CHAPTER - III

NYĀYA-VAIŚEŚIKA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

A. NYĀYA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

The Nyāya system was founded by Gautama or Akṣapāda, so it is called Akṣapādadarśana. It is also called Tarkaśāstra or the science of reasoning, Hetuvidyā or the science of causes; Vādavidyā or the science of debate, Ānvikṣikī or the science of critical study, and Pramāṇaśāstra or the science of logic and epistemology. The system is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. Traditions regards, the Nyāya system of Indian philosophy belongs to the group of āstika darśanas. Broadly speaking the term ‘Nyāya’ means logic and epistemology. Literally the term ‘Nyāya’ means that by means of which the mind is led to a conclusion ‘Nyāya’ becomes equivalent to an argument, and the system which treats of arguments more thoroughly than others comes to be known as the Nyāya system.

Generally, the term Nyāya derived from the root ni is sometimes explained as that by which sentence and words could be interpreted as

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1. pramāṇairarthapariśařtan niyayaḥ. NBh., 1.1.1.
2. niyate anena iti nyāyaḥ. GIP., p.134.
having one particular meaning and not another, and on the strength of
this even Vedic accents of words (which indicate the meaning of
compound words by pointing out the particular kind of compound in
which the words entered into combination) were called Nyāya³.

Philosophically the Nyāya system is divided into two broad
divisions viz., Prācina-Nyāya and Navya-Nyāya. Among the Prācina-
Nyāya school, the main expositions are Nyāyasūtra of Gautama and its
commentary and sub-commentaries. The earliest commentary on
Nyāyasūtra is Vātsyāyanabhaṣya of Vātsyāyana. Besides, Uddyotakara
wrote a Vārttika on Vātsyāyana’s bhāṣya known as Nyāyavārttika.
Vācaspati Miśra wrote a sub-commentary on Nyāyavārttika which is
called Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā. Again Udayana wrote a sub-
commentary on Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā which is known as
Tātparyāṭikāpārisuddhi. Vardhamāna wrote a sub-commentary on that
which is called Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa. Padmanābha wrote a sub-
commentary on Nyāyanibandhaprakāśa which is called
Vardhamānendu. Samkara Miśra wrote a sub-commentary on
Vardhamānendu known as Nyāyatātparyamaṇḍana. In the seventeenth
century Viśvanātha wrote a commentary known as Viśvanāthavṛtti on
Nyāyasūtra. Rādhāmohana wrote a separate commentary on the

Nyāyasūtra known as Nyāyasūtravivarana. In addition to these works many other independent works of great philosophical value have been written on Nyāya philosophy. The most important works among these are the Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Again Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjalī is an important work of the Pracina-Nyāya school.

In the Navya-Nyāya school, the main expositions are Tattvacintāmaṇī of Gaṅgeśa. Another important work on Navya-Nyāya school is Bhāṣāpariccheda by Viśvanātha. On Bhāṣāpariccheda commentaries like Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Dinakarī and Rāmarudrī are important. Again Annam Bhaṭṭa’s Tarkasaṅgraha is a notable work of Navya-Nyāya school. On this Tarkasaṅgraha commentaries like Tarkadīpikā, Nyāyanirṇaya and Nīlakaṇṭhī of Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa are noteworthy. Other important works of Navya-Nyāya schools are Tarkabhāṣā of Keśava Miśra with the commentary Nyāyapradīpa, Saptapadārtī of Śivāditya, Tārkiṇarakṣa of Varadarāja with the commentary Niṣkanta by Mallinātha, Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajñā with the Nyāyasārapadapanīcikā of Vāsudevasūri, Nyāyatātparyadīpikā of Jayasirinhasūri etc.

Epistemologically these two divisions of Nyāya accepted four types of valid knowledge, viz., perception (pratyakṣa), inference
(anumāna), comparison (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Different divisions of Nyāya system are not unanimous regarding the nature and the definitions of perception. According to Naiyāyikas, the word perception or pratyakṣa is ambiguous, as it is used for both the result, the apprehension of the truth and the process or the operation which leads to that result. Though pratyakṣa originally means sense-perception, it soon came to cover all immediate apprehension whether through the aid of the senses or not⁴. According to Naiyāyikas perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge and it is the final test of all knowledge. Hence perception is not only the source of human knowledge but it is the basis of other sources or means of knowledge. Thus it has been said that all other means of knowledge presuppose perception and must be based on knowledge derived from perception⁵.

Now some theories on perception given by Prācina Nyiyāyikas and Navya-Nyiyāyikas are given bellow:

**The Prācina- Naiyāyika’s Theory of Perception:**

**Perception According to Gautama:**

Gautama, the founder of Prācina- Nyāya school defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the intercourse of the sense-
organs with the objects, not associated with any name, and well-defined. There are four points in this definition which need consideration: (i) sense-object-contact- which is the specific defining character of perception according to Gautama, (ii) *avyabhicāri* - which establishes the logical condition of a valid perception, (iii) *avyapadeśyam*, and (iv) *vyavasāyātmakaṁ*.

In the first part of Gautama’s definition follows from the etymological meaning of the word *pratyakṣa* which means the functioning of the sense-organs, each in relation to each particular object. Perception is a kind of cognition which is generated by the contact of the self with the mind, the contact of the mind with the sense-organs and the intercourse of the sense organs with their proper objects. In Gautama’s definition of perception, the contact of the soul with the mind and of the mind with the senses is not mentioned, because it is common to cognition produced by all the *pramāṇas*.

The definition mentions only the specific cause of perceptual knowledge. The specific feature of Gautama’s definition is the sense-object-contact, which is accepted by many philosophical systems.

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7. *aksasyaṅkṣasya prativiṣayaṁ vṛttih pratyakṣam*. NBh., 1.1.3.
In the second part of Gautama’s definition, the word ‘avyabhisceśa’, i.e. non-erroneous cognition, mentions the logical conditions of valid perception i.e., it should not contradict the real nature of the object. For instance, it is found that during the summer, the rays of the sun become mixed up with the heat-rays radiating from the surface of the earth and thus the two together appearing at same distance come in contact with the eyes of an observer who apparently seems to have a direct perception of water arising out of the sense-organ and the object-contact. In order to avoid such cases of wrong notions, the word avyabhisceśa has been added to the definition.\(^8\)

The third and fourth parts of Gautama’s definition mentions two kinds of perception: (i) avyapadesvatamyam, i.e. which is not associated with a name and (ii) vyavasayatmakam, i.e. well-defined or determinate perception. The other ancient Naiyāyikas call the first type of perception as indeterminate perception (nirvikalpaka) and the other as determinate (savikalpaka).

In the definition of pratyakṣa given by Gautama the term artha is rendered as ‘object’ which stands for a ‘real thing’, but it does not stand for anything of which one may aware without the contact of the sense-

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8. Vbh., 1.1.4.
organ. So the word *artha* is used in the sense of only perceptible object. Perception will not be possible without a contact between such an object and the sense organ. In the *Nyāyasūtra*, the word *artha* means the five qualities belonging to the five elements that are earth (*prthivi*), water (*ap*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and empty space (*ākāśa*) from which the senses originate.

To the Naiyāyikas, perception is dependent on the contact of the sense organ (*indriya*) with the object (*artha*). This contact or relation is known as *sannikarṣa* which is the ‘operative relation’. Gautama has included the term *sannikarṣa* instead of the terms *saṁyoga* or *samavāya*, as *sannikarṣa* embraces both the entities (i.e. object and sense-organ).

It may be argued that the definition of perception given by the Naiyāyikas is defective. Because in the case of perception there is a contact between object and sense-organ which is associated with mind which is again connected with ātman or self. So self and mind are vital causes of perception which cannot be denied, but the role of self and mind is not mentioned in Gautama’s definition.

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9. prthivyāpastejo vāyurākāśamiti bhūtāni. NS.,1.1.13.
10. ITK., p.70.
11. na tarihānīmidaṁ bhavati, ātmā manasā saṁhyujyate, mana indriyeṇa'ndriyamarthene' iti. NBh., 1.1.4.
In reply, the Naiyāyikas may argue that in the definition of perception, the special cause or the uncommon cause (karaṇa) of it has been mentioned. Karāṇa is defined as vyāpāravādaḥ asādhāraṇakāraṇaṁ karaṇaṁ (i.e. the uncommon cause along with intermediary is called a karaṇaṁ). But self, mind, etc. are not the uncommon causes but the common causes of perception by virtue of the fact that they are common in inference, comparison and testimony also. Hence, it is necessary to mention the characteristics of the perceptual cognition which are different from other sources of valid cognition. It is not at all necessary to mention the role of ātman and mind in the definition\(^{12}\). Gautama’s definition has been discussed by his successors like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra and Jayanta Bhaṭṭa elaborately.

**Perception According to Vātsyāyana:**

Vātsyāyana, the main commentator of Gautama’s *Nyāyasūtra*, interpreting the definition of perception gives a description of the entire process of perceptual cognition. According to Vātsyāyana self comes in contact with the mind, the mind with the sense-organ, and the sense-

\(^{12}\) *nedāṁ kāraṇāvadhāraṇaṁ etāvatpratyakṣe kāraṇam iti, kintu viśiṣṭa-kāraṇavacanam iti, yat pratyakṣa-jñānasya viśiṣṭākāraṇaṁ taudcyate, yattu samānānamumānādijñānasya na tannivartate iti. NBh., 1.1.4.*
organ with the objects of the world and thereafter the perceptual cognition arises.\textsuperscript{13}

This is a clear description of the epistemological process of a perceptual cognition. Knowing is an activity and it starts from the initiative taken by the self. After it starts its initiative, the first effect is with the internal sense-organ called \textit{manas} (mind); after the self is connected with the mind another effect is seen and that is the contact of the mind with the senses. After that, the senses come in contact with the objects of the world and thereafter a perceptual cognition which is indeterminate, occurs. This is followed by a verbalizable perceptual cognition.

We know that the self is a substance, mind is also a substance, the external senses are substances and the objects of the world may be a substance or a quality or an action or any other positive or negative entity. Between two substances there arises a contact. But between a quality and a substance, between an action and a substance, between a universal and a substance, between a whole and its parts and between a distinguishing feature and a permanent substance the system of Nyāya

\textsuperscript{13} atmā manasā saṁyujyate, mana āndriyeṇa, āndriyamarthena, tataḥ pratyakṣaṁ. Vbh. on NS., 1.1.4.
and Vaiśeṣika accept a permanent relationship called *samavāya* i.e. inherence.

This is why, there is contact between the self and the internal sense called mind, between mind and the external sense-organs, and between an external sense-organ and the worldly object made of substance.

In the Gautama’s definition of perception, Vātsyāyana takes up the phrase *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam* and analyses the cause of perception in detail. Vātsyāyana maintains that in every perceptual situation the self unites with the mind, the mind with the sense and the sense with the object. Vātsyāyana makes it perfectly clear that the sense object contact is not the only cause of perception. There are others as well, namely, the self mind contact and the mind-sense contact. Vātsyāyana, however, does not find fault with the author of *Nyāyasūtra* for giving only one cause of perception. He rather compliments him for having brought forth the idea of sense-object contact in his definition\(^\text{14}\). Vātsyāyana is also of the view that where as the self-mind contact is common to perception, inference, etc., the mind-sense contact and the sense-object contact are peculiar characteristics of perception. The

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\(^{14}\) NV.,1.1.4.
definition contains only the sense-object contact and not the mind-sense contact, since in a definition the mention of any one character that serves to distinguish a defined thing from others suffices. In other words, a definitive aphorism is not supposed to contain exhaustive account of all the distinctive features of the thing defined.

Vātsyāyana further states that the apprehension of pleasure or pain by the soul are the cases of perception. The mind is regarded by him as a sense-organ, though unlike other sense organs, it is non-material and devoid of qualities and operates on all objects without being confined to specific ones15. In short the sense-object contact, according to Vātsyāyana, is a necessary condition for all kinds of perception including the apprehension of pleasure or pain by the soul. In this account of Vātsyāyana we have at least, a vague idea of differentiation between pramāṇa and pramā and that is why his interpretation of the sense-object contact has been of great help to us in determining the psychology of perception.

In the Nyāyabhāṣya Vātsyāyana says that indriyārthasannikarṣa is the special cause (karaṇa) of perception. And the sensible objects i.e. quality (guna), action (kriyā), universal (jāti) etc. do not have any

15. indriyasya bai sato manasa indriyebhyāḥ prthagupadeśo dharma bhedat. NBh., 1.1.4.
relation of contact (*samyoga*) with the sense-organs. So Gautama in his *sūtra* has used the term *sannikarpa* (instead of the term *samyoga*) through which the other relation including *samyoga* are to be understood\(^\text{16}\). This sense-object-contact is of six kinds\(^\text{17}\).

(i) *samyoga*:

According to Nyāya, the external perception of substances or finite things, the senses come in direct contact with the things. This sense-object-contact is called *samyoga* or conjunction. It occurs between two separable substances viz., sense and objects. For example, in perception of a substance like a pot or a cloth, we may perceive either by visual or by tactual sense-organs. In both kinds of perception the visual sense-organ (*caksu*) or the tactual sense-organ (*tvak*) comes in direct conjunction (*samyoga*) with the substance which is the operative relation\(^\text{18}\).

(ii) *samyukta-samavāya*:

The perception of a quality (*guna*) or an action is due to its inherence in a substance which is in union with a sense-organ is called *samyukta-samavāya*. It occurs between the sense and the sensible

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17. pratyakṣajñānahetur indriyārthasannikarṣāḥ śaḍvidhaḥ. TS., p.48.
18. cakṣuṣā ghaṭapratyakṣajānanē saṃyogāḥ sannikarṣāḥ. Ibid.
qualities of the object. Viśvanātha holds that the sense come in contact with movement through their conjunction with the things in which it inheres\textsuperscript{19}. For example, in the case of perception of a pot we cannot have direct perception of the colour of it. The relation between the sense and the colour is not directly perceived by the senses. So the relation between the sense and the quality is called ‘inheritance in the conjoined’ (\textit{saṁyukta samavāya})\textsuperscript{20}.

(iii) \textit{saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya}:

When the sense-object contact is mediated by two intermediary terms it becomes more indirect than we find it in the preceding case. For example, if we perceive the blueness of a pot, the universal colourness, inheres in the pot (substance) which is conjoined with the eye. Thus, perception of blueness by the eye involves two successive inheritance and one conjunction. So it is called \textit{saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya}\textsuperscript{21}.

(iv) \textit{samavāya}:

The indirect sense-object-contact is known as inheritance (\textit{samavāya}). \textit{Samavāya} remains in the perception of sound by the

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19. BP., pp.54-56.
20. gatārūpastvānāyaṁ dvanukta-samavāyaṁ sannikarṣaḥ. Ibid.
21. rūpatvasāmānayaṁ pratyakṣaṁ dvanukta-samavetasmānāyaṁ sannikarṣaḥ, cakṣusarūpyukte ghaṭe rūpariṁ samavetāṁ, tatra rūpatvasya samavāyāṁ. Ibid.

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auditory sense-organ or ear. According to the Nyāya school, the ear which is a sense-organ is the space (ākāśa) limited by auditory passage and sound is a quality. As quality always exists in a substance through the relation of inherence, sound as a quality exists in the space (ākāśa) which is a substance through the relation of inherence (samavāya)\(^{22}\).

(v) **samaveta-samavāya**:  

In this form of sense-object-contact, the sense is in contact with its object through the medium of an intermediary term which is inseparably related to both. The relation between ‘soundness’ and ear is called *samaveta-samavāya*\(^{23}\). For example, in the auditory perception of soundness the sense-organ (ear) is in contact with the object ‘soundness’ because it inheres in sound which, on its part, inheres as a quality in the ear.

(vi) **višeṣaṇa-višeṣyabhāva**:  

There is a relation between the sense-organ and the negative entity which is called the relation between the sense-organ and the negative entity known as the relation of ‘characterizer and characterized’ (*višeṣaṇa-višeṣya-bhāva*). For example, ‘I am seeing the

\(^{22}\) *srotreṇa sabdasakṣatkare samavāyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ.* Ibid.  
\(^{23}\) *śabdatvasākṣatkare samavetasamavāyaḥ sannikarṣaḥ śrotasamavete śabde śabdatvasya samavāyät.* Ibid.
absence of a jar on the ground’. According to the Naiyāyikas, an absence is as much a fact as presence. The explanation will be easier if we turn the sentence as ‘I am seeing the ground endowed with the absence of a jar’. Here my eye which is the sense-organ is in conjunction with the ground which is characterized by the absence of a jar. So there is the operative relation between the eye as the sense-organ and ‘the absence of a jar’ as the object. This relation is described as the relation of ‘characteriser-charactered’.

In order to accommodate absence in perception, the Naiyāyikas admit this sixth kind of sense-object-contact. According to this view, non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) and presumption (arthāpatti) are not separate pramāṇas but they are included in perception and inference respectively. So the Naiyāyikas have to admit the sixth kind of ‘sense-object-contact’, where it is stated that absence can come in contact with the sense-organ.

In the commentary Nyāyabodhinī on Dīpikā of Tarkasaṅgraha three types of contact in the case of the perception of absence have been accepted. They are qualifier in the conjoined (saṁyukta-viśesana), qualifier inherent in the conjoined (saṁyukta-samaveta-viśesana) and

24. abhāvapratyakṣe viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaḥ sannikārṣaṇo, ghaṭābhāvavadbhūtalamityatra caṅkuḥ saṁyukte bhūtale ghaṭābhāvasya viśeṣaṇatvāt. Ibid.
qualifier inherent in the inhered conjoined object (*saṃyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa*). In the case of the perception of a jar, we also perceive the non-existence of clothness in it. Here the absence of clothness inheres in the jar which comes in contact (conjunction) with the eye, because in a jar there is the distinction (*bheda*) of a cloth, which is also revealed simultaneously. So there is another case of perception of non-existence. This contact between ‘the eye’ as the sense-organ and ‘the absence of clothness’ in the object is called *saṃyukta-viśeṣaṇa* i.e. conjoined qualifier.

Again, while perceiving a jarness (existing in a jar) the absence of earthness in it is also revealed. Here the absence of earthness inheres in the jarness (through the relation of inherence) which also inheres in the jar which is in conjunction with the eye. So the perception of the non-existence of earthness in jarness is possible through the contact called *saṃyukta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier inherent in the conjoined).

Again, in the case of the perception of coloumess (existing in the colour of a jar), we also perceive the non-existence of blueness in it. The absence of blueness inheres in the coloumess which also inheres in the colour which again inheres in the jar. This is conjoined with the eye. So, the contact between the eye as the sense-organ and the absence of
blueness as the object is called *sāṁyukta-samaveta-samaveta- viśeṣaṇa*, i.e. qualifier inherent in that which again inherent in the conjoined\(^{25}\).

Here it may be considered the purpose of the inclusion of the term *avyapadeśya* which means ‘unnameable’ or ‘non-expressible’ through words. According to Vātsyāyana, every individual manifestation of knowledge of an object which is produced out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object is expressed by words like colour, taste etc. The cognition which is expressed through words would be taken as produced from verbal testimony. In order to exclude this possibility the term *avyapadeśya* has been inserted in the definition. It has further been stated that the name of the perceived object is necessary when this knowledge is being communicated to others. The main purpose of the use of the term is to point out that the knowledge produced from the sense-object-contact can never be considered as verbal comprehension\(^{26}\).

\(^{25}\) paficasannikarṣeṣu madhye sarṇyogasthāne sarṇyuktapadaṁ āhaṭayitvā samavāyaasthāne samavetapadaṁ āhaṭayitvā abhāvasthāle nirvāhayaṁ, tathā hi dravyādhikaraṇakābhāvapratyakṣe sarṇyuktaviśeṣaṇatā, dravyasamavetādhikaraṇakābhāvapratyakṣe sarṇyuktasamaveta-viśeṣaṇatā ca, dravyasamavetasamavetādhikaraṇakābhāvapratyakṣe sarṇyuktasamaveta- samavetaviśeṣaṇatā ca saṁnikarṣaṁ, tatra āhaṭe ghaṭattvābhāvāḥ sarṇyukta viśeṣaṇatayā āhyate, ghaṭasamavetaghāṭavāḍau prthivītvābhāvāḥ, sarṇyukta- samavetaviśeṣaṇatayā āhyate, ghaṭasamavetasamaveta rūpavāḍau nilatvābhāvaṁsa sarṇyukta-samaveta-samaveta-viśeṣaṇatayā āhyate iti sarṁkṣepaṁ. NBh. on TS., p.46.

\(^{26}\) tatredamindriyārthasannikarṣādutpannamarthajñānāṁ ‘rūpam’iti vā ‘rasa’ ityevaṁ vā bhavati, rūparasāsabdāśca viṣayanāmādhyeyāṁ; tena vyapadiśyate jñānaṁ ‘rūpamiti jānite’ ‘rasa iti jānite’, nāmadheyaśābdena vyapadiśyamānaṁ sacchābdāṁ prasaṅgyate, ata āha avyapadeśyamiti. NBh. 1.1.4.
Vātsyāyana signifies of the insertion of the term *avyabhicāri* in the Gautama’s definition of perception. When we attain the knowledge of water in the case of mirage connected with sunrays during summer, it (i.e. the knowledge of water) would come under the purview of perception as it is produced out of the sense-object-contact. The insertion of the term *avyabhicāri* entails that such type of knowledge would not be considered as a perceptual one. The perceptual knowledge would always be non-deviated (*avyabhicāri*) and hence it is always the right cognition of an object. That is, when an object is known as such, it is called non-deviated knowledge and an object known otherwise is called deviated (*vyabhicāri*)\(^*\).

One may have doubt (regarding the nature of an object seen at a distance) in the form-‘whether it is smoke or dust’. Such type of dubious knowledge would be treated as a perceptual one as it is produced from the sense-object contact. In order to exclude such type of knowledge from perception, the term *vyavasāyātmaka* has been inserted in the

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27. *grīṣme maricayo bhāumenosmaṇaḥ saṁśṛṭāḥ spandamānā dūraṣṭhasya caṅṣuṣa saṁnikṛṣyante, tatrendriyārthasannikarṣādudakamiti jñānamutpadyate, tacc āpanā ṣaṁkṣiptaḥ, tad pratyakṣāraḥ prasajyata ityata āha avyabhicārī, yad tasminstādītī tad vyabhicārī, yattu tasminstadītī tad avyabhicārī pratyakṣamīti. Ibid.
definition. The cognition which being produced from the sense-object-contact becomes certain in character is called perception\textsuperscript{28}.

It may be argued that doubtful cognition is produced from the contact of the self with mind and not by sense-object-contact. So, there is no necessity for incorporating the term *vyavasāyātmaka* in the definition.

The above-mentioned view is not tenable\textsuperscript{29}. For, when one sees an object with the help of eye, one has a doubtful cognition. It is found that in all cases of perception our sense-organ is operative\textsuperscript{30}. The doubtful cognition would be included in perception on the basis of having the characteristic ‘sense-object-contact’. In order to exclude such type of cognition from the purview of perception the adjunct *vyavasāyātmaka* has been inserted in the definition.

**Perception According to Uddyotakara:**

Uddyotakara a commentator of *Vātsyāyanabhasya* takes the literary meaning of perception as that which is related to the senses\textsuperscript{31}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{28} dūrāccaksuṣā hyayamarthāṁ paśyannāvadhārayati dhūma iti vā reṣuriti vā, tadetadindriyārthaśannikāraṇotpannamanaṇavadhāraṇajānanāṁ pratyakṣaṁ prasajyata ityata āha vyavasāyātmakamiti. Ibid.1.1.4.
\item \textsuperscript{29} na caitanmavyaṁ, ‘ātmamanāḥ sannikāraṇa-jameva’ navadhāraṇajānanamiti. Ibid.1.1.4.
\item \textsuperscript{30} caksuṣā hyayamarthāṁ, paśyannāvadhārayati, yathā cendriyēnopaladhausmarmarthāṁ manasopalabhate. Ibid.1.1.4.
\item \textsuperscript{31} indriyenārthasya sannikārṣādyadutpadyate jānāṁ tat pratyakṣaṁ. NV., on NS.,1.1.4.
\end{itemize}
Uddyotakara explains the phrase *indriyārthasannikārṣotpannanaiṁ jñānaiṁ pratyaksaiṁ* elaborately. According to Uddyotakara perception is that knowledge which is brought about by the sense-object contact. His main contribution to this aspect of the theory of perception is that he has discussed it in detail and enumerated as many as six types of sense-object contact. Interpreting Vātsyāyana’s view on perception, Uddyotakara offers other explanations too. Firstly, the sense-object contact is the distinctive feature of every individual perception. In every individual perception, which is produced by the sense-object contact, what differentiates it from every other perception is either the sense-organ concerned, or the object perceived; and each individual perception is called either after the sense-organ, or after the object. For example, the perception of colour is called either visual perception or colour-perception; and no perception is ever called after the mind-sense-contact; the perception of colour, for example, is never called mental perception. Secondly, the mind-sense-contact is the common factor among all kinds of perception, which are otherwise different. In other words, the contact of the mind with the sense-organs does not differ in different kinds of perception; it remains the same in different kinds of perception. Thirdly, the mind-sense-contact is not mentioned as the distinctive feature of perception, since with regard to perception the mind-sense-contact stands on the same footing as the mind-soul-contact,

32. Ibid., 1.1.4.
firstly because individual perceptions are never called either after the
mind or after the soul; and secondly because both these contacts subsist
in a sub-stratum which is imperceptible by the senses; thirdly because
neither of these two contacts belongs to the perceived object; and lastly
because both these contacts subsist in the mind. These are the reasons
why the mind-sense-contact has not been mentioned in the definition of
perception\textsuperscript{33}. Hence, Uddyotakara explained the term \textit{sannikarśa}
involved in the definition and enumerates six kinds of \textit{sannikarśas}
which are accepted by all the latter Naiyāyikas\textsuperscript{34}.

In the Gautama's \textit{sūtra} on perception Uddyotakara adopts the
term \textit{avyapadesyam} for 'unnameable', but he has left it unexplained.
Again Uddyotakara endorses Vātsyāyana in interpreting the epithet
\textit{vyavasāyātmaka} also. He makes it clear that both the 'mind-soul
contact' and the 'sense-object contact' can be regarded equally
responsible for producing a doubtful apprehension. Uddyotakara is also
of the view that the mind is distinct from the other sense- organs in the
sense that while the former is connected with all sorts of apprehension,
the latter are effective upon specific objects only. The difference
between the mind and the sense organs does not depend upon their being

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33} Ibid.,1.1.4.
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{sannikarśah punaḥ śoḍā bhidayate, saṁyogah saṁyuktasamavāyaḥ,
saṁyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ, samavāyaḥ, samavetasamavāyo,
viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaśceti. NV., on NS.,1.1.4.}
\end{itemize}
non-material or material since the mind, in fact, is neither material nor non-material\textsuperscript{35}.

**Perception According to Vācaspati Miśra:**

Vācaspati Miśra, the author of *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāti*\textsuperscript{kā} interprets Gautama's definition of perception. Gautama does not differentiate between *pratyakṣa* as *pramāṇa* and as *pramiti*. But Vācaspati Miśra differentiate between the source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and knowledge (*pramā*). He tried to overcome the difficulty by supplying an additional word *yataḥ* and thus, interpreted the aphorism as *pratyakṣa pramāṇa* is that from which the knowledge based upon the sense object contact arises. The commentators of *Nyāyasūtra* interpreted this definition in different ways. Some of them maintain that *indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannath jñānath avyabhicāri pratyakṣarṇi* forms the definition and the term *avyapadesyam* and *vyavasāyātmakam* refer to the indeterminate and determinate types of perception.

Vācaspati Miśra first of all justifies the term *sannikarṣa* found in the definition. He says that the Śutrakāra has included the term *sannikarṣa* instead of *samyoga* or *samavāya* in order to include all types of relation. If *sāmyoga* had been included, *samaśva* would have been

\textsuperscript{35} kāryadharmāvetau bhautikanabhautikāh ca, na kāryaṁ manāḥ, tasmaiṇa bhautikāṁ nāpyabhautikamīti. NV.,1.1.4.
precluded and similarly in the case of adoption of \textit{samavāya, saṁyoga} would have been excluded. Vācaspati Miśra also points that the term \textit{artha} (object) is also quite purposeful. By the term \textit{artha}, the Sūtrakāra means that the object of perception should be knowable in their nature. In case of \textit{paramāṇu} (atom) and \textit{ākāśa} (ether) though \textit{saṁyoga} etc. is possible, they are not knowable as such and hence are not perceptible\footnote{arthagrahaṇaṁarthyanānatayā jñeyasvarūpayogyataṁ darsitā na cāśavaṇvākāśādīnāmaśtiṁ satyapi saṁyogādau nāsāvarhasannikarṣa iti tajhudāsah. NVTT., on NS., 1.1.4.}.

Regarding the term \textit{utpanna}, Vācaspati Miśra is of the view that it is indicative of the fact that the contact of the sense with the object is instrumental in bringing about perceptual knowledge\footnote{utpannagrahnena ca saṁnikarṣasyotpādakatvarṁ sucitam. NVTT., on NS., 1.1.4.}. As such that which conjoined with a conjunction is not perceptible. Otherwise a cloth etc. which is behind a wall but is conjoined with the eye, will be perceived.

Vācaspati Miśra then proceeds to explain the different types of \textit{sannikarṣa} involved in perception. He also provided us examples of these \textit{sannikarṣas}.

In the Gautama's definition of perception, the last three attributes viz., of \textit{avyapadeśyam} (which is not verbal), \textit{avyabhicāri} (which is not
contradicted) and \textit{vyavasāyātmakam} (which is definite) receive a lot of attention from the commentators. The term \textit{avyapadeśyam} means that knowledge which is unnameable.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the part of Gautama’s aphorism, viz., \textit{indriyasannikarṣotpannam jñānāṁ avyabhicāri} meaning the uncontradicted cognition produced by sense-object contact, is the definition of perception and the two words viz., \textit{avyapadeśyam} and \textit{vyavasāyātmakam} indicates two kinds of perception as \textit{nirvikalpaka} (indeterminate) and \textit{savikalpaka} (determinate)\textsuperscript{38}.

The term \textit{avyabhicāri} in the definition of perception means the uncontradicted knowledge produced by sense-object-contact. Vācaspati Miśra has given three alternative justification for the inclusion of the term \textit{avyabhicāri} in the Gautama’s \textit{sūtra}.

According to Vācaspati Miśra, the erroneous cognitions are excluded from the domain of perception on the basis of the general characteristics. However the term \textit{avyabhicāri} is mentioned to assign an authoritative sanction to it\textsuperscript{39}.

\textsuperscript{38} Contribution of Vācaspati Miśra to Indian Philosophy, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{siddhe satyārāmbho niyamārthaḥ}. NVTT., on NS., 1.1.4.
Moreover, it is essential for other means of knowledge like *anumāna* etc. also that they should be non-erroneous. Perception being the basis of other forms of knowledge, the term *avyabhicāri* is included to establish the fact that perception by nature must be non-erroneous\(^\text{40}\). Vācaspati Miśra further opines that the qualification *avyabhicāri* is necessary in the case of perception because the non-erroneous nature of perception to be the cause of non-erroneousness of other forms of knowledge\(^\text{41}\).

The justification of the insertion of the term *vyavasāyātmaka* in the definition of perception as given by Vātsyāyana and Vācaspati Miśra is not at all tenable. Vātsyāyana opines that this term is inserted in order to exclude doubtful cognition from the purview of perception. The doubtful cognition though produced from the sense-objects-contact cannot be called perception as it is not certain (*vyavasāyātmaka*). To Vācaspati Miśra doubtful cognition has already been excluded from perception with the insertion of the term *avyabhicāri* and hence the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is inserted in the definition to include determinate perception (*savikalpajñāna*) under the definition of perception. Here it can be said that the term *vyavasāyātmaka* is not used to exclude doubtful knowledge, because in the earlier *sūtra*

\(^{40}\) pratyakṣasya rūpamāpayi tum avyabhicāripadopādanam. Ibid.

\(^{41}\) atha vā pratyakṣāvyabhicāra evānumānādyavyabhicāre kāraṇam. Ibid.
it is said that perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony are the sources of valid cognition. In the sūtra perception is already taken as a valid cognition and hence in the definition an object is rightly known through the contact of the sense-organ with an object. There is no question of having deviated cognition (vyabhicāri of an object and hence the term avyabhicāri is not at all useful in the definition. That which is expressed with the help of language is called vyavasāyātmaka (determinate cognition). As it is a form of valid cognition, it is always valid and hence determinate. The validity of a piece of cognition is determined by verification which is possible in the case of determinate perception only. The indeterminate perception is not verifiable as it is formless and not expressed in language. So the question of validity cannot be determined. So the term vyavasāyātmaka should not be included in the definition on account of the fact that it is already taken as a form of pramā. Hence the use of the term vyavasāyātmaka is superfluous and redundant.

Perception According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa:

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa the author of Nyāyamañjarī interprets Gautama’s definition of perception. According to the Naiyāyikas the sense-object-contact has been regarded as the cause of perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

42. NS., 1.1.3.
strongly supports this view and like other logicians, also discusses the nature of perception and the sense-organs in respect of their object. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s account is generally the same as given by other old Naiyāyikas. Like Uddyotakara, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also holds that perception is that cognition which is brought about by the sense-object-contact. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa enumerates the sense-organs as those of smell, taste, sight, touch and hearing. He enlists objects as odour, flavour etc., and states that the way in which the sense organs come in contact with their objects is six-fold. The existence of the sense-object-contact is proved by the fact that the sense-organs cannot grasp the veiled objects. This contact is not simply one of the conditions. It is rather essential that the sense-organs, being the instrumental cause of the act of perception, are united with the other conditions existent in the process of an act of perception. The contact of the sense-organs of taste and touch with their objects is seen undoubtedly. As the rest of the sense-organs share some characteristics with the above two, it is obvious that they also come in contact with the objects and produce the act of perception. Though this fact is directly suggested to our mind, it has been clearly mentioned in the sūtra to spell out the six-fold division of the contact. The word utpanna in the sūtra just suggests that both the sense-organs and the

\[\text{sannikarṣastu indriyāṇāmārghaiḥ saha satprakāraḥ. NM., I-68.}\]
objects condition the perception of an object. The object is that which is perceived. That the object is causally connected with the act of perception, is proved by the fact that only the object in question is cognized. There are other instances which show that an accusative determines an act. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa concludes that the term *utpanna* suggests that the sense-organs determine perception as its condition so that the object which is perceived also conditions its perception. It is not proper to conclude that the adjective clause ‘which arises from the sense-object-contact’ excludes the inner perception of pleasure, etc., from the domain of perception. It is rather included in it and is grasped by the inner sense organ. It is, however, not enumerated in the list of sense-organs because it is not elemental like the external sense-organs.

The perception of an object, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, may be produced by four or three or two phases of contact as the case may be. When we perceive the colour of an external object four phases of contact are required to produce its perception. Here the individual soul is conjoins to the internal organ which in its turn comes into contact with the external sense-organ which again is united with the coloured substance in which colour (the object in question) inheres. The inner

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44. *utpannagrahaṇatvena indriyārthaivaurjñānajanakatvāṁ*. Ibid., I-69.
45. *bhoutikagṛgāṇādindriyadharmavālakṣaṇavyāttu manasastadbargē parigāṇanaṁ na kṛtāṁ*. Ibid.
perception of internal phenomena such as pleasure, etc., requires two contacts to be produced. External organs such as eyes, etc., have no part to play in that. The transcendental perception of the soul by a sage is produced by a single contact only since in that stage a third object, viz., a subject or an object, does not exist besides the soul and the internal organ\textsuperscript{46}.

The adjective clause 'arising from the 'sense-object-contact' thus, concludes Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, has rightly been used, since the inner perception of pleasure, etc., is included in the class of perception. The \textit{sūtra} on perception does not include the contact of the soul with the internal organ in the list of casual factors of perception though it is one of its conditions, because such a contact is the common factor of all forms of consciousness and not a special condition of perception only\textsuperscript{47}.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the term \textit{avyapadesya} Gautama wants to indicate that there is at least the existence of a state which is not endowed with a word, its denotation and there relation. Though the judgments like 'this is a cow 'are verbalised knowledge, there is the initial sense-perception which is capable of being defined and this has

\textsuperscript{46} ITK., p. 72.
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., p. 73.
become possible through insertion of the adjunct *avyapadesya*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa concludes that the author of *Nyāyasūtra* includes both determinate and indeterminate perception within sense-perception and by the term *avyapadesya* he refers to indeterminate perception.

Like other old Naiyāyikas Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also holds that the term *avyabhicāri* means non-errorneous.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa interprets the term *vyavasāyātmaka* on the same line on which Vātsyāyana does. There is, however, difference in the examples which they supply to illustrate their standpoints. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa states that the epithet *vyavasāyātmaka* has been incorporated in the *sūtra* to exclude doubt from the range of perception. It is wrong to maintain that the characteristic sense-object contact is enough to achieve this purpose since doubt is grasped by the mind which is not an external sense-organ. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that a doubt expressed in the form ‘it is either a pole or a man’ is produced by the external sense-organs. Doubts such as two astrologers’ conflicting predictions are, however, subjective since the inner sense organ is their sole cause.


Some logicians maintain that 'doubt' is an 'error' and the epithet 'non-erroneous' excludes 'doubt' from the domain of perception and, thus, the term vyavasāyātmaka is superfluous. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa objects to this view stating that 'doubt' is different from 'error' since their causes are different. There is a certainty of opposite truth in an 'error' but in 'doubt' our mind oscillates between two contradictory predictions and fails to arrive at a decision. Error is conditioned by the remembrance of an attribute which does not belong to the object in front of us. A man recollects waterness at the contact of the rays of the sun with his eyes and thus has illusory experience. Doubt, on the other hand, is conditioned by the recollection of the two specific features, for example, 'this is a pole or a man' is preceded by the recollection of 'pole-ness' and 'man-ness'. Thus doubt is a class in itself and the epithet vyavasāyātmaka is necessary to exclude it from sense-perception.

Some of the logicians hold that the epithet avyapadesya is competent enough to exclude doubt and error from the range of true sense-perception since it is impossible to hold that doubt and error are indeterminate. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa does not share this view and points out that as a piece of determinate perception is not associated with the words denoting its object, error and doubt owe their existence to the function
of their sense-organs but are not verbalized\(^5\). Therefore Jayanta Bhaṭṭa asserts that the epithet *vyavasāyātmaka* is not superfluous.

**The Navya-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception:**

**Perception According to Gaṅgeśa:**

Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya-Nyāya school, states that perception is direct or immediate knowledge\(^5\). This is the characteristic of perception. It may be produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. Or, it may be produced directly by the contact of the mind with the objects owing to certain occult powers of the mind. So it is proper to define perception as direct immediate knowledge not derived through medium of some other knowledge.

Gaṅgeśa opposes old Naiyāyikas’ theory of perception on several grounds. First, it is objected by him that the definition is too wide, since it applies to inference and memory as forms of knowledge in which there is sense-object contact. The mind as an internal sense is operative and related to the object known through memory or inference. Secondly, the definition is too narrow in another sense. It precludes the possibility of God’s omniscience which is a direct perception of all truth and

\(^5\) samyak pratyayavattasmād vācakolakkhaṇavijñātu//
\akṣavyāpārajanmānau svalḥsārḥāvāparyayu// NM., I-35.
\(^5\) pratyakṣā sākṣātākṣāritvāḥ lakṣaṇāṁ. TC. Ibid.
reality. If there can be no perception without sense-object contact, we can hardly speak of the divine perception, since it is not a sensuous cognition in any sense. Further, we do not find that sense-contact, in one or other form, is common to all perceptions. Again, to define perception by sense-stimulation is to explain the obscurum perobscurius. In view of such defects in the old definition, the Navya-Naiyāyikas propose to define perception as immediate knowledge. It is the character of immediacy (sākṣātkāritvam) that is common to all perception. The visual, auditory and other kinds of perception are alike connected with the feeling that something is immediately known by the subject or the knower. Another definition of perception, given by the Navya-Nyāya, is that it is knowledge which is not brought about by the Navya-Nyāya, is that it is knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any antecedent knowledge. This definition applies to all cases of perception, human or divine. Hence, Gaṅgeśa holds that this is the characteristic of perception. It may be produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with their proper objects. Or, it may be produced directly by the contact of the mind with the objects owing to certain occult powers of the mind. So it is proper to define perception as direct

52. TC., pp.539-43.
53. jñāñākaraṇakaṁ jñānamiti tu vayaṁ. TC., p.552.
immediate knowledge not derived through medium of some other knowledge. For example, when a visual perception takes place, there arises a corresponding knowledge of the form ‘I apprehend direct’.

**Perception According to Viśvanātha:**

Viśvanātha a Navya-Naiyāyika defines perception as the cognition which is not produced through the instrumentality of another cognition. It is direct or immediate knowledge. Viśvanātha holds that as perception does not depend on other knowledge, so it is called *jñānākaraṇakajñāna*. This new definition has been introduced by the New-logicians so that God’s perception may come under the purview of perception. It is to be mentioned that like Gaṅgeśa, Viśvanātha’s definition applies to both human perception and divine perception. It excludes inferential knowledge, analogical knowledge, memory and verbal knowledge, because inferential knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of universal concomitance, analogical knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the

54. ‘Īśvara-pratyakṣaṇtu na lakṣyaṁ’, indriyāthahasannikṣotpannāṁ jñānāmavyapadeśyamavyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣamiti sūtre-tathaivoktavat. SM. on v. 52.
55. athavā jñānākaraṇaṁ jñānāṁ pratyakṣāṁ, anumitaṁ vyāptijñānasya, upamitau śādṛśyajñānasya śābdavodhe pada jñānasya, smṛtāvanubhavasya karoṇāvattatvā tatra nātivyāptih idam laksanamīśvara-pratyakṣasādhāraṇaṁ. SM. on v.51.
knowledge of similarity, verbal knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of the knowledge of words, and memory is produced through the instrumentality of previous apprehension (anubhava)\textsuperscript{56}.

Here a question may arise regarding insertion of the terms ‘sense-organ (indriya), ‘object (artha)’ and ‘contact (sannikarṣa)’. The Sanskrit term indriya does not stand for sense-organ in the physiological sense. According to Viśvanātha the conjunction of indriya with manas which is a quality inheres in the sense-organ as well as in the manas or mind. So indriya is the seat (āśraya) of that conjunction which is one condition of perception. Again it is not the substratum (anāśraya) of manifest specific quality other than sound. The first part of the definition (i.e. not being the locus of the manifest specific quality other than sound—śabdetarodbhūta višeṣaguṇānāśrayatve sati) has been given so that self or ātman does not come under sense-organ. Though self is the locus of the contact of the mind, the cause of knowledge, it is the locus (but not the non-locus) of the manifest specific quality other than sound. So the definition of sense-organ does not unduly extend to self. The definition of sense-organ cannot be applied to the ear as it is the locus of sound, which is the manifest specific quality. So, the adjunct ‘other than sound’ (śabdetara) has been inserted in the definition. As the specific

\textsuperscript{56} SM., pp.237-240.
qualities like colour etc. exist in eye etc, the definition of sense-organ cannot be applied to them and hence the adjunct ‘manifest’ (*udbhūta*) has been inserted in the definition. As the colour etc. are not manifest specific qualities, they cannot be taken into consideration\(^{57}\).

There are five external sense-organs and one internal sense-organ. The perceptions caused by external sense-organs are known as olfactory (*ghraṇaja*), the gustatory (*rāsana*), the visual (*cāksuṣa*), the cutaneous (*spārśana*) and the auditory (*śrautra*) organs. Perception caused by internal sense-organ is known as *manasa*\(^{58}\). Each and every sense-organ has a particular object of its own i.e. different sense-organs have different objects e.g. the function of olfactory sense-organ is to receive smell which is the object of this sense-organ etc\(^ {59} \).

**Perception According to Bhāsarvajñā:**

According to Bhāsarvajñā perception is the means of direct immediate (*aparokṣa*) experience\(^ {60} \). It is of two kinds: *yogic* perception and non-*yogic* perception.

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\(^{57}\) अत्मादिवाराणया सत्यांतान, उद्भूतविशेषागुप्याया श्रोते सत्त्वत शब्दतेतरी, विशेषागुप्याया रूपादेशकाशुरदावपि सत्त्वत-उद्भूतेति. SM. on v. 58.

\(^{58}\) ग्ह्राणाजाः रासार्थि काक्षार्थि स्पार्शार्थि श्राउतार्थि मानसार्थि शाद्विद्धार्थि प्रत्यक्षार्थि. SM. on v. 52.

\(^{59}\) ग्ह्राणस्या गोचारो गण्धो. BP., v. 53.

\(^{60}\) तत्र साम्याग्परोक्षानुब्धावसद्धार्थि प्रत्यक्षार्थि. Nsār., p.7.
According to Bhāsarvajñā yogic perception is direct and immediate apprehension of distant, past, future, and subtle object\textsuperscript{61}. Yogic perception grasps objects which are far away spatially or temporally. It is of two kinds: yuktāvasthā i.e. in a disciplined state, and ayuktāvasthā i.e. not in a disciplined state. In the former kind of yogic perception one grasps all objects collectively without remainder through one’s merit together with contact between the self and the inner cause (antaḥkaraṇa). In the latter the usual sort of sense object and other contacts have to take place, either fourfold, threefold, etc. as required, whereas in the disciplined state kind only a twofold contact is needed. So-called ārṣa knowledge is included under yogic perception, since it is produced by exceptional merit of the sages.

Again, perception is of two sorts: propositional and nonpropositional. Propositional perception is demarcated through its having arisen from its description through relation with names, etc. e.g., ‘this Devadatta has a stick’. Nonpropositional perception involves the appearance of the mere nature (svarūpa) of a thing, e.g., the judgment produced by the first contact with the eye, or yogic perception of the disciplined-state variety. According to Bhāsarvajñā non-yogic perception is direct and immediate apprehension of gross objects,

\textsuperscript{61} tatra yogipratyaksam prakaśadeśakāladharmādyanu-grahādindriyārthasambandha viśeṣaṇa sthūlārtha grāhakam. Ibid.
produced by a particular relation between sense-organs and their objects with the help of light, time (now), space (here), merit or demerit of the person.

**Perception According to Śivāditya:**

Śivāditya a Navya-Naiyāyika also hold that perception is direct or immediate knowledge\(^{62}\). Right knowledge by means of perception is the cognition of truth produced by an instrumental cause which is not itself cognizable. Perceptive knowledge has for its cause the sense-organs and their contact with objects. Sense-organ is that which is the special cause of direct perception and which is itself supersensuous. *Atindriyam* i.e. special instrument of direct perception' is meant to exclude inference which though an instrument of knowledge is not direct perception. ‘*Mānasā*’ or contemplation also leads to direct perception but it is not ‘*atindriya*’ (supersensuous)\(^{63}\). The definition also excludes God who is both an instrument of direct perception supersensuous but is not ‘*indriya*’.

**Perception According to Varadarāja:**

Varadarāja the author of *Tārīkaraṅkṣā* holds that perception is immediate valid knowledge\(^{64}\).

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62. ajñāyamānakaraṇajanyastattvānubhavaḥ pratyakṣapramā. p. 67
63. sākṣātkāra jñānakaraṇam indriyam. Ibid., p. 62.
64. aprakṣapramāvyaptam pratyakṣam. TR., p.57.
Perception According to Kesava Miśra:

According to Keśava Miśra the instrument which gives rays to direct valid cognition is called perception. In this definition only the specific condition of perception has been stated. Keśava Miśra’s definition indicated that instrument of knowledge is sometimes a sense-organ, sometimes the contact between sense organ and object, and sometimes it is a judgment. It is the sense-organ when the result is a nonpropositional judgment. In such cases the sense-object-contact is the intervening operation (avāntararvyāpāra). But when the result is a propositional judgment, the instrument is the sense-object-contact. Finally, when the results are taken to be the reactions of attraction or repulsion to the object, the instrument is the nonpropositional judgment, and the propositional judgment is the intervening operation.

Perception According to Annam Bhaṭṭa:

According to Annam Bhaṭṭa perception is the peculiar cause of perceptive knowledge. It is the perceptive knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with the object. Regarding the

65. sākṣātkāri pramākaraṇam pratyakṣam. TB., p.36.
66. indriyārthasannikarṣajanyāṁ jñānaṁ pratyakṣam. TS., p.15.
   indriyam cākṣurādikāṁ, artho gatādiḥ, tayoḥ sannikarṣaḥ sarṣyogādiḥ
tatjanyāṁ jñānamityarthaḥ. TD. on TS., p. 30.
   pramābhūteṣu pratyakṣātmakāṁ yatjñānaṁ cākṣuṣādiprtyakṣaṁ tatprati
   karaṇāṁ vyāpārabadsādhiṣāyaṁindriyāṁ bhabati, athaḥ
   pratyakṣajñānakaraṇatvaṁ pratyakṣāsyā lakṣaṇam. NBo. on TS., p.30.
definition of perception given by Annam Bhaṭṭa, the term *indriya* is that which, not being the seat (*anāśraya*) of a manifest (*udbhūta*) specific quality (*vīśeṣaguna*) other than sound is the seat of that conjunction with *manas* (*manahsamyoga*) which is the condition of cognition (*jñānakaraṇa*)\(^{67}\). Annam Bhaṭṭa uses the word *pratyakṣa* for both the proof and the resulting knowledge\(^{68}\). The proof is defined as *sākṣātkārajñānakaraṇaṃ*. Others again define *pratyakṣa* as *pratyakṣapramākaraṇaṃ*\(^{69}\) or *sākṣātkāripramākaraṇaṃ*\(^{70}\); but Annam Bhaṭṭa seems to have deliberately used *jñāna* in order to include both right and wrong apprehensions. It is to be mentioned that Annam Bhaṭṭa’s definition, is liable to the serious objection of being applicable to all kinds of knowledge, since all cognitions are products of mind which is an *indriya*.

**Division of Perception:**

**Laukika and Alaukika Pratyakṣa:**

Perception has been divided by the Naiyāyikas into two broad classes: *laukika* or ordinary and *alaukika* or extra-ordinary\(^{71}\). It is also known as normal and super normal perception. According to Naiyāyikas

\(^{67}\) sabdetarodabhūtavīśeṣagūṇānāśrayatve sati jñānakaraṇamanaḥsaṁ-yogāśrayatvaṁ indriyatvarāṁ. Ibid.

\(^{68}\) pratyakṣa pramākaraṇaṁ or sākṣātkāripramākaraṇaṁ. TK., p.820.

\(^{69}\) TK., p.8.

\(^{70}\) TB., p.27.

\(^{71}\) BP., p.52.
ordinary perception is due to the ordinary intercourse of the sense organs with their objects (laukika sannikarṣa). There are two kinds of ordinary perception external and internal perception. In Nyāya there are five external sense-organs and one internal sense-organ which is already mentioned. Each and every sense-organ has a particular object of its own i.e. different sense-organs have different objects i.e. the function of olfactory sense-organ is to receive smell which is the object of this sense-organ etc.

The external sense-organs are composed of material elements. The visual organs is composed of fire (tejas). Therefore it is the organ of the perception of colour, the specific quality of fire. The auditory organ is composed of ether (ākāśa). Therefore it is the organ of the perception of sound, the specific quality of ether. The tactual organ is composed of air. Therefore it is organ of the perception of touch, the specific quality of air. The gustatory organ is composed of water. Therefore it is the organ of the perception of taste, the specific quality of water. The olfactory organ is composed of earth. Therefore it is the organ of the perception of smell, the specific quality of earth. The external sense-organs are physical in nature and are composed of those material elements whose specific qualities are perceived through them. The mind (manas) is the internal organ. It is not physical in nature. It is not
composed of physical elements. It is the organ of the perception of the qualities of the self. External objects are perceived through the external senses. The qualities of the soul are perceived through the internal organ. The mind supervises the functions of the external senses. It is the central coordinating organ in all kinds of external perception.

*Laukika pratyakṣa* again is divided into two kinds viz., *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate perception and *savikalpaka* or determinate perception. Various definitions of indeterminate and determinate perception given by the Naiyāyikas are follows:

**Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa:**

Both the Prācina-Naiyāyika and the Navya-Naiyāyika have accepted the existence of the *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. According to some thinkers indeterminate is not at all a case of perception and hence all perceptions are determinate. But, according to the Naiyāyikas, *nirvikalpaka* is as much a case of perception as *savikalpaka*. Literally *nirvikalpaka* means that in which there is no vikalpa and *savikalpaka* means that in which there is a vikalpa. The term vikalpa means name, universal, a quality or a relation of ‘characteriser-characterised’ (*viśeṇa-vaśeṣya-bhāva*). So, *nirvikalpaka*
perception is a perception which is not endowed with name, universal, 
quality or relation of characteriser-characterised.

Gautama in his Nyāyasūtra has not divided perception into nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka pratyakṣa. He describes the term avyapadesya which means not associated with a name. However the ancient Naiyāyikas call it nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. Gautama discusses the term vyavasāyātmaka as determinate perception. The ancient Naiyāyikas call it savikalpaka pratyakṣa.

Vātsyāyana in his Nyāyabhāṣya recognizes a nameless perception which may be called nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. An object may be perceived even without an apprehension of its name. When an object is perceived along with its name and their relation to each other, it is said to be apprehended by determinate perception. Determinate perception has the same object as indeterminate perception, but it differs from the latter in apprehending an additional factor, viz., the name of its object revived in memory by association. The indeterminate perception is mixed up with the verbal image of the name of its object, while the determinate perception is free from verbal images\textsuperscript{72}. It is to be pointed out that in Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara’s definition of perception,

\textsuperscript{72} NBh., 1.1.4.
determinate perception is not included. They have discussed indeterminate perception only.

According to Vācaspati Miśra both the universal and the particulars constituting an object are cognized in indeterminate perception, they are not brought under the substantive-adjective relation (viśeṣyanviśeṣanasambandhānaṇavagāhi)\(^{73}\). Determinate perception is the definite cognition of an object qualified by its generic character, specific character and other properties. It is the function of manas or the central sensory.

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the object of indeterminate perception is essentially the same as that of determinate perception. But only difference between them lies in the fact that the indeterminate is devoid of all reference to a name\(^ {74}\) and hence free from verbal images, while the determinate apprehends the name of its object and is thus mixed up with verbal images. Both types of perception apprehend generality, substantiality, quality and action. But, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa the indeterminate perception is nameless, dumb and inarticulate, while the determinate is vocal and articulate. Thus determine

\(^{73}\) avyapadeśya jātyādisvarūpāvagāhi na tu jātyādīnāṁ mitho viśeṣanaviśeṣya-abhāvavagāḥiṁ yāvat. NVTT., on NS.,1.1.4.

\(^{74}\) śabdolkekhaṇivāraṇa. NM., p.99.
perception differs from indeterminate perception only in apprehending the name of its object\textsuperscript{75}.

In the Navya-Nyāya school Gaṅgeśa defines indeterminate perception as the non relational apprehension of an object free from all associations of name, genus, and the like. It is the knowledge of an object as not characterised in anyway\textsuperscript{76}. Determinate perception as an object is known as related to certain qualities\textsuperscript{77}. Viśvanātha elaborates the view of Gaṅgeśa. Viśvanātha defines indeterminate perception as the apprehension of an object and its generic character as unrelated to each other immediately after the intercourse of a sense-organ with the object. For instance, immediately after the contact of a jar with the visual organ we cannot perceive it as belonging to the class of jars; we perceive the mere jar (\textit{ghaṭa}) and mere jar-ness (genus for jar, \textit{ghaṭatva}) without their mutual connection\textsuperscript{78}. It is only by determinate perception that we can apprehended the relation between an object and its generic character, and perceive it as belonging to a particular class.

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} nāmājātyādiyojanārahitāṁ vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi niṣprakārakāṁ nirvikalpākām.TC., p.809.
\textsuperscript{77} viśiṣṭavaṁśiṣṭyavajñānānīṁ prāti hi viśeṣaṇatāvacchedakapraṇakārakāṁ jñānāṁ kāraṇām. Ibid. p.812.
\textsuperscript{78} prathamatah ghaṭaghaṭatvavaiśiṣṭyānavagāhi jñānāṁ jāyate, tadeva nirvikalpaṁ. SM.,p. 58.
According to Viśvanātha, indeterminate perception is not an object of perception. It is a non-relational mode of consciousness. It apprehends an object and its generic character, but not the relation between them. It does not apprehended any subject-predicate relation. And since it is purely non-relational in character, it cannot be appropriated by the self. A cognition can be appropriate by the self only when it apprehend a property (ghaṭatva) as qualifying an object (ghaṭa).

For instance, when the self has the determinate perception of a jar as qualified by its generic character, it can appropriate it and distinctly apprehended it as its own experience. Here the cognition of the jar qualifies the self-appropriated cognition (anuvyavasāya). The jar qualifies the cognition of the jar. And the generic character of the jar (ghaṭatva) qualifies the jar. All these qualifications qualify the self-appropriated determinate perception of the jar. But in indeterminate perception there is no apprehension of any qualification (viśeṣana) as qualifying an object (viśeṣya). Though the person apprehends an object and its generic character, it does not apprehend the relation between them. It cannot apprehend the object as qualified by its generic character. So in indeterminate perception of a jar its generic character is not the qualification (prakāra) of consciousness; and unless there is a qualification of consciousness, it cannot be appropriated by the self and
be an object of distinct apprehension. Indeterminate perception is not an
object of perception. It is supersensuous and imperceptible\textsuperscript{79}.

According to Keśava Miśra indeterminate perception is the
apprehension of the mere existence of the object devoid of all its
qualifications such as name, class, and the like. It is followed by
determinate perception. It is the apprehension of the object as qualified
by name, class, and other qualifications. It apprehends the relation
between the qualified object and the qualifications. It connects them
together by the subject predicate relation\textsuperscript{80}. Indeterminate perception is
vague and abstract. According to Keśava Miśra determinate perception
is definite and concrete. The indeterminate is the apprehension of an
object as something. The determinate is the apprehension of an object as
having a certain name, as belonging to a certain class, or as having a
certain quality\textsuperscript{81}. Keśava Miśra asserts that the 'universal' is as real as
the unique particular and so savikalpaka is as good a type of perception
as nirvikalpaka. The novelty of his approach lies in the fact that he
makes it clear that whereas sense is the operative (karana) cause of

\textsuperscript{79} SM., p. 58.
\textsuperscript{80} nirvikalpakaṁ nāmājātyādiyojanāhīnaṁ kiśecid idamit i jñānaṁ
jayate. TB., p. 36.
\textsuperscript{81} savikalpakaṁ nāmājātyādiyojanātmakam. Ibid., p. 37.
indeterminate perception, sense-object contact is the cause of determinate perception.

According to Keśava Miśra there are three factors in the production of an effect. There is an instrument (*karana*); there is an operation of the instrument (*vyāpāra*); and there is a result of the instrument (*phala*). When a tree is cut by an axe, the axe is the instrument of cutting, the conjunction of the axe, with the tree is the operation of the axe, and the cutting of the tree is the result. So in every act of perception there are three factors. When we have indeterminate perception just after sense-object-contact, the sense-organ is the instrument (*karana*) of indeterminate perception, the sense-object-contact is the operation (*vyāpāra*) or intermediate agency, and indeterminate perception is the result (*phala*) of the operation. When we have determinate perception after indeterminate perception, the-sense-object-intercourse is the instrument (*karana*), indeterminate perception is the intermediate agency (*vyāpāra*), and determinate perception is the result (*phala*). When after determinate perception we perceive that the object ought to be accepted, or rejected, or neither accepted nor rejected, indeterminate perception is the instrument (*karana*), determinate perception is the intermediate agency (*vyāpāra*), and the apprehension
of acceptability, rejectability, or neutrality of the object is the result (phala)\textsuperscript{82}.

According to Annam Bhaṭṭa nirvikalpaka \textit{pratyakṣa} means \textit{nisprakāraka} which means that which has no \textit{prakāra} or qualifier. \textit{Prakāra} denotes ‘something having some character’ (i.e. \textit{viśeṣa}). A \textit{nirvikalpaka} cognition is thus a cognition whose object is not given as having some character. That is to say, an indeterminate or \textit{nirvikalpaka} perception is a cognition which does not apprehend the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand\textsuperscript{83}. But in the case of determinate perception there is the apprehension of the relation between the qualifier and the qualificand. When a jar is known, there is apprehension of qualifier. (i.e. jarness), qualificand (jar) and their relation (i.e. inherence)\textsuperscript{84}.

In the \textit{Nilakaṇṭhī} on \textit{Tarkasaṅgraha}, Nilakaṇṭha holds that indeterminate perception is the mere apprehension of an object (\textit{viśeṣya}), its qualifications (\textit{viśeṣa}), and the relation of inherence (\textit{samavāya}) without their mutual connection. It does not recognize its

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{82} TC., p.809.
  \item \textsuperscript{83} nisprakārakāṃ jñānaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ. TS.,p.53.
  \item viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasaribandhānavagāhi jñānaṁ. TSD.on TS., Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{84} saprakārakāṃ jñānaṁ savikalpakaṃ. TS.,p.53.
  \item viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyasaribandhānavagāhi jñānaṁ ityarthāḥ. TSD. on TS.,Ibid.
\end{itemize}
object as a qualified thing (*viṣeṣya*), its qualifications as qualifications (*viṣeṣaṇa*), and the relation of inherence as subsisting between the two. The mutual connection among these elements is apprehended by determinate perception. Thus unlike Viśvanātha and Annam Bhaṭṭa, Nīlakaṇṭha makes the relation of inherence also an object of indeterminate perception, though not the connection of this relation with the qualified object and the qualifications. But Nīlakaṇṭha agrees with Viśvanātha and Annam Bhaṭṭa in regard to indeterminate perception as an immediate sensory presentation of an object.

On the other words, Śivāditya holds in his *Saptapadārthī* that determinate and indeterminate cognitions are involved in both true and false knowledge. According to him indeterminate perception is the apprehension of the bare nature of an object (*vastusvarūpamātra*) and the determinate perception is the apprehension of an object as qualified by its properties (*viśiṣṭa*).

In *Nyāyasāra*, Bhāsarvajñā defines indeterminate perception as apprehension of the bare nature of an object immediately after

85. TSN., p.42.
86. savikalpanirvikalpakayorhtu pramāyaṁ apramāyaṁ ca antarbhābaḥ. SP., p.32.
87. Ibid. p. 68.
peripheral stimulation. Bhāsarvajña agrees with Praśastapāda and Śivāditya. He also maintained that yogi and ayogi are another kinds of perception. In Nyāyasārapadapāṇcikā on Nyāyasāra, Vāsudeva points out that immediately after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is no recollection of its relation to a name and other qualifications. So there is only an immediate apprehension of the mere existence of the object apart from its qualities. And this is called indeterminate perception.

In Nyāyatātparyādipikā, Jayasiṁhasūri points out that immediately after sense-object intercourse there is an immediate apprehension of the bare existence of an object, which is free from recollection and cognition of time and special properties. But, it may be argued, as soon as there is the sense-object-intercourse, determinate perception emerges into consciousness and we are not conscious of indeterminate perception arising before determinate perception, so there is no indeterminate perception. But Jayasiṁhasūri urges that we are not

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88. vastusvarūpamātrāvabhāsakaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ yathā prathamākṣasan - nipātājaṁ jñānaṁ. Nsār., p.4.
89. yogipratyakṣasyāsmadādipratyakṣadrṣṭantavalena vedyatvādādu tadeva laksayati. Ibid. p.7.
90. tatra ayogipratyakṣānirprakāśadesokālādḥarmādyanugrahādīṛthāsarraṁbandhaviśeṣena śthūlārthagrāhakaṁ. Ibid. p.7.
91. yuktāvasthāyaṁ ca samādhyavasthāyaṁ yogijjñānaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ. NSPP., on Nsār., p.14.
distinctly conscious of indeterminate perception arising before determinate perception in our adult experience because, owing to habit, as soon as indeterminate perception arises, determinate perception supervenes and shuts out the former of our view. This is the reason why, in our adult experience as soon as we perceive that an object exists we perceive what it is. But we are distinctly conscious of indeterminate perception in perceiving an entirely new object, where habit does not convert indeterminate perception into determinate perception at once\textsuperscript{92}.

In \textit{Tārkvikaraḵša}, Varadarāja defines indeterminate perception as an object in itself devoid of all qualifications such as name, class substance, quality, action and the like; and determinate perception apprehends an object as qualified by these qualifications\textsuperscript{93}.

\textit{Alaukika Pratyakṣa}:

The \textit{alaukika pratyakṣa} or supernormal perception or extra ordinary perception given by Naiyāyika is of three folds viz., \textit{sāmānyalakṣaṇa}, \textit{jñānalakṣaṇa}, and \textit{yogāja}\textsuperscript{94}.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{abhyāsadaśāyaṁ} savikalpasyaśūtpāditvānirvikalpānupalambhe'-pyanabhyaśādaśāyaṁ tasya sphuṭopalambḥat. NTD., p.86.
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{TR.}, p.60.
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{BP.}, p.63.
\end{flushleft}
Samanyalaksana Pratyakṣa:

Samanyalaksana pratyakṣa is the general comprehension of a class or the perception of class. In alaukika pratyakṣa the objects are not actually present to sense, but are conveyed to it through an extraordinary medium. In it there is a special kind of sense-object contact (alaukika sannikarṣa). According to Naiyāyika, sāmānyalaksana is the perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property (sāmānya) perceived in any individual member of that class. It is a type of perception depend on the presentative knowledge. It is a type of genuine perception. For example, when we perceive something as a pot we judge it as belonging to the class of pots. But to know that the thing belongs to the class of pots is also to know all other pots belonging to the same class. To say that ‘this is a pot’ is to know, by implication, what all other pots are. Hence in perceiving one thing as a pot we perceive all other pots. But the other pots are not present to sense in the same way in which one is present. Here the question arises as how can there be any perception of the other pots? If there is to be any perception of the other pots, they must be in some sort of contact (sannikarṣa) with our sense. According to the Naiyāyikas, when we perceive one pot we perceive the universal ‘potness’ as its defining property. It is this perception of the universal ‘potness’ in the present pot that serves the
purpose of contact (āsatti) between sense and all other pots. The knowledge of the universal (sāmānyajñāna) is here the medium of sense-object contact, by which we have a perception of all pots when one is perceived\(^{95}\). It may be objected here that sāmānyalakṣaṇa perception would make each of us omniscient. If all the objects of a class are known with the perception of any of them, we should know all knowable objects when we perceive anything of the world as belonging to the class of knowable. The Naiyāyikas reply that in sāmānyalakṣaṇa we perceive only one member of a class as an individual with its specific and generic properties, while the other members are known as possessing the generic property or the universal alone. Hence we cannot expect to have detailed knowledge of all things, which is implied by omniscience.

**Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa:**

The jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa or acquired perception of an object is in contact with sense through a previous knowledge of itself\(^{96}\). For example, when on seeing something one says: ‘I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood’, he has an immediate knowledge or perception of its fragrance. This cannot be explained without the help of jñānalakṣaṇa. It

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95. āsattirāśrayānāṁ tu sāmānya jñāṇamisyate. BP. v. 64.
96. viṣayī yasya tasyaiva vyāpāro jñānalakṣaṇaḥ. BP., v. 65.
is extraordinary perception, because in it the quality of the object is perceived by the sense-organ which is not competent to give us that knowledge. Hence our past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood does the work of contact between sense and object. Our past knowledge of fragrance brings about the present perception of it, although it is not actually smelt by us. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandalwood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell.

But Advaitins reject the Nyāya theory of jñānalaksana pratyakṣa, holding that the knowledge of fragrance in the distantly placed sandalwood is nothing but a case of inference. As regards the cases of illusion, the Advaitins hold that the theory of jñānalaksana pratyakṣa does not satisfactorily explain the immediacy of the illusory object.

**Yogaja Pratyakṣa :**

The third kind of ordinary perception is called yogaja pratyakṣa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Naiyāyika, describes yogic perception as the perception of subtle, hidden, remote, past, and future objects and
considers it to be the highest excellence of human perception. The minds of yogis can have the immediate knowledge of all knowable objects due to the repeated practice of meditation. Our minds rendered impure by the taints of love, hatred, etc. and cannot attain the highest status of supreme knowledge. But the minds of yogis who are free from all impurities can visualize all objects. Hence they acquire the power of perceiving all objects with their pure minds free of all taints by constant concentration. It may be contended that the yogis perceive all objects through one cognition or many cognitions, that they cannot perceive mutually contradictory objects through one cognition, that they cannot perceive all objects simultaneously through the atomic manas, and that they cannot exhaustively perceive an infinite number of objects in the universe successively even through unending epochs. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejoins that the yogis perceive all objects in all places through a single cognition simultaneously. Mutually contradictory objects (e.g., blue, yellow etc.) are perceived by a variegated cognition (citrapratyaya). It may be contended that if the yogic perception cognizes all past, future and remote objects by a single cognition, then it does not differ from

97. darśanasya paro’ tiśayaḥ śukṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭabhūta- bhaviṣyadādīviṣayatvam. NM.,p.103.
98. NM.,p.106.
divine perception. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa replies that divine perception is eternal whereas human yogic perception is noneternal and due to the practice of yoga and meditation\textsuperscript{100}. It may be contended that there is no scope for meditation in respect of unperceived objects and moral laws (dharma) which are ascertained by the study of the Vedas, and that, consequently, yogic perception cannot cognize them. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa rejoins that the yogis first acquire the knowledge of moral laws from the Vedas, meditate on them repeatedly, and then acquire the yogic perception of them without the help of the Vedas, but that God’s knowledge of moral law is natural and not acquired and that He is the creator of the Vedas and the promulgator of moral laws\textsuperscript{101}. Yogic perception is valid because it cognizes the real nature of objects.

The yogaja pratyakṣa or intuitive belongs exclusively to yogins who, by means of their super-human powers can perceive objects which are imperceptible to others\textsuperscript{102}. Yogaja pratyakṣa is the intercourse brought about by meditation (yogaja sannikarṣa). A peculiar merit is produced in the self by intense meditation. By virtue of it the self can perceive past, future, remote, hidden, and subtle objects. Yogaja

\textsuperscript{100} asti viśeṣa īśvarasya tathāvidhāṁ nityaṁ eva jñānaṁ yogināṁ tu yogabhāvanābhāyaṁ aprabhāvam iti. Ibid., p.108.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{102} yogajadharma sannikarṣeṇa ca yogināṁ vastumātsya pratyakṣaṁ manasā janyate.TK., p.9.
perception is intuitive in nature. There are two kinds of yogic perception, viz., yukta and yunjana. The former is the intuitive perception of a yogin who has attained union with God. Such yogic intuition is constant and spontaneous. The latter is the intuitive perception of a yogin who is endeavoring to attain union with God. It requires the aid of concentration to perceive all objects. It is not effortless. It requires the effort of attention. 

The yogaja pratyakṣa has been accepted by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy whereas regarding the other two types of extraordinary perception there is divergence of views. Actually, kevalajñāna of Jainas, buddhi of the Buddhists, kaivalya of the Sāṁkhya and sākṣātkāra of the Vedāntins are more or less the other names of yogaja perception.

Recognition:

The Nyāya regards recognition as a kind of qualified perception in which the perception of an object is modified by the subconscious impression of a past perception of it. And as a kind of perception it is valid. It does not mistake one object for another owing to certain defects. It apprehends an object as it really is. It is not produced by the external sense-organs or the internal organ impaired by certain defects.

103. SM., pp. 274. 85.
So, it should be regarded as valid. Hence recognition is defined by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa as the perception of a present object qualified by the past time, due to the contact of a sense-organ with the present object, or as the perception of a present object, as modified by its past cognition. Just as the visual perception of a flower is modified by the previous olfactory perception of its fragrance, which is not perceived by the visual organ at the present, and thus brings about the indirect visual perception of a fragrant flower through the *manas*, so in recognition the perception of a present object is modified by a past cognition reproduced in imagination. Though pure perception is produced by the peripheral organs, and pure recollection is produced by subconscious impressions, yet recognition is produced by the co-operation of both, and the object of recognition is perceived through the *manas*, as qualified by the past cognition of the object\(^{104}\). Śivāditya also defines recognition as the apprehension of an object as qualified by the past time\(^{105}\). Viśvanātha refers to a doctrine which regards recollection as a cause of recognition, since a sub-conscious impression without being revived cannot bring about recognition, and it is better to hold that a recollection, rather than a revived impression, is the cause of recognition\(^ {106}\).

\(^{104}\) NM., p.461.

\(^{105}\) atītāvastāvacchinnāṁ vastugrahanāṁ pratyabhijñānam.SP., p.68.

\(^{106}\) SM., p.497.
Thus recognition is not a mixed mode of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not admit the simultaneity of two or more cognitions owing to the atomic nature of the manas. According to his view, recognition is a single presentative cognition or perception, but qualified by the pastime or by the past cognition of the object. Recognition, therefore, is a kind of qualified perception.

B. VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY OF PERCEPTION:

Kaṇāda was the founder of the Vaiśeṣika system. The term 'Vaiśeṣika' has been interpreted in two different ways. According to Chinese tradition, 'the origin of the name is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the Sāṅkhya'\textsuperscript{107}. The second interpretation of the term 'Vaiśeṣika' in that the Vaiśeṣika, the name of the school, is due to the atomic theory based mainly on the category of viṣeṣa (particularity) conceived first by Kaṇāda\textsuperscript{108}.

The second interpretation seems to be more accurate, because the system admitted in its metaphysical scheme an entity called viṣeṣa, literary meaning a 'particularizing', or 'individualizing' thing. Vaiśeṣika system is also known by the name of 'aulukya'-- derived from the

\textsuperscript{107} Vaiśeṣika Philosophy., p.4.
\textsuperscript{108} Indian Philosophy, Vol.II.p.176.
founder's name, i.e., 'Ulūka' (owl). This name was given to him as he behaved like an owl, as H.Ui the author of the 'Vaiśeṣika Philosophy' has remarked that 'in the day-time he mediated in a dense forest......and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food'.

Rājaśekhara, a Jaina commentator of the Nyāyakandli gives another reason. He points out that God Himself, being pleased with the penances of the founder, appeared before him in the form of an owl and taught him the six categories. Hence the system is called aulukyadarśana.

The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika are the allied systems (samānatantra). They both recognize the reality of God, the finite souls, physical things, atoms of earth, water, fire, and air, space, time, and ether. They both hold the same views of the nature of the finite soul and its bondage and liberation. They both insist on the plurality of the individual souls. The deistic conception of God is entertained by both the schools. They both advocate realism and pluralism and also admit the reality of the external world independent of the perceiving souls. They admit the plurality and distinctness of the finite souls and physical objects. Both materialism and idealism are rejected by the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

110. Sanskrit Introduction to Nyāyakandali, p.11.
But they differ from each other in three main points. First, the Nyāya specializes in epistemology and logic, while the Vaiśeṣika specializes in the philosophy of nature. Secondly, the Nyāya recognizes four means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*) viz., perception, inference, comparison, and testimony. But the Vaiśeṣika recognizes perception and inference only as *pramāṇas*. Thirdly, the Nyāya recognizes sixteen categories, while the Vaiśeṣika recognizes seven categories. The Nyāya categories are mainly based on topics of a treatise on logic. The Vaiśeṣika philosophy mainly discusses the objects of knowledge. The Nyāya categories are logical, whereas the Vaiśeṣika categories are metaphysical.

The first systematic exposition of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy is found in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda. *Rāvaṇabhāṣya* and *Bhāradvājavrṛtti* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* seem to be lost. Padmaṇābha refers to the former in *Kiraṇāvalībhāṣkara*. The latter is referred to as *vrṛtti* in some Vaiśeṣika works. Saṅkara Miśra wrote a commentary called *Upaskāra* on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. He wrote an independent treatise called *Kanādarahasya*. Jayanārāyaṇa wrote a commentary on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* entitled *Kanādasūtravrāvṛtti*. Praśastapāda wrote a running commentary on the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* called *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha*. It is regarded as an authoritative work on the Vaiśeṣika system. It is also
called *Prasastapādabhāṣya*. Some scholars are of opinion that it is a different work which is lost. Śrīdhara wrote an elaborate commentary on *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* called *Nyāyakandalī*. Udayana wrote a well-reasoned commentary on it called *Kiranāvalī*. Vyomaśivācārya wrote a commentary on *Kiranāvalī* called *Vyomavatī*, which is partly published. It is probably older than the two commentaries mentioned above or at least equally old. Padmanābha Miśra wrote a commentary on *Vyomavatī* called *Setu*. Jagaddiśa Tarkālaṅkāra wrote a commentary on *Setu* called *Sūkti*. Vardhamāna, Gaṅgeśa’s son, wrote a commentary on *Kiranāvalī* called *Kiranāvalīprakāśa*. Padmanābha Miśra wrote a gloss on *Kiranāvalīprakāśa* called *Kiranāvalīprakāśa*. Bhaṭṭa Vāḍindra wrote a commentary on *Guṇakiranāvalī* called *Rasasāra*. Bhagīratha Ṭhakkura wrote a commentary on Vardhamāna’s *Kiranāvalīprakāśa* called *Kiranāvalīprakāśavyākhyā*. Raghunātha Śiromaṇi wrote a commentary on it called *Kiranāvalīprakāśa-viṣṇu*. Mathurānātha Tarkavāgiśa wrote a commentary on *Kiranāvalīprakāśa-viṣṇu* called *Guṇakiranāvalīprakāśa-viṣṇu-tirahāsya*. Praśastapāda’s *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, Śrīdhara’s *Nyāyakandalī* and Udayana’s *Kiranāvalī* are the most important works on the Vaiśeṣika system.

The most important topic in the epistemology of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* is the cognition of substance, and it will appear that its treatment is marked by a high standard of philosophical analysis. It
forms the chief argument for maintaining the reality of substance as something independent of cognition. There are no signs, however, to show that the argument is meant to be a refutation of any particular school of subjective idealism.

In the Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Kaṇāda seems to postulate perception (pratyakṣa), the probans-regarding laiṅgika that is inference (anumāna), scriptural authority (āgama)\textsuperscript{111}, and possibly residue (pariśeṣa) as well\textsuperscript{112}. Kaṇāda also mentions sagic perception (ārṣa, siddhadarśana) separately\textsuperscript{113}. Praṣastapāda lists perception (pratyakṣa), the probans-regarding (laiṅgika), memory (smṛti), sagic perception (ārṣa) as four means of knowledge (vidyā)\textsuperscript{114}. According to him, scriptural authority etc. are subsumable under inference (anumāna)\textsuperscript{115}. Vyomaśīva believes in three sources of knowledge: perception, inference and authority\textsuperscript{116}.

Perception is either normal or supernormal. Normal perception is external (sensuous) or internal (mental). Supernormal perception is sagic (ārṣa)\textsuperscript{117}, yogic\textsuperscript{118} or intuitive (prātibha)\textsuperscript{119}.

\textsuperscript{111} perception, VS. 3.1.13., 9.13.17., 10.4.5., inference, 9.18., 10.4.19., scriptural authority, 1.1.3., 2.1.17-19., 3.2.8.
\textsuperscript{112} VS., 2.1.27.
\textsuperscript{113} VS., 9.28.
\textsuperscript{114} vidyā caturvidhā---pratyakṣa-laiṅgika-smṛtyārṣa-lakṣaṇā. PDS., p.552.
\textsuperscript{115} PDS., pp. 576-577.
\textsuperscript{116} Vv., pp. 538-587.
\textsuperscript{117} VS., 9.28.
\textsuperscript{118} VS., 9.13-17.
\textsuperscript{119} PDS., pp.621-622.
It is to be noted that in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* the term *pratyakṣa* is used for the sensory cognitions from the five sense-organs. But it is sometimes used for the visual sensation only, because the visual sensation is typical of the sensory cognitions. In this sense *pratyakṣa* is almost the same as *德拉, cākṣuṣa*, and *upalabdhi*. In the terminology of *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* the term *upalabdhi* is limited to visual cognition. But according to *Prāśastapāda-bhāṣya* of Praśastapāda it is not correct when it asserts that *buddhi, jñāna, pratyakṣa*, and *upalbdhi* are synonymous. Some holds that this perception involves three (principles): self (*pramātā*), knowledge (*pramitī*) and object (*pramāṇa*).

**Perception According to Praśastapāda:**

In the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* of Kanāda, the definition of perception is not given. But Praśastapāda, the great and popular commentator of *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* defines perception elaborately. According to Praśastapāda, perception as a knowledge is dependent on sense organs. Praśastapāda gives two alternative definitions of this perception. Firstly Praśastapāda defines perception as the cognition of the generic and the specific properties of the object of cognition, which enables to apprehend substances, qualities and actions. In the second

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120. *buddhirupalabdhir jñānaṁ ityanarthāntaram*. NS., 1.1.15.

121. *tatraksamakṣampratītyotpadyata iti pratyakṣaṁ*. PB., p.442.
definition, Prasastapāda includes soul (atman) and mind (manas) as factors in cognition, which were absent in the definition of pratyakṣa as given by Nyāyasūtra. Secondly perception arises as a result of the union of the soul. Prasastapāda holds that when there is union of the soul and the mind in connection with other substances, there is perception of those substances. When substances are perceived, there can be a perception of their attributes and actions too, and when there is a perception of the soul there can also be a perception of its attributes.

Perception according to Vaiśeṣika is external or internal. Praśastapāda agrees with this view. According to Praśastapāda external perception is of five kinds, viz, olfactory (ghṛṇāja), gustatory (rāsana) auditory (śrauta), visual (cākṣuṣa) and tactual (sparśa) perception. Internal perception is due to conjunction of the self with the internal organ (mānasa). Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and volition are apprehended by internal perception.

The older Vaiśeṣikas hold that external perception depends upon the following conditions: (i) the object of external perception must have extensity (mahattva) or appreciable magnitude. Atoms are imperceptible, because they have no appreciable magnitude. (ii) the object of external perception must consist of many substances. It must be a composite of many parts (anekadravyavat). A mote is perceptible
but an atom is not, because the former has magnitude while the latter has none. A mote has magnitude because it is composed of many parts. An atom has no magnitude because it does not consist of parts. Therefore, an object, in order to be perceived, must not be a simple, indivisible atom, but a composite substance in which a plurality of substances co-inhere. It must be composed of many parts and consequently it must have an appreciable magnitude. (iii) the object of perception must have colour (rūpa). The air is made up of many parts, and so it has an appreciable magnitude. But still it is not perceived through the visual organ because it is devoid of the impression of colour. The term 'impression of colour' (rūpasamāskāra) means inherence of colour (rūpasamavāya), or appreciability of colour (rūpodbhava), or non-obscuration of colour (rūpānabhibhava). The light of the eye has colour and magnitude. But it is not visible because there is not appreciable or manifested colour in it. The light of a meteor also has colour and magnitude. But it is not visible in midday because it is obscured by the stronger light of the sun.

The older Vaiṣeṣikas hold that manifest or appreciable colour (udbhūtarūpa) is a necessary condition of every kind of external

122. VS., and VSU. IV. 1.6.
123. VS., and VSU. IV. 1.7.
perception of a substance. But the later Vaiśeṣikas hold that manifest or appreciable colour is the necessary condition of visual perception only, and that manifest or appreciable touch (*udbhūtasparsa*) is the necessary condition of tactual perception, and so on. This is proved by the double method of agreement in presence and agreement in absence. In this context the question naturally arises as what is the general condition of all kinds of external perception? Either there is none, or it is the possession of a distinctive quality (*viśeṣaguna*) other than sound and those which exist in the self. Ether (*ākāśa*) cannot be an object of sense-perception, though it is endued with a distinctive quality, viz., sound. The self is not an object of external perception, though it is endued with the distinctive qualities of pleasure, pain, cognition, desire, aversion, and volition. So the possession of any other distinctive quality than sound and the qualities of the self may be regarded as the general condition of all kinds of external perception.

As regards the division of perception, the Vaiśeṣikas in determinate perception is neither valid nor invalid. Praśastapāda maintains, that just after the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ there is immediate apprehension of the mere form of the object (*svarūpamātra*). This is called indeterminate perception. It apprehends

124. SM., p.245.
an object with its generic and specific characters, but does not distinguish them from each other. It is the primal stage of perception. It is not the result of any other prior condition. It is not of the nature of resultant condition.

**Perception According to Śrīdhara:**

Śrīdhara the commentator of *Padārthadharmanasamgraha* agrees with Praśastapāda’s view of perception. According to him perception arises cognition (*buddhi*) with sense-organs. Perception is called *pratyakṣa*, because it arises in relation to this or that sense (*aksam aksam prati*). These *aksas* or sense-organs are six, viz., smell, taste, sight, touch, hearing, and the internal organ *manas*. Perception arises in respect of substance and the other categories. Substance being of two kinds, there is perception of substances which have non-atomic magnitude, provided that they possess parts, and show manifest colour, such perception arising from a contact involving four factors -provided that there is also present the totality of conditions constituted by ‘merit’ and so forth. The four factors are, viz., object, external organ, mind (*manas*) and soul. There are two moments of perception, viz., (i) intuition of *svaṛūpa* and (ii) perception of subjects as possessing

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qualifications. Perception is bare intuition of unrelated things. But from a contact of mind and soul which bears on the five qualifications (viśeṣaṇa), viz., genus, species, substance, quality, and movement, there arise perception in the forms.

Like Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara also clearly brings out the characteristics of indeterminate perception. According to Śrīdhara indeterminate perception is valid. When indeterminate perception is regarded as valid knowledge (pramaṇa), the intercourse between its object and a sense-organ is to be regarded as an instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), and when determinate perception is regarded as valid knowledge (pramāṇa), indeterminate cognition is to be regarded as an instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Śrīdhara holds that indeterminate perception is the immediate apprehension of the mere form of an object, which is a purely presentative process free from all determinations and representative elements. It apprehends both the generic character and the specific character of its object as an indistinguishable mass. It does not analyse its object into its component qualities, generic and specific, distinguish them from each other, and

127. yadā nirvikalpāṁ sāmānyya-viśeṣa- jñāṇaṁ phalaṁ
tadendriyārthasannikarṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ yadā viśeṣajñānaṁ phalaṁ tadā sāmānyya-viśeṣa-locanaṁ pramāṇam. NK., p.199.
128. svarūpasyālocanaṁātṛaṁ grahaṇaṁātraṁ vikalparahitaṁ pratyakṣaṁātramiti yāvat. Ibid., p.189.
combine them together by a synthetic act of apprehension. It apprehends its object with its generic and specific characters, but does not apprehend the generic character as generic and the specific character as specific, since it apprehends a single individual belonging to a class, and cannot therefore assimilate it to other like objects, and distinguish it from other unlike objects. Thus both generic and specific characters are apprehended by indeterminate perception, but they are not differentiated from each other and recognized as such. It is only at the stage of determinate perception that the generic and specific characters are distinguished from each other, and the object is recognized as belonging to a definite class\(^{129}\). If the generic and specific characters were not apprehended by indeterminate perception, they could not be distinguished from each other by determinate perception. Hence it cannot be denied that indeterminate perception apprehends both common and distinctive features of an object. But it cannot recognize them as such because it is a purely presentative process, and consequently cannot revive the subconscious impressions of other individuals perceived in the past. It cannot recognize the generic

\(^{129}\) savikalpakaṁ sāmānyaviṣeṣarūpaṁ pratyeti
piṇḍāntaramanusanandadhānaṁ-
yātmano'nuvṛttivyāvṛttī dharmou
pratipadyamānasyendriyadvāreṇa
tathā bhūtapratyupapatteḥ. Ibid., p.448.
character of its object as common to the whole class, and its distinctive characters as peculiar to it alone which distinguish it from all other objects of the same class\textsuperscript{130}. Hence, Śrīdhara’s view is similar to that of Prabhākara Miśra. Again Śrīdhara holds that indeterminate perception is an immediate cognition of the generic and specific character of its objects without a knowledge of the difference between them\textsuperscript{131}. It is to be noted that the modern Naiyāyikas like Śivāditya also agrees with Praśastapāda and Śrīdhara’s view on the nature of indeterminate and determinate perception.

Śaṅkara Miśra the author of Upaskāra on Vaiśeṣikasūtra, also agrees with Śrīdhara’s view of indeterminate and determinate perception. Śrīdhara holds that in the perception of substances, qualities, and actions there is a determinate consciousness of these individual objects as qualified by their generic characters. And this determinate apprehension presupposes an indeterminate apprehension of the individual objects which are qualified and the generic characters which qualify them. And this indeterminate apprehension is produced by the intercourse of the individual objects (viṣeṣa) and their generic characters.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., pp. 189-190.

\textsuperscript{131} nirvikalpena sāmānyaviṣeṣasvalakṣaṇānām na viṣeṣaṇaviṣeṣyabhābānugamaḥ, tashya bhedābagatipūrbakattvā nirvikalpena ca sāmānyādīnām parasparabhedānadhāyabāsāyāt. Ibid., p.447.
(sāmānyā) with the sense-organs. This is called indeterminate perception. It apprehends both common characters (sāmānyā) and individual characters (viśeṣa) of its object but not the relation between them. It is only at the stage of determinate perception that this relation is apprehended, and a particular substance, quality, or action is recognized as ‘this is a substance’, ‘this is a quality’, or ‘this is an action’132. Determinate perception is due to three causes, viz., indeterminate perception of the qualifying properties, intercourse of the qualified object with a sense-organ, and non-apprehension of the absence of connection between the qualified object and its qualifying properties133. Thus Sāmkara Miśra’s view is substantially the same as that of Śrīdhara.

Udayana the author of Kīraṇāvalī does not give proper definition of perception. According to Udayana in the case of direct or pure sense perception (āločana) the object may be grasped as such along with its universal property. But propositional (savikalpaka) perceptual judgment should be preceded by a cognition or conception of the qualifier. Nobody apprehends something to be a horned object without a prior cognition or conception of the horn. The Buddhists say that the

132. VSU., VIII. 1.6.
133. viśeṣaṇaṇaṇaviśeṣyendriyasannikarṣaṇadubhayāsamsargāgraḥasya kāraṇatvāvadhāraṇāt. VSU., VIII. 1.2.
construction (vikalpa) is not perception in the proper sense of the term. It is at the level of imagination comparable with the imagination of nonexistential pairs in the horizon by a person suffering from an eye disease. Udayana rejects this view on the ground that universal properties, substances, etc., are real entities, not fictions.

**Yogic Perception:**

The Vaiśeṣikas admit yogic perception. According to Vaiśeṣika the yogic perception is a perceptual cognition of the soul (atmapratyakṣa). They believe in the capacity of yogins to perceive things which are beyond the reach of ordinary people. Praśastapāda divides yogic perception into two kinds: ecstatic (yukta) perception and nonecstatic (viyukta) perception. He defines ecstatic perception as valid perception of the essential nature of their own selves, other selves, ether (ākāśa), space, time, atoms, air, and manas, and of the qualities, actions, generalities, particularities, and inherence inhering in them by the yogis in ecstasy through minds aided by merits born of meditation. The yogis perceive these objects through their internal organs (manas) strengthened and perfected by merits due to the practice of meditation, whereas we perceive the sensible objects present 'here and now' with our sense-organs. Hence the yogis are distinguished from common
people like us. Praśastapāda defines nonecstatic perception as valid perception of subtle, hidden, and remote objects through the fourfold contact of the sense-organs with these objects, contact of the sense-organs with manas, and contact of manas with self, by the yogis, who have fallen out of ecstasy, through the supernormal power born of a special merit due to meditation.

Udayana avers that ecstatic perception is mental perception, that the yogis in a state of trance perceive supersensible objects through the manas aided by a special merit born of meditation, and that they acquire trance or ecstasy by withdrawing the manas from the sense-organs and focusing it on the supersensible objects which are to be intuited. They constantly think of them uninterruptedly for a long time every day and acquire an intuition of them. Udayana also avers that nonecstatic perception is sensory perception of subtle, hidden and remote objects through the sense-organs whose powers are enhanced by a special merit born of meditation. A special merit (dharma) is generated by constant practice of concentration of mind and meditation. Different modes of mental concentration produce different kinds of supernatural powers.

The sense-organs are rendered more acute and powerful by them and

134. PB., pp.283-84.
operate on those objects which are not normally within their ken. In nonecstatic perception the impediments to the function of the sense-organs are removed and they are brought under control. The objects are perceived through the sensory contact\textsuperscript{136}.

Praśastapāda regards the indeterminate perception of the bare nature of substances, etc., as the means of valid knowledge (\textit{pramāna}), substances, etc., as objects (\textit{prameya}), the self as the knower (\textit{pramātr}), and the knowledge of substances, etc., as valid knowledge (\textit{pramiti}). Udayana describes right determinate cognition of objects as valid knowledge\textsuperscript{137}. Praśastapāda regards right, indeterminate, nameless knowledge due to the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, contact of \textit{manas} with the sense-organs, and contact of \textit{manas} with the self, as the means of valid perception (\textit{pramāna}), substances, etc., as objects (\textit{prameya}), self as the knower (\textit{pramātr}), and the knowledge of acceptability, avoidability, and neutrality as the result of valid perception (\textit{pramā})\textsuperscript{138}. Udayana does not regard it as valid because it is the result of concentration of mind and of the practice of meditation because constant thought of a beloved woman produces the false

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{136} Ki., pp. 284-85.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} pramitir dravyādi, viṣayaṁ jñānāṁ samyak niścayaḥ. Ibid. p. 287.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} PB., pp. 288-89.
\end{itemize}
hallucination of her, and because mere concentration and meditation unaided by merit born of yoga do not produce valid yogic perception\textsuperscript{139}.

**Sagic Perception :**

In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Kaṇḍāda considers the intuition of sages (ārṣajñāna) to be valid knowledge due to their special merit\textsuperscript{140}. Kaṇḍāda recognizes two kinds of valid knowledge; perception and inference, which are already mentioned. Kaṇḍāda includes ārṣajñāna in perception. Praśastapāda avers that the sages who are the authors of the scriptures have a valid intuition of all objects--- past, present and future--and also of merit (dharma) and other supersensible objects owing to the contact of the internal organ with the self and a peculiar merit born of austerities. Such an intuitive cognition is called ārṣajñāna. This cognition is perceptual in character, since it is not produced by marks of inference and so forth; but it differs from ordinary perception because it is not produced by the external sense-organs, but by the internal organ with the help of certain powers acquired by learning austerities, and meditation. Praśastapāda calls it *prātiḥajñāna* also, since it is a distinct and vivid perception in harmony with the real nature of things not

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{139} dharmānanugṛhītabhāvanā mātraprabhvastu (anubhavaḥ) na pramā. 
Ibid., also Ki, p.284. 
\textsuperscript{140} ārṣaṁ dharmebyah. VS., IX. 2.13.}
produced by the sense-organs, marks of inference and the like\textsuperscript{141}. Śrīdhara also treats it as a valid cognition since it corresponds with the real nature of its object and since it is free from doubt and illusion\textsuperscript{142}. Saṁkara Miśra defines ārṣajñāna as the sages’ intuition of the past and the future objects due to their special merit\textsuperscript{143}. Saṁkara Miśra regards it either as mental perception or inference from signs (\textit{linga}) such as throbbing of the eyes, etc.,-- the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the probans and the probandum being dependent on a subconscious impression (\textit{saṁskāra}) of the experience of previous life. Saṁkara Miśra regards \textit{pratibhajñāna} as ārṣajñāna occurring in common persons\textsuperscript{144}. He admits the validity of ārṣajñāna due to special merit (\textit{dharma}) born of austerities. Jayanārāyaṇa the author of \textit{Vaiśeṣikasūtraśivṛtti} on \textit{Vaiśeṣikasūtra} includes ārṣajñāna in yogic perception and considers it to be valid knowledge because it is due to a special merit alone born of meditation\textsuperscript{145}. An illusory perception of a distant object is due to the defect of an object aided by a demerit. But ārṣajñāna is a valid immediate cognition of past, future and remote objects due to an excellent merit alone born of meditation or

\textsuperscript{141} PB., p. 258.  
\textsuperscript{142} NK., p 258.  
\textsuperscript{143} rṣīnāṁ yad aifter-nāgata-viśayakārāṁ jñānaṁ ted ārṣam. VSU., IX, 2.13.  
\textsuperscript{144} ārṣajñānaṁ vidyaiva sā ca rṣīnāṁ laukikānāṁ ca bhavati. Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{145} ārṣaṁ rṣīnāṁ yogaja-dharmeṇa janitam dharma-mātrā-dhīnaṁ pramā rūpam eva bhavati. VSV., IX. 2.13.
austerities. Chandrakānta the author of *Vaiśeṣikabhaṣya* on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, considers *ārṣajñāna* as the immediate intuition of past, present, future, and supersensible objects like merit and the like to be valid knowledge due to meditation and trance. Chandrakānta calls *ārṣajñāna* as *pratibhajñā*. Vallabhācārya, the author of *Nyāyālīlāvatī* treats *ārṣajñāna* as immediate knowledge but not as sensory perception because it is not produced by the sense-organs in intercourse with their objects. It may be argued that *ārṣajñāna* is valid perception like divine perception which is valid. Vallabhācārya rejoins that divine knowledge is called valid perception because it is immediate knowledge like perception. Vallabhācārya does not include *ārṣajñāna* in perception or inference but treats it as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. Only valid knowledge of common people is of two kinds: perception and inference. *Ārṣajñāna* is an uncommon kind of valid knowledge.

**Occult Perception:**

In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Kaṇāda ascribes occult perception (*siddhadarśana*) to a special merit (*dharma*) of the occultist. Occult perception is valid immediate knowledge. According to Samkara Miśra,

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146. VSV., IX. 2.13.
147. VSB., IX. 2.13.
148. aparokṣam eva cāṛṣa jñānam na tu pratyakṣaṁ, anindriya karaṇaka- tvāt. NL., p. 69.
149. Ibid.
of hidden and remote objects which are present through the sense-organs rendered acute by the application of herbs, unguents, etc., to them, or by uttering incantations (mantra), or by taking a potent medicine, due to a special merit. Occult perception is sensory perception due to the operation of the external sense-organs. Only their power is enhanced by the agencies mentioned above, and yet occult perception is not entirely due to the occult power of medicines, incantations and the like, but also due to a special merit or occult power of the person who has this kind of extraordinary perception. Saṅkara Miśra includes occult perception in yogic perception, and does not treat it as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. Jayanārāyaṇa also observes that occult perception is like the intuition of sages (ārṣajñāna) and due to a special merit (dharma), and that it is not due to a demerit (adharma) and not illusory. Candrakānta also remarks that occult perception of supersensible objects also is due to a special merit. Only it is not extrasensory perception but sensory perception of supersensible objects through the sense-organs strengthened and purified by unguents and the like. Occult perception is valid because it accords with the real nature of supersensible objects.

150. VSU., IX. 2,13.
151. VSV., IX, 2.13.
152. VSB., Ibid.
Praśastapāda does not regard occult perception as a distinct kind of valid knowledge. If occult knowledge cognizes hidden and distant objects, then it is perception. If it cognizes supersensible objects through the medium of the movement of the planets, stars and other heavenly bodies, then it is inference. Praśastapāda admits the validity of occult perception of subtle, remote and hidden objects, which is purely sensuous because it is produced by the external sense-organs refined and strengthened by certain occult medicines.

Recollection:

Praśastapāda admits recollection (smṛti) as a kind of valid knowledge. It apprehends the real nature of an object perceived in the past. Recollection is produced by a particular conjunction of the self with manas, a subconscious impression, and suggestive forces or cues. The self is the inherent cause (samavāyikāraṇa); conjunction of the self with manas is the non-inherent cause (asamavāyikāraṇa); a subconscious impression (samskāra) is the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) of recollection. It apprehends a past object, seen, heard, or felt in the past owing to a particular conjunction of the self with manas and revival of its subconscious impression produced by

153. VSU, Ibid.
154. PB., p. 258.
155. VS., VSU., VSV., IX.2.6.
intensity, frequency, or emotional appeal of a past experience\textsuperscript{156}. Perception, recollection or thought of a connected experience is the exciting cause of recollection. Attention, intention to recall inhibition of contrary suggestive forces, perception of a similar object and the like are its exciting causes\textsuperscript{157}.

\textsuperscript{156} PB., p.256.
\textsuperscript{157} NS., III.2.44.