CHAPTER - IV

SĀMKHYA-YOGA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

A. SĀMKHYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION :

The Sāṁkhya system is founded by Kapila. It is also known as Kapiladarśana. The Sāṁkhya philosophy is always tries to harmonies the teaching of the Vedas through reason. It is a systematic account of the process of cosmic evolution.

The Sāṁkhya system occupies an important place amongst the āstika school of Indian philosophy. This systems is basically a system of right knowledge (saṁ + khyā, i.e. samyak jñāna) or ultimate knowledge.

Generally, the term Sāṁkhya is derived from a Sanskrit word 'samkhyā' meaning 'number' or right knowledge which arises from the philosophical investigations. The word 'Sāṁkhya' may be drawn from a verbal Sanskrit root śkhyā meaning 'to know' or 'jñāna' preceded by the suffix saṁh. Consequently similar interpretation of the term 'Sāṁkhya' has been found from the time of very early days as far back as to the age of the Mahābhārata. The word 'Sāṁkhya'
earlier refers to the idea of number or enumeration. Thus, the term 
Sāṁkhyā is stated to imply a system which analyses the facts of 
experience by the means of enumeration of categories\(^1\). Though 
Kapila is universally recognized to be the founder of this system, 
there is no genuine source of information regarding the time, works 
and nature of the philosophical thought originally expounded by him.

Of the traditional Indian schools of philosophy Sāṁkhyā 
may be the oldest. It may also be stated that Sāṁkhyā was 
systematized earlier than the *Mahābhārata*, since the *Mahābhārata* 
acknowledged Sāṁkhyā as an archaic system and holds it in high 
regard. Sāṁkhyā views have also been referred to in the *Śāntiparvan* 
of *Mahābhārata*, wherein Bhiṣma, the grandfather of both the family 
viz. Kauravas and the Pāṇḍavas has given some references to 
Yudhiṣṭhira about Sāṁkhyā that ‘Sāṁkhyā is the supreme and most 
profound among all the knowledge\(^2\).

Though the word ‘Sāṁkhyā’ firstly occurs in the 
*Svetāśvataropaniṣad* yet Sāṁkhyā’s denotation are also found even in 
the *Ṛgveda* as well as in most of the principal Upaniṣads e.g. in the 

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1. MBh., 12.294.41-42
2. na hi sāṁkhyasamarjñānam. MBh., Śānti. 316.
Besides, the reflections of Sāṃkhya have also been enlisted in the Bhagavad-Gītā, Manusmṛti and in the Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra. Some references of Sāṃkhya are found in the Purāṇa literature also.

The main expositions of the system of Sāṃkhya have been based on the Sāṃkhyasūtra of Kapila and Sāṃkhya-kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. In Sāṃkhyasūtra the most important commentaries are the Sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti of Aniruddha, Sāṃkhya-vṛttisāra of Mahādeva Sarasvatī, Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya of Vijñānabhaṭṭa, Laghu-sāṃkhyasūtravṛtti of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, Sāṃkhya-taraṅga of Viśveśvaradatta Miśra etc. In the Sāṃkhya-kārikā the most important commentaries are Gauḍapāda’s commentary, Rājā Bhoja’s Rājavārttika, Yuktidīpikā, Māṭharavṛtti of Māṭhara, Sāṃkhya-tattvakaumudi of Vācaspati Miśra, Sāṃkhya-candrīkā of Nārāyaṇa, Jayamaṅgalā of Śaṅkarācārya etc.

Different commentaries and the sub-commentaries on the textbooks of Sāṃkhyasūtra and Sāṃkhya-kārikā are not unanimous.

3. ChU., VI.2.
4. PU., VI.2.
5. KU., 1.3.10-13.
6. MU., 1.2.5.
regarding the definition of perception. The Sāṅkhya system consists of three different traditions in defining perception, viz. (i) the one initiated in Sāṅkhyaśūtra probably by Kapila himself (ii) the one propounded by Vindhyaśāsin and (iii) the one proposed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

**Perception According to Kapila:**

The term *pratyakṣa* used in the Sāṅkhyaśūtra denotes only a small portion of immediate experience. The experience of inner phenomena remains outside the range of the definition of *pratyakṣa*. The author of Sāṅkhyaśūtra defines perception as the knowledge which portrays the form of object coming in contact with it. According to Dr. Jwalaprasad the definition has two special features: (i) that the knowledge called *pratyakṣa* is regarded more as an act than as a product and (ii) that it is the form of object (*tadākāra*) which is cognized and not the object itself. Here it is noticed that the knowledge of ‘Sāṅkhya’ is itself an act as well as a result in the form of a particular modification or state of buddhi. As to the second observation, buddhi which is a determining principle is a form which is not imaginary but real, and thus, what is cognized is the object only

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7. yat sambandhasiddham tadākārolekhī vijñānaṁ tat pratyakṣam. SS., 1.89.
8. HIE., p. 195.
and not the form created with mental imagination as supposed by the Buddhists. According to Kapila the above definition can not apply to perceptive knowledge of yogins as also to the perception of Īśvara. In their opinion perception defined here is the external perception while the perceptive knowledge of yogins does not come under the purview of it. Again to avoid the defects of the definition they try to explain that yogins due to their exaltation can come in contact with the object lying in their cause in the past and future states also. As to the defect of its non-applicability to Īśvara’s perception the Sāṁkhyasūtra states that existence of Īśvara is not proved. Now some views of Kapila’s theory on perception given by various Sāṁkhya commentators are given below:

Perception According to Vijñānabhikṣu:

Vijñānabhikṣu a commentator of Sāṁkhyasūtra elucidates the term pratyakṣa as defined by Kapila. According to Vijñānabhikṣu’s description the term knowledge stands for buddhivṛtti. The buddhi goes to the object with the respective cognitive organ and gets the form of that object. This is called perception. The essence of the definition is that perception is vṛtti of citta followed by its contact

9. yogināmbāhyapratyakṣatvād na dosaḥ. SS., 1.90.
10. Īśvarāsiddheḥ. Ibid., 1.92.
11. sarībandhāṁ bhavat sarībandhavasttvākāradhāri bhavati yadvijñānāṁ buddhivṛttīḥ tat pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇamityarthāḥ. SPB. on SS., 1. 89.
with the object and through the cognitive organ\textsuperscript{12}. The Sāṁkhya holds that inertia (\textit{tamas}) of \textit{buddhi} obstructs its functioning, and it is overcome by the contact of the sense-organs with objects, or by certain intuitive powers of the \textit{yogins}.

**Perception According to Aniruddha:**

Aniruddha the commentator of \textit{Sāṁkhyaśūtravṛtti} on \textit{Sāṁkhyaśūtra} defined perception in a different way. He said that perception is direct and immediate apprehension of an object. It is produced by conditions of direct and immediate knowledge, not vitiated by any defect\textsuperscript{13}.

**Perception According to Vindhyavāsin:**

Vindhyavāsin the oldest Sāṁkhya philosopher defines \textit{pratyakṣa} as \textit{śrotradivrṛttiravikalpikā} i.e. ‘operation of cognitive organs, ear and the rest’. Pulinbihari Chakraborty the author of the ‘Origin and Development of Sāṁkhya System of Thought’ thinks that Vindhyavāsin revised the definition given by Vāraṇagāṇya by embodying the epithet \textit{avikalpikā}\textsuperscript{14}. Gunaratna elaborates Vindhyavāsin’s definition and states that the sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} SPB. on SS., 1. 89.
\item \textsuperscript{13} aduṣṭasākṣātkāri pramāṇaṁ pramāṇagṛtjanitarśī pratyakṣaṁ. SSV., I.89.
\item \textsuperscript{14} ODSST. p. 138.
\end{itemize}
into the form of the objects. In the opinion of Gunaratna the term \textit{avikalpikā} means to be free from imagination, as has been expounded by the Buddhists through the term \textit{kalpanāpodha}.

**Perception According to Īśvarakṛṣṇa:**

Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his book \textit{Sāmkhyakārikā} defines \textit{pratyakṣa} as ascertainment of individual object. The definition when interpreted independently by the commentator it reveals that there is no reference to sense-object contact. Further, Īśvarakṛṣṇa unlike Vārṣagāṇya defines perception in terms of knowledge. This knowledge is qualified by ‘pertaining to individual object’. Such a definition also is unique in the arena of Indian philosophy. Knowledge of all kinds, according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, is function or attribute of \textit{buddhi}. Thus the question naturally arises as to what is the factor which differentiates perception from sources of non-valid knowledge accepted by Sāṁkhya. Here it can be said that the expression ‘ascertainment’

16. (a) \textit{prativiṣayādhyavasayo drṣṭam.} SK., kā.5.
   (b) \textit{prativiṣayēṣu śrotradānāṁ niyateṣu sābdādviṣayēṣu adhyavasāyaḥ vyāpāraḥ pravṛttiḥ vā dṛṣṭaṁ pratyakṣamityarthāḥ nigadyate.} TPT. on SK., kā. 5.
17. SK., 23.
18. STK., 5
differentiates it from doubtful knowledge, the word object from already perceived knowledge and the word *prati* from memory etc. 19.

It is to be pointed out that in the *Sāmkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa used the term *drṣṭa* instead of *pratyakṣa*. None of the commentators of the *Sāmkhyakārikā* explains why the author of the *Sāmkhyakārikā* used the term *drṣṭa* instead of the term *pratyakṣa*. But the term *drṣṭa* is very significant. In the book ‘Sāṅkhya Yoga Epistemology’ Mukta Biswas says that all cases of immediate experiences are not due to the sense-object contact. The experiences namely, “I am happy” “I am sorry” etc. do not require the help of sense-organs and *manas*. Hence the term *pratyakṣa* is not applicable in these cases because though the experience is immediate it is not sensuous 20.

**Perception According to Gauḍapāda:**

Gauḍapāda the commentator of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s *Sāmkhyakārikā* interprets the definition of perception. He says that perception is application or exertion of the senses in regard to their several objects, as of the ear, and the rest, to sound 21. In Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition the term *viṣaya* means objects and *prativiṣaya* means organs of sense.

19. SK., 6.
20 SYE., pp. 117-118.
21 prativiṣayeṣu śrotrādiṃnāṁ śabdādiṣṭayeṣu adhyavaśāyo drṣṭaiṁ pratyakṣamityarthāḥ. GB on SK., ka.5
But Gaudapāda does not interpret *prativiśaya* as cognitive organ. However, Gaudapāda introduces sense-object contact through importation. Again, Gaudapāda holds that the term *adhyavasāya* means intellectual determination of the object of perception as belonging to a definite class such as ‘this is a jar’, ‘this is a cloth’, etc.  

**Perception According to Māṭhara:**

Māṭhara the commentator of *Sāṁkhyakārikā* says that perception is the knowledge with reference to particular object. Here Māṭhara seems to define perception in terms of indeterminate perception as determinative knowledge cannot arise in cognitive organ. Thus, Māṭhara and Gaudapāda import *indriyānāṁ* in the above definition given by *Sāṁkhyakārikā*. The *Jayamaṅgalā* of Śaṅkarācārya, however, imports *indriyadvāreṇa* and explains the above definition as perception is the knowledge of the objects like word, etc. through cognitive organs like ear etc.
Perception According to Yuktidipikā:

The author of Yuktidipikā elucidates Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition of perception\(^{25}\) and holds that the term prati stands for immediate nearness, the word viṣaya refers to the objects of cognition and the adhyavasāya implies the function of the intellect. Hence, the author of Yuktidipikā holds that the word prati is used in the definition to exclude understanding of mutual intention by the cognitive organs\(^{26}\). The author of Yuktidipikā splits up prativiṣayadhyavasāya into two parts—the first prativiṣayadhyavasāya covers the perception of external and the second prativiṣayadhyavasāya covers immediate experience of the inner phenomena. He holds that it is a case of ekaśeṣa compound i.e. one component factor which is similar to the next one is dropped according to the rule of grammar\(^{27}\). Though one word is dropped, its meaning is conveyed by the remaining component. It denotes its own meaning as well as that of the other (the dropped). Regarding the number of the word, the author of the Yuktidipikā does not explain why singular number has been used instead of the dual one. The Yuktidipikā further shows the

\(^{25}\) tatra dṛṣṭaṁ nāma upāttvaviṣayendriyavṛttyupanipātī yo’dhyavasāyaḥ. YD. on SK., Ibid.

\(^{26}\) YD. on SK., Ibid.

\(^{27}\) evam tarhi prativiṣayādhyavasāyaścā prativiṣayādhyavasāyaśca prativiṣayādhyavasāya iti sārūpānāmekaśeṣaḥkārisyate. YD. on SK., Ibid.
significance of the word *prativisaya* in the definition. The word *adhyavasaya* excludes application of the definition to the knowledge of absolutely non-existent objects like mirage, the circle of firebrand and the city of the Gandharvas. If the definition would have been worded as *adhyavasayadrstam* it will include non-existent objects also because one will get determinate knowledge of these objects. According to *Yuktidipika* the word *visaya* only can exclude the knowledge of the above non-existent objects from the domain of perception as these are mental concepts and not the objects in reality. The word *prati* in the definition excludes inferential knowledge from perception. The term *prati* means near and thus, denotes sense-object contact which is not found in inference. In Sāṁkhya philosophy when one sense-organ cognizes its object, the other understands its intention and takes action. For example, when colour of a ripe mango is observed by the eyes, the organ of taste attains eagerness for that after understanding the decision of the eyes. Thus understanding of mutual intention arises in organs through their mutual contact of organs with the object cognized. Therefore, the term *prati* excludes understanding of mutual intention by the cognitive organs.
Perception According to Vācaspati Miśra:

Interpreting Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition Vācaspati Miśra states that perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense-object contact. In Vācaspati Miśra’s opinion, intellect (buddhi), ego (ahamkāra), mind (manas) and the senses (indriya) constitute the apparatus through which external object is apprehended by the subject. When an object excites the senses the manas arranges the sense-impressions into a percept, the ego refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept. Thus, in the Sāṁkhya theory the modification of buddhi through the senses instead of sense-object contact is the precondition of perception.

Vācaspati Miśra holds that in Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition, literally the word viṣaya means objects of cognition. The objects are those that bind or connect the subject (viṣayi) with their own forms i.e. they mark out the subject, such are earth, pleasure, etc. Hence the objects are the gross and the subtle matters. The gross matters are the objects of cognition while the subtle matters fall within the province of perception of the yogins²⁸. Prativiṣaya is that which is applied to

²⁸. visinvanti viṣayiṇamaniṇuvadhnanti, svena rūpeṇa nirūpaṇīyair kurvanntī yāvat/ ‘viṣayāḥ’ prthivyādayaḥ sukhādayahṣc ca, asmadādinaṁ viṣayāstamatralakṣaṇaḥ yogināmūrdhaḥ strasārṇ ca viṣayāḥ / STK. on SK., kā. 5.
different objects, i.e. the organ of sense. Here application is close proximity or direct knowledge\textsuperscript{29}. Thus, the term \textit{prativiṣaya} means a real object must be present and it does differentiates perception from illusion. Vācaspati Miśra explains \textit{adhyavasāya} elsewhere as ascertainmment or determinate knowledge consequent upon the manifestation of the essence (\textit{sattva}) of the intellect, when the inertia (\textit{tamas}) of the intellect is overcome by the operation of the sense-organs in apprehending their objects\textsuperscript{30}. Like Vācaspati Miśra, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha gives the same explanation of \textit{adhyavasāya} in \textit{Sāṅkhya-candrikā}. According to Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, \textit{adhyavasāya} is a modified condition of the intellect, as flame is that of a lamp; it is determination in such a form as ‘such’ an act is to be done by me\textsuperscript{31}. But Gauḍapāda explains \textit{adhyavasāya} is intellectual determination of the object of perception as belonging to a definite class, such as ‘this is a jar’, ‘this is a cloth’, etc\textsuperscript{32}.

Vācaspati Miśra fully brings out the significance of Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition. In the first place, there must be a real object of perception. This characteristic differentiates perception from

\textsuperscript{29} viśayam viśayam prativartate iti prativiṣayam. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} adhyavasāyaśca buddhivyāpāro jñānam. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} SC., 23.
\textsuperscript{32} SKG. on SK., kā.23.
illusion. The object transforms the mental mode into its own particular form, which is in itself formless. The objects of perception are both external and internal, external as the gross sensible objects, e.g. earth, water etc. and internal, as pleasure, pain and the like. Even the subtle tanmātras, which are infra-sensible to us, are the objects of perception to the yogin. In the second place, perception of a particular kind of object (colour, sound etc.) involves the operation of a particular sense-organ (eye, ear etc.), which consists in its intercourse with its object. This characteristic differentiates perception from memory, inference, etc. In the third place, perception not only involves the existence of an object, and the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object, but it also involves the operation of the intellect (buddhi) which produces a definite and determinate cognition of an object. When the sense-organs come into contact with the objects, the inertia (tamas) of the intellect is overcome, and the essence (sattva) springs forth in it, in consequence of which a definite and determinate cognition of the object is produced. This characteristic of perception excludes doubtful cognitions.

Vācaspati Miśra illustrates the process of perception by an example. Just as the headman of a village collects taxes from the

33. STK. on SK., kā.5.
villagers and gives them over to the governor of the province, and the
governor hands them over to the minister, and the minister, to the
king, so the external sense-organs, having immediate impression to
the mind (manas), and the mind reflects upon them and gives them
over to the empirical ego (ahaṁkāra) which appropriates them by its
unity of apperception and gives these self-appropriated apperceived
impressions of the objects to the intellect (buddhi) for the experience
of the self (puruṣa). Thus perception involves the functioning of
certain organs. It involves the operation of the external sense-organs,
the central sensory or the mind (manas), empirical ego (ahaṁkāra)
and the intellect (buddhi).

Criticism on Śāṁkhya’s Theory of Perception:

For a critical estimate of Śāṁkhya’s theory of perception, it
will be worthwhile to consider the criticism of those definitions. The
definition offered by Vindhyavāsin is criticized by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and
Hemacandra. Again the definition given by Vāraṇaṇya was criticized
by Aklāṅka, Diṅnāga, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra.
Īśvarakṛṣṇa’s definition on perception is criticized by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa
and Hemacandra. The definition given by the Śāṁkhyaśūtra is not
criticised by the critics of Sāṁkhya. It seems that the Sāṁkhya-sūtra is a later composition and hence could not draw the attention of eminent old logicians.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticized Vindhyavāsin's definition on the ground that it is having much in common with the Buddhist definition and is refuted with the Buddhist definition itself. Here the similarity with the Buddhist definition is with reference to the condition of being 'free from imagination'. Hemacandra criticizes the definition mainly from Jaina point of view. He presupposes that means of knowledge must be conscious only. The senses are unconscious and consequently their function will also be unconscious. As such they cannot be the means of knowledge. The definition offered by the followers of Vārṣaganya as the function of (cognitive organ) ear and the rest invited severe criticism from Diṅnāga, Aklāṅka, Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra. The points of their criticism are given below.

Diṅnāga finds following faults in the definition: the Sāṁkhya-sūtras hold that perception is the function of cognitive organs to apprehend a specific object. The object of apprehension is composed of three guṇas. However, if a particular cognitive organ cognizes a particular proportion of the guṇas, there will arise the undesirable contingency
of acceptance of many cognitive organs, as the objects in particular proportion of the \textit{gunas} are innumerable, Aklāṅka rejects the above definition on the ground that it would apply even to the erroneous knowledge. Uddyotakāra rejects the definition on the ground that the Nyāya position is the only correct one and that which differs from it is unacceptable and incorrect. Vācaspati Miśra adds that the above definition is wrong because it is equally applicable to doubtful knowledge, etc.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a staunch follower of Navya-Nyāya school, criticizes the definition of perception as given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. He states that Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition is not correct as it does not mention sense object contact as a necessary condition of perception. Consequently, it becomes too wide as it is applicable to the other \textit{pramāṇas} like \textit{anumāna} which are also the means of definite knowledge.

It is to be mentioned that the Sāṁkhya had its own tradition of defining perception which was not originally influenced by other

\begin{footnotes}
35. evamānena nyāyena yānyapyanuktāni tanyetasmālak sanāṇa bhidyamānāni na lakṣaṇaṃ. NV., 1.4. cf. SYE., p.124.
36. NVTT., 1.4.
37. anumānādīviññānānāmapi viśaṣṭhyāvastavyāsasvabhāva-vatvenātyāpāti. NM., p.100. cf. SYE., p.124.
\end{footnotes}
systems. It has undergone various changes during its development. The earliest available definition was offered by Vindhyavāsin which was revised by the followers of Vārṣaganyā. The definition of Vārṣaganyā was rejected by the later Sāṃkhyas because it is not applicable to the internal perception as also to the extraordinary perception of yogins. Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception in terms of determining an individual object. The logicians of other schools have criticized these definitions on various grounds but most of the objections can be easily alleviated by Sāṃkhya philosophers.

**Division of Perception:**

The Sāṃkhya system accepts two kinds of perception viz., normal (laukika) and abnormal (alaukika). The former requires a particular process in sense object contact with the respective sense organ. Vācaspati Miśra refers to yogic perception as abnormal (alaukika) kind of perception. The yogins can perceive the objects like subtle elements (tanmātras) which are not the objects of sense-perception for ordinary people. The perception of yogins does not depend upon the contact of the external organs with objects. Śrīkṛṣṇa Vallabhācārya states that in addition to yogic perception Sāṃkhya

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38. asmadādinnāmaviṣayāśtanmātralakṣaṇā yogināṃurdhaśrotasāṁ ca viṣayāḥ. STK. on SK., kā. 5.
accepts *jñānalakṣaṇa* type of abnormal perception. It is the perception of an object which is not directly connected with sense, but through a previous knowledge of that object. For example, after perceiving a piece of sandalwood one comes to have the knowledge of its fragrance. Fragrance is not directly perceived because it has not yet come in contact with the olfactory organ. Therefore, the post experience of fragrance in sandalwood serves as contact between sense and the object. The texts of Sāṃkhya do not discuss in details the abnormal kind of perception. According to Vācaspati Miśra the Sāṃkhya system is meant for the understanding of the common people. The supernormal knowledge of the *yogin* is not useful for common people. The absence of such a discussion of Sāṃkhya texts does not mean its non-existence.

Vācaspati Miśra discusses the process of normal perception in the following manner. According to Vācaspati Miśra The external sense-organ comes in contact with the object and having cognized the object gives it to the *manas* which analysis and synthesize its qualifications. *Manas* present it to *ahaṅkāra* which connects in with self-notion and delivers in turn to *buddhi* which turns impression into determinate knowledge\(^{39}\).

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39. Ibid., 30.
Thus, the whole process in perception is divided into two stages: indeterminate (nirvikalpa) and determinate (savikalpa). The former stage refers to apprehension at the stage of senses. An object is vaguely apprehended by the senses as 'a thing'. It is like the idea in the mind of infant, dumb and the like. Then starts the process towards determinate knowledge. Manas then alleviates the alternatives apprehending that the object cognized is of this kind, not of some other kind. Such an observation is through associating the object with qualities. At this stage genus and particular qualities of an object are decided. Ahaṅkāra then determines relation of object with cognizer. Finally buddhi decides whether to accept or to reject the object. This is the final state called adhyavasāya (ascertainment or determination). At this stage knowledge is turned into determinate. Here it may be remarked that the above process differs from that given by the Naiyāyikas regarding determinate perception, mainly in two respects. According to the Naiyāyikas vague apprehension is turned into determinate at the stage of manas while according to the Sāṅkhya determinate knowledge takes place at the stage of buddhi. Secondly, nature of determinate perception according to the Naiyāyikas refers to ascertainment of an object in the form 'it is the object having these

40. STK. on SK., kā. 27.
qualities and is named so’ while the Sāṁkhyas holds that determinate knowledge refers to decision of accepting or rejecting which is technically called hānopādeyabuddhi by the Naiyāyikas. At the same time, ascertainment of an object also refers to this stage only. That is why some commentators of the Sāṁkhyakārikā interpret adhyavasāya as ascertainment of the nature of an object. The difference between the Sāṁkhyas and the Naiyāyikas is rooted in the difference about internal organs. The Naiyāyikas admit manas only as an internal organ while the Sāṁkhyas admit three internal organs and assign different functions to them which are assigned partly to manas and partly to soul by the Naiyāyikas. There is no difference between the two systems regarding the nature and process of rise of indeterminate perception of the stage of the senses. The above discussion suggests that Māṭhara41 and Gauḍapāda42 differ from Vācaspati Miśra in respect of the nature of determinate perception. It is the resolution to act according to Vācaspati Miśra43 but these commentators hold that it is of the nature of determination about the nature of an object. According to them such a determinate perception also takes place at the stage of buddhi only. Buddhi

41. MV., 33.
42. GB., 23.
43. STK. on SK. kā. 30.
ascertains the final nature of an object. Manas clears doubts about the nature of an object when final decision of ascertainment is taken by buddhi. The resolution to act seems to be the next step according to them. There is, however, no substantial difference of this commentators from Vācaspati Miśra regarding the stages in perception.

According to Sāńkhya savikalpikā or determinate perception is the function of the external sense organs of knowledge. It is an immediate cognition of an object. But in indeterminate stage, only uncertain idea of an object and not particular features of this object is presented. It is an universalized experience like those of babies and dumb person.

In the Sāṃkhyaapravacanabhāsya, Vijñānabhikṣu holds that both the indeterminate and determinate perception takes place through the external senses. Manas does not play any part in determinate perception. Up to the stage of determinate perception the external senses do everything. Assimilation and discrimination, analysis and synthesis are not the functions of manas, but these are external senses. Again Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the perception of an
object endued with generic and specific characters (sāmānyaviśeṣātma) takes place through the external senses

According to Aniruddha indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of an object free from all association of name, class and the like. It is purely presentative in character. It is free from representative elements. But determinate perception is a presentative-representative process. It involves the recollection of name, class, etc. of the object, which were perceived in the past and are brought back to consciousness by the law of similarity. The visual perception of an object reminds us of its name heard in the past; it reminds us of the class to which it belongs, and so on. And this visual perception of an object as having a particular name, and belonging to a particular class, is called by a special name, viz, determinate perception, because it contains an additional factor of representation of name and class. The Buddhists may argue that the so called determinate perception involves an element of representation, and so cannot be regarded as perception. But Aniruddha contends that the representative element does no harm to the conditions of perception.

44. SPB., II.32.
45. baugnāstu nirvikalpakameva pratyakṣamiti bārṇyayati, ‘kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntarī’ pratyakṣamiti. SSV. on SS., I. 89.
46. nāmājātyādiyojanātmikā prāṇīḥ kalpanā, cā ca savikalpakeʾpyastīti na pratyakṣaḥ pramāṇaḥ. Ibid.
nor does it in any way vitiate the perceptual character of the
cognition. The name of an object revived in memory by the visual
perception of it does not vitiate the perceptual character of the
determinate cognition. A name is an arbitrary mark of an object. It
cannot obscure its intrinsic character\textsuperscript{47}. So the determinate perception
of an object as bearing a particular name can apprehend its real
nature, though it involves the recollection of its name.

Vindhyavāsin refers to indeterminate perception only and his
account also resembles the Buddhist. Hence according to
Vindhyavāsin \textit{nirvikalpaka} is a pure cognition of objects undefined
by any element of ideation, i.e., it is free from any definition of name,
class, verbal expression, etc. For Vindhyavāsin indeterminate
perception is pure sensation.

Like Kapila, Īśvarakṛṣṇa also does not discuss the term
indeterminate and determinate perception elaborately. But Vācaspati
Miśra elucidates the distinction between indeterminate and
determinate perception. According to Vācaspati Miśra indeterminate
perception is the first act of immediate cognition which apprehends
an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relationship between the

\textsuperscript{47} samjñā hi smaryamāṇāpi pratyakṣatvarāṁ na bādhate, samjñīnāḥ sā tātasthā
hi na rūpāchchādanakṣamā.\textit{Ibid.}
qualified object and its qualifications. And he defines determinate perception as the definite cognition of an object as qualified by its generic character, specific character, and properties. Indeterminate perception is the function of the external senses; they give us a non-relational apprehension of an object unqualified by its properties. Determinate perception is the function of manas or the central sensory. It distinguishes the generic character from the specific character, and apprehends its object as qualified by them. The external senses are the organs of indeterminate perception, while manas is the organ of determinate perception. The external senses apprehend an object as merely ‘this’, not as ‘like this’ or ‘unlike this’. Assimilation and discrimination which are involved in determinate perception are the functions of manas.

Vācaspati Miśra follows the footsteps of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. He quotes verses from the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa to define indeterminate and determinate perception. But no such terms are found in the authoritative Sāṁkhya works. The word ālocana has

48. STK., 27.
49. asti hy ālocanaṁ jñānaṁ prathamāṁ nirvikalpakaṁ / bālamukā- divijñānasaddhāṁ mugdhavastujāṁ // ‘tataḥ paraṁ punarvastudharmair- jātyādibhirvayā/ buddhyaśvasyate sā’pi pratyaksatvena sammatāiti. ŚV. as quoted in STK., 27.
been used in the *Sāṁkhya-karikā*. Vācaspati Miśra interprets *ālocana-jñānam* as indeterminate perception which does not discriminate the two elements of an object namely the particular form of the *adhyavasāya*. *Adhyavasāya* is defined by Vācaspati Miśra himself as the form of determinate knowledge. Here it can be said that the definition of perception of the *Sāṁkhya-karikā* is a determinate perception. Again the author of *Yuktidīpikā* explains *ālocana* as equivalent to the form of the object as seized by the sense organ. Other hand, determinate perception is the definite cognition of an object related to its properties and qualified by its generic and specific characteristics. The determinate perception is due to the operation of *manas* as Vācaspati Miśra interprets. *Manas* alleviates the doubt regarding the definiteness of the object cognized. At this stage genus and particular qualities of an object are decided. *Ahamkāra* then determines relation of object with cognizer. Finally, *buddhi* decides whether to accept or to reject the object. This is the final state called *adhyavasāya*. At this stage, knowledge is turned into determinate 50.

Here, it can be said that the above process differs from that given by the Naiyāyikas regarding determinate perception.

50. samkalpena rūpeṇamano lakṣyate, ālocitamindriyapā vastu, ‘idāṁ iti sammugdhaṁ ‘idamevarī naivaṁ’ iti samyak kalpayati, viśeṣaṇāvīśeṣyabhāvena viveçayatīti yāvat. STK. under SK., 27.
Vijñānabhikṣu criticizes Vācaspati Miśra very often on different topics but the classification of perception as given by Vācaspati Miśra escapes his notice and he kept silent on this topic. Again Vijñānabhikṣu, holds that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the sense-organs. But it seems that Vācaspati Miśra is to be right in this point. It is curious to notices that Vindhyavāsin’s definition of perception⁵¹ speaks of indeterminate perception only and not the determinate one. According to the opinion of this celebrated exponent of Sāṁkhya, the sense-organs come in contact with their respective objects and are accordingly modified into the form of the objects as they are. This is perception (drṣṭam). It is free from imagination (avikalpikā) i.e. from all associations of name, class and such other categories. It thus presents an immediate and vague impression of the object to the mind. Again Vijñānabhikṣu holds that both determinate and indeterminate perceptions are given by only the external sense-organs.

The Sāṁkhya describes yogic perception as a mental and extraordinary perception⁵². It corresponds to ecstatic perception described above. The past is present as merged in the material cause and the

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⁵¹ srotri vīrtitavikāpikā. cf. ITK., p.93.
⁵² yogiprtyakṣāṁ tvabhāhyamalaikāṁ ca. SSV., 1.90.
future also is present in the material cause in a potential condition. The present is the actual manifest state of a physical entity. Yogic perception cognizes the past and the future objects because they exist in some condition at present and also because of a supernatural power attained by the yogis through the practice of yoga. Their yogic perception cognizes all objects in all times and in all places due to the relation to prakṛti through the manas which acquires excellence due to a special merit born of yoga. The Sāṃkhya explanation is better than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika explanation of the yogic perception of the past and the future.

It is to be noted that in the Sāṃkhya and Yoga system pratyabhijñā or recognition is a kind of perception. It is possible because buddhi is external, and quite different from the momentary cognitions of individuals. The external buddhi undergoes modifications, by virtue of which it becomes connected with the different cognition involved in recognition. This would not be possible of the self which is unmodifiable.

53. naśtamapi svakāraṇe līmarī bhūtatvenāsti, bhaviṣyadapi svakāraṇe’-nāgatatvenāsti. Ibid.1.91.
54. yogajadharmanugrahalabdhatisayasya yogina eva pradhānasarīrvandhāt sarvadeśakālādisarīrvandharīti. Ibid.
It may be concluded here that the theory of perception as advocated by Sāṃkhya is of a peculiar nature as it differs from the views of the other systems of Indian philosophy.

B. YOGA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Patañjali is the traditional founder of the Yoga system. The word ‘yoga’ literally means ‘union’ i.e. spiritual union of the individual soul with the Universal Soul and is used in this sense in the Vedānta. The Gītā defines Yoga as that state than which there is nothing higher or worth realizing and firmly rooted in which a person is never shaken even by the greatest pain; that state free from all pain and misery is Yoga. According to Patañjali Yoga does not mean union but spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of the body, senses and mind, and through right discrimination between puruṣa and prakṛti.

Yoga is intimately allied to Sāṃkhya. The Gītā calls them one. Yoga means spiritual action and Sāṃkhya means knowledge. Sāṃkhya is theory, Yoga is practice. For all practical purposes Sāṃkhya and Yoga may be treated as the theoretical and practical sides of the same system. The metaphysical and epistemological views of both the schools are same. Yoga like Samkhya accepts the
three *pramānas*—perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) and scripture (*āgama*). The Yoga accepts the twenty-five metaphysical principles of Sāṁkhya. However Yoga believes in God as the twenty-sixth principle. Hence, it is sometimes called "*sesvāra* Sāṁkhya" or "theistic Sāṁkhya" as distinct from classical Sāṁkhya which is *nirīśvara* or atheistic.

The main expositions of Yoga philosophy are the *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. Vyāsadeva’s commentary on the *Yogasūtra* known as *Vyāsabhāṣya* gives the standard exposition of the Yoga principles. Vācaspati Miśra wrote a commentary on *Vyāsabhāṣya* called *Tattvavaisāradī*. Bhojadeva wrote a commentary on the *Yogasūtra* called *Rājamārttaṇḍa*. It is known as *Bhojavṛtti*. Vijñānabhikṣu’s *Yogavārttika*, a running commentary on *Yogabhāṣya* and *Yogasārasaṁgraha* are useful manuals. Nārāyaṇatīrtha wrote three commentaries on *Yogasūtra* called *Yogasiddhāntacandrikā*, *Yogavṛtti* and *Yogacandrikā*. Rāmānanda Yāti wrote another commentary on it called *Māṇiprabhā*. The expositions of the Yoga principles are mainly based on *Vyāsabhāṣya*, *Tattvavaisāradī*, and *Yogavārttika*. Some of the later Upaniṣads such as *Maitrī*, *Śāndilya*, *Yogatattva,*
Dhyānabindu, Harīsa, Varāha and Nādabindu attach great importance to the principles of the Yoga.

The pramāṇas, according to the Yogasūtra are three factors, viz., perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and scriptural testimony (āgama)\textsuperscript{55}. These are simply mentioned and not defined by Patañjali. But Vyāsadeva, Vācaspati Miśra, Vijnānabhikṣu and other commentators of Yugasūtra have discussed the term perception elaborately.

Perception According to Vyāsadeva:

According to Vyāsadeva, perception is the mental mode which apprehends a real object possessing generic and specific characters, which particularly apprehends its specific properties, when buddhi goes out to an external object through the channel of the external sense-organs and is modified into its form\textsuperscript{56}. Here the mental modification is directly related to the object. Though the latter has in it both generic and specific features, we are concerned more with the latter in perception. The reality of external objects is accepted by the

\textsuperscript{55} tatra pratyakṣānumāṇāgamāḥ pramāṇāni. YS.,1.7.
\textsuperscript{56} a. indriyapraṇālikāya cittasya vāhyavastūparāṅgāttadviiṣayaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣātmano’ rthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇaprādhaṃ vṛttīḥ pratyakṣāṁ pramāṇam. YB., 1. 7.

b. indriyadyvārā yā buddheryathārthā vṛttīḥ sā pratyakṣāṁ pramāṇam. or indriyadvārā yā buddheryathārthā vṛttistajjātyatvāṁ pratyakṣāṁ pramāṇamiti pratyakṣāsya saripūrṇam lakṣaṇam. YSS., p.3.
Yoga. Like the universe, all sensible objects have their eternal archetypes or noumena, which undergo phenomenal changes, but are never absolutely destroyed. When an object changes into another, only its form is modified, and when all forms are destroyed, the object ultimately reverts to its primary or noumenal state. Sensations occur whenever there are sensible objects exciting the senses. It is, however, true that though the presented object is the same, the resulting sensations may be different. For the *citta* receives the impressions of the presented objects under the influence of one or other of the three *gunas*.

**Perception According to Vācaspati Miśra:**

Vācaspati Miśra the commentator of *Tattvavaiśāradī* on *Yogasūtra*, brings out the implications of Vyāsadeva's theory of perception. According to Vācaspati Miśra perception apprehends an object identical with its generic and specific qualities. There is no relation of inherence between the qualities and the substance. There is identity (*tādātmya*) between them. Perception apprehends both generality and particularity characterizing an object, but the apprehension of generality is subordinated to that of particularity in it. This characteristic distinguishes perception from inference in which

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57. IV.15-17.
the apprehension of generality is the predominant factor. Perception is immediate apprehension (*sāksātkāra*)\(^58\). Vācaspati Miśra's explanations of the term perception has four forms. Firstly perception is valid knowledge which apprehends a real object. It does not mistake one object for another. Secondly perception apprehends an external object directly. It does not apprehend the form of a cognition (*jñānakāra*). It does not indirectly apprehend an external object through the medium of a cognition. Perception is direct or presentative. It is not indirect or representative. Thirdly the form of cognition corresponds to the external object because *buddhi* goes out to it and is modified into its form. Fourthly, perception apprehends neither generality (*sāmānya*) only, nor particularity (*viśeṣa*) only, nor a substance in which they inhere, but both generality and particularity characterizing an object in which apprehension of particularity is the predominant factor. So it implies that although generic nature also is apprehended in perception yet it is subordinate to specific nature\(^59\).

**Perception According to Viññānabhikṣu:**

Viññānabhikṣu, the commentator of *Yogavārttika* does not agree with Vyāsadeva's theory on perception. Because the cognition

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\(^58\) TV., 1.7.

\(^59\) yadyapi sāmānyamapi pratyakṣe pratibhāsate tathāpi viśeṣaṁ pratyupasarjanibhūtamityarthāḥ. TV., 1. 7.
being in the Spirit, it cannot be the effect of a function of the internal organ. The sense of the reply is that the cognition of the Spirit is not produced; what happens is that the intelligence of the Spirit, being reflected in the mirror of the internal organ, is stamped with the character of the objective form then predominating in the Buddhic function. Thus, this intelligence being identical with the internal organ, with which again the function is identical,—both come to have a common substrate; and as such the cognition of the Spirit is quite rightly said to be the effect of the function. Vijnānabhikṣu observes that the expression after its being coloured with the form of external object through cognitive organs should not be considered a part of the definition. It speaks of merely the cause of perception⁶⁰. Otherwise the definition will not be applicable to perceptive knowledge of soul, etc. as also perception of Īśvara for the former does not stand in need of colouring of citta by external object and Īśvara has no cognitive organ⁶¹. The Bhāswatīṭkā on Yogasūtra also holds that perception is a source of valid ideas which arises as a modification of the inner-organ⁶².

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⁶⁰. ātmādipratyākṣāvyaraṇāṇādīśvarapratīyākṣāvyāpanācca, tasyājanyatvāt. YV., 1.7.
⁶¹. Ibid.
⁶². indriyavyabhātasyāpindriyapraṇālikā aboparāgaityarthāḥ, jā vṛittirutpadyte tat pratyakṣāṁ pramāṇam. BT. on YS., I.7.
It is to be mentioned that in the system of Yoga we come across a different account of process in perception. Vyāsadeva states that *citta* goes to the external object through senses and gets the form of that object. According to Vijnānabhikṣu *citta* goes to the external object along with the senses. The statement ‘through the senses’ does not mean that *citta* alone travels to the objects cognized. The fact that the defect of eye like jaundice affects perceptual knowledge and the *citta* is modified into the form of object along with the sense-organ. Vijnānabhikṣu further states that this *citta* or *buddhi* again reflects its modification into the *puruṣa* after getting the reflection of *puruṣa* earlier. There arises the apparent knowledge in *puruṣa* through this reflection. Perception in this way depends upon the contact of sense-organs with the object on the one hand and with the internal organs on the other. When the object is clearly visible or when one feels fear or the like, the contact of external sense-organ with the object and among internal senses is simultaneous. For example, when one sees a lion facing him, operation of the aggregate of internal organs and the external sense-organ is simultaneous. There is, however, difference of opinion amongst the Sāṅkhya in this respect.

63. cittasyendriya sāhityenaivārthākāraḥ pariṇāmo bhavati. YV., 1. 7.
64. nayanādigatapittādyānvyavayatirekābhyām. Ibid.
Vijñānabhikṣu and his follower Bhāvakaneṣa discussed one problem of perception. Actually Bhāvakaneṣa repeats the view of Vijñānabhikṣu in this regard. According to Vijñānabhikṣu the sense-organ goes out but not get detached from the body. It prolongs itself and the prolonged part remains united with the sense-organ. It goes straight to the object and catches the form of the object with which it becomes united. The prolonged part is called vr̥tti. Since a distant object is perceived small, the question arises whether the sense-organ goes out through vr̥tti. The object remaining at a distant place is not really small. The observer perceives it small. One simultaneously perceives the lightpost and the Sun. The distance between the observer and the lightpost is little but the distance between the Sun and the same observer is far greater. It is to be discussed whether the same vr̥tti can be united with both of them at the same time. If it cannot do so, the two objects cannot be perceived at the same time. Neither Vijñānabhikṣu nor Bhāvakaneṣa utters a single word to explain these difficulties. Again all the sense-organs excepting the visual one do not go out in order to be united with their objects. Therefore Vijñānabhikṣu’s discussion of this topic is not complete.

Another problem of perception has not been discussed either in the Sāṁkhya works or in the Yoga works. The problem is, in case of
illusory perception question arises whether it is partially or entirely illusory. The perceptual judgment has three parts- subject, copula and predicate. If the predicate is only illusory it is questionable whether this wrong predicate invalidates the whole judgment. But none of the authors discussed this matter.

**Division of Perception:**

Regarding the divisions of perception, Yoga philosophers have not discussed any thing, however it can be assumed that the divisions of perception of Yoga is similar with a view of the Sāṅkhya. But the theoretical kinds of Yoga’s perception is similar with the view of the Sāṅkhyaas.

**Yogic Perception:**

Like Sāṅkhya, the Yoga system also admit yogic perception. The Yoga believes that the past and the future are present in a physical substance in some condition, and can, consequently, be cognized by yogic perception. The present alone is real. Temporal order is a construction of the intellect (buddhinirmāna). There can be no aggregate of moments in reality. Hence the yogis can know the past and the future from the present states of things by concentrating their minds on them and completely withdrawing them from other
objects. Further, the Yoga believes that all objects are in the nature of all other objects so that by concentration on any object all other objects are known\(^65\). Concentration on attributes (dharma), characteristics (laksana), and conditions (avastha) of physical things which are modifications of sattva, rajas and tamas leads to the yogic perception of the past and the present\(^66\). Concentration of pure sattva of mind on subtle, hidden and remote objects generates immediate knowledge of them\(^67\). Pure sattva of mind is acquired by the practice of yoga which removes the taints of love, hatred, egoism, nescience, and delusion, and decreases rajas and tamas to the utmost degree. Rajas makes the mind restless. Tamas obstructs knowledge and causes ignorance. The yogis can perceive all objects through prātibhajñānā\(^68\). It is not a flash of intuition in common persons as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds. It is intuition acquired through the practice of yoga. It is the state prior to discriminating knowledge of the self as distinct from prakrit and mind-body-complex. It is called redeeming (tāraka) knowledge because it is the prior state of discriminating

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\(^{65}\) sarvam sarvātmakam. YBh. III. 14.
\(^{66}\) pariṇāmatraya sarhyamādatītāgatajñānam. YS. III. 16.
\(^{67}\) YS., III. 25.
\(^{68}\) prātibhād vā sarvam. Ibid. III. 33. III. 43.
knowledge that brings about release\textsuperscript{69}. Subtle, hidden, remote, past and future objects, supernatural sounds, touches, sights, tastes and smells are perceived through \textit{prātibhajñāna}\textsuperscript{70}. Such supernormal perceptions are hugged as supernatural powers (\textit{siddhi}) by the extraverted (\textit{vyu̱thcit\-t\-a\-n\-ta}) but discarded by the introverted \textit{yogis} who aspire for liberation alone\textsuperscript{71}. Concentration on the present moment and the order of moments generates discriminating knowledge of the self\textsuperscript{72}. Furthermore, the Yoga conceives the mind (\textit{citta}) as pervasive (\textit{vibhu}) which perceives all objects when its \textit{rajas} and \textit{tamas} are removed completely and when the sense-organs are completely controlled by the self and cannot restrict its knowledge\textsuperscript{73}. The Yoga regards both self and mind (\textit{citta}) as pervasive whereas the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards the self as pervasive and mind (\textit{manas}) as atomic. The validity of \textit{yogic} perception is due to a special merit born out of yoga. All orthodox systems of philosophy except the Mīmāṃsā believe in the validity of \textit{yogic} perception.

\textsuperscript{69} prātibhām nāma tārakāṁ, tad vivekajasya jñānasya pūrvarūpaṁ, tena và sarvameva jānātī. YBh. III. 33.
\textsuperscript{70} tataḥ prātibha-śrāvaṇa-vedanāha’darāha’svādāvārttā yāyante.YS. III. 36.
\textsuperscript{71} te samādhābupasargā byuthāne siddhayaḥ. Ibid. III. 37.
\textsuperscript{72} śraṇa-tatkramayoḥ samyāmādvivekajñānāṁ jñānam.Ibid, III. 52.
\textsuperscript{73} tadupārāgāpekṣītvācīcittasya vastu jñātājñātāmaṁ.Ibid., IV. 17.
The Yoga prescribes the methods by which a *yogin* can perceive his self, his mind (*citta*), and others’ minds. Patañjali avers that habitual concentration of the mind on the self isolated from experience yields the intuition of the self, experience being for the self and being due to the false identification of the self and the mind which are absolutely different from each other\(^74\). The self is immutable and conscious. The mind (*buddhi*) is mutable and unconscious. It is made of transparent *sattva* in which the conscious self is reflected. Vyāsadeva avers that the self knows the mental mode in which it is reflected, again the mental mode does not know the self as its objects, since the knower cannot know itself\(^75\). Patañjali avers that habitual concentration of the mind on the heart-cavity yields the intuition of the pure mind\(^76\). The heart-cavity is the seat of the mind (*citta*). Patañjali avers that habitual concentration of the mind on any organic expression of another person’s mind yields the intuition of it devoid of the knowledge of its object\(^77\).

\(^{74}\) sattva-puruṣayoratyantā-śaṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyayā- viśeṣo/ bhogaḥ parārthaḥ svārthaḥ-saṁyamāt puruṣa- jñānam. Ibid.III.35.

\(^{75}\) na ca puruṣa-pratyayena buddhī-saṭṭvātmanā puruṣo dṛṣṭyate, puruṣa eva, pratayamā svātmāvalambaṇam paśyati. YBh.,III. 35.

\(^{76}\) hrḍaye citta-saṁvit. YS.,III. 34.

\(^{77}\) pratyayasya paracitājñānam, na ca tat sālambanaṁ tasyāviśayībhūtāt. YS., III. 19-20.