Chapter-III
SINO-PAK RELATION (1962 - 2000)

(A) Boundary Agreement (1963)

The Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement of March 2, 1963 marked a major breakthrough in the relations between these states. President Ayub Khan termed it as "the first step in the evolution of the relations between Pakistan and China". It demarcated 200 miles frontier beginning at the tri junction of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sinkiang and running in a south-easterly direction up to Karakoram Pass including the Oprang Valley and the Salt mining areas east of the Shimshal Pass, whereas Pakistan did not part with any territory under its actual control. In 1947, when Pakistan was formed, it had no common boundary with the People’s Republic of China. As a result of Pakistan’s invasion on the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-48 as the two countries have been sharing a common boundary of nearly three hundred miles. The Pakistan occupied Kashmir is contiguous to Chinese, autonomous region of Sinkiang. Pakistan occupied Kashmir, particularly Gilgit has a great strategic importance. Here China, India, Pakistan and even Afghanistan meet and the Soviet Union is not far away. Being involved in a border dispute with India, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Pakistan, China had a great interest in this region.

88 Yasmin, Pakistan Relations with China, Islamabad Institute of Defence Studies, Pub. 1982, pp 87
In 1953, Chinese army had intruded into the mountainous region of Hunza. Chinese maps showed a large part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir, including some important passes like Kilik, Shimshal in Gilgit and Baltistan as part of China. But Pakistan definitely knew that the areas shown in the Chinese maps were under its jurisdiction. On 23 October, 1959, President Ayub Khan declared that Pakistan would approach China to define the boundary between Pakistan and China. On 15 January, 1961 when Pakistan foreign minister Manzur Qadir announced that there was an agreement in principle between China and Pakistan to conduct negotiations regarding the demarcation of the boundary between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Chinese Sinkiang\(^{89}\).

By the end of 1959 United States attempted to isolate China, Sino-Soviet rift was widening. Nehru-Chau Delhi talk of April 1960 had failed. China found itself in a situation of being isolated politically. Under these circumstances, China sounded Pakistan on normalising the relations between the two countries\(^{90}\). Chinese showed their willingness to negotiate with Pakistan the question of boundary between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Chinese Sinkiang.

In accordance with the Joint Communiqué announced on 3 May, 1962 the Government of Pakistan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China commenced boundary negotiation to formally delimit the boundary between Chinese


Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is the responsibility of Pakistan. But actual negotiation started only a week before the outbreak of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Sino-Indian war provided an opportunity to both Pakistan and China to shed their mutual suspicions. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Minister of External Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, proceeded on a visit to Peking, at the invitation of the Foreign Minister of the Government of People’s Republic of China, to conclude the Border Agreement between Pakistan and China⁹¹.

“The Government of China and Pakistan on March 3, 1963 solemnly signed a boundary agreement and the people of all circles of our capital have held a grand rally in celebration of this. The signing of this agreement constitutes an important milestone in China-Pakistan friendship”⁹².

There is a difference of 3400 square miles between the Pakistan and the Chinese versions of their respective territorial claims. Of this difference, it was claimed by Rawalpindi that Pakistan gained 1050 square miles of territory, including 750 square miles which had been under Chinese control. The compromise arrived at left about 2050 square miles on China’s side, including the Shaksgam Mustagh drainage area of about 1050 square miles⁹³.

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The boundary agreement involved nearly 300 miles of border stretching from the Karakoram pass to Pakistan Afghanistan border. Commencing from the trijunction of the frontier of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, it proceeded south-eastward along the main watershed running across the Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Karahanai Pass, Parpik Pass up to Khunjerb Pass. From this point it would pass along the main watershed from a point at longitude 75° 57’ latitude 36° 03’, until it reached east Mustagh Pass, from where it went to the south-eastern extremely of Karakoram Pass and would touch K-2, Broad Peak, Gasherbrum and Teram Kangri.

Pakistan claimed to have gained access to six out of the seven passes along the Karakoram Range and control of three quarters of the world’s second highest peak K-2 (Mount Godwin Austen).

India’s Reaction:- Motivation and implications of this agreement were not limited only to this objective of the foreign policies of Pakistan and China. They can be analysed in terms of territorial, political and geopolitical gains.

This motivation was related to a long-range objective of Pakistan Policy. But it appears that Pakistan was motivated more by short and medium-range objective then the long range ones in concluding the agreement. Pakistan considered Kashmir question as the touchstone of the success of Pakistan’s foreign policy. No doubt, the agreement did not solve the Kashmir problem but it entailed a legal recognition to

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Pakistan's de facto control of Pakistan occupied Kashmir. Chinese motivation behind signing the Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement was their desire to weaken India's negotiating position in future and to acquire areas of geopolitical importance for itself. Chinese increased their influence over Karakoram Pass and in the north-west, they acquired a beach-head with in Kashmir through the Pakistani cession of lands in Hunza, south of Mintaka Pass. The concession has apparently brought China close to the Gilgit air field. Through this concession Chinese have acquired theoretically a capability to attack Kashmir by land from the Karakoram Pass and from Ladakh. In the light of the 1962 conflict these possibilities constitute a grave and permanent menace to Kashmir. In this process, China had sought to secure its flank in Kashmir in any future conflict with India.

The Government of India reiterate their deep concern at the Chinese Government's persistence in continuing their arbitrary and illegal efforts to "locate and align the boundary" between China and the areas of Kashmir which have been illegally occupied by Pakistan. As has been stated, repeatedly by the Government of India, any such illegal arrangements involving Indian territory between parties that have no legal or constitutional locus-standi is invalid and unacceptable to the Government of India.

The Chinese note asserts that the Chinese Government has never involved itself in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. This assertion is directly contradicted by the action of the Chinese Government entering into negotiations with Pakistan though
there is no common border between Pakistan and China. Equally groundless and misleading is the further assertion that the Sino-Pak boundary negotiations and the related agreements have not at all touched upon the ownership of Kashmir. If Pakistan has no common border with China, and China and Pakistan nevertheless, agree to locate and align a boundary in Kashmir, no further proof is needed to show that the Chinese objective is to come to terms with Pakistan on the question of the ownership of Kashmir and to involve itself in its neighbours dispute in the interests of its expansionistic and chauvinistic policies.

The absurd claim made in the Chinese note that the boundary negotiations between Pakistan and China have promoted the friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani people and is in the interest of Asia and the world peace, is therefore, nothing but an excuse and a false excuse at that for the pursuit of exactly the opposite objectives, namely, China’s insidious policy of poisoning the mutual relations between the countries of Asia and creating tensions and conflict in this region.

This agreement purports to demarcate (albeit on a provisional basis) part of Kashmir’s northern boundary. However, neither Pakistan nor China has any competence to conclude such an agreement. This agreement is with out any validity and can not bind India, whose rights and territory are sought to be bartened away by the two parties.

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Leaving aside the question of Pakistan’s malafide intention in concluding this Agreement, we might consider here a change in China’s attitude towards India’s sovereignty over Kashmir. It must be remembered that China had never before questioned India’s sovereignty over Kashmir in fact all her earlier statements and action showed that China acknowledged India as the competent body to act on behalf of Kashmir in the international field. Chinese motivation behind signing the Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement was their desire to weaken India’s neighbouring position in future and to acquire areas of geostrategic importance for itself. Soon modern highways on both sides of the Sino-Pakistan border were built. Jeapable roads were now built from Kashgar upto the Karakoram mountains. On Pakistan’s side, the Indus Valley highway provides an all weather road to Gilgit and beyond. In Hunza a jeep truck crosses over dangerous slopes and wooden bridges across high precipices upto the Chinese border. The all weather road between China and Kashmir can carry goods or can provide one more invasion route to India.  

(b) Sino-Pakistan Alliance

The Sino-Pakistan Alliance can be understood by comprehending the framework of the foreign strategies of these two countries. Conceptually, the framework of foreign strategy of a country may mean that its leadership has conceived of certain goals on the basis of their perceptions on the national, regional and global settings and there is a broad consensus about them within the country, that it has drawn up a scale of preferences of such goals and interests and that it has evolved a basic strategy to realise them. As regards, the scale of preferences, for instance, a country may attach more importance to security than other interests; in other case ideology and national ethos may take precedence over other interests and in a yet another case a mix of these may acquire priority.

China was established on October 1, 1949. Like many countries, Pakistan received invitation to extend recognition to Peking Government. Pakistan becomes the first Muslim country to accord recognition to Peking Government on January 4, 1950. Pakistan Government announced that: They recognize the Central Government of People’s Republic of China established at Peking as the de jure government of China. They trust that the friendly cordial relations between China and Pakistan will be cemented in all spheres of mutual advantage. Pakistan exchange his Ambassador
appointed on January 15, 1951, who assumed his charge in Peking in April 1951. China’s Ambassador assumed his charge in Pakistan in June 1951.  

Despite the dramatic changes in the international and regional environments, Sino-Pakistan relations continue to demonstrate enviable cordiality and remarkable consistency. Obviously the sources continuously commenting such relationships are frequent assertion of their mutual trust and confidence coupled with the convergence of national interests and regional situation. Since the relationship between the two countries are based on the objective realities of the region, the need for formal alliance partnership was never felt by either side. However, with the passage of time (in which not only the mutual contacts multiplied but also the mutual interdependence increased considerably) and the advent of Joint Commission have made the relationship more meaningful in all aspects in political, economic and defence spheres that brought these two neighbours closer to each other.

The rapid development of political relations between Pakistan and China, which was greatly accelerated by the successful conclusion of the border agreement, made Pakistan leader confident about their friendship with China. The border agreement was followed by an Airline agreement on 29 August 1963 by which Pakistan international Airline became the first foreign airline to have landing and transit facility in China, Pakistan signed a trade agreement with China on 5 January

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99 Cheema, Perviz Iqbal, Significance of Pak-Sino border, Pakistan Horizon Karachi, 1986, pp 41.
1963. This trade agreement provided for "most favoured nation" treatment in trade and commerce, including shipping\textsuperscript{101}. The two countries did not have a formal military agreement but a statement by Bhutto in July 1963 in the national assembly obliquely hinted that Pakistan could rely on Chinese support in the event of an Indo-Pak War. Bhutto's words were "An attack by India on Pakistan involves the territorial integrity and security of the largest State in Asia, and therefore, this new element and this new factor brought in the situation a very element and a very important factor\textsuperscript{102}. Zhou-en-Lai told a Pakistani group paying a good-will visit to China that his country would defend Pakistan throughout the world\textsuperscript{103}. Even the possibility of a Pak-china military alliance was expressed by President Ayub Khan who stated to the correspondent of the Washington post, Selig S. Harrison that if the threat from India reached such a degree as to threaten the territorial integrity of Pakistan the latter would then be compelled to go into a military alliance with China. Ayub visited China in 1965 and while there, he reaffirmed Pakistan's support to PRC representation in the UN and opposition to the two China policy. In April 1965, an agreement was signed according to which a monthly sea transport service would begin between the two countries\textsuperscript{104}.

\textsuperscript{101} Dixit, Aabha, Sino-Pak relations and their implication for India, Strategic Analysis, 1986, pp 1069.
\textsuperscript{102} Arif, K., China-Pak relations, 1947-86, pp 12.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid No.101, pp. 1070.
\textsuperscript{104} Sharma, B.L., The Pakistan-China Axis, 1968, pp 80.
During Pakistan's dispute with India in April 1965 over the Rann of Kutchh and the subsequent Pakistan offensive in Kashmir China expressed full throated support to Pakistan. China condemned India and simultaneously "threatened India with dire consequences for its criminal aggression" but India ignored these threats, since it rightly felt that Pakistan was the aggressive having first sent infiltrators. During the 1965 war, there was considerable speculation about a secret agreement between Pakistan and China. This persistent doubt was somewhat cleared when Bhutto disclosed that he had gone to Beijing during the height of tensions. He was able to gain some armaments and an assurance of a certain degree of Chinese support during the Indo-Pak war.

The Chinese, though supporting Pakistan in its hour of trouble affirmed that the Kashmir dispute should be resolved "in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir". The Tashkent agreement which brought the 1965 hostilities between India and Pakistan to participation in such an agreement which China described as a "dirty trick" and "a joint US-Soviet collusion against India", was totally opposed. Nevertheless, after the war, new Sino-Pak agreement in June 1966 was signed to promote scientific and cultural exchanges. A trade protocol was signed in July and in October 1966 another agreement on maritime transport was concluded. Another economic and technical agreement was signed by the two countries in 1970 when

President Ayub Khan visit Beijing. In Feb. 1973, Beijing decided to write off four loans made to Pakistan earlier and Payable in 1974.

Bhutto's visit to Beijing in May 1976 was of great significance, because two agreements emerged from it, (i) Scientific Co-operation and (ii) Military Cooperation.

China continued to help Pakistan not only in various field but also it collaborated in the critical field of nuclear and missile development and extended potential support on issues impinging upon Pakistan’s national interests, Pakistani leadership always held consultations with the Chinese counterparts before and after taking any initiative. Exchange of high level delegation took place for this and other purposes with an extraordinary regularity. Ms Bhutto paid a visit to Beijing in Feb., 1989. She characterized Pakistan-China alliance as "mature, featuring many sides developments and cooperation". During her visit, the two countries signed on Feb. 12, 1989 an agreement on the reciprocal encouragement and protection of investment and a memorandum of understanding. During Chinese Prime Minister Li-Peng, Pakistan visit, four agreements were signed on 14 November 1989. These agreements were related to economic and technical cooperation, power and natural resources development, trade, industry, agriculture, cultural, education and scientific co-operation. A Chinese delegation would visit Pakistan to conclude a new protocol for border trade was also decided. In connection with Pakistan’s nuclear and missile field,

Pakistan has signed an agreement with China in September 1986 on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This agreement includes the design, construction, and operation of nuclear reactors.

Moreover, Pakistan and China have learned much from another experience. Integrative relationship between two countries is built around their common interest and experience. As a big power China could be unreceptive to Pakistan's needs but it has not followed this course. It stood by Pakistan in every crisis and proved that a friend in need is a friend indeed. The Sino-Pak friendship and co-operation provides an excellent example of integrative relationship, despite many political changes, the relations between them have been remained stable during the past forty years. China has been providing economic and military aid to Pakistan whenever it was asked for and continued to this day on a regular basis. This has been the motivating force behind their alliance107.

(c) **Chinese Support to Pakistan Nuclear Programme**

China is a big country which has been trying to expand in all directions. Undoubtedly, it has created many problems for the world by its hostile, belligerent and imperialistic attitude particularly towards its neighbours and generally towards the whole world. The whole of China has not only been militarized but also nuclearised.

China had also played a vital role in Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons programme. Sino-Pak relations are rooted in the mutual self interest derived from the desire to counter India. Soon after the Pokhran test by India in May 1974 China decided to support Pakistan against the so called nuclear threat and nuclear Blackmail by India.

Pakistan’s failure to achieve its objective in the wars of 1947-48, 1965 and 1971, and the breaking away of its eastern half into Bangladesh, resulted in Pakistan leaders becoming paranoid about the threat from India. Pakistan’s President Mr. Bhutto is reported to have said that Pakistanis would be prepared to eat grass if they had to, if this become necessary for Pakistan to build its own nuclear deterrent.\(^{108}\)

Consequently, in June 1976 and September 1986, Pakistan signed two nuclear accords for technical co-operation with China, which gave a new dimension to the existing relations between the two countries. These accords clearly indicate towards

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Pakistan’s secret nuclear link with China’s. Pakistan’s nuclear programme can be divided into three phases. The first phase 1953-71, in this period the Pak's nuclear policy was mostly civilian in nature. The second phase was 1972-79, in this period, Bhutto gave a new direction to Pakistan's nuclear capability and it became military oriented. The Third phase 1980 to present day, in this period Pakistan’s nuclear programme was developed for the defence purpose and Pakistan made a nuclear bomb and it was exploded in the month of June 1998 in Changai Hill in North-Eastern Frontier.

Pakistan’s nuclear policy of 1950’s and 1960’s was deeply rooted in the security calculation and historical basis and antagonism. Since 1950’s, late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the father of present nuclear policy has remained the architect of Pakistan’s nuclear programme. He built up the nuclear programme with great determination from almost nothing to a viable deterrent capability. Pakistan’s nuclear programme started in mid 1955 when Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was created and led Dr. Nazir Ahmad, “Atom for peace” type programme in 1965. Pakistan has established principal nuclear research facility with Beijing transferring technology for building the pilot reprocessing plant at Nilore (PARS-I), in the vicinity of Rawalpindi known as Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology.


(PINSTECH). Pakistan's first nuclear power plant was completed in 1972 known as the Karachi Nuclear Power Programme (KANUPP)\textsuperscript{111}.

China is helping and coordinating Pakistan in its endeavour for making nuclear weapons. Pakistan and China working in vision since 1960's. China in the past has been siding Pakistan on Kashmir issue and has actually helped her in attaining nuclear capability (despite the fact that it is a signatory to nuclear non-proliferation treaty). This relationship today, has attained a new dimension owing to the extent of involvement of China in Pakistan's search for nuclear weapon programme\textsuperscript{112}.

As regards China's help, Bhutto can similarly be credited with having laid the foundation of Sino-Pakistan nuclear co-operation, which he had worked out with relentless zeal during this three visits to Beijing in February 1972, September 1974 and April 1976\textsuperscript{113}.

China is deeply involved in Pakistani nuclear weapons development activities. Bhutto obliquely pointed to the China connection in his death cell memories. He said, "My single most important achievement which I believe will dominate the portrait of my public life is an agreement which I arrived at after an assiduous and tenacious endeavour spanning over eleven years of negotiations. In the present context, the

\textsuperscript{111} Chitra, M.G.: Nuclear Pakistan, New Delhi, 1996.
\textsuperscript{113} Ali, Akhtar: South Asia: Nuclear Stalemate or Conflagration, Karachi, 1987, pp 103.
agreement of mine, concluded in June 1976, will perhaps be my greatest achievement and contribution to the survival of our people and our Nation 114.

Close on the heels of Bhutto’s China visit, a high level team of Chinese scientists visited Pakistan. According to a report circulated by the US defence intelligence agency dated May 14, 1975 "Sometime before October 1974, the PRC assigned the first batch of 12 scientists to assist Pakistan in developing its nuclear science 115. In March 1977, another team of Chinese scientists toured a number of places in Pakistan and had discussions with Pakistani nuclear scientists. On January 29, 1977, Pakistan and China signed a protocol on scientific and technical cooperation. Chinese assistance for the development of nuclear energy was implicit in the protocol 116.

An Indian specialist P.K.S. Namboodiri mentions that Chinese help to Pakistan consisted of transfer of nuclear weapon design information (assistance in setting up an enrichment plant), supply of nuclear test data, the conduct of a nuclear test on Pakistan’s behalf (or to make a test site available), the supply of heavy water and the transfer of plutonium reprocessing technology. One explanation for China’s continuing role in Pakistan’s nuclear programme is that in exchange for their help, the Chinese have been given access to Pakistan’s imported CANDU reactor technology

transferred arranged for Chinese reprocessing technology. China provided technical assistance for its secret uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta in 1977. Regarding China’s help to Pakistan in the nuclear field, the United States Congressional Research Study Report, June 1, 1993 by Shirley A. Khan mentions the following:

The New York Times dated June 22 and 23, 1984 reported that the Reagan Administration had been consuming evidence that China was helping Pakistan to operate its Kahuta uranium enrichment plant and had given Pakistan a nuclear bomb design. This new facility is expected to take Pakistan from the stage of conventional uranium bomb to the production of plutonium and tritium, which will make it possible for it to develop more advanced compact nuclear warheads for their missile. They also stated that Chinese scientists have been sighted at the Kahuta complex (in which gas centrifuges are used to produce weapon grade uranium), and that in 1986, China sold Pakistan tritium (used to achieve fusion in hydrogen bomb and to increase the yield of tritium boosted nuclear bombs). According to Nucleonics Week of August 9, 1990, in 1989, China also designed the nuclear system for a Pakistani 27 KW research reactor (PARR-2) is built at Rawalpindi with Chinese assistance, which uses highly enriched uranium fuel\textsuperscript{117}.

Both the US Administration and Soviet official have asserted more than once that China had a definite role in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. Leslie Gelb,

\textsuperscript{117} Burman, Shibdasm China’s nuclear weapons programme, World Affairs, June, 1995, pp 48.
who held an important position in the Carter Administration saying that China had provided Pakistan with the design of its forth nuclear weapon test, which weighed less than a ton and could easily be carried by an aircraft like the Mirage-II/V F-16 or any of Pakistan's modern missiles. Similarly, in the Moscow World Service Report of August 26, 1984, it was stated that China had made a direct contribution to the development of Pakistan's nuclear potential. The United States intelligence aided in February 1996 that China had supplied 5000 specialised ring magnets to Pakistan's Abdul Quder Khan research laboratories in Kahuta in 1995. According to experts, these magnets were said to used in special suspension bearings at the top of a spinning chamber in the high-speed centrifuges which could double their capacity to enrich uranium for weapons purposes.

Pakistan's dependencies on China, which even today continues its long standing special nuclear relationship with Islamabad. China's supply of a 40 MW heavy water research reactor for Pakistan's secret enrichment facility at Khushab.

Pakistan was quietly constructing a nuclear reactor which will give it access to substantial quantities of plutonium for more powerful and compact weapon than it meant for power generation. Khushab, near Sargodha in Pakistan. Pakistan's admission that it has been secretly installing with Chinese help, which will produce substantial quantities of plutonium for manufacturing smaller and compact nuclear

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119 The Times of India, New Delhi, April 1996.
weapon. The Khushab site is probably a plutonium 239 reprocessing plant to produce weapon grade plutonium. In the coming years might see Pakistan developing plutonium bombs.

Pakistan is already setting up a 300 MW plutonium extraction plant with Chinese assistance at Chasma south of Islamabad which could be used as a camouflage for supplying of materials and components for the weapon programme in Punjab, which was expected to become critical in 1997\textsuperscript{120}. In recent years, China has supplied to Pakistan a 300,000 KW stabilizer and 300,000 KW streamers as also large quantities of heavy water which have been suspected of being diverted to other unsafe guarded facilities, like the Khushab plutonium production reactor\textsuperscript{121}. Similarly, China’s official new agency, Xinhua, reported that China had exported to Pakistan a sophisticated simulated nuclear power plant control room, which it said was aimed at training Pakistani technicians.

**Pakistan nuclear missile capability**

The assessment is that Pakistan has put together 10-16 first generation nuclear warheads and modified a few F-16 aircraft to give it the capability to deliver these by air. Pakistan has missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Currently, the

\textsuperscript{120} Sawhny, Parveen: A Secret Sino-Pak Nuclear Cooperation, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, March 5, 1996.

\textsuperscript{121} Sirohi, Seema: China to Export Nuclear Power Equipment of Pakistan, The Hindu, New Delhi, September 21, 1997.
(HATF-2 500 kg payload) and M-11 (800 kg Payload) are in service—both with ranges of 300 km. It has 84 M-11 missile and 24-36 launchers, acquired from China, in its inventory. It is developing a missile with a range of 800 km and a payload of 500 kg (HATF-III) believed to be a clone of the Chinese M-9 missile. On June 13, 1996 the Washington Post quoted a leaked CIA document saying Pakistan had "probably finished developing nuclear warheads" for its M-11 missile. If true, it may indicate Chinese assistance miniaturising the warheads design122.

Pakistan may have foregone a retaliatory atomic test in response to Indian explosion, because it may have a nuclear arsenal which work based on a Chinese design handed over to it in the 80's say the 'Janes Intelligence Weekly'. China's extraordinary generously, might have been Pakistani nuclear scientists sharing secrets of processes to enrich uranium to weapons grade using high-speed centrifuges.

Pakistan has nuclear devices, which can be quickly turned into bombs. The country's scientists claim they need seven days notice and experts reckon Pakistan may have up to 30 bombs already. Pakistan has acquired the capability of producing thermo-nuclear bombs, which would give it the capacity of making nuclear warheads for its Ghauri and other surface to surface missiles123.

China, Pakistan and India say, they need nuclear weapons to defend themselves. China declared that it would never be the first one to use nuclear weapons

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and that it would never use them against a country that did not possess such weapons. India has since 1994 called on Pakistan to join in making such a ‘No first use’ pledge. However, Pakistan has bulked at this, arguing that for a smaller country, such a commitment would be disadvantageous. There is also a broad consensus that Pakistan’s nuclearization is imperative to ‘neutralize India’s broad regional dominance and their calculation that the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability can deter India’s conventional military threat’. At present, Pakistan seems to be suffering from a sense of inferiority complex vis-à-vis India in the nuclear as well as other fields.

If China also agrees not to upset the military balance on the sub-continent, it would indeed be a factor for safeguarding peace and security in this area. Pakistan’s strategy and the continued assistance by China to the formal will adversely affect the political conditions in India. It will have an “adverse affect on the political stability due to conflicting requirements of the responses on global issues such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)” china is indulging in proliferation in the region.

China, in fact, has gone a long way in helping Pakistan become a nuclear power. This is known as the strategy of indirect approach and it obviously meant that with a nuclear China, Pakistan axis, India could be kept under control in south Asia. As regards the timing of the Indian tests; these should have been done earlier. The demonstration of Pakistan nuclear weapon capacity in the Chagai hills is the culmination of a clandestine programme which bean nearly three decades ago. China
is fully aware that its role of sensitive technologies to Pakistan is seen by India as a hostile action and a major threat to its security\textsuperscript{124}.

Pakistan's nuclear tests may prove useful for India in certain ways. Now, India know the Pakistani nuclear capability. China is technologically advance than India, but Pakistan is also not far behind in nuclear technology. India can not afford to be complacent in its development of nuclear weapons, for Pakistan has already declared that it is equipping the Ghauri missile with nuclear devices. India should not only weaponise but should develop a proper command control structure, for it has to deal with two nuclear powers i.e. Pakistan and China. The continuing Sino-Pak collaboration confirmed Indian suspicions that Chinese hostility to India is not over. US Senator Connie Mark alluded to this when she stated on the senate floor on June 16, 1998 that "China may be too pre-occupied today to directly threaten India, but they need only employ Pakistan as a surrogate belligerent to Jeopardise India's security.\textsuperscript{124} Aneja, Atul: The Pakistan Nuclear Programme, The Hindu, May 28, 1998