METHODOLOGY

Historic-Analytical method is employed as principal tool of the research project. It takes a holistic approach, i.e., it has analysis of the under issues involved with an integral approach instead of examining various issues piecemeal. The research work has mainly depended upon secondary source materials. But China being a communist country, there is no free and reliable flow of information as such and when it comes to the strategic aspect. This has been a major handicap faced by the researcher. The present study is primarily based on statements and documents of official nature, it is also based on Pakistani, Indian and the western sources as well as on magazines, periodicals journals, newspapers and books I have tried to make my own assessment of the situation in interpreting the press reporting.

Dr.D.S.Bajia has been a rich and rewarding experience for me. I discovered the soft and sympathetic heart conceded behind the face of his stern looks. Without his ungrudging help and guidance, I would not have been able to complete my thesis today. I shall always remain obliged to him.
Sino-Pakistan nexus attracted attention from diverse quarters for various reasons. It has been basically directed toward throwing the equation obtaining on the subcontinent off balance. Among many factors which have influenced the course of Indian security in last five decades, the most crucial has been the Sino-Pak nexus.

India is a country of lofty mountains and mighty rivers. The location of India in the southern peninsula of the Asian continent and the triangular shape tapering southward of Indian ocean, give it a distinctive character. Its neighbours are China and Nepal in the North, Pakistan in the north-west, Maynmar (Burma) and Bangladesh in the east. The "Islamic Republic of Pakistan is bordered by India in the west. It can be said that India has geographical superiority over Pakistan\(^1\). They were hairnet from each other in resources, products, peoples, cultural background and language. China shares a 2400 miles long boundary with India. Sino-Indian boundary become alive boundary and serious friction at various points on it started in 1959\(^2\).

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India and Pakistan emerged on the world map as sovereign independent countries in August 1947, but their relations are still strained. The religious fanaticism continue to be one of the main characteristics of Pakistan which is symbolized by the official name given to the country "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" and by the strategy she had adopted towards Kashmir. Infact, this fanaticism has widened the gulf between India and Pakistan. The people of Pakistan consider India a country of Hindus and in their opinion secularism in India is a "hoax" because they feel that muslims are not treated at par with the Hindus. Pakistan at its birth did not find itself in a vary congenial politics and security environment.

Both the countries feel threatened by each other and have been strengthening their defence, spending major portion of their budgets on armed forces. Infact, neither India nor Pakistan can afford a war. But by now, they have fought four major wars shattering their economy and sacrificing thousands of human lives. The gainer from these wars seems to be the superpowers and China, the supplier of arms and ammunitions. Between 1947 to 2000 there have been several ups and downs between these two countries marked by many events. The recent conflict of Kargil is one of them. Pakistan's search for security and for matching with India had led to seek alliance with the China. Pakistan has forged

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an alliance to get economic and military aid. Pakistan also made its efforts to assert its identity through its Islamic connections.

Pakistan was hit hard in 1965 and 1971 war against India. In 1971 war it is estimated that Pakistan lost half of its Navy, a quarter of its air force and one third of its army. Besides security and military threat Pakistan also forced secure social and economical problem after war\(^4\). China has also played a vital role in Pakistan's pursuit of military, economic and nuclear programme. The Sino-Pak relations are rooted in the mutual self-interest derived from geo-politics, the desire to contain India and to play major role in south Asia.

The term of security has widened connotation than is believed generally. It is not only merely concerned with defending the territories, building armies, importing and manufacturing sophisticated weaponry of a nation, but is also concerned with political and economic stability, ethno-centric conflicts, cultural incompatibilities, divergent domestic structures, as well with national core values. Thus, it relates to all the aspect of nationalism, regionalism and internationalism. Therefore, there is a need to have an elective approach to understand all the nuances of various dimensions of security\(^5\).

Analysis of the threat perception of India and Pakistan, indicates the contour of problems. In case of India, the first objective of her

strategy had been to neutralize Pakistan's anti Indian propaganda, especially regularly its claim to Kashmir and also had been directed to neutralize Chinese threat.

The Sino-Pak nexus seems to have been built at Bandung in April 1955 and the development was rather quickly. Leaders of the both countries exchanged visits and made cultural declaration after Bandung conference. As a result, the Pakistan's scholarly journals began to write about China. During one year after Bandung six articles were published in Pakistan Horizon alone. Chinese strategic objectives in Pakistan can be identified as her security interest in South Asia; China’s relations with India were not friendly, Chinese strategic objective in Pakistan can be viewed from two different angles viz., (i) Whether Pakistan poses a threat to China's security directly or indirectly, and (ii) Whether it can be used by China in bolstering its security vis-à-vis India. Pakistan was cultivated by China, mainly for two reasons, First, in the conduct of Chinese global policies, Pakistan was seen as a link to the middle east, Second, in the regional initiatives, Chinese strategy was to forge closer links with south Asian countries to create a sub-regional balance to counter India’s pre-eminence in south Asia.

China's relations with Pakistan have generated stresses and strains in the latter's relations with the superpowers. The American decision to

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terminate military assistance to Pakistan in 1965 and the Soviet Union decision to assist India dismembering her in 1971, can not be fully understood without reference to these powers anxiety over China's growing influence in Pakistan. Sino-Pakistan relations are thus entangled in a much larger web of relationships among Pakistan, India, China, the United States and the Soviet Union. This complex interaction is therefore, a recurring theme in this thesis, involving considerable reference to south Asian polities and the goals and strategies of the great powers with respect to this region and India's security concerns.

Why were China and Pakistan drawn together? In this, it is pertinent to note that writing in 1967, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan observed that India's hostility toward these two countries had given them a "fundamental common interest", so that it was in Pakistan's national interest to seek China's friendship and in China's national interest to support Pakistan. It clearly sounds the making nexus between the two against India. Security considerations and the compulsions of power politics have always been a vital factor in the development of Sino-Pakistan relations. But the nexus has, now, matured to a point where India's role as the common enemy is no longer essential to its sustenance.8

India stood as an obstacle to the path of China's long cherished aspiration for achieving the status of undisputed great Asian power. Moreover, China was also worried about the growing influence of Russia in this region due to its close friendship with India. Therefore, the basic thrust of the Chinese policies in this region has been to cut down Indian influence.

China's counter strategy assumed various forms. First it took upon itself the task of strengthening Pakistan's armed forces and set it on a collision course with India. Secondly, China started forming close ties with India's neighbours and to wean them away from India. This was a part of a comprehensive Chinese strategy of isolating India by forming independent centres of power around India viz., Pakistan, Bangladesh, Srilanka and Nepal. It is in this background that China uses military and economic aid to the various south Asian countries and an instrument of diplomacy and a mean to strengthening its Pakistan vis-à-vis India.

India's stand as the major obstacle in the path of Chinese progress toward occurring the status of great power in Asia. China felt concerned with the growing role and power of India within the region and outside. India's growing importance in the third world, NAM and its impressive development in the field of science and technology as well as its military potential were matter of concern to China. China was particularly worried about the possible consequences of India's emergence as the major power in south Asia.
Sino-Pakistan strategic alliance with Pakistan and political backing to even the genocide committed by Pakistan armed forces in Bangladesh, the scathing attack on the Taskand agreement as USSR-India play the support to ultra left and secessionist groups in India and the constant military pressure and threatening language have all contributed for worsening Sino-Indian relations on the resultant Chinese drive to cut down Indian levels and spheres of influence.

It is in this back drop that China uses military and economic aid to various south Asian countries as an instrument of diplomacy and a mean to strengthen it's position vis-à-vis India. China's role in Tibet, China opened communication and transportation links between Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Xinjiang on the one hand and between Nepal and Tibet on the other ultimately linking Nepal and Pakistan.

Although there is an inherent asymmetry in resource base, ideological outlook and a divergent socio-political framework. The Sino-Pak nexus over the last five decades symbolized continuity and stability with the vortex of Asian region. The nexus has survived and prospect through numerous changes in domestic regions and amidst varying international circumstances. Sino-Pak partnership is, of course, rooted in the mutual self-interest derived from geo-strategy, the desire to contain India. Both the parties are aware of the limitations of their
partnership in strategic terms, yet continue to drive the partnership as usual.

Another very important dimension of the increasing Sino-Pak friendship is their mutual cooperation in the field of nuclear, conventional weaponry and missiles. There are certain distinguishing features and uniqueness in Chinese strategy and arms aid transfer to Pakistan and other countries. Firstly, despite its own domestic difficulties and inadequate production facilities, China has never failed to keep its commitment in supplying arms and ammunition. This has proved the dependability of China as an ally and has placed it in good stead not only to Pakistan but also to other third world countries. Secondly, the money values of the Chinese military aid to Pakistan is misleading because they were given on friendly price. But the Chinese price is low as compared to other similar weapons for the west. Chinese interest to transfer arms to Pakistan lies in that the military collaboration would allow development of great link with Pakistan, and also that the arms supply to Pakistan present a showcase of potential export to third world.

China has played a very important role in Pakistan's nuclear programme. In order to enhance her position in the Indo-Centric South Asian Region, she has developed close nuclear relations with Pakistan.

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The nuclear issue in the south Asian context essentially revolves around the bilateral, India-Pakistan relation. The 1976 Sino-Pak agreement of nuclear collaboration helps Pakistan to come at par with India in the nuclear field. Thereby minimizing India's influence as a nuclear power in the region. In September 1986, Pakistan again signed a nuclear accord with China which gave a new dimension to the existing nexus between the two countries. This accord has established to Pakistan's secret nuclear links with China\(^\text{10}\). In January 1990, a Pakistani military delegation led by Gen. Aslam Beg went to Beijing to negotiate the purchase of M-9 missile as part of more general discussion on expanded Sino-Pakistan defence cooperation\(^\text{11}\). The US intelligence sources noted that M-11 mobile missile launchers have arrived in Pakistan alongwith missile frames for practice\(^\text{12}\).

Sino-Pak nexus serves China's strategic and political interest in South Asian Region. The most important part of the ever growing Sino-Pak friendship is that Pakistan could contribute to the global design of China against USA, Russia, India and other potential threat from Third World countries.

Beijing's interest towards Bangladesh in the region is China's design to fastening independent centres of power on India's borders.


Such a policy of political support and modest economic assistance as well as military aid could be utilized by China's vis-à-vis India.

Srilanka, a small island near the southern most tip of the Indian peninsula strategically located in Indian Ocean, and having close proximity with India attracts China towards the Island.

It is with regard to this structural aspect that China assumes a threatening position to regional security. The perceived threat of India as a hegenmonistic nation had led and continues to do so for the smaller states to join hand with China against India – thereby destabilizing the security balance on the attempt to achieve a balance in the region. This aspect became apparent approval strongly during the period starting from 1962 with the growth and development of alliance with Pakistan.

The most important sector of the region in term of size, population and politically is India. This Indo-centric made India the prime target to compete and hostility both by the regional and the extra-regional powers. The early promise of close Sino-Indian relations was based on anti-colonization and a species of Asian nationalism founded on the rock of conflicting national interest in the Himalayan west lands. India's sympathy for the Tibetan freedom fighter, the sanctuary provided to the Dalai Lama and his entourage and India's close ties with the Russia further irritated the Chinese leadership on the other hand, the dominant Indian view that China was an expansionist nation.
The strategy in North Sector showed that how China shared, fruits of aggression in that sector. Chinese strategy was to capture large tracts of the land of a neighbour. Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Pakistan played a more dubious role by giving China a vital strength of territory east to Kashmir cease fire line according to their border agreement. This was immediate to south Karakoram Pass and this butterised China's contention that the traditional customary boundary line between Sinkiang and the Indian sub-continent runs along the Karakoram watershed and not along the west of Aghill mountains. An extension of this principle on the other side of Karakoram gave China the territory in Laddakh (Akasi-Chin) which it had always wanted. Both Sino-Pak shared the fruits of aggression by parceling out Indian territory according to the agreement relating to Northern Sector of the Sino-Pak border and legitimisation the aggression at both. The Karakoram road system apart from giving China an easy access to Indian Kashmir, provided Beijing with an opportunity to leap frog into Indian ocean, the strategic Gulf region and Africa.

Thus, the analysis of the security at logical, perceptual and political level opens up the valuable points of security in the South Asian region. Chinese interest in Himalayan States become another cause of threat for the security in region.

Sino-Pak development ground the security complex in the region, the international system as a whole contains a large number of security complexes, some of which intersect or overlap, and some of which fail inside each other. Because these complicated patterns, the boundary of any particular country may be difficult to define with precision and the use of concept requires sensitivity of those status which occupy position in one or more complex. The link which is together a security complex may be of many type-geographical, political, historical, economical, cultural and states outside the complex may play a major role without it, without the complex itself being centered of their security concerns.

**SINO-PAK COLLISION**

In the beginning, Pakistan's relations with China were not cordial. During the Korean crisis, Pakistan supported the US and that strained her relations with China. But in 1953-54, Pakistan's foreign policy took a sudden turn, when Pakistan aligned herself with the western countries, there was no strong protest from China. On the other hand they had accepted it "mildly". The Chinese correctly asserted that Pakistan's membership of SEANTO was only to increase her military strength against India.

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At the Bandung conference 1955 an understanding was reached between the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou-En-Lai and the Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra. At Bandung we succeeded in removing the doubts of his Chinese counterpart about Pakistan motives of joining western military alliances\(^\text{16}\). From 1955 onwards, relations between China and Pakistan started improving. During the Sino-Indian war, Pakistan's sympathizers were with the Chinese Government. On 2 March 1963, Sino-Pak Border agreement was signed in Peking by the Foreign Ministers of China and Pakistan. The Indian Government strongly condemned the agreement and charged the Chinese Government with the intention of destroying the amity which had been developing between India and Pakistan as a result of the joint ministerial level talks between the two countries on Kashmir and related matters.

Why was China in a hurry to arrive at such an agreement? The obvious answer is that since she had been branded in the west as an aggressor, she was interested in changing that image and presenting herself as a reasonable and friendly nation\(^\text{17}\). The timing of the agreement (1963) was controlled by China with a view to sabotage the Indo-Pak talks which had registered some progress at the time.

By signing the agreement both the governments succeeded in removing the "irritants" from their relations. It also stabilized the

\(^{16}\text{Goswami, B.N.: Pakistan and China – A study of their relations, Bombay 1972, pp 41.}\)

\(^{17}\text{Bwarkadas, Kajori: Ten years of Freedom, Bombay, 1963, pp.236-237.}\)
position of Pakistan on Kashmir. It compelled the Chinese Government to reject unequivocally the contention that Kashmir belonged to India and both the government wanted to convince the world that Pakistan and China could solve their disputes through peaceful means while India preferred cohesive methods for solving the disputes with the neighbouring countries. One can easily understand the intentions of the Pakistani Government. On the one hand, Pakistani leaders were saying that it was their sincere desire to improve relations with India, while on the other hand they concluded a border agreement with China. After the agreement a broad understanding developed between the two countries and Pakistan started preparing once again to use force to grab Kashmir. She was sure about the Chinese help in the event of a war with India\textsuperscript{18}.

Sino-Indian friendship was one of the main planks of Nehru's foreign policy. "A powerful neighbour is a potential energy" is a saying as old as Kautilya. But the leaders of India as well as communist China developed sympathies between themselves having suffered a common experience of white colonialism for more than a century, despite their divergent ideologies. Even in the context of decision of communist China to establish its hegemony over Tibet in the 1950, although Tibet had enjoyed the status of a buffer state between India and China.

\textsuperscript{18} Bindra. pp.36.
China might be prepared to acquiesce in the Indian claim to the MacMahon line. India, also for the first time secured the right for establishing a permanent consulate General in Lhasa, which would provide a good listening post for gathering information about the development in the extensive Trans Himalayan plateau. China's tactics acceptance of the Indian takeover of Twang in Feb. 1951 and her omission to raise the issue of India's frontier activities in NEFA area at the conference table in Peking, convinced Nehru about the conciliatory attitude of China towards India's desire to reach up to the Himalayan crest line, i.e., the MacMahon line and make it the de facto boundary. This was quite in contrast with the attitude of Nationalist China, which had officially challenged the validity of Indo-Tibetian Border Agreement of July 1914. On the other hand, India's diplomatic support to China on various international issues in the U.N. and others international conferences strengthened the foundation of friendship between India and China during the early fifties. India China border dispute an open issue since September 1959, the Government of India sought the help of Sir Olaf Caroe to agree its case for the MacMahon line\textsuperscript{19}. Since the late 1960s China has been a important factor in the global strategic balance, with a significant influence upon the competition between Soviet Union and United States. Although

objectively weaker than either the Soviet Union or the United States, China is powerful enough to have a "swing value" in the global balance, and Peking's alignment in the East-West competition has been of intense concern to both Moscow and Washington.

Notwithstanding its growing importance in the global strategic balance and the world economy, China remains essentially a regional Asian power, seeking to advance its regional security and economic interest. Despite recent improvements, differences of both interests and outlook between China and its Asian neighbours, coupled with the prospect that China's economic and military power will increase substantially over the next few decades, continue to complicate Peking's relations with the rest of the region.

China's foreign policy since 1949 has embodied a complex mixture of change and continuity. Its alignments, resources, degree of involvement in world affairs, and satisfaction with the international system have all changed, sometimes dramatically, over the last thirty-five years. But there remain notable continuities in China's view of the world. Peking has consistently been concerned with maintaining its security and sovereignty against threats from abroad, mistrustful of stronger allies, and deeply ambivalent about turning abroad for economic assistance, advanced technology, or modern institutions. These continuities are likely to persist well into the post-Mao Era.
China will pursue its own independent pasture. China will avoid any extensive involvement in the politics of the non-aligned movement. While part of both Asia and the developing world, in other words, China will stay somewhat aloof from both, while attempting to avoid international isolation, China should never become too dependent on any foreign protector or benefactor. Instead, China will try to preserve its international independence and initiative to the greatest degree possible. China will over the rest of the country be neither a close friend nor a bitter foe of the United States. In many areas, the parallel interests of China and the United States will continue to bring the two countries together. In particular, Peking and Washington can be expected to maintain a common desire for peace and stability in Asia, for containment of Soviet expansion in the region, and for mutually beneficial economic, scientific, and cultural relationships\textsuperscript{20}.

India's security problems would inevitably have to take into account China as a critical factor. China's policies, strategies and tactics had exercised and would continue to exercise a major impact on India's security. China identified four basic issues as being of importance in evaluating this impact. These were (i) the Chinese perception of India and the operationalization of China's involvement in areas of vital strategic concern to India; (ii) the Chinese role in the global system; and

(iii) China's military modernization. This was felt that though there was no immediate possibility of a conflict between China and India and there were encouraging signs from Beijing showing a desire to improve Sino-Indian relations, there was an inherent basic rivalry between India and China which was a long term factor. Both were a major Asian countries and their cultures had historically, influenced development in the rest of Asia. It was pointed out that China's policies had, from the very beginning, been formulated with a view to realizing its ambition to become a world power and to assume the leading role in Asia. These ambitions, partly realised, continued to be the guiding force of Chinese foreign policy. China had never lost sight of its long term goal. Thus, China's global and regional ambitions might, in a long term, run counter to India's interests.

 Basically, apart from the border dispute which did not, as yet, show any signs of being resolved, there was also the problem of China's refusal to accept the integration of Sikkim with India and its support (though much reduced) to insurgencies in North-East China interaction. China's proclaimed desire to modernize its armed forces, defence modernization had taken a back seat and economic goals were being given priority. It was, therefore, held that in the next decade or so, no conventional military threat would be passed by China to India, except in the eventuality of strengthening of the Sino-US strategic parallelism.
However, the fact that China possessed nuclear weapons and was acquiring a sea-based nuclear deterrent would obviously influence India's interaction with that country. It was argued that though there was no prospect of a direct-threat by China to use nuclear weapons against India.

It was felt that India could counter China and minimize the Chinese influence in its immediate neighbourhood by increasing cooperation with the south Asian countries. If India could build a climate of trust and friendship with her neighbours it would obviate their perceived need for using China as a countervailing factor. In south-east Asia India's purpose would be served by the emergence of independent centres of power. India cooperation with the Indo-Chinese countries and with the Asian countries should, therefore, be strengthened. Efforts should also be made to have more effective cooperation with Burma, which was particularly vulnerable to Chinese pressure.