink with William James, a founder of Pragmatist school of thought that faith is one's right to believe, either to assert existence or non-existence of God. If God exists for the believer or does not exist for the unbeliever, we cannot escape by remaining sceptical and wait for further light. The will to believe works and it is so much so good if it goes with truth but in any case one has to bet his life for a possibility whatsoever. In his words: "Better risk loss of truth than chance of error" and such a stake is important enough to "give me the right to choose my own form of risk".11

It may be quite relevant to see the facet of religious language of faith as symbolic that has invited serious as well as delightful attention of rational critics of our times.

For Tillich, religion is the "Ultimate Concern" and "the meaning of our life". There are two trends with which he seems to have been at work leading to metaphysics or ontology of the Absolute, the transcendent reality as 'It' and also the empirical human problems and predicaments for which man is concerned. While he speaks of "total concern" from an essentialist view, he harps on 'concerns' from existential view. The structural ontology of Tillich is the outcome of his existential meaning of life and his craving for a dignified destiny and self-complete paradisal consciousness as a spiritual therapeutic. It is worth quoting here Ruth Reyna's illumination:

Tillich's greatness, it would seem, lies in his exploration of the boundary between metaphysics and theology. Perhaps there is no other of our times who has brought the marriage of philosophy and theology so close to consumption. Yet, Tillich, like all others before him has not quite succeeded in teeing the connubial
knot. However, although his theology appears to be compact and acceptable, his philosophy falls wayside. Tillich is first a religionist and in the final analysis chooses to remain a religionist.12

As is clear, Tillich keeps his ontological commitment, or more appropriately, his essentialism and existential concern and involvement or existentialism together. What after all, he is labouring for, is his notion of religion as a whole. Sometime he goes beyond Christianity as in his last word he dealt with the issue of relationship between Christian systematic theology and other religions.

To characterise Tillich's conception of 'faith' is not easy although it is said to be "the state of being ultimately concerned". Due to this mixed-ontological-cum-existential verbiage, Tillich remains between the two realms equally. It is however, possible to scan the relation between "faith and reason". In his Dynamics of faith, Tillich mentions:

"Faith... happens in the centre of the personal life and includes all its elements. It is not a movement of a special section or a special function of man's total being. They are all united in the act of faith". Again he emphasises, "the dynamics of faith are the dynamics of man's ultimate concern"... The ultimate concern is the concern of the Unconditioned. God is the fundamental symbol of the ultimate concern. It is always present in any act of faith.

These interpretations have been critically investigated as may be instantiated with the rational estimation of the problem by Hick who argues:

It is important to distinguish between the assertions of faith and subsequent development of theological theories to explain them, for these fulfil distinct functions and have a different epistemological status.

Paul Helm seems to have done a great service by observing in his way: "Words such as 'faith', 'belief',

14. ibid., p.1 and p.45.
'know' and 'knowledge' are not used univocally in English.\textsuperscript{16}

There is a host of conceptual differences due to the variant uses of the word faith. It is however unnecessary to reiterate more theories concerning religious faith the essence of which amounts to religious persons \textit{credo}. Eric Carlton\textsuperscript{17} has viewed correctly that religion is a strange business and more we think about and more we investigate it the stranger it gets. Whatever we think about them one thing strikes very common, that is, meaning of religion. But this is altogether a conceptual affair. Religion is lively and persistent despite changing patterns of faith. No religion is conclusive. Religion has survived because it has been fulfilling some worthwhile purposes. The basis of religion is faith. Carlton accepts it a task to see what the manifold logic of faith or the multiplicity of meanings which make religion possible.

It is interesting to note that religion has undergone serious challenges and attacks, at length. David Hume, for example, is an invincible sceptic who declares all

\textsuperscript{16} Paul Helm, \textit{The Varieties of Belief}, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973, p.64.

philosophy including religious philosophy, "sophistry and illusion" - "What Hume is dramatizing in the purple pejoration is the conclusion of his general offensive against the rational foundations of any supernatural religion". 18

The opposing strands, religion as fulfilment of some "worthwhile purposes" and lack of "rational foundation" have put serious challenge on the meaning of religion. The sceptical thrust on the one hand and fundamental attitude on the other hand form the basis of future perspectives.

Another important and allied facet of inquiry rests with the revolutionary works respectively of Antony Flew, R.M.Hare, Basil Mitchell, I.M.Crombie, R.B.Braithwaite, John Hick and others inspite of variance in their mode of analysis.

Basil Mitchell's response to Flew's simple central question is different from Hare's. The treatment he metes out to the problem accommodates the application of the falsifiability criterion and for this reason, Flew appreciates it as "admirably direct, straightforward and

understanding". The response is treated by Blackstone very lucidly designating it "The Rightwing Response". Mitchell does not accept Flew's thesis that the theologian does not allow anything to count against religious assertion. Thus "the theologian surely would not deny that the fact of pain counts against the assertion that god loves man".

Religious language, for example, "God loves man" resembles "the stranger is on our side" can both be treated in at least three different ways:

1. As provisional hypotheses to be discarded if experiences tell against them;

2. As significant articles of faith, and

3. As vacuous formulae (expressing, perhaps, a desire for reassurance) to which experience makes no difference to life.

19. NEPT, eds. A Flew and A. MacIntyre, p.105. Also reproduced and criticised elaborately elsewhere.


21. NEPT, op.cit., p.103.

22 ibid.
Mitchell is concerned with stressing the similarity rather than the dissimilarity between religious beliefs and ordinary unproblematic, factual beliefs because he opts for three different contentions.

Mitchell's concluding remarks are really commendable:

The Christian once he has committed himself is precluded by his faith from taking up the first attitude "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God". He is in constant danger as Flew has observed, of slipping into a third. But he need not; and if he does, it is a failure in faith as well as in logic.23

Mitchell's emphasis on 'faith' appears to be an eye-opener to further consequences. The critic is naturally inquisitive to ask further questions, such as, what then happens to faith or, more particularly religious faith? In saying that some one has a certain faith in something, it may not, however be always conceived as to making an assertion that it is true or false in some sense a belief that may be taken in that sense amounts to be either true.

23. ibid., p.105.
or false. But there is the case of 'belief-in' as rightly distinguished by Price from 'belief-that'. Price goes a long way in maintaining that there are some cases of 'belief-in' reducible to 'belief-that' as in the case of "I cannot trust my doctor unless I at least believe that there is a person to whom the description 'being my doctor' applies".24

Blackstone is led to his conclusion that Mitchell had failed to meet Flew's challenge - "he sidesteps, as does a slippery half-back". But we can't agree with Blackstone that "Mitchell's side-step takes him completely off the playing field. At least, he is not playing Flew's game".25 Although according to Blackstone it may be true that Mitchell might not have "faced the falsifiability challenge" or "fails to show that such beliefs conform to the falsifiability requirement", but perhaps to take it as the end of things in Mitchell seems abrupt. At least in all fairness of facts and arguments, it may be pointed out that for Mitchell, the logic of religious language is not confined to the criterion of 'falsifiability'. The inapplicability of the criterion to religious discourse26

has already been shown and established.

R.M.Hare's concept of \( blik \)^{27} throws adequate light on the topic much more than what was really the main objective, i.e. an answer to Flew's Challenge on the basis of the famous falsifiability theory of meaning. Although, this theory is inapplicable to the arena of religious meaning in general, the concept of \( blik \) is still fresh and alive. The Harean discrimination of right and wrong \( blik \) as religious attitude is by and large the citadel of rationality for which his critical analytical acumen is adored. This facet has been developed in recent analytical approaches very lucidly.

Braithwaite's view that religious statements have a meaning because they can be shown to have a use is often regarded of much value to the analytic thinker. Religious language does not simply express emotions, evoke feelings but do more than the same by being declaration regarding the behaviour-policy of action, rather commitment to a way of life.^{28}

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27. R.M.Hare, "Theology and Falsification", *NEPT*. eds. A.Flew & A.MacIntyre.

Philosophy of religion is concerned with philosophical scrutiny of religion. It is neither a defense of nor an attack against religion. It is neutral as regards to acceptance and denial. Its main and most formidable task is to analyze concepts and evaluate arguments by rational means. In such analysis, logical reasoning as the most glaring method of arriving at any viable decision. Religion cannot be an exception to this since the faculty of reason and rationality as the accepted intellectual key to validity of an argument covers the entirety of human discourses.

Swinburne remarks:

All the kinds of faith I have discussed involve attitudes to behaviour in the light of propositions. They are not necessarily always so phrased, but my claim is that talk about believing in God or trusting God can without loss of meaning be analyzed in one of the ways.29

Swinburne favours propositional view against Hick's contention of non-propositional faith:

John Hick however seems to claim that faith is not concerned with proposition. He entitles his view as 'non-propositional' and claims rather that the man of faith is one who experiences world as God's.\textsuperscript{30}

Swinburne discards non-propositional view and prefers attitude to behaviour in the light of proposition, so faith as voluntary belief is always propositional. This seems rationally more wholesome and justified as it maintains faith as propositional is open to critical inquiry in contrast to other points of view, for example, the Thomist view, Lutheran view, Pragmatic view etc.

The position of I.M. Cromble appears to be quite genuine through his intension with regard to analysis of religious language. He inquires,

\begin{quote}
Does anything count decisively against it? No, we reply, because it is true. Could anything count decisively against it? Yes, suffering which was utterly, eternally and irredeemably
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{30} ibid.
Religious statements, utterances, assertions are meaningful in their own context—they have logic of their own, "logical stipulation" being satisfied and "communicational stipulation"\textsuperscript{32} being reinforced. It is clear that the inapplicability of falsifiability criterion is perhaps enough to make religion and science distinct enterprises. A religious statement not being falsifiable tends to be non-scientific and non-empirical but it is not meaningless. There are many other ways of understanding the significance of religious language. Assertability and falsifiability do not go together. The eschatological view of religion is one of the manifold attempts to restore meaningfulness of religious statements. Both Crombie and Hick contribute to proper elucidation of the eschatological notion into religious discourse. This view has its consequence, sceptical and narrow: sceptical because of admittance of belief as knowledge without rational scrutiny and narrow because the restriction of religion to the expression of attitude. This is one end. There is yet another, with the agnostics, atheists or materialists


\textsuperscript{32} I.M.Crombie, "Theology & Falsification", \textit{NEPT}, \textit{op.cit.}, pp.125-126.
denying religious experience the capacity of giving knowledge "fresh knowledge".\textsuperscript{33} Any religious claims, if rationally justified becomes a piece of religious knowledge. Thus religious cognition is a complex, comprehensive system consisting of its presuppositions, theories and facts. In another context, the questions relating to rational justifiability of religious knowledge, have raised controversies in philosophical analysis. But such controversies are cleared off when the nature of the question is grasped with clarity. Logic of faith is a developing concern which from time to time exercises discipline and restores the capacity to the knowledge-claims by way of substantiation and validation through the means of Reason.

The insight gained from Crombie is "all that is necessary for an utterance to be a meaningful statement is that it should be governed by rules which specify what it is about, and what it asserts about it".\textsuperscript{34} Similarly Hick asserts;

The use of 'verify' and its cognates is sufficiently various to permit us to speak in either way. But the only

\textsuperscript{33} Paul F Schmidt, \textit{op.cit.}

sort of verification of theological propositions which is likely to interest us is one in which human beings participate. We may, therefore, for our present purpose, treat verification as a combined logical and psychological, rather than as purely logical, concept.  

Among other features, Crombie and Hick support "eschatological verification" from their standpoint as for both of them religion is a matter of total life even beyond death. There is a very great amount of controversy hinging with the idea. The hypothesis of future life and our understanding of it have the risk of lack of logical clarity. Apart from eschatological verification there is the suggestion that the language of Christian faith as interpreted through stories, parables and such descriptions is of positive value. Religious knowledge is after all the problem directly concerned with the meaningfulness of religious statements.

Reason has a very significant and dominant role in religious epistemology. In a sense, philosophy is a

reaction to the sceptical thrusts and undertakes seriously to answer the charges of scepticism. The history of philosophy is an evolution of knowledge against doubt and dogma. In this, consists the instrumentality in the operation of reason or say, the very rational methods. In fact, knowledge is related to reason in restoration of human intellectual endowment against the hazards of dogma and doubt in such a way that it is peculiar to epistemological problems. The very definition of knowledge as a belief or set of beliefs which is certain and true based on necessary and sufficient evidence is the fundamental presupposition of epistemology. Moreover, the pre-requisite to knowledge is 'reason' or rational foundation.

Another such basic question philosophers often ask is about the criteria of knowing.

Concerning the criteria of knowledge, the source of knowledge as both reason and experience were stressed and religious knowledge by not conforming to these two turned out as an impossibility of knowledge proper for the sceptic. Indeed, soon the victory was found to be quite bloodless. The virtues of rationality are utilised to expand new vista of the changing dimensions of an expanding universe with its ever growing possibilities to examine and
realise. Faith in reason is the most minimal acquisition for reason to acknowledge and reason for faith is the acid test of genuineness. Without faith, reason is idle and without reason, faith mere fantasy or dogma. There is no antagonism between faith and reason, rather both are complimentary and the absence of one turns the other impotent. Penelhum\textsuperscript{36} outlines and contrasts two accounts of the religious faith and its relation to knowledge:

The first is the traditional Catholic account that derives from St. Thomas. On this view faith is reasonable and free acceptance of certain propositions about God and man, belief in which is a prerequisite for salvation. The second is a modern protestant account, deriving from the sixteenth century reformers and twentieth century neo-orthodoxy and placed in a philosophically accessible setting by John Hick. On this view faith is a complex cognitive-conative response to God's alleged revelation of himself in human history.

For restoration of meaning of life which is at the base meaning of faith, a person has to look for a rational view of life or a world-view: "It (life) can have just as much meaning as one is able to put into it". Reason consists just in this that we are able to give account of our concepts, opinions and assertions, either on objective or subjective grounds. Hudson rightly remarks in another context relevant to mention here:

Like any other conceptual scheme, a religion based logically upon presupposition, and is bounded logically by frontiers, the former must be accepted, and the latter rejected, if the game is to be played or the form of life taken up.

All conceptual meanings are at the base human meanings. As faith must be tested by rational criteria, reason must be subservient to meaningful life.


Reason must be used both to analyze our beliefs and concepts and to subject them to critical inquiry. The indispensability of reason can not be denied in respect of thinking, acting and valuing. In other words, religion must seek the help and guidance of reason by the virtues of logic of faith as the basis or foundation. Unless the foundation at the depth is sound and strong, howsoever otherwise outwardly attractive and apparently ornamental, the edifice so built might weaken and collapse. If, analytical-rational living could be practised through reason it might yield more fruitful results. Logic of faith through rational terms could test its genuineness at the depth and such test is only done through conceptual analysis. The "straw shows where wind blows" or "the taste of the pudding lies in tasting it" is true of logic of religion.

R.M. Hare contends in another context relevant to the above remarks:

By philosophy, I mean the ability to reason logically about these and other subjects with enough familiarity with the verbal traps that is on one's path not to fall into them, the ability, that is to say, to see the issues clearly and not to be deceived by
sophistries whether intentional or inadvertent. Logic, as it is being studied in many of the most important philosophical schools at the present time is the anatomy of language. 40

Religion generally is open to reason within its limits but a distinction may be made as religious-reason contrasted with reason in other areas as science, art etc. Religious-reason works in a sphere based on a religious 'World-view' weltanschauung. Reason consists in coherence, implication, entailment and consistency. Any discourse open to reason secures its vitality only after passing adequate and appropriate test-check. The religious cognitions are a part of religious-consciousness inclusive of cognition, conation, affection etc. It is the total life-orientation, designated variously like ultimate concern, holistic response etc.

After having glanced through some of the features of religious reasoning, it is at this stage pertinent to inquire into the question about the rationality of religious commitments. But what, after all, is commitment?

Religion most generally speaking, is concerned with faith at the base. Faith is commitment of the believer. The unbeliever does not have the faith of the believer. He does not believe what believer does; but does not he have faith of his own? The sceptic, iconoclast, heretics etc. do have faith, at least in what they claim to do, say or combat or doubt or deny. What is that faith? Ultimately, squarely, we must come to the question of commitment. "All commitments must involve beliefs which may turn out to be true or false. It is not adequate to maintain that the beliefs only have a truth which is relative to the society, conceptual system or whatever is in question".  

As we have seen earlier, the general and broad notion of rationalism implies a commitment to the standards of rationality—a commitment which is an essential prerequisite for any philosophical system. In this general sense it seems clear that all philosophers without exception are, or ought to be, rationalists. As it is stated clearly "A belief in the value and importance of rational argument is a pre-requisite for all serious intellectual inquiry".

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41. Roger Trigg, *op.cit.*, p.43.
42. John Cottingham, *op.cit.*, p.3.
Now it be noticed that faith is a commitment, rather a "willed commitment". It is a conviction. The coinages, viz. commitment, conviction, attitude, blik or the like are pointed to 'faith' at the very base of religious activities. Religion is a view of life, religious life or living consisting in religious activities. The backdrop of all these activities is faith. But 'faith' as 'Commitment' does not, as supposed, preclude the "critical reflection, continued inquiry and dedication to the search for a truth beyond individual preference". 43

Reason plays its role of critical assessment of our commitment to any kind of faith whatsoever. Religious commitment does not throw rational inquiry over-board, rather helps us assess the logical respectability of an "article of faith" as well as "interpretation of faith". Hick explains the position with regard to role of reason:

... any religious knowledge must be based upon aspects of human experience that are received as revelatory. Thus, reason can never replace experience as the source of the basic religious data. Nevertheless, in its proper place and when allowed to fulfil its

proper role, reason plays an important part in the religious life. Negatively, it can criticize naturalistic theories that are proposed as ruling out a rational belief in God; and in this way it may have the effect of removing blocks in the way of belief. Positively, it must seek to understand the implications of that is known by faith; in a famous phrase of Anslem's, this is "faith seeking understanding". And, of course, reason is at work also in the systematic formulation of what is believed on the basis of faith.\footnote{44. John Hick, \textit{Philosophy of Religion}, 3rd edn., pp.74-75. Cf. R.G. Swinburne, \textit{Faith and Reason}, op.cit., p.124, fn.1.}

Reason can be applied to the religious framework consisting of its horizons, foundational backdrop, activities and interpretations. Faith is the basis of all religious activities and interpretations.

The most basic feature of religion being faith, faith being commitment, expressed in language invites rational
scrutiny. As Férré puts it: "Every one has some perspective, some 'slant' on himself, others and the world he lives in. At its most basic, this viewpoint, or blik, as we have met it before". 45 If any person has for himself-herself any faith, it only becomes cognizable by expression, interpretation and communication. So, the question of reasonableness or non-reasonableness of faith arises; whether is or is not there a state of faith where the point of reason does not at all arise? Now how is such faith rational(?) is a viably logical question concerning faith as belief. Swinburne makes it clear:

A rational belief is one when the believer has by his own standards adequately investigated the evidence, his inductive standards with force of his evidence. 46

So it is faith as belief which invites reason to be tested. The question is, whether a faith as belief is rational. While discussing the main points of this important tenet, Roger Trigg comments: If I commit myself to God, I base may life on my belief that there is a

46. R. Swinburne, Faith and Reason, op. cit., p.65.
The notion of an ultimate arbitrary commitment has been put to criticism leading to the conclusion, when somebody is sceptical about rationality, it is merely to beg the question to tell him why he is being irrational.\textsuperscript{48}

Bartley poses the problem as follows:

Obviously, a man cannot, without arguing in a circle, justify the rationality of his standard of rationality by appealing to that standard. Yet, if he holds certain beliefs - for example the standard itself - to be immune from the demand of rational justification and from the question "How do you know"? he can be said to hold them irrationally or dogmatically. And, so it is claimed, arguments among men about the radically different beliefs they hold in this way is pointless.\textsuperscript{49}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{47} Roger Trigg, \textit{op. cit.}, p.43.
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{ibid.}, p.150.
\end{itemize}
The problem of justifying, says Trigg, any commitment apparently comes down in the end to the problem of whether commitment to rationality itself can be justified. Aided by the arguments especially after Bartley's comprehensively critical rationalism, Trigg asserts that there is no commitment which is arbitrary and cannot itself be examined.

It is perhaps made clear by now that there is no antagonism between religious faith and reason and logic of faith exhibits no indication of preclusion from rational scrutiny. The supposition wrongly upheld makes religion a closed affair whereas in fact it is open for all purposes as a form of living, thinking and valuing.

50. R. Trigg, op. cit., p. 146.