BIBLIOGRAPHY
BIBLIOGRAPHY

4. A New History of India By : Stanley A Welport.
7. ASEAN and South Asia: Development Experience/edited By Baladas Ghoshal.
13. Behind the scene By Jogender Singh.
18. Changing the Political Boundary in India (Form Ashoka Period to the Recent Time) : A. S. Yadav, 1887, Inter India Publisher New Delhi.
42. China's Military By Shrikanth Kondapally.
44. China-South Asia issues; Equation, Policies. By Swam Singh.
55. Defending India By Jaswant Singh.
56. East-Asian conflict Zone By E. Lawrence & Young Whan Kihi.
59. Engaging India By : Strobe Talbott.
60. Foreign Direct Investment in India: An Analytical Overview/Monuj
86. India, Pakistan, and the United States: Breaking with the Past By
103. India's boundary and territorial disputes- P. Surya , P. Sharma. [N.O.- Vikash Publishing 1971]
104. India's defence spending By Jasjit Singh.
105. India's Emerging Nuclear Posture By: Ashley J. Tellis. Dragon on Terrorism By : Dr. Mohan Malik.
106. India's Nuclear Bomb By : Perkovich.
107. India's Nuclear Bomb By: George Perkovich.
135. Pakistan: A modem history By Ian Talbot.
136. Pakistan: A Modem History By Ian Talbot.
140. Perspectives of India's nuclear policy - T.T. Poulouse.]
141. Perspectives on India's International Relations/Kedar S. Arya. New Delhi
142. Political Change in Southeast Asia: Trimming the Banyan Tree By Michael R.J. Vatikiotis.
144. Population Geography-Dr. R.D. Tripathi.
146. Problem of Peace and War- Lalban Singh.
150. Secret Society in China By Jean Chesneaux.
Internet Sources

- Vigyan Prasar science Portal, accessed on 06.02.2008.
- Centre for Defense and Security Studies, accessed on 07.02.08
- http://www.defencejournal.com/aug98/Ind_tmissiledevelop, accessed on 21.03.08.
- “The Hindu”, 24.03.08.
- Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons Program, accessed on 18.02.08.
- Global Security.org, accessed on 20.02.08.
- http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/index, accessed on 17.03.08
- http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_1/article/7a, accessed on 21.03.08.
- http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/nuke, accessed on 08.03.08.
- Carnegie Endowment Center.
Mr. Nehru did not oppose the Chinese step in hard words. Nehru thought that it can destroy the harmoniousness of relations.

The demarcation of boundary line between China and India always remain disputed, because the communist government of China did not accept MacMahon line. Thus the dispute on MacMahon had the probability to become the bone of contention.

The slogan of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” was the muscat of the event of the fifth decade of the twentieth century but China had the ambitions and intention to show her power. In 1950 Tibet was overcome. The chapter shows how Nehru had tried to escape from Chinese anger when he gave a statement on Tibet issue as, “we have no political and regional ambitions on Tibet, India does not want any privilege in Tibet. We hope that the traditional bargaining will going on without any disturbance.”

In April 1954 India and China signed an agreement on Tibet, that proved the base of relations about Tibet. Thus the primary era of Sino-Indian relations remain normal. But the phase was going to a turnover when Dalai Lama got sanctuary in Dharamsala (India). Now the Panchsheel was going to prove as the plan made by a child policy maker. China registered her protest to India on Dalai Lama’s issue. India was blamed for having the intention to increase her boundary in Himalyan region.

In 1959 China published a map in which about 104000 km² area was shown as the part of People Republic of China. Thus the 2nd chapter of my research has the brief history of causes that leads to the war of 1962. The disputed area like Aksai-Chin, Lakakh, Sikkim, are discussed in explairy methods. Chinese Prime Minister Chau-En-Lai offered Indian Government that People Republics of China can leave her claim on the North-Eastern sector of India if India can leave her claim on Akshai Chin. But Nehru disregarded this contract due to public opinion in India.

In 1958 it was disclosed that China was developing fundamental facilities in the Tibet and in the neighbouring region of Tibet. China did not
army at Ko-nga Pass. China alleged Indian troops to make first attack. Thus after the military encounter in Khejnimane, Long-Ju and Kongka, Nehru policy towards China became the burning issue of debating in parliament.

Till the end of 1959 Chinese intrusion was increasing seriously in Indian areas. This intrusion forced Indian government to give over the front to Army. Thus due to Chinese action on Mac Mohan the Indian plan for peaceful settlement of dispute was sabotaged. Indian Government ordered to establish posts beside Sino-Indian boundary line. Indian government wanted to settle the dispute at the time of the visit of Chinese Prime Minister to India in 1960, but the situation was growing complicated. Chinese rejection of Indian claim in North Eastern Sector made the situation more disputed. Due to the increasing incidents of intrusion it was felt that Indian leadership should give a hard reply. Because the solution of problems was not in hanging them in a vaccume. So on 2 November 1961 a meeting was held at the residence of Mr. Nehru. Mr. Nehru, Defence Minister K.K. Menon, Army Chief General Thaper, Lieutenant General Kaul (Quarter Master General), Brigadier D.K. Palit, and defence secretary O.Pull Reddy took part in the meeting. It was decided that Indian army will patrolling in Lakakh Sector and new post were established on boundary line to reduce the incidents of intrusion.

Indian intelligence was speculating that Chinese would not react on this context but be proved wrong. General Thaper signed out that we are not in the condition of competition on the basis of number of army and logistics and supply lines. These arguments were ignored by PM and Defence Minister. So on 5 December 1961 New orders were sent to Eastern and Northern command to start operation ‘Onkar’.

According the military plan, all preparation were taking place on border. Sometime unjustified political decision were posed at military that resulted in the defeat in war later in 1962. Our political leadership were ignoring military suggestions. Thus the background was prepared due to this
The battle at Sela Hill sector was also the decisive fighting of the war. The 62 infantry brigade was deployed in defence of Sela. As the result of 1962 war shows. India is defeating all his battle. Same happened with this fighting. Chinese captured this sector on 18 November 1962.

Simultaneously the 65th infantry brigade was fighting against the enemy at Dirang-Dzong sector. On same date of eighteenth November this fighting also lost by Indian troops.

The fighting at Bomdila hill seemed that it will remain continue, because Indian troops were giving a complete competition and equal loss to Chinese. Unfortunatly this one also did not stop the order of Indian defeat. This post was captured by Chinese army on 18th November.

Nexty to Bomdila the battle at Walang is analysed and explained. I explained that how the 48th infantry Brigade failed to defend the sector the end of the fighting at Walong was on 18 November also. Thus till 18 November Chinese had conquered all major post of Indian army. In this fighting 11 infantry brigade suffured a great loss of life and ammunition. In this order Chinese succeeded to defeat 114 infantry brigade at Daulat Beg Oldi. The battle of Gurang Hill and the battle of Chusul proved the lust fighting of the war. These fighting ended by 18 November 1962.

Chinese declared 'Unilateral Cease Fire' on 22 November 1962. Thus the war had wrote a history of unforgotten defeat of India. After the defeat Indian leadership particularly Mr. Nehru and Defence Minister of India were criticized. K.K. Memon had to resign. Various new plans were organize to strengthen military power in India. The reactions from International and national community on Indian defeat and ceasefire are discussed and analysed.

The steps for the cordiality in relation that were made by International community through Colombo proposal is explained.

In the chapter the impact of war on Indian security were shown in objective manner. The Indian awareness about arms agreement with the
Chinese news papers were loaded with anti Indian statements and compare the war with American Vietnam war.

After 1962 war Sino-Indian relation touched their nadir. Chinese intimacy with Pakistan work as patrol in fire. India was encircled by triangular threat

1. Threat from Pakistan
2. Threat from China
3. Threat from Sino-Pak nexus

Chinese policy during the war of 1971 is also discussed in this chapter. It is also mentioned that India should develop his military technology for dual target. Though presently Pakistan is a factor in Sino-Indian relations but now China has stopped illusion statement against India.

In the Kargil conflict 1998 China remain neutral and did not give any anti Indian statement. Now China has understood that India is not a country in present, as he was at the time of 1962 war. The relation between India and China is going towards harmony and Pakistan’s role is going to be lessen.”

**China’s role in nuclearisation of India and Pakistan**

This chapter present the comparative study of nuclear weapons of China, India and Pak. The comparative study of nuclear technology is important because all the three nations of Asia got freedom simultaneously. How China paid great concentration to its Military power from the very first, and India and Pakistan in later.

China tested its first nuclear explosion in 1964 and thus China went ahead toward nuclear weapon from traditional arms. China had the ambition to become a world power. Her ambitions were the mirror of the changing geopolitical scenerio. However India had signed the treaty for partial ban of nuclear tests in 1963 and thus turn himself towards non-nuclear weapons policies.

Pakistan was not in nuclear arms race because India had nothing. Pakistan’s leadership ignoring the nuclear question because his chief enemy
nation to commit a constructive cooperation, after Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee took office in 1998. However China had been singled-out as number one security threat by India’s then defence minister Mr. George Franadeez while he was giving a statement in justification of Indian nuclear tests in 1998. This statement implied a turn for the worse in India’s China policy, and then the two nations had entered a new era of antagonism and hostility. But the situation changed again when Vajpayee government began making overtures towards China and two notions reached consensus on comprehensive bilateral cooperation in 2003 during Prime Minister visit to Beijing.

In this chapter comprehensive notes are present of every visit of chief leaders from both side and the progress in relations is depicted in explainary mode.

This chapter takes India’s security concept as a central point, exploring the influence of India’s security concept on its China policy and interprets the substance of changes in India’s policies towards China and Chinese policies toward India in 21st century, and the directions are assessed in which these are likely to evolve.

It is mentioned that the word is going to be a market and the economic stability is going to be the symbol of political stability, however Chinese Military superiority influences a lot to the security posture of India. With the passing of time India’s security concepts has changed, yet some traditional security concept remain strong.

Some scholar concludes that post cold war security concepts will continue to produce an effect on security policies. It is said that the absence of American- Soviet antagonism has give way to a major change in the South Asian strategic structure. The non-traditional security threats such as terrorism and drug trafficking have triggered the adjustments. Whereby India emphasizes economic, military, cultural and other comprehensive security capabilities. Thus China and India seems ready to step in the new phase of
must be rich with nuclear weapon as well as tradition arms, and have its presence in world economic market. Here it is a fact, in present geopolitical scenario, if a nation is powerful in respect of political stability, if his economic condition is in good health then he will became a powerful state in respect of military power automatically.

In the present research work I present the chronicle order of Sino-Indian relation, ups and downs and the influence released by Chinese presence on Indian security. In conclusion it was cleared that in international politics there is no permanent enemy and no permanent friend. The relations among nations are of changing nature. As the question of Sino-Indian relation is concerned, the relation went in a hostile era after few years of independence, a war was fought. But in international relations, national interest remains above on all interest. On the basis of this concept Sino-Indian relation get turned when they understood the importance of each other. I choose the subject of “Sino-Indian relations and India’s security in 21st century” because Sino-Indian relations are growing toward cordiality. In the present phase of international politics, the interests and relations are changing. In such a phase the closeness of two great Asian countries nutritise the national interests.

I tried to justify the importance of my research work with the illustration of ups and downs in the relation of India and China. I consider that the solution of problem is the demand of the time. The development and permanentisation of Sino-Indian relations should be done with this mentality. In conclusion I have cleared that India cannot secure his national interest in fear and pressure but can secure them with the will of competition with competitor nations.

I found that though China has the ambition to become the super power of world and Asia in particular. The war of 1962 was the result of her political ambitions and imperialistic approach. He supports Pakistan to make a trap of strategy surround India. But China has understood that India now is growing
Farnadeez just before the nuclear tests at Pokheran in May 1998. The situation went better by Vajpayee's visit of Beijjing.

In 2005 Chinese prime minister visited New Delhi and in 2006 Chinese president Ho-Jintao visited India. Indian Prime Minister also visited China. In 2005 Ben-Jiabao straightly declared in New Delhi that border disputes will not come in the progress of relations. Ho Jintao and Man Mohan singh in a meeting agreed to make the partenership strong. Now we remember the statement of Pt. Jawahar Lal Neharu, "if the Asian continent has to remain free from super power's rivallary, India and China must strengthen their bond of friendship."

The research finds that Sino-Indian relationship is uncertain in nature. China tries hard to maintain a rough balance of power in south Asia by keeping India away from gaining upper hand in the region.

Mr. Man Mohan Singh's visit to China open the new phase of relations. Before this Paranb Mukherjee (India's defence Minister) set out a road map for the visit of Indian Prime Minister. The aim of cooperation and trust was set by both countries.

Both People Republic of China and India have faith in U.N.O. as an institution to bring global peace. My research found the Sino-Indian relations need an assessment because both are the most important spokesmen of Afro-Asian community. Both have some common interest on international level. The relations between India and China are growing harmonious rapidly.

As both nation have agreed to declare 2007 as Sino-Indian tourism year. India festival was held in China in 2008 China has launched a scholarship for Indian students who want to study in China. Both have signed an agreement with Russia for fighting against terrorism. Presently terrorism and drug trafficking is become the current security problem. Both nations are leaving the traditional security concepts. At the time of terrorist attack on 26 November in Mumbai, China condemn the attack in hard words.
Here India should analyse the policy of China regarding her relation with South Asian relations.

12. Though now Sino-Pak nexus is going to be weak but India should not ignore this bond of hostile stream. Irrelevant diplomatic pressure in favor of Pakistan by China should be protested in smooth and hard diplomatic way.

13. India should signed an agreement with China that confirm the non use of Chinese arms against India that China supplied to Pakistan.

14. India should strengthen strategic relations with China on the basis of. “In International politics there is not permanent enemy and no permanent friends.” But do not have blind faith on China.

15. India should acquire minimum deterrent power and should tries to equip his force with latest technology. In the changing goe political order India should analyse his military power.

16. Both countries should cooperate each other in the area of space technology and development. We should remember that the supreme and primary interest of a nation lies in the logic that he should be capable to secure and maintain its political, geographical sovereignty and freedom. It will be possible only if India has a strong and capable security system and a sound economical structure with healthy and harmonious social set up.