CHAPTER - 1

Introduction
Security continues to rank high on national agendas worldwide. It commands enormous resources, including the sacrifice of life, liberty and property, the protection of which justifies the state in the first place. The end of the Cold War has not altered these facts. The anticipated peace dividend has materialised in only a few countries. Very large amounts of resources continue to be devoted to defense in most countries — especially in Asia. Termination of the Cold War, however, has contributed to a rethinking of security, especially on the part of the major protagonists in that ideological conflict. Receding concern over a general nuclear war, the growing salience of regional security issues, concern with "new" referents, dimensions, and threats and more generally the complex post-Cold War situation have stimulated interest in the redefinition of security. Policy makers' interest in broadening the scope of security has further stimulated the controversy within the academic community over how security should be defined since the early 1980s, quite a few scholars have argued for broader definitions. Others have argued the contrary; at most they accept only limited broadening of the concept preferring to keep it within the parameters of realism, the reigning paradigm for this subject area, especially during the Cold War.

The debate over the redefinition of security is a welcome development, but it has been largely abstract, lacking roots in empirical investigation. In some respects this has also been a dialogue without listeners. With a few exceptions, participants have been talking past one another, more interested in expounding the merits of their own paradigms and definitions and elaborating upon the shortcomings of alternatives than in
building on the strengths of competing expositions. There is no shared understanding of security and there has been little interest in developing such an understanding. This situation has led to a proliferation of neologisms. Security is now used with more than 30 different adjectives.

The title of this research "strategic environment of South Asia and India's security perspectives" suggests traditional notion of security i.e. military aspects of security, which lays emphasis on the territorial integrity of the state. Military notion of security thinks of the defence of the country from any external aggression in the first place. Keeping in tune with this military notion of security the study has built up around discussing and highlighting the problems and prospects of a peaceful and secured South Asia and India's security thinking and policy therein.

As far as South Asian strategic environment is concerned, regardless of the global, regional and internal changes that have taken place within the South Asian countries in the 1990s, one cannot but have a dela v4 when reviewing the security preoccupations of countries in the sub-continent. The same regional issues continue to absorb the interest of policy makers and analysis without any sight of a long-term approach to resolution of these problems. Moreover, despite changes in the international environment and political regimes in some countries, the same core issues also continue to dominate, if not dictate, the basic structure of intra-state relations.

It would be in correct to attribute such persistence in outlook to consistency in the foreign policy of each of the South Asian nations as their policies have gone through metamorphosis as well. In the 1950s, much
before the non-aligned movement became a fad, India championed the cause of non-alignment as a means of cultivating self-reliance and in the process alienated itself from the United States. This opened the door to the Soviet wooing of India, which initially began with a major arms deal in 1962 and further culminated in the twenty years peace and friendship treaty between the two countries in 1971. Till the demise of the Soviet power, India had not only drifted away from the axioms of non-alignment, but also remained the principal recipient of arms and licensed production facilities from Soviet Union. On the other hand, India's relations with both the United States and China remained cool for much of the post-independence phase. With a brief interlude immediately after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, when the Americans and other western powers rushed in with military aid to New Delhi, the two largest democracies were unable to develop a close friendship, despite the fact that United States remained an important trade partner of India. Similarly India's relations with China were never able to revert to the euphoric Hindi-Chin-bhai-bhai phase of the fifties after the 1962 conflict, despite thawing of diplomatic relations between the two in the mid 80s and growing economic interaction a decade later. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, followed by the inability of the new Russian rulers to live up to the traditional "tested friendship" between the two countries by their failure to deliver rocket engine parts to India under American pressure, left two-decade old framework of Indian foreign policy in a lurch. In the post Cold-War content, India is again seeking to redefine its policies towards the lone super-power, whose global influence it can no longer take for granted, and
China, whose growing economic and military power it can no longer hope to contain.

As a secondary regional power, Pakistan’s policies have also seen similar changes, which have been influenced largely by its ability to capitalise from the propitious international environment and from India’s predicament at a given moment. From 1954 to 1965, it joined the American alliance structure against communism in order to extract the cheap flow of American arms in order to augment its position against India. When the Americans cut off their arms supply to both India and Pakistan after the 1965 conflict, Pakistan looked towards China taking advantage not only from the rift between the two principal communist powers but also from the mutual suspicion and hostility between China and India.¹ However its balancing strategy proved to be insufficient in preventing the secession of its eastern wing in 1971, although it had the support of its allies against the prospect of defeat in the Western part of the country.

Until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Pakistan’s importance in the western containment strategy diminished drastically when the euphoria of détente saw significant improvement in America’s relations with both the Soviet Union and China. It regained its importance for a decade after participating as an ally in the west’s war of attrition against Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan, but was again left in the cold on grounds of its nuclearisation programme, some years after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Today, in order to re-orient itself to the post-

¹ Subrahmanyam, K., *Nuclear Myths and Realities* [New Delhi, ABC Publishers, 1981], P-32
Cold War environment, Pakistan continues not only to cling to its "enduring détente" with China but also to cultivate assiduously its Islamic option both in the Middle East and in some of the former Soviet-Muslim dominated republics by seeking external support to offset the relative weight of India's regional influence.

One the other hand, the variation in the foreign policy of the smaller states of the region within the last few decades have had less to do with military preoccupation than with their desire to augment their bargaining capabilities in their dealing with India. Throughout much of the Cold-War, these countries were able to extract economic assistance not only from the super-powers due to their global search for influence, but also derive whatever benefits they could from security complences that had give rise to the triangular entanglement of India, China and Pakistan within the region. By 1980, out of total of NRs, 5239.3 million received by Nepal as grants from bilateral sources, almost 17% had come from two communist powers, China and the Soviet Union. Similarly, from 1960-1976 out of a total SRs. 1,8698.4 million received from bilateral sources as loans and SRs. 399.9 million as grants, 26 and nearly 20% respectively, had come from the communist sources. Even Bangladesh, which was to some extent beholden to India for support in its war of liberation from Pakistan, not only decreased its economic dependence on India from 100% in 1971-72 to a meager 1-13% in 1974-75 but also shifted its source of arms supply from the Soviet Union.

---

3 Op.cit,no-1,P-114
which from 1971 to 1974 had supplied 54% of the total arms sales to the
country, to China, whose contribution accounted for 75% of the total sales
from 1978-82. Like India and Pakistan, the smaller regional powers are
today attempting to redefine their position in the subcontinent by taking into
account not only the fluid state of relations of the extra-regional powers,
including their diminishing interest in the region, but also the yet
indeterminate positions of India and Pakistan in the new setting.

It would also be inaccurate to attribute “the persistence of regional
tension to incompatibility of ideology among the political regimes in these
countries. Although personal ambitions of political leaders and the inner
dynamics of power struggle among political forces within countries have at
times had regional ramifications, there are no concrete evidences to suggest
that the political regimes are alone responsible for perpetuating the tensions.

With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the emergence of a
unipolar world, the United States, as the sole superpower, there is yet no
sign of global demilitarization despite world-wide detents and the upsurge of
democracy al over the world, including the South Asian region. It is unlikely
that the supremacy of the United States would be politically challenged
either by the economic giant Japan or a more unified E.E.C. in the
foreseeable future for the obvious reasons that they are political allies and in
reality they all belong to the elite ‘North’ group. But the challenge may come
later. China may also have the potentialities to become a superpower in this

---

1 Hemisath, Charles, H and Mansingh, Surjit, A Diplomatic history of Modern India [New Delhi, Allied Publisheres ,1971]P-131
5 The Hindu, New Delhi, March 27, 2002
century. The security of South Asian region is interlinked with the above developments. The overt nuclear posture of India in 1998 that invited similar response from Pakistan can be seen in this backdrop. India's growing sense of insecurity because of its encirclement by the nuclear power near its border, China and the presence of U.S. in the Indian Ocean, left her with no choice other than going nuclear. India has always seen China as a regional adversary and in her security calculation China is the major security challenge.6

In the post Pokhran-II and Chagai phase India has carved out a place of some prominence in the U.S. Strategic thinking on south Asia. The shift in U.S. policies regarding India is clearly evident. In the new strategic dynamics of South Asia, emerging Indo-US partnership has added new potentialities for both the countries and particularly to India. Notwithstanding the western analysis that South Asia has become a nuclear flashpoint, the region has shown much promises for peace as the two countries India and Pakistan who had tested nuclear weapons in 1998 seem to be able to settle down the nuclear dust and putting them on the path of self-reliance in other fields of development (economic, social) which only have the potential to serve their quest for security in the modern era. Towards this goal SAARC can play a major role as it has all the potentialities to secure a positive power balance in terms of economics and demography provided the SAARC countries can overcome their political difficulties, particularly those between India and Pakistan.7

---

6 The Statesman, New Delhi, May 27, 2002
7 The Katmandu Post, Katmandu, January 5, 2002
are harnessed, and political stability can be achieved under democratic systems, the SAARC countries together can be an economic force to be reckoned with in the foreseeable future and can play a crucial role in the evolution of a system of global security which is not wholly dependent on a single super-power, and thus heralding an era of peace and prosperity for the region and for the world.