(a) Border dispute before Independence

The dispute between India and China is set in an arena of vast proportion. China and India have some 2,500 miles of common frontier extending from north-west Kashmir to a tripartite junction of India, Burma and China near Talu Pass. Both India and China agree that their boundary is a traditional one; but the Chinese contend that although the line claimed by them had been formed through thousands of years of history, it could not be based on any abstract geographical principle. The line adopted different geographical principle in different situation. The Indian side had challenged the basis of such an argument and held that in mountainous areas, which were unaffected by political changes, national boundaries tended to follow the watershed line of the mountain ranges. Between India and China known throughout history to have been separated by natural mountain barriers, the dispute largely centred round the determination of the particular line of mountains, which acted as the natural and traditional boundary. Here, in addition to such evidence as the two parties had of actual jurisdictional evidence, one had necessarily to be guided by national laws of human behaviour. This did not mean that all other evidences would be set aside, but that the validity and possibility of such evidence would be tested against the natural laws of human

125 Sharma, Surya P. India’s Boundary and territorial disputes, Vikas Publications, New Delhi, 1972, pp 152.
behaviour in the formation of a truly traditional and natural boundary. The Chinese had agreed that the boundary between the two countries was a traditional one and they could not possibly demur to an examination of such natural processes as were involved in the formation of traditional boundaries. It was the age of a great game and Lord Curjon was at the helm of British affairs in India. In his new famous observation he revealed the problem which confronted the British not just in India but in the entire 'modern world'. The mountainous border between China and India are a legacy of history; the Sino-Indian border is divided into three sectors. The **Western Sector** is the boundary between the Laddakh area of Indian held Kashmir and Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Xizag (Tibet). The **Middle Sector** much shorter in length touches three Indian states – Eastern Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh and the **Eastern Sector** separates Xizang from the Indian states of Assam and Nagaland.

**Western Sector:**

In the Western Sector, the boundary starts from the Karakoram Pass along the watershed between the Shyok and the Yarkand, runs through QaraTag Pass, and ascends the main Kuen Lun mountains, at a point well beyond 80°21' E and descends in a south-westerly direction. It is about 1100 miles. In the western sector, the Indian Government bases its claims upon two agreements: the 1684

---

treaty between Laddakh and Tibet and China. The treaty of 1684 between Laddakh and Tibet, which confirmed the traditional Laddakh Tibet, border\textsuperscript{128}.

Laddakh, which at first was and independent state, came under the suzerainty of the Mughul Empire about 1664. A mixed force of Mangols and Tibetan involved Laddakh during 1681-83 but they were ousted in toto by the Laddakhis with the support of the Mughul Government of Kashmir. This was followed by a treaty of peace in 1684 between Laddakh and Tibet. The record of this in the Alamgir Nama, the official chronicle of the region of Aurangzeb\textsuperscript{129}. The treaty of 1842 is important, as it is the most recent treaty concerning the Laddakh-Tibet border. The treaty did not lay down specific boundaries but merely re-established the status quo ante and re-affirmed the traditional boundary between Laddakh and Ari (Western, Tibet); The Maharaja of Kashmir, the Dalai Lama of Tibet, and the Chinese Emperor signed the treaty. The Tibetan text of the treaty confirms that China was a party to it\textsuperscript{130}. In addition, the Indian side produced German maps and one issued in 1912 by the Royal Geographical Society clearly indicating that the boundary of Sinkiang extended only up to the Khen-Lun\textsuperscript{131}.

The Chinese Government registered its objection to the agreement of 1684 and 1842. She challenge the vary existence of the agreement.

\textsuperscript{128} Link, April 19, 1992, pp 18.
\textsuperscript{129} Wing Commandar, J. Thomas, Solving the Indian China border, Indian Defence Review, March 1986, pp 52.
\textsuperscript{130} China Armed Report, Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, New Delhi, 1959, pp 60.
\textsuperscript{131} Palit, R.K., India-China border dispute, New Delhi, p 167.
Middle Sector:

The Indian Government clearly able to establish historic possession up to the crest of Himalayas in Eastern Sector, documents drawn from as long ago as the epic period, 1500 B.C., establish the fact that the Northern frontier of India stretched along the crest of Himalayan ranges. In north east, the traditional boundary was formalized at a tripartite conference held in Simla from October 1913 to July 1914.\(^{12}\)

MacMahon was the Foreign Secretary of British India. A former army engineer, he was a specialist in survey and had helped in demarcating the MacMahon Line. MacMahon marked this line on a large scale map attached to his treaty with the Tibetan representative at Simla in 1914. The maps of 1914 were far from perfect. MacMahon drew the line where he thought the watershed was the Indo-Tibetan boundary agreement of March 1914, which laid down in clear terms the Indo-Tibetan boundary in a map on scale 1:8 miles. It runs mostly along the crest of the high Himalayan range which forms the natural frontier between the Tibetan Plateau in the North and sub-mountain region in South. The Chinese letter contended that this agreement was concluded behind the back of the Chinese representative and that they were not bound by it. Both the Simla convention and

---

\(^{12}\) Sharma, Suriya, P.: OP.Cit. No. 125, pp 18
the map attached to it were signed by Ivan Chen, the Chinese representative. Although, the Chinese Government later repudiated his signature\textsuperscript{133}.

The middle sector of the boundary between Tibet and India is the frontier of Uttar Pradesh, H.P. and Punjab States in North India. The boundary between Uttar Pradesh follow the watershed between the Sutlej on the one hand and the Ganges (the Kali, the Alaknanda and the Jadh Ganga) on the other. However, this watershed has been the traditional and well known boundary. Revenue records of the Garhwal district as far back as 1850 established this. Even Chinese maps upto 1958, the watershed as the frontier. The Nilang – Jadhang area, Bara Hati, Lapthal and Sangeha Malla, which according to the contention of the Chinese Government lie in Tibet, are in fact well on the Indian side of the watershed. Niland-Jadhang is an area of 700 square miles north of the middle Himalayan range but south of the watershed. Bara Hati, a small area of about 1 square mile also lies between the main watershed. Lapthal and Sangeha malla are south-east of Bara Hati, in Almora district in Uttar Pradesh. The boundary between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet is the water parting between the eastern and the western tributories of the Sutlej; and the boundary between the Punjab and Tibet is the major watershed between the Para chu and the Spiti River system\textsuperscript{134}.

The dispute in a central sector revolves around the status of a number of mountain passes and other individual and relatively small areas. The Indian

\textsuperscript{133} China’s Annual Report of MEA, New Delhi, 1962, pp 63.

\textsuperscript{134} Link, OP.Cit. No.128, pp 18.
Government bases its claims on an agreement concluded in 1890, Great Britain and China concluded a treaty declaring that India was henceforth to exercise direct and exclusive control in the conduct of Sikkim's foreign relations\textsuperscript{135}. Article-I of the treaty clearly defines between Tibet and Sikkim which confirms to the now claimed by India. The boundary was jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895. An Anglo-Tibetan Treaty of Lhasa 1904 reiterated this provision regarding the agreed upon border\textsuperscript{136}.

For India, perhaps the most serious British failure was their inability to persuade China to agree to any boundaries in Northern Assam, East of Nepal, and the Akasi Chin. In northern Assam, India at present relies on the Mac Mahon Line, which was product of British attempts after 1904 to limited Chinese expansion and define the precise area of British responsibility in the Himalayas. There are two versions of Mac Mahon Line and China consider neither mandatory. The Chinese maintain that the Simla convention is not binding on them since they never ratified it. Both India and China agree that there is a traditional boundary in Akasi Chin but disagree on its location. China at times even reject the claims that a boundary was drawn at all\textsuperscript{137}.

According to the Chinese, in the middle and the east, their territory extended to the Southern side of the Himalayan ridges. In the West, Chinese territory included an area of about 15,000 sq. miles from Laddakh, the Spiti area,

\textsuperscript{135} Sharma, Surya, P.: OP.Cit.No. 125, pp 10-12.
\textsuperscript{136} Banerjee, Paul: OP.Cit. No.127, pp 15.
the Spiki Pass, the Nilang, Jhadang and Barahati areas, while in the east it covered the whole of North-east. A frontier agency (NFEA) covering about 35,000 square miles. As for NFEA, through the Chinese did not accept the MacMahon Line, the precise extent to their claim was never made clear. The Chinese refused to accept that the line was in any way legal\textsuperscript{138}.

Official Chinese map after 1949 confirmed to ignore the boundaries of the Simla Convention. The International border with India in the eastern sector was shown as lying at the Himalayan foothills. In the western sector, there were wide differences between Chinese and Indian border demarcation. China claims a huge portion of land both in the eastern and western sector; around 32,000 square miles and 10,000 to 14,000 square miles, respectively, which India considered its own. In the Central sector, the Chinese claim ran into a few hundred square miles. During discussion preceding the 1945 agreement between Indian and China neither side raised the frontier question nor did the Agreement specifically refer to the Sino-Indian Frontier\textsuperscript{139}.

Chinese were serious about their border claims because apparent the same year when they protested against what they termed on the intrusion of Indian troop beyond Niti Pass into Wu-Ze. Even after repeated requests from the Indian Government, they did not change their map nor did they accept the boundaries given by the British. Chinese Government replied that their map was based on old

\textsuperscript{138} Banerjee, Paul: OP.Cit. No.127, pp 20.
\textsuperscript{139} Dutt, Subimal, With Nehru in Foreign Office, Calcutta, 1977, pp 113.
maps of the Kuomintang period and they did not assert any claims on the basis of these maps nor did they challenge the official Indian maps which were showing the traditional alignment.

The current position of India-China boundary is as follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Length</strong></td>
<td>4056 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Length by sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>2176 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>554 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>1326 km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area under dispute</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sector</td>
<td>38,000 sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle sector (area under actual dispute may be only 40-45 sq. km)</td>
<td>2,000 sq. km</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Sector</td>
<td>90,000 sq. km</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

India has also the world's second longest land border with China, which too is not a friendly border. The 'hot' to 'tepid' Indian border with the neighbour strain the country's security. Constant security guard had to be mounted on the border. The nature of the border being very diverse – mountains, plains, waters, deep jungles – security also has to be of diverse kinds. Very long stretches of the border are 'alive' and have to be actively protected.

Much of the border territory is politically soft. Some are inhabited by extra rural tribes like the Nagas and Mizos. Assam a border state is being threatened by
a 'liberation' Movement, Tripura has a tribal insurgency. There is a perceived threat of separatism and disintegration.\(^{140}\)

The unresolved border disputes of the nineteenth century continued well into the present century and thereby initiated the political milieu of the south Asian region. On the contrary, the existence of the Akasi Chin and the Mac Mahon Lines constructed Sino-Indian relations. The compulsions of the borders drew India and china inexorably into the vertex of a crisis. Chinese leadership understood this long before Indian leadership could. Nehru tried to wish away the border problem, but he could not do so.

China continues to occupy 38,000 sq. km of Ladakh's Aksai Chin region, which is 4,000 sq. km of land located west of the Karakoram Pass illegally ceded to China by Pakistan.

The map below shows the line separating the Indian and Chinese forces on Sept. 7, 1962, in the Eastern Sector. The line was the same as the natural and traditional border of India in the sector, which was formalised under the Simla agreement of 1914 and came to be known as the McMahon Line. The map also shows the Chinese claim line in this sector.

Source: The Economic Times New Delhi Friday, 22 May 1998
(b) **Panchsheel Agreement**

China's policies towards India have been characterized as a judicious combination of deep strategy, observable from the pattern of her actions, is to gain in strategic edge over India in inner Asia by courting Indian acquiescence in the Chinese occupation of Tibet. This region of Asia is of particular interest to China.

Nehru did not give up Tibet easily. In 1950 he tried his best, mainly through diplomacy to prevent the Chinese military occupation of resolution of Sino-Tibetan tensions. Though, he ultimately sacrificed. Tibet for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship, Nehru was clearly determined to protect India's vital interests in the Himalayan region. As the Chinese communists neared their revolutionary victory, Nehru was rushing through a series of defence treaties with Bhutan (Aug 8, 1949), Nepal (July 31, 1950) and Sikkim (Dec. 5, 1950). These countries constituted Nehru's definition of a security zone in which India would tolerate no foreign interference. In Public statement in August and December 1959, Nehru offered support in defence of Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim in case of Chinese invasion.

All the outstanding problems between India and China, particularly the border question and demarcation at respective spheres of special interest — that is, China's Tibet and India's Himalayas — were resolved by 1954\(^\text{141}\). In this context Government of China and Govt. of India, being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India and to facilitating

---

\(^{141}\) Norbu, Dewa: Tibet in Sino-Indian relations, Strategic Digest. April 1998, pp. 536.
pilgrimage and travel by the people's of China and India, have resolved to enter into the present agreement based on the following principles:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. Mutual non-aggression,
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. Equality and mutual benefits, and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

This was the preamble of the India-China agreement on trade and cultural relations between Tibet and India in 1954. These five principles were to become famous as the 'Panchsheel', incorporating widely acclaimed principles that should govern mutual relations between states.

Premier Chau-En-Lai, in a letter to Nehru at the time of signing of the agreement on April 29, 1954 further commended these principles by saying that "the signing of this agreement not only will strengthen further the friendship between the peoples of China and India, but also fully demonstrates the fact that a reasonable settlement can be achieved for any international question so long as the nations abide by the above mentioned principles and adopt the way of negotiation."

---

142 Pauly Perakal, Peking's Bilateral of Asia (Forgotten Panchsheel), New Delhi, 1976, pp.16.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India pointed out in his speech at a state banquet given to Premier Zhau-En-Lai of China on June 26, 1954 during the latter's first visit to India.

"The major question before the world today is how to get rid of the specter of war and fear and hatred which oppress so many countries and peoples. In Asia, peace is even more vital and necessary than elsewhere, for we have to utilize all our energies in the task of construction and not of destruction".

In the same spirit, Zhau-En-Lai said in his reply "we are confident that the hope of peace-loving nations and people of Asia will frustrate the scheme of war instigators". As a result of the successful visit, a joint statement was issued, in which the two Prime Ministers earnestly commanded to the whole world the Five principles, originally written in the preamble of the "China-India Agreement on trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India", which was signed just two months earlier. The joint statement reads "The Prime Minister recognised that different social and political system exist in various parts of Asia and the world. It however, the above mentioned principles are accepted and acted upon and there is no interference by any one counting with another, these differences should not come in the way of peace or create conflicts. With the assurance of territorial integrity and of non-aggression, there would be peaceful co-existence and friendly relations between the countries concerned. This would
lessen the tensions that exit in the world today and help in creating a climate of peace.

And yet, what is the record of Peking in its relations with India? Ever since the Maoist leadership of the PRC elevated its claims over large tracts of territory on India's Northern borders in a border dispute and then escalated the border dispute into an open war in 20 Oct., 1962, it has been grossly flouting all these principles. Some of them were flouted even earlier when the Chinese Government began its road-building activity in Laddakh, it discarded respect for India's territorial integrity and sovereignty. The border war smote to smithereens the principle of mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence. Ever since the war, the Peking regime has been grossly interfering in the internal affairs of India and inciting and aiding all kinds of disruptive and anti-national elements within this country. Another blatant interference in the internal affairs of India is the arming and training of Naga and Mizo rebels who want to secede from India.

Peking's most blatant interference in the internal affairs of India and the most ravenous cry to rebel against the Government of India has come in the case of Sikkim. The people of Sikkim had been struggling for a democratic set up for years and in the beginning of 1973 a process began where their aspirations were being fulfilled step by step. This process culminated in the Himalayan State

---

143 Chen Qida, Panchsheel, Historical Background and Present relevance, Air Commodore Jasjit Singh (Ed.), India-China Panchsheel, New Delhi, 1991 pp.53.
144 Pauly Parkal: OP.Cit. No.142, pp.16.
145 The Times of India, May 4, 1975.
joining the Indian Union and becoming the 22\textsuperscript{nd} State of India. But the Maoists did not like this at all; fulmination and war cries rent the air.

But the Maoists were not to be fazed PRC Vice Premier Li-Hsien-Nein went to the ridiculous limit when he declared during a visit to Rawalpindi in 1975, "China would continue to render resolute support to the people of Sikkim and other peoples in South Asia in their struggle against hegemonism and expansionism"\textsuperscript{146}.

The metamorphosis, which the Chinese leadership under went even in the case of Sikkim, will be evident when one recalls that as late as 1960, when Chau-En-Lai came to New Delhi to negotiate over border dispute, he had recognized India's position in Sikkim. As the Indian Express on May 2, 1975 put it, "observers here find it interesting that the Chinese Government has chosen to ignore its own past statement. In 1960, Mr. Chau-En-Lai had said, "China respect India's position in Sikkim".

Kashmir is a continuing case study. By virtue of its accession to India, the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. But in the late fifties, Peking laid claims to large areas in Laddakh and later backed up its claims with armed might. It violated India's sovereignty over those areas. It secretly built a road in Aksai Chin, from Sinkiang to western Tibet, and occupied large areas. Further, ever since, Peking has been egging on Pakistan to wage war against India

\textsuperscript{146} Pauly Perkal: OP.Cit No.142, pp.21.
over Kashmir and supporting the alleged right of self-determination of the "Kashmir people".

Here, the sand is of full support to Pakistan's claims to Kashmir. But a few months later, Chinese Vice-Premier Ten Hsiao-Tong was still talking about the right of self-determination for the people of Kashmir. In a speech in Peking on May 12, 1974, he said, "The Chinese Government and people will as always firmly support the people of Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination". Tong wants self determination for the Kashmir people, which means the latter can choose either India or Pakistan, but for Chang, Kashmir is already a part of Pakistan147.

Based on Kuomintang cartography and geographical art book, the maps published in China today reflect certain tendencies in the Maoist foreign policy. They are, virtual refusal to recognize some of the treaties defining China's frontiers on the pretext that they are 'unequal'. One imposed on china, claims to territories of neighbouring countries by both demands made and cartographic aggression and taking border disputes with neighbouring countries to the point of armed clashed, seizures and wars. All these are done ever while mouthing some sentiments as "good neighbours", "Non-interference in internal affairs", "Peaceful co-existence" and the rest of the Panchsheel tents148.

147 Mukerjee and Banerjee: China policy towards Asia, New Delhi 1975, pp.23.
148 Pauly Perkal: OP.Cit. No.142, pp.12
Panchsheel present relevance

Thus for the historical background for the laying down of the five Principle. Now, that forty five years have elapsed, do the five principles still bear relevance to the present international relations. Admittedly, the world has witnessed tremendous change since the end of the cold war. For one thing, the possibility of a new world war has receded and détente has taken the lace of tension; for another, colonism has been laid on its death bed, and economic competition has taken the place of military confrontation in international life. But this is only one side of the coin; on the other side, as a result of the end of the cold war and the subsequent disappearance of the old balance of world power, almost all contradictions formerly covered up by the East-West confrontation have come out into the open and the world is now plagued by even more turmoil and conflicts, though not as menacing as the international tension prevailing in the early 1950s. When the five principles were first initiated, one can safely say that the five principles have at least the same vitality today that they had forty years ago, if not more. As a matter of fact, they have been accepted by many countries as principles for safeguarding peace and security of the world149.

The demand for establishing a new international political order was first raised by Deng Xiaoping in 1988 during his talks with the visiting Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. At the end of Rajiv's visit, a Joint Communiqué was

149 Chen Qida: OP.Cit. No.143 pp.57.
issued, in which the leaders of the two countries commended as earnestly as their predecessors the five principles to the world. The Communique reads: "they (the leaders of China and India) emphasized that the five principles..... which have proved full of vitality through the test of history, constitute the basic guiding principles for good relations between States. These principles also constitute the basic guidelines for the establishment of a new international political order and the new international economic order."

In this regard Sino-Indian relations in the period after their Joint initiation of the five principles, China and India experienced a bitter period of mutual distrust. There even broke out a military conflict between them in 1962. But the spirit of the five principles eventually prevailed and the two countries agreed to deepen mutual understanding and came to mutual accommodation. Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988 brought Sino-Indian relations to a new phase. And Prime Minister P.V.Narasimha Rao's visit in 1993 culminated in the signing of a landmark agreement over the line of actual control (LAC) on the Sino-Indian border, thus paving the way for the eventual settlement of the boundary issue between them. Concluding his China trip, Mr.Rao said, "Now relations between India and China are matured. The two sides did not allow the differences between them to hamper the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two sides."
In the 45 years of that have passed since these principles were formulated there can be no dispute that these principles have been practised none in the breach than in observance. In sum, Panchsheel or the five principles are not only a product of historical necessity but also an urgent need of the Sino-Indian relations expect world today. The reason is that these principles have embodies all fundamental norms and basic requirements of international relations. Surely, they will go down from generation to generation. The world may change with the times but the spirit of Panchsheel will never perish from this world of ours.\(^{152}\)

(c) Tibet Problem

Sino-Indian relations during the post-colonial period, Tibet has appeared to be nearly invisible. However, an understanding of Indo-Tibetan relations helps clarify the context of the politics of Sino-Indian relations and buttresses a broader analysis of the objective impact of changing global and regional power structures. No sooner had two almost equally nationalistic regimes come to power in Delhi (1947) and Beijing (1949) than Tibet began to impinge on their relations. Stripped of diplomatic dressings, the critical question in 1950 was who should or could occupy the strategic buffer region between the two? Nehru acceded to the indirect but persistent Chinese demands in 1954, hoping that each state would respect the Himalayas as the operations perimeter of the other’s political interest and defence.

On October 1, 1949 the Central Government of the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed, and the Government of India extended its official recognition to it on December 30, 1949. One of the first tasks on the agenda of the Communists China was to ‘Liberate Tibet’, though Chau En-Lai did assure K.M. Panikkar, first Ambassador of India to the Communist China “that his Government was anxious to secure their ends by negotiations and not by military action. However, the Chinese army was soon ordered to advance into Tibet, and on October 25, 1950 Peking radio announced that the process of liberation of Tibet

153 Professor Norbu, Dowa, Tibet in Sino-Indian relations, Strategic Analysis, April 1998, pp 535.
had already begun. The next day the Govt. of India sent a note to Peking deploring the Chinese invasion and pleading for "Slower but more enduring methods of peaceful approach". The Chinese government immediately reported: "Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and no foreign interference shall be tolerated"\textsuperscript{154}.

While all this was happening in Tibet; a Tibetan goodwill mission was on its way to Peking. On May 23, 1951, a 17-point agreement was signed between Tibet and China. By this agreement the Tibetan people were to "unite and drive out imperialists forces from Tibet and return to the big family at Motherland – the People's Republic of China". Lhasa Government was to "actively assist" the PLA to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defences, the Tibetan Army was to be merged in the PLA and the Chinese Government was to handle all external affairs of Tibet in future\textsuperscript{155}.

Nehru did not give up Tibet so in 1950 he tried his best mainly through diplomacy, to prevent the Chinese military occupation of Tibet, and strongly advocated a peaceful resolution of Sino-Tibetan tensions. Though he ultimately sacrificed Tibet for the sake of Sino-Indian friendship, Nehru was clearly determined to protect India's vital interests in the Himalaya region\textsuperscript{156}. India can not save Tibet as Nehru confessed in the Rajya Sabha "Words like Bandung and

\textsuperscript{154} Professor Nobru, Dawa, Tibet as a invisible dynamic of Sino-Indian relations, Defence Today, January 1955
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} Nobru, Dowa: OP.Cit. No. 153, pp 536.
Panchsheel had begun to lose their shine and to be hurled abeyant without meaning, even as the world peace had become almost a thunderbolt\textsuperscript{157}.

India geopolitical, strategical and spiritual interest is directly linked with Tibet’s destiny and, therefore, China’s unwanted and oppressive presence in Tibet is a constant threat not only to the peace in the sub-continent.

It is no secret that the forced disappearance of Tibet as a nation created defence problems for India to an unprecedented magnitude. For the first time in centuries India’s defence has to be concentrated on northern frontiers due to China’s massive military and strategic build up in occupied Tibet. Chinese rulers were busy invading and occupying Tibet threatening India’s peaceful borders which bred only non-violence, mutual understanding, brotherly love and compassion for neighbours throughout their history\textsuperscript{158}.

The major ports of PLA stationed in Tibet are placed at strategic points at India’s borders like Natula, Jelapla, chola, Phari Naga Dony, Shar-Shigine Json, Zayal etc. In the later half of 1981, the Chinese nuclear base was shifted from Northern Janghtan to Kangpo Nyatri in Southern Tibet, which is much nearer to the so called Sino-Indian border. In the same region, the construction of International Ballistic Missile (ICBM) base has also been started. The original deployment of DF-4 (limited) ICBM with a range of 4000 kms was upgraded to the 7000 km version. These are possibly being replaced or augmented by the

\textsuperscript{157} Norbu, Dawa: OP. Cit. No.154, pp 14.
\textsuperscript{158} Mulik, B.N., My Years with Nehru, New Delhi, 1971, pp 76
12,800 kms DF-5 ICBM probably carrying 6 Megaton MIRVS. All these destructive activities bordering with insanity have no other aims but to pose a constant threat to the territorial integrity of India\textsuperscript{159}. The mere presence of Chinese nuclear-tipped missile in Tibet poses a direct and most serious challenge to India as these missile (DF-2, DF-3, DF-4 and DF-5) are capable of reaching all Indian cities\textsuperscript{160}. India’s northern frontiers all through the Himalayas had been with Tibet and not with China. India spends over Rs.700 crores per year for safeguarding her northern border alone. An independent Tibet as a buffer state could help India becoming one of the most developed nations in the world. According to reliable Tibetan youth Congress sources, the Chinese military set up in the whole of Tibet are commanded from 4 Zonal Headquarters:-

1. Chengtu – Szechuan Province
2. Lanchaw- Chinghai Province
3. Kunming – Yunan Province
4. Urumchi- Sinkinerg Province

Major part of the PLA troops in Tibet are stationed at Rutok, Gartook and Puling Sumdo in Western Tibet; Phri Nagar Dzong, Sharsingmo, Tsona, Lhuntse Dzeny, Sangacholing, Pemakod. Kongpa Milling, Nyitri, Metok Dzong, Dzayul,

\textsuperscript{159} Tiwari, Udaynarayan, Resurgent Tibet "A cause for non-aligned movement", New Delhi, 1983, pp 50-51.

etc., of Sautron Tibet. All these places are on the opposite side of North and North-east Indian borders. The intention of Chinese troop concentration in Tibet is clear because it is an area which Mao once called, after conquering Tibet, Ladakh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Nagaland are "The Five Fingers of a Palm of China".

According to the Hong Kong newspaper 'Xianggang Rihao', "the Chinese are building a large missile base in a mountainous area about 320 km North of Lhasa. The base currently has 90 missiles, when its construction is completed, China will be able to keep at gunpoint many cities in India". While those actions and preparations are in progress, Peking hypocritically declares its desire to normalise Sino-Indian relations and to settle the border issues by peaceful means. Military preparations are also being carried out in Tibet by constructing airfields and installing radar stations. There are at present 9 airfields and about 15 radar stations in Tibet. China military movement, accumulation of huge arms and ammunitions, transfer of ICBM base along the Indo-Tibetan border and also construction or improvement of Aerodromes is to wage another war against India\(^{161}\). Another serious development is shifting of ICBM base from Chang Thang (Northern Tibet) to Kongpo Nyatri and Powo Tawo, towards north-eastern Indo-Tibetan border. New ICBM base under the command and control of airforce headquarters at Gangdaklingkha in Lhasa.

\(^{161}\) Tiwari, Udaynarayan: OP.Cit. No.159, pp 52-54.
China's nuclear legacy in Tibet is influencing India's national security policy. The load of N-armaments along the border impinges precariously on India's strategic and environmental interests. Geostrategic location of Tibet between four nuclear weapon states (Russia-China-India-Pakistan), the territorial dispute with India and growing separatist Islamic movement in Sinking are critical factor in the evolving Chinese strategies to retain its capacity to become a global power in the 21st century162.

China exploitation of Tibet's resources, strategic depth and sequestered location to research, development, produce and deploy its strategic nuclear capabilities. She instituted its comprehensive nuclear weapon cycle, for inception, Research and Development, validation, production and the deployment of strategic forces, in Tibet in under a decade. In the early 1960's, while it was securing its southern flank with India, the Chinese government was already creating its primary nuclear weapons, Research and Development and production facilities on the Tibetan plateau.

A top secret nuclear city in Haiyen country- the Ninth Academy (Factory 211) China's primary nuclear weapons research and design facility, that designed all of China's earlier nuclear bombs. Nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities around the ninth academy. Nuclear facilities established in Huangyan. Under water related R & D and testing at Kokonor lake, extension uranium mining and deployment of

nuclear weapons on the Tibetan Plateau. China has conducted 43 nuclear tests 23 atmospheric and 20 underground.

Chinese deployment in Tibet escalating the threat to India beyond conventional military means to a nuclear one. The forward positioning of Chinese nuclear weapons on the Tibetan plateau bring India’s entire industrial and military facilities within striking range-albeit in a zero warning environment. The first nuclear weapon was deployed in Tibet in 1971. By and large, the deployment of 100 nuclear weapons in Tibet is restricted to the Qinhai province.

Besides some ICBMs and IRBMs, china has deployed a large number of medium and short range nuclear tipped missile and nuclear capable aircraft in Tibet. These deployment nuclear weapons constitutes threat in being to India.

The situation in Tibet is also likely to play a significant role in any conflict between China and India. In early 1970s, the then Foreign Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh and his officials sang almost daily the soothing mantra “Tibet is part of China” designed to convey the message to the PRC that India had no intention to move beyond the Himalayas.

Tibet loom large in Sino-Indian relations and politics, even after 50 years of Chinese occupation, because of its intimate confection with the strategic interest of both parties. It is a manifestation of containing Sino-Indian strategic rivalry in Inner Asia and the Himalayas. To the late Chang Empire strategists, Tibet was the

\[163\] OP.Cit. No.162
“lips” of the Chinese “Mouth” and the fulcrum of central Asian policies. Mao’s strategy considered Tibet as China’s back door and some of India’s elite still consider it as a buffer between India and China. The cruse of the Sino-Indian rivalry is thus; if the Chinese power elite consider Tibet to be strategically important to China, the Indian counterpart thinks it is equally vital to Indian national security. Tibet thus presents itself even today as a strategic dilemma for both parties. If India dominate Tibet, the Chinese feel insecure and threatened. Conversely, if China occupied Tibet (as it has since 1950) India feels that its whole northern security systems, stretching over 3200 km is open to external danger.

Thus, whenever China feels strategically vulnerable in Tibet, one makes moves toward New Delhi. And her strategic vulnerability in Tibet increases in direct proportion to her perception of India allying formally or informally, with a great external power hostile to China at a given period of time. That is to say China does not usually perceive threat to her occupation of Tibet from India acting by itself. Chinese threat perceptions increase whenever she suspects India acting in concern with great external powers hostile to China. In such a combination, Beijing suspects, constitutes a definite danger to the Chinese occupation of Tibet.

---

165 Monthly Public Opinion, Tibetan at cross roads of Frustration Fury in India, April, 1997
(d) **Sino-Indo conflict and co-operation**

India and China, the two Asian giants, have shared a long history of friendly relations stretching from ancient time in the fields of trade, culture and religion, science, literature and art. Diplomatic ties date back of Han period. Over the years, the two countries have been regarded as Champions and leaders of the Third World. Both have stood by certain principles, like anticolonism, Asian unity, equality of all nations, etc. Independent India and revolutionary China mould towards a natural and logical course of friendship and good neighbourliness. Both have also made much of their shared commonalties of historical experience and civilizational values, the basis of present national concerns, future international concerns and future international objectives. Sino-Indian relations are from a period when both were not independent sovereign nations. There is evidence in the statement of leaders of the National Liberation Movements in both countries that they sympathized deeply with their respective popular struggles for ending colonialism. An indication of the type of mutual regard they had for the unfolding historical process in India and china may be had in a letter written by Mao Tse Tung to Jawaharlal Nehru in July 1940. In this letter, Mao Tse Tung wrote "our emancipation, the emancipation of the Indian
people and the Chinese will be the signal of the emancipation of all the down-
trodden and oppressed\textsuperscript{166}.

The first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and virtually the architect of Sino-Indian friendship said that "I have always thought that it is important even essential that these two countries of Asia; India and China, should have friendly and, as far as possible, co-operative relations. It would be a tragedy not only for India, and possible for China, but for Asia and the whole world, if they develop some kind of permanent hostility. Friendship can not exist between the weak and the strong, between a country that is trying to bully and the other which agrees to be bullied. It is only when people are more or less equal and when they respect each other, that they can be friends. That is true of nations also we did work for the friendship of India and China and despite all that has happened and is happening, we shall continue to work for it. That does not mean that we should surrender anything that we consider right and that we should hand over bits of territory to china to please them. That is not the way to be friends with anybody or to maintain our dignity or self-respect\textsuperscript{167}. All this, however, have not helped to resolve their bilateral problems or to construct a relationship of co-operation envisaged in Panchsheel. The boundary dispute is the major irritant which has been devilled the process of rapprochemement between India and China. For four decades, Sino-Indian hostility had remained one of the constant features of the

\textsuperscript{166} Subrahamyan, K.: Nehru and India-China conflict of 1962 in Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi 1992, pp. 110.

\textsuperscript{167} Jawaharlal Nehru: Indian Foreign Policy, New Delhi, 1964, pp. 344.
global scene. The Sino-Indian relationship remained marred by suspicion and mistrust.\textsuperscript{168}

**Good relations turned sour:**

India was amongst the first countries to recognize the new regime in China when Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was established on 1 Oct. 1949. It was a decision taken against the prevalent opinion in Washington and at a time when India was keen to secure US aid for industrialization. Sino-Indian relations were based on five principles of co-existence (Panchsheel). By 1954, "Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai" slogan was at its climax. China started brandishing. Nehru and other Indian leaders as "Lackeys of western imperialism" and calling India "a running dog of imperialism and a colonial state", cracks in good relations started appearing. China started laying claims to certain Indian territory as Chinese and indulging in violations and intrusions into Indian territory. To prepare grounds for its intrusions, China started blaming India for intrusion. Its first note mentioning the intrusions was on 17 July 1954. In August, 1954, the Chinese violated India's frontiers at Baro Hati in middle sector. The year 1955 saw the first intrusion by the Chinese troops in NEFA. China was unhappy over India's stand over Tibet. It was in 1959 that Sino Indian relations turned sour.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{168} Santosh. Sino-Indian border dispute. Link, July 3, 1994, pp.8.

\textsuperscript{169} Lt.Col. (Dr.)Bhupender: Current Events, Patiala, 1992, pp.178.
Sino-Indian war of 1962 and relations completely broken:

After the failure of Chairman Mao’s Great Leap Forward Programme, in October 1962, China decided to resolve the Sino-Indian border issue by use of force. In October 1962, the PLA moved in swiftly, defeated Indian army and declare unilateral cease-fire latter taking possession of approximately 30,000 sq km. of Indian territory.

Nathula of 1967:

In September 1967, the PLA launched a direct attack on the Indian armed forces at Nathula, on the Sikkim-Tibet border. The six day "border skirmishes" from September 8 to 13, 1967 had all the elements of a high drama, including exchange of heavy artillery fire, and the PLA soldiers tried to cross the border in large numbers.

Sumdorong Chu Valley incident of 1986:

Chairman Deng decided to flex China’s muscles again with India. In mid 1986, it came to the notice of India that the PLA had built a helipad at Wandung in Sumdorong chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh. India reacted swiftly and the PLA had an eyeball to eyeball confrontation with the Indian army in Sumdorong Chu Valley of Arunachal Pradesh in August 1986170.

---

170 Sreedhar: China becoming a super power and India's option. Strategic Analysis, July 1997, pp.534, 537
Nuclear Test:

Apart from occasional references to the 'Entry into Force' (EIF) Clause of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to the general nuclearisation of India's surrounding environment, the Government of India has already projected China as the single most important determinant of New Delhi's decision to carry out its recent series of Five Nuclear tests at Pokhran on May 11 and 13, 1998. And going by the gaze of official statements that followed, China has also been said to be the main focus evolving new part-Pokhran-II strategic profile. There is indeed a lot of truth in these projections, yet the another of statements from both sides of the Himalayas has resulted in unleashing a diplomatic show down which threatens to derail the entire process of Sino-Indian rapprochement which has been so assiduously evolved during the last decade or so.\(^\text{171}\)

To recall, China's response to India's nuclear explosion of 1974 had also been completely mute except for a Xinhua report describing it as potentially having an adverse impact on India's economic development. This time again China's initial response to India's nuclear tests was extremely measured, pragmatic, and gradual to say the least. There was no indication of ganging up against India, which started becoming prominent in China's later responses. This clearly shows that it wasn't India's tests but its follow-up which led to the Sino-Indian diplomatic showdown. To gaze Beijing's response to India's nuclear tests

the graphic picture can be plotted like this. The news of India's nuclear tests on May 11, 1998 was followed by Beijing's complete silence for the next 24 hours. At the end of this they expressed their grave concern about this development and described India's nuclear tests as "destabilizing" to the South Asian regional strategic balance. But their response to India's second series of tests on May 13 was relatively harsher. The statement issued by China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 14, 1998, among others, made the following five points:

- The Chinese Government is deeply shocked by this and hereby expresses its strong condemnation.
- This act of India is nothing but an outrageous contempt for the comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and a hard blow on the international effort to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation.
- It will entail serious consequences to the peace and stability of South Asia and the world at large.
- The international community should adopt a common position in strongly demanding India to immediately stop its nuclear development programme.
- And finally, the statement added a further sting by characterizing India as the trying-to-be hegemon in South Asia and describing India's expression of the China threat as the factor in its decision to go for nuclear testing as utterly groundless, which threatened to once again bring Mao's hard-hitting expressions back to the Sino-Indian diplomatic lexicon (emphasis added)\(^\text{172}\).

However, it was the leakage of Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter in The New York Times that unleashed a barrage of anti-India reports and commentaries.

in China's official press. A commentary in the People's Daily of May 15, 1998 criticized India of seeking hegemony in South Asia and said that India was using "China as a scapegoat in its unbridled zest for nuclear development" which it described as "nothing but a groundless accusation" and advised India to "cherish the hard-won achievements in Sino-Indian relations and stop uttering words that are detrimental to the feeling of the Chinese people" and doing deeds that are harmful to bilateral relations.\(^{173}\)

**Parameters of Sino-Indian Relations:**

It needs to be clearly recognized that China's claims to vast tracts of Indian borders are related in the main to ideological and power factors. The primary motivations behind the border dispute were more political than territorial and it was essentially a part of a much broader and deeper conflict implicit in the very geopolitical configuration of the two countries, particularly after the elimination of Tibet as a buffer zone. The fundamental objective of the entire Chinese strategy as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few thousand miles of mountainous territory-not all which was strategically vital to China-as to eliminate India as a power of some consequence from the Asian scene China's policy in South Asia – imposing a deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962, tarnishing its image as a great Asian country, systematically eroding its special ties with its Himalayan neighbours,

exploiting sub-continental dissensions by embarking on a deliberate policy of collusion with Pakistan and above all weakening the political stability of India through clandestine support to Mizo and Naga insurgents – has been essentially an exercise in isolating India and eroding its influence in the region.

China continues to represent a deep concern for Indian strategic, notwithstanding a growing feeling that it has neither the will nor the means to challenge India in the sub-continent. China's emergence as a formidable power both in conventional terms as well as nuclear power capability – strengthening not only its military position but also its bargaining power – has resulted in a vast power gap with its neighbours. Nevertheless India's emergence as a major force since the seventies ensures that while it may not be in a position to dominate others, no other power in South Asia can challenge its preeminence. This makes for China's continued politico-strategic stakes in reducing India's influence by keeping military and political pressure on India as also building up the other regional states as a counterweight to India. A stable peace between India and China would, therefore, have to rest not only on a satisfactory resolution of the border dispute on agreed principles – necessarily involving some territorial concessions in a process of give and take – but also on a clear recognition of their relative power status and geo-political stakes in the region. China's peaceful settlement of its border dispute with its smaller neighbours like Nepal, Burma, Pakistan and Afghanistan and its steady refusal to adopt a similar conciliatory tone to India. So long as the basic problem of political co-existence between India and China is not
resolved, a mere settlement of the border dispute—undoubtedly the key factor in Sino-Indian conflict.\textsuperscript{174}

\textbf{Co-operation:}

Sino-Indian interaction can be divided into three major phases. The First Phase (1976-1988) was characterized by both simply gauging the Potential for expanding mutual goodwill and trust. The Second Phase (1988-1996) witnessed five formal summits interspersed by hectic initiatives and agreements towards evolving and solidifying confidence building measures (CBMs). Then having established this strong network of CBMs with the recent four agreements including the one that extends CBMs to the military field signed during President Jiang Zemin’s visit to New Delhi, Sino-Indian rapprochement has now entered its Third and final Phase (1996) where the two are expected to take concrete decisions on more difficult issues like defining and demarcating their border, and their co-operation has already resulted in evolving common strategy on various regional and global issues. So much so that today CBM have come to be the byword for Sino-Indian rapprochement.\textsuperscript{175}

It is in this backdrop that we must examine India’s policy options vis-à-vis China, say in the short and medium terms. To discuss long term perspectives at this stage is not correct, as there are so many imponderables.


\textsuperscript{175} Dr. Singh, Swaran: Sino-Indian CBMs problems and prospects, Strategic Analysis, July 1997, pp. 544.
At one level, the current phase of Sino-Indian relations started in the early 1980s by the late Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, progressed satisfactorily. Both sides took a number of confidences building measures, including high level political visits, armed forces-to-armed forces contacts, dialogue at various levels, etc. The Sino-Indian joint working group has been meeting regularly. Even the bilateral trade, which was at a low level, started picking up. In other words, both India and China have engaged themselves in a constructive dialogue, which proved to be mutually beneficial.

Second is the economic cooperation between the two countries. Both China and India are developing countries, and each side enjoys some advantage over the other in trade. Incidentally, both are exporters of primary commodities and semi-manufactured goods. At the moment, in the international market, India enjoys a marginal advantage over China, because of its being a member of the World Trade Organization.

Otherwise, both the economies are competing with each other in the international market. Therefore, the scope for a larger volume of India-China trade is rather slim. The existing volume of India-China trade of around $1 billion may at best become $4-5 billion by the turn of the century. In percentage terms of foreign trade of India and China, this is less than one per cent of each country's trade.

\[176\] Sreedhar: OP.Cit. No. 170, pp.541.
Lastly, the option to improve people-to-people level contacts between India and China. This, undoubtedly, is one area where more interaction can take place between the two countries. But here too, the spirit of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai of the 1950s can not stage a comeback for obvious reasons.

To conclude, for their own strategic interests, both China and India broke the impasse that had set into their relations from 1962 onwards, in the early 1980s, and continued to do so even in the 1990s. The political leaderships of both these nations have, over the last 15 years, evolved a mature relationship, which is mutually beneficial. To take it beyond this level in the immediate future does not seem possible at this point of time. However, both nations would continue the existing level of relationship in future also in their own interests177.

First Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Agreement (1993):

Signed between Prime Ministers Narasimha Rao and Li Peng at Beijing's Great Hall of the People on September 7, 1993, the "Agreement of Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control" (henceforth MPTA) was hailed as the first major conventional arms control agreement between two Asian countries without any role played by third country". As the first thing, it reiterates its faith in Panchsheel and assert that these Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be revived to form the basis of inter-state relations. But far from the earlier Sino-India Panchsheel Agreement of April 1954 where only India

177 Sreedhar: OP.Cit. No. 170, pp.542.
made major concessions, this clearly represents the equality of the two nations and lays out various CBMs that should further buttress. Sino-India understanding and mutual confidence". This spirit and sincerity is crystal clear throughout its concise text that details on a number of CBMs.

Article I of the MPTA starts by highlighting the consensus where both sides wish to resolve the boundary question "through peaceful and friendly consultations" and both undertake to "strictly respect and observe the line of actual control" and never to "use or threaten to use force" and whenever necessary "jointly check and determine the segments" of their borders.

Article II makes a far more concrete recommendation asking the two sides to keep their border military presence "to a minimum level compatible with the friendly and good neighbourly relations" and in fact to further agree "to reduce" them "in conformity with the requirements of the principle of mutual and equal security".

Taking off from here, Article III talks of evolving "effective CBMs" and asks each side to not "undertake specified levels of military exercises in mutually identified zones" and to "give the other notification of military exercises" along the border.

Then Articles IV and V speak about their agreement to create mechanism for dealing with intrusions and other exigencies.
In Article VI both sides clarify that despite these resolutions, nothing in this treaty shall "prejudice their respective positions on the boundary question". To actually kick off initiatives.

Article VII asks both sides to start by specifically defining the "form, method, scale and content of effective verification measures".

Article VIII initiates this process by asking each side to "appoint diplomats and military experts to formulate, through mutual consultations, implementation measures for the present agreement". This setting up of an Expert Group can be easily described as the greatest achievement of this pact in terms of building Sino-Indian CBMs.

Finally, Article IX gives its date of coming into effect and declares all its version in — Hindi, Chinese, English — as equally valid178.

**Second Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) Agreement (1996):**

This twelve –Article agreement on CBMs was signed during President Jiang Zemin's November 1996 visit to New Delhi. Amongst some new initiatives, this treaty is primarily geared to fulfill the agenda of their first such agreement of 1993 and it seeks to further extend their existing CBMs to more specific and sensitive areas in the military field. Going by its first Article that reads, "Neither side shall use its military capability against the other side", it virtually stands out as a no war pact and both sides have also projected it in that spirit. The agreement

---

178 Indian Defence Review: Comments "Security environment and India's recent diplomatic initiatives, Indian Defence Review, 1993, pp.7
once again affirms their commitment: to the LOAC (Article II) while this time fully recognizing that both have "different perceptions" on certain segments for which the two agree" to speed up process of clarification" and start "to exchange maps indicating their respective perceptions.... as soon as possible" (Article X). It is this business like approach to these sensitive questions that gives hope for the future as it depicts their mutual confidence in the current state of their rapprochement. Besides, all these yeas there had been major confusion as China does not consider its deployment in Tibet as being open for mutual reductions and India believes that Chinese forces on the Tibetan plateau have a clear one-to-ten advantage against Indian forces who will have to operate from below.

Accordingly, Article III of this agreement provides that in keeping with "the principle of mutual and equal security" all future ceilings are expected to be based on "parameters such as the nature of terrain, road communications and other infrastructure and time taken to induct/deinduct troops and armaments". Article IV clearly categorises certain types of offensive weapons, withdrawal of which will be given priority. These include combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, guns (including howitzers) with 75 mm or bigger calibre, mortars with 120 mm or bigger calibre, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, and to start with the two sides will "exchange data on the military forces and armaments" that are to be reduced. It also exhorts the two to "avoid holding large scale military exercises involving more than one division (15,000 troops) in close proximity to the LOAC" and to inform the other side on "type, level, planned duration and areas of
exercise" in case it involves more than a brigade (5000 troops) and about deinduction "within five days of competition", and the other side shall be free to seek any number of clarifications as it deems necessary.

Taking a major step forward, the two agree that no combat aircraft which "include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft" shall be allowed to fly "within ten kilometers" of the LOAC "except by prior permission "from the other side (Article V). Similarly, Article VI prohibits any use of "hazardous chemicals, conduct blast operations or hunt with guns or explosives within two kilometers" of the LOAC unless it is "part of developmental activities" in which case the other side shall be informed "through diplomatic channels or by convening a border personnel meeting, preferably five days in advance". Then to "strengthen exchanges and co-operation between their military personnel and establishments", Article VII provides that the two sides shall expand (a) "meeting between their border representatives at designated places; (b) "telecommunication links" between these border points; and (c) establish "step-by-step medium and high-level contacts between the border authorities" of the two sides. If any land or air intrusions take place "because of unavoidable circumstances like natural disaster", the other side is expected under Article VIII to "extend all possible assistance to them" and the two shall exchange information and have consultations to work out "modalities of return of the concerned personnel".
And finally, as under Article XI the Sino-Indian Joint Working group on Boundary Question starts "mutual consultations" for "detailed implementation measures", once again under Article IX each side shall have "the right to seek clarification" regarding the "manner in which the other side is observing the agreement" or on any "doubtful situation" in the border region. Under Article XII, though all Hindi, Chinese and English versions are "equally authentic", but in case of divergence, the English text shall prevail" and like most other agreements, it is also subject to ratification and "shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification". Apart from being a major take-off point for many fresh initiatives, these two agreements also provide a major boost for their other existing channels for Sino-Indian border related CBMs.\(^{179}\)

The 12th Meeting of the Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (JWG) took place in New Delhi in April 2000, ties between the two countries after the nuclear explosion in 1998.

India and China, celebrated the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between them in April 2000. Before the two days JWG talks began, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jia Xuan wrote a letter to his Indian counterpart, expressing Beijing's appreciation for the help rendered by India in defeating a U.S. – sponsored resolution that criticised China's human rights record. Every year the U.S. tries to pass such a resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council.

\(^{179}\) Dr. Singh, Swaran: OP.Cit. No.175, pp.549.
Right Commission in Geneva and failed to get the required majority for it to be adopted.

After the latest round of JWG talks, India and China have agreed to step up efforts to clarify the LAC. Both sides reiterated their commitment "to seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement of the boundary problem".

Beijing once again raised the issue of the Dalai Lama and his activities on Indian soil. Although, India has time and again reiterated that Tibet is an autonomous region of China. The Karmapa Lama's flight from Tibet and setting up of base in India has made the Chinese wary. The Indian side conveyed its concerns about Sikkim being shown as an "independent" country in some Chinese maps. The Chinese side indicated that its position on Sikkim was an "evolving and flexible one".

India has also been quite vocal about what it claims is China's support for Pakistan's nuclear and missile programmes. According to sources, New Delhi would also have liked China to refer to terrorist-inspired violence and Indian territory, in a joint statement after the conclusions of the JWG talks. Beijing was not amenable to the idea as it would have been misconstrued by Pakistan. However, in an important CBM, both countries agreed to resume senior level military contacts, which were stopped after the Pokhran-II nuclear test\textsuperscript{180}.

\textsuperscript{180} Frontline, June 2000. pp. 29.
Prospects:

India's great urge to come to terms with China is no longer overbearing but this is not to argue that India should drag its feet in seeking improvement of relations with China – a major neighbouring country with whom it shares a long border. Continued stalemate on the border not only serves to condone a militarily active border – although no border clashes have been reported for a number of years – but also curbs India's diplomatic maneuverability, limiting its potential role in the region and the wider world. It is in India's abiding interest to have peaceful and cooperative relations with its powerful neighbour. But the imperative need for spelling out clearly the parameter for a meaningful dialogue can not be overlooked.

A number of issues – China's view of India's legitimate interests in the Himalayan states, its stand on Sikkim and Kashmir, its reported involvement in Pakistan's nuclear programme – would need to be sorted out in a spirit of mutual accommodation and goodwill. It is only in the context of such wider political understanding that the border dispute can be settled in a spirit of mutual confidence. India has a great stake in Sino-Indian amity and cannot remain impervious to the imperatives of conciliation. This is however not to suggest that India can accept China's views on its neighbourhood – having vital bearings on its politico-strategic interests just to create – conditions for Sino-Indian friendship. China itself, it bears pointing out, has linked its border issue with the Soviet Union
to the wider question of Soviet policies in the neighbourhood and is showing no keenness to settle the issue on the basis of status-quo. It may also be useful to recall here Nehru's plea for a balanced approach—still not widely understood or appreciated—towards Sino-Indian ties.

Turning to future prospects in India-China relations, we need to deepen understanding of the dynamics of each other's domestic economic development in the period after the enormous changes brought about the reforms in each country. There are so many obvious similarities our two countries share as we review our experience in reforms. At the same time we must not lose sight of the long distance our two countries have still to traverse to spread the benefits of economic reforms to vast sections of our populations.

Lastly, both India and China need to take advantage of the factors of geographical contiguity. Hitherto geo-political compulsions have prevailed at the cost of geo-economic objectives. In recent years China has set up diverse transborder linkages across China's borders in all directions. The time has come in India-China relations to explore possibilities of such linkages between the two counties. While a beginning has been made in border trade between India and the Tibet region of China, more points remain to be opened. To the east of India and to the south-west of China there is a vast populated region, including Myanmar and some counties in ASEAN, where India and China could cooperate in building up infrastructural and communication linkages, trade and investments to the benefit of the area as a whole. Our two governments and leaders of trade and
industry should open up to the realities of geo-economics in order to bring the needed development to an important area in the neighbourhood of our countries.\footnote{Ranganathan, C.V.: India-China Relations – Retrospect and Prospect "Fifty Years of India's Independence", 1999. pp 180-182.}

Neither country can run away from its geographical position. Therefore, we have to think in long range terms apart from the short-term objectives we have. The short-term problem oppresses us as we have to meet the questions of today and we have to find answers to these questions. But in approaching the present it is not a wise policy to weaken ourselves from the long term point of view.\footnote{Jawahar Lal Nehru: OP.Cit. No.167, pp.372.}

India indeed faces a difficult task ahead. New Delhi can ill-afford to be burdened by the dear weight of the past; but negotiations with China are bound to be slow and halting. However, even though there are no soft options in sight, the momentum of Sino-Indian normalization can hardly be reversed. This would make for continued optimism with regard to the future of Sino-Indian relations.