The strategic interest of Pakistan is an outgrowth of the worldview of Pakistan leadership, whose perception is influenced by its geography, the nature of its nationalism and its economy. Pakistani leadership, whether democratic or military bureaucratic, assigns an important role to China, while in the South Asian affairs it seeks Chinese involvement, but in the internal affairs of Pakistan it does not want China to play a vital role. China’s attitude towards Pakistan is primarily conditioned by geopolitical considerations. Communist ideology and Chinese traditions are, no doubt, important determinants of China’s strategic interest, but they are kept in a low key vis-à-vis Pakistan. In South Asia, India is considered by the Chinese leadership as the principal contradiction, because it is a rival for influence in the third world. This is also because New Delhi has close relations with Moscow, which is considered by the Chinese policy makers as the main enemy in the international setting. Pakistan’s anti-Indianism helps Peking undermine India’s influence in South Asia, which is a more important objective of China than realizing revolutionary objectives in Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan-China relationship, like any other bilateral relationship, is a process of
complex interaction of the determinants and objectives of the strategic interest of the two countries.

Connected with the crisis of national identity, the problem of security claims prime attention of Pakistani policy makers. The problem of security stems from the geographical factor which are as constraints in Pakistan's strategy. In terms of security calculations India, the Soviet Union and to a degree Afghanistan engage the attention of Pakistani policy makers, while in the case of India, Pakistani leadership has always been apprehensive about a threat to Pakistan's security, Islamabad's evaluation of the Russian and the Afghan factor has been changing. The United States has been taken into consideration by the Pakistani leadership as a factor bolstering Pakistan's security. Apart from the above factor, Pakistani security calculations are conditioned by the South Asian context in particular and the international political situation in general which undergoes a change from time to time.

The role of geography is most keenly felt ground in the north-western area of the Indian sub-continent where India, Pakistan, China and the Soviet Union have their vital interests. The North-Eastern area of the Indian sub-continent forming the erstwhile East Pakistan was also an integral part of Pakistan's geography, but the Pakistani elite remained indifferent to it. Further, we find that in South Asia, the confrontation between India and Pakistan has become a common
feature, and Kashmir has been a keynote of Pakistan’s foreign policy and the main bone of contention between New Delhi and Islamabad. Between 1947, 1971 and 1999, India and Pakistan fought four wars-three wars on Kashmir in 1947, 1965, 1999, and 1971, which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. In this overview of the South Asian political context, we observe that India is considered to be a formidable factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy.

The history of Pakistan-China relations can be traced as far back as 1949. Pakistan’s China policy during the 1950s was directionless. Sometimes Pakistan showed as inclination to be a friend of China and at others it took steps, which were inimical to the Chinese interests. But China kept in view a role for Pakistan in its Asian and Global policy and an element of consistency in China’s Pakistan policy was visible.

China adopted a pragmatic approach to its relations with Pakistan. In the matter of normalization of relations with Pakistan and subsequently in strengthening their relations, China proceeded step by step. A meaningful relationship between Pakistan and China developed on a quid-pro-quo basis. China changed its attitude towards Kashmir and Pakistan revised its stand on Chinese representation in the United Nations. The signing of the Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement in March 1963 became a watershed in Pakistan China relations. Therefore, cooperation and collaboration between
the two countries increased. They supported each other on issues impinging on their national interests and matters of common concern. Besides this, Pakistan china signed a number of agreements to strengthen their relations. Between 1963 and 1965, they raised the level of their interaction in political, economic and cultural fields within the limitations of their policies.

During the Indo-Pakistani war on Kashmir in September 1965, China not only charged India with extending the area of conflict, but also threatened to open a second front in a bid to relieve pressure on Pakistani forces. Peking gave an ultimatum to India to remove the alleged military built up on the Sikkim border interestingly enough, China took this step on Pakistan’s “frantic appeals”. China was keen on having only political involvement in the affairs of the Indian subcontinent and it was hesitant to take military measures in favour of Pakistan against India.

It can be said that three kinds of objectives of Pakistan’s, China’s nexus have been identified in the present study viz. strategic, political and economic. Pakistan has twin objectives in ensuring that China does not pose a threat to its security vis-à-vis other neighbours. As regards Chinese threat to Pakistan security, Pakistan leadership has tried to turn a potential area of tension into a tranquil border. In this direction, the signing of Sino-Pak boundary agreement was a significant step-Pakistani policy makers seen to have been
working on the assumption that China would not use its neighbours against Pakistan. In fact, China has itself desisted from using neighbours of Pakistan against it. It appears that Peking has assured Islamabad that it would not export communism to Pakistan.

China has bolstered Pakistan's security through the construction of the Karakoram Highway, which can be used in times of war for sending arms and ammunition to Pakistan and other assistance against India. China has also some objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan. In view of Pakistan's strategic locations in the Indian sub-continent, which is contiguous to Sinkiang and Tibet - two turbulent regions over which Chinese have a hold is precarious. Islamabad figures in the Chinese security calculations. The location of Pak-occupied-Kashmir in an area where India, China and Afghanistan, have vital interest, raises Pakistan's value in Chinese geopolitical calculations. Thus, Pakistan is helpful in bolstering China's security against India.

Sino-Pak Boundary Agreement of March 1963, China incurred nominal cost in the form of giving a further setback to Sino-Indian relations which had been already strained whereas China has not only able to ensure a tranquil border with Pak-occupied-Kashmir (PoK) and improved its strategic environment by securing strategic areas, it has also been able to win the friendship of Pakistan. China's help to Pakistan nuclear weapons design information, test data, heavy water
and the setting up of enrichment facilities. China is fully aware that its role of sensitive technologies to Pakistan is seen by India as a hostile action and a major threat to its security. Pakistan has succeeded in acquiring a vast range of equipment and technology, clandestinely and otherwise, from a vast range of sources – source which China may have had difficulty in tapping, particularly in the 70’s and the 80’s. The continuing Sino-Pakistani collaboration confirms Indian suspicions that Chinese hostility to India is not over. US Senator Connie Mark alluded to this when she stated on the Senate floor on June 16, 1998 that “China may be too preoccupied today to directly threaten India, but they need only employ Pakistan as a surrogate belligerent to jeopardize India’s security.

In a war between India and Pakistan, it would be unlikely that India would be the first user of nuclear weapons. Indian armed forces are more than double those of Pakistan, so even set backs on the battle field should not be sufficient to cause the Indian nuclear button to be pressed. Hence, the user of nuclear weapon in any conflict in South Asia is certainly Pakistan out numbered and out gunned, the Pakistan Govt. may have to chose between employing a nuclear weapon or accepting a defeat, terminating Pakistan as an independent sovereign State.

India and China are two largest Asian nations bound by mightily mountain ranges and numerous rivers. If we back into
history, there was a certain degree of understanding and interaction between these two greatest civilizations. If India can settle border problem with China at the earliest it can definitely contribute to the development process undertaken by both the nations. From the Indian perspective, settling the boundary dispute with China can help not only in augmenting her development process. It also can allow us the freedom to re-deploy those forces and energies in settling the another more vexing national security issues.

The real tragedy of 1962 clashes was not the defeat of the Indian army by much more experienced People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China. The real issue is the loss of faith and confidence by large sections of Indians about the intentions of Chinese government and its military leadership.

Hence, it will be useful to make a case as to how this settlement can be achieved without sacrificing our strategic and tactical advantages. Looking India’s current security scenario, India will continue to grapple with the problems regarding our small western neighbour, Pakistan. Yet, it is almost impossible for Pakistan to make peace with India under the current circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to neutralize one key player in this triangular game. This does not mean that by merely signing a border agreement with China it will give up its all weather friendship with Pakistan nurtured
over a period of nearly forty years. However, this can weaken the overt capabilities of China to pose a two front war on India.

The issue of Jammu and Kashmir is an unfinished agenda not only with Pakistan, but with China too apart from the on going process of cross border terrorism and the undeclared proxy war waged by Pakistan since independence, one of our major security concern for the coming decades will be the unholy nexus between China and Pakistan. One of the key strategic position to weaken this linkage will be our relentless efforts to take back the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). If India returns the territory under PoK, it will negate the current advantage of China having a direct link with Pakistan, this will not only give a strategic boost to the morale of Indian forces and the nation as a whole, it can substantially weaken the ability of Pakistan to continue its undeclared proxy war against India.

The study has tried to understand Sino-Pak alliance role in the South Asia. Security during the Chinese aim of offensive alliance were first to warn India that whole it would not support Pakistani adventurism, it would not countenance a major shift in India’s favour in the sub-continent balance of power. Secondly, to demonstrate China’s credibility and usefulness as an alliance partners, thirdly, to serve notice that Chinese intention take into account in any international settlement on the Kashmir question. In 1966 Sino-Pak
relation reached a peak, it measured by cultural, economic and military exchange. This phase witnessed arms transfers from China to Pakistan at very large scale.

This Chinese threat to India at contiguous level was generally politics-strategic and less military in character. The object was of check mating India’s strategic influence and power position in the regions. Chinese leader sought to achieve this by widening the strategic divergence between India and South Asian countries. Thus, China’s factor was important strategical regional factor influencing the security of the region.

China is a major nuclear power with long standing territorial and boundary dispute with India. Despite the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993 and the Confidence Building Measures in the military field agreed upon in 1996, the Line of Actual Control continues to remain ill defined and ambiguous. Its early ‘clarification’ still appears to be a distant goal as China is apparently in no hurry for further progress on these substantive issues. China’s continuing nuclear and missile collusion and defence cooperation with Pakistan, its support to the military regime in Myanmar and increased activities in the Bay of Bengal, its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, are all pointers to a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India. Apparently, china poses a long-term strategic challenge to India as a competing regional power in
Asia. A border war between these two Asian giants, though improbable cannot be ruled out. In the long run, all indicators point towards a clash of strategic interests between India and China in the 21st Century.

With China, India should continue to seek a relationship providing stability and peace for mutual benefit. China’s emergence as a major world power, with widespread economic and security interests, is a reality, which has to be accepted. India should endeavour to realistically balance China’s power through developing its own economic and military strength and through strong relationships with neighbouring countries in SAARC. The ASEAN countries and the CARs. Due to their dominant positions and status in Asia, India and China cannot remain immune to the logic of collective security in Asia. It is in the mutual interest of both the countries to work towards building a strong, prosperous, self-confident and self-reliant Asia.

Simultaneously, India must be militarily prepared to deal with China from a position of strength. There is no need to be either hawkish or wimpish in relations with China and no need to fear China militarily. However, India must seriously consider the impact of China’s rising power in Asia and the manner in which that power may be used by China to further its national interests. This must be publically articulated and discussed rationally with China at the diplomatic level as well as military-to-military with the PLA. Only then can China’s emerging challenge be dealt with pragmatically.
RESEARCH FINDINGS

- Sino-Pak nexus presents a unique example of inter-state ties, which has no comparison whatsoever anywhere around the world. This is a unique case where one nuclear weapon state has been responsible for propping up another nuclear weapon state.

- India’s China Policy must be looked at from two angles. China, being our neighbour on the northern side was an important and ancient civilization. India and in particular Nehru realised that if the Asian continent has to remain free from super power rivalry, India and China must strengthen their bond of friendship. The 1950s saw the high point of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai. This euphoric period was short-lived as India miscalculated the Chinese designs. The war of 1962 made it abundantly clear that the Chinese were driving for pre-eminence in southeast Asia. They also realised that India was the only country that could check their influence in these regions. Hence, over a period of time China assiduously built up its friendship with Pakistan.

- Sino-Pak nexus was exposed during 1965 Indo-Pak war. From then onwards, India has had to control with the two pronged security threat. India’s victory over Pakistan in 1971 war marks
a watershed in our history. The war enhanced the position and status of India. This did not suit the Sino-Pak strategy of neutralizing and isolating India.

Sino-Pak links have a direct bearing on India. To that extent, it inculcates a lingering suspicion that the link-up serves a kind of axis. Not only the peculiar circumstances of its origin but also the process of its growth, and opportunism, blatant flexibility, cautious diplomacy and a kindred spirit of accommodation, transcending the various outstanding constraints, which have governed their bilateral interaction have a reactive Indian element. An important adjunct of China's strategy is aimed at contributing towards a regional balance by containing India. Pakistan has sought precisely the kind of countervailing authority which China has been readily willing to provide. Predictably, the surcharged motivation ensures somewhat more than a transient stake in forging close ties. By offering support to Pakistan, the Chinese have accumulated a net gain of comparable strategic advantages vis-à-vis India.

Sino-Pak nexus has been cultivated by China because of two reasons, firstly, in the Chinese global design, Pakistan, a Muslim country in good standing with the Islamic world, allows Islamabad to use its good offices to facilitate ties
between China and other anti-Communist Islamic countries. For example, Pakistan played a vital role in the establishment of ties between China and Iran in the early 1980s. More recently, Pakistan helped ease the way for the normalization of Chinese-Saudi Arabian relationship. Islamabad also helps China to burnish its image as an anti-Islamic country.

Sino-Pak border agreement (March 1963) was a value-added initiative for Beijing’s long term goals for consolidating its regional presence further southwards through the development of communication infrastructure in an area of geo-strategic importance. The much publicised network of strategic highways facilitating commercial and military exchanges between the two countries was conceived at this stage. An implicit alliance between China and Pakistan took shape and India was faced with the dilemma of a potential military collusion by its two powerful neighbour. In the process China had sought to secure its flank in Kashmir in any future conflict with India.

Sino-Pak military relationship has gained strategic advantage over India by progressively making India’s neighbours dependent on her to a large extent for their defence supplies. It has supplied Pakistan with technical assistance in the joint development of the MBT-2000 (Al Khalid). China has supplied
T-59/T-69/T-85 tanks, heavy artillery, guns, air system, etc. All these modern and sophisticated weapons, have been used against India. This is evident in case of 1965, 1971 and recent proxy war of Pakistan (1998) in Kargil.

Sino-Pak nexus was strategically bound by the re-opening in 1967 of the old silk route-the Karakoram Highway, which linked Chinese Xinjiang with Pak-occupied Hunza Valley. This meant the opening of a direct bridge for supply of arms which would remain undisturbed in any future contingency.

Sino-Pak nexus has direct support for counter insurgency movement in India’s northeastern states and in Jammu and Kashmir. The large scale supply of cheap arms to regimes inimical to India, is an ingenious method of indirect involvement of this nexus as these small arms are eventually supplied by agencies such as the inter-services-intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to insurgent group in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern States of India.

Sino-Pak nuclear cooperation seeks to serve other’s strategic needs. China understand that a nuclear Pakistan would be more confident in check-mating Indian influence beyond south Asia.

Sino-Pak nuclear collaboration is a clear effort which is rooted in a desire to grant the wishes of an old and valued ally on an issue that Pakistan’s leaders deem essential to their vital
national interests. More fundamentally, Beijing want to see Pakistan remain outside India orbit. China’s over-riding strategic interest is to keep Pakistan independent, powerful and confident enough to present India with a standing two front threat.

Sino-Pak friendship would be an effective means to pressurize India to solve Kashmir problem in favour of Pakistan.

Sino-Pak ideological linkage or military alliances, China have tried to tie down India in south Asia by seeking influence by building friendship with all its neighbours. China emerging as the single largest supplied of military equipment to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Burma. This indulgence has to be understood in terms of Beijing’s strategic vision of emerging as the Asian leader which has a direct bearing on south Asian security.

Sino-Pak missile collaboration has gone up from time to time. Pakistan received the supply of longer range M-11 missile from China. These nuclear capable missiles are reported to have been deployed by Pakistan in the vicinity of its border with India.

China is also actively engaged in substantially upgrading the military infrastructure in Tibet. The more presence of Chinese nuclear tipped missile launcher (DF-2, DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5) in
Tibet poses a direct and more serious challenge to India's security.

- India has also the world's second longest long border with China, which too is not determined. The 'hot' tipid' and porous nature of Indian border with the neighbour strain the country's security. The implementation of the 1993's BPTA and 1996's CBMs between India and China has been tardy. There has not been much real progress in translating diplomatic agreement into tangible military measures on the ground.

- Viewing India's current security scenario, India will continue to grapple with the problems regarding our small western neighbour, Pakistan. Yet, it is almost impossible for Pakistan to make peace with India under the current circumstances. Therefore, it is necessary to neutralize one key player in this triangular game. However, this can weaken the overt capabilities of China to pose a two front war on India.

- Pakistan's strategy and the continued assistance by China to the former will adversely affect the political conditions in India. It will have an adverse effect on the political stability due to the conflicting requirements of the responses on global issues such as the NPT and CTBT. India's stance on the NPT and CTBT, in real terms, has kept us away from multifarious gains including economic gains.
Pakistan by itself cannot be a major threat to India's security which is why it is constantly attempting to acquire allies. China shares with Pakistan a common hostility towards India. India's main security problem arises from China's known bellicosity, her desire to neutralize India and extend her hegemony.

The closeness of Pakistan relation's with China is well established. There are no dissenting issues between both which could effect the content and cordiality of bilateral relations. All trends are indicative of the fact that Pak-China axis will continue to expand in all directions.

Sino-Pak strategic and military cooperation against India's security interests, has enhanced the Chinese position in the Himalayan region and given to China the necessary foothold to serve as a counterforce to India in the region, this is serving China's strategic and political interest in South Asian subcontinent. It has also given Pakistan the capability of contributing to the global design of China. The Pak-China diplomatic, political, military friendship is a step forward towards the achievement of the Sino-Pak strategy of isolating and neutralizing India, has a significant bearing on India's security environments and is detrimental to India's vital security interests. India has to deter and nullify joint Sino-Pak aggression.