CHAPTER-II

THE LOGIC OF FAITH
Faith, belief and revelation constitute the key-concepts of philosophy of religion which needs to be elucidated in order to understand the logical status of Faith and Reason. Faith is considered to be a form of assent to propositions revealed by God which enjoys the sanction of different religious traditions. Faith is connotative of an attitude which makes the individual believe the veracity and infallibility of the truths contained in the scriptures. Since these truths are mere record of what is revealed by God, they are considered to be infallible and certain. 'Faith' for all purposes of religion is the faith in the existence of God which has been opposed by religious atheists and theological sceptics. 'Faith' may be consisting of cognitive and conative elements. On the conative side, it may be considered as a special form of courage. It is grounded however, on a cognitive element and on this side, it is plainly interpretative. It is a way of looking at and understanding the world.¹

Faith is defined by the vatican council of 1870 as "A supernatural virtue whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which he has

revealed are true" or "Faith is the catholic's response to an intellectual message communicated by God". Faith, for Bultman means;

Faith is turning away from the world, the act of de-secularisation, the surrender of all seeming security and every pretence, the willingness to live by the strength of the invisible and the uncontrollable.

Bultman has assimilated much of Heidegger's existentialism. For Bultman, a man can decide to be an inauthentic creature if he refuses to exercise his option in matters of choice. By following the crowd in a sheep-like fashion (Kierkegaard) or by being led by one's past historical upbringing a man becomes an inauthentic existence. Authentic individuality consists in being liberated from one's own life of the flesh, from every self-made security, from dependence on this earthly


concern, and from one's own past. It means the present decision in faith for an openness to the future.

This is what is meant by 'faith', to open ourselves freely to the future. But at the same time faith involves obedience, for faith means turning our backs on self and abandoning all security. It means giving up every attempt to carve out a niche life for ourselves and surrendering all our self-confidence, and resolving to trust in God alone ...

Faith is not an intellectual game which can be played once for all-times. It is a never-ceasing process, and faith is to be sustained by constant decisions as an ever-recurring event. It is always a leap, attended by risk, as Kierkegaard and Tillich have maintained. An individual is to state his life either following the faith of belief or unbelief. If one believes in the existence of God one would gain the highest good and if God does not exist then one would lose a little. On the other hand, if one does not believe in God one would lose a great deal if God exists and gain a little. Therefore Pascal argues;

Let us weigh the gain and loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two changes. If you gain, you gain all, if you lose; you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.6

The concept of faith for Bultman does not mean either asceticism or other-worldliness. It means to live in the world but not to be attached in worldly activities. This corresponds to the Gita's concept of niskamakarma, not renunciation of action but renunciation in action. Bultman is fond of quoting the Pauline injunctions in this regard;

And they that weep, as though they wept not; and they that rejoice as though they rejoiced not; and they that buy, as though they possessed not; And they that use this world, as not abusing it.7

One of the characteristic features of faith is that it is not so much compelled by the object of faith as by the

act of voluntary assent. It is in this respect that faith is to be distinguished from knowledge on the one hand and from opinion on the other hand. In elucidating the nature of faith Aquinas observes:

Faith involves intellectual assent to that which is believed. But there are two ways in which intellect gives its assent. In the first way, it is moved to give its assent by the object itself, which is either known in itself, as first principles are obviously known, since the intellect understand them, or through something else that is known, as are conclusions which are known scientifically. In the second way, the intellect gives its assent not because it is convinced by the object itself, but by voluntarily preferring the one alternative to the other. If it chooses with hesitation, and with misgiving about the other alternative, there will be opinion. If it chooses with assurance, and without any such misgivings, there will be
William James compares faith to a working hypothesis. As an hypothesis determines the mode and direction of an enquiry, faith creates its facts and has its won verification. Faith is creative as it constitutes the totality of frame-work. The believer cannot but act in a way which follows from the act of believing. The choice between faith and non-faith is momentous in the sense that one cannot afford to escape from the both. He has to choose either of the two and such a choice is vital because one has to stake one's life. James says;

Better risk loss of truth than chance of error - that is your faith -
vetoer's exact position. He is actively playing his stake as much as the believer is. He is backing the religious hypothesis against the field. 8

Tenant treats faith on par with scientific hypothesis. Faith gives direction to the venture of religious enquiry.


Tenant is aware of the distinction between scientific faith and religious faith. A scientific supposition or faith turns out to be true or false in terms of its predictable consequences. Religious faith is verified by the fact that it gives inner quietude and contentment. It is an epistemic venture leading to the cognition of the absolute.

Without more venture some response from human subjects that is involved in infallible reading off of the self-evident, there would have emerged neither religion nor science ... 10

Faith is to be distinguished from belief, according to Waismann:

Believing means thinking, having confidence, or faith, trusting, relying, giving credence to, expecting, hoping, being afraid of, fancying, to be of opinion, to hold as true, to accept to acquiesce in truth etc. It is essential to contrast belief and faith.11


Faith is meant as the expression of an attitude. Attitude is not just a feeling although when such a feeling is embedded in repeated situations with similar consequent patterns of behaviour, it can lead to the formation of an attitude. Thus religious attitude is not just religious belief. We can distinguish between two kinds of belief in religion, 'belief-in' and 'belief-that'.

A 'belief-that' is an affirmation by a person of a statement that belongs to one of the types of knowledge, even though in some cases it is not acceptable by the rules of justification. A 'belief-in' is the affirmation by a person of an object rather of a statement. 12

Faith is identifiable with a set of belief-in about particular sorts of objects such that certain attitudes as dispositions would be instilled in the believers. Belief has been interpreted as (a) judgement of probability based on certain natural analogies or empirical data, (b) certainty grounded in the intrinsically self-authentic character of a judgement, (c) regulative moral principle,

and (d) immediate awareness of God akin to knowledge by acquaintance of persons and material objects. Schmidt says;

In saying that I have a certain faith in something, I do not assert a statement that is to be understood as true or false in some sense, as is the case with the statement of a belief-that. Faith in knowledge creates an attitude towards knowledge, a disposition to seek it, treasure it, use it, and communicate it.¹³

The terms 'faith' does not appear to have been used univocally in religious context. The use of 'faith' in ordinary language too has been quite varied and this justifies the need of making a distinction between 'belief-in' and 'belief-that'. In this connection Davis observes;

Faith, in a sense, then begins with what the believer sees as adequate evidence. However, it does seem to be characteristic of propositions that are accepted on faith that once they

¹³. ibid., pp. 83-84.
are accepted, it is difficult for the believer later to be convinced that they should be rejected... . This somehow seems characteristic of 'faith-situations', that is, situations where a person accepts a proposition with complete certitude, despite the fact that the public evidence supporting the proposition is weak.14

Faith is to be distinguished from belief in so far as the latter is more or less determined or constrained by the fact or reality whereas faith postulates an ideal and subsequently proceeds to verify the ideal as the actual. Tenant says that in the absence of a faith-venture, human knowledge would be limited with in actuality.

Belief is more or less constrained by fact or actuality that already is or will be, independently of any striving of ours, and which convinces us. Faith on the otherhand, reaches beyond the actual or the given to the ideally

possible, which in the first instance it creates as the mathematician posits his entities, and then by practical activity may realize or bring into actuality.\textsuperscript{15}

On the one hand Tenant gives the same epistemological status to science and religion and on the other hand, a religious faith is said to be less objective than the scientific faith as it is based on subjective certainty. He is aware of the fact that to say that faith is fruitful is not to say that it is true for there could be articles of faith which inspires and leads to successful activities even though they are not true. Tenant undermines the cognitive claim of faith as faith may turn out to be a mere act of wishful thinking. This makes faith a half-hearted or tentative venture and such interpretation of faith does not fully explain the faith-phenomena.

According to Paul Tillich faith is a form of self-disclosure and a state of ultimate concern. The Biblical statement according to Tillich is symbolical and the truth of the symbolical statement should not be confused with the truth of descriptive or scientific statements. A symbolical

\textsuperscript{15} F.R. Tenant, \textit{op. cit.}, p.297.
statement expresses revelatory events. A revelatory event declares the mystery of Being and this has to be co-related with the receptivity of the recipient of such a revelation. There can be no religious symbol without some believer who accepts it, and there can be no religious belief without some symbols which open up new dimension of the transcendent Infinite Being. A symbolic statement is authentic when it evokes an ultimate concern of what is ultimate for the believer. The genuineness and acceptability of a symbolical statement have to be verified in terms of the whole life-process itself. At the end of the believer's life we should be able to say whether the religious risk was well-merited or deluded. Tillich observes;

"Therefore the knowledge of revelation can be received only in the situation of revelation, and it can be communicated ... in contrast to ordinary knowledge ... only to those who participate in this situation." 16

But a question may be raised as to. How can a symbol be used to throw light on the nature of the Absolute Being

which is infinite? According to Tillich the infinite being in itself and is the ground of all existence. Every symbol of God participates in the power of God and yet has to be negated as it must point to God beyond itself.

The only infallible truth of faith, the one in which the ultimate itself is unconditionally manifest, is that any truth of faith (i.e. symbolical truth) stands under a yes-or-no judgement.17

That is why, Tillich insists that the notion of participation is fundamental to the understanding of the concept of faith. To have faith is to participate in the very ground of one's being. That explains why the faith is the response of the total self, the object of ultimate concern.

The special nature of the belief is that it is a belief in something as revealed by God. Faith, thus defined is a correlate of revelation. Hence it is worthwhile to examine the concept of revelation. Revelation is a kind of self-disclosure and faith is an act of voluntary acceptance.

Revelation may be defined as the communication of some truth by God to a rational creature through means which are beyond the ordinary course of nature.\textsuperscript{18}

The thesis that revelation is necessarily propositional in nature has given rise to two different kinds of theology viz. the natural theology was held to consist of all those theological truths that can be worked out by the unaided human intellect. Revealed theology, on the other hand, was held to consist of those theological truths that are not accessible to human reason and that can be known to us only if they are specially revealed by God. Natural theology consists of a philosophical justification of the theological truths. It purports to be a theology for which natural reason is sufficient. It is the use of revelation which distinguished the revealed theologian from the natural theologian.

Revelation means that God has revealed to the human race certain truths about himself which were not ascertainable by reason. Those who agree that there was divine revelation which called for faith might disagree on

\textsuperscript{18} The Catholic Encyclopedia, Robert Appleton Co., New York, 1912, XIII, I.
the particular content of revelation. There were many different forms in which the revelation might be made, different channels by which it reached the human race from God. What was common to all the different cases was that the believer's faith was belief in certain propositions specially revealed by God. These propositions are not demonstrable without appeal to revelation. They are opaque and appear repugnant to the unaided human intelligence. As such faith in these propositions differed from reason. But because the fact of their being revealed could be proved, it was claimed that faith was not in conflict with reason. Faith was considered to be a virtue permitting the mind access to truths which would otherwise be beyond the reach. Whether faith is a rational frame of mind or not needs critical evaluation.

First of all, it seems that faith must presuppose belief in the existence of God. It does not seem possible that some one could believe that God had revealed something without believing that God existed. The real problem concerning the relation between the belief in an article of faith and the belief that God has revealed it turns on the degree of commitment involved in each belief. Faith is a commitment. Now is it possible for the belief to have that degree of certainty unless the belief in the fact of revelation has the same certainty? If not, can faith itself
be rational? If divine revelation is the reason for the belief in the article of faith \( p \), one cannot rationally believe \( p \) on faith with a stronger commitment that of one's belief that God has revealed that \( p \).

Belief in a divine revelation has two elements; first, that there is a God who can reveal himself; second that certain historical events constitute the actual revelation. Answer to the first element depends upon the question regarding the proof for the existence of God. A.Kenny says;

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\ldots \text{the existence of God can be rationally justified outside faith,} \\
\text{secondly whatever are the historical events which are pointed to as constituting the divine revelation must be independently established as historically certain with the degree of commitment which one can have in the pieces of historical knowledge of the kind I have mentioned.}^{13}
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There are others who subscribe to the contention that revelation is not propositional in nature. God does not

reveal himself through the injunction of the scriptures but his revelation consists in His appearance in flesh and blood in this world. His descent is not frequent but only in moments of social juncture. Thus the revelation of God is in form of His enactment of the cosmic drama in which he plays the deciding role. The revelation, therefore, infuses a sense of hope and faith in the finite. Faith, therefore, is directed upon the incarnation of God. Faith under this interpretation is not only a matter of concern for the ultimate but the sense of eternal dependence on Him. Faith being the only mode of cognising God, God is available only to the faithful.

Faith-propositions are often held with more certitude than the evidence strictly warrants. The believer, in having faith, often experiences a total transformation of his way of seeing life. As Hick argues, faith is a 'total interpretation. For the believer, experiencing God is just like putting on a new set of glasses through which he sees the world. It helps him in discovering different patterns and relationships which are otherwise unnoticed by a non-believer. Thus the world becomes different for a faithful. There is thus, the intimate interaction between interpretation and action. John Hick observes;

There is also a reciprocal influence of action upon our interpretations.
For it is only when we have begun to act upon our interpretations, and have there by verified that our environment is capable of being successfully inhabited in terms of them, that they become fully 'real' modes of experience ... . It is by acting upon our interpretations that we build up an apprehension of the world around us; and in this process interpretations, once confirmed, suggest and support further interpretations. 20

For Hick, to perceive the world is to perceive things in relation to one another and things in relation to the knower. The reality discovered by the faithful is not subjective but is as much real as the objective reality discovered by the empirical scientist.

A true belief carries with it a commitment to the way of God. Love, service and sacrifice become the inevitable outer expressions of the inner act of faith. To believe in God, is therefore, to embrace a mode of life. The existence

of God forms the centre of the religious framework. Faith in God's existence is central and all other articles of faith are corollaries. A believer clings to the object of belief with a tenacity, so that he hardly is prepared to give it up ordinarily. This phenomenon, led Hare to construe religious statements as Bilk - statements. Our personal commitments and deepest concerns, whether religious or secular. Swinburne observes;

The book analyses the nature of belief and the nature of trust, and considers when belief and trust are rational ... The kind of faith which is necessary for religion involves both trust and belief; but the kind of belief that a certain creed is more likely to be true than the creed of any vital religion.21

From the stand-point of religion, faith to a religious person means that which ultimately convinces him of the soundness of his faith to create for him a world - view, a perspective from which he is to interpret all his experience. Religion is thus a way of life, its dominant interest is more practical that theoretical.

There is a very interesting distinction between belief-in and belief-that. The term 'belief-in' emphasizes the trust which is an essential part of the faith attitude. Faith is very much unlike belief-that and certainly not reducible to it nor definable in terms of it. Faith is an attitude but not a propositional attitude. It is an attitude of loving adherence to a person or at least to a Being with whom one may have personal relations.

Faith is closer to 'belief-in' than 'belief-that'. A belief-in is an affirmation by a person of an object rather than a statement. It is also a fact that sometime belief-in and belief-that operate together. On the basis of strength of evidence belief-that can be classified as rational, arational, irrational and non-rational. Belief is associated with the particular belief that can also be classified in accordance with the above categories. So it is akin to knowledge which is certain and true belief supported by evidence and justifications. Faith has been both accepted and denied the status of knowledge valiantly due to the meaning of certain other cognate concepts such as 'faith', 'belief', 'Knowledge'. They are not univocally

in English to agree with Paul Helm. 23

While believers assign knowledge-status to 'faith', the sceptics dispute the same. So a question arises, whether faith is a kind of cognition at all. Before delving into further analysis, the essential characteristics of knowledge need to be looked into. It is, generally held that knowledge consists of propositions. A proposition must be true, acceptable and evident. Gettier added the fourth condition, i.e. 'sufficient reason'. Cognition involves both propositional and non-propositional apprehensions. But owing to a confusion, the propositional interpretation has been over-emphasised and the non-propositional interpretation given less importance or neglected. Such an erroneous conception of the distinction between the propositional and non-propositional interpretation points to the fundamental serious distinction between 'faith' and 'reason'. It may be that such misconception has grown due to the influence of scientific paradigm to contrast with religious cognition. This is neither absolute nor acceptable. It is clear that non-propositional apprehension cannot by any means be denied the status of knowledge.

Knowledge is a belief or a set of beliefs. It is certain and true. It is based on adequate evidence. It is grounded on necessary and sufficient conditions of justification. Any belief involves a degree of commitment in addition to these criteria of rationality. It transpires that 'faith' enjoys multiplicity of meaning. 'Faith' consists of cognitive and conative elements. Generally, it is related to knowledge on the cognitive side whereas to courage, trust, love and attachment etc. constitute the conative aspect. This issues concerning cognitive as well as non-cognitive aspects of meaning are of paramount importance for philosophical critics. Questions, like how is faith related to knowledge, is faith a kind of knowledge and what kind of cognition could there be in faith, are often. In the religious as well as religio-theological-philosophical discourses, faith of any kind seems to have received serious attention. Thus faith perhaps is treated as the foundation of all religious activities and is akin to belief, concern, worship, devotion, grace, attitude, involvement, commitment etc. and therefore, commitment or response to a certain kind of vision or the world-view, weltanschauung. Faith is willed commitment;\(^2^4\) It is total

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24. Sraddhā, The Gita, XVIII 73
and ultimate concern, the Sraddha of Indian tradition. It relates to the credo of the religious person. It formulates, governs the total life of the believer. It is the stance, perspectives, slants, the model. It involves "certain aspects of how things are in the world", it is the choice of a view of life or more broadly, the basis of one's meaning of life. It is in this sense, one's bilk, acquires significance.

Hume and Hare go by the same board in treating bilk, "our whole commerce with the world depends upon our bilk ... ." According to Mitchell, one of the Oxford debaters mentions Hare's bilk and remarks,

R.M.Hare seeks to escape between the horns by suggesting that the religious believer does not, characteristically make assertions but rather adopts what Hare calls a bilk, a principle by which he lives and in accordance with which he interprets experiences.\(^{25}\)

In this context Hick observes that not only Hare but Randall also conceives the concept of bilk. Of course for Hick it is a conviction unverifiable and unshakable where

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as for Randall it is something more for Randall conceives of religion as a human activity which like its compeers, science and arts makes its own special contribution to man's culture. Belief means a propositional belief (belief-that), whereas faith is belief without sufficient evidence. By thus elucidating the conceptual differences it is interesting to see how they bear upon the central feature of 'meaning' of religious concepts. It is rightly suggested:

> We require a common link or set of family resemblances that will account for the presence in religion of the heterogenous kinds of statements belonging to most world religions: cosmological, historical, theological, ethical, devotional and attitudinal. Each of the sacred books is somehow a unity containing most of these kinds of statements in different conditions.26

One more salient point at issue is whether faith could ever be rational or not as Richard Taylor27 observed is of


great relevance; Our most holy religion, David Hume, said is founded on faith, not on reason. Although Taylor harps on an important point, his conclusion remains half-way - house in his tacit conjecture of non-admittance of reason to faith. To press the point as back as to St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas the proper object of faith is precisely what reason does, not attain.

It is that the rustic thinks it contrary to reason that the Sun should be bigger than the Earth. But this proposition seems reasonable to the scientist. "Let us rest assured that apparent incompatibility between faith and reason is similarly reconciled in the infinite wisdom of God" as Gilson puts it. So faith teaches truths and not propositions contrary to reason.

Among other repercussions, indeed, the above issue generates the 'Sceptical thrust' as Hick rightly observes:

The unacceptable feature of the position is that by treating religious Language as autonomous as a language-game with its own rules, or a speech

activity having meaning only within its metaphysical significance. The ordinary religious believer has always supposed that such a statement as "God loves mankind" is a true declaration concerning an ultimate order of fact which sustains and governs all the more proximate types of fact. The religious worshippers have always supposed that God exists independently of anyone's believing or disbelieving that he exists, and that he is a personal Mind who can know and enter into personal relationship with his creatures. But this supposition is one to which a variety of considerations are logically relevant. ... Religious language becomes a type of 'protected discourse', and forfeits its immortal claim to bear witness to the most momentous of all truths.29

Hick feels that "reason is unable to perform any legitimate apologetic function—reason removes intellectual

blockages which inhibit religious faith. Even reason could sometime play the decisive part in a move from scepticism to belief.

Swinburne's own approach to faith and reason might be helpful to advance our assessment.

The practice of a religion such as Christianity is normally said to involve faith. But different theologians give different accounts of faith. For some faith is simply belief that there is a God, for others, it is trust in God. The book analyses the nature of belief and trust are rational. It argues that men have a duty to pursue religious investigation, and to hold whatever religious belief investigation shows to be probably true. The kind of faith which is necessary for religion involves both trust and belief; but the kind of belief involved is of a family weak kind- the belief that a certain creed is more likely to be true than the creed of any vital
religion. The book reaches this conclusion by analysing the purposes for practising a religion, the attainment of salvation for oneself and others and the rendering of due worship and obedience to God. A creed provides a rationale for believing that practising a religion will achieve these purposes.  

These remarks are undoubtedly illuminating in learning that religion is really a strange business. And the more we investigate it, the stranger it gets.

Paul Holmer analyses the matter of religious faith and records his views in an emphatically simple and straightforward passage:

... Perhaps such an act of belief is a necessary condition for religious faith, but it is not itself religious, for religious faith peculiarly is the passionate and enthusiastic becoming of a possibility. Faith is not belief.

- cognitive belief but is, instead, a non-cognitive translation of a herefore cognated possibility into the concreteness of one's idiosyncratic character.31

In this context, looking into the way in which faith is contrasted to belief may be quite helpful. To take an instance, Marty distinguished 'belief' from 'unbelief' and contrasts to 'faith' and 'unfaith';

Unbelief in its varieties and forms does not appear in vacuum. It occurs as an event in history, over against 'belief' in its varying definitions. This reality forces us to raise the question of the meaning of belief in the Christian tradition. If to-day there is crisis of belief, if many are scared of departing from it or opposing it, and if others are pictured as its defenders, we shall need to isolate some elements of the definition of belief. Christians to-

day would no doubt be more prepared to talk about 'unfaith' because in their vocabulary the opposite word, 'faith', occurs more frequently than belief. But 'unfaith' is a clumsy and seldom used synonymous for 'unbelief' and we shall wish to deal with a language as it is inherited. Actually, the word 'faith' has some colours which 'belief' lacks, it is more frequently described as a comprehensive relationship to God, based on God's movement to man, Belief is some what more hardened and objectified to mean a doctrine, a fact, part of the content of faith.\textsuperscript{32}

Marty thinks rightly that belief is a proposition, a doctrine, a theory or a fact as part of the content of faith. To the question—"what is faith"? with which we are working at present, Clegg's enlightening analysis might be an eye-opener: "Faith may be shaken, crushed, clashed, lost

or abandoned but not falsified". In the context of Flew's famous charge through his "simple central question", Clegg offers his advocacy,

To imagine a faith, being vindicated is to imagine a mere belief being proved... Knowing that it is dogmatism protects against it, and that knowledge, which is also knowledge of life and science, will always tie a viable faith to normal canons of evidence.

Faith is equivocal and its multiple meaning in use could not possibly be singularised in view of such manifold logic. It is therefore, imperative to examine such meanings of faith and the justifiability of such meanings would hinge upon the criteria, rules, contexts, games or reference range of uses etc.

It may be quite availing to consider the meaning of faith as 'concern'. Concern is one of such neighbouring concepts in the religious framework. Concern means

34. Ibid.
interest, relation, affecting the business of activity, anxiety, occupying with, engaged in, involvement, commitment, care, attachment, participation. Religion has been characterised from its very inception without interruption as concern for, commitment to, interest in meaning an exquisite sense of attachment. It has been meant in the above sense, irrespective of terminological difference, owing to assigning captions in a changing climate. But in all epochs, ancient, medieval, modern, contemporary and current century religio-philosophical treatment concern has been occupying a conspicuously dominant space. For instance, in rational theology as well as in the revealed theology, love of God, attachment to Absolute etc. are such matters of human concern. The point with regard to such attachment as concern would be clearly visible in Aquinas, Rudolf Otto, Paul Tillich, and Oxford analytic philosophers in their debate on Theology and Falsification.

Rudolf Otto has done quite commendable service to religion as well as philosophy through his concept of 'The Holy'. Otto describes the Holy as the sense of sacredness—of awe before the incomparably precious, of fascination mingled with fear, of the mysterium tremendum. As he has written,
The object of religious awe or reverence the tremendum and augustum cannot be fully determined conceptually: it is non-rational as is the beauty of a musical composition, which no less eludes complete conceptual analysis.35

The Holy is connected not accidentally but essentially to religion. It is the ultimate concern. Paul Tillich has admirably shown special competence in the treatment of 'concern' in his theological innovation. For Tillich religion is the "ultimate concern" and the "meaning of all life". For him, both philosophy and theology demand commitment. The logic of concern either ultimate or not might be having an identity with the logic of blik. A concern is a blik or a blik is a concern. In every possible sense at least, it has family resemblance. The concepts are symbols. As Urban puts, "All knowledge of whatever kind is bound up with language and since language is impossible without an element of symbol, all knowledge involves an element of symbolism."36


In Tillich, faith and concern are synonymous. Thus Tillich is a departure from the tradition is declaring an unusual notion of a "religion beyond religion" what he called "encounter of religions". Religious faith is not confined to institutional or denominational status only but transcends their limits and becomes a secular, supra-mundane state of symbolism. Tillich's illumination on religious faith as "total concern" has both been admired and severely criticised. Tillich is masquerading to be an analytic thinker as well as an existentialist interpreter. This has led his critics to describe his philosophy as diabolical. Anyway his characterisation of the concept of faith in terms of the basic religious symbols has great philosophical significance inspite of its existential implication. His dynamic conceptual elucidation is an aid to the analytical thinker. John Hick rightly remarks:

Existential thinking is thinking that is desperately serious and passionately concerned. A philosopher is thinking existentially when,

p.349.


instead of being detached and uncaring spectator, he is personally involved in the problem with which he is dealing, his entire being engaged in the philosophical struggle.39

Flew uses 'concern' in the context of his simple central question, "... His earthly father is driven frantic in his efforts to help, but in heavenly Father reveals no obvious sign of 'concern'".40 It has been pursued by the debtors and critics very seriously. It is worthwhile to see this in Crombie in a slightly different manner, "The Christian finds in Christ, not only convincing evidence of God's 'concern' for us, but also what sort of love the divine love is, what sort of benefits God is 'concerned' to give us".41

Among other important facets of development that cropped up on account of the famous Oxford debate on Theology and Falsification, the most illustrious is the innovation made by Basil Mitchell in spelling out the new

logic of faith—significant articles of faith. Religious expressions are, at their depth, statements of faith. His depth-analysis synchronises the importance of faith. Latter Mitchell developed his philosophy of 'Grace' and other tenets 'love', 'felicity', 'purity', 'patience', 'self-severity' allied thereto.

Howsoever, controversial his findings might have been, the logic of faith that he holds stands immune to the attack of the critics. It leaves an idelible impression in the minds of the theologian, religious thinkers and practitioners of any denomination and philosophers of religion at large including the serious analytical minds who award "significant articles of faith" great appreciation. As a result of this, the legacy of Mitchell's logic of faith counts indispensable to assessment of religious language.

Hick tries to enumerate certain enlightening facts as they appear to him regarding the nature of faith in distinction and relation to knowledge. He emphasises meaning as significance in preference to other meanings of meaning. By 'significance' he means "that fundamental and all pervasive characteristic of our conscious experience which de facto constitutes it for us the experience of a
'world' and not of a mere empty void or churning chaos'.\textsuperscript{42} He refers to Kant to relate the framework of basic relations with the structure of our own consciousness. These basic relations represent the minimal conditions of significance. Significance, says Hick, then is simply the most general characteristic of our experience.\textsuperscript{43} Hick further distinguishes between objecti-significance and situational-significance. Significance, is however a genus which exist only in species. Just as we perceive the various colours, but never colour in general, so we perceive this and that kind of significance but never significance, \textit{simpliciter}.

It is perhaps crystal-clear now that manifold logic of faith has stirred different philosophical issues connected with a variety of concepts, "thus the game is played" as we noticed in the preceding chapter. Relevant to the forthcoming chapter, discussion concerning reason and religion would unfasten the problematic knots of 'faith' which undoubtedly is most vulnerable of all basic concepts in religion. Religion has a very long old history which witnessed the harbouring irreligious pseudo-occupations in the shadow of human civilization and culture. Indeed,

\textsuperscript{42} John Hick, \textit{Faith and Knowledge, op.cit.}, p.98.
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{ibid.}, p.99.
religion is the witness to serious human predicaments, existential and otherwise, intellectual and non-intellectual ruptures and worse disasters inspite of all human efforts to restore humility, peace, fellowship, welfare and harmony. To reiterate the age-old pious, sacred and paramount human values on the positive side of religion and re-vitalise the true spirit of religion pledged to human service needs employment of reason and only reason at all steps. This vital issue would engage our serious attention and critical scrutiny in what follows in the fourth chapter.

Besides the above point at issue, the question of meaning of 'faith' may be pressed a little deeper to ensure clarity in understanding. Faith by any meaning points to engineering religious knowledge, by opinion, conviction, apprehension, sight, way or any other coinage of the like. These Hick treats as cognitive. But other meanings, such as trust, commitment, attitude etc. are treated as quasi-cognitive according to Hare and Braithwaite.

If however, in all fairness of facts the term 'faith' enjoys so many meanings, quite obviously it raises the question as to how are such meanings connected. Relation of meaning would depend on "linguistic-cum-signification situation". Without a thorough understanding of such
situation, any verdict would turn out arbitrary and illegitimate. In each case, justification or otherwise of any meaning of faith would be situation-bound.

There may be more difficulty in distinguishing the variety of religious truth-claims among themselves, i.e., among faith, belief, knowledge etc. for "there is usually no precise truth-claim that we can directly examine". Besides this, care has to be taken to distinguish doctrinal claims from metaphysical claims. Thus unspecificity of faith-claims is of prime logical importance. Faith has been variously interpreted in different contexts. Faith is defined by the Vatican Council of 1870 as "A supernatural virtue whereby, inspired and assisted by the grace of God, we believe that the things which He has revealed are true"; or "Faith is the Catholic's response to an intellectual message communicated by God" "the state of being ultimately concerned", "Love thy God with all thine heart" is the ultimate

As we have stated earlier, the concept of faith enjoys quite many meanings and as such the logic of faith is multi-dimensional. In our brief survey in the foregoing discussion, it is found that the concept is related to a large number of neighbouring concepts—viz. concern, belief, attitude, worship, devotion, grace, response, commitment, knowledge and reason etc. It appears as if the concept has its manifestations in a variety of situations and activities. It also renders itself to be the very basis of the religious world-view. In view of this, religious language is seen centrally as faith-expression, first and any other thing next. Two most important concepts related to faith seem to us to be of very deep philosophical significance, viz. commitment and reason.