China's relationships to the global strategic balance has always been pivotal. For better or for worse, the post war world continues to be dominated by the power rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union as is evident from their military strength and nuclear arsenals. After the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese leadership had set to define the international role and position for their country. It consolidated its political, economic and administrative power within China. It decided to play in international environment by taking into account the security scenario and obstacle created by others. When Mao-ze-dong took the leadership of China, he made it clear that China's strategic objective world be to reduce its vulnerability to external powers. Since Soviet Union and America were prominent military powers in the post war era. The relationship with both superpowers was considered important for China's security. Chinese long term strategy was based on firstly, identifying the main threat to China and do not allow China to embroiled in conflicts. Secondly, avoid international isolation from the two world powers. These two aspects of China's policy were helpful but at the same time, there was much divergence from above-said theory\(^\text{235}\).

After revolution, Chinese leadership found the security aspect different from its revolutionary experience. By the time, PRC took over the world affairs had gone a sea change. The Soviet-American war time friendship changed into political, ideological and military confrontation. The triumph of China had assumed great significance in this scenario as well as China's inclination towards Maxism-Lennism.

In the post World War-II period, China owing to her economic and military position was not capable of influencing the course of international events to the extent of either the USA or the USSR. Circumstances compelled them to align themselves with the two rival grouping into which the world was divided under the leadership of the two superpowers. They, nevertheless, retained a certain degree of maneuverability in world affairs. In past years, the complexion of international relations has changed substantially with the emergence of Sino-Soviet confrontation, super power détente and Sino-US rapprochement. Accordingly, China viewed that there was a imperialist camp headed by the United States and a democratic camp headed by the Soviet Union "all the countries and peoples of the world", belonged to one of these camps. Further, China asserted that a "third road" did not exist and extended militant support for revolutionaries.

The Korean war (1950-53) and China's involvement in it, US support to Taiwan, the spread of the cold war between Washington and Moscow to Asia, US efforts to encircle and contain China with a string of bases and the western orientation

---

at new independent countries like India, Indonesia and Burma led to abandonment of the two camp thesis, particularly in the Asian context. The primary objective becomes the breaking of the US encirclement of China. Thus, the non-aligned countries become friends and those aligned for leaning towards the US, the foes. This distinction made possible the selective adoption of militant postures, if and when required against the foes. The end of the Korean war and China's participation in the Geneva conference (1954) enhanced her prestige and the era of peaceful co-existence began. This tactical line was also the outcome of the realization by China that it required a breather for internal consolidation with Soviet Union and communist block assistance\textsuperscript{237}.

Since the late 1960s, China has been an important factor in the global strategic balance, with a significant influence upon the competition between the Soviet Union and United States. Although, objectively weaker than either the Soviet Union or the United States, China has been powerful enough to have a 'swing value' in the global balance, and Peking's alignment in the East-west competition has been of intense concern to both Moscow and Washington\textsuperscript{238}.

A decade latter, after the failure of Chairman Mao's great leap forward programmes in October 1962, China decided to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue by use of force. In October 1962, the PLA moved in swiftly, defeated the Indian army

\textsuperscript{237} Bajpai, U.S. - India Security: The politico-strategic environment. pp 86.

\textsuperscript{238} Harry, Hardy: OP.Cit. No.235 pp.IX
and declared unilateral cease-fire after taking possession of approximately 3000 sq.km Indian territory. By March 1969, the GPCR entered its final phase and at that time the PLA decided that it could settle the border with the former Soviet Union by use of force. On March 2-3, 1969, there were "border skirmishes" in the area of the Nizhan emikh allocka border post on the Ussuari River. The Soviet Red Army confronted the intruding PLA men.

In 1974, PLA captured the disputed paracel Island in the South China sea. Virtually without firing a shot, the PLA had total success in this operation. In Feb. 1979, PLA and Vietnamese forces fought a war in the South China Sea, Island of Spartly was the main issue of the war. By the end of 1970s, however, many of China's political and strategic objectives had been achieved. The contrast with Peking's political and military environment at the outset of the decade was palpable. Though, still subject to severe military pressure, China was no longer isolated internationally. With increasing by diversified economic ties, it could use the prospect of its untapped economic potential to induce broadened trade and technology purchases from the west. And, though lagging severely behind its major military rival, China did not face the likely prospect of serious military conflict, except along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The goal was to use these latent possibilities to China's

overall advantage, hoping ultimately to redefine China's long term relationship to both superpowers.\textsuperscript{240}

Notwithstanding its growing importance in the global strategic balance and the world economy, China remains essentially a regional Asian power, seeking to imposed its regional security and economic interest and outlook upon its Asian neighbours, coupled with the prospect that China's economic and military power will increase substantially over the next few decades, continue to complete Peking's relations with the rest of the region.\textsuperscript{241}

**Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations**

Sino-US relations in the past almost three decades have swung from one extreme to the other and this is a trend that continued to influence the ties between these two states. The United States' understanding and relations with China have been long standing one and their impact upon the international strategical environment on the whole has always been of interest to those who monitor these developments.\textsuperscript{242}

China had looked upon the US, as being the major threat to China's security and independence. In the Chinese view, the United States had pursued an unremitting hostility towards the People's Republic of China for twenty years (1949-1969). That was how they regarded the US effort to impose a trade quarantine on China for twenty years, and US sending of their troops north of the 38 Parallel in Korea, the positioning

\textsuperscript{240} Harry, Hardy: OP.Cit. No.235, pp.158.
\textsuperscript{241} Ibid, pp IX
of the seventh fleet between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, and the US sponsorship of an efforts at the United Nations to label China "the aggression in Korea". The US objective centered around the view to intensify and consolidate the military encirclement of China by the establishing bases in East Asia and the signing treaties with Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The Eisenhower period witnesses the strengthening of ties with south Korea, Pakistan and Thailand. The ties with the UK, France, Australia and New Zealand were also given more emphasis during this period. These treaties were aimed at the isolation of China. United States was increasingly committed to a renascent Japan closely aligned with US political and strategic goals in the pacific. A confrontation with American power in East Asia ill served China's long term interests.

It viewed critically, the Sino-Soviet alliance of early 1950 represented a marriage of convenience. Yet it is doubtful weather any Chinese leader-including Mao-saw any reasonable alternative. China and USSR shared both a long border and a common ideology. The emergence of communist rule, made it clear that cold war would reach up to Asia. In this situation China titled towards Soviet Union to save herself from American antagonism. The consummation of the Moscow-Peking alliance further abetted the stark polarization of the international system. The Korean War (1950) brought American military power to China's north eastern door step,

244 Shreedhar: OP.Cit. No.239, pp 46.
compelling the PRC to intervene on behalf of North Korea. This war affected the Chinese economic programmes. Soviet Union exploited the situation and engulfed China in socialist block. America, considering China as a major adversary, imposed economic sanctions\(^{245}\). Despite the mounting evidence of Sino-Soviet estrangement over ideology and foreign relations, the United States failed to exploit the political and diplomatic opportunities inherent in such circumstances\(^{246}\). In due course, the PRC became a nuclear power, a donor of foreign aid and entered into conflict with the Soviet Union\(^{247}\). The Sino-Soviet rift constitutes one of the great schisms of contemporary-international relations, and it is wrought with great strategic and diplomatic implication that have a considerable impact on the external policies of both China and the Soviet Union. Out of the prime reasons for China’s favourable response to President Nixon’s new China policy in 1970-71 was the country’s fear of the Soviet Union, and reference has also been made to the Soviet Policy of containing China by both diplomatic and military means\(^{248}\).

So, China reached “a political settlement with the United States on the basis of equality, and in disregard of the interests of its smaller associates”. China made friendly over-tone to USA and these efforts culminated in Nixon’s visit to China in 1972\(^{249}\).

\(^{245}\) Harry, Hardy: OP. Cit. No.235, pp. 149-150.
\(^{246}\) Ibid. pp. 151.
\(^{249}\) Ibid. 39.
Successive Chinese government have experienced particular difficulties in dealing with countries that are deemed stronger or potentially challenging to China. Yet paradoxically, Chinese international power and influence may be said to have been greatest when it was aligned with first the USSR in the 1950s and then with the United States in the 1970s and 1980s. At the same time, China has experienced difficulties with smaller power largely because it perceives itself as benign and does not quite understand why smaller neighbours do not necessarily see it in that light.

One of the key characteristics of China as a great power has been the demand by its leaders that others great powers should treat it as their equal. Perhaps only Russia has been as insistent as China upon being treated as the equal of other great powers. One of the underlying causes of the break-up of the Sino-Soviet alliance was Mao's perception that he personally and China itself were regarded in Moscow as ultimately subordinate to Soviet interests. Similarly, many of the problems inherent in Sino-American relations stem from Chinese fears of American superiority and their feeling of vulnerability. Interestingly, much of this was disguised during the period of tripolarity (1971-89). When despite its lack of military comparability, China was treated with respect by both the superpowers; indeed for most of the 1980s it was in the envisable position of being cultivated by both.²⁵⁰

In 1979, after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the US, the first trade agreement between the two countries was signed and they granted each other MFN status. Thus, in 1980, China became a member of World Bank and International Monetary Fund. China has also joined some of the key regional organization like Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993\(^{251}\).

Thus, China carved out a place among world’s major powers. Although, China’s GDP growth rate is on the upward tract, economically it is still not so strong. Its internal problem is more complicated than those of external. The end of the cold war had brought a new state of affairs in world politics, but the post-cold-war world have yet to crystalise out of the emerging possibility of unipolarity, multipolarity and polycentricity of global power politics. But Asian Region presents a more complex scenario. In this framework, the role of China is particularly relevant and the most significant strategic transformation lies in the emergence of China as a major-player on the Asian stage with the potential to effect the global balance of power\(^{252}\).

In 1996 China joined an academically driven Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia pacific (CSCAP). The CSCAP is designed to discuss a broad range of proposals and ideas to further the interests of the ARF.

---

\(^{251}\) Yahuda, Michael: OP.Cit. No.250, pp. 653.

\(^{252}\) Bhaskar, C.Uday: Role of China in the Emerging World Order “Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, April 1993, pp.3.
China has become a participant in many international regimes and committed itself to observe a large number of international conventions. China signed the NPT in 1992 and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996. China is also the member of FMCT253.

The Chinese, therefore, understand that their long term interest are not well served by an overly antagonistic or highly polarized international situation. Yet Asia has been thought of a principal battle ground of the post war era, and China has never shrunk from using its military power, even if doing so has heightened tensions. In an ironic way, China's participation in these conflicts was demonstrated her centrality to the global strategic balance.

China's strategic perceptions of India need to be analysed in the context of the evaluation of China's strategies in its encounter with the international system and its drive to achieve specific bilateral and regional objectives. Chinese perception of India have undergone changes in the last three decades and more. However, the basic real politic aspect of containing India in South Asia and in the neighbouring regions of interest to China has remained a constant factor in the midst of several variables.

During the first phase of advocacy of two camp formula and the denial of the third road, China perceived India as an appendage of imperialism and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was called "a running dog". However, China's occupation of Tibet without tangible protest from India; India's recognition of China and its role during

the Korean war as a mediating force. Nehru’s assertion of non-alignment as a treaty; the US policy of containment of China and the emergence of anti-China alliances in Asia (SEATO and Baghdad Pact). China's perception of the usefulness of Pakistan for its long term strategy was evidenced by the late premier Zhow-Enlai’s acceptance of Pakistan's explanation at the Bandung Conference (April 1955) that its alliance with USA was not directed at China. The fact that Beijing accepted such an explanation in the cold war phase indeed demonstrated its firms commitment to real politik.

Since 1962, India in a tactical terms neither formed a past of an international united front to oppose "US imperialism" and implicitly "modern revisionism" that in USSR, nor was it an independent country with which China had to interact for mutual benefit. In fact, Beijing adopted a military posture with a view to consolidate its military gains, and initiated a positive strategy of the containment of India by exercising the option of cementing relations with Pakistan.

In the middle and late seventies, Beijing, having realized the objective of enhancing its security by linkages with the United States, sought to enlarge its option in South Asia by setting aside the tactics of confrontation, which had failed to stop India from emerging as the pre-eminence power in the sub-continent\textsuperscript{254}. China's role in the core area of India's concern is a destabilizing one, as south Asia is perceived by Beijing a region in which it should have a strong presence because it straddles China's southern borders. In the Indian Ocean area, Beijing's role is limited now, but it may

emerge as a new factor adding to the existing super power rivalry. China will grow stronger due to its central geographical positions in Asia. China wants to make strong position in oil rich region of Asia and ensure energy, factor for its greater role. And its friendly overtures with neighbouring countries, particularly with Pakistan, Myanmar, Afghanistan and Russia, will obtain her two types of benefit, namely political, economic and dilute any possibility of ethical problems. This cooperation with Pakistan and Myanmar gave her facility to reach Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf and with Myanmar she has established strong naval bases in Indian ocean, which are necessary for a greater role in world affairs and to encircle India. In the current phase, China has come to the conclusion that India can not be ignored in tactical term. In strategic terms also, India continues to remain a major factor that has to be reckoned with in any drive to achieve a pre-eminent position in the Third World. To put it differently, India is an obstacle to realizing China's aspirations to assure the leadership of the developing countries, in general, and of Asia in particular.

Sardar Vallabh Bhai Patel had given sound advice and timely and repeated warnings in 1949 to safeguard India's national security interests, vis-à-vis China but these were ignored. China on the regional and global scene and deliberated on its political, economic and military impact on India.

---

255 Bhasker, C. Uday: OP. Cit. No. 252, pp. 6-9
(b) China's changing role in contemporary world

China throughout its long history of 4000 years has been an imperialist and expansionist power and it continues to be so. China is strategically located, having common border with nearly fourteen countries. Its coast line extends to 18,000 km along the Pacific ocean in the east.

China, the most highly populated country in the world, a standing member of the Security Council and the only largest country that still adhering to the socialist regime. China's current diplomatic activities have been geared to national interest in improving that country's international status. However, in view of the circumstances determining the boundaries of Chinese influence on international relations, the objective importance of China's activities goes far beyond these goals, "Noilens Volens". From the aspect of the world community's global interests, particularly the interest of the non-aligned and developing countries, China's role in resolving international development issues can not remain irrelevant. On the contrary, China's attitude is an important factor in tipping the scales of diplomatic negotiations in the context of ensuring balanced approaches and solutions of interest to the international community. The 'rise of China' is, of course, a misnomer. 're-emergence' would be more accurate. By its size and history, China has long been a major power in the Asia-Pacific region.

The end of the cold war, unification of Germany, disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe has transformed the global security environment. Though, its impact is felt more in the western hemisphere where the termination of the bipolar confrontation brought about a more radical re-orientation in international security relations, the rest of the world too has been affected by this new reality. But for Asia, a more significant development is the sudden growth of Chinese power. Since November 1978, when Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms in China\textsuperscript{259}.

Since the end of the cold war, the international order is gradually, but inexorably, changing to a polycentric system. The geo-political embrace of the former super powers has resulted in the emergence of six potential centres of power. These area the USA, the EC (with Germany, France and the UK playing a more active role), Russia, China, Japan, India and possibly, some other regional groups, are likely to be the primary centres of power in the first century of the new millennium. China has the potential and the intent to assure a role next only to the USA\textsuperscript{260}.

China, which is already the largest power in Asia, is gradually emerging as a major global power and will acquire formidable economic and military capabilities in the first few decades of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century. Its growing economy is expected to overtake the US economy between 2020 and 2050. Its strategy of 'four modernizations',

\textsuperscript{259} Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee: China Military Posture by 2010 A.D. Editor S.G.Ghitis (Pune University, Pune) 22-23 November 1994, This paper was presented on the seminar on the "Emerging China".

\textsuperscript{260} Bhaskar, C.Uday, "Role of China in the Emerging World Order", Strategic Analysis, New Delhi, April 1993, pp 3-4
formally adopted in 1978 has been fruitful and is leading to fairly rapid, though regionally skewed, development and modernization, including that of the armed forces. In recent years, the Chinese have stressed the need for comprehensive national strength in determining the country's role in international affairs. Their concept of national defence is no longer limited merely to the defence of territory but has been expanded to include the seaboard and outer space. The erstwhile strategy of coastal defence has been converted to a strategy of 'oceanic offensive'. The emphasis on "bolstering naval and air forces stems from a drive to project power well away from China's shores". Russia and China have recently entered into a new strategic partnership for peace, ending three decades of bitterness and distrust fostered by ideological confrontation and the Sino-Soviet border war. While Russia advocates a new multipolar world order based on a Russia-China-India triangle to counter US domination and for peace and stability in the Asia pacific region, the Chinese view is that only the US, Russia and China are real global powers and that in the Asia pacific region, security and stability should be based on a China-India-Japan triangle. Exhibiting its determinations to play a greater geo-strategic role and to counter. What it perceives as increasing US Hegomony, Russia's Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov offered to form a "strategic triangle" along with India and China during his talk with

---

262 Times of India, April 28, 1997.
the Indian Prime Minister at New Delhi in December 1998. While India responded in a lukewarm manner to the proposal, but China did not respond with enthusiasm\textsuperscript{263}.

**US-China relations**

Post cold war US dominates the international environment as an economic and military super power. In view of its economic interests in China, the US has changed its public stance from 'containment' to 'engagement'. However, in US perceptions, a stronger and prosperous China is proving to be even more unpredictable and defiant. The Chinese have repeatedly violated non-proliferation assurances to Washington. Continued nuclear and missile supplies have been reported to Pakistan and Iran. US relations with Taiwan are a major stumbling block in improvement of relations with China. The US has made no major lead in its quest to ensure better adherence to human rights by the Chinese Government, particularly in Tibet and Sinking. The Chinese stand on important geostrategic issues is not in conformity with US global and regional power calculations. Other US concern include Chinese nuclear and missile proliferation reports about the development of a 12,000 km range Chinese ICBM. Hence, while advocating 'engagement' and a strategic partnership, the US is clearly actively continuing to pursue a policy of 'containment' by allying with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and by making gradual in roads in to the Central Asian Republic (CAR) by way of trade.

\textsuperscript{263} Times of India, December 29, 1998.
and joint military maneuvers\textsuperscript{264}. China has developed deterrent capability with its few international ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States. China is the only nuclear power which refuses to detarget its missiles vis-à-vis the US unless the latter is willing to conclude a no first use of nuclear weapon treaty. The US, obviously, wants to use the nuclear weapon as the currency of power in enforcing its role as the 'indispensable nation'\textsuperscript{265}. Hence, relations between the US and China are 'more turbulent than is commonly perceived and the manner in which these competing compulsions are played out among the two states, will provide a clue about how the Asian canvas will be punctuated in the next century'.

**Russia-China Relation**

Russian-China relations have improved steadily since May 1989 Summit meeting at Beijing. Both have agreed for creation of a new multipolar world order and ending US domination. Seeking to counter US daut and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) Eastward expansion, Russia is looking towards strategic partners in Asia and China is the foremost among them. Russia, China and three CAR nations (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) have agreed to reduce the troops and tensions. The new Russia – China friendship is also grounded in economic self interest.

\textsuperscript{264} Kanwal, Gurmeet: OP. Cit. No 261, pp 1715.

\textsuperscript{265} Subrahmanyam, K.: The global strategic environment: Biopolarity or polycentrism, Strategic Analysis, New Delhi May 1997, pp. 192.
Sino-Asian Relations

The Asian countries have had centuries old link with China and almost have a sizeable Chinese population. While the Asian countries do not see a major military threat from China. They are wary of China's burgeoning economic might. Hongkong has been returned to China in August 1997, China's influence in South East Asia is expected to increase further. The south China sea is a potential flash point that Marits concern due to the conflicting claims of China and other countries on the Sprately and Paracel islands^{266}.

India, China, Japan, Indonesia and Korea are the dominant countries in Asia. China's supply of nuclear technology, missiles, and advanced conventional weapon is creating pressures for military modernization in these states^{267}.

Chinese moves in Indian ocean should reap her benefits readily available in one of the world's most lucrative water ways close to its backyard. These waterways provide immense economic wealth in the shape of marine life, minerals, off shore oil and natural gas. Its geo-strategic disposition is enviable. It links the East with the West, and the North with the South. It offers unlimited transverse sea routs for merchant as well as regular navies. Any power that controls the Indian Ocean in the coming millennium will enjoy unprecedented advantages in political, economic and military dimension. China is fully aware of this^{268}. The Chinese overtures in Indian

^{266} Kanwal, Gurmeet: OP. Cit. No.261, pp. 1716.
Ocean is likely to destabilise regional security. China's economy has posted exceptional growth during 1990s. She has world class military and technological capability. The emergence of an economically and militarily much stronger China will bound to upset the current equilibrium of power in Asia and would spark re-alignment by China's neighbours.

Beijing has long generated bad feeling among international community with its poor human rights record, its resistance to multilateral discussion of expansive Chinese claims in the South China Sea, and its persistent threat to use force against Taiwan. Some of China's recent behaviour, the mischief reef incident in the south China sea, the missile test off the coast of Taiwan, and continued sales of nuclear capable missile technology to Pakistan have hardened these view.

China, unlike India, is a major power and acts as one. It is capable of influencing events in the Asian region of its interest in the Pacific, South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. It also has its national interest held high while China proposes a policy of peace and friendliness toward India, its deeds clearly indicate that concerted efforts are underway aimed at the strategic encirclement of India. For the last several decades, China has been engaged in efforts to create a ring of anti-Indian influences around India through military and economic assistance programmes. The neighbouring countries Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Srilanka, Myanmar have been assiduously and cleverly cultivated towards this end.

---
China's growing power and influence in Asia is a strategic challenge for India. In recent year, China is seriously involved in Myanmar particularly in Coco Island, near the Andaman group, Hainggyi Island at the mouth of Bassaian River. The rapidly growing Chinese presence in Myanmar tends to encircle India strategically as the Chinese can pose a threat to the Brahmaputra valley through Myanmar.270

China has also supplied a variety of arms and missiles to Iran and even to Saudi Arabia. While China's, direct support for counter insurgency movement in India's North-Eastern States, China is also seeking to keep India strategically engaged though its neighbours. China's sale of sophisticated military technology to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the possibility of it acquiring naval bases, and overland and air routes to such bases, are areas of concern for India's security.271 Hence, it is obvious that China will continue to be a major security concern for India as it becomes even more economically and militarily powerful in the next 10-15 years.

In conclusion, it can be inferred that China is flexing its muscles to become world power and to play a greater role in changing world order. China appears a special case in Asian security and stability since it occupies a significant geographic and geopolitical niche. As indicated at the outset, it has the ability and potential to dramatically alter and modify the existing order of the world affairs.272

China's New Global Role - Problem and Prospect as World Power

Rapid growth of China's overall national strength after the end of the cold war has attracted worldwide attention. Nearly two centuries ago, Nepolian Napoleon's had said that "There lies a sleeping giant. Let us sleep. For when she awakes, she will shake the world". Awakening from the humiliation of the sacking of Beijing during the Boxer rebellion through the Japanese aggression, the civil war and Korean war, China has emerged as a super power in her own right and appears to be destined to be one of the most dominant power in the next century. Despite reverses suffered at various times, the Chinese leader have displayed a remarkable farsighted in safeguarding their strategic perception and promoting national security interest.

China's security situation has been greatly improved since the end of cold war. Historically, China was constantly under direct external military threats for long years after the opium war in 1940-42. Even after the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the threats were not wholly removed. The direct military threat faced by China came from the US in the 1950s from both the US and the USSR in 1960s, and mainly from the USSR since the end of 1960s. After the end of cold war, fortunately, China was relieved from direct military threat as a result of the disintegration of the USSR. Although both the US and Russia still have the military capacity to invade China, neither of them will have the motive for doing so in a considerably long time to come. Russia is in need of a long period of time to stabilize its domestic political order and to extricate itself from its present economic crisis, and
so has neither the will nor the strength to exercise military expansion in East Asia. And as a result of America's relative decline in strength, there has emerged a kind of isolationism in the US. It is noted that the US even began to take initiative to carry out security cooperation with China in 1993. Such being the case, there is now no external power that poses a massive threat to China's security in the world. Disappearance of massive military threats, however, does not mean that there is no longer any problem to China's security. China is still troubled with problems like ethnic separatism and border disputes.

China's perception of the cold war, as an epoch of change, and of its own rising power allow it to participate in the definition of a secure and globally acceptable international order. Chinese leader and analysts are acutely aware of the opportunity for China to be significant player in defining global and regional security agendas, and also of the fact that it is only in conditions of change and volatility that alternative perspectives can be insinuated and imbedded into conventional ways of engaging the world. In the new multipolar system since 1991, China has actively sought to create a balance between power in the region. Apart from itself, China recognizes the emergence of the other four poles-the United States, Japan, Russia and the European Union in the post cold war global power structure. All have significance for regional and global relations. Historically, China has been implicated in relations

---

273 Yan Xuetong: China's past cold war security strategy, Contemporary International Relations: Vol.8, No.5, May 1995 pp 1-3.
of cooperation and confrontation with three of the four. In the post cold war era, the PRC's policy has been to manage each of the three individually/bilaterally in the interests of its policy of economic development and the creation of a secure security environment for itself. China's position in the third world countries reflected its long standing declaratory positions. Their common identity has been continually stressed, as has been their positive revolutionary international role. China belongs to the third world. For China can not compare with rich or powerful countries politically, economically, etc. Being a member of this world, many third world countries consider it as a rather idiosyncratic one which differs from the rest in many important aspects. China is freely regarded as one of the great powers in the world affairs. Its nuclear programme, Economic potential, military strength, technological advancement and a second strike capability make it so. Furthermore, unlike any other country in the third world, China is in the better position.

Under Mao-ze-dong China's view of its strategic environment was one of impending conflict. This perception persisted till the 1970s and was characterized by popular slogans such as "be prepared against war", "be prepared for an early strike, a major strike, and a nuclear strike", with normalization of relation with the USA this perception had gone under a major change, but the Soviet threat continued to loom large. The four modernization recommended by Zhou-Enlai in the mid 1970s put

military modernization in third place. China was amongst the first countries to detect Soviet weakness much earlier than these were apparent. Its world view was now ripe for change. China's security environment presently is at the best that the country has had at least in the last 150 years. All its land borders are either settled or in a state of tranquility. In the region around Beijing perceives the following positive development over the last decade: normalization of Sino-Russian, Sino-Vietnamese and Sino-Japanese relations, improvement in Russia-Japan relations despite the problem of the northern territories and decrease in tension on the Korean peninsula.\footnote{Maj. Gen. Dipankar Banerjee "China military posture by 2010 AD (CASS) Pune University, Pune 22-23 November 1994, pp.50.}

The ground forces of the PLA consist of 2,300,000 soldiers which is more than twice as large as the second largest army in the world. These encompass 84 infantry division, 10 armoured division, 7 field artillery division and 4 air defense division. The army has 7500 to 8000 medium and 1200 light tanks. Towed artillery guns number 14,500. The army is equipped with self propelled artillery, surface to air missile and armed helicopter. The army is planning to acquire T-800 Tank and SA-300 air defence missile (Patriot equivalent) from Russia.

Chinese air force is probably the most antiquated. It has a total of 4970 aircraft divided into 7 military air regions. Its bomber aircraft are 120 Hong 6 (TU-16 equivalent medium) and 350 Hong 5 (IL 28, light). Though other type of combat aircraft, fighter, fighter ground attack and helicopters are in large numbers. A major
upgradation of air force capability is planned through collaboration with Russia. Twenty six S4-27 aircrafts were purchased from Russia as part of a US $1.8 million arms deal signed in 1992.

The Navy has the highest priority, next only to the second artillery (the missile command) in term of resource allocation. Building a quality Navy is an important national concern, in keeping with the perceived threats in the South China Sea and Taiwan.

**China's major naval and fleet deployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North Sea Fleet</th>
<th>Forces:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bases: Qingdo (HQ)</td>
<td>2 Submarines Sqns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiaonan</td>
<td>Escort Sqns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalian</td>
<td>1 Mine Warfare Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huludao</td>
<td>1 Amphibious Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wenhui</td>
<td>Bohai Gulf Training Flotilla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chengshan</td>
<td>Approx 325 Patrol and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Coastal Defence Districts</td>
<td>Coastal Combatants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>East Sea Fleet</th>
<th>Forces:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bases: Shanghai (HQ)</td>
<td>2 Submarines Sqns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wusong</td>
<td>2 Escort Sqns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dinghai</td>
<td>1 Mine Warfare Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangzhou</td>
<td>1 Amphibious Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Coastal Defence Districts</td>
<td>Approx 270 Patrol and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastal Combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marines: 1 Cadre Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Sea Fleet</th>
<th>Forces:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bases: Zhanjiang (HQ)</td>
<td>2 Submarines Sqns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shantou</td>
<td>2 Escort Sqns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangzhou</td>
<td>1 Mine Warfare Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haikou</td>
<td>1 Amphibious Sqn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yulin/Beihai</td>
<td>Approx 270 Patrol and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastal Combatants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huangpu</td>
<td>Marines: 1 Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outposts on Paracels and Spratlys</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Coastal Defence Districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China's strategic missile forces consist of 90,000 soldiers divided into offensive and defensive troops. Offensive capability is divided into air, missile and naval forces, thus providing it with a trial capability. Defensive forces consist of tracking station units in the western sector and ballistic missile early warning system based on phased array radar. The current state China's nuclear capability is shown as below. China has around 400 nuclear weapons at about 15 different types and yields.

**China's nuclear delivery capabilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payload/Yield</th>
<th>Range (km)</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land-based missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-5A (ICBM)</td>
<td>4-5 MT warhead</td>
<td>12500-15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-5 (IRBM/ICBM)</td>
<td>3.3 MT warhead</td>
<td>4750+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-3A (IRBM)</td>
<td>3.3 MT warhead</td>
<td>2600-2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-21 (IRBM)</td>
<td>200-300 MT warhead</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-31 (ICBM)</td>
<td>200-300 MT warhead</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-41 (ICBM)</td>
<td>MIRVed</td>
<td>12000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sea-launched ballistic missiles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL-1</td>
<td>0.5-1 MT</td>
<td>1700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JL-2</td>
<td>0.5-1 MT</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactical missiles and nuclear-configured bombers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-15 (M-9)</td>
<td>500 kg payload</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF-11 (M-11)</td>
<td>800-1000 kg payload</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-7, H-6, H-5, Q-5</td>
<td>20 kt-3 Mt single bomb</td>
<td>400-3500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HY-2, HY-1, HY-4</td>
<td>400-500 kg payload</td>
<td>40-150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HY-3, C-101</td>
<td>400-500 kg payload</td>
<td>45-130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

China as the third nuclear forces in the world, after the USA and Russia. With one fifth of world's population, a pulsating economy, third most powerful nuclear weapon state. Vito-wielding permanent member of the UN Security Council, member of a NPT, CTBT, FMCT and other international treaty. China carries a tremendous clout. China was self sufficient and highly industrialized, but the nineteenth century reduced it to colonial status. It is now emerging as a major power. It sees the post cold war world as multipolar, and China as a pole.

The emergence of China on the regional and global scene and deliberated on its political economic and military impact on India. China is all set to emerge as the global power. It is already being described as a great power-on-horizon and the American have certified it as the second most important global actor. This development poses some real challenges to Indian strategists. China still believes that "equilibrium of power" is an essential pre-requisite for stability of international safe environment. We need to factor in China's growing military capability in our strategic plans. A deeper understanding of China is essential for shaping our China policy. India has the potential to claim its rightful place in the world affairs. The strength has to be found and built up from within on the social political, economic, industrial, technological, commercial as well as cultural fronts. Weakness is universally despised. Strength respects strength. These aspects should be fully taken into account in formulating and shaping our strategy.

(d) China and the USA in arms supply race

Chinese arms exports began attracting global attention in the mid 1980s when Beijing embarked on a policy that gave saliency to selling weapons to earn hard currency. Previously, arms were often supplied gratis or accompanied by long term interest free loans in order to support China's efforts to win influence as a radical third world power—an objective that was abandoned by the mid 1970s for reciprocal restraint on arms sales by major suppliers focussed on the former Soviet Union and some west European countries. China was not considered a significant player at that time. American concerns about China were aroused when Beijing started transferring armaments and military technology which complicated or threatened to upset US security interest and Washington's high profile non-proliferation objectives in the third world, especially in the Middle-East and South Asia. The sharpening at American focus on China also coincided with the collapse of countervailing Soviet power, thus facilitating a more aggressive pursuit by the United States of its non-proliferation objectives.279

Arms exports are also seen in terms of an outgrowth of the arms production sector primarily for European countries. At present, it is believed that European arms industries are facing the problem of large over capacities and due to this reason they go in for export of arms.280 China's regional power status with hegemonistic ambitions

---

279 Kamal, Nazir, China's Arms export policy and responses to multilateral restraints, Contemporary south-eastern Volume 14, No.2, September 1992, pp 112-114.
largely derived sustenance from the motives of the smaller countries to extract aid and support from the extra regional power as also to introduce a countervailing power in the region—largely an outcome of intra-regional politics, the intentions being attributed for outstripping actual potential. China has probably the largest standing army in the world. Despite this impressive numerical superiority, developments over a decade have revealed serious qualitative deficiencies in the Chinese military machine, further underscored by the display of state of the art technology during the gulf war, which render it at best a "second rate" military power. Having said that it would be pertinent to take cognizance of the changes and developments in the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) including Navy (PLAN) and Airforce (PLAAF) to assist in making a more realistic assessment of the PRC as it moves further into the last decade of the twentieth century.  

The People's Republic of China remains the fifth largest exporter of major conventional weapons system for the period 1986-90. During the five year period (1986-90), China supplied major conventional weapons to 22 countries. The main customer were Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Thailand and North Korea. China has intensified co-operation in arms production with Pakistan and is Pakistan's most important supplier. Myanmar is also a major importer of Chinese military equipment,

---

281 Acharya, Alka, "China's Arms sales. The fulcrum of its South Asia policy". Strategic Analysis, May 1992, pp. 149-150.
including warships and fighter planes that is a cause of concern to neighbouring
countries in general and to India in particular\textsuperscript{282}.

United States exports of major conventional weapon systems decreased in
1990 by about one quarter, totaling US $ 8.7 billion while the politico-military aspect
of arms transfer in the United States focus primarily on middle-east policy, questions
of industrial competitiveness and the economic benefits of arms transfer relations
increasingly focus on east Asia\textsuperscript{283}. After the cold war reduction of the US presence in
the Asian region. The military bases and facilities in the Philippines have been closed.
Overall, military capabilities at the end of this decade are expected to be about a third
less than they were in the late 1980s; most of this decline will take place by China, but
countries in this region are none the less worried about the possibility of substantial
reduction in the US forward presence over the longer term\textsuperscript{284}.

The shift in China's policy was abetted by changes in its national priorities
under the "four modernization" programme launched by Deng Xioping in the late
1970s. Under this programme, the Chinese military was endeavoured to overhaul its
force structure, to reduce greatly its bloated size, to convert most of its ordnance
factories into civilian production, and to develop a high-tech defence capability so
that it can catch up with other major military powers. While faced with these tasks,
the Chinese military had to compete for scarce resources from a position of

\textsuperscript{282} Supri Year Book: 1991, pp 217.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid. pp. 215.
\textsuperscript{284} Gom Wattanaya, Panilan and Ball, Desmond "A regional arms race". The Journal of Strategic Studies,
September 1995, pp 165.
disadvantage as the defence sector ranked low in priority among the "four modernizations". Without a steady flow of funds, the Chinese military could not manage its own reforms effectively to restructure itself into a modern fighting machine. Thus selling arms became an obvious way out to get those funds. The early Eighties thus saw the launching of the Chinese arms sale offensive in its first ever exhibition at an international arms trade fair in Australia in May 1984. Between 1979 and 1984, the PRC had been the seventh largest arms exporting country. In 1984, it suddenly shot up to the fifth largest. Between 1984 and 1987, arms sales yielded more than $8.2 billion in hard currency. In 1986-90 China remained the fifth largest exporter. In the list of arms exporters to the developing world, China ranks third, (after the USA and Russia) concerning more than 10 per cent of the market. Even although the Chinese can in no way match the American volume of arms sales.

In keeping with the high-tech approach, military research and development (R & D) was the only area, which received greater resource allocation during the 1980s. But such allocations required hard currency support to finance the purchase of weapons-systems and the flow of specific technology from Western firms to assist China's ambitions defence modernization programme. Conspicuously, China engaged in arrangements with Western firms to strengthen its aerospace industry. China had

---

286 Acharya, Alka: OP.Cit. No.281, pp 151-152.
embarked on a US $ 800 million project with Grumman to develop its fighter aircraft, while the cost of upgrading its F-7 fighter and acquiring other equipment, was estimated at US $ 200 million and US $ 500 million, respectively. China began to work in collaboration with France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the U.K., US and lately with Israel in arms production programmes. In 1990, China cancelled its defence contract with American firms, following the US arms embargo in June 1989, and turned promptly to Moscow for arms purchases and technology transfer.

Today China has successfully carved out a definite niche for her in the world arms market by providing inexpensive and even specialized military equipment. Chinese sale of conventional arms, hardware, and technical assistance in missile field to Gulf countries mainly Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Chinese sales to Iraq mainly T-59, F-69 tank, T-531 APCS 138 mm artillery, antiship missiles (including Hy-2 silk worm and B-6 Bomber). In Iran-China delivered nearly F-6, F-17 Fighter aircraft, T-50 tank, T-501 APCS (Armoured Personnel Carriers), T-63 ARLS (Multiple Rocket Launchers) and silkworms. China sales to Saudi Arabia nearly CSS-2 IRBMS (Intermediate range ballistic missiles).

China expanded its arms export to Sudan by supplying some F-6 Fighter, a number of F-7 fighter, tank and MRLS under a US $ 300 million deal signed in

287 Strategic Digest, September 1989.
288 Kamal, Nazir: OP.Cit. No.279, pp 114.
290 Ibid., pp 252.
March 1991\textsuperscript{291}. In middle-east, China also maintained important defence link with Egypt. China sold numerous naval vessels, antiship missiles for the Jianghu-class frigates and Huangfen-class fast attack crafts\textsuperscript{292}. The United States strongly criticized China for supplying arms in the Gulf region because it counters the US, Gulf and Middle-East policy.

In South Asia, China continued to play a traditional role as a major arms supplier to Pakistan, Srilanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and Nepal. In the region, Pakistan was the major recipient of Chinese conventional arms, missile and nuclear know-how.

Other notable recipients of Chinese arms in recent years have been Thailand and Myanmar. Sino-Thai arms trade relationship began in 1986. China has supplied to Thailand T-69 Tanks, T-531 APCS and frigates (mainly Hianghu-Class). Sino-Myanmar arms deals includes Tanks, APCS, Anti aircraft, Anti Aircraft Artillery combat capable K-8 Jet trainers\textsuperscript{293}. China has ignored the US-led effort to isolate the 'SLOPE' regime in Yangon and the European community's call in July 1991 for an international arms embargo on Myanmar for its human right violation. China won a new customer in 1991 by agreeing to provide the Philippines with two logistic support vessels valued at US $ 34 million. Resistance groups in Afghanistan and Cambodia have also been recipients of Chinese weapons. Beijing maintains that it ceased

\textsuperscript{291} Lowery, Robert. Sudan Strengthening forces as fighting is started up, Janel's Defence Weekly, May 9, 1992, pp 806.
\textsuperscript{292} Sipri Year Book, 1989, pp 394.
\textsuperscript{293} Strategic Digest, February 1991, No.2, pp 311.
supplying arms to the Khmer Range immediately after the United Nations peace plan for Cambodia was adopted in September 1990.\textsuperscript{294}

China's drive to export arms extended to ballistic missiles and space rockets, along with technology transfers. China sells missiles to South Arabia, Brazil, Pakistan, Iraq, North Korea, Burma and Argentina. The missile sold include the zone potent long range missiles such as the CSS-2, the M-9 and 11, the silk worm, the DF-61 and the Hy-2. China has also been a supplier of nuclear material.\textsuperscript{295} China has transferred nuclear weapon programmes as that of North Korea, Pakistan, Brazil, Algeria, Iran and Syria. China has transferred the complete design of 25 kilo ton nuclear weapon to Pakistan. She is also suspected to supply 220 kg enriched uranium. In April 1998, Algeria was constructing a nuclear research complex at Oussora with China. In June 1990 China agreed to sell Iran a micro-nuclear reactor for the Isfahan nuclear complex. Syria also receiving a 30 KW research reactor.\textsuperscript{296}

US pressure on China to abide by its schemes for controlling arms proliferation in the third world. China seemed to be the only major power impending the realization. America's heightened non-proliferation objective, especially in south and south east Asia where US objectives faced stiff resistance from several countries with whom China maintained a significant arms transfer relationship.\textsuperscript{297} The US has been the top arms supplier of the world wide arms transfers, as far as transfers of arms to

\textsuperscript{294} Kamal Nazir: OP.Cit. No.279, pp.119.
\textsuperscript{295} Uday, Bhaskar. C. Role of China in the emerging world order. Strategic Analysis (April 1993) pp 7.
\textsuperscript{296} Kamal Nazir: OP.Cit. No. 279, pp 122-123.
\textsuperscript{297} Ibid. pp 125.
the third world countries are concerned. In east-Asia, the US share of their arms transfer is 50 per cent. In south Asia USA transfers the arms mainly to Pakistan\textsuperscript{298}. However, China's prospects of maintaining its position as a major supplier of third world countries are destabilizing the US objectives.

After disintegration of USSR, China has shown the strong desire to settle herself as a strong arms dealer in world market. The whole of the South Asian regions got shock due to this move. Particularly, China is providing weapons to Indian neighbours, which create a great concern in Indian encirclement. Today China is supplying missile to 14 countries. Around 25 countries had brought from her surface to surface missile, near about 23 countries are getting air craft and 20 countries are getting fighter planes. In world market China at present is providing 8 per cent weapons of total. China's arms supply to South Asian, South East Asian and Central Asian countries could counter production for Indian security in future.

\textsuperscript{298} Narayan, Rajan: OP.Cit. No. 280, pp 74 - 75.