CHAPTER-6

CHINA AS A FACTOR IN INIDA'S SECURITY IN 21ST CENTURY
Geo Strategic Location of China and India
CHAPTER-6

CHINA AS A FACTOR IN INIDA’S SECURITY
IN 21ST CENTURY

In the present scenario China and India dominates the will of the huge volume of mass. China is a powerful military and economic power now. As China is located in neighbourhood of India and its strategic location has a great influence on India’s security. India’s security faces threats from a number of sources. The internal short-coming make call to external security threats. Though any sources of security threat prove serious but the internal weaknesses make a nation the customer of external threats. History tells if a country has disputes with neighbouring states, he would be confronted with more serious security threats.

Presently all the world is in the shadow of nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear technology is chief concerns for international security. When we assume Indian security in 21st century, we find that India’s security phenomenon could be threatened from various sources. India progress in different field calls different types of threats. Though India’s economic progress is improperly distributed and limited, however it is considered as a competitor to the developed and fast growing economy of the world. Presently the Chief source of threats to India’s security are supported by hostile forces particularly neighbours.¹

Indian status in Chinese foreign policy in 21st century

When we observe China’s national security calculus, we find that the current economic and strategic trends Indicates that India’s weight in China’s foreign policy is increasing in 21st century. Though before 1971 Indian status was not in Chinese foreign policy as it seems presently. As India growing incessantly towards the strategic growth it is heightening its status in the view of international community.

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Thus the elements that are formed by China are also changing their role and places in Indian security in 21st century.

**India as a deer competitor and Chinese regional ambitions**

Though in Asia Pacific Zone Japan is also considered an obstacle in spreading Chinese influence in the region. But as Japan is not militarily strong so the main competitor regarding military power is India. Since Pakistan is acting like naturally of China then India is the single one that poses the stream of competition. So China’s Asia policy has always been to ‘restrain’ and ‘contain’ India so as to prevent the rise of a real Asian rival to challenge China’s status in Asia.4

Before analyzing China’s role in Indian security we should discuss about Indian security challenges and possible Chinese influence in 21st century.

1. **Internal security challenges**

   Internal threat makes call the external threats. Presently India is suffering from various internal threats as:

   - Negative social trends
   - Wrong policies and some Chinese influenced pressure groups.
   - Wrong Judgments and social irritation.
   - Coalition government a sign of political insecurity.

**Refugee Problem and China**

India has been facing refugee problem since 1970, when refugee in number of One Lakh penetrated in Indian Territory from Eastern Pakistan (Now Bangladesh). Before it refugees found sanctuary in India from Tibet when China undertook Tibet. Tibetan refugee in India hates Chinese interfere in Tibet. They are protesting Chinese role in Tibet. Though they call Tibet their mother land but due to Chinese dictatorship in Tibet they do not like to live in their motherland. So if Chinese Government tries with plain intention then problem of Tibetan refugee can be resolved.5
Year wise study of China-India Relations after 2000:-

**China India Diplomatic relations in 2000 to 2002**

The year of 2000 is the beginning of Twenty first century. After nuclear test in 1998 China is advancing towards the dual diplomacy of supporting Pakistan in nuclear fields and improving relations with India by neutralize itself during Kargil crisis. Leaders from both sides visited each other and signed various agreements. Though India justified his nuclear explosion by saying that these are necessary due to Chinese threat yet Indian PM Vajpayee sent harmonious message to PRC. Situation is growing after the visit of Mr. Jaswant Singh (External Affairs Minister of India) to Beijing.

In January 2001, Li Peng, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC visited India which set in order the temporary setback in Sino-Indian relations. The process continued during Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's visit to India, in January 2002, through wide ranging discussions on bilateral issues as well as international issues covering the tension created on the Indo-Pak border, the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, and his declaration that "China is opposed to terrorism in all its forms, no matter when or where it occurs or who it is directed against." Indian Prime Minister, A.B. Vajpayee reiterated that "China does not pose any threat to India nor does India believe that China regards India as a threat." The stabilization of political relationship is well underway with the exchange of maps and the expand Joint Working Group (JWG) parleys, the most recent held in November 2002. The Expert Group's assertion to view this as a "politically feasible package deal rather than seeking clarifications on each disputed sector" marks a way out from the impasse that India was embroiled in since the genesis of the dispute.

Economic Cooperation India and China have responded positively to the priorities of the post-Soviet world by opening up their economies, though China precedes India in its effort to liberalize its economy. Both the countries have expedited the process of integration in the global economy as well as
moment trade-related competition between both the countries is not ruled out but the economic relationship should become more stable to create an environment conducive for solving more difficult bilateral political problems.

**Common Perspectives**

The key factors which shape the domestic as well as foreign policies of both the countries in post-Cold War period are their perception of the changing contours of world politics, consensus on several issues, the desire for friendship based on domestic priorities and accommodate changes happening in the international sphere. China's foreign policy emphasizes military difficult to define Sino-Indian boundary as it involves no demographic issue to be tackled, neither is it an important trade route but strong popular sentiments have to be overcome to achieve a final settlement. China's new mood for engagement with India in the recent past indicates its reassessment of security relations with India possibly due to its fear of Pakistani involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus in which China has commercial and strategic interests.\(^{12}\) The post-September 11/2000 scenario has changed the attitude of China towards terrorism and particularly after December 13, 2001\(^{*}\) China has not opposed India's stand on terrorism. One important reason of China's changed posture is the ethnic and religious tension in the Xinjiang province.\(^{13}\) China is also scared by the military presence of the US in South Asia through Pakistan. India has therefore become strategically important for China because India could be a reliable partner in its endeavor to denounce hemispheric dominance by any one power. Secondly, India's technological superiority in computer software will be an important sector for Sino-Indian collaboration. "The fast changing global strategic environment will be the defining paradigm for the exchange of plans of action between China and India."\(^{15}\)

\(^{*}\) Terrorist attack on Indian Parliament.
Chinese and Indian ground forces used periodic friendly meetings and mountaineering expeditions prior to 1998 as means of preliminary contact and communication on the basis of the treaties of 1993 and 1996 relating to border tranquillity and military confidence-building measures. There was a hiatus in the dialogue after the nuclear tests of 1998, but it officially resumed in 2000, when the nations’ military communications began to develop in breadth and depth. Mid-level contacts, in addition to mutual visits by defence ministers and other high-level military officials, also stepped up.

At the time India was expanding its military exchanges with China, there were also signs of promotion of a security dialogue. The two nations had agreed to establish a security dialogue mechanism during Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh's 1999 visit to China. Its function would be that of exchanging views on bilateral, regional and international security issues; strengthening mutual understanding; expanding consensus; and eliminating disagreements. The Indian side's specific consideration, however, was to use this platform to track and understand China's strategic intentions towards India; to exert pressure on China and limit development of the Sino-Pakistani strategic relationship; and to seek China's understanding of its development of nuclear weapons and press China to recognize its status as a nuclear state. The two sides pursued preliminary talks in 2000.

**Year of 2003 and High Level visits (Mutuality in India and China)**

2003 proves a remarkable year in Sino-Indian relations. In the month of January speaker of India Lok Sabha Mr. Manohar Joshi visited China. This visit cleared various bilateral confusions. Between 5 and 10 January 2003, Speaker of the Indian Lok Sabha Manohar Joshi paid an official friendly visit to China at the invitation of Chairman Li Peng, of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. President Jiang Zemin, Chairman Li Peng and
Minister of External Affairs Yashwant Sinha. H.E. Mr. Jia Qinglin also visited Hyderabad.¹⁹

A Sino-Indian Parliamentary Friendship Group delegation led by Mr. Sheng Huaren, Member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Chairman of the NPC Sino-Indian Parliamentary Friendship Group was invited to visit India and attend the celebration activities of the Golden Jubilee of Parliament of India from January 18 to 25. During the visit, the delegation called on Mr. Manohar Joshi, Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Mme. Najma Heptulla, Deputy Chairperson of India's Rajya Sabha and President of the Inter-Parliamentary Council, and met with Mr. R.L. Bhatia, Indian Vice Chairman of the India-China Parliamentary Friendship Group and Indian co-chair of India-China Eminent Persons' Group, and Ashwani Kumar, member of Rajya Sabha. The delegation also visited Mumbai, Bangalore and Jamunagar, Gujarat.²⁰

In January 2003, on a three-day seminar on Asian Security and China in Delhi, organized by the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, Indian Minister of External Affairs Yashwant Sinha said New Delhi and Beijing had shown the wisdom to move ahead in their bilateral relations even as contentious issues, such as the border dispute are separately addressed. Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez said Beijing and New Delhi were not a threat to each other and that the time had come to rearrange mutual ties keeping in view the ground realities.

The 15th International Engineering and Technology Fair were held in New Delhi from February 5 to 8. Mr. An-Min, Vice Minister of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation led the first-ever largest exhibition delegation to the Fair. More than 70 Chinese enterprises including several first-rate big enterprises attended the Fair. Their exhibition products included engineering technology contracting and equipments, household electric appliances, Hi-tech products, communication equipments,
Advani expressed that he noticed the efforts made by the Chinese government to develop China-India relations and the efforts were of great importance. Although there were differences on some issues including the border issue, the two governments had reached consensus to prevent these differences and problems from affecting the development of bilateral relations in the areas like politics, economy and culture.

Mr. Zheng Xinmiao, Chinese vice Minister of Culture led a delegation to visit India from April 16 to 23. During his visit to India, Vice Minister Zheng attended the China Culture Week held in Mumbai. He held talks with Mr. Dhanenhur Kumar, Secretary of the Department of Culture and called on Mme. Najma Heptulla, Deputy Chairperson of Rajya Sabha. On April 28, Shandong Power Construction Corporation and India's sixth largest enterprise Starlight held the signature ceremony of Balco 43.5Mw captive power project in Mumbai. The project, whose bidding price is $230 million, is the biggest one that Chinese companies have ever bagged in India.

On May 2, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes, on behalf of the Indian Defense Ministry, presented 17 boxes of medicines worth 200 thousand Rupees to China to help Chinese people's fight against SARS. Chinese Ambassador to India Mr. Hua Junduo attended the ceremony of presenting medicines. In the ceremony, Mr. Fernandes noted that when the Chinese people were in difficulties, the Indian people were standing side by side with them. Ambassador Hua extended his thanks to the Indian side on behalf of the Chinese government and people and stressed that there was a good tradition of mutual support between the two peoples. The anti-SARS medicines presented by the Indian side fully showed the Indian people's deep friendship with the Chinese people.

On May 12, 2003, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing had a phone conversation with Indian Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha. Li said China had
international anti-terrorist cooperation. They agreed to hold the third round of consultations in the first half of next year in India.

The year of 2004: Sino-Indian interactions

The People's Republic of China is committed to a long-term constructive and cooperative partnership with the Republic of India. In 2004, steady and healthy development was achieved in bilateral relations. The two countries had frequent political interactions and deeper political mutual trust. Their leaders maintained close high-level contacts through frequent meetings and exchanges of letters. In November, Premier Wen Jiabao met Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh during the ASEAN plus China meeting in Vientiane, and they agreed to further deepen the friendly, good-neighborly and mutually beneficial cooperation between their countries. In December, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao sent messages respectively to India President Kalam and Prime Minister Singh to extend sympathy over the Indian Ocean tsunami. Premier Wen Jiabao met the diplomatic envoys from the tsunami-hit countries including India and representatives of some international organizations in Beijing. In February, October and November, He Guoqiang, Member of the CCCPC Political Bureau and Head of the CCCPC Organization Department, State Councilors Tang Jiaxuan and Chen Zhili, and Liu Qi, Member of the CCCPC Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPC Beijing Municipal Committee visited India. Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxiong met with Indian External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh on many multilateral occasions. China and India held a series of joint activities commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Some progress was made in settling the problems left over from history between the two countries. The special representatives of the two countries for the boundary question conducted three rounds of talks and the joint team of diplomatic and military experts held the 14th meeting. The ad
Radio, Film and Television paid a visit to India. Two Indian press delegations visited China.²⁸

Consultation and cooperation between the two countries in international and regional affairs were fruitful. India continued to give unequivocal support to China on questions involving China's major interests such as human rights and Taiwan. Foreign ministers of China, Russia and India held another informal meeting when they attended the Foreign Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Alma-Ata and discussed, among others, the international situation and the United Nations. The 2nd round of China-India foreign policy consultations was held in Beijing. In the WTO, China and India worked hand-in-hand to vigorously defend the interests of the developing countries.

Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 28 June 2004 marks the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly initiated by China and India.²⁹

On 28 June 1954, the late Premier Zhou-En-Lai paid a visit to India, during which a joint statement was issued by Premier Zhou and Prime Minister Jawarlal Nehru. The Statement put forward, for the first time and in clear-cut terms, the Five Principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affair, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. During Premier Zhou's following visit to Myanmar, he reaffirmed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly with the Prime Minister of Myanmar. In the past 50 years, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence jointly initiated by China and India and China and Myanmar have been taken by the majority of the world's countries as basic norms governing state-to-state relations.

Agreement was reached by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee during the latter's visit to China in 2003 on
stability and development in Asia and the world at large for the two countries to live together in harmony and friendly cooperation.

On June 28, People's Daily carried an editorial and the China State Post Bureau issued a stamped postcard in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

On June 14-15, the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) sponsored the International Seminar on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Former Chinese vice Premier Qian Qichen made a keynote address at the seminar. A number of foreign dignities including former Indian President Kocheril Raman Naraynan, former German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger attended and addressed the seminar.

On June 25, State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan had a written interview with the Beijing correspondent of Press Trust of India. On July 20, Assistant Foreign Minister Shen Guofang had an interview with the visiting Indian media delegation. The Chinese Embassy in India and Indian Embassy in China held commemorating receptions respectively, and both were attended and addressed by foreign ministers of the host country. Groups of artists from the two countries exchanged visits and gave performances.

On November 18, a seminar to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence was hosted by Indian Council of World Affairs in New Delhi. Mr. Jia Zhijie, Vice-Director of Finance and Economic Committee of the NPC and Chairman of the NPC China-India Parliamentary Friendship Group and Mr. Liu Shuqing, former Vice Foreign Minister and Chairman of the China-India Eminent Person's Group, attended the seminar at invitation and delivered speeches there. Thus the year 2004 also prove the significant time for the betterment of Sino-Indian relations.
ternational projects recently. But on the other hand a degree of cooperation too is visible as they are increasingly confrontly bigger players in global market.

Chinese President Hu Jintao and his Indian counterpart Abdul Kalam exchanged congratulations Sunday on the launching of the Sino-Indian Friendship Year and vowed to further develop the bilateral ties and boost cooperation in 2006.

China and India are good neighbors with a long-standing friendship between the two peoples, said Hu-Jintao in his congratulatory message. The Sino-Indian relations have been pushed to higher levels thanks to joint efforts of the two countries since they established diplomatic relations, Hu-Jintao said.

The establishment of the Sino-Indian strategic cooperative partnership oriented to peace and prosperity in 2005 marked a new stage for the development of the bilateral ties, and the declaration on setting the year 2006 as Sino-Indian Friendship Year demonstrated the common aspiration of the two governments and two peoples to strengthen good-neighborly relations, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation and boost common development, Hu-Jintao said.

In the year 2006, China will take the Sino-Indian Friendship Year as an opportunity to boost the traditional Sino-Indian friendship, expand bilateral dialogues, exchanges and cooperation in various fields to enrich the contents of bilateral ties and push forward the development of the bilateral strategic cooperative partnership, Hu said.

Kalam said in his message that the far-reaching historic and cultural exchanges between the two ancient civilizations of India and China have greatly contributed to the civilization of human beings. The leaders of India and China jointly initiated the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence over 50 years ago, Kalam noted.

Kalam said India was satisfied with the remarkable progress achieved in the bilateral relations with China during the recent years, and that the
reforms.' Finally, the 2006 Sino-Indian Joint Declaration states: ‘The two sides shall conduct consultations on the question of UN reform, including the reform of the UN Security Council. The Indian side reiterates its aspirations towards permanent membership of the UN Security Council. China attaches great importance to the status of India in international affairs. It understands and supports India's aspirations to play a greater role in the United Nations.’ China's position on whether or not to support India's quest for a seat on the Security Council has clearly become more positive, yet there is still a certain ambiguity in its language. There is consequently some distance between China's and India's expectations in this regard.

Sino-Indian Territorial disputes and India's security in 21st century

A territorial dispute became a full-scale war in 1962 and the two countries came close to fighting another war in 1987. Several rounds of talks over the last 24 years have failed to resolve the disputed border claims. Agreements on maintaining peace and tranquility on the disputed border were signed in 1993 and 1996 but have been frequently violated, especially since 1998 when India–China relations deteriorated following India's nuclear tests. The Indian Army reported about 120 incidents of territorial violation of the demilitarized zone of 20km by the people's Liberation Army (PLA) in 2000, 98 time in 2001, 96 times and 90 in 2002. Not only has that, despite repeated assurances, the Chinese side failed to exchange maps of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While Chinese leaders counsel patience in resolving the boundary dispute 'let over from history', Indians want the dispute to be resolved expeditiously and 'not left to history again'. The prospects of a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute in the near future, however, seem remote despite the elevation of talks to the political level during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to China in June.

Tensions caused by the territorial dispute have been compounded by rivalry between the two for power and influence in Asia. Nor can China
conflicts. The terrorist support by Pak is also an example of Pakistan's intention. When it was reported that China was supporting Pak to develop nuclear weapon, India-China relations were socked with a set back. Pakistani nuclear tests, which were tested just after Indian nuclear tests, signal out Chinese aid to Pak in the sphere of nuclear weapons.

Despite the Chinese efforts to justify nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan as part of 'normal state-to-state relations', India has remained unconvinced, seeing it as 'hostile and threatening' in both intent and character. Beijing has not only helped Islamabad with its nuclear weapons programme (all three Pakistani nuclear plants-Kahuta, Khushab, and Chasma have been built with Chinese assistance) but also its delivery systems: ready-to-launch M-9 (Ghaznavi/Hatf), M-11 (shaheen), and a number of Song Feng-21s (Ghauri) ballistic missiles. This cooperation has continued despite Beijing's growing concerns over the Talibanisation of the Pakistan state and society. As Ehasan Ahrari put it: 'In enabling Pakistan to become a nuclear power China has already created a very painful long-term reality for India. The strategic parity with India that Pakistan has gives it tremendous potential to emerge as a major factor in Southwest and Central Asia, if it could set its economy in order.

When India weaponised its nuclear capability through a series of tests in May 1998, Defence Minister Fernandez argued that India's aim was to counter China's capability rather than Pakistan's describing how his country was being 'encircled' by military alliances with Pakistan and Mauyanmar and Chinese military activities in Tibet. He also called 'China the mother of Pakistan's nuclear bomb', which drew protests from Beijing. From their part, Chinese analysts have accused India, particularly since May 1998, of pursuing a policy of military expansion since attaining independence, in order to become a global military power, contain China, and dominate and control South Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
to double the trade till 2010. Thus in 21st century Sino-India economic tie will serve the world with strong economic powers.

Though the mutual cooperation in the field of economy pays the way of better relations, yet the economic competition between two great economies present a picture of economic race. Economic ambitions may strike in new century. Some symbols of striking economic ambitions were seen during the last decade of twentieth century and in the beginning of 21st century.

China’s comprehensive national power grown exponentially over the last two decades on current trends, china is projected to become the world’s biggest economy well before the twenty-first century reaches its midpoint. This will make China a genuine global great power-something that the former Soviet Union never was. As such, it will exercise enormous influence on the international stage, most notably on its Asian neighbours and its major trading partners. In the economic sphere, Indian and Chinese economies are competitive rather than complementary. India and China are the two most populous nations in the world, both struggling to get the heavy hand of the state out of their fast-growing economies. Both look to the West and Japan for advanced to technology, machinery, capital, and investment. Nonetheless, Beijing and New Delhi have tried to expand trade and economic cooperation with some success. In 1994, India displaced Pakistan to become China’s largest trading partner in South Asia and in 2003 China displaced Japan as India’s largest trading partner in East Asia.

However, considering their size and potential, two-way trade has only grown from $271 million in 1989 to $7 billion in 2003, China's electric consumer goods companies like Hai'er, Konka and India's Information Technology (IT) and pharmaceutical Companies such as Infosys, NIIT, Ranbaxy, and Dr Reddy's have established some presence. Several joint ventures in power generation, consumer goods, chemicals, metals, minerals,
terms of security, China and India are two huge blocs for Southeast Asia. ASEAN has no defence-related problem with India but is conscious of China's ambitions and intentions.

Here it is also discussable that after signing the nuclear agreement with USA India became the major counter part of USA as regarding the Indian energy needs. Presently due to India's closeness to USA India would use its strategic ties with Washington to bolster its position in its dealing with China. India also can use American influence to contain China as China wants to contain India by her influence.

China's initial optimism that the new Sino-US-Pakistan triangular cooperation against terrorism in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US mainland would wean Washington away from New Delhi turned out to be wishful thinking as the Bush administration assured India that America's intensifying alliance with Pakistan would not be at India's expense. If anything, the twin threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have strengthened the American commitment to building stronger relations, including defence ties, with India. Growing Chinese strategic pressure on the Malacca Straits has already led to maritime collaboration between India and the US with their navies jointly patrolling the Straits. More significantly, US-India strategic engagement has scaled new heights with the announcement of a series of measures such as joint military exercises and sale of military hardware. Washington gave the green light for Israel to precede with the sale of Phalcon airborne early warning and control system (AWACS) to India- something that was earlier denied to China for fear of enhancing Beijing's air surveillance and early warning capabilities in the Taiwan Straits. All these measures send an implicit signal to China of India's growing military prowess. A cover story in the authoritative Beijing Review by China's noted South Asia specialists expressed concern over the
impacts on the whole world. The world knows it and is watching with interest.

I therefore would like to use this opportunity to speak to you on India is development experience and on what I see as a special opportunity for India and China to work together in the twenty-first century.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Premier Wen Jiabao recently spoke in Singapore about how it was only with openness and inclusiveness that a country can become strong and prosperous. In the past few decades, China has benefited from opening its economy to the rest of the world, and so has India.

India is changing and I would like to acknowledge that the success of China has been a stimulus to change. This process began in the 1980s and was intensified in 1991. In our system change can only be brought about through public debate and it takes time to build a political consensus. However, I am happy to say that in the 16 years that have elapsed since 1991, successive governments in India have carried forward the reform process, with the result that today India is on a high growth path.

Our economic growth during the last five years has averaged over 8.5% per year. This is unprecedented, and has created confidence that we can do better. We are aiming to raise it to 10% per year in the near future. There is a palpable sense of confidence in the country and optimism about the future.

The Indian economy has demonstrated resilience in meeting the challenges posed by globalization. In the last two decades, our industry especially large and medium industry has restructured to become globally competitive. This process is continuing.

We have, over the past few years, been able to create an environment conducive to creativity and enterprise. This is symbolized by the success of our information technology sector in world markets. There are other sectors that are also emerging. Pharmaceuticals and auto-components are both highly
Sustainability of development for a country of India’s size is another key concern. We need to address critical challenges relating to energy, food and water security, and climate change. These are challenges that China faces as well.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

India’s domestic and foreign policy priorities are closely linked. The primary task of our foreign policy is to create an external environment that is conducive for our rapid development. Our policy seeks to widen our development choices and give us strategic autonomy in the world. The independence of our foreign policy enables us to pursue mutually beneficial cooperation with all major countries of the world.

The establishment of peaceful and cooperative relationships in our neighbourhood is an intrinsic element of our foreign policy. We realise that our destinies are linked by geography and history. Both India and China seek tranquility and stability in our immediate neighbourhood and extended region.

We recognise that the world is evolving and developing features of multipolarity. It is natural that major powers, bound together by economic interdependence, will seek to cooperate with each other to mutual benefit. India and China must be part of this cooperative framework.

I look forward with optimism to the future and the role which India and China are destined to play in the transformation of Asia and the world. This optimism is based on my conviction that there is enough space for both India and China to grow and prosper while strengthening our cooperative engagement. History shows that our two great civilizations, flourished for centuries, side by side, interacting and influencing each other.

The Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity that we established in 2005 seeks purposeful engagement covering a wide
development will have a positive influence not only on our own economies but also on the rest of the world.

I would like to highlight some key focus areas for the future.

First, we must bridge the knowledge gap between India and China. We need to make much more sustained effort to ensure proper awareness of each other. This not only applies to our culture and history but also to contemporary developments. We need to have more people to people contacts to remove misconceptions and prejudices. We need a broad based comprehensive dialogue at the level of intelligentsia, media, non-governmental professionals and the worlds of culture and the arts.

Second, we need to expand our cooperation in a broad range of functional sectors. This could include learning from each other national developmental experiences. We would like to learn from China success in the creation of physical infrastructure, strategies to provide productive employment outside the agriculture sector, and poverty alleviation. Other areas for potential cooperation are science and technology, public health, education, institution building, water resource management and disaster management.

Third, we should harness our complementarities and synergies in the areas of trade and business. India's growing consumer market, skilled human resources, and software excellence together with China's own large market, its manufacturing prowess and cost competitiveness provide the platform for exponential growth in our economic ties. China is already the second largest trading partner of India. Yesterday, we agreed to set a bilateral trade target of 60 billion US dollars by the year 2010.

Asia is today more integrated than ever before in terms of trade in goods and services and investment of capital and knowledge. In the East Asian Summit and other fora, we are discussing several constructive ideas for an open inclusive economic architecture from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific.
collaborative research and development. India seeks international cooperation in the field of civilian nuclear energy, including with China.

Another area which merits our attention is food security. Global trends in food production and prices, and changing patterns of consumption are going to put increasing pressure on the availability and prices of basic food items. These trends pose major challenges for how we manage our food economy in the years ahead. Our interests are common and we can learn from each other in the strategies we follow.

Perhaps the greatest danger to our development comes from extremism of all types, whether in the garb of religion or on the pretext of righting historical wrongs. Recent developments in our neighbourhood have brought home to us again the imperative need to collectively fight terrorism and extremism in all its forms. As large and diverse societies, we are well placed to demonstrate the benefits of moderation and peaceful co-existence. The rise of non-state actors, often based on intolerance, and narrow conceptions of identity, is a threat to all civilized nations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The responsibility for the further development of India-China relations is a shared one. Our governments have an important role to play. But we must also look to you, the intellectuals, thinkers and scholars of China to lead the way by working closely with your Indian counterparts. It is through a free flow of ideas and sharing of different perspectives that our two societies can build upon the edifice of our civilisational links. Thus Indian Prime Minister and ends his addressing with happy note of optimism.

D.S. Rajan presents a nice and clear speculation on future of Sino-Indian relations. In his research paper on “India’s Emerging Security Challenges and Strategies” he exposed a future analysis of the forthcoming Sino-Indian bound. I’m agreeing with his speculations so presenting year for the justification of my research work.
Study on Regional Trade Agreement), Sino-Indian relations remain bedeviled by lack of progress on settling core issues mentioned below.

China’s stand on the border issue indicates that Beijing is unwilling to compromise on issues concerning territorial sovereignty. The Sino-Indian border talks, despite twelve rounds of talks so far between two Special representatives, have not led to any substantial result in finalising a ‘frame work’ for a boundary settlement in accordance with the 2005 Agreement on Political Parameters. While Beijing’s stand is to approach the border issue in the spirit of ‘mutual understanding and mutual accommodation’, India wants ‘ground realities’ to be taken into account. Interestingly, the Chinese have of late introduced some new elements to the border question by questioning the already agreed position of keeping areas with settled populations out of the dispute. As confirmation of their official position of claiming entire Arunachal Pradesh, Beijing even raised verbal objections to the visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Arunachal Pradesh soon after his trip to Beijing in January 2008. Is China ready for a compromise on the border issue? The statement made by the PRC Ambassador to India in November 2006 that both sides should make compromises on the ‘disputed’ Arunachal may be meaningful in this regard. The two sides seem to perceive that the issue is complex, the negotiations could be long and a solution may not be immediate. Chinese academic circles have explained the same in terms of public sentiments in China disallowing any compromise by Beijing on questions concerning national sovereignty as well as the need for priority to solve the critical Taiwan issue first, before any attempt to solve the border tangle with India.

China also considers Tibet issue as sensitive in its relations with India. The March 2008 unrest in Tibet has raised questions for China’s sovereignty over Tibet, a factor naturally connected to the border negotiations. It is being assessed that the Tibet unrest may erode China’s bargaining position during
'new balance of power in Asia'. Days before the first-ever official-level security consultation between the United States, India, Japan and Australia in June 2007, China issued demarches to each of the participants seeking to know the purpose behind their meeting.

On the India-US nuclear deal, the Chinese official position has been non-committal. Beijing has said that they welcome civil nuclear cooperation between nations if the same is in the interest of international non-proliferation regime. Beijing’s ultimate stand at the Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting at Vienna in 2008, in favour of granting waiver to India, has further underscored China’s ambivalent thinking on the deal; just prior to the meeting, the People’s Daily strongly criticised the deal. Other Chinese media comments have alleged that India’s development of nuclear weapons is an important reason for nuclear arms race in South Asia and that the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement marks a serious breach of the international non-proliferation regime. Their observation that India’s nuclear strategy is a potential challenge to China’s national security is a strong indicator to China’s basic thinking.

China’s military modernisation continues to be of a concern of regional powers including India. Indian Defence Ministry’s recent annual reports have been indicative of the same. New Delhi may have noted the recent evaluation of the US that China’s military modernisation is changing the regional balance in East Asia. There is a strong feeling in the region that though Beijing’s Defence policy is in the main oriented towards preventing US intervention in Taiwan, it has other intentions, for e.g. gaining capacity to meet contingencies like conflicts over resources and territories. China nevertheless is showing some conciliatory gestures. Its latest Defence White Paper for 2008 downplays Indian concerns about the Chinese naval build up and the ongoing border dispute. On its part, New Delhi has shown a tendency
mind in this regard is the advice given by veteran leader Deng Xiaoping that China should ‘stand firmly, hide its capabilities, bide its time and never try to take the lead’ in pursuance of its objectives. Worth noting in this context are evidences already surfacing to suggest that China’s strategy is not going to remain static, for e.g. in the new circumstances, the country’s ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ is being made conditional to ‘safeguarding of Chinese Sovereignty, Security and Development’ and the ‘economic growth’ imperative is being balanced with that of ‘military modernisation’. This would mean that the PRC may not hesitate to modify its strategy, if need arises. One has only to note what Robert B. Zoellick, former US Deputy Secretary of State and the initiator of the US-China Strategic Dialogue, said. According to him, though China remains absorbed in its domestic development, a question will remain whether it will have a similar view in next 10-15 years.

It is clear that China – South Asia relations are undergoing a tactical phase. Beijing’s present aim is to ease tensions in that region to help China in realising its modernisation task. That is why in the case of India, it is following the principle of ‘reserving the differences and working for common development’ and on India-Pakistan problems, it favours a peaceful dialogue between the two. However, for reasons mentioned above, uncertainties seem to be inherent in Beijing’s long-term strategy towards South Asia, on which regional powers like India need to be vigilant.

Thus we can say that if China and India join hand in a positive intention, they can lead the world in the sphere of multi polarity. Sino-Indian friendship can replace the American pre-eminent place in international policies. If they do not leave hostile stream for each other then the development of India and China would feel to be choked in every sphere. In 21st century both has a great probability and credibility to play a role of most decisive actors of International politics.


17. “Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and Anti-State Actors,”


23. “The China Factor in the India-Pakistan Conflict,”
35. China Institute of International Strategic Studies (CIIS), Beijing, 21 November 2006

36. Ambassador C.V. Ranganathan, Chennai Centre for China Studies, March 2008


39. Dr Zhang Guihong, International Studies Dept, Fudan University, CASS website (Chinese) online 13 March 2009


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47. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Qin Gang, 3 June 2008 and the then Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee, New Delhi, Reuters, 14 June 2006


50. PM's addressing in China, abstracted from net.
capacity to lead the globe on international stages in twenty 1st century. So I tried to signify the work of my research. In this attempt I present a review of historical relations. After independence both countries were forwarding towards better relations but the issues of Tibet, issue of line of control, (MacMahon) problem of intrusion, worsened the situation. China posed a war on India in 1962 to exhibit her power. As Sino-Indian boundary line remained disputed from very beginning. So the new government of People Republic never considered McMahon line as a line of control. So the dispute make serious later, that result in a war. India had soft policy towards China but China remain stood on his imperialistic thinking. The Panchsheel agreement of 1954 failed to stop the war and hostility. From 1955, concerns and disputes were increasing on border but in spite of this India’s policy makers failed to finalise a clear foreign policy to wards China, and thus taken these incidents as normal. This ignorance resulted in 1962 war. The war of 1962 proved a landmark in the history of Sino-Indian relations. Though Indian forces fought with a great courage but they proved inferior to that of Chinese in every field of battles. As India did not pay much attention to military preparations so in the lack of a clear policy and ammunition, the courage of Indian forces went in vain.

Though the war of 1962 succeeded to aware Indian government about military preparations and those weaknesses that were seen during the war. Till now India had understood that either it was People Republic of China or any other nation of the world, they can not leave their national interests for the sake of friendship or Panchsheela. The unilateral declaration of ceasefire was enough to feel India that with out a strong military power one will have to go through the situation of great assault, and disgrace. This lesson force India to make a clear and advanced military strategy. 1964 Indian defense policy was prepared. A decision to enhance military power was taken. The results of India’s military preparations and policies came in the 1965 Indo-Pak war.
Pak attacked India with the firm support of Chinese Republic, but had to face a great defeat. Thus the war of 1965 played a significant role to regain Indian’s international status which India had lost in 1962.

China began a programme to support Pakistan after the secret dialogues and meetings by Chinese external affair minister with Pakistan’s officials and PM Benzir Bhutto in 1965. China blamed India for this war. A Chinese official gave a statement that India crossed the cease fire line. Thus Chinese statement had cleared that 1965 Pakistani attack was being possible with Chinese support. In apposition to China USSR called both Indian and Pakistan to call back their military to the line of cease fire. China made propounds to regrace India that India wanted to occupy Tibet and Sikyang. China’s news papers were full with anti-Indian news. This China Indian antagonism was going on. The research found that in 1965 war India succeeded to recognize the weaknesses of 1962 and eradicate them.

Though later in 1971 India also defeated Pakistan but the victory of 1965 was unique in this matter. In 1971 China also helped Pak but the situation were changing slowly changed and china stopped to deliver anti-Indian statements. During Kargil conflict of 1998 China keeps neutral herself. China now has understood that India can not be constrained by helping Pakistan. So China is indulging in making harmonious relations with South Asian countries to encircled India. It is clear now that by attacking India, China can not fulfill her national interests. The South Asian strategic location is very important in the commercial view. In the present research the increasing Chinese influence in South Asia and its impacts on India and its security is analysed.

In the present international world order India is a significant neighbour for China but it not mean that China’s friendship with Pakistan has been ended. As china is forwarding the hand of friendship to wards India beside
There was still a strong market for this viewpoint within Indian strategic and policy circles after the Cold War ended. Although China's South Asian policy made an obvious shift after the Cold War to more equilateral treatment of India and Pakistan, many Indian leaders and strategists were still worried that China would 'use Islamabad to counter India' India has consequently scrutinized every move in the relationship between China and Pakistan. Each annual report issued by India's Ministry of Defence since the end of the Cold War mentions the Sino–Pakistani military relationship and China's military aid to Pakistan. Comments vary in tone, at times directly charging that China's help to Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons and missiles directly impacts upon Indian security, at others expressing mild concern over the two nations' continued military cooperation. Such shifts in nuance reflect to a certain extent subtle changes in both Sino–Indian relations and India's China policy.

The Pakistani factor was in any event still an important aspect of India's China policy after the Cold War ended; only India's management of the issue underwent tactical adjustments, in that before the Cold War ended India relied on its alliance with the USSR to maintain contention with the Sino–Pakistani friendship, and when it ended resorted to both the carrot and the stick: by drawing close to China it sought to persuade the country to distance itself from Pakistan, and by drawing close to the United States trod the old Cold War road of pursuing a balance of power.

As India continued to abide by the principle of checks and balances after the Cold War, its China policy still emphasized the desire for parity. The obvious power gap between India and China motivated Indian leaders' decision in the 1990s to emulate China by expanding comprehensive national strength and restoring a balance of power between the two nations. The race to overtake China thus subtly began in India, and continues to the present day. But unlike the arms race of the Cold War (from 1962 onwards) its progress is
ever to sudden deterioration as a result of misperceptions, unrealistic expectations, accidents, and eruption of unresolved issues.

Despite customary denials by Beijing and New Delhi to the contrary, India-China relations will remain competitive, if not conflictual, for the simple reason that the two giants are engaged in a battle for supremacy in overlapping areas of influence and are determined to emerge as major powers on the world stage. India’s ‘look east’ policy, which envisions high-level engagements with the ASEAN, Japan, Taiwan, and the US, is bringing Indian military and economic interests into China’s claimed sphere of influence, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Any US tilt towards or alignment with India will prompt the Chinese to tighten their embrace of India’s smaller neighbours, which will, in turn, prompt India to respond to kind. It is in their dealings in their immediate neighbourhoods that the patterns and perceptions of the past appear most obvious, and provide contradictions and conflicts for the present and future. Just as Pakistan and Bangladesh see China as a stabilizing influence in South Asia, East Asian countries, such as Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, and Australia see a strong India as a stabilizing influence in the wider Asia-Pacific region. The net result is that India and China are locked into a rivalry which appears unavoidable, inexorable, and is a rivalry which could result either in the voluntary submission of one of the rivals to the other, or a test of wills, or an agreement on keeping out of each other’s sphere of influence or perhaps, a trial of strength by ordeal of battle.

It is safe to conclude that as in the past, China’s foreign and defence policy initiatives will continue to be designed to reduce India to the status of a sub-regional power by increasing Chinese influence and leverage in India’s general neighbourhood. If the twenty-first contrary’s first decade indeed turns out to be India’s decade (in terms of a rapid increase in its economic and military might) just as the 1990s were China’s and the 1980s were Japan’s,
Both China and India has agreed to open Nathula and Sipki pass. The reopened of Nathula may make possible the strong bond of trade between two largest populated nations of world. China has no interest in Indian claim on the permanent seat in Security Council in UNO, but do not show any direct and clear complaint.

Suggestions.

After analyzing the whole research I found some arguments about Sino-Indian relations and India’s security in 21st century. In the light of present study I presents some suggestion that may be useful for the mutual relations and India’s policies towards China in 21st century. These suggestions may help both China and India to make harmonious relations.

The suggestions are as:

1. The government of India should take the issue of boundary seriously, so that in future India will not remain in pressure as it was in before 1962.

2. Both India a China should follow the race of healthy competition in the changing economical and geo political world for peace and development.

3. India should continue his nuclear programme until China and rest nuclear power will agree to destroy nuclear weapons.

4. The peaceful negotiations should be given a rapid shape to settle disputes and China should leave her robust manner and should be fluctuate for the betterment of relations.

5. India should take a lesson from Chinese determination to complete a development programme and should avoid political malish and gossips. Thus India can grow its political height.

6. The leaders from both sides should avoid hard word for each other.
16. Both countries should co-operate each other in the area of space technology and development. We should remember that the supreme and primary interest of a nation lies in the logic that he should be capable to secure and maintain its political, geographical sovereignty and freedom. It will be possible only if India has a strong and capable security system and a sound economical structure with healthy and harmonious social set up.

17. Indian policy makers should recognize the course of history presently status quo is untenable and India’s rise as a big power is inevitable.

18. China will have to stop behave like a preacher to a ancient civilization like India.

19. For the betterment of relations China should show sensitivity to India’s security concerns and should not exploit or play up differences between India and her neighbours.

20. Both India and China should regard the fact that multi-polarity is better then unipolarity.

21. Both should be less hegemonic, less arrogant and share the leadership of the Asia pacific region. Here China should show a special generosity.

22. It will be useful for both countries that both shed anti and hostile intention for each other, for the mutual satisfactions.

23. Sino-Indian relation should be strictly abide by the three bilateral agreements (1955,1993,1996)

24. China should follow a one India policy and should not interfere in internal affairs (Kashmir, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh) of India.
(v) If China backs Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir or supports its resolution as per the UN security Council Resolution, India should play ‘the Tibet card’ and demand the implementation of UN General Assembly Resolution on Tibet and the safe return of 200,000 Tibetan refugees living in India;

(vi) If the PLA claims that the Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean, the Indian Navy cannot accept the South China Sea as China’s sea. If China acquires naval bases in Pakistan and Myanmar, India should seek the use of naval bases in Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines for forward deployment of Indian naval assets.

(vii) Just as Chinese leaders offer military support and economic aid to ‘India-wary countries’, India could take a leading role in ‘the China-wary club’;

(viii) If China can justify nuclear/missile assistance to Pakistan as part of ‘normal state-to-state relations’, India can do the same with respect to its ‘all-weather friends’ Vietnam and Mongolia. After all, the argue, China has not taken out an exclusive patent on trade in nuclear/missile technologies;

(ix) If Beijing plays host to Pakistani or Bangladeshi leaders at the time of heightened tensions in South Asia, New Delhi should play host to Taiwanese, Vietnamese or Filipino leaders at the time of tensions across the Taiwan Strait or in the South China sea; and

(x) If China chides India for raising its defence spending, India should do the same for Beijing’s double digit increases in its military outlays.