CHAPTER - V

PŪRVA MĪMĀ(NSĀ AND VEDĀNTA THEORY OF
PERCEPTION

A. PŪRVĀMĪMĀ(NSĀ THEORY OF PERCEPTION

The Pūrvāmīmānsa or Mīmānsa system was founded by Jaimini. Mīmānsa as a Vedic system of Indian philosophy emphasizes much on the proper understanding of Vedic language so that the rituals can be performed properly. The word ‘Mīmānsa’ is derived from the root man with the affix san adding the affix tāp. The ‘Mīmānsa’ system constitute the orthodox Brahmanical philosophy, for which the word of the Veda constitutes, as the ‘revelation’ the highest authority for all knowledge. ‘Mīmānsa’ means ‘full discussion’. Pūrvāmīmānsa is the ‘discussion of the first part’ (or preliminary investigation), namely the Karmakāṇḍa (work-part) of the Veda, and hence it is called also Karmamīmānsa. The system of Pūrvāmīmānsa stands in close relationship to Indian Law since its main object is to determine injunctions which are distinct from those of civil law mainly in the fact that they deal with the sacrificial rather than civil obligations.
The Mīmāṁsā system is ascribed to the great sage Jaimini who composes the Mīmāṁsāsūtra. The most famous commentary on this sūtra is written by Śabarāsvāmi which is known as Śabarabhaśya. This bhāṣya of Śabarāsvāmi is the basis of the latter Mīmāṁsā works\textsuperscript{1}. Other commentators of the Mīmāṁsāsūtra are Bhartrmitra (alluded to in Nyāyaratnākara verse 10 of Ślokavārttika), Bhavadāsa (Pratijñāsūtra 63), Hari, Upavarṣa (mentioned in Śāstradīpikā), Bodhāyana etc. Among the commentators, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Miśra deserve special mention. These two philosophers founded the two chief branches rather sister schools of Mīmāṁsā known after their names viz., the Bhaṭṭa and the Prabhākara school. It may be pointed out here that besides the two schools of Mīmāṁsā already stated one more school is found to exist known as the Miśramata initiated by one Murāri Miśra. This school, however, is not known except through some references in other works.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, wrote his celebrated independent exposition of Śabarāsvāmi’s bhāṣya in the three parts known as Ślokavārttika, Tantravārttika and Tuptikā. The Ślokavārttika deals with the first part of the first chapter known as Tarkapāda is of great

\textsuperscript{1} HIP., Vol. I, p.370.
philosophical importance. *Brhattīkā* is an important work of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The next great Mīmāṃśā scholar and follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa was Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Vidhiviveka, Bhāvanāviveka, Vibhramaviveka, Brahmasiddhi, Sphoṭasiddhi* and *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇī*. Pārthasārathi Miśra wrote his *Nyāyaratnamālā, Tantraratna* and *Śāradīpikā* following the footprints of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Amongst the numerous other followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the names ofSucarita Miśra the author of *Kāśikā* on *Tarkapāda* and Someśvara the author of *Nyāyasudhā* are noteworthy. On the *Kāśikā*, Umbekā wrote a commentary known as *Tatparyatīkā*. Rāmakṛṣṇa Bhaṭṭa wrote an excellent commentary on the *Tarkapāda* of *Śāradīpikā* called the *Yuktisnehapūrṇaṁśīdhaṁtacandrikā* and Sōmanātha wrote his *Mayūkhamālikā* on the remaining chapters of *Śāradīpikā*. Other important current Mīmāṃśā works which deserve notice are such as *Nyāyamālāvistara* of Mādhava, *Subodhinī, Mīmāṃsābhālapakāśa* of Śaṅkara Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāyakanikā* of Vācaspati Miśra, *Mīmāṃsāparibhāṣā* of Kṛṣṇayajvan, *Mīmāṃsānyāvaprakāśa* by Anantadeva, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa’s *Bhāṭṭacintamaṇi*, Cidānanda Paṇḍita’s *Nītītattāvīr bhāva*, Nārāyaṇa’s, *Mānmayodaya*, Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s, *Arthasaṃgraha* etc. Among the later scholars writing on this system are Pandit A. Cinnaswami Sastri, Ananta Shastri, Dr. Pashupatinath
Prabhākara Miśra probably a pupil of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, wrote two commentaries viz, *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* on the *Śabarabhāṣya*. Śālikānātha Miśra, a first-rate scholar and a polemical writer of the Prābhākara school wrote an independent treatise on *Brhatī* called *Prakaraṇapañcikā*. Śālikānātha Miśra’s *Rjuvimalā* and *Dīpaśikhā* both are being the commentary on Prabhākara Miśra’s *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* respectively. Among other writers of this school are Bhavanātha Miśra, author of the *Nayaviveka*, Nandīśvara, author of the *Prabhakaravijaya*, Rāmānujācārya, author of the *Tantrarahasya* and Varadarāja, author of the *Dīpikā*, commentary on the *Nayaviveka*. Of the latter scholars writing on this system, the names of Dr. Gaganath Jha, M.Kuppuswami Shastri and Pt. A. Subrahmanya Shastri deserve to be specially mentioned.

Like other systems of Indian philosophy, the system of Mīmāṁsā also takes up perception in dealing with their epistemology. According to Jaimini sources of valid knowledge are of three kinds viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and verbal
testimony (śabda)\(^2\). Among these three pramāṇas Prabhakara Miśra adds two pramāṇas called comparison (upamāna) and postulation (arthāpatti), but Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and his followers add one more pramāṇa called non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) in addition to these five.

**Perception According to Jaimini:**

According to Jaimini perception is the cognition produced in the self by the sense-organs which have the right contact with the real objects, which apprehends a present object. It is not cause of the knowledge of dharma or the Moral Law, which exists in all times\(^3\). This definition is practically the same as that of the Naiyāyikas like Gautama and Annam Bhaṭṭa. Through the analysis of Jaimini’s definition it is found that perception requires the existence of (i) a present object of perception, (ii) a sense-organ with which the object comes into contact, and (iii) the self (puruṣa) in which the cognition is produced. In perception there must be an intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects. And there must be something more. The sense-organs must be connected with the mind, and the mind

\(^2\) Ibid., p.278.

\(^3\) satsariprayoge puruṣasyendriyaṇaṁ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣamanimittaṁ vidyamānopalambhanat. MS, 1.1.4.
with the self. Thus there must be the sense-object-contact, the mind-
sense-contact, and the mind-soul-contact in external perception\textsuperscript{4}. The 
Naiyāyika contends that this definition includes doubtful perception 
and illusion in perception. Though perception is said to be produced 
by a real object, and as such excludes hallucinations which are not 
produced by external stimuli, it does not exclude doubtful perception 
and illusion which are produced by external stimuli\textsuperscript{5}. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa 
tries to avoid this objection by saying that \textit{samprayoga} means the 
right application of the sense-organs to their objects, so that doubtful 
perception and illusion are excluded from perception\textsuperscript{6}. Pārthasārathi 
Miśra points out that Jaimini has not defined perception in the above 
\textit{sūtra}\textsuperscript{7}. He simply says that perception is not the condition of the 
apprehension of supersensuous \textit{dharma}\textsuperscript{8}. So the Naiyāyika’s 
objection is beside the mark. It cannot be urged that this definition 
does not include the perception of pleasure, pain etc., since it does not 
depend upon the external sense-organs. For it depends upon the 
contact of pleasure, pain, etc., with the internal organ or mind\textsuperscript{9}.

\textsuperscript{4} YSP., on ŚD., p.98. 
\textsuperscript{5} NM., pp.100-101. 
\textsuperscript{6} ŚV.,4,p.38. 
\textsuperscript{7} M.S.,1.1.4. 
\textsuperscript{8} ŚD., p.111, also, ŚV., 4,p.19. 
\textsuperscript{9} ŚD., pp.111-112.
There have been the commentators who developed the epistemology of Jaimini. Of these, Śabaravāmi is one of the oldest commentators whose work, the Śabarabhāṣya, describes the Jaimini’s sūtra, and analyses the term perception. Śabaravāmi holds that perception is the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense-organs with existing objects\(^\text{10}\). It is produced by objects existing at present and stimulating the sense-organs. Śabaravāmi holds that in Jaimini’s definition of perception, freedom from error is one of the essential conditions of direct knowledge. It may be said that which is erroneous is not direct knowledge\(^\text{11}\). Further it explains the distinction between right apprehension and wrong apprehension as follows: When the mind is obstructed by the eye, etc., or the sense-organ by darkness etc., or the external object because of minuteness etc., then there is wrong apprehension; for right apprehension is (only) when there are no obstructions and the mutual contact of the sense-organ, mind and the object is the cause of right apprehension. When there is obstruction in perception, the apprehension is false. It may be questioned here that how does one know about it? One knows about it when a right cognition is obtained.

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10. \text{satodriyārthasaṁbandhe ya puruśasya buddhirjāyate tat pratyakṣam. ŠB.,1.1.4.}
11. \text{ŠB., on MS., 1.1.4.}
by the removal of the defects. But then how to discriminate between what is defective and what is not. The answer is that if on careful investigation we do not find any defect, in the absence of any proof (for the presence of a defect) we presume that there is no defect. Therefore only that apprehension is false and none other, which has defective cause and where it is perceived that (the apprehension) is false.\footnote{HIE., pp. 258-259.}

Bhavadāsa an earlier commentator of Mīmāṁsāśūtra interprets Jaimini’s śūtra of perception. According to Bhavadāsa, there are two parts in Jaimini’s śūtra of perception. The first part states that perception is that cognition which arises on the contact of a person’s sense-organs with objects, and the second part states the ground of its incompetence for knowing dharma.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that Bhavadāsa’s view cannot be a definition of perception, because any definition does not fit in the context. The author of the śūtras undertakes an investigation of the means of knowing dharma and hence a definition of perception would have been beside the point. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Bhavadāsa’s definition is too wide since it applies to illusion and

\footnote{HIE., pp. 258-259.}
doubt also. In the illusion of mirage there is a contact of the eyes with heated sand and in the doubtful cognition, e.g., 'is it a man or a post'? the eyes are in contact with something of a determinate character. Bhavadāsa's definition excludes only dream cognitions and hallucinations in which there is nothing objective in contact with eyes. A definition of perception as a means of valid knowledge can be correct only if it covers all cases of true perception and at the same time excludes all cases of false perception. The definition might have been correct if it were stated in the form “perception is that cognition which arises on the contact of a person’s sense- organs with the object that is cognised (grāhya)”. But as the term grāhya has not been inserted in the definition the defect of over - extensiveness persists, since, according to the definition, even the cognition of an object from the contact of the eyes with a different object would come to possess the character of being perception\textsuperscript{13}.

Upavarsa a Vṛttikāra of Mīmāṃsāsūtra rightly said that Jaimini’s sūtra on perception could not give a correct definition. Hence Upavarsa changed the reading of the Jaimini’s sūtra\textsuperscript{14}.

According to Upavarsa, Jaimini’s sūtra does not cover the cases of

\textsuperscript{13} SV., 4.10-14.
\textsuperscript{14} MS., 1.1.4.
illusion and doubt which arise on the contact of a different object. It may be urged that even without changing the reading, the definition will not embrace illusion and doubt. In the illusion of silver in shell the object with which there is actual contact is lost sight of due to some witness and ‘silver’ which is revived in mind through association is remembered and thus what is ‘perceived’ is not in contact with eyes. When without changing the reading perception is defined as that which arises from sense-contact the implication is that it arises directly from sense-contact; otherwise, inference also becomes perception because it too arises mediately from sense-contact. In the inference of fire, for example, there is a contact of the eyes with smoke, which, reviving the memory of fire, leads in directly to the cognition of fire. Thus illusion not directly arising from sense-contact, is excluded from perception. Similarly, doubt too is mediated by memory and hence it is excluded. Pārthasārathi Miśra, on behalf of the Vṛttikāra, argues that even if it is accepted that ‘silver’ in shell-silver illusion be remembered it does not cease to be regarded as directly arising from sense-contact because the remembered ‘silver’ is identified with the perceived ‘this’ while the eyes continue to be in contact with the latter, so that illusion cannot but be regarded as a case of perception according to the objector’s definition. Again, even
if we grant that the shell-silver illusion results in directly from sense-contact over-extensiveness cannot be avoided in the cognition of yellow conch and double moon, because these two arise directly from sense-contact and yet they are cases of illusion. Therefore, the Vṛttikāra's definition is the correct one\textsuperscript{15}.

**Perception According to Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsa:**

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the propounder of Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsa interprets the term perception elaborately. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, perception as a knowledge, is the result of the right functioning of the sense-organs with reference to their objects\textsuperscript{16}. It is to be regarded that the fourth *sūtra* of the first chapter of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* of Jaimini is the basis of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s theory of perception. The system of Mīmāṃsā broadly agrees with the Nyāya system in its view of perception. The self comes into contact with the mind. The mind comes into contact with sense-organ and the sense-organ comes into contact with the external object. The difference between the two systems are that the Mīmāṃsakas regard the auditory organ as proceeding from space and the Naiyāyikas regard it as proceeding from ether. So, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is inclined to define perception in

\textsuperscript{15} SD., pp. 49-50.
\textsuperscript{16} ŚV., 4.38-39.
terms of contact. According to him, the prefix *sam* in the word *samprayoga* occurring in the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* is used to mean right and it serves to preclude all faulty *prayoga*. By *prayoga* Kumārila Bhaṭṭa means the function of the sense-organs with reference to their objects. In the case of cognition of silver in the conch-shell, the function of the sense-organ of eyes is faulty and so, this type of cognition becomes precluded by the prefix *sam*. Thus the fourth *sūtra* of the first chapter of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* may be taken to mean the statement of the definition of perception. In this way, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s interpretation of the above *sūtra* states that the *sūtra* gives the definition of perception as the cognition of a person brought about by the correct functioning of his sense-organs.

Pārthasārathi Miśra a staunch follower of Bhāṭṭamāṃśaka holds that perception can apprehend sensible objects only, but it cannot apprehend supersensible objects like *dharma*. Pārthasārathi Miśra accepted Vṛttikāra’s definition of perception. But he does not agree with Jaimini’s definition of perception. Hence Pārthasārathi

17. MS., 1.1.4.
19. ŚD., pp. 35-36.
Miśra gives a different opinion on perception. At first Pārthasārathi Miśra says that a direct knowledge of pleasure etc. leads to the inference of some sense-organ as its cause, because in the case of colour etc. direct knowledge is always seen to depend on a sense-organ\textsuperscript{20}. Here Pārthasārathi Miśra accepts that the essential nature of perception is its immediacy or directness and that its sensuous origin is only a matter of inference. But he does not give the definition of perception in terms of immediacy. Secondly Pārthasārathi Miśra says that a sense-organ is that which produces knowledge in the form of a distinct and specific consciousness when some object is in contact with it\textsuperscript{21}. Thus immediacy, distinctness and the character of being specific essentially belong to perception. Again, Pārthasārathi Miśra says that the immediate knowledge that results from sense-contact and not from any other source is perception and it is commonly known as such without any regard to how philosophers define perception\textsuperscript{22}. Pārthasārathi Miśra could have boldly defined perception as a true knowledge which is direct, distinct and specific or which is direct and results from the activity of sense-organs.

\textsuperscript{20} aparokṣāvabhāsajñānasyendriyādhīnatayā rūpādiṃjñānesu vyāptidarśanāt sukhaḍiśayamparokṣajñānamindriyamanumāpayati. Ibid., p.36.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} ŚD., on ŚV., p.254.
The latter Bhāṭṭas Cidananda and Nārāyaṇa, define perception as the valid knowledge arising from sense-contact\textsuperscript{23}.

**Perception According to Prābhākaramīmāṁsā**:

Śālikānātha Miśra the author of *Prakaraṇapañcikā* has given a simple but clear definition of perception. He says that perception is the direct apprehension which cognises the apprehended object (*meya*) the self (*mātā*), and the apprehension itself (*miti*)\textsuperscript{24}. In each of act of perception, the idea of each of these three enters as its constituent factor. According to this theory, three factors i.e. *meya*, *mātā* and *miti* are revealed. According to the Prābhākaras in a sentence like *ghaṭamahām jānāmi* i.e., ‘I know the jar’, there are three factors, viz., *jñāna* or *miti*, the *jneya* or *meya* (the apprehended object), and *mātā*. These three are known as *tripūti*, and this distinctive view of perception has been called *tripūti pratyakṣavāda* i.e., the doctrine of triple perception. Here in the above example, *aham* refers to *mātā*, *ghaṭa* refers to the *meya* and *jānāmi* refers to the *miti*. These three factors are apprehended together. But while the *meya* is apprehended as having a form, the other two, i.e., *mātā* and *miti* are apprehended as without a form. The *meya* is always

\textsuperscript{23} tatra indriyārthasannikarṣajāṁ pramāṇaṁ pratyakṣam. MM., p.8.
\textsuperscript{24} sākṣatpratītiḥ pratyakṣaṁ meya-māṭr-pramāṣu sā. PP., 5.4.
apprehended as *karma*. *Ātmā* is apprehended as the *kartā* and the *miti* or apprehension as the *kriyā*. Direct apprehension is the proof for the existence of these three factors. Of these three factors, the first two stand in need of a revealer, but the third is self-revealed\(^{25}\). The *ātmā* and the *meya* are always dependent on apprehension for the manifestation. They are not self-luminous, because it is seen during sleep, though they exist, still they are not manifested in consciousness. Apprehension is its own manifestor. It is formless and revealing itself by its very nature, it reveals the *ātmā* and the *meya*. Apprehension illuminates its subject and objects just as the light of lamp being self-luminous illuminates lamp and the objects as well. Śālikānātha Miśra very clearly explains all these factors\(^{26}\). Just as a second light is not needed to manifest a light, so a second apprehension is not necessary for manifesting an apprehension. Śālikānātha Miśra also holds that in regard to objects, there is the perception of substances qualities and universals due to the

\text{25. meyamāträpramāṇāṇāṁ pratītai vīśeṣāḥ kaḥ? ucyate-meye mātari ca vyatiriktā pratītiḥ sākṣātkāravati, mitau tvavyatiriktā. Ibid., p. 170.}

\text{26. kiṁcāprakāśasvabhāvāni meyāni, mātā ca prakāśamapekṣantāṁ, prakāśastu prakāśatmakatvānāṁyamapekṣate, jāgrato hi meyāni mātā ca prakāśante, susūptasya tadā na tat dvayahapi prakāśate...tasmāt svayaṁ prakāśasamaya eva meyamāträprakāśāḥ. PP., pp.172-73.}
intercourse of the sense-organs with them. With regard to the self, all kinds of knowledge as cognitions are apprehended as perceptions by it. According to Prabhākara Miśra, consciousness is self-luminous; it manifests both the self and the not-self, the knowing subject and the known object. This is the peculiarity of Prabhākara Miśra’s doctrine of perception as distinguished from the Bhāṭṭas doctrine of perception.

**Criticism:**

**Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsaka’s Criticism on Prabhākara’s Theory of Triple Perception:**

Pārthasārathi Miśra, criticizes Prabhākara Miśra’s theory of perception. He maintains that *ayam ghaṭaḥ* i.e., ‘this is a jar’ and *ghaṭamaham jānāmi* i.e., ‘I know the jar’ are two quite different types of judgments. In the earlier, only the object *ghaṭa* is manifested and not the self nor the apprehension. In the latter, the object *ghaṭa* is recalled and the primary apprehension of the jar is inferred. Thus, the earlier is a case of perception, while the latter is a case of inference and the two never go together. So, according to Pārthasārathi Miśra,

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27. meya-māṭpramāṣu śa dravya-jāti-guṇeṣvindriyasya-rnyogottā sā pratyakṣā pratītiḥ. PP., p.147.
the Prābhākaras unnecessarily confound the two when they say that there is a triple consciousness in every cognition\textsuperscript{29}. The Prābhākaras hold that every cognition being self-luminous by nature, the collocation of causal conditions that produces a cognition enables us not only to apprehend the cognition itself but also to apprehend its validity. According to Prabhākara, \textit{samvit}, of which we are directly aware, is not a subjective process, but the result of a subjective process and this process is called \textit{jñāna} which results in the consciousness of an object and is inferred instead of being directly apprehended\textsuperscript{30}.

Sucarita Miśra the author of the commentary of \textit{Kāśikā} criticises Prabhākara Miśra’s identification of \textit{jñāna} with self-mind conjunction. According to Sucarita Miśra, \textit{jñāna} is consciousness but the conjunction of the soul and the mind is not consciousness, hence the mind being as distinct a term of the relation as the soul is, becomes conscious like the latter, while Prabhākara Miśra himself is not prepared to hold such an extraordinary view. Hence, \textit{jñāna} or \textit{buddhi} can be nothing other than the \textit{samvit} which Prabhākara Miśra

\begin{flushright}
29. yadā ca grāhyāmātrameva bhāsate na kriyā kartā vā, tadā ye sarvavittiṣu tritaya-pratibhāsāmāhustē nirastāḥ, yastu nīlamahāṁ jānāmīti pratibhāsah sa nīle jñāte paścādānumānīkaḥ......tasmād bhinnameva grāhyāṁ grāhakādīti. ŚV., p.219.

30. ILES., p.104.
\end{flushright}
holds to be self-aware, and thus he leads to a contradiction of Śabarasvāmi’s view which he pretends to support in his *Brhati*\(^{31}\).

Moreover, when Prabhākara Miśra maintains that the self, the object and the cognition are apprehended simultaneously in every cognition though the form that is manifested is only one, then, as in that case there can be no consciousness of their mutual difference, and as a result three become non-distinct from each other and thus he only contributes to the Buddhist subjectivism. Prabhākara Miśra may say that simultaneous apprehension of two things does not necessarily imply their identity. Colour and light are apprehended simultaneously, but they are not identical. But this does not help the theory of Prabhākara Miśra\(^{32}\).

**Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s Criticism on Mīmāṁsā Theory of Perception:**

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, an old Naiyāyika criticizes the view of Bhavadāsa, Upavarṣa, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Śabarasvāmi in his own ways. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa introduces the Mīmāṁsā theory of perception with a clear observation that if the followers of Jaimini maintain that the Jaimini’s *sūtra* of perception is simply a pointer in characterising *dharma* and that it has no direct bearing upon the definition of

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31. cf. EPSP., p.53.
32. Ibid.p.53.
perception, it is useless to discuss the aphorism in terms of defining perception. On the other hand, if they hold that it embodies the definition of perception they are simply mistaken since it does not escape the defect of being too wide because it is applicable to the cases of doubt and illusion, as they are also based on the sense-object-contact (*satsamprayoga*). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is aware of the fact that even the commentators of Jaimini’s own school differ with one another and draw farfetched meanings on account of the divergent interpretations of the phrase *sat samprayoge*, primarily on the basis of the analytical splitting of this compound into its components in various ways, such as, (i) *satāṁ samprayoge* (ii) *sati samprayoge* (*sati, sam samyak prayoge*), and (iii) *tat samprayoge sat pratyakṣam* (with the interchange of the words *tat* and *sat* in the original *sūtra*). Jayanta Bhaṭṭa objects to this manoeuvre on the part of the followers of Jaimini and rejects all the interpretations on the following grounds:

(i) If the phrase is interpreted as ‘the contact of the sense organ with the existent real object’, only those hallucinations which are not conditioned by the real existent objects will be excluded from the domain of the perception, but doubt and illusions which are conditioned by the real objects will not be excluded. (ii) In order to reject the second alternative interpretation, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa quotes a
verse from Ślokavārṭṭika wherein Kumārila Bhaṭṭa states that this phrase is to be analysed in a different manner, i.e., the term sat is a participle, the indeclinable word saṁ signifies properness, the compound saṁprayoge is qualified by the participle sat, and the precise sense of the aphorism is that “when the contact of the sense organ with an object takes place properly, true sense-perception issues forth.” As doubt and illusion involve incorrect sense-object contact, they are excluded from the province of perception. But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refutes this argument on the ground that the properness of the sense-object contact is supersensuous; it is not perceived. If it is held that such ‘properness’ is inferred by the effect, it is also untenable since effect, i.e., apprehension, is not directly qualified by an adjective such as ‘proper’. Again, if it is maintained that the adjective is supplied by the people themselves, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa remarks that the Māṁsakas should not take unnecessary pains since in this manner they may very well hold perception to be an accomplished fact.

(iii) As regards the third possible analysis of the phrase, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa refers to Vṛttikāra who probably finds the original

33. samyagarthe ca saṁśabdou duṣprayoganiśvaraṇaḥ/ duṣṭattvacchuktiṣayaγo vāryatāmajajekṣanat// NM., I.93.
reading of the aphorism defective and so makes a reciprocal change of the words \textit{sat} and \textit{tat} in the \textit{sūtra} to give a proper definition of perception, i.e., “true perception is that which arises from the contact of the sense-organs of a person with that object alone of which it is the perception”. But Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is of the view that this interpretation of the \textit{sūtra} does not suffice, since this definition is applicable to doubt as well. If the Mīmāṃsakas hold that a doubt refers to two distinct objects but one’s sense-organ does not come in contact with either of them, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa states that in such a situation even, the objects are alternatively referred to the sense-organ and thus the definition applies to ‘doubt’ as well\textsuperscript{34}.

After refuting the views of Bhavadāsa, Upavarṣa and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa takes exception to Šabaravāmi’s statement also. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa points out that if the Mīmāṃsakas maintain that though their aim is not to give a definition of perception, they have referred to it just to show that perception is not a proof for ascertaining \textit{dharma}, they may be asked whether it is normal perception which does not reveal \textit{dharma} or the transcendental perception of the \textit{yogins} which does not reveal it. If they resort to the first alternative it is an uncontested proposition and there is no need

\textsuperscript{34} ITK., pp. 92-93.
of taking so much trouble to prove it. If, however, they refer to the second alternative, they cannot escape the fault of self contradiction since according to them yogic perception is simply a fiction. Moreover, if they believe in the existence of transcendental perception on the basis of the conclusions of rival schools, then, they should either accept that transcendental perception also as real, or, if they are opposed to it, they should not make it a ground. It is useless to try to draw a picture without a canvas or to discuss whether skyflower is fragrant or not. So, it is futile to propose or support something which is not based on sound evidence. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa enters into a long discussion with the Mīmāṁsakas regarding the veracity of yogic perception and tries to prove that the sages endowed with the supersenses can perceive dharma and concludes that Jaimini’s aphorism does not serve any purpose. It neither provides a definition of perception nor gives a proper characteristic of dharma.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s task in dealing with the Mīmāṁsā definition of perception does not seem confined simply to its approval or refusal. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa tries to present a comprehensive Mīmāṁsā view which may be of unifying nature in spite of all the diversities in various aspects. It is, however, not understandable why Jayanta
Bhaṭṭa has left Prabhākara Miśra altogether unnoticed. It is the weakness of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa that by Mīmāṃsā here Jayanta Bhaṭṭa primarily means Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, whom he sometimes quotes verbatim and sometimes with adaptations. Anyhow, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has been perfectly successful in taking them to task mainly by pointing out to their mutually conflicting attitudes in interpreting the basic Mīmāṃsāsūtra and in indirectly establishing the fact that Gautama's definition of perception is preferable to that of Jaimini.

A modern Naiyāyika like Gaṅgeśa criticizes Prabhākara's doctrine of Tripūṭipratyakṣa35 on the ground that it is not true that people are acquainted with the apprehending subject (pramāṭr) in the act of sense cognition itself. In this connection Gaṅgeśa draws a distinction between the first determination (vyavasāya) and the after-determination (anuvyavasāya) in the act of cognition. The first determination consists of the cognizance of the object as a mere 'this', and the after determination which follows the first consist of the cognition 'I know this'36. It is shown thus that it is only at the

35. tatrātma kaṭṛṭṛtena, jñeyam karmatayā, jñānam kriyātvena bhāsate, to jñātṛ jñeya eva viṣayaṁ jñānam anubhūyata iti tripūṭipratyakṣavādinaḥ. TC., p.788.
36. nanv idam iti vyavasāyaḥ, tad uttaram idam ahaṁ jānāmīty anuvyavasāyaḥ. TC., p.789.
\textit{anuvyavasāya} stage of cognition that there is consciousness of the self or subject; and this cognition is mental, and not sensuous\textsuperscript{37}.

**Perception and \textit{Sannikarṣa} :**

Like other systems of Indian philosophy the Mīmāṁsā also holds that perception depends upon the intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects. The Bhāṭṭamīmasakas admit only two forms of contact viz., conjunction and identity with what is conjoined (\textit{saṁyukta tādātmya})\textsuperscript{38}. The various substances are perceived through the conjunction of sense-organs with them. The Bhāṭṭas reject the contact of \textit{samavāya} because sound which is said to be perceived through this contact is not a quality but an eternal substance and so it is apprehended through conjunction with the auditory organ like other substances. Again when \textit{samavāya} as a form of contact is rejected, the contact of \textit{samavetasaṁavāya} is also rejected. \textit{Viśeṣaṇatā} is rejected because non-existence according to the Bhāṭṭas is not an object of perception but of a different means of knowledge known as

\textsuperscript{37} apare punar evam āhuḥ, jñāna-saṁsargad viṣaye prakāśamāne prakāśa svā bhāvatvāt pradīpavat vijñānaṁ prakāśate prakāśāśrayatvāt pradīpavartivad ātmāpi prakāśate iti triputīpratyakṣateti, tad apy asat, ghaṭo ‘yam ity etasmin pratiyamāne jñātṛ-jñānayor aprati-bhāsanāt yatra tu anayoḥ pratibhāso ghaṭam aharī jñāmānti tatrotpanne jñāne jñātṛ jñāna - viśiṣṭasyārthasya māṇasa- pratyakṣatā na tu jñātṛjñānayos caṅkṣaṇa jñāne pratibhāsah tayor api caṅkṣaṇatva-prasangāt.\textit{NK.}, pp.91-92, as quoted \textit{HIE.}, pp.345-346.

\textsuperscript{38} sannikarṣastu dvividhaḥ, saṁyogah saṁyuktatādātmyarī ceti. \textit{MM.}, p.12.
anupalabdhi. Out of the remaining two forms of contact viz., samyuktasamavāya and samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, the first is accepted, but with a different name called samyukta-tādātmya where tādātmya is substituted for samavāya. Thus qualities, actions, and universals of substances are perceived through the contact of samyukta-tādātmya. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa a follower of Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsā holds that there are three kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects, viz., (i) union (samyoga), (ii) united-inherence (samyukta samavāya), and (iii) united-inherent-inherence (samyukta-samaveta-samavāya). Substances are perceived through their conjunction with the sense-organs. The qualities, actions, and generalities inhering in the substances are perceived through united-inherence (samyukta-samavāya). The communities of these qualities and actions are perceived through united-inherent-inherence (samyukta-samaveta-samavāya). But Gāgā Bhaṭṭa does not recognize inherence and inherent-inherence. According to Gāgā Bhaṭṭa, sound is not perceived through inherence (samavāya) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds, because sound is not a quality but a substance; so it is perceived through conjunction (samyoga) with the ear. And

39. rūpādīnāṁ tu samyuktadṛṣṭmadevā tādātmyeva naṁ /
pratītiṅkāraṇāṁ tasmānna saṁbhāntāraśprhyā// Ibid.,p.13.
consequently the generic character of sound also is not perceived through inherent-inherence; it is perceived through united-inherence like the generic character of any other substance, e.g. ‘a jar’. Thus, according to the Bhāṭṭamāṁśaka, there are only three kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects\textsuperscript{40}.

Śālikānātha Miśra holds that there are three kinds of sense-object-intercourse, viz., union (\textit{samyoga}), united inherence (\textit{samyukta samavāya}) and inherence (\textit{samavāya})\textsuperscript{41}.

**Division of Perception:**

According to Mīmaṁsā, the whole process in perception is divided into two forms rather stages. They are indeterminate (\textit{nirvikalpaka}) and determinate (\textit{savikalpaka}) perception. The former proceeds the latter and the latter is more advanced than the former. The indeterminate perception refers to apprehension at the stage of the senses. An object is apprehended vaguely by the senses as a ‘thing’. That is to say, perception that arises immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with some object is \textit{nirvikalpaka} type of perception. The word \textit{nirvikalpaka} means devoid of determinations i.e., \textit{vikalpasūnya}. The term \textit{vikalpa} means the property of

\textsuperscript{40} BC., p. 20.  
\textsuperscript{41} PP., p. 46.
discriminating like the universal etc. and when the vikalpa goes away, then it is called nirvikalpaka.\textsuperscript{42}

Describing the indeterminate perception Kumārila Bhaṭṭa holds that immediately after peripheral stimulation there is an undefined and indeterminate perception of an object, pure and simple, similar to the simple apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. It arises purely out of the object itself.\textsuperscript{43} It apprehends only an individual object which is the substratum of generic and specific characters. Even in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension of an object in its two-fold aspect, generic and specific; but there is no distinct apprehension of the generic character as generic, and the specific character as specific. But here some are of opinion that it is self-contradictory to say that indeterminate perception apprehends an object, in its two-fold aspect, generic and specific, but yet it cannot apprehend its generic character as generic and specific character as specific. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa points out that there is no contradiction here. The generic character is common to many individuals. The

\textsuperscript{42} tatra vikalpo nāma-bhedako dharmab jātyādi,------ nirgato vikalpo yasminnirvikalpakaṁ, avikalpaśbdena nirvikalpakamucceyate, prathamam ākṣa sannipātottannamāpatajajāṁ vastumātragrāhakaṁ vikalpavasthātprāgavastham nirvikalpakam. Nyā.S. as quoted in PP.,pp.160-161.

\textsuperscript{43} asti hyalocanam j nanam prathamam nirvikalpakam/ bālamukādi vijñānāṁ sādṛṣaṁ suddhavastuṁ. ŚV., 4.112.
specific character is peculiar to one individual. The former is inclusive, while the latter is exclusive. Inclusiveness of the generic character and exclusiveness of the specific character are not apprehended by indeterminate perception, since it apprehends only one individual. It cannot apprehend its object as specific, since it cannot distinguish it from other objects; nor can it apprehend its object as generic, since it cannot assimilate it to other objects. It apprehends an object, pure and simple, not as qualified by its generic and specific characters. They qualify the object of indeterminate perception, which is their substratum, but they are not apprehended by it as qualifying its object. All that Kumārila Bhaṭṭa means by mentioning the two-fold aspect of the object of indeterminate perception is to define the character of the object, and to emphasize that its object has a two-fold aspect, generic and specific.

It is to be mentioned that the earliest use of the word ālocana used by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also to mean indeterminate perception is seen in the Praśastapādabhāṣya. From this, it appears that earlier philosophers were conscious of the two forms of perception though

44. na viśeṣo na sāmānyāṁ tadānīmanubhūyate/
tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate// ŚV., 4.113.
45. taddhi dravyādiṣu......dharmādisāmāgye ca svarupālopanamātram.PB., pp.442-443.
clear and detailed description of them was attempted for the first time by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.\footnote{EPSP., p.59.}

In the case of determinate perception Kumārila Bhaṭṭa holds that the determinate perception apprehends the generic characters of an object as generic, and its specific characters as specific. It contains an element of recollection of similar and dissimilar objects and apprehends the community of its objects with other similar objects and its distinction from other dissimilar objects. Its apprehends an object and its generic and specific properties in a subject predicate relation.\footnote{ŚV., 4.120-125.}

Pārthasārathi Miśra being a follower of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa gives slightly different view on the definition of perception by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa indeterminate perception apprehends an individual object in which the generic character and the specific character subsist. But Pārthasārati Miśra holds that indeterminate perception is an undifferentiated and non-relational apprehension of an object with its multiple forms and properties, viz., genus, substance, quality, action and name. Determinate perception breaks up this undifferentiated sensory matrix into its component
factors, viz., the qualified object and its qualifying properties, differentiates them from and relates them to each other, and integrates them into the unity of a determinate percept. It apprehends an object as belonging to a particular class, e.g. ‘this is a cow’, as being qualified by a particular substance, e.g. ‘this is with a staff’, as being endowed with a particular quality, e.g. ‘this is white’, as doing a particular action, e.g. ‘this is going’, and as bearing a particular name, e.g. ‘this is Dittha’.

Gāgā Bhaṭṭa agrees with Pārthasārathī Miśra’s view. According to him, indeterminate perception is the apprehension of an object and its properties as unrelated to each other. For instance, it apprehends a jar i.e., ghaṭa and its generic character i.e., ghaṭatva, but not as related to each other. It does not apprehend its object as a qualified substance and its generic character as its qualifying property. Just after the contact of an object with a sense-organ there is the apprehension of the mere individual object in which the generic character and the specific character are not yet differentiated from each other. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa’s view resembles that of Viśvanātha, who holds that

48. nirvikalpakam anekākāraṁ vastu sarīmugdhaṁ gṛhiṇī, savikalpakam tvēkaikākāraṁ jātyādikaṁ vivicya viṣayīkaroti. ŚD., p.114.
49. ŚD., pp. 138-140.
50. BC., p.21.
indeterminate perception apprehends an object and its generic character as unrelated to each other. It also resembles the view of Prabhākara Miśra, who holds that indeterminate perception apprehends an object in which the generic character and the specific character are not distinguished from each other. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa also holds that indeterminate perception is a distinct psychological process, which apprehends an undifferentiated mass of many properties which are not related to the object in the subject predicate relation. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa defines determinate perception as the apprehension of a qualified object, its qualifications, and the relation between the two. This definition closely resembles that of Nīlakaṇṭha who is the author of Nīlakaṇṭhi on Tarkasamgraha. Gāgā Bhaṭṭa accepts the modern-Naiyāyika’s definition of determinate perception. Like Pārthasārathi Miśra, Gāgā Bhaṭṭa divides determinate perception into five kinds, viz., object as qualified by a genus, a substance, an attribute, an action, and a name. The latter Bhāṭṭamāṁsaṅka holds that after the indeterminate perception, when the sense-object contact still continues, the object is determined as

51. saviśeṣyakam saprakāraṁ sasaraṁsargakam vā jñānaṁ savikalpakaṁ. BC., p.21.
52. Ibid.
belonging to a particular class or as possessing some qualities etc, then the perception becomes determinate\textsuperscript{53}.

According to the Prābhākaras, indeterminate perception is a simple apprehension of the bare nature of an object. Prabhākara Miśra holds that indeterminate perception apprehends not merely the individual object, which is the substrate of its generic and specific characters, but it apprehends also the generic and specific characters of its object without apprehending their distinction. It is not an object of inference; it is felt as perception. Śālikānātha Miśra uses the terms \textit{savikalpā} and \textit{avikalpā} to mean \textit{savikalpaka} and \textit{nirvikalpaka} types of perception\textsuperscript{54}. According to Śālikānātha Miśra, the determinate perception is that which apprehends the object as actually being an individual possessed of specific features and the indeterminate perception is that which apprehends only the nature of the object\textsuperscript{55}. Indeterminate perception apprehends the bare nature of the generic and specific characters but not the difference between them. But determinate perception distinguishes them from each other and apprehends its object as qualified by them. It apprehends the qualified

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} yattu tadanantarāṁ śabdasmaraṇasahakṛtaṁ
  jātyādi visiṣṭavastuvisayair raktōyaṁ ghato' yaṁ ityādivyaktavijñānaṁ
tatsavikalpakaṁ. MM.,p.20.
\item \textsuperscript{54} savikalpā’ vikalpā ca pratyakṣa-buddhirisyate. PP., p.160.
\item \textsuperscript{55} ādyā visiṣṭaviṣaṁyāṁ svarūpaviṣayetārā. PP., p.161.
\end{itemize}
object and the qualifying properties in the subject-predicate relation. It is pointed out that like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Śālikānātha Misra proves the validity of determinate perception. In determinate perception there are two elements, presentative and representative. The representative factor of the determinate perception has been held to invalidate it by some thinkers, for memory is not regarded as valid cognition by them. But Prabhākara Misra does not accept this view. According to him, though determinate perception follows in the wake of indeterminate perception and thus apprehends the same thing which has already been apprehended by indeterminate perception, it must be regarded as a valid cognition like a serial cognition inasmuch as it apprehends certain new factors which did not enter into indeterminate perception viz., the relation between the qualified object and its qualifying properties, both of which were indeed perceived by indeterminate cognition but not as related to each other. The representative factor in determinate perception does not pertain to the thing perceived but to the other things with which it has certain characters in common, and this cannot invalidate the cognition of the

56. sāmānyaviśeṣau dve vastunī pratipadyamānaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prathamam aprapadyate...... savikalpakantu tatprṣṭhabhāvi ta eva vastunī sāmānyaviśeṣaṁ taṁ pratiṣṭhitam prāptayate. PP., pp.54-55.
thing itself. Thus, according to the Prabhakersara determinate perception though presentative-representative in character, is valid\textsuperscript{57}.

The division of perception into the above-mentioned two forms in the Prabhakersara school is the same as in the Bhatti school, though their expressions differ in so far as the nature of indeterminate perception is concerned. There are, however, some scholars like Dr. Ganganatha Jha, who see a real difference between the two. They think that while according to Kumari Bhatta the particular and the generic characters, though present implicitly, are not perceived at the first moment, according to Prabhakersara they are perceived but not as particular and generic characters, for the object cognised is not yet compared with other objects\textsuperscript{58}. Keith, however, maintains that this difference is simply in verbal expression\textsuperscript{59}.

\textbf{Recognition:}

The Mimamsa regards recognition as a kind of qualified perception. Kumari Bhatta agrees with the Naiayika in regarding recognition as a presentative cognition. He puts forward the following

\textsuperscript{57} atmanah pramartvam nirvikalpaka-prsthabhavinaasca savikalpakasya ghatm

\textsuperscript{58} PSP., p.3.

\textsuperscript{59} KM., pp.25-26.
reason. Whatever cognition is produced by peripheral stimulation is presentative or perceptual in nature. Recognition is present when there is peripheral stimulation. Though recognition is preceded by an act of recollection, it is not to be regarded as non-perceptual in character, inasmuch as it is produced by the contact of sense-organ with a present object. There is no injunction that only such a cognition is to be regarded as a perception, as is prior to recollection. Nor is the operation of the sense-organs, after recollection, precluded by any valid reason. Thus the fact of following upon recollection cannot deprive a cognition of its perceptual character, if it is produced by peripheral stimulation. For these reasons, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa regards every cognition as a perception, which is produced by peripheral stimulation, whether it appears before or after recollection. Hence Kumārila Bhaṭṭa regards recognition as a kind of perception.60 Pārthasārathi Miśra also argue this view. He holds that the object is determined by the name by which it is called, e.g. “this is Devadatta”61, i.e. recognition.

Prabhākara Miśra regards direct and immediate apprehension as valid, and recollection as invalid. Prabhākara Miśra also aggress

60. ŚV., pp.234-7.
61. ŚD., p. 42.
with the Nyāya in holding that all recollection is invalid, but he differs from the latter which divides apprehension into valid apprehension and invalid apprehension. Prabhākara Miśra identifies all apprehension with valid knowledge. He means by pramāṇa, ‘valid cognition’ and not the means of valid cognition as the Nyāya holds. For him apprehension alone is valid knowledge, which is different from recollection; recollection is invalid because it depends upon a previous perception62.

B. VEDĀNTA THEORY OF PERCEPTION:

The Vedānta system was founded by Bādarāyaṇa. Literally the term ‘Vedānta’ means ‘the end of the Vedas’ and stands primarily for the Upaniṣads which are considered as the end of the Vedas—both chronologically and philosophically. Chronologically, the Upaniṣads are regarded as the ‘end of the Vedas’ because each of the four Vedas comprises four types of literature, viz., the Sarhhitās, the Brāhmanas,, the Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads, coming successively, of which the Upaniṣads form the last part. Philosophically also, the Upaniṣads, are regarded as the ‘end of the Vedas’, as they mark the culmination of the Vedic speculation and contain the essence of the Vedic

62. pramāṇam anubhūtīḥ, sā smṛteranyathā na sa smṛtīḥ. na pramāṇam smṛtīḥ pūrva-pratipatterapekṣaṇāt. PP., p. 42.
teachings. Later on the denotation of the term ‘Vedānta’ has been expanded so as to include the Bhagavadgītā, the Brahmasūtra, their commentaries etc. all of which have the Upaniṣads as their foundation.

In the Vedāntsāra Sadānanda Yogīndra defines ‘Vedānta’ as Upaniṣad pramāṇa. Thus, Vedānta system, properly speaking is that philosophy which takes its lead from the Upaniṣads. Max Mullar regards it even to be the native philosophy of India. The philosophy of the Upaniṣads, which are collectively called the Vedānta, remarks the starting point of the Indian philosophy, that accepts the Vedas as supreme authority. The contact of the Upaniṣads is vedāntavijñānam, it speaks of the highest mystery in the Vedānta.

The central theme of the Vedānta system is the relation between God and the world and that between the individual and the cosmic world. The Vedānta philosophy primarily an interpretation of the Brahmasūtra is known as Vedāntasūtra, Śārirakasūtra, and Śārirakamāṁsā. Broadly speaking, the Vedānta philosophy has two main divisions: viz., monistic and monotheistic. The monistic or non-dualistic i.e. Advaita school was propounded by Śaṅkara.

63. vide, Indian Literature., p.204.
64. vedānto’ nama upaniṣat pramāṇam. Vsār.,p.8.
65. vedānte paramāṁ guhyāṁ purākalpe procoditam. ŚV. U.,VI.22.
According to this school Jīva and Brahma are absolutely identical. The Vivaraṇa school and the Vācaspati school are included in the Advaita school of Vedānta. Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Nimbārka, Śrī Caitanya and Madhva are included in the monotheistic school of Vedānta. Each of the five monotheistic systems are known respectively as Viśiṣṭādvaita, Śuddhādvaita, Dvaitādvaita, Acintyabheda-bheda and Dvaita.

The school of Advaita Vedānta is based on Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahmasūtra. The earliest available treatise of the Advaita school is the Māṇḍukya-kārikā of Gauḍapāda. Śaṅkara’s commentary on the Brahmasūtra is the root from which sprang forth a host of the commentaries and studies on Vedāntism of great originality, vigor and philosophic insight. Ānandagiri a disciple of Śaṅkara, wrote a commentary on Brahmasūtra called Nyāyānīrṇāya. Again Govindānanda, teacher of Śaṅkara, wrote a commentary on Brahmasūtra named Ratnaprabhā. Vācaspati Miśra, who propounded the Vācaspati school, wrote a commentary on Brahmasūtra called Bhāmatī. On this Bhāmatī, Amalānanda wrote a commentary known as Kalpataru. This work again was commented upon by Appayādikṣita in his Kalpatarūparimala. Other disciple of Śaṅkara, like Padmapāda, also called Sadānanda, wrote a commentary on
Brahmasūtra known as Pañcapādikā. A commentary on Brahmasūtra was composed by Prakāśātman which is known as Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. Another work of Advaita Vedānta is the Naiśkarmyasiddhi of Sureśvara. Again Vidyāraṇya wrote an excellent work named Vivaraṇaprameyasyaṃgraha, elaborating the ideas of Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa. His Jīvanmuktiviveka on the Vedānta doctrine of liberation is an excellent treatise. Vidyāraṇya’s Pañcadasī is a popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Advaita Vedānta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of Śaṅkara’s Bhāṣya is Śamkṣepaśārīraka, written by Sarvajñātamuni. This has also been commented upon by Rāmatīrtha. Śrīharṣa’s Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā, is a most celebrated work on Vedānta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after Śrīharṣa, also wrote an independent work on Vedānta dialectic known as Tattvadīpikā. Śaṅkara Miśra and Raghunātha also wrote commentaries on Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā. A work on Vedānta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedānta of great originality and merit known as Vedānta-paribhāṣā was written by Dharmarājadhvindra. Other commentaries on Vedānta-paribhāṣā are Rāmakṛṣṇadhvarindra’s Śikhāmani and Amaradāsa’s Maṇiprabhā. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Advaitasiddhi is another comprehensive
treatise on Advaita Vedanta. Other notable works of Advaita Vedanta philosophy are Sadananda Vyasa’s *Vedantasāra*, Prakāśananda’s *Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, Sadananda Yāti’s *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, etc.

The school of Viśiṣṭādvaita i.e. the doctrine of qualified monism was composed by Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja criticized Śaṅkara’s monism or absolutism. And he established the ontological reality of God, the individual souls, and the world and regarded the souls and the world as attributes or modes of God. The main exposition of Viśiṣṭādvaita school is Śrībhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra*, composed by Rāmānuja. Other important treatises of this school are *Gītābhāṣya, Vedāntasāra, Vedārtha Saṅgraha* and *Vedānta Dīpa* composed by Rāmānuja. Rāmānuja’s bhāṣya is also dealt with by the famous Veṅkaṭanātha, in his work *Tattvātīkā*. Veṅkaṭanātha’s *Nyāyaparipariśuddhi* is an important treatise of Viśiṣṭādvaita school. The Śrībhāṣya had another commentary called *Nyāyaprakāśikā*, by Meghanādāri, a contemporary of Veṅkaṭanātha. Viṣṇucitta, a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja, wrote two works: *Prameyasamgraha* and *Samgatimala*. Other important works of Viśiṣṭādvaita school are Varadaviśṇu Miśra’s *Mānayāthātmyanirnaya*, Varada Narāyaṇa Bhaṭṭaraka’s *Prajñaparitrāṇa*, Parāśara Bhaṭṭāraka’s...
Tattvaratnakara, Śrīnivāsadāsa’s Yatindramatadīpikā on Śrībhāṣya etc.

The school of Śuddhādvaita was composed by Vallabha. The main comprehensive treatise of Śuddhādvaita school is Anubhāṣya of Brahmasūtra. Puruṣottama a follower of Vallabha’s school wrote a sub commentary on Anubhāṣya called Prakāśa. Giridhara’s Śuddhādvaitamārtanda, and Puruṣottama’s Prasthānaratnakara are important manuals on Śuddhādvaita school of Vedānta. Vallabha’s Anubhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra and Prakāśa’s Tattvārthadīpikā are the main comprehensive treatises of Vallabha school.

In the Nimbārka school, Nimbārka advocated the doctrine of dualistic monism i.e. dvaitādvaitavāda. Nimbārka insists on difference as well as non difference or identity (Bhedabheda) between Brahman and the individual souls and the world. Nimbārka advocated the relation of identity in difference between them. The main exposition of Nimbārka school is Vedāntapārijātasaurabha on Brahmasūtra of Nimbārka. Other notable works of Nimbārka school are Daśaślokī, Guruparamparā, Vedāntatattvabodha etc.

Madhva is the founder of Davita Vedānta. He recognizes the five distinction of God and the individual soul and matter, one
individual soul and another, and one material thing and another to be eternal. This is the central teaching of Madhva’s dualism. In Madhva’s school, Madhva composed ten treatises in own ways, viz., Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Kaṭhakāṅkaṇa, Pramāṇalakṣaṇa, Prapañca Mithyātvānumāna Khaṇḍana, Upādhikhaṇḍana, Māyāvādakhaṇḍana, Tattvasaṅkhyaṇa, Tattvaviveka, Tattvodyota, Viṣṇutattvavinirṇaya and Karmanirṇaya. Madhva’s Brahmasūtrabhāṣya, Brahmasūtrāṇubhāṣya, and Brahmasūtrāṇubyākhyānam are also important treatises of Davita school. Like other systems of Indian philosophy, the Vedānta also takes up perception as a source of valid knowledge. Śaṅkara refers to three sources of knowledge: viz., perception, inference, and scriptural testimony. Later writers add comparison, postulation and non-apprehension. Rāmānuja sticks to three only: perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Madhva and Nimbārka agree with Rāmānuja. The system of Vallabha did not admit any definite number of the sources of knowledge, but laid

66. SSA., II.21.
68. pratyakṣānumānāgamākhyāṇā pramāṇajātām. cf. The Philosophy of Rāmānuja, p. 27.
69. hyākṣyādītītayar pramāṇamakhlāmnāyaikvedhyo hariḥ. Ibid.
the greatest emphasis on scriptural testimony\textsuperscript{71}. The \textit{Acintyabhedabheda} school also believed in the three ways of knowing—perception, inference and scriptural testimony\textsuperscript{72}.

It is already mentioned that the whole Vedānta system is closely based on the teachings of Upaniṣads. In earlier Upaniṣads perception is explained in terms of the self (ātmā) as an inner light which shines outward (through the eyes) and illuminates the objective world\textsuperscript{73}. When the psychosis of the internal organ goes out through the channel of the senses, pervades the object and puts on the form of the object, there is brought about the non-difference of the intelligence which is inherent in the means of valid knowledge from the object-defined-intelligence\textsuperscript{74}. This is called perception. Perception is possible only with the things which are present and are capable of being perceived. The events of yesterday are not objects of perception, because they are not facts of the present time. Mind, though present, cannot be perceived, because it is not capable of being an object of perception. Knowledge derived from perception can be valid only when it is not sublated by any other evidence.

\textsuperscript{71} sabda eva mukhyaṁ pramāṇaṁ tadanukūlatayaṁyasyāṁ pramāṇaṁ kantu tatsuṁkhyanapeksitā. cf. The Philosophy of Rāmānuja, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{72} pramāṇaṁ trividham prākhyat tatra mukhyā śrutirbhabet. Ibid.p.27.

\textsuperscript{73} Br.U., 4.3.6.

\textsuperscript{74} cf. The Philosophy of Advaita., p.19.
Judged by this test only the knowledge of Brahman can be *pramāṇa*; and the Vedānta which leads to that knowledge can alone be the *pramāṇa*. But still, since empirical knowledge remains unsublated up to the cognition of Brahman, it is also regarded as valid. Now the theory of perception in the light of various Vedāntic schools are given bellow:

**Perception According to Advaita Vedānta:**

According to Śaṅkara, perception or the sensuously perceptible is that knowledge in which we come in direct contact with reality. A contact of the sense with the object produces the necessary conviction. It is realized that the main sources of knowledge for the human beings takes place inevitably without depending upon our will. It has a measure of reality which can never be taken away. We cannot accept the words of him who while perceiving a thing through his sense still says that he does not perceive the outward thing and that no such thing exists\(^7\).\(^5\)

Perception is a very important topic for Advaita Vedānta, mainly because direct perception is viewed as one of the six sources of validation of knowledge. The importance given to perception is reflected in Śaṅkara’s remarks in his commentary on the

75. Śb.,II.2.28.
Bhagavadgītā\textsuperscript{76}, where he affirms the supremacy of direct perception as a criterion for validation of knowledge, albeit in its own specific sphere, namely practical as opposed to higher knowledge. Śaṅkara restricts authority of Vedic seers mainly to the domain of higher knowledge, while accepting the evidence of direct perception as the most valuable in practical matters such as the nature of fire. Śaṅkara unequivocally states that one cannot, and should not, believe that fire is lightless and cold, even if a hundred scriptural proclamations asserted so\textsuperscript{77}. However, at the same time, Śaṅkara marks off the limits of direct perception, or empirical evidence.

It is to be noted here that Śaṅkara’s theory on perception was perfectly elaborated by the celebrated Dharmarājadhvarindra in his \textit{Vedāntaparibhāṣā}. According to Dharmarājadhvarindra perception is the distinctive cause of valid perceptual knowledge\textsuperscript{78}. This perceptual knowledge is nothing but pure consciousness. It is the knowledge acquired through the operation of \textit{antahkaranaṇavṛtti}. In perception, the transparent \textit{antahkarana} goes out through the sense-organs, pervades the object, say, the pot, and assumes the form of that object. This

\textsuperscript{76} Šb. on BG.,18.66.
\textsuperscript{77} na hy śrutiśatamapi śīto’ gnirapraṅāso vetī bruvatprāmāṇyamupaiti. Šb., on BG.18.66.
\textsuperscript{78} pratyakṣapramāṇāyāḥ karaṇaṁ partyakṣa pramāṇam. VP., p.8.
transformation of the internal organ in the form of the object is called \textit{antahkaraṇavṛtti}. This \textit{antahkaraṇavṛtti} removes the \textit{ajñāna} that conceals the objects. Then, in this \textit{antahkaraṇavṛtti}, consciousness limited by the object like pot etc. is reflected. This reflection of consciousness in the \textit{vṛtti} is called \textit{cidābhāsa}. By this \textit{cidābhāsa} the object is revealed to the cognizer and accordingly there arises the perceptive knowledge of the object as “this is pot”.

In the perception of an object, there are two parts- one is the ‘knowledge part’ (\textit{jñānāṁśa}) in the form of ‘this is the pot cognition’, while the other is the ‘object part’ (\textit{viśayāṁśa}) in the form of ‘the pot is cognize’. Of these, the former is \textit{jñānagatapratyakṣa} (perception of knowledge), the latter, \textit{viśayagatapratyakṣa} (perception of the object). There is a difference among the followers of \textit{Bhāmati} and those of \textit{Vivarana} about the process of knowledge perception and object perception.

According to the follower of \textit{Bhāmati}, knowledge generated by the \textit{pratyakṣa pramāṇa} or means of perception is the knowledge

\begin{itemize}
\item[79.] tathā taijasamantaḥkaraṇamapī caṅṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghaṭādi-
viśayadeśaṁ gatyā ghaṭādīviśayāyākāreṇa-pariṇamate, sa eva pariṇāmo
vṛttrītyucyate. VP., p.33.
\item[80.] yamniṣṭhā ca yadākāraḥ vṛttir bhavati tanniṣṭhāṁ tadākāraṁ ajñānāṁ sa
nāsayati. AS., p. 372.
\item[81.] buddhi tatstha-cidābhāsaṁ dvāvena vyāpṇuto ghaṭam /
tatrājñānāṁ dhiyā naśyed ābhāṣena ghaṭaḥ sphuret // PD., 7.91.
\end{itemize}
perception, and the object of such knowledge perception is the object perception. According to the follower of Vivaraṇa school, on the other hand, the immediate revelation of the object to the agent is called the object perception, and the pramāṇa which generates such a knowledge is pratyakṣa pramāṇa.

Dharmarājadhvarindra has discussed in detail the difference of the cause of the jñānagatapratyakṣatva and the viṣayagatapratyakṣatva. According to the Advaita Vedāntins consciousness limited by the antahkaraṇa is known as pramāṇacaitanya, that limited by the object is viṣayacaitanya and that limited by antahkaraṇa is the pramātr-caitanya. Now the jñānagatapratyakṣa arises, when there arises a non-difference between the pramāṇacaitanya and the viṣayacaitanya. When the antahkaraṇavr̥tti assumes the form of the object, consciousness limited by the pramāṇa and that limited by the object become

82. karana-viṣeṣa-nibandhanamevajñānanāṁ pratyakṣaṁ viṣayaviṣeṣaṁ nibandhanam. VP., p.299.
83. sarvidaparokṣyaṁ na karana viṣeṣa-nibandhanam, kindtu prameya-viṣeṣa-nibandhanam. Ibid., p.298.
84. vide. Ibid, pp.31-32.
identical. For the adjuncts viz., vṛtti and viṣaya, even though different from each other, can not generate difference in the consciousness limited by them as they exist in the same place\textsuperscript{86}. This perception is possible only about the things which are present (vartamāna) and capable of being perceived (yogyā)\textsuperscript{87}.

The viṣayagatapratyakṣa arises when the pramātrcaitanya and the viṣayacaitanya become non-different from each other\textsuperscript{88}. This does not mean that cognizer (pramātr) and the object become identical or one. Here, non-difference simply means that the existence of the viṣayacaitanya is not something beyond the existence of the pramātrcaitanya\textsuperscript{89}. That means, the substrates of both the knower and the object, which are nothing but consciousness itself do not exist separately from each other. When the antaḥkaraṇavṛtti comes in contact with the object through the sense-organ and takes the form of the object, consciousness limited by the object and that limited by the vṛtti being in the same locus become one. Thus, the

\textsuperscript{86} tathā cāyaṁ ghaṭa ityādi- pratyakṣa-sthale-ghaṭādes tadākāraṇvṛtteś ca bahirekatra deśā samavadhānāt tadubhayaśvacchinnāṁ ca ityādāṁ ekameva, vibhājakayor api antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti-ghaṭādviṣayayor ekadesasthatven bhedājanakatvāt. Ibid., pp.34-35.

\textsuperscript{87} vartamanatvam viṣaya viśesāqanāṁ nanvevamapi ............. yogyatvasyāpi viṣayaviśesāqatvāt. Ibid., pp.38-39.

\textsuperscript{88} ghaṭāder viṣayasya pratyakṣaṁ tu pramāṭrabhinnaṁ. Ibid., p.47.

\textsuperscript{89} pramāṭrabheda nāma na tadaikyam, kintu pramāṭraśattā’u tīrīk tasattākatvābhāvaḥ. Ibid., p.48.
pramāṇacaitanya, pramātrcaitanya and visayacaitanya become identical, being present in the same object, say, a pot. Again the author of Vedāntaparibhāṣā divides perception into two kinds, viz. sensuous (inriyajanya) perception and non-sensuous (indriyājanya) perception. The former is produced by the sense-organs, while the latter is not. Dharmarājadhvārindra regards the external senses only as a sense-organs. He does not regard the mind as a sense-organ. So by sensuous perception means external perception, and by non-sensuous perception means internal perception. We have sensuous perception of external objects and non-sensuous perception of pleasure, pain, and the like. But the Naiyāyika may object that if the mind is not a sense-organ, we cannot speak of the perception of pleasure and pain, because perception is always produced by a sense-organ. Śaṅkara replies that the perception of pleasure and pain does not necessarily imply that the mind is a sense-organ through which the self perceives pleasure and pain. The directness (sākṣātva) of a cognition does not consists in its being produced by a sense-organ. If it did so, then inferential cognition also would be regarded as direct perception, since it is produced by the mind which is regarded by the Naiyāyika as a sense-organ. Moreover, God has no sense-organ, but still he has

90. VP., p.177.
perception. Hence the Naiyāyika’s contention is absolutely unfounded. According to Śaṅkara, production by a sense-organ (indriyajanyatta) is neither a sufficing condition nor a necessary condition of perception (pratyakṣaḥpṛṇāna); the directness of a cognition (sākṣātava) or its perceptual character (pratyakṣatva) depends on the identification of the cognitive-consciousness with the object consciousness, or of the apprehending mental mode with the perceived object\textsuperscript{91}.

Śaṅkara divides perception, again, into two parts; viz., perception of an object (jñeyapratyakṣa) and the perception of a cognition (jñānapratyakṣa). The former is perceived through the medium of a mental mode (vṛtti). The latter is perceived in itself without the intervention of a mental mode\textsuperscript{92}. Śaṅkara recognizes the distinction between indeterminate (nirvikalpa) perception and determinate (savikalpa) perception. Again Śaṅkara divides perception into two kinds, viz. the perception of the witness self (jīvasākṣīpratyakṣa) and the perception of the divine witness (Īsvarasākṣīpratyakṣa)\textsuperscript{93}.

\textsuperscript{91} VP., p.52.
\textsuperscript{92} VP., pp.76-82.
\textsuperscript{93} VP., p. 102.
As observed above in the neo-Vedantic theory of perception, two elements are given, viz., (i) the going out of the *antahkarana* to the object and (ii) the *antahkarana* assuming the form of the object. In contradiction of the Vedantic view, modern science believes that in perception objects send out stimuli which are received in the brain where they somehow result in the perception of the object. Now Śaṅkara would have no objection to this analysis of perception provided it were granted that the stimuli travelling from the object through the sense-organs along the nerve-paths needed the light of the self to be enlivened into perceptual experience. It must further be granted that the form of the object somehow travels along with the stimuli. One thing which comes out clearly even from the modern description of the perceptual process is that the light of consciousness does not directly fall upon or illumine the object of experience. The form of the object has first to be assimilated by what Śaṅkara calls the internal organ[^94] and what modern psychology identifies with nervous processes.

Śaṅkara makes the self responsible for all manifestation in experiences. All appearances hang round the light of consciousness.

[^94]: cf. रूपकारेण हृदयार्थ परिनातार्थ, यस्मात हृदयेन हृपानि सर्बो लोको ज्ञाति. Br U. 3.8.20.
The ātman, however does not reveal the whole world directly. In the graded series of objects which are subtle and internal, buddhi occupies the very first position being the subtlest and the most internal of all things. Hence it is the first to receive that light of consciousness. Next comes manas which is in contact with buddhi, then the senses which are in contact with the manas; then the body which is in contact with the senses, and then the rest of the world bound with the law of cause and effect95.

In the Vivaraṇa school of Advaita Vedānta, Vidyārṇya defines perception. According to him perception is the identity between the ultimate consciousness particularized by and object which exists in the present time and is fit to be perceived by the senses and the ultimate consciousness particularized by the mode (vṛtti) which has taken the form of the object96. Since this theory of perception as expounded by these later writers, is contradictory to the modern scientific views has been the object of favourable criticism in recent times97.

95. buddhistavat svacchatvādānāntaryācca ātmacaitityajyotiḥ praticchāyā bhavati ...... tato'pyānāntaryānmānasā caitityābhāsata buddhisamparkāt, tat indriyeṣu manah saṁyogād, tato'nantarantāṁ sarire, evam pāramparyēṇa kṛtsnam kārya kāraṇasam ātām. Br U. 4.3.8.
96. tattadindriyāvyayogavartamanaviṣayāvacchinnacaitityābhinnatvam, tattad anīśe prayyakṣatvam. VPS., I. 1.
97. Indian Philosophy., Vol. II. pp.492-93.
Perception According to Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta:

Rāmānuja and his followers admitted only three kinds of pramāṇas, viz. perception, inference and scriptural testimony which have already been mentioned. Unlike Veṅkaṭanātha, Meghanādārī holds that Rāmānuja admitted five pramāṇas, viz. perception, inference, analogy, scripture and implication (arthāpatti)\textsuperscript{98}. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita school perceptual knowledge is gained immediately through sense-object-contact\textsuperscript{99}. In the case of perception therefore, the sense-organs are the means that enable a soul to know an object directly. The sense-organs which are the instruments of perception are six in number- five external sense-organs and mind which is internal. Buddhi, ahamkāra, citta etc. refer to different vṛttis (adhyavasāya, abhimāna, cintā etc.) of the one and the same internal organ\textsuperscript{100}. The five external sense-organs are primarily needed to receive knowledge of the external world, whereas mind is an instrument for memory etc\textsuperscript{101}. The sense-organs which are perceptible on the surface of the body are external. The real auditory organ lies in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98} HIP., Vol. III. p.216.
\item \textsuperscript{99} sākṣātkāri pramākaraṇaṁ pratyakṣaṁ. YMD., p.8.
\item \textsuperscript{100} adhyavasāyaabhimānacintāvṛttibhedānānam eva budhyahahānkāracittāśabdairvyapadiśyata. Śbb., 2.4.5.
\item \textsuperscript{101} smṛtyādikaraṇamindriyaṁ manah, taceca hṛdayadeśavṛtti buddhyahahānkāracittādiśabdavācyāṁ vandhamokṣahetubhūtam ca. YMD., p.54.
\end{itemize}
the cavities of the ears, the tactual is spread over the skin, the visual is in the eye, the taste organ is in the tongue and the olfactory one is in the nose. These sense-organs are only the instruments through which the ātman (soul)--the real knower-acquires knowledge.

The sense-organs manifest objects only when they are in contact with them. In the case of our perception of taste, smell, sound and touch, the objects reach them. In the case of visual perception, however, the visual organ comes in contact with the object through vṛtti. The term vṛtti is a peculiar modification of the sense-organ which connects it with the objects. Such a modification can stream out of a sense-organ and can connect the latter with distant objects for the purpose of apprehension. All sense-organs are described as prāpyaprakāśakari perhaps on the basis of the fact that all of them function in regard to those objects only which are within reach.\textsuperscript{102}

The sense-organs are primarily ahaṁkārika (psychical) in nature. They are bhautika (physical) only in a secondary sense, i.e. in the sense that their powers are nursed and fed by the bhautika objects\textsuperscript{103}.

\textsuperscript{102.} Philosophy of Rāmānuja. pp. 28-29.
\textsuperscript{103.} śrotradīndriyāṇāṁ bhautikatvapratipādanāṁ bhūtāpyāyitritvenaupacārikam. YMD., p.56.
All sense-organs are atomic in nature. If they were not atomic they would not have been able to move along with souls from birth to birth. Since they are prākṛta (natural) they are incapable of accompanying the soul to vaikunṭha which is a supernatural place. So, the organs exist till dissolution\textsuperscript{104}.

Veṅkaṭanātha a follower of Rāmānuja school defines perception as direct or immediate intuitive knowledge (sāksātkāri pramā) and describes immediate knowledge as distinct and vivid manifestation of an object in consciousness. Veṅkaṭanātha describes vividness as the power of manifesting an object with its individuality and uniqueness. Veṅkaṭanātha divides immediate knowledge into two kinds: eternal and noneternal. Divine perception is eternal immediate knowledge. Human perception is non-eternal immediate knowledge. Human perception is of two kinds: yogic and ayogic perception. Yogic perception is due to excellent merit born of yoga. It is either ecstatic or nonecstatic. Ecstatic perception is produced by the internal organ (manas) only. Nonecstatic perception is produced by the

\textsuperscript{104} etānindriyaṇaśūni parakāyaprābeśe lokamtaragamanādiśu ca jīvena saha gamamamindriyāṇāṁ muktidaśaśāyāmaprākṛtadēsaśagamanāśaṁbhāvādihaiva yāvatpralayaṁ sthitiḥ. Ibid. pp. 57-58.
external sense-organs also\textsuperscript{105}. The special merit is due to the practice of yoga and austerities. The intuition of sages (\textit{a\textresima{r}ṣajñāna}) also due to austerities is generated by excellent merit, and, consequently, included in \textit{yogic} perception. Śrīnivāsa also includes \textit{a\textresima{r}ṣajñāna} in \textit{yogic} perception\textsuperscript{106}. The author of the \textit{Prajñāparātrāṇa} holds that \textit{yogic} perception which manifests supersensible objects is independent of physical sense organs but dependent on spiritual sense-organs. Arjuna could see Kṛṣṇa's cosmic form through the spiritual (\textit{divya}) eye granted by Kṛṣṇa. Veṅkaṭanātha observes that not only \textit{yogic} perception but also divine perception and perception of the released souls are independent of the physical sense-organs\textsuperscript{107}.

It is objected that, though \textit{yogic} perception may cognize subtle, hidden and remote objects because they exist at the present time and because the sense-organs are strengthened and purified by the practice of yoga, it cannot cognize past objects. Veṅkaṭanātha rejoins that \textit{yogic} perception can cognize past objects even as cognitive perception cognizes the past condition of a nonexistent object. If a subconscious impression (\textit{samskāra}) be said to relate recognition to

\textsuperscript{105} yogi pratyakṣaṁ prakṛṣṭ-ādṛśta-viśeṣajaṁ tad yuktāvasthāyāṁ manomātra janyāṁ viyuktā-vasthāyāṁ tu bāhyendriya-janyamapi. NP., p. 72.

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., pp.74-75.

\textsuperscript{107} NP., p. 75.
the prior condition of an object, then an unseen agency (*adrṣṭa*) e.g., a special merit generated by the practice of yoga may be thought to relate *yogic* perception to a past object as well as a future object. The Navya-Nyāya admits an extraordinary *yogaja sannikarṣa* to account for the *yogic* perception of past and future objects. Viśiṣṭādvaitavādin does not believe in such an extraordinary intercourse.

Viṣṇucitta, a junior contemporary of Rāmānuja agrees with Veṅkaṭānātha’s view on perception. In the *Prameyasamgraha*, Viṣṇucitta defines perception as immediate apprehension, and immediateness is stated to be a special class of knowledge. In the *Mānayāthātmyanirṇaya*, Varadaviśēṣu Miśra defined perception as clear and vivid impression (*pramāyā āparokṣyam nāma viśadāvabhāsatvam*). Clearness and vividness with him mean the illumination of the special and unique features of the object, as different from the appearance of generic features as in the case of inference or verbal knowledge.

Meghanādāri also, in his *Nyāyaprakāśikā* on Śrībhāṣya has defined perception as direct knowledge of objects. The directness consists in the fact that the production of this knowledge does not depend on any other *pramānas*. It is, no doubt, true that sense-

perception depends upon the functioning of the senses, but this is no objection; for the senses are common causes, which are operative as means in the perception of the hetu, even in inference. The directness of perceptual knowledge, as distinguished from inference, is evident from the fact that the latter is produced through the mediacy of other cognitions\textsuperscript{109}.

**Perception According to Śuddhādvaita Vedānta:**

According to Śuddhāvaita school of Vallabha, perception is immediate knowledge produced by the sense-object-intercourse. Madhva and Vallabha deny the possibility of indeterminate perception altogether. The Madhva Vedāntist regards all perception is determinate. Vallabha agrees with Madhva's view. Puruṣottamaji Mahārāja, a follower of Vallabha, asserts that all knowledge is determinate. All knowledge is in the form of judgment, and all judgment involves a subject-predicate relation. So perceptual judgment also is a determinate relational consciousness involving a subject-predicate relation. Determinate relational consciousness does not presuppose indeterminate consciousness of the terms of the relation. The consciousness of the terms of the relation is a determinate as the consciousness of the relation. For example,

determinate perception of a man with a stick does not presuppose indeterminate perception of the stick, but definite and determinate perception of it. Otherwise the stick can never be used as a term of the relation\textsuperscript{110}. Puruṣottamaji Mahārāja recognizes two kinds of determinate perception: (i) viśiṣṭabuddhi, and (ii) samūhāvalambana. Viśiṣṭabuddhi is the determinate apprehension of an object qualified by some properties. It may assume another form called viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhi. It apprehends an object (e.g. man) qualified by a qualification (dandin), which again qualified by another qualification (danda). Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhi is more complex than viśiṣṭabuddhi, Both are determinate and relational consciousness. The former is qualified relational consciousness while the latter is unqualified relational consciousness. Viśiṣṭa-buddhi apprehends the relation between a subject and a predicate. Viśiṣṭa-vaiśiṣṭya-buddhi apprehends the relation between a subject and a predicate, which, in its turn, involves a subject-predicate relation. Samūhā-valambanabuddhi is the determinate consciousness of the relation of a qualified object and its qualification e.g. a man, a stick, and the conjunction between them. It assumes another form. The determinate consciousness of a collection of objects such as a jar, a cloth, and

\textsuperscript{110} PR., p.9.
pillar is qualified form of \textit{samūhāvalambanabuddhi} or combining consciousness. It is called \textit{viśṣṭasamūhāvalambanabuddhi}^{111}.

**Perception According To Dvaitādvaita Vedānta:**

Nimbārka and his followers admitted only three \textit{pramāṇas} viz., perception, inference and testimony. Perception is that valid source of knowledge through which an object is known directly. Madhava Mukunda a follower of Nimbārka defines perception as knowledge produced by the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ, or by an object related to a sense-organ. Madhava Mukunda agrees with the Nyāya definition of perception. Like Naiyāyikas he also holds that perception is of two kinds: external and internal. Like other systems there are five kinds of external perception, viz. auditory, tactual, visual, gustatory, and olfactory, which perceive a sound, a tactual quality, a colour, a taste, and an odour, respectively. The mental perception is also called internal perception. It is of two kinds: ordinary (\textit{laukika}) and transcendental (\textit{alaukika}). The perception of pleasure and pain is a case of ordinary internal perception, whereas the perception of the nature of self, God and their qualities is a case of transcendental internal perception. This transcendental internal perception is again of two kinds, that which flashes forth through the

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^{111} Ibid., p.13.
meditation of an entity and that which comes out of meditation on the essence of a scriptural text. The scriptural reference that the ultimate truth cannot be perceived by the mind means either that the ultimate truth in its entirety cannot be perceived by the mind or that unless the mind is duly trained by a teacher. In the case of internal perception the operation of the senses is not required, and so pleasure and pain are directly perceived by the mind. In self-consciousness or the perception of the self, the self being itself self-luminous, the mental directions to the self remove the state of contraction and reveal the nature of the self. So God can be realized through His grace and the removal of obstruction through the meditative condition of the mind\textsuperscript{112}.

**Perception According to Dvaita Vedānta:**

According to the Dvaita school, perception is the means of the apprehension of an object. Its range is limited to present time and space. Perception cannot help us to solve the riddle of the universe. Perception is confined to the facts upon to the senses. Perception, according to Pramāṇacandrikā, is the means to the apprehension of that which is comparatively proximate, non-mediated and present

\textsuperscript{112} A History of Indian Philosophy by Jadunath Sinha , Vol. III. pp.426-427.
here and now. As in all realistic schools it is said to be caused by sense-object-contact. This contact can result in valid perception only when both the senses and the objects are free from defects which, however, cause illusion and doubt. Thus, valid perception is defined as the cognition that arises through the contact of the six senses—as recognized by Madhva—with their specific objects that are free from such defects as excessive remoteness, excessive smallness, excessive nearness etc. It is the association of these defects with the senses which deprives the sākṣin of its natural manifestation of knowledge and results in either illusion or doubt.

The cognitive senses in the Madhva school are of two kinds, viz. (i) the intuitive faculty or the sākṣin and (ii) ordinary cognitive senses, viz., olfactory-sense, the sense of taste, ear, eye, the sense of touch and manas. The sākṣin is the purest, form of indriya which is identical with the cognitive agent and possesses absolute validity of knowledge. It may be observed here in this connection that the degree of the validity of knowledge in the Madhva system depends on the degree of the purity of sense-organs. Because the intuitive faculty is the purest sense-organ, its knowledge is always valid and it is an essential agency in the production of knowledge by other senses, e.g.,

ear, eye, taste etc. In the Madhva system manas too, unlike Vedānta is conceived as an indriya and is taken to be the superintendnet of all other sense-organs and the faculty of memory. The faults of manas which are instrumental in the generation of erroneous knowledge are passions and attachments and those of the other senses are diseases such as jaundice etc. Thus in Madhva philosophy a valid perceptual cognition is the result of the combined action of the intuitive agent, manas and the cognitive sense, the last two, however, should be free from all defects.

Besides the indirect operation of sākṣin in all sorts of perceptual cognitions there are some objects that are perceived directly by the sākṣin itself. These objects, according to Madhvasiddhāntasāra, are Ātman, manas, pleasure and pain, avidyā, kāla (time) and the ‘unmanifested-ether (avyākṛtākāśa). It is an interesting feature of Madhva philosophy that Ātman or Self is not an object of its natural consciousness, but it is the object of the intuitive-agent or the sākṣin. The knowledge of the Self as ‘I’ or the ego-consciousness is due to the operation of the sākṣin.\textsuperscript{114}

**Perception and Sannikarṣa:**

Like other systems of Indian philosophy the system of Vedānta also discuss the different views in connection with the intercourse of

\textsuperscript{114} An Outline of Madhva Philosophy, pp. 32-33.
the sense-organs with their objects. Śaṅkara recognises six kinds of intercourse between the sense-organs and their objects. (i) *samyoga*- for instance, the visual perception of a jar is due to its direct conjunction with the visual organ. (ii) *samyuktādātmya*- for instance, the perception of colour is due to its co-essentiality or identity with something (e.g. a jar) which is an conjunction with the visual organ. (iii) *samyuktabhinnatādātmya*- for instance, the perception of the generic character of colour (*rupatva*) is due to its co-essentiality with something (e.g. colour) which is co-essential with that (e.g. a jar) which is in conjunction with the visual organ. (iv) *tādātmya*- for instance the perception of sound is due to its co-essentiality with the sense-organ, viz., the ear-drum, which is pervaded by ether (*ākāśa*). (v) *tādātmyavadabhinnatva*- for instance, the perception of the generic character of sound (*śabdatva*) is due to its co-essentiality with something (e.g. sound) which, again, is co-essential with the sense-organ, viz. the ear-drum, which is pervaded by ether (*ākāśa*). (vi) *Višeṣya-višeṣaṇabhāva*- for instance, the perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to the absence of qualifying something (e.g. the ground) which is, therefore, possessed of this qualification (e.g. the absence of the jar)\textsuperscript{115}.

\textsuperscript{115} VP. p. 87.
Thus the Śaṅkara’s concepts of *samyoga, samyukta-tādātmya, samyukta-bhinna-tādātmya, tādātmya, tādātmyavada-bhinnatva,* and *vīśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva* correspond to the Naiyāyika’s concepts of *samyoga, samyukta-samavāya, samyukta-samaveta-samavāya, samavāya, samaveta-samavāya,* and *vīśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-sambandha* respectively.

The philosophers of Rāmānuja school hold that there are only two kinds of sense-object intercourse, viz. *samyoga* and *samyuktāśrayana.* The perception of substances is due to their conjunction with the appropriate sense-organs; the perception of their qualities is due to the contact of the sense-organs with the substance in which the qualities subsist. The qualities are brought into relation with the sense-organs through the direct contact of their substances with the senses.\(^{116}\)

The Vallabha school of Indian philosophy recognizes five kinds of sense-object intercourse, viz. *samyoga, tādātmya, samyukta-tādātmya, samyukta-viśeṣaṇatā,* and *svārūpa.* The perception of a jar is due to its contact (*samyoga*) with the visual organ. The perception of the colour of a jar is due to the contact of the visual organ with the jar which is identical with its colour. The internal perception of

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\(^{116}\) NP., p. 77.
cognition, pleasure, and other properties of the mind (*svadharma*) is due to the relation of identity (*tādātmya*); there is identity between the mind and its properties. The perception of the absence of a jar on the ground is due to the contact of the visual organ with the ground, which is the locus of the absences of the jar. ‘The locus is perceived by contact, *samyoga*, the negation as a predicate of the locus’\(^{117}\). The perception of the mental modes (*vṛtti*) is due to *svarūpasambandha*; they are perceived in themselves without implying any relation beyond themselves\(^{118}\).

Janārdana Bhaṭṭa, a follower of Madhva, refutes all kind of sense-object-intercourse except union (*samyoga*). In his view there is a direct contact of all perceptible objects with the sense-organs and this contact implies union. There are no other intervening relations between the senses and their objects. ‘The *guna* (quality) is identical with the *gunin* (substance), and no relation can be conceived among them. *Samavāya* is refuted as involving an infinite regress and with the refutation of *samavāya*, the forms of *samavāya* can have no hold. *Abhāva* (non-existence) is directly perceived, and we require no conception of relation\(^{119}\).

\(^{117}\) Comparative Studies in Vedāntism, p. 242.  
\(^{118}\) Ibid., pp. 242-43.  
\(^{119}\) Ibid., p. 237.
Division of Perception:

Like other systems, the system of Advaita Vedānta also holds two kinds of perception; viz., indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa). According to Śaṅkara, indeterminate perception is a purely non-relational apprehension which apprehends the mere ‘Being’\(^{120}\). But the plurality of empirical objects can be apprehended by determinate perception. So it has empirical validity (vyavahārika prāmāṇyā) but no metaphysical validity. Determinate perception involves the application of forms and determinations which have no foundation in reality. In fact, determination is negation. Determinations do not apply to the pries and substratum of all empirical being viz. one pure being. But within the limits of empirical knowledge determinate perception is valid. And determinate perception is the synthetic relational mode of apprehending empirical objects and qualities in relation to one another. Śaṅkara admitted that indeterminate perception cannot apprehend even an object (e.g. mere jar, ghaṭa), and its generic nature (e.g. mere jarness, ghaṭatva) unrelated to each other. The later philosophers of Advaita Vedānta also hold that the indeterminate

\(^{120}\) IP., p. 52.
perception is the non-relational apprehension of an object which is
not necessarily sensuous in character.

Dharmarājadhvarindra maintains that indeterminate
perception is the immediate apprehension of an object without
apprehending its relations, but it may not be sensuous in character.
The cognitions produced by such sentences as ‘this is that Devadatta’,
‘that thou art’, etc are indeterminate perception. Hence indeterminate
perception is not necessarily confined to the pre-judgment stage,
because there are some judgment also which exhibit all characters of
indeterminate perception and they are still capable of being expressed
in language. The determinate, on the other hand, gives the truth of
appearances. It is the relational apprehension of an object such as ‘I
know the jar’.121

According to the Viśiṣṭādvaīta school of Rāmānuja, perception
is of three kinds: God’s perception, perception of the yogins, and
perception of ordinary persons. This perception of yogins includes
intuitive perception of the mind (māṇasa pratyakṣa) or perception of
sages (ārṣa pratyakṣa), and the yogipratyakṣa is due to the special

121. nirvikalpakaṁ tu saṁsargānāvagāhi jñānam, savikalpakaṁ vaiśiṣṭyāvagāhi
jñānam. VP., p.89.
enlightenment of yoga practice. Ordinary perception is again of two kinds: *savikalpa* or determinate and *nirvikalpa* or indeterminate.

According to Rāmānuja, both indeterminate perception and determinate perception apprehend objects affected with difference. Indeterminate perception is the perception of an object endowed with some qualities at least. But these qualities are not apprehended by indeterminate perception as common qualities\(^\text{122}\). The only difference between indeterminate perception and determinate perception lies in the fact that the former is the perception of the first individual among a number of objects belonging to the same class, while the latter is the perception of the second individual, the third individual and so on. And both these kinds of perception are equally valid\(^\text{123}\). In the perception of the first cow, there is indeed the apprehension of the class-character of the cow in the shape of her particular configuration, viz., dewlap and the like, but there is no consciousness of this generic character being common to all the cows, since there is no perception of other cows except the first cow in indeterminate perception. But in the perception of the second individual, the third individual and so on,

\(^{122}\) nirvikalpakam nāma kenacid viśeṣeṇa viyuktasya grahaṇāṁ, na sarva-viśeṣa-rahitasya, nirvikalpakamapi saviśeṣa-viṣayameva, savikalpake svasminnanubhūta-padārtha-viśiṣṭa-pratisandhāna-hetutvāt. Śbh., I.I.I.

\(^{123}\) nirvikalpakam eka-jātiya-dravyesu prathamapiṇḍa grahaṇam; dvitiyādi-piṇḍa-grahaṇāṁ savikalpakam ucyate. Śbh., I.I.I.
this generic character is recognized as the common character of the whole class. In the indeterminate perception of the first individual there is an apprehension of its generic character in the shape of a particular arrangement of parts, but it is not recognized as common to the whole class. Thus what was indeterminate in the perception of the first individual of a class becomes determinate in the perception of the second individual, the third individual, and so on. Hence, the former is called indeterminate perception, and the latter, determinate perception. In indeterminate perception there is the apprehension of the generic character in the shape of a particular structure, since an object having a structure (samsthānin) can never be perceived apart from its structure (samsthāna). In determinate perception we perceive in addition to the object possessing a structure, and the structure itself, the character of the structure as being common to the whole class.124

Venkatanātha elaborates Rāmānuja’s division of perception. Venkatanātha defines indeterminate perception as perception devoid of recognition. Determinate perception is perception involving recognition. The former is pure perception, while the later is recognitive perception. The former is a presentative process, while the

124. Ibid., I.I.I.
later is a presentative-representative process. The object of both indeterminate and determinate perception is qualified (viśīṣṭa) or affected with difference. Indeterminate perception does not apprehend an unqualified object as some suppose. We are never conscious of a cognition apprehending an unqualified object. Nor is there a proof for its existence. It is generally held that perceptions of the dumb, babies and animals are nameless and indeterminate, and apprehend unqualified objects. Venkataṭanātha admits that these perceptions are indeterminate and devoid of the apprehension of names. But he does not admit that they apprehend unqualified objects. Babies and animals do not, of course, perceive objects as having particular names. But they do perceive them as having certain qualities. They never perceive unqualified objects. They react to different objects in different ways. They accept those objects which are beneficial to them, and avoid those which are injurious to them. This clearly proves that they never perceive objects without qualities. It is to be pointed here that Venkataṭanātha’s definition of nirvikalpa perception distinguishes Rāmānuja’s conception of nirvikalpa knowledge from the types formulated by many other systems of Indian philosophy. In

125. sapratyavamarśa pratyakṣaṁ savikalpam., tadrahitam pratyakṣaṁ nirvikalpam. NP., p.77.
126. ŠV., 4. 112.
the *Yatīnramatadīpikā*, Śrīnīvāsadāsa holds that indeterminate perception is the cognition of the first individual qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. On the other hand determinate perception is the cognition of the second (third and so on) individual qualified by its attributes, configuration, etc. grasped with retrospection\(^\text{127}\).

Madhva philosophy recognises seven kinds of perception, viz., the six different kinds of perception caused by the operation of the senses and the perception of the *sākṣin* (witnessing-consciousness). “Of these, the perception of the witnessing consciousness is perception consisting in the operation of the witnessing-intelligence as an organ or instrument. The objects of such immediate knowledge are, as discussed above, the essence of the Self or Ātman as well as the properties thereof, the nescience underlying absence or privation, the mind, the functions of the mind such as knowledge, pleasure and the rest, time *ākāśa* in its original unmodified condition etc. The other six kinds of perceptions arise out of the operation of the six sense-organs, namely, the eye, the ear, the sense of smell, the sense of taste, the sense of touch and the *manas*. The objects of the first five types of

\(^{127}\) nirvikalpakaṁ nāma guṇasarṣthinādiśiṣṭaprathamapiṇḍagrahaṇam, savikalpakaṁ tu sapratyavamamsa guṇasarṣthinādiśiṣṭadvityā dipiṇḍa jñānam. YMD., p.8.
sense-organs are almost the same as in other systems of Indian philosophy and as such do not require any elucidation. But, apart from these, there are certain other types of perceptions that are experienced directly by the mind without the help of any of the external sense-organs e.g. the cognition of past events or 'memory'. One may doubt in this connection: How can 'memory' be called 'perception' when there is no sense-object-contact which is a necessary condition in 'perception'? The author of Pramāṇacandrika however, replies that 'the contact of sense and object in this case is furnished by what we call the samskāra, trace or disposition left behind by the past experience. The process of mind in recollection is thus analogous to that of the specially gifted senses of the yogis which possess extra-ordinary supernatural powers due to practice of yogic concentration.

Besides the perception of existence (bhāvapadārthas) the Madhva school also recognises the perception of 'non-existence'. The knowledge, 'there is no jar on the ground', is not a case of anupalabdhi as the schools of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are led to believe but an instance of perceptual-cognition. The absence of a jar on the ground is apprehensible, according to the followers of Madhva on the verdict of a quickly produced perception without which the immediacy of the cognition of 'non-existence' would be impossible.
But it may be argued: How can there be any perception without a sense-contact when sense-object-contact is a necessary condition in 'perception'? In reply to this the Madhva philosopher argues like a Naiyāyika that the condition of sense-object-contact is applicable only to positive existents and not to 'negation'. To him the perception of non-existence is a unitary perception of itself and its locus where the perception of the non-existence arise out of the perception and sense-contact of the locus. It may, however, be contended that the restriction of the condition of sense-object-contact would adversely affect the cogency of the Madhva argument that the importance of the cognitive senses consists in their being the via media of the contact between 'subject' and 'object' and that no knowledge of an indeterminate object is ever possible. This difficulty is, however, explained by contending that though there may be no actual sense-contact with non-existence (abhāva) yet its perception requires sense-contact with its locus and thus there is no violation of the rule that sense-contact is a necessary condition in the generation of perceptual cognition.\footnote{An Outline of Madhva Philosophy., pp.34-35.}

\footnote{An Outline of Madhva Philosophy., pp.34-35.}