Chapter-II

BACKGROUND OF SINO-PAK RELATIONS

(A) China's Attitude Towards Pakistan: Determinants and Objectives

Pakistan was the first Muslim country to recognise on 4 January, 1950, the newly born People's Republic of China (PRC) which proclaimed its willingness to enter into diplomatic relations "with any foreign government willing to observe the principle of equality, mutual benefit and mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity". Although, the two countries possess diametrically opposite systems of government, different ideologies, opposing socio-economic and political structures as well as different "value system" and national psyche", mutual geopolitical necessities and strategic compulsions brought them together. Since then, the relations between the two countries have been more or less stable, and increasingly supporting to each other21.

Pakistan supported the admission of the PRC to the United Nations as well as to other international bodies. When in 1951 the resolution of the General Assembly, which called China the aggressor for having entered the Korean war was put to vote, Pakistan abstained. The Chinese have been very appreciative of such support from Pakistan in those days, when the USA led a severe tirade against the communists. China hoped that its Pakistan connection would serve as a bridge to other Muslim

countries, especially in the Middle East, while Pakistan's objective in strengthening ties with Chinese was to neutralize India.  

The sino-Pakistan friendship offers a good opportunity to delineate upon reliable and durable relationship. This relationship between Pakistan and China has traversed a long path of ups and down. China is a communist country and her communist ideology exercises a great influence on her foreign policy which is governed by two sets of interest, i.e., short term objectives and long term objective. China has deliberately developed her relations with Pakistan on State to State basis, and has refrained from people to people relationship because she apprehends that Islamic fundamentalism may spread through such contact.

China's relations with other countries can be explained on the basis of two conceptual framework. One is based on "Alliance Model" and the other on the "United Front Model". He was analysed China's relations with Pakistan on the "Alliance model". The alliance model sees China's Foreign Policy "as concerned with short problems externally determined and reactive. This is the view which emphasises China's weakness and vulnerability, and points to the threat to China from several powerful adversaries. It sees a concern for security as the dominant theme of China's Foreign Policy. This conception tends to see Chinese objectives as limited and short

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terms and China's International behaviour as consisting primarily of reactions to move to others.

The impact of Chinese design on Sino-Pak relations is reflected in the desire of Chinese leadership to achieve for China a status of a super power. First step in this direction is that China should have a dominant position in Asia. The Indian subcontinent is one of the important areas of the world. In order to be dominant Asian Power, China must have influence in this area. In this area, India being the largest country, is the dominant economic and military power. In terms of political influence, India poses a challenge to the Chinese ambition. China is, therefore, keen to weaken India to achieve this goal. China has been exploiting Pakistan for this purpose.

Russian Factor:

China acknowledged the Soviet Union as a friend, guide and protector during the initial phase of their interaction with Soviet Union, But, by the end of 1950's she began to consider it as a rival, ideological backslider and an unreliable ally. In the 1960s with the perception of a clash of vital national interests the two countries drifted more and more apart from each other. The Sino-Soviet differences further widened over their approach to non-aligned India. Besides, Soviet Union gave foreign aid to India. China was opposed to Soviet foreign aid to the non-aligned countries, including India. The Sino-Soviet differences appeared more clearly at the time of

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1959 Sino-Indian border skirmishes during 1962 Sino-Indian war. India having found her encircled by the Sino-US-Pakistan coalition, was also obliged to move strategically closer to the Soviet Union. The Indo-Soviet friendship went on strengthening. Finding that Pakistan was unhappy over Soviet friendship with India, China wooed Islamabad.

China is interested in countering Russia, spreading its influence in Pakistan. China also knows that the Russian can not move to Pakistan at the cost of India. In view of the fact that China perceives the Soviet Union to be its competitor and a constant source of threat to its security postures, a friendly Pakistan with a unique strategic location in south-west Asia is useful to it in the event of a conventional confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Indian Factor:

India's ideology and development pattern and its importance in world affairs, made China somewhat tense, India adopted the midway and infused democracy and socialism in a common yam and made this yam strong with its steady and consistent struggle for success. Both the super powers smelled, China's willingness to world power and they changed their posture and started taking interest in India, China perceived this thought. Chinese aggression in 1962, and the Pakistan's displeasure at

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the US military aid to India during the war, however, induced Pakistan to come closer to Beijing. US straining relations with India prompted the Pakistan's military ruling elites to forge military and strategic ties with China. K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian expert of defence affairs, is of the view that Pakistan is mainly responsible for bringing in the sub-continent the influence of the external power. A former Pakistani diplomat, Irtiza Hussain has said that "it was misfortune both for the US and India that they "misread Chinese intentions as well as underrated China's strength". India's misreading, however, "opened for the first time the door for a real dialogue between Pakistan and China", and Pakistan to be a party to the Chinese expansionist design. China's constant attempts to isolate the Gulf nations from India, while exploiting Pakistan's religious ties with the Gulf countries council (GCC), the security milieu in the south Asian region might further deteriorate. For, any strategic co-operation between China and the Gulf States is tantamount to weakening India's diplomatic options in dealing with its neighbouring countries. In Pakistan, China found a natural ally against India.

**US Factor:**

The US factor has been relevant to China-Pakistan policy into different situation. Firstly, when China found that Washington was posed against Peking its policy towards Pakistan was affected by Pakistan's relationship with United States.

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28 Ibid. 122.
Though, China was interested in having friendly relations with Pakistan, it remained suspicious about Pakistan's intention. However, Peking persistently pursued its objectives of weaning Pakistan away from the United State to undermine the US influence in south Asia. Secondly, in the wake of the impending Sino-US reapproachment, China abandoned its earlier negative approach towards Pakistan's relationship with the United States. Now China's Pakistan Policy was no more aimed at undermining the US influence in South Asia, but it has such elements in long term\textsuperscript{29}.

**China's objectives in Pakistan:**

The objectives flowing from the determinants of China's Policy towards Pakistan can be identified in two categories viz.,

(1) Objective in terms of ideology, and

(2) Objective in terms of power

(1) **Ideological objectives:**

China emerged as a Communist State. Its Communist ideology was based on Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by Mao-ze-dong. China's communist ideology limits itself in that she has kept it in a low key in its relations with Pakistan. It clearly shows that China has some exceptional objectives in Pakistan. The Chinese leadership under

\textsuperscript{29} Bhola, P.L. Op Cit. No.24 p 52.
Moa-tse-Tung started building China as a model of political and socio-economic development.

Chinese always claimed that China's model alone is suitable for the developing countries of Asia, because like her they are also economically backward, over populated and have been exploited by the western imperialism. India offers another alternative of political and socio-economic development which combined the qualities of the western liberalism, democracy and the Soviet type socialism. In ideological terms India poses a challenge to the Chinese model. Indian model set up, an example for developing countries to follow it for their over all development. This causes a serious concern to China. There is always an ideological conflict between India and Pakistan. The Chinese take deep interest in Pakistan, so that joint pressures could be exerted on India.

(2) Power objective:

Power objectives, subdivided into strategic, political and economic, are as follows:

(a) Strategic objectives:

Chinese geo-strategic significance in South Asia is due to its close proximity to the economically significant and politically violatile regions, i.e., Tibet and Sinkiang. China's hold over them is precarious. Chinese are particularly worried about

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Sinkiang, which is also contiguous to the Soviet Union. China’s relation with India and Russia are no more friendly. Pakistan is in occupation of certain areas of Kashmir, which have immense strategic value. Pakistan occupied Kashmir is located in a region where the boundaries of Soviet Union, China, India and Afghanistan meet together. China’s strategic objectives in Pakistan can be viewed from different angles (i) whether Pakistan poses any threat to China, and (ii) Pak's area can be used to counter Russia and India. In the latter case how far Pakistan can be useful in Chinese offensive against India and Soviet Union as well as how far defending China against the Soviet attack in a conventional warfare.

A possibility of Pakistan being used by Russian against China might have figured in the Chinese calculation. Pakistan occupied a strategical position in Indian sub-continent, particularly, in relation to the security of Sinkiang from Pakistan area Chinese can manage to feeble moves against her security. Keeping this in mind China made good posture of friendliness with Pakistan. On the other side China can use Pakistan against India and Soviet Union as it has acquired an access to Pakistan through the construction of the Karakoram highway and the acquisition of some strategic areas. It gave China a stony foot hold in Pakistan and access to its Arabian sea port of Karachi. It may be so but the opening of the highway boosted trade

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between Pakistan and China, and created an important link between the two countries to be used in case of any emergency.

The strategic importance of the Karakoram highway is very obvious. It links Xingiang with Tibet through Axai Chin. In case of an attack on Pakistan by sea, military aid from China can reach Pakistan through this route. The bridges on the Karakoram highway are capable to carrying light weight tanks and other small weapons. Despite the apparent vulnerability of the road, its usefulness in the time of peace and war is conspicuously apparent\textsuperscript{34}.

In the context of India, Pakistan's geography was helpful in supporting Chinese position in the North-West in Laddakh's critical areas in the rear of the Indian military positions. Thus, Pakistan figures in the defence of China's South flank\textsuperscript{35}.

**Economic objective:**

Sino-Pakistan relations date back to the early 1950 when following a virtual halt in her trade with India, the PRC was looking for new outlets for export of her surplus coal to Pakistan that was badly needed to run the railway and industry, but which was denied by India. There were two reasons for that, firstly, the PRC wanted to establish trade links with other states with a view, "to serve the socialist industrialization in the better way". Secondly, she also recognized in the utility of

\textsuperscript{34} Chaudhri, Mohammad Ahsani: Strategic and Military Dimension in Pakistan- China relations. Pak Horizon December 1986 pp 20.

\textsuperscript{35} Yasmin, Op.Cit. No.31 p 56.
trade in the establishment of normal relations with Pakistan\textsuperscript{36}. Although, trade with Pakistan's total overall export and import is small in proportion with China. Economic relations between Pakistan and China registered a gradual improvement and finally lead to the signing of the first trade agreement between the two states in January 1963. The terms of agreement granted each country most favoured nation treatment in trade, commerce and shipping. The Martime agreement concluded on 2 October 1966 allowed merchant vessel and passenger services\textsuperscript{37}.

**Political objectives:**

China wants to become a super power and in order to achieve this status she must have at least a dominant position in Asia. Asia is the largest continent. There are a number of politically important regions in it. South Asia is one of them. In South Asia, India with its size, population, resources, achievements in scientific, technological and defence field has been given more consideration by China to be a political rival in Asia. Chinese are well aware of India-Pakistan disputes and they have noted that from its very inception. Therefore, China has made a point that to counter India, Pakistan can provide sound ground. In 1950, the relations between china and Pakistan were not so good, but in the early 1960s when Pakistan and China

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p 27.
had reached a political understanding, China started roping Pakistan in its South Asia strategies.\(^{38}\)

After deterioration of Sino-India's relations, China made attempts to develop friendly relations with other Asian countries as well as African countries. All its moves to organize Afro-Asia Conference were to undermine the Indian prestige. Although, Chinese strategies of undermining India's influence by making use of Pakistan misfired, it continues to be a Chinese objective to build up Pakistan as a counterweight against India.

It is well-established fact that China and Russia have historic rivalry in central Asian region. Till 1950, China did not project herself as a rival to Russia, because it was not strong enough at that time and it needed the Soviet support against the Western countries, particularly the United States. Subsequently, as China gained in strength and the Ideological Schism between the two countries started. China had launched a campaign against super powers particularly towards Russia and tried to organize an Afro-Asian Conference. Pakistan become instrumental to China in opposing the invitation to the Soviet Union to attend the proposed Afro-Asian Nations Conference. With a view to undermine the Soviet influence in South Asia. Thus, it has been a Chinese objective to use Pakistan for undermining the Soviet influence.

Chinese are opposed to the extension of the US influence in Asia. Pakistan's entry into the US sponsored military alliance was an indication that Pakistan welcome

the extension of the US influence in South Asia. Thus, Pakistan’s move run counter to
the Chinese policies in South Asia. China decided to gradually wean Pakistan away
from the United States by patients and persistent persuasion. Before March 1969,
China considered USA its major opponent but after the armed clashes along the
Ussuri River in March 1969, it began to consider Russia as the potential enemy.
During 1960-70 USA and China made a less successful try to become friendly but
Chinese hidden agenda of weaning Pakistan from USA never abandoned. Chinese will
not like Pakistan to render help to the United States in the achievement of latter's
policy objectives in South Asia, particularly vis-à-vis China39.

Keeping in view the above facts, it can be concluded that China wants super
power status in world affairs. Its strategic and political objective to use Pakistan as a
grant to counter India, Russia and lesser extent USA and to achieve a better place in
world affairs.

(B) Pakistan's Attitude towards China: Determinants and Objectives

Pakistan's attitude towards China is determined by its geography, economic constraints, domestic compulsions and international political situation. The interest, values and principles involved over a period of time, formulate interest of a nation. It is the foremost duty of policy makers to pursue these interests because responsibility to promote national interest rests on them.

Geographical factors are relatively permanent and basic. Pakistan is strategically located in the Indian continent and the Indian Ocean. Till 1971 it consisted of two parts, i.e., West Pakistan and East Pakistan (Bangladesh). Pakistan is in close proximity to West Asia. It extends from 23.45' N latitude to 36.50' N latitude and 60.55' E longitude to 75.30' E longitude. It has an area of 80,06,940 sq. km. It has a common frontier with Iran and Afghanistan, besides the long border with India. It is separated from the Soviet Union (CIA States) by a small strip of Afghan territory, which is now more than 50 miles in width. Gilgit Hunza-Baltistan areas of Pakistan occupied Kashmir are adjoining to Chinese Sinkiang.

Topographically Pakistan can be divided into three distinct regions, the mountain region, the plateau of Baluchistan and the plain of Indus River. The Northern part of West Pakistan and the Gilgit-Hunza-Baltistan are high altitude and rough terrain areas. There are two main ranges. The Hindu Kush, which runs into
Afghanistan in the West and the Karakoram, which runs through Kashmir into Tibet in the East\textsuperscript{40}.

The mountain region of Gilgit, Huzza-Baltistan extends from the Leh to Yarkand with the construction of Karakoram Highway connecting this region with Chinese Sinkiang facilities for vehicular transport and communication between China and Pakistan have been established\textsuperscript{41}.

Topographically Pakistan is exposed to a threat to its security. The main defect of Pakistan's territory is that it is not sufficiently broad one. A powerful enemy can cut it into two slices by making rapid thrusts from the Western to the Eastern frontier.

President Ayub Khan wrote in his autobiography "Pakistan is wedged in between three enormous powers with the Soviet Union at the top, the PRC in the north-east, and India into South and East. I know of no other small country which has the somewhat dubious distinction of having three such mighty neighbours\textsuperscript{42}.

In 1962, in its editorial, the Pakistan Times observed and advised the Pakistan Government, "Let us seek strength within the campus of our own geography, the Middle-East on the one hand and China on the other\textsuperscript{43}. In the light of this situation it becomes clear that geography of Pakistan is one of the determinants which dictates her relations with China.

\textsuperscript{40} Hasan, K Sarwar: The strategic interest of Pakistan, Karanchi 1983, pp 1-2.
\textsuperscript{41} Youndhusband, F.F.: The northern frontier of Kashmir, New Delhi, 1973, pp 103.
\textsuperscript{43} Pakistan Times, Lahore, 27 May 1962.
Economic Factors:

Pakistan is a developing country and its economy is not sound. Contribution of agriculture, minerals and industry is not up to the maximum level. She depended upon India for its necessities. To reduce this dependence she had established economic and trade relations with Western countries. Western aid was not always without strings. During 1960 Pakistan tended to assert independence in its economic policy formulation. Islamabad started normalization of its relation with communist countries. With the results Western countries began to reduce their foreign aid to Pakistan. They also put hard terms and conditions on their loans. In these circumstances, Pakistan had to diversify in economic relations with communist countries, including China.

A number of considerations promoted Pakistan to strengthen its economic and trade relations with China. Both China and Pakistan were gripped with some type of problem. China got some success in solving these problems, Pakistan could benefit from Chinese experience. When the western aid to Pakistan started declining, china offered such aid at low rate of interest or no interest at all\textsuperscript{44}.

Indian Factor:

The history and geography of a nation provide an orientation to perceive friends and foes. Pakistan has always regarded India as its enemy no.1 India's image in Pakistan has been marked by hatred and hostility\textsuperscript{45}. Rooted in the pre-partition days

\textsuperscript{44} Bhola, P.L.: Pakistan-China Relations, Jaipur, 1986, pp 8.
\textsuperscript{45} Ayubkhan, Mohammad, OP.Cit. No.42, p 48.
of communal disharmony, this image was strengthened by the partition, movement of population, post partition Hindu Muslim riots and Pakistan's domestic compulsion. India's predominance in terms of Geography, culture and ideology, Pakistan has always tried to maintain a posture of rivalry and continued in search of parity with India. As things stand, Pakistan can not have a parity with India, and at most, an attempt is made to create an artificial parity. This Pakistan has done by bringing in an external countervailing power. Since its birth, Pakistan has been seeking involvement of an outside power in South Asian affairs. India has been opposing such attempts. During 1950's, the US gave substantial foreign aid and diplomatic support to Pakistan against India. After 1962 Sino-Indian war, Pakistan began to feel that the US support against India was not enough. Pakistan did not abandon the United States for Chinese support, but in addition it sought Chinese support too. This provided China with a golden opportunity to wean Pakistan away from the US influence and obtain a foothold in South Asia. Kashmir issue, the milestone of Pakistan's national interest, was used by China as a convenient proposition to further her interests⁴⁶.

In 1957, Pakistan's Prime Minister Suhgawardy told the National Assembly that "Most of our foreign Policy depends on the Kashmir question and if they (some Muslim Nations) are with us on Kashmir, they are with us in Foreign Policy". Pakistan has come to regard China as a friend since the time the later showed hostility towards India and was involved in the Kashmir issue.

⁴⁶ Pakistan Times, OP. Cit. No.43 p 22.
**Russian Factor:**

The Soviet Union boundaries meet with those of Pakistan's neighbours, such as China, Afghanistan and Iran. Hence, Russia's relationship with these countries are bound to have some impact on Pak-Soviet relations. Afghanistan's relations with the Soviet Union have been traditionally, but with Pakistan they have not always been friendly. China's relations with the Soviet Union till 1960 were cordial, while with Pakistan relations were formal and correct. The attitude of Pakistan towards China prior to the Bandung Conference was based on block approach. China being a member of communist block, Pakistan leaders could not regard it different from the Soviet Union. Naturally, Pakistanis and the Chinese looked askance at each other. The Soviet Union's endorsement of Afghanistan's stand on "Pakhtunistan" and India's stand on Kashmir were considered as acts of hostility towards Pakistan. Here a cause of worry for Pakistan and hence the Tilt towards China⁴⁷.

**US Factor:**

Pakistan turned towards USA that was already ascertaining the possibility of using sub-continent as a counter poise to communist China as well as Soviet Union in the form of middle East Defence organization. Having realised the presence of strong anti-western opinion in middle eastern countries and the futile attempt to woo India

away from her policy of non-alignment, the USA was left with no option but to decide to establish closer relations with Pakistan⁴⁸.

Pakistan has remained dependent considerably on the United States for economic and military aid as well as diplomatic support. This dependence began with its entry into the western military alliance in mid 1950. On February 5, 1954 Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra formally requested for military aid from the United State honouring the mutual Security Act with the aim to achieve "increased defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of economic stability of Pakistan"⁴⁹. Eisenhower, the then US President, announced his government's decision to extend this aid but it was made conditional on the signing of a mutual defence agreement between Pakistan and USA. This agreement which was signed on May 19, 1954, was a prelude to Pakistan's membership of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954 and Bagdad Pact, renamed (CENTO) in February 1955. This was followed by another bilateral mutual defence agreement between the USA and Pakistan on March 5, 1959. Under these agreement Pakistan became the recipient of a considerable amount of military and economic aid from the USA and became America's most allied ally in Asia⁵⁰.

As a member of the Western Military Alliance, Pakistan had to honour certain obligations. The containment of China had been one of the keynotes of the US interest

⁵⁰ Yasmin, OP. Cit. No.48 p 2.
in Asia. The SEATO and CENTO were mainly directed against China. Pak's membership of this alliance was bound to influence its foreign policy. Thus, on account of the Pakistani dependence on the United States, Pakistan lost some of its independence of action in the field of foreign relations. From the early 1960s Pakistani leaders began to realize that this dependence should be reduced gradually. That is why Pakistan started diversifying its relations with the communist powers. In this process, Pakistan drew closer to China51.

Objectives:

Strategic objectives:

Analysing Pakistan's geographical conditions, it is clear that security is the most important problem of Pakistan. Pakistan's strategic objectives vis-à-vis China can be viewed from two different angles. Firstly, from the view point whether China poses a threat to Pakistan's security directly or indirectly or both ways. Secondly, whether China can help Pakistan in strengthening its security vis-à-vis its other neighbours.

As regard to the first opinion, the nature of rough terrain in Sinkiang Kashmir region minimises the chance of attack from China. According to Young Husband, who undertook expeditions in this region, a small contingent equipped with weapons would be able to hold an attack on Kashmir52. With the construction of the strategically important Karakoram highway, facilities for means of communication

52 Younghusband, OP.Cit No.41, p 104.
and transportation between Sinkiang and Gilgit have been created. Despite the technological advance, the rugged terrain of the Himalayas in the region is still very difficult for a sustained military warfare or even an offensive on a large scale. Moreover, in the present day world, it is not easy to subjugate a country especially in a region where a number of great powers have their strategic interests. At the most China can make an attempt analogous to the one in Laddakh. The objectives of such an attempt can be political and not military victory. This type of threat to its security can not be ruled out by Pakistan. During 1953-1959, China had violated the airspace of Pak occupied Kashmir (PoK). To ensure against a possibility of Chinese attack, Pakistan concluded a boundary agreement with China obviously the Pakistan objective was to turn a potential area of tension into tranquil border\textsuperscript{53}.

China can threaten Pakistan indirectly by using its neighbour Afghanistan, which is a neighbour of both China and Pakistan. It can be used against Pakistan by China if circumstances so permit. Pak-Afghanistan relations are marked by a complex issue, i.e., the "Pakhtun" issue. During 1953-54, when Pakistan joined the western military alliances, both China and Afghanistan were against this move. Although, there is no evidence to show that China tried to use Afghanistan against Pakistan, as mentioned earlier, the Chinese press used to quote antagonistic expressions of the Afghan Press against Pakistan\textsuperscript{54}.

\textsuperscript{53} Jain, B.M.: Nuclear politics in south Asia in search of an alternative paradigm, Jaipur, 1994, pp. 124.
China can bolster Pakistan's security vis-à-vis its other neighbours. As observed earlier, a threat to the security of Pakistan may emanate from its neighbours but Pakistan is always afraid of such a threat mainly from India. The location of Tibet and Sinkiang on the North of Indian sub-continent places China in a position to intervene militarily in a confrontation between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Karakoram highway can be used by China for sending arms and ammunition and forces. In 1971, Indo-Pak war, this highway was used for this purpose.\textsuperscript{55}

**Political objectives:**

Pakistani strategist finds a political challenge mainly from India. Pakistan's objective is to secure a better deal from both superpowers against India by using China. This main objective seems to have been based on three assumptions. First of all, China is competing with the United States and Soviet Union in South Asian region for power and influence. Secondly, both the superpowers support India against China for their different reasons. Thirdly, just as any foreign aid and diplomatic support to India by the superpower is a matter of great concern for Pakistan, it is so for China. In view of the above assumptions, Pakistan thinks that as a reaction to the action of the superpowers China will compel the super powers to be more considerate toward Pakistan to keep on their influence in that country. The pattern of Pakistan's interaction with the United States, the Soviet Union and China during the 1960's proves this. On Pakistan's

\textsuperscript{55} Air Commodor Singh, Jasjit: India and Pakistan, New Delhi (IDSA) 1990, pp. 18-19.
strengthening United States had to modify the Indian stance taken by the Kennedy administration. The Soviet Union had to adopt a balanced approach towards India and Pakistan.

**Economic objectives:**

Pakistan can utilize China for its economic development. Since Pakistan's economy is so much based on western countries, particularly the United States, that this dependence puts a serious limitations on its independent economic development. It is in this context that Pakistan needs economic diversification. This is why their economic relation with China assumes importance. Pakistan governments have been consistently aimed at improving bilateral relations with China. At the same time Pakistan has sought to use China as a pressure on the west and other communist countries to extended more aid to Pakistan. China can be and is a good source of economic and technical assistance to Pakistan particularly in certain important sectors of its economy, transport power and agriculture.

Sinkiang economy develops and the means of communication and transportation between Sinkiang and Pakistan occupied Kashmir improve further, Pakistan can, hopefully look forward to have increased border trade with China. As a long range objective Pakistanis can think that their country can assume a role of an enterpat between China and West Asian and African countries. This is admittedly a distant hope. Sinkiang's economy is still not on the wheels and the quantum of border trade via Karakoram highway is still inconsequential.

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(C) **Pakistan arms build up and China**

Pakistan becoming completely dependent on China for arms supply. It assume that Chinese arms are being supplied to Pakistan in considerable quantities. There is a danger of Pakistan becoming dependent on China for its future arms requirements. China continued to play an important role as a major arms supplier to Pakistan. The close co-operation between them, particularly in the military and strategic field, is a grave concern to India's security. China has been widely involved in Pakistan's arms build up.

Existence of Sino-Pakistan military relations date back to 1963, when Ayub Khan, in an interview with Selig S.Harison, the Washington Post correspondent in Karachi, stated that "if India grows mechanically strong, Pakistan might feel compelled to enter into a military act with China". China fitted into the frame work of aid when the USA imposed an arms embargo on both India and Pakistan during 1965 War. Pakistan had been almost entirely dependent on US military aid since 1954. During the war, Chinese Government was biased in favour of Pakistan signing the impartial posture taken by USA and USSR as actually a show of partiality towards India.

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58 Dixit, Aabhat: Sino-Pak Relations and their implication for India, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, New Delhi, December 1987, pp 1072.
In September 1965, US had suspended all sale and gift supply of arms to Pakistan and India, a decision which was revised in March 1966 to permit the sale of non-lethal weapons on 12 April, 1967 a spokesman of the State Department said in Washington "we have concluded an extensive review of our policy with regard to the provision of military equipment to India and Pakistan and have decided that we will not resume grant military assistance which has been suspended since September 1965. We are, therefore, closing the US Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Pakistan and the US Military Supply Mission in India (USMSMI). This process is expected to be completed by July 1, 1967 in both cases. We have also decided to remove present US Government restrictions on the kinds of spare parts, which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously supplied equipment. Henceforth, we will be prepared to consider, on a case by case basis, all requests for export permits covering the cash purchase of spare parts59.

The fact that in the absence of American replenishment, Pakistan would have been left defenceless within few weeks demonstrated the need of diversity for the source of arms supply. Therefore, Pakistan turned towards Western armament producing nation as well as communist States for arms supply. Very soon it become evident that the NATO countries and USSR were hesitant to sell arms to Pakistan for the fear of alienating India who had been continuously opposing any decision to supply arms to its neighbour. Since the PRC was not inhibited by this consideration,

China decided to supply arms to Pakistan in late 1965. The very first military agreement between Pakistan and China, which bound them into a "strategic military relationship", was signed in July 1966, valued at £120 million. From 1966 to 1968, Pakistan acquired 100 T-59 Tank, 80 Mig-19s (F-6) and 10 Iluyshin 28 bomber. This greatly made up for the losses during the 1965 war. By 1970, "the tanks supplied by China constituted 25 per cent of entire tank force at Pakistan proposal. The aircraft supplied by China constituted 33 per cent of the Pakistani air force's 270 planes, 65 per cent of all interceptor bomber and 99 per cent of its first line modern fighter planes." Commencing with the 1970-73, the Pakistan army acquired 80 F6 Fighter, 64 MIG-19 interceptor 210 T-59 MBT, 50 T-63 light tank another 12 Shanghai PB, 4 Huchwan FAC Naval vessels.

There was a sudden spurt of Chinese weaponry to Pakistan after the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Z.A. Bhutto went to China to discuss Pakistan's defence needs with Chinese leaders and to procure arms. Chau-En-Lai was reported to have said to Bhutto, "We are not ammunition merchants whatever your defence requirement are, they will be met gratis." During that visit Bhutto also raised the matter of signing a defence pact.

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with China, but Chinese leaders were not in favour of formal alliance as China's defence pact with Soviet Union did not work. Therefore, Mr. Bhutto was told that what really mattered was a common interest and not defence pact\textsuperscript{65}.

Between 1972-1980 twenty five military delegations were exchanged between Pakistan and China. While from Pakistan 17 delegations went to China and from China only eight delegations came to Pakistan\textsuperscript{66}. In 1976, Bhutto made move journey in search of arms. He was able to persuade Chairman Hua-kou-feng to include Pakistan's requirements in China's long term defence production plants. In 1976, a joint Sino-Pak Military Committee was established for the first time. On the eve Huang Hua's Pakistan visit in January 1980 when Zia was asked by Newsman whether Pakistan would ask for Chinese weapon, he said, "we do not have to ask Chinese friends for military assistance. They have already been giving military assistance\textsuperscript{67}.

In 1973-76 Pakistan received 112 F 6 Fighter, 28 in 1974-75 and 159 F 55 MBT and 20 F 53 IAPC and 2 Hainan RB, 6 Hu Chwan, 2 Shanghai class Patrol boat. In 1977-79 Pakistan got 24 G-4 Fighter, 81-F-6 Fighter, 150 T-59 MBT, 3 Patrol Boat, 12 FPB ex-Shanghai class 4 Hu-Chwan hydrofoils and 200-130 MM T4, 50 122 MM 5 PH\textsuperscript{68}.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid p 265.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid p 264.
\textsuperscript{68} Sipri Year Book 1991, Table 7.1 p-198, Table 7A.2 p-230, 1986 Table 17.1 p 324.
In 1980 – 82 Pakistan received 20 F-6, A-5 Fantan Aircraft, 150-F-60 MBT, 50
T-60 LT, 80 –122 MM MRS; 2 Hainan RB, 4 Hegu FAC Naval Vessels, and 8 Shshm
surface to surface missile. In 1983-85, Pakistan received delivery of 42 G-5 Fighter,
150 F-60 MBT. The Pakistan Navy also had 9 Huangfen FAC (4 Hy-2 SSM) and 16
Shshm/SSM, 20 CSA-1 SAM. In 1986-88 Pakistan received 98 F-5 Fighter, 60 F-7
Fighter, 35 QSA-5 Fighter, 200 T-59 MBT Tank, Four Huangfen (4 Hy-2 SSM), Four
Hoku (2 Hy-2) and FAC (gun), 12 Shanghai II class from China. In 1988-89 Pakistan
forces received 60-T-7 Fighter, 200 T-59 MBT, 2 Romeo Class submarines and 200
Portable surface to air missile. In 1990 Pakistan received 125 T-59 MBT and M-11
short range ballistic missile. During 1991 Pakistan received Jian Jiao Fighter planes
and 100 portable SAM. During 1993, China exported 40 F-7 PS Fighter, 82 T-85 II
MBTS tanks and 41/100 M-11 Missile. In 1994, Pakistan received 2 K-8 lighter
fighter and 6 K-8 lighter fighter added in 1995. In 1996, Pak Navy received 3
Frigates.

The most important contribution to the Pakistan defence system by China was
the £ 7 million worth establishment of heavy mechanical complex and having foundry
and forage near Taxila, the first such industrial complex established in a non-
communist country by China. This complex has been given Pakistan, the necessary

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71 Bhaskar,C Uday : Role of China in emerging world order, Strategic Analysis, April 1993, p 17.
72 Indian Defence Year Book 1997-98, pp 146-147.
infrastructure to produce ammunition and spares for Chinese equipment. A tank rebuild factory and arms plant with facilities for repairing Mig-19 has also been established with Chinese assistance at Kamra near Attock 75 km from Islamabad. China has also helped Pakistan to set up a tank rebuild factory near Amelpur to replace patent tank in by T-54 and T-59 tanks. In April 1986, the foundation stone of the Heavy Electronics Complex, with Chinese financial and technical assistance, was laid at Hattar in Haripur in the North-west frontier province. It is to produce 500 kilo watt power transformers and associated equipment. China has been sending experts to Pakistan on training mission and a few licensees have also been granted for the production of Chinese weapons.

Traditionally, it has been observed China has supplied over one third of Pakistan's conventional arsenal. Nearly two third of its MBT’s and nearly half of its fighter aircraft fleet have been acquired from China. Further, much of Pakistan's imported light weapons, small arms and ammunitions came from China. Moreover, China has also been collaborating with Pakistan for developing fighters (super 7 and Karakoram-8) main battle tanks (Al-Khalid), M-113 Armed Personnel Carrier and Missile (from RBS MK1 and 2 to their current Hatf series). The Sino-Pak memorandum of understanding for a ten year defence co-operation has become particularly important during the six years following the pressler Amendment affecting American sanctions on defence procurement73.

73 Op.Cit No.72 p 146-47.
The Pakistan-China entente serves China’s strategic interest in South Asian sub-continent, it enhances the Chinese position in the Himalayan region where India is considered to be dominant. India stands as the major obstacle in Chinese progress towards acquiring the status of a great Asian Power. Therefore, friendship with Pakistan could contribute to obstructing that factor. The most significant portion of the ever growing Sino-Pak friendship is that Pakistan could contribute to the global designs of China against India. So, China has not only provided Pakistan with sophisticated weapon, but also providing military technology, spare parts and many more items. She does not consider any international treaty in this regard. It is a proved fact that all these modern and sophisticated weapons, which Pakistan has acquired, have been used against India. This is evident in case of 1965, 1971 and recent proxy war of Pakistan. To counter this design with which China wants to disturb balance in this region, Indian Defence Planners have to look into this nexus more deeply and have to take every possible step to stop them creating security problems.
**Mutual Security Interests**

In the contemporary frame, Sino-Pak friendship can be singled out as having shown a remarkable viability, considering the fact that an inherent asymmetry of resource base, ideological heritage, political structure and social perspective would neatly divide China and Pakistan into opposites, which are obviously not made for each other. At the bilateral level, their intimacy continues to signify the durability of ties on the basis of perceived advantage and importance to each other. Starting with a border agreement in principal, which almost ran parallel to the escalation of tension on the Sino-Indian front, the relationship has come to acquire a mystique of a rare survival quality witnessed in relationship between neighbouring countries. China's security interests have changed from alignments and isolationists postures to a declaration of selective non alignment. Such apparent inconsistencies notwithstanding, in the specific case of Pakistan, the foundations of their diplomatic relationship have become increasingly firm and stable.

Sino-Pak links have a direct bearing on India. To that extent, it inculcates a lingering suspicion that the link up serves as a axis. Not only the peculiar circumstances at its origin but also the process of growth, transcending the various outstanding constraints, which have governed their bilateral interaction, a reactive Indian element. Since an important adjunct of China's strategy in this region is aimed at containing India. Pakistan has also sought the kind of countervailing authority
against India which China has been readily willing to provide. Predictably, this surcharged motivation of both ensures somewhat more than a transient stake in foregoing close ties. Infact, offering support to Pakistan, the China has accumulate a net gain of comparable strategic advantage vis-à-vis India.

During 1959-1962 both Pakistan and China probed into each other intentions and realised that there was no real clash of vital interest between the two countries. After the Sino-Indian war (1962) their convergence of interest further increased in term of their hostility towards India. They were also moved by the consideration that their friendship would exert pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union, who in pursuance of their global and Asian strategies, did not want to see India weakened.

In enumerating the shifts in the Chinese perception one finds that in the fifties US-Pakistan relationship evoked concern in China but on the surface, it maintained correct diplomatic relations with Pakistan. China could not fail to notice the growing military relationship between Pakistan and the United States and the shifting stance of the former towards it. From 1954 onwards, Pakistan began to vote along with US for the postponement of the consideration of the question of the Chinese representation in the U.N. Understandably, China found it difficult to be reconciled with Pakistan’s decision to join the Baghdad pact. The Chinese publicly expressed their disapproval.

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74 Hussain, T.Karki: A perceptual from work of Sino-Pak relations, China and South Asia, 1986 pp 175-176.
by commenting that Pakistan had placed itself in the position of being used as a base for US to threaten China. 

In the context of an obvious pro-American shift in Pakistan's policy during the meeting between Chou-en-lai and Pakistani premier Mohammad Ali in April 1955 at Bandung conference of Afro-Asian countries served as an important exercise in public relations at the highest level. Chou-en-lai reacted in the following words: "Although, Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China, Pakistan had no fear that China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that we achieved a mutual understanding...". The Prime Minister Mohammad Ali further assured that if the US should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a global war Pakistan would not be involved in it. He said Pakistan would not be involved in it just as it was not involved in the Korean war. Chou-en-lai said, "I am grateful to him for this explanation, because through these explanations we achieve a mutual understanding. This creates agreement and harmony amongst us in understanding each other on collective peace and co-operation". After the 7 October 1958 Military coup, the Martial Law Administration under Ayub Khan continued the pro-US policy of the previous regime for a couple of years. Sino-Pak relations came under stress due to the US-Pak ties. On 5 March, 1959 US and Pakistan entered into a "Mutual Security Pact", that was more or less directed against

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77 Meldi, Niloufer: Sino-Pakistan relations: Historical Background, Pakistan Horizon, December 1986, pp 61-62.
the socialist countries. China had further occasion to stress the increasing US-Pak link up when Pakistan allowed a Chinese Haj Mission from Taiwan to visit the country in June, 1959. Pakistan's hostile attitude towards China had worsened. Chinese were extremely sensitive about Pakistan's stand on its representation in the United Nations and its ambivalence with regard to Taiwan. Subsequently certain changes in the objective condition enable China to reappraise its relations with Pakistan in a different light. Chinese friendship with Pakistan was reinforced by the emerging coalescence of American strategic interest in the region.

Probably strategic and political considerations did more to influence the course of relation between China and Pakistan than any other factor. Pakistan supported the admission of China to the United Nations and to other international bodies. During Chau-en-lai's Pakistan visit in February 1964, President Ayub Khan said, "we are of the view that the world organization will not be fully representative of mankind unless the People's Republic of China which represent almost one fourth of the human race, take its rightful place in it."

With regard to Korean crisis in 1956, Pakistan votes in the general assembly of the UNO in favour of China. Pakistan also supported China on Tibetan issue. In this context Pakistan has entered into a provisional agreement with China on 2 March 1963, having keen desire for peace on their border. The Tashkant Agreement which

79 Ibid, p 123.
brought the 1965 hostilities between India and Pakistan to a close, was viewed dimly in Beijing. Pakistan's participation in such an agreement, which China describe as a 'dirty trick' a Joint US-Soviet collision against China, was totally opposed by the Chinese.80

From the Chinese side, the turning point in their mutual relations with Pakistan was mainly influenced by the rapid deterioration in Sino-Indian relation and the accompanying shift in the regional balance of power. The aftermath of active confrontation between the former friends logically cemented their existing ties. However, precariously began, just as an equation between China's unresolved dispute with India and the outstanding Indo-Pakistan controversy over Kashmir even consciously underlined in the form of an embryonic strategic consensus.81

The Pakistan-China strategic interest in South Asia: Till date India and Pakistan have been engaged in five military encounters and China has also been involved in the misadventures of Pakistan with India. It is generally admitted that Pakistan has all along been pre-occupied with need to establish parity with India. On China's part it has been more than willing to lend support to this objective of Pakistan by the provision of incentives of high visibility. China's alleged transfer of nuclear technology in terms of designing of the reprocessing plant and testing can also be treated as a demonstration of its tactical backing of Pakistan's National obsession of

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81 Hussain, T.Kirki, OP.Cit. No.74 pp 187.
Matching Indian Power. China was in a position to raise objections to India's nuclear programme. However, it offered Pakistan its full support against "all interferes including nuclear blackmail". Coupled with its substantial military aid to Pakistan since the 1965 Indo-Pak war over Kashmir, the nuclearisation of Pakistan. Sino-Pak strategic relationship has come to underpin the linkage between conventional and nuclear factors in relation to the outstanding diplomatic interest of the Beijing regime which over a long term would obviously be uneasy at the prospect of a nuclear South Asia with the ultimate option residing in the hands of the subcontinent's perpetual rivals which have yet to reconcile their differences.

Indeed, the India factor in China's response can not be underestimated. It may be worth while to remember that Chinese had moved closer to Pakistan in 1964, when they switched their position on Kashmir by expressing their support for a plebiscite. Earlier, China has entered in a provisional agreement with Pakistan on the boundary between Sinkiang and the part of Kashmir, west of the Karakoram Pass which was administered by Pakistan. The Chinese media hailed the agreement as a starting point in the development of Sino-Pak friendship and an important milestone for peaceful co-existence. This agreement, in fact, was one way of pressurising India on their own border dispute with her. Sino-Pak border agreement was a value-added initiative for Beijing's long term goals for consolidating its regional presence further southwards.

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82 Hussain, T.Kirki, OP.Cit. No.74 pp 146.
through communication infrastructure in an area of geostrategic importance\textsuperscript{83}. The much publicized network of strategic Highway (Karakoram Highway) which linked Chinese Xinjiang with Pak-occupied Hunza Valley, meant the opening of a direct bridge for supply of arms to Pakistan which would remain undisturbed in any further contingency. For the Chinese, domestically, the highway opened up a strategic link between Xingiang and occupied Tibet through Akasi Chin. This development posed a more serious threat to India's security\textsuperscript{84}. The implicit alliance between China and Pakistan took a shape of nexus and India was faced with the dilemma of a potential military collision with its two most powerful neighbours.

The Pakistan-China entente serve China's strategic and political interest in the south Asian sub-continent. Besides giving that country the necessary foothold to serve as a counter force to Russia in this region, it enhances the Chinese position in the Himalayan region where India is considered to be dominant. India stands as the major obstacle in Chinese progress towards acquiring the status of a great Asian power. Therefore, strategic link with Pakistan could contribute to the global design of China against India, USSR, USA and other potential threats from third world countries. But the Pakistan-China diplomatic, political and military friendship seems to be integrated to serve one underlying purpose of isolating and neutralizing India\textsuperscript{85}.

\textsuperscript{83} Husain, T. Karki, World Focus, August 1998, Vol 19, No.8, pp 12.
\textsuperscript{84} Dixit, Aabha,OP.Cit. No.80, pp 1074
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid. 1075
It could be predicted that the value of Pakistan friendship would not be diminished for China. By now, the latter had come to fully endorse the Anglo-American strategy for containing Soviet Union from gaining access in the vicinity of vitally up held sea lanes through Gulf, connecting Asia with Europe. Implicitly, China was an equal claimant of building up new relationship with Islamic countries of the middle-east region. Now that Sino-US interests had found convergence in many fields such as trade including some kind of military association, Pakistan's utility in promoting China in another strategic theatre of intense superpower rivalry was an additional incentive. Earlier, Pakistan had played some part in the break through between the American and the Chinese. Indeed that courier role was in no way negligible in view of the delicacy involved in transforming their sworn enmity into a tactic alignment.

Mutual security interest between Pakistan and China are build on the basis of enlightened self-interest when the interest of nations coincide, there is a greater co-operation, and when their interests clash, there is a less co-operation or no co-operation at all. The contingencies of international politics and the geo-strategic compulsions have brought China and Pakistan closer to each other.

Pakistan by itself cannot be a major threat to India's security, which is why it is constantly attempting to acquire allies. China shares with Pakistan a common hostility towards India. India's main security problem arises from China's known bellicosity, her desire to neutralise India and extension of her hegemony in the sub-continent.

86 Hussain, T.Kirki, OP. Cit. No.83, pp 13