CHAPTER VII
India’s National Security Policy Perspective
The superpowers, since earliest times have shown interest in this part of the Subcontinent due to various reasons. The geo-strategic environment of the region induces their interest here. In the post Second World War phase, the established superpowers, US, Russia policy has much to do with the security environment of this region. India as the leading nation of the region had and will have to be in the foreseeable future very cautious in her dealing with the super-powers and take a very rationale position on the issues of strategic importance. However, in this chapter, we will discuss the Indian security policy perspective, which has developed over a considerable period of time, but has shown little or no marked change in its basics characters. India is a major actor in Asia and the world as a function of its geostrategic location, the size of its population, its large and growing economy, its indigenous technological capability, and its army, which is the fourth largest in the world. With the termination of the Cold War and the ongoing reforms in the Indian economy, many Indian and international observers believe that in the next two or three decades India could emerge as a great power whose reach extends well beyond South Asia. How India conceives of its security, therefore, is of international interest.

I argue that India’s security practice is close to what Stephen Krasner calls “modified structuralism”. In the modified structuralist view, decision makers operate in “a world of sovereign states seeking to maximize their interest and power” but under certain conditions choose to transcend “individualistic calculations of interest”. In a world of sovereign states, Indian decision makers are primarily concerned with protecting the two major attributes of sovereignty: territory and independence of foreign policy. To do
so, they understand that their country must be powerful. Their comprehension of national power is a broad one that includes three key elements — military strength, economic development, and internal order. But India's approach to security also goes beyond this classical conception. Its decision makers are willing to resort to methods that involve concessions to rival interests, both external and internal. With external rivals, these methods include negotiation, regular summitry, promotion of economic and cultural links between societies, confidence-building measures, nonalignment, and regional cooperation. With internal rivals, too, India has negotiated (for example, reaching peace accords with various ethnic separatists. It has also attempted to use economic incentives and rewards to end militant struggles. Most important, it has granted collective rights to dissatisfied communities and tried to decentralize power within a federal system of government.

The reason for India's modified structuralism in security affairs, I argue, is twofold: expediency, arising from deficiencies in national power; and conviction, based on the existence or evolution of norms against the untrammeled pursuit of power and exercise of coercion. Thus, India's conception of security can be understood in terms of material as well as ideational factors. Over time, our analysis suggests, India has shifted perceptibly from a modified structuralism based on conviction and ideational factors to one based on expediency and material factors. However, with economic growth, India may move toward cooperative security and a modified structuralism once again based on conviction.
To substantiate this argument as well as to elucidate Indian security thinking and behaviour, this chapter is organized in four parts. The first part delineates India's historic conception of security in terms of the nationalist interpretation of Indian history, which was vital to the "operational code" of decision makers through the 1950s. The second part reviews the conceptualizations of security held by Indian strategic thinkers of the postcolonial period. Once we have abstracted India's core values from these conceptualizations, the third part discusses the threats to these values and the responses by India's central decision makers. The fourth part advances an explanation of India's conception of security.

Historical Understanding of Indian Security

Present-day ideas about national security bear the mark of history. The influence of the past on the present is not a simple one: it is not merely a residue, some essential characteristic that inheres in the present. Nor is the past infinitely malleable. Rather, historical legacies are interpreted, recovered, and constituted within the limits set by contemporary interests and constraints. India's conceptions of security since independence, in this sense, owe much to the past. Its leaders have invested the past with a certain significance that bears upon contemporary notions of security.

India's security conceptions after independence were informed by British India's strategic ideas but were not identical to them. For Britain, India was the linchpin of its empire. Control of India gave Britain prestige and material power on a world scale. British policies rested on the postulate that India is vitally located at the juncture of several regions in Asia and at the top
of the Indian Ocean. On the Asian landmass, it resides between the Middle East, Russia, Central Asia, China, and Southeast Asia. In the Indian Ocean, it was Britain's key to controlling an area that extended from the Suez to the Strait of Malacca. The threats to British control of India were perceived to derive from the Asian landmass and, subsidiarily, from the ocean. On land the principal threats were from Russia and China. To protect India from them, the British constructed a system of "ring fences" comprising an "inner ring" of Himalayan kingdoms and the tribal areas of northeastern India and an "outer ring" of the Persian Gulf, Iran, Afghanistan, and Thailand. The inner ring would be defended by military power; control of the outer ring would be denied to outside powers by diplomacy and force. By sea, the threats initially came from other European powers, although by the late nineteenth century there was little prospect of any real challenge there. The British navy was the key instrument for the defense of India from seaborne threats and for the projection of British power from the Cape of Good Hope to the Strait of Malacca.

The view of India as a strategic linchpin was internalized by Indian nationalists. Indian governments saw great powers and other outsiders coveting India for geopolitical reasons. British policy stressed "forward defense" and Ocean control. Independent India shifted the emphasis. Jawaharlal Nehru had less faith in military instruments, though he did not ignore them. Instead he stressed diplomacy nonalignment and panchashila

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1 G.S. Bajpai, India's first secretary general of external affairs, argued that nonalignment is vital and that in a world of power politics armed force is essential. As early as June 1946, Nehru noted that if India were attacked it would defend itself by all the means available to
(literally "five virtues or five principles of moral and proper conduct")\textsuperscript{2} – and the importance of internal political stability in dissuading outsiders from threatening India.

In addition to British conceptions, postindependence governments also drew on more indigenous visions, even if they were refracted through colonial lenses. In particular, they drew on an image of Indian history through the ages and a narrative of successive political invasions and internal integrations and disintegrations. The British had helped shape that narrative in order to justify their rule. In the British narrative, imperial rule was deliverance for Indians – a liberation from invasion and internal collapse. India was depicted as having constantly been prey to invasions. The Indian narrative, however, stressed periods of Indian glory, casting the British in the role of one among a long line of invaders: Most of the invasions, according to the nationalist narrative, came through the northwest passes via present-day Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Europeans were exceptional in that they came from the sea. These invasions succeeded because Indians were internally divided and because they were backward – not only in terms of military hardware but also in the art of war. The incursions of the Europeans were more subtle; they came posing as traders but stayed to consolidate their commercial niches. They carved out larger and larger enclaves as they exploited internal differences between Indians. India's suspicion of foreign

\textsuperscript{2} The Panchashila or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence between India and China (1954) are mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual nonaggression, mutual noninterference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

\textsuperscript{1} The Hindu, New Delhi, February 10, 1971

\textsuperscript{2} The clear implication that such means did not exclude atomic bombs.
investment, multinational corporations, and a globalized economic order can be traced to this reading of colonial history.

For Nehru and other Indian nationalists, India's history was marked not just by external threats and relative backwardness on a world scale but also, significantly, by long and recurring periods of internal disorder. Golden periods where India was united, well governed, socially tolerant, culturally and scientifically advanced were succeeded by dark periods of disunity, tyranny, intolerance, and cultural and scientific stagnation. For the nationalists, the chaos at the end of the Mughal Empire and the long period of British rule signified the torpor into which India had fallen. Beneath the torpor, though, there was a vitality and an immanent sense of unity in India, and the nationalist movement had begun to rediscover and release it. India could be a great force once again if its internal structure were refurbished.

The past influenced Indian thinking in another way. The precolonial past and colonial rule combined to produce a political culture that had an impact on conceptions of security. Ancient Hindu thought and practice were marked by tension between a deep involvement in social and political life, on the one hand, and a desire for detachment from the phenomenal world on the other. Thus Indian elites in the ancient past seem to have feared that involvement in social and political life would lead to disorder and violence. Their response was to withdraw from the world of phenomena and entrust order to those with the power to coerce – either through naked force or through a highly structured social system such as caste. The problem was that these social forces in turn would, by their excessive reliance on
coercion, bring on the very collapse that haunted Indians. Thus India traditionally seems to have lacked an ability to produce mediating institutions capable of sustaining social order without excessive coercion. Nor did the medieval period with its various Muslim empires produce such institutions.

Apart from such conceptual influences, three key developments in international relations and domestic politics seemed to confirm and reconfirm the nationalist reading of India's history: the Cold War, hostilities between India and Pakistan, and the Communist victory in China. First, by 1948 the Cold War had begun. Nehru, as early as 1944, had understood that the United States and the Soviet Union would be the leading powers and would engaged in global competition. Like the colonial powers that had played Indian rulers off against one another, the superpowers would approach lesser powers all over the world with the promise of military and economic aid and then use them for their own ends. India must therefore resist being drawn into the competition. Second, the postpartition war between Indian and Pakistan over Kashmir meant that the division of the subcontinent had not solved the basic quarrel in South Asia; indeed it had added a layer of hostility. The postcolonial conflict between Indian and Pakistan can be related to the theme of internal weakness and disunity in the nationalist narrative. As India historically had been internally divided, now South Asia was internally divided between India and Pakistan, two sovereign and potentially rival states. As Hindus and Muslims had been manipulated by the colonial power, so India and Pakistan could be manipulated by "neocolonial"

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3 Nehru had come up with something like the idea of nonalignment before the Cold War. The Hindu, New Delhi, March 24, 1948.
powers who wished to divide South Asia. And third, the Communist victory in China meant that India would have to rethink its relations with the Middle Kingdom. Nehru and the Congress had developed close links with the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kaishek. After 1949, India had to reckon with a new regime in Beijing. New Delhi could see that, depending on how the relationship evolved, India could be faced with into the nationalist narrative: as a great power that could be turned against India, thus dividing resurgent Asia against itself, but also as a potential fraternal partner in continental affairs.

Four strands were therefore central in Indian security thinking in these first moments after independence. First, India was a strategic and economic prize and would one day be a great nation. It must be vigilant in protecting its territory and its independence from external powers and forces who coveted it, wanted to dominate it, even wished to destroy it. In particular, India had to be on guard against the superpowers, Pakistan, China, and, not cast, foreign capital. Second, vigilance must be backed by power. Indian could not expect to preserve its borders and independence if it once again lagged behind other countries. Third, India had to be stable internally. Without internal resilience and progress, Indian unity and independence could be undermined by internal and external forces, either separately or in combination. A strong state was essential if such disintegration was to be avoided. Fourth, mediating institutions were necessary in both the international and domestic spheres. Any system, external or internal, equilibrated purely by coercive power was prone to collapse. Norms and
institutions at the international and domestic levels were viewed as vital to check "power politics" and to prevent collapse in the long run.

**Defining India’s Security in the Postcolonial Period**

From the vantage point of the present, there is a tendency to think that India neglected security and defense in the immediate postcolonial period at both the conceptual and material levels. There are at least three reasons for this view. First, after dependence the term security was rarely used. There preferred term was defense. This usage reflected the relative currencies of the two terms in the Anglo-American world. British usage favored the term defense, and even in the United States, which has done so much to popularize the term security, its use was not was widespread as it would become by the 1950s and 1960s. Second, with regard to "defense", the extent of public debate in India was minimal. This relative silence reflected the British inheritance, which stressed secrecy in colonial military matters; it also reflected Nehru's worries about "militarism" in India. Third, India's defeat at the hands of China in 1962, never thoroughly probed, was attributed to political and administrative oversight and lapses – hence the charge that security and defense were ignored.

A more nuanced retrospective view of the period reveals, however, that although security (or defense) was neglected by the Indian National Congress prior to independence, it was an important area of postindependence endeavour, and that the oversight and lapses were more of a conceptual than material nature. Nehru himself, his defense minister and trusted lieutenant, Krishna Menon, the historian and diplomat K.M.
Panikkar, the jurist H.N. Kunzru, as well as an additional group of officials (e.g., H.M. Patel, H.C. Sarin, P.V.R. Rao), all were attentive to security/defense, especially in material terms. Nehru and his team attempted to evolve a new decision-making system for security/defense, they invested in an indigenous defense and nuclear industry, and they bought major weapons systems from abroad when necessary. Indeed, "Indian decision-makers were more ambitious than they were cautious (in defense), especially on the procurement side".

India's war experiences, in 1962 with China and in 1965 and 1971 with Pakistan, were important milestones in the development of a more self-conscious discourse that attempted to explicitly define the nature of security/defense. With each war, there grew a realization that, materially, Indian security/defense had been and probably was more or less adequate. What was lacking was integrated decision making, technical expertise, and sufficient attention to the long-term assessment of threats, instruments, and strategies.

From the 1970s onward, therefore, a discourse based on the term security increasingly came to be articulated not so much with the state apparatus as by a growing and vocal policy community, located in New Delhi, consisting of diplomats, bureaucrats, politicians, soldiers, journalists, and academics. That community increasingly resorted to the world security and began a conceptual delineation of the term.

Thus K. Subrahmanyam, perhaps the leading member of India's strategic community and a former Defense Ministry official, cites the
"Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences" definition of security, the "ability of a nation to protect its internal values from external threat." He also approvingly quotes Walter Lippman's famous definition: A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war”. Similarly, H.C. Sarin, a former Indian defense secretary, suggests that "for a nation, security is a state of mind when it is able to apply its resources to activities it considers germane to its national purpose without leaving to be unduly concerned about extraneous considerations."

Subrahmanyan argues that national security goes beyond "threats to our territorial integrity and sovereignty" to encompass "economic development plans" and "communal harmony". This broader conception has been articulated by others as well. A major seminar in New Delhi, attended by virtually the entire Indian security community, held that

In the contemporary world threats to security were not limited to threats of military action or occupation of territory... In defining 'security' it was felt that too narrow a view – one that looked at it purely in terms of military invasions and loss of territory – should be avoided. 'Security', properly understood, was a far wider concept covering to a lesser degree or greater degree almost all aspects of the domestic situation in a nation, as well as its military preparedness and foreign policy.

Govind Narain, another former defense secretary, writes that national security "is much wider and much more comprehensive [than territorial integrity]. It extents virtually to all the freedoms that we cherish and wish to enjoy and to uninterrupted and uninterfered implementation of all that we plan, intend or wish to do for our country". Finally, a knowledgeable and articulate former defense minister, K.C. Pant, argues: "National Security is a
broad concept, which covers political stability, which covers economic growth, economic strength of the country, and obviously it covers defense preparedness. These are well recognized aspects of National Security, and they are in very many ways interdependent”.

At the heart of these definitions is, first, the idea that the state is the referent of security, the entity that must be protected. This is not particularly surprising. That the state is the primary referent is a classical formulation: in the Indian Arthashastra tradition as in Aristotle, a secure state is regarded as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the security of other social entities and individual citizen. Second is the idea that security lies in the protection of a set of interdependent values: territorial integrity, foreign policy autonomy, military strength (referred to as “defense preparedness”), economic development (“economic growth”, “economic strength”), and internal order (“communal harmony,” “domestic situation,” “policy stability”). Indian decision makers and analysts do not regard this list of values as being particularly controversial: a survey of official documents and pronouncements shows widespread agreement on them. Third, although there is no clear statement of priorities among the five core values, we can infer that territorial integrity and political autonomy are primary, for they are intrinsic to the notion of sovereignty. The other values – military strength, economic development, and internal order – can be regarded as secondary or instrumental values in that they are necessary of the fullest attainment of sovereignty. In other words, control of one’s territory and the freedom to choose one’s enemies and friends depends on military, economic, and domestic political resilience – a classical national security formulation.
A national security conceptualization is incomplete without an assessment of threats to core values and strategies to contain or eliminate those threats. As we will see in the following sections, the threats to virtually every core value are simultaneously external and internal, with the two levels interacting in ways that exacerbate India’s security problems. The Indian state’s strategies for coping with this complex environment of threats are correspondingly varied, exhibiting a reliance on force and coercion but also more institutional, noncoercive, and indirect measures.

Territorial Integrity

Three territorial issues have been of concern to India’s decision makers. First, there was the problem of integrating the various units of the British Empire – the states of British India plus the Princely States – as well as the French and Portuguese colonial possessions. Second, there were external threats to India’s territorial integrity. And third, territorial integrity was threatened from within by secessionists aided and abetted by external foes.

The first challenge was dealt with almost immediately by the integration of the Princely States into the Indian Union. Most of the princes quickly acceded to either India or Pakistan, but a few hoped to stay independent or chose sides that went against the demographic composition of their states. Hyderabad and Junagardh were the most important cases. Indian military action in 1948 ended their independence. Kashmir was the other key state. When tribal invaders backed by Pakistani forces attempted to incorporate the state into Pakistan, India resisted with force. Most of Kashmir was saved and gradually became integrated into the Indian union.
With regard to the colonial territories of Pondicherry and Goa, France quickly signed over Pondicherry, and India argued that Goa, too, must be returned by Portugal because colonial enclaves were unacceptable on the Indian landmass. Nehru negotiated, but when the Portuguese proved intransigent India took Goa by force in 1961.

The second and third challenges to India's territorial integrity persist. The principal external throats issue from Pakistan and China. The threat from Pakistan relates primarily to Kashmir; the Chinese threat concerns the demarcation of the Sino-Indian border.

Kashmir is the subject of the most important quarrel between India and Pakistan. Since 1948, when Pakistan questioned the accession of the Princely State of Kashmir to the Indian Union, it has stood at the center of their troubled relationship. As a result of the 1948 war, the Kashmiri state was divided between the two countries. Neither accepts the partition. For India, Kashmir accounts for only about 4 per cent of its national territory (and only 1 per cent of its total population), but its presence in the Union represents much more than territorial completeness. As long as Kashmiris stay within the Union, they affirm India's secular credentials -- and, by extension, falsify Pakistan's claim that Muslims need a separate homeland in the subcontinent. Thus Kashmir is vital to India's construction of its national identity.

Since the end of the "long peace" of 1950-89, Kashmir has become the critical issue in Indo-Pakistani relations. New Delhi is convinced that Pakistan instigated the present troubles in Kashmir and that it continues to
provide refuge, training, money, and arms to the militants. India fears that this proxy war could again escalate to full-fledged combat as in 1948, 1965 and 1971. If the situation in Kashmir deteriorates and Pakistan perceives a weak or distracted government in India, it might choose to attack.

The territorial conflict with China dates to 1954. At issue are the Aksai Chin area in the west and the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA) in the east. It appears that China was willing to swap Aksai Chin for its claims in NEFA. If, as Nehru noted, Aksai Chin was a wasteland without “a blade of grass”, that should have been an attractive offer. However, India opposed the idea of a swap for a number of reasons. First, Nehru saw China as an expansionist power: a strong stand was necessary in order to check it. Second, Nehru faced strong internal pressures not to swap. Third, he calculated that, in the end, with Soviet and U.S. sympathies on his side, the correlation of forces was against China. Finally, India’s borders were not simply artifacts of colonial rule, as claimed by the Chinese: they were of precolonial origin and intimately bound up with an Indian identity that had existed, sub-consciously if not consciously, for hundreds of years.

Apart form the overland challenges from Pakistan and China, India fear intrusions into its territorial waters and its massive exclusive economic zone. From their colonial past, Indians have learned that great-power navies can be harbingers of domination. Since the early 1970s, India has been

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4 This issue is cited in virtually every annual report of the Ministry of Defence since 1990-91. The Hindu, New Delhi, March 10, 1992.

5 See, for instance, the reference to Nehru’s dismissal of a swap in Kavid 1967: 68. The Statesman, New Delhi, March 17, 1972.
particularly anxious about the growing presence of superpower navies in the Indian Ocean. In addition, in the 1980s it has watched the growth of the Chinese navy and the development of its capacity to sail the Indian Ocean on a regular basis. Beijing's deepening relationship with Burma has added to Indian fears. New Delhi has seen China develop Burmese ports and is worried that the Chinese navy may make use of the Hanggyi Islands. Finally, India recognizes that in case of war Pakistan could attack vital oil-producing areas near Mumbai.

India faces internal threats to territory as well. In Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeastern states, India has been challenged by a number of secessionist groups that have been supported by outside powers, most notably Pakistan and China. Kashmir, since 1989, has become the country's major internal security problem. Sikh militancy in the Punjab was a separatist threat from the early 1980s until 1993. Sikh dissidents found their way to Pakistan and obtained refuge, training, arms, and money from their hosts. By 1993, India had brought the militancy under control and the Punjab had reverted to near normalcy. The seven northeastern states have almost constantly been at war with New Delhi. The uprisings have been instigated or sustained by external support – mostly by China (until the mid-1970s) but also by various groups or state agencies in Burma, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. The northeast’s integrity is also under threat from illegal migration from Bangladesh. Some regard Dhaka as having encouraged migration; others see it as indifferent. Migration threatens territory in two ways: it feeds

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separatist feelings, and it may produce Muslim majorities in those states, leading to "new Pakistan."\(^7\)

This review suggests that the internal threats to territory are at least as significant as the external threats and, moreover, that the internal and external are deeply enmeshed. Pakistan and China present ongoing military threats to border areas, but the internal threats in Kashmir, Punjab, and the northeast, compounded by external involvement, have been the most troubling.

India has relied on a combination of force, negotiations, and indirect strategies to deal with threats to its territorial integrity. We will see this in the case of Pakistan and China but also in India's approach to its ocean territories and to secessionism.

The 1948 war put paid to the hope that partition would pacify South Asia. Lord Louis Mountbatten had hoped that India and Pakistan would combine against external threats and contribute to British and Commonwealth strategic defense. Indeed, he had persuaded the two sides to agree to joint defense policies. When the Kashmir war broke out, the idea of joint defense collapsed. Henceforth the Indian army's primary orientation was against Pakistan. Most of the India's land forces were deployed in Kashmir and along the western border with Pakistan, not on the northern border with China. This remains India's posture.

`Border defence has been supplemented by an interest in confidence building measures. Confidence-building is intended to stabilize a military\(^7\)

\(^7\) *The Statesman*, New Delhi, May 12, 1992
situation; it is not intended to bring about a resolution of the fundamental dispute. From time to time, India has made efforts to solve the Kashmir problem and other territorial disputes with Pakistan through bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Despite its reservations, India also went along with various U.N. – led efforts to solve the Kashmir problem. These included the Nimitz and McNaughton mediations, the plebiscite negotiations (1950), the Dixon plan (1951), and the Graham efforts (1953-58). The key to most of these interventions was the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir. Given its suspicions of Pakistan and of Anglo-American involvement in the issue, India was doubtful about the possibility of a free and fair plebiscite, and in the end the U.N.’s interventions came to naught.

In addition to force and negotiations, India has tried to engineer less direct methods of settling disputes. Since the 1965 war, it has argued for the “normalization” of relations with Pakistan. New Delhi’s approach to the border dispute with China has also featured a combination of force, negotiations, and indirection. In 1950 India embarked on a border defense plan that included building roads and check posts, increasing intelligence activity and patrolling, and creating border police forces.

After the 1962 border war, India built up its forces rapidly, eventually deploying ten divisions along the front and equipping them with modern weaponry that outstripped Chinese capabilities. In 1974, India’s nuclear test was a signal that New Delhi would harden its defense posture. By the early 1980s, India was militarily confident. When Indian and then Chinese units

established a presence in the Sumdurong Chu Valley in 1986-87, India responded aggressively in the ensuing confrontation.\textsuperscript{9} Later in 1987, the Indian military held a massive exercise - once again demonstrating that it was prepared to meet force with force.\textsuperscript{10}

While building up its defense forces along the Sino-Indian border, India also resorted to confidence-building measures in an effort to avoid border clashes. Concurrently with conventional defense and confidence-building measures, India has at various times ought to resolve the Chinese border problem through bilateral negotiations.

After the impasse of 1960-61, negotiations ended and were resumed only in the 1980s. In June 1981, both sides made procedural concessions. China dropped its insistence on a package deal that stressed the linkage of adjustments in one sector of the border to adjustments in other sectors. India, for its part, abandoned its commitment not to discuss substantive issues until China withdrew from “Indian” territory occupied in 1962. Border talks have continued through the 1990s.

The combination of force, negotiations, and indirection can also be observed with respect to India’s Ocean territories. Since the early 1970s, New Delhi has built up its naval forces to counter not only the great-power navies but also those of Pakistan and China. It has tried negotiating. In the 1960s and 1970s, India labored hard in the United Nations to develop the idea of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace where the activities of}

\textsuperscript{9} The Hindu, New Delhi, April 15,1993
nonregional navies would be restricted. It is now trying indirect measures. India has become part of a fourteen-member group called the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) that will focus on economic, environmental, and technical issues. By fostering cooperation among the major countries, IOR-ARC will, New Delhi hopes, make the ocean more secure.\textsuperscript{11}

In essence, the same combination of approaches has been applied to separatist struggles too. The Kashmiri militancy – like the Sikh militancy before it – is being fought by the massive use of the regular army, paramilitary forces, and local police. India is defending the northeast using a similar combination of means. When the government senses that the militants are fatigued, it holds out the possibility of negotiations. Meanwhile it deploys a strategy of indirection toward the society: the military engages in local health and relief work; economic and other developmental activities are increased; eventually, an amnesty releases militants captured during counterinsurgency operations, new elections are held in the state, the separatist organization is brought in from the cold, often to govern the state, and a peace accord is signed wherein the government makes concessions relating to major grievances.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} K.R. Singh, \textit{Indian Ocean: Big power presence and local response},[New Delhi, Manohar, 1977]P-37

\textsuperscript{12} Over several decades these concessions, according to a close observer of the scene, have included “creating new ethno-political territories..., giving tribes the legal rights to mineral resources and offering protection, such as requiring inner-line entry permits and prohibiting outsiders from buying properties in tribal regions.” Weapons were not “surrendered” but “handed over” to be stored in safe houses, often under the eye of peace councils led by tribal elders. In striking a deal the government generally “avoided claims of victory” and the militants “did not have to admit defeat”. Gupta, Sisir, \textit{Kashmir; A study in Indo-Pak Relations}[Bombay, Asia Publisher, 1975]P.-: 27.
India’s approach to territorial security relies on military force and confidence-building, on the one hand, and negotiations and indirect strategies on the other. That is, it combines coercive approaches that seek to advance India’s interests with measures that demonstrate readiness to concede something to the other side. The mix of approaches is not necessarily a conscious and carefully calibrated policy of sticks and carrots. Idiosyncratic decisions, the attitudes and actions of adversaries, and domestic politics and public opinion influence India’s stance at any given time. But at a deeper level, policy is shaped by an equilibrating tendency in Indian political thought. There is, as suggested earlier, an understanding that power-based, coercive approaches by themselves cannot bring peace and stability in the long term and must be tempered by conciliatory, noncoercive methods and instruments. This understanding rests on both material and ideational factors, a point we will return to later. Suffice it to say here that Indian policy on territorial security is complex and cannot be reduced to any single approach.

At independence, Jawaharlal Nehru said in a favour remark “What does independence consist of? It consists fundamentally and basically of foreign relations. That is the test of independence. All else is local autonomy”. India values foreign policy autonomy, and, for the most part, New Delhi has steered its own course. This does not mean that India has not tilted toward one great power or another at various times. It has always maintained the right to do so in its own interest. But, as the following episodes reveal, it has at key junctures maintained its own line of policy:
At independence, despite British pressures, India refused to enter into an alliance. When the United States wanted India to join in the containment of the Soviet Union, India declined, even though it was clear that this position might incur U.S. wrath and that Pakistan would profit by enlisting in the Western alliance system. British and American sympathies for Pakistan's case on Kashmir did not cause India to recant or to shun relations with the two communist giants. Indeed, India established close relations with both.

In 1962, when China was winning the war against India, New Delhi was vulnerable. It needed British and U.S. military aid and even sought outright military intervention. Yet Nehru was greatly exercised over the implications for Indian nonalignment, even though Washington did not insist on public expressions of solidarity with the West.

In a last-minute attempt to join the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Indira Gandhi asked for a nuclear umbrella. Here was a moment when India was prepared to give up a measure of its foreign policy autonomy. When it did not get a security guarantee, India refused to sign the NPT and reverted to a policy of nuclear autonomy that it has maintained ever since which was most forcefully manifested in the nuclear tests of May 1998.

During the Johnson presidency India - U.S. relations became especially strained over Vietnam. When India was hit by massive food shortages, Lyndon Johnson, annoyed by Indira Gandhi's outspokenness, slowed U.S. grain shipments to India in his famous
“short tether” policy. Even so, India’s stance on the Vietnam War did not appreciably change.

- India also resisted Soviet pressures when necessary. In 1969, New Delhi refused to join Moscow’s anti-China “Asian Collective Security” system. The Soviet Union was India’s biggest arms supplier and also a major economic partner. With Nixon in the White House and not sympathetic to Indian concerns, India depended also on Soviet diplomatic support. Yet India made it quite clear that it would not join the proposed system.

- Ten years later, India was to display a good deal of autonomy over Afghanistan. Although New Delhi was about to sign the largest arms deal ever with the Soviets, India’s initial reactions to the Soviet invasion were condemnatory. They soon moderated, but India continued to indicate that it did not approve of the Soviet action. An American specialist on Indo-Soviet relations concludes that it was the coincidence of interests that accounted for India’s relative softness on the Soviets, not Moscow’s ability to influence Indian choices.

During the Cold War, India’s foreign policy autonomy was threatened by the bipolar confrontation: as early as 1944, Nehru had understood that the United States and the Soviet Union would be dominant and competitive and there would be pressure on the rest of the world to choose sides. Forty-five years later, the threats to autonomy have changed: a bipolar Cold War no longer exists, but in India’s estimation there are other powers and forces that seek to subvert Indian independence. Thus, in September 1994, on his state visit to Singapore, Narasimha Rao told his audience “the Non-aligned
Movement is fully relevant today... Its principles have not really been diluted by the recent strategic changes — we continue with the determination to decide our own destiny.”

The second threat to foreign policy autonomy, from New Delhi’s perspective, is “the new institutionalism”, once again led by the United States. India fears that a range of organizations and regimes, strengthened since the end of the Cold War, will reduce its room for diplomatic maneuver. A revitalized United Nations and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), under U.S. leadership, could impose constraints on Indian foreign policy options. The United Nations could resurrect its role in the Kashmir issue. The World Bank and the IMF have already warned India that its defense expenditures are too high, and loans could be made conditional on scaling down of military outlays. These institutions could become more intrusive with respect to issues such as India’s relations with Pakistan and the rest of the region. In addition to these organizations, a variety of U.S.-brokered and U.S.-led regimes are seen as inimical to the conduct of an independent foreign policy. The capacity to choose one’s enemies and friends and to take a stand on issues depends, in the end, on military power. The NPT, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and now the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are seen as denying India’s weapons and technological capabilities essential for its military preparedness.¹³

The third threat to foreign policy autonomy, in India's calculus, is economic globalization. India has always been suspicious of what it regards as a global capitalist system, represented by multinational corporations and foreign investment, which could ensnare it in a neo-colonial order.

In totality, New Delhi sees the major threat to Indian foreign policy autonomy as being constituted by the U.S. – led concert of Western powers. The concert can operate directly on India but also works through various international institutions, regimes, and a globalized economic order. These entities could punish India diplomatically (in the United Nations, for example, on an issue like Kashmir), militarily (by denying it key technologies), and economically by withholding multilateral funding (from the World Bank or IMF) or impeding private investment flows.

In addition to India's general desire for balance is a regional policy that seeks to exclude the great powers from South Asian affairs. In this regard Indian policy displays a good deal of consistency. Indian decision makers are aware that the smaller states in South Asia perceive three basic threats to their security – threats posed by extraregional powers including the great powers; internal subversion; and India itself – any of which may cause them to turn to outside powers for assistance. India has in turn fashioned three basic responses by which it tries to reduce the insecurity of the small states and their incentive to woo nonregional powers. The first response is to forge bilateral defense agreements with the smaller states. These agreements give India a role in those states' external security and obviate the need for nonregional protectors: thus India has treaty
arrangements with Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Nepal. The second response is to insist that, in the event of internal instabilities that require external military help and other forms of assistance, India should be consulted and used as a first resort: commentators in South Asia have called this "the India Doctrine". The third response has been to forge regional organizations that will reassure the smaller states with respect to Indian motives and actions: SAARC is the most recent example, but India's attempts to bring South Asia into a regional arrangement date back to the Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi in March 1947.

India's strategy for foreign policy autonomy is a mix of two broad approaches. While it accepts a certain degree of bandwagoning with the United States in the short term, its search for strategic balance, its long-term concern with internal balancing through indigenous arms production, and its regional policy of defense agreements and Indian-led collective security ("the India Doctrine") – all these reveal that New Delhi seeks to marshal power and force against threats to India's autonomy. At the same time, India seeks to protect its autonomy through more institutional and noncoercive practices. Nonalignment and regional cooperation in South Asia represent this alternative track.

National Power

If India is to defend its territory and become a truly autonomous actor in the international system, it must be powerful. Indian leaders have had

14 The Statesman, New Delhi, November 11, 1997.
15 Muni, S.D and Anuradha Muni, Regional Cooperation in South Asia [New Delhi, Nation, 1984] P-75.
different notions of national power. For Nehru (1947-64), power included military capacity. India's first Prime Minister, it should be remembered, laid the basis for India's defense industry and its nuclear program. But power was also economic strength, technological capacity, and social and political stability. In addition, power lay not so much in coercive as in mediatory diplomacy and had "cosmopolitan" ends.\textsuperscript{16} Such diplomacy would serve Indian interests but also the interests of international society as a whole. India would be powerful to the extent that it had the ability to persuade and reassure others rather than coerce them.

With Indira Gandhi (1966-77, 1980-84), India's view of power came closer to the realpolitik notion of military and other coercive instrumentalities. Moreover, whereas Nehru saw Indian security in a global environment, Mrs. Gandhi focused on the region, the near region, and domestic politics, a policy focus that was even more central to the security conception of its successor, Janata government (1977-79).

The review of Indian visions of power suggests that national power, whether it is cosmopolitan or more inward looking, rest on three components: military strength, economic development, and internal order. These in turn become secondary values of a security conception. As we shall see, these secondary values are also vulnerable to external and internal threats or limitations. India's strategies for managing its vulnerabilities have been partially successful. New Delhi has built up conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities to an impressive level. Given

\textsuperscript{16} Muni, S.D, \textit{Arms build-up and Development} [New Delhi, Heritage Publisher, 1983]P-73.
its size and highly diverse society, it has maintained a fair degree of internal order. Its greatest failure has been in the realm of economic development. India's pro-market reforms since 1991, though, may bring about a turnaround.

Military strength is a key component of India's conception of power. Indian decision makers want enough military capacity for deterrence – and for defense should deterrence break down – against both Pakistan and China. Some have suggested that India also needs a general deterrent in the Indian Ocean against great-power navies. This requirement, they argue, has grown since the U.S.-led war against Iraq. In addition, there are situations that require compulsion, mostly in the region or near-region. Indian leaders want enough extra force to be able to project power in the neighborhood, whether as a "peacekeeping force" in Sri Lanka or as an interventionary force on an Indian Ocean island or even in the Persian Gulf, where India gets most of its oil.

India's ability to deter and defend against Chinese and Pakistani attacks rests on its conventional and nuclear preparedness. India's armed forces, numbering 1.265 million (down from a peak of about 1.5 million) and 200,000 reservists, are the fourth largest in the world. The major increase in forces came after 1962, when India had about half a million men under arms. The defense budget has grown from an average of 2 percent of gross domestic product in the 1950, to 3.4 percent in the 1960s, to 3.6 percent in

General K. Sundarji, India's best-known "thinking" general, has noted that India should be in a position to deter a U.S.-led coalition of the type Iraq faced in 1991. This requires that India have a nuclear capability. The Times of India, New Delhi, August 21, 1999
the 1970s and 1980s. The 1990s show a downward trend, with the budget closer to 3 percent of GDP.

India's nuclear deterrent, too, is vulnerable to pressures from external powers. Whereas the basic nuclear technologies have been mastered indigenously, there are concerns about a fully operation deterrent.

A host of external and internal problems thus curtail India's capacity to maintain its military strength.

Since independence, India has been aware of its vulnerability to external suppliers of military equipment. The Blackett Report of 1948 recommended that India deal with the problem by embarking on a process of indigenization. Thus India has invested in a large defense production base that is intended to make the country self-sufficient. It presently has 39 ordnance factories (Ofs) and 8 defense public-sector undertakings (DPSUs). These installations produce ammunition, batter tanks, armored vehicles, aircraft, warships, missiles, electronic and communications equipment, engines, alloys, and specialized components and spares. Indian investment in the OFs and DPSUs in 1994 was $920 million.

The Indian defense industry, though, has failed to indigenize the production of key combat systems and subsystems, including such key items as aircraft, armor and artillery, carriers and submarines, engines, and electronics. To correct for this deficiency, Indian strategy has been to
increase research and development allocations, to enter into licensing and coproduction relationships, and to increase privatization.\textsuperscript{18}

Even since independence, India has held to the vision that economic development is a key security value. An economically weakness would be prey to external and internal foes. Economic weakness would hurt India's defense, keep it technologically backward, and promote internal instability. The country's enemies, both external and internal, would find fertile soil for subversion.

This logic was exemplified in a speech Nehru gave in 1948 in which he warned: "If we do not ultimately solve the basic problems of our country—the problems of food, clothing, housing, and so on, ... we shall be swept away". Economic productivity was a vital national objective. It was necessary for the achievement of other national goals: "The ultimate peril is the slow drying up of the capacity of the nation to produce. That affects us politically, economically and in every other way, and gradually our strength goes down to resist these very perils that face us". Four decades later, the logic of economy and national strength was echoed in Defense Minister Pant's argument that "you need economic growth and proper distribution of the fruits of economic growth in order to have social stability which is the bedrock of political stability. You need both in order to have the right environment in a democracy for defense preparedness in depth, and defense preparedness obviously is a priority area for both the other areas".

\textsuperscript{18} Singh, Jasjit, \textit{India, China and Panchseel} (New Delhi, Sanchhar, 1997) P-57.
From Nehru's time to the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's second term in office, development meant a steady but not necessarily high rate of economic growth, equitably distributed, and a self-sufficient economy. Self-sufficiency was perhaps considered even more important than "growth with equity". Thus Indian socialism stressed the construction of basic infrastructure — heavy industry, power, transportation, roads, communications — and, particularly after Nehru, the capacity to feed the country's own population. In general, it looked upon consumer satisfaction and choice as a luxury; indeed, consumerism was seen as derogating from investment in infrastructure and agriculture.

From Rajiv Gandhi's period onward, development has been inflected differently. It has come to be equated, as never before, with high rates of growth (6 to 7 percent annually). "The fundamental objective of economic reform, " the Narasimha Rao government wrote, "is to bring about rapid and sustained improvement in the quality of life. Central to this goal is the rapid growth in incomes and productive employment". While there remains a commitment to a "middle way" of growth with equity, that goal is more rhetorical than real. Self-sufficiency continues to animate Indian development ambitions, but the need to "catch up" has substantially moderated the earlier orthodoxy. Thus in the Ministry of Finance's discussion paper on the post-1991 economic reforms, a key paragraph relates to the comparative advance of East and Southeast Asia, and to India's stagnation: "Within a generation, the countries of East Asia have transformed themselves. China, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia today have
living standards much above ours... What they have achieved we must strive for”.

Now that economic development has come to be equated with high rates of economic growth, a number of constraints stand in its way. Disagreement within India is perhaps sharpest on the issue of those constraints. For the Narasimha Rao government they were primarily internal, whereas for domestic critics they are mostly external. The defeat of Narasimha Rao in 1996 brought some changes but not substantial ones. The leftist coalition in power under Prime Minister Deve Gowda and I.K. Gujral was more attentive to equity goals.

For the Narasimha Rao government and its successors, the biggest constraint facing the growth agenda stems from “old habits of thinking and working” within India. The most important of these habits is the expectation that the state rather than the market must play the leading role in structuring production, consumption, investment, and trade. That expectation is widespread in Indian society, but in addition, “powerful sectional interests” sustain such expectations and oppose reform. Thus a second constraint is the role of various special interests. A third constraint on the growth agenda is the negative view Indians take of foreign involvement in the Indian economy.

Our analysis of Indian economic strategy reveals an etatiste conception in the sense of a relatively autonomous state pursuing the “national interests’. The Indian state appears as an activist and interventionary mechanism, as in the past, but one commitment now to
securing high rates of growth by bringing about a change in values, overcoming the resistance of special interests, providing public goods and a promarket regime of norms and rules, and attracting foreign investors in the name of “national development”.

India’s decision makers understand that however strong India may be in terms of military and economic capabilities, the country is vulnerable as long as it is internally unstable. Given the heterogeneity of Indian society and the economic backwardness of various groups, Indian governments have always expected to deal with challenges to internal order. Their concerns about order have grown since the relatively calm years of the Nehru period. A series of threats exist, mostly homegrown but aided and abetted by external actors, particularly Pakistan and China.

In Nehru’s time, internal disruption was limited. The early years saw the “police actions” in Hyderabad and Junagadh, the Kashmir problem, the liberation of Goa from the Portuguese (1961), trouble in Punjab (1954), the threat of communism, and of course religious violence at the time of partition and after. Since Nehru’s time, the tide of internal troubles has risen steadily, bringing the northeastern rebellions from the 1960s to the present, the language riots in Tamil Nadu in the 1960s, increasing Hindu-Muslim violence in the 1970s and 1980s, the Sikh militancy of the 1980s, and the Kashmir insurrection of the 1990s.

Not surprisingly, the government’s concern about internal order has heightened. For the first time since independence, in the Narasimha Rao government India had a Minister of State for Internal Security. The National
Security Council (NSC), created in 1990, was chartered to deal with both external and internal security matters. On his visits to the United States and Russia in 1994, Narasimha Rao repeatedly drew attention to a shared commitment to social pluralism, in the interest of international stability but also of internal order. He frequently argued that economic reforms, though necessary and desirable, must be crafted with an eye to domestic stability.\textsuperscript{19} The Ministry of Defense’s annual report for 1994-95 concludes its opening paragraph with the judgment that “it is not so much inter-state wars as intra-state violence, international terrorism and proxy wars by external powers that characterize the global security environment.” The report makes several other references to internal troubles.

The growth of paramilitary forces is another indication of the increasing inwardness of security concerns. The paramilitaries grew six-folds in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In roughly the same period, the Indian military grew three-folds. The paramilitaries increased their numbers by 50 percent between 1985 and 1993.

The threats to internal order arise from four sources: separatism, illegal migration, religious conflict, and caste tensions. Although the roots are domestic, Indian decision makers see external involvement, or opportunities for external involvement, in virtually every case.

Separatism and migration are seen as long-term threats to territory, but in an everyday sense they are threats to internal order. Separatism involves large-scale, organized violence between the rebelling ethnic group

and the state as well as other ethnic groups. The unrest is abetted, as noted earlier, by external actors. Violence of a secondary nature occurs outside the main threats. Terrorist groups from Punjab and Kashmir have operated in other parts of the country, including Delhi.

Illegal migration, though less immediately and less visibly disruptive, also upsets internal order. The migrants affect local ethnic and religious balances in areas that have a precarious social structure. Indian decision makers see Bangladeshi migrants as the most dangerous influx. There is a widespread perception that they are filtering into West Bengal and the northeastern states in large numbers and moving on to the big Indian cities in the north. As Bengalis, they exacerbate anti-Bengali feeling in Assam. As Muslims, they worsen communal relations in West Bengal, the northeast, and the major urban centers. Even though the impetus to migrate is a personal one and generally stems from broad socioeconomic conditions, Bangladesh is regarded as either actively encouraging the movement of people or not doing enough to stop it.

With respect to religious conflict, the government remains worried about Hindu-Muslim violence above all. The rise of “Muslim fundamentalism” and the growth of an unabashed “political Hinduism” at both the causes and effects of a heightened religious consciousness.\textsuperscript{20} The government is

\textsuperscript{20} Both communities harbor a minority sensibility, a sense of siege. Although Hindus recognize that they are numerically superior, they see the demographic balance as changing in favour of Muslims. Moreover, they see "Hindu" India as being surrounded by Muslims – from the Middle East and North Africa at one end to Southeast Asia at the other. Too makes this point. Muslims, by contrast, are a numerical minority and look with apprehension at the consolidation of Hindus under the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sang (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the Shiv Sena. The Times of India, New Delhi, April 18, 2001
particularly concerned about Muslim communalism, which it sees as part of an upsurge of Islamic feeling globally and which it believes is fueled by Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The wave of bombings in Mumbai in 1993 following the destruction of the Babri Masjid mosque was attributed to Pakistani instigation of local Muslim gangs and provocateurs. Although Hindu fundamentalism has its own external component — Indians studying and settled abroad, for example — the government has not shown any great anxiety over the majority community's foreign links.

Hindu-Muslim religious differences are paralleled by caste tensions in northern India: caste Hindus versus the scheduled castes and tribes; "other backward classes" (OBCs) versus the upper and middle castes; OBCs versus the lower castes. Though caste rivalries are not new, what is new is the large-scale political mobilization according to caste in the huge northern states. The most dangerous aspect of this mobilization is the formation of private militias. Rivalry between the militia has led to an "undeclared war", particularly in the state of Bihar but also in eastern Uttar Pradesh.

These developments point to the most worrying aspect of religious and caste tensions, namely, their militarization. Underlying the growth of violence is the proliferation of small arms. Estimates vary on the numbers of small arms available and on the sources — Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan, Southeast Asia — but Indian analysts see their prevalence as a serious threat. Operationally, the critical problem is the nexus between small arms smugglers, drug mafias, and ethnic dissidents, a nexus that is transnational in scope.
The threats to internal order, then, are both internal and external. Except in the case of separatism, the Indian government does not regard these threats as involving the large-scale use of organized violence directed against state authority. Religious and caste violence can be extensive and claim a high toll. These traumas too are planned rather than spontaneous. But the groups organized to produce violence are evanescent: they tend to disappear after bouts of violence. They are not in any case very large groups. Although the number of *senas* (militias, private armies) is growing these groups are not trained and skilled perpetrators of violence. And they are not, in the end, primarily dedicated to fighting the state but rather are members of other religious or caste communities. The greatest dangers on this front, in New Delhi's estimation, are the spread of small arms and the increase in drug trafficking and mafia activity, which in the long run could thoroughly militarize Indian society and undermine state authority.

India's approach to these various internal threats has been twofold. It has used force or the threat of force against militant groups and their external supporters. But it has also conceded rights to minority groups and decentralized power to create an increasingly layered federal structure.

New Delhi has responded with force to internal violence over nearly fifty years. It has used the army extensively. Indeed, the incidence of "aid of civil" has risen steeply over the last two decades. In response to criticism from the public and from the army itself, New Delhi has built
up an array of paramilitary and police forces to deal with internal violence.\textsuperscript{21} India has also threatened force against external provocateurs. Whereas the Chinese abandoned their support of the northeastern separatists in the late 1970s, Pakistani support has been active since the early 1980s, first in Punjab, then in Kashmir, and now, reportedly, as far away as the northeast. Indian leaders have publicly warned Pakistan of the possibility of a punitive war. These warnings have been seen as intemperate outbursts, but they must also be regarded as exercises in coercive diplomacy. On at least two occasions – in 1987 and 1990 – Indian mobilizations led to crises.\textsuperscript{22} Pakistan is not the only country that has been the object of Indian warnings. Bangladesh has also been suspected of interfering mostly in the northeast. Police and military clashes along the border have resulted into tension between Bangladesh and India.

The general response to the demands of minority groups, though, has been to concede various types of groups rights, including linguistically organized states, religious and vernacular schools, separate civil codes, and caste and tribal reservations in education, government employment, and political representation. These measures have been aimed mostly at linguistic, religious, and caste and tribal groups.

\textsuperscript{21} These forces include the National Security Guard (NSG), the Rashtriya Rifles, the Border Security Force (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Assam Rifles, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and the Nagaland Hill Police. \textit{The Times of India}, New Delhi, March, 19, 1999.

\textsuperscript{22} In 1986-87, an Indian military exercise near Pakistan's borders led to a confrontation in January 1987. Indian moves appeared deliberately ambiguous and were seen as a warning to Pakistan regarding its interference in Punjab. In early 1990, Indian troop reinforcements in Punjab, Rajasthan, and Kashmir led to another dangerous standoff. This had been preceded by a number of statements warning Pakistan about its role in Kashmir. Op.cit, no-1, P-118.
For ethnic separatists, the favored solution has been decentralization of power. From Nehru's time, while the central government has remained enormously powerful, it has also created exceptions to the general division of responsibilities between the central government and the states. The most prominent exception, of course, is Kashmir, which is governed by Article 370 of the constitution. Kashmir is by no means the only exception. Responsibility has also been increasingly layered, though it remains to be seen how effectively. Thus, in addition to the division of authority between the center and the states or union territories, there are regional councils (consisting of groups of states), autonomous district councils, and panchayats (elected councils at the local, usually village, level). In short, rights plus a multilayered federalism make up the Indian formula for internal order.

Conceding group rights and instituting multilayered federalism has not diminished central government control. Even as special rights and provisions are conceded, central authorities remain supreme. The authorities maintain skewed distributions of power, of the means of violence are substantially under their control as is also the power of the purse. Any group that attempts to accumulate the means of violence or to extract resources from the populace (through "taxes", for example), such as insurgents or various communitarian groups, becomes for the authorities "antinational". Such organizations are eliminated by force or brought into the political process after a campaign of military attrition has rendered them amenable to "normal" politics. Although this approach has had success in managing internal order,

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there are challenges ahead for which India has not yet evolved a coherent approach. The militarization, even criminalisation, of caste and religious confrontations is the most serious internal security threat.

The Indian conception of security appears at first glance to bear out the classical conception of national security. In the classical formulation, the state is bound to protect two primary values that are intrinsic to the enjoyment of sovereignty – territorial integrity and foreign policy autonomy – and to cultivate if not maximize power in order to protect those values. Our review of India's security; that security strategies seek to protect three primary values – territorial integrity, foreign policy autonomy, and national power; that national power in turn is a function of three secondary values – military strength, economic development, and internal order; and that national power is vital to the protection of India's territorial integrity and foreign policy autonomy.24

On further reflection, the Indian conception of security appears more complex. India's strategies for coping with threats and vulnerabilities appear diverse and numerous. New Delhi perceives a structure of external and internal threats and, more often than not, of external actors working with internal actors to harm India. Externally, the major threats to India are China, Pakistan constitute military threats; the U.S. – led concert of mostly Western industrial countries.25 China and Pakistan constitute military threats; the U.S. – led concert is a diplomatic and political threat. Internally, the major threats

24 Chari, P.R, Perspective on National Security in South Asia[New Delhi, Manohar, 1999]P-104
are ethnic separatists whose rebellions furnish opportunities for outside meddling, principally from China and Pakistan but also potentially from the West. Religious and caste rivalries are also a destabilizing factor, especially with the spread of small arms. With respect to military strength and economic growth, internal institutions and attitudes present vulnerabilities.

India’s policies with respect to the threats to and vulnerabilities of its core values are multifarious. New Delhi has resorted to force to defend core values. It has done so to protect its borders and territory from external and internal threats. It has also built up an indigenous capacity to produce arms, both conventional and nuclear. In addition, it has imported major weapons systems. These give it the ability to defend its borders and territory, but they also give it a reputation for power, which is vital for foreign policy autonomy and for its self-conception as a major power.

However, in addition to force, New Delhi has used a variety of institutional mechanisms and noncoercive measures to protect core values. These include negotiations (e.g., with China and Pakistan and with ethnic separatists), nonalignment (with respect to the great powers), and group rights and decentralization (to deal with internal ethnic, religious, and caste disaffection). New Delhi has also turned to strategies that it hopes will improve the diplomatic environment with rivals and lead to a reconceptualization of its adversaries’ interests. These strategies include diplomatic normalization (with China and Pakistan), summitry (primarily with China but also with Pakistan whenever possible), and economic and cultural cooperation (bilaterally with China and Pakistan, multilaterally with in

26 Copra, V.D AND Gupta, Rakesh, Nuclear Bomb and Pakistan; External and Internal Factors [New Delhi, Patriot Publisher, 1987] P-157.
India hopes that its economic opening to the West, especially the United States, will ease American pressures on it in issue areas such as nonproliferation and human rights. Internally, India’s concern with economic development rests in part on a view that material well being will buy off dissent.

India’s mix of strategies – power and coercion but also institutional and noncoercive measures – belies the picture of a classical conception of national security. Indian decision makers do see their country as a major if not a great power. They seek power in terms of military strength, economic development and internal order as a way of protecting national sovereignty. But, in contrast to the classical conception of security, they do not appear relentlessly preoccupied with power and its deployment. Indeed, they repeatedly turn to other resources and methods.

India stands revealed, therefore, as a modified structuralist state in security matters, to use Stephen Krasner’s term. National interests as articulated by the state, national power, and the ability to coerce are very much a part of India’s security conception, but so, broadly, are institutional and noncoercive measures that aim to accommodate or change through peaceful means the views of enemies and rivals, both external and internal.

Two interpretations of India’s modified structuralism can be advanced. In the first interpretation, modified structuralism arises from expediency.

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Given the magnitude of the external threats facing India and its internal vulnerabilities – in the areas of military strength, economic development, and internal order – the country must combine coercive with accommodative strategies as a way of compensating for its weaknesses. As India’s power grows, it will rely less on strategies of accommodation and peaceful change; until then, a modified structuralist approach is apt.

In the second interpretation, modified structuralism is a function of conviction. Power is India’s ambition; but Indian decision makers understand that power seeking provokes power seeking, force begets force. Beyond a certain point, then, power approaches are self-defeating: they may provoke the very outcome that one seeks to avoid, namely, large-scale violence. In addition, large-scale violence, even if it is visited on an adversary, is unacceptable. The pursuit of power without supplementary strategies designed to accommodate others or to change their attitudes could end in physical or moral disaster. The urge to power must therefore be moderated.

In the first interpretation Indian security choices are explained by material factors. The deficiencies in Indian military and economic power as well as internal order simply cannot sustain a pure power approach. In the second interpretation, by contrast, a deep-seated norm against a power approach exists or evolves. Such a norm may arise from “egoistic self-interest,” which holds that it is rational to try to avoid a mutually undesirable outcome such as massive violence between two or more states. Thus, India’s first Prime Minister wrote: “Self interest itself should drive every

nation to... wider co-operation in order to escape disaster... The self interest of the 'realist' is far too limited". The norm against pure power approaches may also arise from other "norms and principles, habit and custom, and knowledge," as Krasner has argued with regard to regime development. Thus, Gandhian norms and principles of nonviolence have imbued India with an aversion to a pure power approach. The role of knowledge in generating this norm can be illustrated by Nehru's understanding of European history in terms of a security dilemma engendered by balance of power politics: "Germany, nursing dreams of world conquest, was obsessed by fears of encirclement. Soviet Russia feared a combination of her enemies. England's national policy has long been based on a balance of power in Europe ... Always there has been fear of others, and that fear has led to aggression." Referring to Spykman's geopolitical ideas, Nehru noted: "all this looks very clear and realistic and yet it is supremely foolish, for it is based on the old policy of expansion and empire and the balance of power, which inevitably leads to conflict and war".

Thus India's modified structuralism in national security affairs is a function of both expediency and conviction, of material deficiencies and of ideational legacies and configurations. It is not purely one or the other. Different sets of decision makers in India, at different times, have been and are influenced more by one set of factors than the other. In Nehru's days, the ideational factors were probably the more important source of India's

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modified structuralism. This interpretation is reflected in the common judgment that the first Prime Minister was an idealist and a moralist.\textsuperscript{33}

Since Nehru, the pendulum has swung toward material factors as the prime cause of India's policy of modified structuralism. India's security posture and behaviour, many have argued, appears incoherent. Most recently, Sandy Gordon has ascribed this inconsistency to India's being a "weak-strong" state – weak internally, economically, and in some respects militarily; strong in terms of its overall size, resources, and ambitions. Our analysis suggests a somewhat different interpretation of Indian security policies.\textsuperscript{34} India's policies are not particularly incoherent: modified structuralism has been and is central. What looks like incoherence is the ebb and flow in the policy-making process between currents that favor modified structuralist postures based on expediency (material factors) or on conviction (ideational factors), the former inclining toward a "power" approach, the latter toward an "institutional" one. On the whole, Indian policy is a tempered, combinatorial one, susceptible to modulation and correction, rarely extreme in any direction.

Does India's policy work? Only a sketchy and brief answer to that question is possible here. On balance, India's policy has served it well. It has lost wars (1962) and won wars (1971), but above all it has not been involved in a major war and its casualties in all its wars combined have been relatively few.\textsuperscript{35} It lost some territory to China – the Aksai Chin, essentially – and some to Pakistan in Kashmir in 1948, but no more. Notwithstanding intermittent

\textsuperscript{33} Chopra, Surindra, \textit{Sino-Indian Relations} [Amritsar, GND University, 1985] P-109.
\textsuperscript{35} Cohen, Stephen P, \textit{The Indian Army} [Ullionis; University of Ullionis, 1987] P-117.
tensions, it has sustained at least a cold peace with both neighbors since 1971. India has maintained a foreign policy distance from the great powers. It has slowly – admittedly, more slowly than it would like – built up its military and economic strength it is now a military power that can defend itself against its major rivals and economically. Its internal politics have been marked by upheavals and violence, but given India’s size and diversity it has managed to preserve both stability and democracy. That India’s approach to security has not brought about a lasting peace with the country’s major rivals or with internal dissidents has been its greatest limitation.  

If India’s modified structuralist posture has increasingly been informed by material deficiencies rather than normative conviction, what is the future of its security conception? Assuming that material deficiencies are substantially reduced, what will be crucial is whether military or economic deficiencies are remedied first. If Indian military deficiencies are corrected before the economic ones, it is likely that a move toward power and coercive approaches will ensue. If, on the other hand, the economic deficiencies are dealt with before the military, then we may see swing back toward softer Nehruvian conceptions of security. In such a scenario India would increasingly participate in cooperative security arrangements with its neighbors, with the near regions such as the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific, and with the great powers. New Delhi’s more concessionary stance with regard to its neighbours since 1996 (which has already produced major river water agreements with Bangladesh and Nepal), Indian membership in the ARF, and joint military exercises with

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36 Nath, Birbal, Kashmir, the Nuclear Flashpoint [New Delhi, Manas, 1998] P-129.
37 Op.cit.,no-34 p-118
Southeast Asian countries and the United States presage just such a development.

Since 1991, the signs indicate that the economic deficiencies of India are being treated as the higher priority. In 1991, the financial crisis unleashed India’s economic reforms, which have already raised Indian growth rates from between 1.5 and 3 percent to 5 percent a year, brought in foreign investment, and increased India’s imports and exports. The economic crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was India’s main military supplier, set off a decline in defense allocations and purchases.³⁸ In addition, the problems plaguing indigenous arms productions and purchases are already, in 1977, showing signs of increasing once again, but indigenous arms production and the nuclear program will require a considerable effort.

India seems to have chosen butter over guns for the time being. It appears to have set its sights on an economic reform process that will increasingly tie it into a globalizing economy. Growing interdependence promises to move India in the direction of a more cooperative notion of security. Involvement in cooperative security arrangements is vital, because sustained economic growth can lead to a resurgence of defense spending, as is apparently the case in Southeast Asia. With high rates of economic growth and membership in cooperative security structures, India will remain a modified structuralist state – for the sake of conviction rather than expediency – to the benefit of international peace and stability in the twenty-first century.

³⁸ The Hindu, New Delhi, October 2, 2001