CHAPTER - II

THEORY OF INVALID KNOWLEDGE

Invalid knowledge or apramā is the wrong apprehension of an object. If any knowledge lacks definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. Invalid knowledge is the manifestation of an object which is actually not so. Hence it is an apprehension of a false-cognition in which the qualifier is not appropriately related to the qualificant (viśeṣa). All philosophers like āstika and nāstika are attempted in their own way to analyse invalid knowledge and its means. Different systems of Indian philosophy have forwarded divergent opinions with regard to the theory of invalid knowledge and its variety.

Nyāya Theory of Invalid Knowledge:

In Indian epistemology knowledge is mainly of two kinds, valid knowledge (vidyā) and invalid knowledge (avidyā). Valid knowledge is what apprehends an object in its real nature. Invalid knowledge is what apprehends an object as different from it. Valid

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1. tattvānubhavaḥ pramā, atattvajñānār apramā. SP.,p.59.
knowledge is a true and definite knowledge of some new facts. If any knowledge lacks definiteness or certitude or does not convey any new information or does not represent things as they really are, it is invalid. According to Naiyāyikas there are some cases of knowledge which are presentational in character but not valid. These constitute the class of apramā or non-valid presentation (ayathārthānubhava) which includes all cognitions that are either false or not true. Hence, under apramā Nyāya includes doubt (sathśaya), with its varieties of conjecture (ūha) and indefinite cognition (anadhyavasāya) as well as error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning.

Doubt is a form of invalid knowledge. It is an indefinite knowledge which characterises an object in mutually conflicting ways. According to Gautama doubt is the knowledge of conflicting notions with regard to the same object. Vātsyāyana explains five forms of doubt. The first form of doubt is the contradictory knowledge (vimarśa) about the same object due to the apprehension of common characteristics (samāna-dharma) and which depends on the remembrance of the special characteristic of each (viśeṣāpekṣa). For example, is it a pillar or a man?

2. ayathārthānubhavastrividhāḥ sathśayaviparyayatarkabhedā. TS. p.82.
3. samānānekadharmpapattverbhavapratisaṃkalpadhy anupalabdhyavavyavasthātaśca viśeṣāpekṣo vimarśaḥ sathśayaḥ. NS., 1.1.23.
4. Vbh., under Ibid.
The second form of doubt is due to the apprehension of the unique characteristics of many objects. By 'many' is meant objects of similar as well as dissimilar nature. Doubt is due to the apprehension of characteristics of such manifold objects, the unique characteristics being perceived in both types of objects⁵.

The third form of doubt may arise due to conflicting testimony, e.g., through a mere study of scriptures one cannot decide whether the soul exists, for one system of philosophy affirms that it does while another system states that it does not.

Fourthly, doubt is caused by the irregularity of perception, as when we doubt if the perceived water really exists or not, since there is a perception of water both in a tank and in a mirage.

Lastly, doubt springs from irregularity of non-perception, as when we are not sure if the thing we cannot see now really exists or not, since the existent also is not perceived under certain conditions⁶. These are the five forms of doubt as stated by Vātsyāyana. There is a difference of opinion with regard to the types of doubt. Even Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra and others, there are not five but

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5. Ibid.
6. NBh., 1.1.23.
only three or two types of doubt. Vātsyāyana holds that doubt is a wavering judgment where characters common to many objects are discerned, but none of them is specific. The Sāṅkhyaśātras exclude doubt from valid knowledge, since it is an uncertain knowledge. The validity of doubt as a form of knowledge is not acceptable, because it is not definite and positive knowledge and it cannot be tested by coherence or by correspondence. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, however, is aware of the value of doubt in the field of philosophical learning and valued it as the starting point of logical investigation. Descartes also envisages that knowledge begins with doubt.

But there is a difference of opinion with regard to the nature of doubt by modern Naiyāyikas. According to Annam Bhaṭṭa doubt is the mental reference of two or more contradictory properties to the same object. In it mind oscillates between different alternate characterizations of some given object. Bhāsarvajñā defines doubt as uncertain knowledge (anavadhāraṇa jñāna). But this definition is too wide. It includes two other kinds of indefinite perception, e.g. āha.

7. NV., and NVTT., 1.1.23.
9. ekasmin dharmini viruddhanādharmanāiṣṭyāvagāhījñānānāi sarāsāyaḥ. TS., p 82.
and anadhyavasāya. Kesava Miśra holds that when in one and the same object arises the apprehension of two or more conflicting notions, that becomes doubt. It is of three kinds. The first variety is that caused by the observation of certain common attributes of two things while not noticing any differentiating features between the two; e.g. whether the object ahead is a tree stump or a person. In this case, on seeing an object at a distance the observer does not notice any curvedness or crevices that would enable the object being recognised as a tree stump; nor does he see any clear definition of head, hands, etc. which would enable the object being recognised as a person. At the same time he observes some features common to both the stump and a person such as tallness, shortness, etc. Then he gets a doubt in the form ‘is this a stump or a person?’

The second variety of doubt arises from the difference of opinion about one and the same thing when there is a special reason to ignore or accept either; e.g. whether sound is eternal or not.

11. ekasmin dharmiṇi viruddhanārthāvamarśaḥ sarṣayaḥ. TB., p. 223.
12. tatradyo viśeṣādarsane sati samānadhamadarsana jāha, yathā sthānurvā puruṣo veti. Ibid.
13. samāsayo viśeṣādarsane sati vipratipattijaḥ, yathā sabdo nitya utā’nitya iti. Ibid.
The third variety of doubt is that caused by observing some peculiar attitude or characteristic, without noticing anything special, in an object\(^{14}\). For example when one apprehends smell which is the special quality of earth, but which does not indicate whether it subsists in eternal or non-eternal things and when he does not see any special reason (to decide either way), the doubt arises whether earth is eternal or not\(^{15}\). Because it will be non-eternal if smell is not present in eternal things and it will be eternal if smell is not present in non-eternal things.

Viśvanātha defines doubt as the notion of the presence and absence with regard to the same subject\(^{16}\). For instance, on knowing the height, that is common to the stump of a tree and a man one doubts whether it is a stump or not\(^{17}\). Thus doubt is a cognitive mode vacillating between conflicting notions. It is strictly speaking, non-valid cognition marked by indecision. It neither affirms nor defines anything. It cannot be characterized as belief or disbelief. It is

\(^{14}\) vīṣeṣādārśane satī asādhāraṇadharmadārśanājah, sa yathā nityādānityācchavyāvṛttena bhūmātrasādhāraṇena gandhavatvena vīṣeṣāsamapāsyyato bhuviniyatvānityatyavasamāyāh. Ibid.

\(^{15}\) tatāh hi,sakalāntiyavyāvṛttena gandhavattena yogāt bhūḥ kimānityā, uta sakalāntiyavyāvṛttena tenaiva yogānityā, iti sarīṇśayāh. Ibid.

\(^{16}\) BP., p.130.

\(^{17}\) Ibid. SM.
different from misconception and cannot serve as a means of valid knowledge.

*Viparyaya* or error or illusion is a typical forms of invalid knowledge accepted by Naiyāyikas. When an object is presented in a form which does not belong to it, it is a case of illusion. Illusion in Indian philosophy is discussed in different theories known as the *khyātivādas*. The word *khyāti* means knowledge and hence the *khyātivāda* may mean the theory of knowledge. But then a question arises as to how can the theory of knowledge turn to be the theory of illusion. In reply to this question it may be stated that in Indian philosophy, knowledge is accepted as both true and false. So, the *khyātivādas* are discussed only in the case of falsity of knowledge. There are five theories of illusion namely *ātmakhyāti, asatkhyāti, akhyāti, anyathākhyāti* and *anirvacanīyakhyāti*. Of these five theories of illusion, *ātmakhyāti* and *asatkhyāti* are advocated by the Yogācāra Idealists and Madhyamika Nihilists of Buddhism respectively. The *ātmakhyātivāda* is advocated by the Prābhākaramīmāṇśakas. The *anyathākhyātivāda* belongs to the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāttamīmāṇśakas. The Advaita Vedāntins advocate the theory of *anirvacanīyakhyātivāda*.

18. *ātmakhyātirasaṭkhyātirakhyātihkhyātiranyathā/*

†tathānirvacanīyakhyātirityetat khyātipaṇcakam/* FN., 1 underVD., p.11.
The Nyāya, theory of illusion is known as anyathākhyātivāda. The Vaiśeṣikas also accept this theory of illusion. It is also called viparītakhyāti or the theory of erroneous cognition. It is to be seen that anyathākhyāti is identical to viparītakhyāti propounded by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. According to this theory, an illusion is the manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object19. In other words, an error is a positive misapprehension in which the mistake consists in identifying two different objects. The word anyatha means otherwise or elsewhere and both these meanings are brought out in illusion. According to the Naiyāyikas, illusion is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented object is confused with a presented one. The presented object is perceived otherwise and the represented object exists somewhere. According to the Nyāya philosophers, in the illusion of conch-shell-silver, shell as shell is not known. Had it been known as shell, there would not have been any illusion. Nor is this silver known as any ordinary silver in the true sense of the term. For, in that case, the judgment that ‘this is silver’ would continue as valid and would not be subsequently sublated by another judgment--this is not silver, this is shell’20.

19. NM., I-166.
20. EPSP.,pp.34-35.
The theory of anyathākhyaṭītivāda is very often interpreted by its adherents to maintain a thing which was seen in the past is perceived again by some supernatural perception at the point where a different object exists at present. Actually, some later Naiyāyikas introduced a complicated form of perception for explaining illusion. According to them in illusion, the conch-shell is mistaken for silver which exists somewhere else and is perceived where actually shell is present. This is possible by means of jñānalakṣaṇa prayākṣa, a type of extra-ordinary perception which is a complicated perception through association. But this explanation offered by the Naiyāyikas does not give any new insight to the perceptual character of the silver. It merely takes for granted that the silver which appears like a percept is actually a percept. Moreover, if both ‘this’ and ‘silver’ are perceived, whatever the nature of the contacts involved in them may be, the difference between this and the other type of illusion disappears because in the latter also both the elements are perceptual.

It may be pointed out here that the Naiyāyikas by accepting jñānalakṣaṇa in case of illusion, fail to distinguish their position from that of the Bhāṭṭas. While for the Naiyāyikas the illusory silver is a matter of perception, for the Bhāṭṭas it is only due to memory. But this contrast seems to be very much light while the later Naiyāyikas in
elaborating the *jñānalaksana* for the explanation of illusion admit that perception of illusory silver is due to association and memory. In both the cases, memory plays an important role. So, the acceptance of extra-ordinary perception, so far illusion is concerned does not seem to serve any extra purpose. The difference between memory and *jñānalaksana* perception seems to be nothing significant. The above contention of *anyathākhyāti* is common to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems.

*Tarka* is a type of implicative argument by which we may test the validity of the conclusion of any reasoning (or of any judgment). It is not based on any perception. According to Gautama, *tarka* or hypothetical reasoning is an intellectual act which contributes to the ascertainment of truth by means of adducing logical grounds in favour of one of the alternative possibilities when the reality is not known in its actual character\(^{21}\). Vātsyāyana endorses Gautama’s views and states that when two contradictory alternatives seem to be equally possible with regard to a particular point of enquiry and the mind oscillates between them, hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) in support of either of them helps to resolve the indecisiveness.

\(^{21}\) *avijñātatattve”rthe kāraṇopappitastattvajñānārthamūhastarkah.*

NS., 1.1. 40.
Vātsyāyana, however, makes it clear that it is not *pramāṇa* but simply an aid to *pramāṇa*\(^22\).

The fact as to why the hypothetical reasoning has not been regarded as an independent means of knowledge was brought home by Uddyotakara. Uddyotakara maintains that it simply facilitates the operation of a relevant means of knowledge but does not itself determine the desired characteristics of the datum. It rather helps to determine between two near equal alternatives on the basis of the superior strength of either of the two\(^23\). Vācaspati Miśra agrees with Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara, but lays greater stress upon the aspect of elimination which happens to be his valuable contribution to hypothetical reasoning. According to Vācaspati Miśra the method of elimination helps to prove that one of the alternatives is logically impossible and the remaining one is nearer to truth\(^24\).

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has given a lengthy account of the problem of *tarka*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is of the view that hypothetical reasoning serves to produce a strong presumption in support of the probandum. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s main contribution, with this problem in view, however, rests

\(^{22}\) NBh., 1.1.40.
\(^{23}\) NV., 1.1.41.
\(^{24}\) viśeṣādārṣanāniśayataḥ pramāṇena bhavati, na tarkena tadanumānam-ātrattvāttarkasya. NVTT., 1.1. 40.
with his analysis of *tarka* in contrast to *samśaya* and *nirṇaya*. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that in doubt both the alternatives have equal strength and none of them is specific with the result that the mind oscillates between the two and does not carry with it any definite assertion. In *nirṇaya* the doubt is removed by hearing or assessing arguments advanced by the conflicting parties, and a final judgment is taken in favour of one of them. After that there does not remain any possibility of such a state of mind flickering in favour of another alternative. But as far as *tarka* is concerned, though it favours one of the alternatives, yet it does not leave the other altogether.²⁵

There is a difference of opinion with regard to the nature and type of *tarka* given by modern Naiyāyikas. *Tarka* is defined as the *prasañjana* of an inadmissible negation from the two negations having equal force on account of their being in the same space and time.²⁶ For example, absence of smoke (*dhūmābhāva*) in the argument ‘if there were no fire there would be no smoke’²⁷ for, in the absence of the cause the effect is not possible. Keśava Miśra defined

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²⁵. sāmyena hi samullekhaḥ samśaye pakṣayordvoyoḥ/ nirnaye tvitarah pakṣaḥ smṛiṣyate na manāgapi// tarkastvēkataraṁ pakṣam vibhātyutthāpayannīva. NM., XI-145

²⁶. anिष्ठायापक्रप्रसादी पक्षजनयोऽनि, tarkaḥ tulyatvenābhāvayoḥ pratyabhāva vacanāri prasañjanaṁ.SP., p.81.

²⁷. yadyatra vahnyābhāvaḥ syāt tarhyatra dhūmādhaṅvo’ pisyat. Ts.
tarka as the process of deducing from a mark that of which it is a mark, but it is false\textsuperscript{28}.

In the \textit{Nyāyasūtramṛtti} on \textit{Nyāyasūtra}, Viśvanātha admit five kinds of tarka, viz., ātmāśraya, anyonyāśraya, cakraka, anavasthā and \textit{tadanyabādhitaḥprasaṅga}\textsuperscript{29}. In all of them the logical form and character of the argument is the same, and they serve the same purpose of testing the validity of some reasoning or judgment. Ātmāśraya is an argument that is self dependent in respect of genesis, subsistence and cognition. For example, ‘A is the cause of A’. Here A must be different from itself, because the cause is different from the effect. This is also called \textit{petitio principi} in the terminology of Western Logic.

\textit{Anyonyāśraya} is a mutually dependent argument. In the instance ‘A depends on B, and B depends upon A’, actually A cannot depend upon B, since to say that ‘B depends upon A’ is virtually to deny that ‘A depends upon B’.

\textit{Cakraka} is the reasoning in a circular way. If A requires B, B requires C and C requires A, the argument is a case of circular reasoning.

\textsuperscript{28} tarko 'niśtaprasaṅgaḥ, sa ca siddhavyāptikayordharmayorvyāpyāṅgikāre vyāpaka prasaṅjanarūpaḥ. TB., Ibid.

\textsuperscript{29} NSV., 1.1.40.
Anavasthā is the *regresses ad infinitum*. If we explain A by B, B by C, C by D, and so on, it is a case of *anavasthā* since we do not actually explain anything but simply our explanation shapes itself into the form of infinite regression.

*Tadanyabādhitārthaprasaṅga* is the *reductio ad absurdum*. It indirectly proves the validity of an argument by showing that the contradictory of its conclusion is absurd. This may be done by opposing the contradiction of the conclusion by means of some fact or by applying some universal law. If, therefore, its contradictory be false, the original conclusion must be true and thus based on a valid reasoning.

Naiyāyika’s divisions of these five kinds are logically unsound. This classification should not be based on the kinds of reasoning that may be tasted by it, because there are unlimited and quite external to the nature of *tarka* as a type of argument. *Tarka* seems to correspond to the antilogism in Western Logic.

The Naiyāyikas hold memory as non-valid knowledge. It is different from *anubhava* (experience). According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa memory is not to be counted as valid knowledge because its content is
not amongst its causal factors\textsuperscript{30}. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that memory is invalid cognition since its object is non existent at the time of its remembrance\textsuperscript{31}. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa does not share the Mīmāṁsā view that the knowledge which refers to a previously known object is invalid. According to him what makes memory invalid is the fact that it does not arise out of the objects themselves\textsuperscript{32}. The objects which we remember once existed in the past but have now ceased to exist. So they are no longer real and there is no correspondence between the ceased objects and their memory-images. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa concludes that memory, as it is not based on any given datum, fails to give valid presentational experiences, and, therefore, it is not a valid knowledge. This standpoint is further strengthened by the fact that memory is excluded from ‘valid knowledge’ by the insertion of the term \textit{arthopalabdhi} in his definition of \textit{pramāṇa}. The ancient Naiyāyikas also hold that memory is not produced by the object which is revealed by its recollections.

According to the modern Naiyāyikas memory is the knowledge of the past. It can be said to be the revival of the past experience. It

\begin{align*}
\text{30. tasmād anarthajatvena smṛti-----prāmāṇya vāraṇād. NM. I. 21.} \\
\text{31. tadārūḍhasya vastunaḥ stadānīmasattvāt. NM., I.23.} \\
\text{32. na smṛterpramāṇatvāṁ gṛhitagrāhitākṛtāṁ/ apitvanarthajanyatvāṁ tadprāmāṇyakāraṇāṁ// Ibid.}
\end{align*}
arises solely from the impression left by the previous experience. 
Gangesopadhyaya maintains that every form of valid knowledge 
illuminates an object as present, whereas remembrance involves a 
reference to the past. So, in his opinion remembrance cannot be 
included in the list of valid knowledge. According to Śivāditya 
memory is that kind of knowledge which is brought about by 
impressions left behind by a former knowledge in the soul. Keśava 
Miśra states that when we are awake, memory may turn out to be true 
or false accordingly as it is connected with the right or the wrong 
cognition in the past. But dream cognitions are all memory cognitions 
and all these are false in character. In dream the non-present objects 
appear as present and so they are unreal.

Prasastapāda observes that memory is a true form of 
knowledge (vidyā) though he does not classify memory as a pramāṇa. 
He classifies memory as one of the several varieties of true 
knowledge. Śridhara elucidates that, despite this, memory is not a 
means of valid knowledge, because it is dependent on perception and 
inference which initially makes us acquainted with the objects we can 
subsequently recall.

33. samaskāramātrajanyai jñānaṁ smṛtiḥ. TS., p. 32.
34. anubhavajanyā smṛtiḥeturbhāvanā ātmamātravṛttiḥ. cf. ITK., p. 28.
35. TB., pp. 25 also 34.
Vaiśeṣika Theory of Invalid Knowledge:

The Vaiśeṣikas also hold invalid knowledge as different from valid knowledge. According to Vaiśeṣikas invalid knowledge is of four kinds: (i) doubt (sāṁśaya), (ii) illusion (viparyaya), (iii) indefinite perception (anadhyavasāya), and (iv) dream (svapna). Śivāditya recognizes another kind of indefinite perception called ūha.

Doubt is indefinite knowledge. It is internal or external. Internal doubt is produced by the attributes of the knowing self. External doubt is produced by the attributes of external objects. External doubts are either in regard to perceptible objects or in regard to inferable objects. The perception of the common quality of two objects and the recollection of their peculiar qualities generate a doubt as to whether the object perceived is one or the other. The common quality of a post and a man e.g., height, is perceived. Then their special qualities are remembered. The mind oscillates between the two memory-images. This is doubtful perception of an external perceptible object, which is expressed in such a form: ‘Is it a post or a

36. praśastapāda-praṇīte padārthasaṁgrahābhidhebhāṣye 
vidyānirūpa-prastave yathārtha jñāṇasya cāturvidhyamuktaṁ sāṁśaya 
viparyayavānapānādhyavasāyabhedena. F.N. 2 under PP., p.43.
37. anavadhāraṇāṁ jñānaṁ sāṁśayaḥ. SP., p.59.
man?' With regard to inferable from objects the perception of a common probans and the recollection of the special qualities of the two objects indicated by it generate a doubt as to whether the object inferred the probans is one or the other. The perception of horns only in a forest and the recollection of the peculiar qualities of a cow and a wild cow (gavāya) indicated by them produce a doubt as to whether the horns belong to a cow or a wild cow\textsuperscript{38}. Hence Praśastapāda defines doubt as uncertain knowledge of the mind wavering between two alternatives, which arises from the perception of the common qualities of two objects, the peculiar qualities of which were perceived in the past, the recollection of the peculiar qualities of both the objects, and demerit (adharma)\textsuperscript{39}.

In the \textit{Padārthadharmanāmśārga}, Praśastapāda maintains that there is fundamentally only one kind of doubt since it is always due to perception of properties common to many familiar objects\textsuperscript{40}.

Śrīdhara explains doubt in the following manner. When we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the peculiar qualities of the object, we have a doubtful perception such as 'is it a post or a man?' Śrīdhara contends, that the perception of the common

\begin{tabular}{ll}
38. & PB., pp.174-175. \\
39. & Ibid. \\
40. & PDS., p.85. \\
\end{tabular}
quality simultaneously revives the subconscious impressions of the peculiar qualities of both objects with which it was associated in our past experience, but that it does not vanish after reinstating the ideas of the peculiar features of both objects; that it lingers in the mind, and together with the conflicting trains of ideas constitutes a complex psychosis called doubtful perception\textsuperscript{41}. Udayana points out that a doubtful perception arises from the perception of an object, endued with the common qualities of two objects along with the non-perception of their peculiar qualities, which brings about the recollection of their peculiar qualities\textsuperscript{42}. Thus, a doubtful perception is a complex presentative-representative process in which there is the perception of the common quality of two objects in the same substance together with two conflicting trains of ideas revived by the perceptions. But these conflicting trains of ideas are not integrated with the percept, but hover round it; sometimes the one train of ideas suggested by the percept gives rise to the apprehension of the one object, and sometimes the other train of ideas suggested by the percept gives rise to the apprehension of the other object. Thus, the mind oscillates between two alternatives in a doubtful perception.

\textsuperscript{41} NK., pp.175-176.
\textsuperscript{42} Kir., p.261.
Udayana points out that the state of doubt has always an unpleasant feeling tone, and we always try to avoid it. Otherwise, it would never bring about the desire to know the object of doubtful cognition more definitely. Saṅkara Miśra defines a doubtful cognition as the knowledge of many contrary qualities in one and the same object.

Error (viparyaya) is the knowledge of one object as another different from it. Kaṇāda defines false knowledge (avidyā) as due to the defects of the sense-organs and the defects of impressions. Praśastapāda holds that viparyayat is a definite knowledge which does not apprehend the real nature of an object. A cow is misperceived as a horse. Illusion is wrong perception by a sense-organ vitiated by the bodily humours, flatulence, bile, or phlegm, an impression (sāṁskāra) produced by the perception of an object which is not present, conjunction of the self with manas, and demerit. Inference also may be wrong. We wrongly infer the existence of fire from moisture which appears to be smoke. We wrongly infer the existence of a cow from the perception of the horns of a wild cow. Wrong inference is inference of a non-existent object from the wrong

44. indriya-doṣāt sarīṇskāra-doṣāccā-vidyā. VS., IX,2,10.
45. atasmimstaditi pratyayo viparyayaḥ. PB., p. 177.
   avadhāraṇarūpā’ttvajñānāṁ viparyayaḥ. SP., p. 59
perception of another object. Considering the body, the sense-organs, or the manas as the self, considering produced things as eternal, knowing good as evil, regarding evil as good, and the like are wrong knowledge.

In the Upaskāra on Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Saṅkara Miśra explains that false knowledge or illusion is due to the sense-organs tainted by the bodily humours, and impressions of past experience tainted by the nonperception of the distinctive characters of an object. In the Vaiśeṣikabhāṣya on Vaiśeṣikasūtra, Candrakānta points out that an illusion due to the defects of the sense-organs apprehends an object as a different object. It is to be noted here that an illusion may be compared with a doubtful perception. According to Udayana, both an illusion (viparyaya) and a doubtful perception (sārṇāya) are not produced by the corresponding objects (anarthaja); but the former is definite (niścayātmaka), while the latter is indefinite (aniścayātmaka). An illusion is a false perception of a definite character in the waking condition.

Anadhyavasāya or indefinite cognition is a form of knowledge which is quite different and distinct from doubt. Indefinite cognition

46. PB., pp. 170 also 177.
47. indriya-doṣād anyathābhūtan anyathopalabhathe. VSB., IX, 2, 10.
is incipient knowledge of an object as a mere ‘something’ without any
definition or determination of what that something is. It is illustrated
by our ordinary nascent experiences, as when we say ‘something
passed by without our knowing what it was’, or when in the presence
of an unfamiliar living being we say ‘it must be some kind of
animal’. Such indefinite cognition differs from doubt both in origin
and in essence. Doubt arises from recollection, without any
accompanying presentation, of the specific characters of two or more
objects, of which we perceive the common properties. The indefinite
cognition, however, is a possible form of cognition with regard to
objects whose specific character had never been presented to us.
Again the indefinite cognition does not, like doubt, rest on two or
more conflicting notions with regard to the same subject. According
to Śivāditya anadhyavasāya is indefinite knowledge in which both
alternatives are unmanifest. Indefinite knowledge (anadhyavasāya)
is perceptual or inferential. When a familiar or an unfamiliar object is
perceived as ‘something’ owing to inattention or interest in a special
thing, we have indefinite perception. A person unfamiliar with a

49. NK., p. 183.
50. NK., Ibid.
51. analingitobhayakotyanavadhāraṇaṁ jñānamanadhyavasāyaṁ. SP., p. 69.
52. prasiddhārtheśvaprasidhārtheśu vā vyāsāṅgād arthītvād vā
kimityālocanamātramanadhyavasāyaṁ. PB., p. 182.
jackfruit tree has an indefinite perception of it. He has definite knowledge of an entity endued with being hood, genus of substance, genus of earth, genus of tree, colour, and the like. He also perceives the genus of jackfruit tree. But he does not know that its name is jackfruit tree. He has indefinite knowledge of its name. His indefinite perception of the jackfruit tree as ‘something’ is anadhyavasāya. A person unfamiliar with a cow perceives the dewlap only of an animal, and infers ‘what this animal may be’. He has indefinite inference.\(^53\)

Udayana differs from Praśastapāda in his conception of anadhyavasāya. According to him, anadhyavasāya is an indefinite perception due to the perception of a common quality of two alternatives both of which are not distinctly apprehended. There is a distinct apprehension of one alternative, but no apprehension of the other. So anadhyavasāya is different from saṁśaya. Saṁśaya or doubt arises from the perception of the common quality of two alternatives, both of which are distinctly apprehended. In it the mind oscillates between two alternatives, both of which are distinctly present to consciousness. But in anadhyavasāya there is no oscillation of the mind, since the two alternatives are not distinctly present to

\(^{53}\) Ibid, p.182.
consciousness⁵⁴. Udayana’s conception of anadhyavasāya resembles Śivāditya’s conception of īha. Saṅkara Miśra defines anadhyavasāya as the apprehension of an object as something⁵⁵. When a person who has never seen a camel sees it suddenly for the first time he apprehends it as something. He perceives the distinctive qualities of the camel, e.g. a long neck, wide lips, etc., and so distinguishes it from a horse or an elephant. But he can not refer it to the class of camels nor does he know its name. So anadhyavasāya is different from saṁśaya.

Ūha or conjecture is an indefinite perception. Śivāditya says that īha is a doubtful perception in which only one alternative is manifested to consciousness⁵⁶. When we perceive a tall object from a distance, in a field of corn in which posts are not generally found, but only men, we have an indefinite perception such as ‘that may be a tall man in the field’⁵⁷. Ūha is not quite an indefinite cognition. It is almost definite⁵⁸.

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⁵⁵. anadhyavasāyo’pi kiṁ svid idamiti jñānārāṁ. KR.,p.121.
⁵⁶. utkataikakotikāḥ saṁśaya īhāḥ. SP., p. 69.
⁵⁷. Mb., p. 25 ; Nsār., p.2 .
⁵⁸. adhyavasāyātmatva eva sa īhāḥ. Nsār. on NP., p.68.
In the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, Kāṇḍaka defines a dream cognition as the consciousness produced by a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (*manas*) in co-operation with the subconscious impressions of past experience, like recollection\(^{59}\). Praśastapāda holds that dream is mental perception of a person through the sense-organs, whose sense-organs have ceased to function, and whose *manas* is overpowered by sleep\(^{60}\). It arises from a particular conjunction of the self with *manas* called sleep, sub-conscious impressions, and merit or demerit. It appears like perception of unreal objects through the sense-organs. It is of three kinds. It arises from the strength of subconscious impressions, or defects of bodily humours, or merits and demerits\(^{61}\). A person dreams of his beloved woman owing to the intensity of the subconscious impression of her generated by repeated thoughts of her. One dreams of flight in the sky owing to flatulence. One dreams of entering into fire owing to excess of bile. One dreams of crossing a river owing to predominance of phlegm. These dreams are due to defects of bodily humours. The auspicious dreams such as riding on elephants, getting an umbrella and the like which betoken

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59. VS., IX. 2. 6-7.
60. uparatendriyagrāmasya pralānumanaskasyendriyadvāreṇaṣaiva yad anubhavanaṁ mānasāṁ tat svapnajñānaṁ. PB., p.183.
61. samskarapatavad dhatudoṣad adṛṣṭāc. Ibid. p. 184.
good are due to merit. The inauspicious dreams such as besmearing the body with oil, riding on a donkey or a camel and the like which betoken evil are due to demerit. Dreams within dreams are recollections of dream-cognitions due to revival of their subconscious impressions during sleep. Udayana asserts, that in the dream-state, though the external sense-organs cease to operate, we distinctly feel that we see objects with our very eyes, hear sounds with our very ears, and so on. Sarñkara Misra also holds that though a dream-cognition is produced by the mind when it has retired, and the external sense-organs have ceased to operate, it is apprehended as if it were produced by external sense-organs. Srídha also regards dreams as presentative in character. Dream-cognitions are independent of previous cognitions, and as such are not mere reproductions of past experience; they are produced through the retired central sensory or mind when the functions of all the peripheral organs have ceased; they are direct and immediate presentations of a definite and determinate character. These dream-cognitions arising from sleep and sub-conscious impressions are

62. Ibid.
64. VSU., IX, 2.7.
65. purvādhiyamānapekṣaṁ paricchedasvabhāvaṁ mānasāṁ manomātraprabhavaṁ tat svapnajñānaṁ. NK., p. 184.
direct and immediate presentations (aparokṣasamvedana) of object which had no real existence at that time and place. They are presentative in character, and not mere reproductions of past experience. But dream-perceptions are not produced by the external organs which cease to function at that time, but they are produced entirely by the mind (manomātraprabhava). And these dream-perceptions are not indefinite and determinate in nature; but they are definite and determinate in character (paricchedasvabhāva). They are not valid but illusory, since they donot represent real objects present to the sense-organs. According to Śivāditya dream is a cognition produced by the internal organ overpowered by sleep. Sleep is the existence of the manas in an organless place without the aid of the merit born of yoga or meditation. Thus doubt, error, indefinite perception, and dream are the different kinds of invalid knowledge.

Sāṁkhya-Yoga Theory of Invalid Knowledge:

In Sāṁkhya and Yoga system of thought, apart from pramā many other states such as viparyaya smrti, nidrā and vikalpa are mentioned. From a closer study of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga

66. Ibid., p.185.
67. nidraduṣṭaṇṭakaṇḍaṇaṁ jñānaṁ svapnaḥ. SP., p.68.
68. Ibid, p.68.
69. pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidraṣṭayaḥ. YS., 1-6.
epistemology the so-called valid knowledge is only valid in the limited sphere of existence. From the metaphysical standpoint the so-called valid knowledge is illusory since transcendental consciousness is devoid of all attributes and changes. When the mode of an intellect is revealed by catching the reflection of transcendental consciousness, transcendental illusion takes place. As a result of transcendental illusion the properties of the intellect are attributed to transcendental consciousness, and consciousness is attributed to the mode of the intellect, i.e. experience of an object. This transcendental illusion is unavoidable in all cases of empirical experience. Therefore, empirical experience being based on transcendental illusion is invalid from the metaphysical point of view. Both Sāṅkhya and the Yoga trace bondage to illusion (avidyā). According to the Sāṅkhya, avidyā consists in the non-apprehension of the difference between puruṣa and prakṛti. The Yoga, on the other hand, regards the illusion as consisting in mis-apprehensions, i.e., in apprehending buddhi as the puruṣa. The Sāṅkhya holds the akhyāti theory of illusion, while the Yoga holds the anyathākhyāti theory of illusion. According to Kapila’s sūtra⁷⁰, when an object is presented to our consciousness it has two elements, viz., the subject and the predicate. The subject is

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³⁰ sadasatkhyaītibādhābhāḥ. SS., V-56.
called dharmī and the predicate is called the vidheya. Here the relation between the subject and the predicate is not real. Some other relation is ascribed to the subject. ‘This is silver’ is an illusory judgment. ‘This’ is the subject, ‘silver’ is the predicate and the verb ‘is’ comes to be the copula. In the case of true perception this copula stands for the relation of identity. ‘This’ means the yonder object. And ‘silver’ stands for silverness. The ‘silverness’ is related to ‘this’ by the relation of identity. The verb ‘is’ stands for the relation which connects the subject with the predicate. In this particular instance it is the relation of identity. Identity may be actual or it may be attributed. The attributed relation is contradicted by a subsequent true judgment. The relation is only contradicted but not silverness. Therefore, in the illusory judgment Kapila mentions that contradiction plays some part here. But the sphere of this contradiction is very limited. It is only confined to the small circle of attributed relation. It should be remembered in this connection that silverness is not contradicted i.e. its reality is not challenged. Silver has truth, i.e. it is a real and true object. When it is not manifested it is called asat. The term asat does not signify the unreal object. But it only denotes the unmanifest object. After destruction its reality is not contradicted. It simply changes its form and remains hidden in its cause. In the theory of
sadasatkhyāti, asat has not been taken to denote such unmanifest form of an effect.

Udayana refers to this theory of sadasatkhyāti in his Tātparyapariśuddhi. Ācārya Padmapāda also refers to this hypothesis. Padmapāda states that the Sāṅkhyaists advocate the hypothesis of saṁsargabhrama. Vijñānabhikṣu explains the sutra in an exact manner and points out that the essence of sadasatkhyāti is constituted by saṁsargabhrama.

The Yoga advocates the doctrine of anyathākhyāti. It is clearly stated by the aphorism which describes ignorance (avidyā) as positive misapprehension of the non-eternal, the impure, the painful, and the not-self as the eternal, the pure, the pleasant, and the self respectively. Avidyā is false knowledge. It apprehends one thing as a different thing. The Yoga differs from the Sāṅkhya which regards avidyā as mere non-discrimination (avivekamātra). The metaphysical error (avidyā) consists in non-discrimination between the self (puruṣa) and the not-self (prakṛti). The illusion (bhrama) consists in non-discrimination between the given element (e.g., ‘this’) and the ideal

71. atattve tattva jñānamiti śāstrakāreṇaiva darsitaḥ saṁsargabhramaḥ. PPā., as quoted in Indian Philosophy—A Modern Approach, p. 41.
72. YS., II.5.
73. RM., IV.33.
element (e.g., ‘silver’). Though both Sāṃkhya and Yoga are similar to each other the Sāṃkhya advocates the doctrine of *akhyāti* (non-apprehension) or *vivekākhyāti* (non-apprehension of distinction) or *sadasatkhyaati* (apprehension of a real object and an unreal object)\(^74\) whereas the Yoga advocates the doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* in accordance with the philosophy of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But there is a slight difference between the view of Yoga and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Yoga holds that in the illusion ‘this is silver’ the internal cognition of silver is attributed to the perceived object or shell\(^75\). The idea of silver, which is an internal form of cognition (*jñānakāra*), is attributed to the external object or shell perceived. The shell is present here and now. It is mistaken for silver because the idea of silver is attributed to it. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that an external remote object (e.g., silver) is attributed to a present object (e.g., shell), so that one object is perceived as another. An internal cognition (*jñānakāra*) is attributed to a perceived external object according to the Yoga, while an unperceived external object is attributed to a perceived external object according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The subtle distinction between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *anyathākhyāti*

\(^{74}\) SPS., V.56.

\(^{75}\) YV., I.8.
and the Yoga doctrine of *anyathākhyāti* has been drawn by Vijnānabhikṣu\(^{76}\).

**Mīmāṃsā Theory of Invalid Knowledge:**

The Mīmāṃsakas also holds that invalid knowledge is a false cognition. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa admits three kinds of invalid knowledge viz; error or illusion (*mithyājñāna*), non-cognition or ignorance (*ajñāna*) and doubt (*samsaya*)\(^{77}\). In this statement Kumārila Bhaṭṭa does not mention memory as invalid knowledge. Elsewhere Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that validity consists in knowing something new and that if a knowledge does not give anything new, it is memory\(^{78}\). Pārthasārathī Miṣra also holds that illusion, ignorance and doubt are definitely false, while memory is not false. All knowledge may be classified into that which is valid and that which is invalid. Invalid knowledge, again, may be classified into that which is false and that which is true, and ignorance, doubt and illusion belong to the former class while memory belongs to the latter.

Sucarita Miṣra divides invalid knowledge into illusion, doubt, memory and *sanāvāda* which together with valid knowledge make up

\(^{76}\) Ibid.
\(^{77}\) *ŚV.*, 2. 54.
\(^{78}\) Ibid., 5.11.
the five forms of knowledge\textsuperscript{79}. In this list there is no mention of ignorance as a form of invalid knowledge. In fact ignorance is not invalid knowledge. According to him, validity and invalidity are the properties of knowledge and not the absence of knowledge. It is true that ignorance or absence of knowledge does not help us in the practical activities of life for which a true knowledge of objects is essential. But the practical disadvantage which is caused by ignorance does not justify our calling it invalid. It is always some knowledge that is judged to be valid or invalid. To call absence of knowledge ‘invalid knowledge’ is self-contradictory. It is as absurd as to say that a barren mother’s son is a disobedient son. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa seems to argue in the following way:

All valid knowledge is knowledge;

No ignorance is knowledge;

\[\therefore\] No ignorance is valid knowledge;

No invalid knowledge is valid knowledge;

No ignorance is valid knowledge.

\[\therefore\] All ignorance is invalid knowledge.

\textsuperscript{79} pramāṇaṁ bhṛmaṁ sāṁśaẏaṁ smaṛaṇaṁ saṁhvāda iti paṁcadhā jñānaṁ vibhaḻaṁahe. KK., on ŚV., 2. 20.
Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s theory of illusion is known as viparītakhyāti. In illusion, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that one thing is perceived as something contrary to itself. There is a creation of false relation between one and the other. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the erroneous judgment ‘this is silver’ is only one single judgment of which ‘this’ and silver’ are just two parts. In the judgment ‘this is silver’, ‘this’ is only regarded by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa to be the subject (viṣaya) and ‘silver’ is taken as the predicate (prakāra). Both are accepted as real. Silver is real in the sense that the predicate of silverhood is itself a valid one. It is not that, silver is nowhere used as a predicate. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa maintains that illusion is not due to relate but only due to the relation (saṁsarga) which misrelates the predicate to the subject. The erroneous judgment is nothing but a contrary judgment (viparītakhyāti). To make a judgment on a thing what it is not is to fall in an illusion.

It may be mentioned here that so far as the logical analysis of illusion is pursued by the Bhāṭṭas, the theory of viparītakhyāti does not seem to differ from the theory of anyathākhyāti of the Naiyāyikas. Like viparīta, anyathā also implies only a formal condition80. As rightly observed by Dr. G.P. Bhaṭṭa, the Bhāṭṭas and the Naiyāyikas

80. ITE., p. 52.
approach the problem of illusion in a purely empirical and psychological way.

Prof. S.N. Dasgupta finds no difference between the theories of viparitakhyāti and an anyathākhyāti. Hence he says that the two theories suppose that illusion takes place because, on account of malobservation, of the peculiar traits of the conch-shell as distinguished from the silver and at the same time by the glow of the conch-shell unconsciously the silver which one had seen elsewhere, is remembered and the object is taken as silver\textsuperscript{81}.

According to Pārthasārathi Miśra in all cases of illusory perception only the relation between the subject and predicate elements, e.g., ‘this’ and ‘silver’, which is unreal appears to be real. Hence Pārthasārathi Miśra holds that this relation is always real\textsuperscript{82}. Accordingly an illusion is a positive mis-apprehension in which the mistake consists in identifying two unrelated real objects under the influence of some vicious subjective and objective conditions.

Prabhākara’s theory of illusion is known as akhyātivāda. It is called akhyāti because it interprets illusion as the absence of

\textsuperscript{81} HIP., p. 385.
\textsuperscript{82} sarvatra saṁsargamātramāsadevāvabhāsate saṁsargīṇastu santa eva; seyam viparītakhyātirityucyte māṁāṁsakaiḥ. SD., p.58.
knowledge (*khyati*). The word *akhyati* means non-apprehension. Prabhākara, because of his admitting intrinsic validity of knowledge, does not admit error or illusion in the logical sense. All knowledge is valid parse. To experience is always to experience validity\(^\text{83}\). So, all knowledge being valid there is no logical distinction between truth and error. It is something logically impossible that the object appears otherwise than as it is. All cognitive expressions are cases of right judgments only. A false judgment is inconceivable. Prabhākara says—“it is strange indeed how a cognition can be said to be apprehended an object and yet be invalid\(^\text{84}\). Illusion is not a unitary knowledge, but a composite of two cognitions, the distinction of which is not apprehended. It is not a positive factor consists in the presence of two cognitions which reveal their respective object only partially. The negative factor consists in overlooking the distinction between these two cognitions and their objects.

According to Prabhākara, the object of a cognition is that alone which is manifested by it. In the illusion ‘this is silver’ (*idarh rajatam*) which is manifested, is the silver. Hence, object is the silver and not the nacre (*suktikā*) as contended by the Bhaṭṭamāṁśakas.

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83. yathārtha sarvamevaḥ vigñānamitī svādhaye/ 
   prabhākara-agororbhāvah samucenah prakāśyate\/// PP., 3.1.
84. PSP., p. 31.
The Prābhākaras contend that in all cases, illusion is due to non-discrimination which means non-apprehension of the distinction between two cognitions and their objects. So, ākhyāti is also called vivekākhyāti or bhedāgraha or asaṁsargāgraha\(^{85}\). The cause of non-discrimination is the obscuration of memory (smṛtiprāmośa)\(^{86}\). The object of memory belongs to the past. It is always referred to as that in contrast with the object of perception which is referred to as ‘this’, but when it is stripped of ‘that-ness’ (pramuṣṭattāka), the memory come to be obscured. According to Śālikānātha Miśra, the silver is neither perceived nor inferred, because neither there is the contact of the eye with the silver nor there is a mark of the presence of silver\(^{87}\). Hence by the method of elimination, it is concluded that the silver is remembered. Because of the non-discrimination, the illusory cognition of silver appears to be similar to the cognition of a real silver.

The position of the Prābhākaras on ākhyātivāda is that it maintains that knowledge never involves a reference to anything that is not actually given. One of the illustrations given in explaining this

\(^{85}\) tanmate bhedāgraḥaḥ vivekāgraḥa ityanarthāntaram. FN., under PP., p. 52.
\(^{86}\) smṛtiprāmośaḥ pramuṣṭattākaṁ smaraṇamiti caiko’rtha iti prābhā-
karaśvākriyate. FN. under Ibid., p.50.
\(^{87}\) na hyasannihitam tāvat pratyakṣaṁ rajataṁ bhavet/
liṅgādyabhāvācanyasya pramāṇasya na gocaraḥ// PP., 3.31.
position is a conch that is seen yellow by a jaundiced person\textsuperscript{88}. For the sake of simplicity, a slight alternation may be made in it by supposing that the conch is seen through a sheet of yellow glass instead of by the jaundiced eye and the fact of existence of glass is for some reason or other lost sight of. According to the \textit{akhyātivāda} here is the perception of the conch minus its true colour viz., white and the sensation of the yellowness of the glass. In this illusion of yellow conch, there are really two cognitions, one apprehending the yellowness of the bile residing in the eye without apprehending the substance, the bile and their apprehending witness. The true apprehensions cannot remain unrelated and as a result the manifestation appears as similar to the manifestation of a real yellow conch. In all these illusions, the non-discrimination is caused by defects.

Thus it is seen that to the Prābhākaras, misapprehension is something logically impossible. This is because the term ‘apprehension’ seems to be understood more in terms of objective revelation. Here the thinker seems to draw our attention to the point that a thing must have its own form of manifestation to be manifested. It cannot be manifested in a form different from what it is\textsuperscript{89}.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{88} pītaśarīkhāvabodhe ca pītasyendriyavartinah/pītīmā grhyate dravyarahito-psviva vigmatā//Ibid., 3.48.
\textsuperscript{89} ITE., p. 44.
\end{flushright}
The Prābhākaras maintain that three forms of fusion are responsible for each of discrimination between two cognitions. They are--(i) fusion of the presentation and presentation e.g. when a crystal appears red due to an adjacent rose, both the crystal and redness are given in cognition. Though redness is a quality of the rose and not of the crystal, the fact is not apprehended. (ii) fusion of presentation and memory, e.g. when the shell is taken as silver, the presentation of the shell and the memory of the silver are confused. It is to be recalled that according to the Prābhākaras, memory or remembrance is a form of invalid knowledge. (iii) fusion of memory e.g., when a person is not able to determine whether a tall object situated at a distance is a post or a person, he gets confused. Because in the example of the post and the person, both are only memory images

A little section of the Mīmāṃsaka’s theory of error is known as alaukikakhyāti. This school holds that error consists in the perception of an extra-ordinary object (alaukika). In the illusory perception of shell as silver, we perceive an extra-ordinary silver. In case of valid perception, we perceive ordinary silver. In case of illusory perception, we perceive extra-ordinary silver. Here the question arises as how one

90. sthanurvā puruṣo veti sandehe’ pi yadā dvayam/
smaryate’ nyonyanirmuktaṁ tadā’ r̩thavirahaḥ kutaḥ?// PP., 3.65.
can distinguish between an ordinary and extra-ordinary silver. According to these Mīmāṁsakas, the former serves a practical purpose, the latter has subsistence. The Naiyāyikas hold that the illusory judgment, e.g. ‘this is silver’ really refers to the shell. But these Mīmāṁsakas hold that the judgment refers to silver since it is the silver which is presented to our consciousness. As it can not be used, so it is extra-ordinary.

The Naiyāyikas repudiate this theory of alaukikakhyāti. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Mīmāṁsakas for their sheer ignorance of the theory of knowledge91. He points out that they are trying to act as the creator (prajāpati) of a new object (alaukika) without knowledge that the sublative judgment e.g. ‘this is not silver’ does not point to the extra-ordinariness of silver, it rather negates the silver which is falsely identified with the shell92. So, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, we know only real and unreal silver. We do not know about ordinary and extra-ordinary silver. Moreover, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds that if utility is accepted as the criterion of commonness, then a woman who is being embraced in a dream should be common and a jar which is destroyed should be uncommon. Mīmāṁsakas may contend that the positive

91. Ibid., 1-172.
92. ITK., p. 38.
proposition refer to common silver and the negation proposition refer to extra-ordinary silver. When we see silver and move for it, it is common silver and when we see it, but do not move it is uncommon silver.

Besides, if the Mīmāṃsakas hold that the silver taken for the shell is uncommon then why do they move to attain it? If they maintain that they misapprehend alaukika silver for common silver, then it is nothing but viparītakhyāti. Thus, on the basis of these arguments, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa advises these Mīmāṃsakas to accept the dictates of universal experience.

The Mīmāṃsakas also hold doubt as a form of invalid knowledge. According to Mīmāṃsakas doubt is an indefinite cognition (anabadhāraṇātmaka pratyakṣa), which characterises an object in mutually conflicting ways. Something is seen, but there does not arise a fixed notion about it whether it is one thing or another. For instance, some tall thing is perceived, but one cannot decide whether it is a man or a post93. In a doubtful cognition two or more interpretations of an observed fact are offered, but the mind does not arrive at any fixed decision. Thus doubt is marked by a lack of

93. NR., on ŚV., 2.54.
assurance or belief. It is an unpleasant state of mind in which the mind swings between two or more alternatives without being able to reconcile them. This gives rise to a further exploratory activity of the senses and usually some differentiating mark is found out which ends this unpleasant state. Doubt is not confined to sense-level alone. It is very frequent on the level of higher thought. On the sense-level it occurs under insufficient conditions of sensibility. Sometimes we are confronted by a situation demanding a prompt adjustment which prevents us from making a fuller use of our cognitive faculties and consequently there occurs a doubt.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa refers to three causes of doubt. They are (i) the existence of some common quality in something, (ii) the existence of some uncommon quality and (iii) the existence of two apparently contradictory qualities. To explain clearly when the middle term exists in the major term as well as in its contradictory; when it does not exist in either i.e. existing only in the minor term and a case wherein one member of the conclusion either the major or the minor term exists in two contradictory attributes.

94. ŚV., Anu.83-85. also----jñātasarāṇībandhavacanātrtyassarāṅśayahetavaḥ,(ŚV., Anu.84) iti vārttike' naikāntikasya sādhanāsādhanāviruddhāvahyabhicāribhedena triśūlānaḥ, sarāṅśayahetutvaṇicoktam. FN.1 under PP., p. 208.
Salikanatha Misra, a staunch follower of Prabhakara school refutes the view of Kumarila Bhatta on the existence of uncommon quality in something as the cause of doubt. According to Sucarita Misra, doubt arises from the perception of a common property together with the non-perception of a specific property and the remembrance of objects possessing the common property. An uncommon property is not the cause of doubt. It may merely be the cause of curiosity and not of doubt. When one sees an uncommon property in something, one simply wants to know further details about the object, it does not suggest conflicting notions to the mind. Sucarita Misra, however, seems to agree with Salikanatha Misra in this case. Thus, doubt is not a valid knowledge as it lacks in belief or certainty.

Sucarita Misra mentions sarhveda (reinculcation) as a form of invalid knowledge. For example, a reliable person tells that there is fire at a distance. Now one goes and sees smoke rising sky wards and then one can infer fire from the smoke. Then one approaches the place where smoke was seen and really perceives the fire. It is the repetition of what is previously told. As contended by Sucarita Misra

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95. tadayuktaṁ, yo hi yena saha sambaddho drṣṭaḥ..............asādhāraṇo’ pi na sarhśayahetuḥ. PP., p.208.
96. KK., on ŚV., Anu.86.
the inference and the perception of fire simply restate what one has already learnt from the reliable person and as they add nothing new what one already knows, they are invalid while the first cognition is valid. Thus *saṁvāda* is invalid like memory\(^97\). Both *saṁvāda* and memory are alike in that they do not reveal any new truth. But they are different in that the *saṁvāda* is presentative while the memory is representative. Thus Sucarita Miśra explains *saṁvāda*.

According to Nyāya, however, the invalidity of *saṁvāda* is not acceptable. But Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, a follower of the Bhāṭṭamāmāṁśa refutes the view of the Naiyāyikas on *saṁvāda*. He states that as the repetition does not possess any distinction from knowledge either in the determination of facts or in empirical use, it does not deserve validity\(^98\).

Remembrance or memory is the knowledge of the past. It can be said that memory is the revival of the past experience. So, memory always refers to the past. Memory owes its existence to the impression of the previous experience of an object. It is impression that produces remembrance. So, the basis of remembrance is

\(^97\) KK., under ŚV., 2.74.

\(^98\) anuvādānām aprāmāṇyaṁ tāraktikādīnāṁ nānumatam, vayaṁ tu brūmaḥ,.......anuvādo hyarthaparicchade vyavahāre vā na pūrvajanāt kiñcidviśeṣamādhatte, atah.......anuvādo’ pi bahiśkārya eva iti. MM., p.2.
impression left on the soul by an experience. Our experiences modify
the soul in some way and these modifications are preserved in soul.
The impressions are the direct cause of remembrance\(^99\). So, it may be
concluded that mind, the organ of remembrance has something to do
with the perception of objects.

Both the schools of Mīmāṁsā and the Nyāya do not accept
remembrance as valid knowledge as in it the remembered object is
not directly presented since it is past\(^100\). According to the Bhāṭṭas and
the Prābhākaras, remembrance is different from recognition which is
not regarded as depending solely on a previous mental impression and
so, is exempted from the defect of remembrance.

Vedānta Theory of Invalid Knowledge:

Advaita Vedānta Theory of Invalid Knowledge:

Advaita Vedānta theory of illusion is known as the
anirvacanīyakhyāti vāda or anirvācyavāda. According to this theory,
not only the object of commonly called erroneous cognition is
indeterminate but also that of the non-erroneous cognition is accepted
to be indeterminate. When an object cannot be ascertained either as

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99. bhāvanātmakastu saṁskāra ātmadravyavartī viśeṣagunaḥ
pūrvānubhavo'sya kāraṇaṁ smṛtiṣṭu kāryam. MM., p. 254.
100. na pramāṇaṁ smṛtiḥ pūrvapratipattherapekṣaṇāt. PP., 5.2.
existing or non-existing then it is called *anirvacanīya*\(^{101}\). The term *anirvavaniṇya* is used by Ācārya Śaṅkara himself in many places\(^{102}\). It is worth mentioning here that Śaṅkara neither mentions the term *anirvacaniṇya* nor the term *khyāti* in the *adhyāsabhāṣya* of his *Śārīrakabhāṣya*. He simply refers to the rival views of illusion and does not explain them\(^{103}\). Moreover, that illusion indeterminable is nowhere clearly mentioned in his *bhāṣya* though the possibility of such a view is not totally denied\(^{104}\).

The Advaita Vedāntins offer the explanation that so long as the illusion of a snake or silver lasts, there comes into being the corresponding object which is logically indeterminate or indefinable i.e., *anirvacaniṇya*. To explain, the Advaitins contend that in the rope-snake illusion, the snake must actually be present where it is perceived, thought it enjoys a temporary presence till the illusion lasts. It is *anirvacaniṇya* as it is neither absolutely real nor absolutely unreal nor both. The illusory snake is perceived for sometime and

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101. pratyekaṁ sadasattvābhyaṁ vicārapadavāṁ na yat /
   grāhate tadanirvācyamāhurvedāntavādinaḥ \(//CS., p. 79.\)
102. sannāpyasannāpyubhayātmikā no /
   bhinnāpyabhinnāpyubhayātmikā no \(//\)
   saṅgāpyanaṅgā hyubhayātīmikā no /
   mahādbhūtāhanirvacaniyarūpā \(//VC., 111.\)
103. taṁ kecid...........vadanti. anye tu ācāksate. SBh., on VD., p. 11.
104. sarvathāpi tu anyasyānyadharmāvabhāṣatāṁ na vyabhicarati. Ibid.
then obstructed by a correcting experience. So, it can neither be absolutely real nor absolutely unreal. So, the illusory snake is indeterminate.

According to the Vedāntins, illusion is not merely subjective, but there is actually a phenomenon of illusion as there are phenomena of actual external objects. The difference in both the cases is that the illusion is caused by the defect of the senses etc. whereas the phenomena of external objects are not due to such specific defects. The special characteristic of this theory of illusion is that an indeterminate illusory silver is caused in every case where an illusory perception of silver takes place. The system of Vedānta speaks of three orders of reality (sattva) namely ultimate or absolute (pāramārthika), phenomenal (vyavahārika) and illusory (pratibhasika)\textsuperscript{105}. The first represents the absolute truth while the other two are false impressions due to defect. The difference between the phenomenal and illusory realities is that the defect of the phenomenal perception is neither discovered nor removed until liberation, whereas the defect of the illusory reality which takes place

\textsuperscript{105} yadvā trividhāṁ sattvarīṁ, pāramārthikāṁ, vyavahārikāṁ pratibhāsikāṇiceti, tatra pāramārthikāṁ sattvarīṁ brahmaṇaḥ, vyavahārikāṁ sattvamākāśadeḥ pratibhāsikāṁ sattvarīṁ śuktirajatādeḥ. VP., p. 102.
in many extraneous forms is perceived in the world of our ordinary experience. Thus the illusory experience lasts for a much shorter period of time than the phenomenal one. In case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indeterminate silver is caused by defect in association with the senses which is called the creation of an indeterminate silver of illusion.

The Bhattamīmāṁsakas see many grounds to be dissatisfied with the theory of anirvacanīyakhyāti. The Advaita Vedāntins ascribe to the illusory snake an indeterminate nature which is different from the absolutely real and absolutely unreal on the ground of the inexplicability of its being perceived and being obstructed but even if this theory is accepted, the inexplicability remains the same. That which is different from the absolutely real cannot be perceived as in the case of a man’s horn. Again that which is different from the absolutely unreal cannot be obstructed as in the case of the self. So, the illusory snake can neither be perceived nor be obstructed. Thus the Bhāṭṭas do not accept the theory of anirvacanīyakhyāti of the Advaitins.

The school of Nyāya also refute the Advaitin’s theory of error like Bhāṭṭamīmāṁsakas. They also hold that the object of illusion is
neither real nor unreal nor both. In illusion a snake is perceived and latter on it is sublated. An object which is perceived and sublated cannot be definable. The Naiyāyikas hold that the anirvacanīyakhyāti cannot explain the sublation. The Nyāya school point out that the silver exists some where else but is sublated here and now when we realize that ‘this is not silver’ it is not the knowledge of silver which is sublated here. On the other hand, it is silver itself. If the knowledge of silver too, is sublated then the known and the fruit of knowledge too, would have to be taken as non-existent, the sublating cognition will be sublated. Thus only what is obtained through knowledge is sublated.

Visiṣṭādvaita Theory of Error:

Rāmānuja’s theory on error is known as satkhyātivāda. According to Rāmānuja all knowledge are true. Even the object of illusory experience is real. Rāmānuja maintains that an illusion apprehends a real object. In case of ‘this is silver’ ‘this’ a piece of mother- of pearl is presented as ‘silver’. The real silver has greater proportion of reality, whereas silver in a piece of mother-of-pearl has a small quantity of silver. This is the implied meaning of satkhyātivāda. Rāmānuja proves his doctrine of satkhyāti by

106. yathārtham sarvavijñānam iti vedavidāṁ matam. Śbh., I.1.1.
appealing to the doctrine of triplication (trivṛtkarana) of the elements of light, water and earth, according to which all physical things are composed of them in different proportion so that a nacre contains silver in a small proportion while a piece of silver contains silver in a larger proportion. All physical things contain other things in small proportions according to the śruti. Śrīnivāsa, a follower of Rāmānuja, advocates the doctrine of satkhyāti by appealing to the doctrine of quintuplication of the elements of ether, air, light, water and earth. The illusion ‘this is silver’ is a valid cognition, because silver exists in a nacre in small parts. It is contradicted by the sublating cognition ‘this is not silver’, because the nacre does not contain a large part of silver. The illusion is due to the absence of apprehension of the relation of the nacre to a large part of it. It may be argued that silver cannot be apprehended because of its non intercourse with the visual organ and because perception is always due to the intercourse of an object with a sense-organ. This argument is wrong, because even an object not present to a sense-organ can be perceived owing to the power of some defects. Silver can be

107. śrutiyaiva darsitā, tasmāt sarve, sarvatra saṅgaṭaḥ. Ibid.
108. sukti rajatajñānādāvapi vaidika-paṅcīkaraṇa-prakriyaya rajatādyavayavānāṁ sattvāt tatra rajatajñānān api pramāṇam. NPNS., p. 37.
perceived owing to some defects of the eyes. Hence perceptual illusion apprehends a real object; the object of an illusion is real; an illusion is so called because it cannot produce a successful action\textsuperscript{109}.

The \textit{Sāmkhyasūtra} criticizes this theory. According to them such a theory is not tenable. No real object in the universe is contradicted. Aniruddha in his \textit{Sāmkhyasūtrasūtra} interprets the \textit{sūtra} in a different way. In his opinion \textit{satkhyāti} is another name of \textit{asatkhyātavāda}. According to Prābhākaraś there are extra-mental real objects in the Universe. Even illusion refers to such objects. \textit{Akhyāti} means non-apprehension of differences between direct presentation and memory. The memory of silver and the presentation of mother-of-pearl take place in quick succession. These two different activities of mind are not distinctly revealed because memory of silver always involves a reference to the past experience of an object, namely silver. Here the reference to experience-silver is deleted, so memory-silver does not possess the distinctive feature of memory. These two pieces of knowledge appear to be identical owing to non-discrimination of difference.

\textsuperscript{109} bhramādi-pratyakṣaṇānam yathartham eva. viṣaya-vyavāhārabādhād bhramatvam. YMD., pp.4-5.
Aniruddha criticizes this view. In his opinion the judgment of illusion is invariably contradicted. But if we accept the truth of the hypothesis of akhyātivāda such contradiction is not possible. No judgment can invalidate another true experience. Akhyātivāda as it stands has no element of illusion in it. Therefore, this hypothesis is contradicted by experience.

In the Sāṁkhya-praravačaṇa-bhāṣya on Sāṁkhya-सूत्र, Vijñānabhikṣu interprets satkhyātivāda directly. He refers to the hypothesis of Rāmānuja. Some other early Vaiśṇavas also hold a similar view.

Dvaita Vedānta Theory of Error:

In the Dvaita school of Madhva, illusion is an apprehension, of a non-existent thing as an existent object, or of an existent thing as a non-existent entity. Madhva regards an illusion as the apprehension of one thing as another110.

In an illusion there is the apprehension of a non-existent entity or relation as existent in something present to a sense-organ. In illusion ‘this is silver’ non-existent silver is apprehended in a nacre.

110. asataḥ sattva-pratīth satot sattva-pratītirevā bhrāntiḥ. MBG., II.26.
which is present of the visual organ or non-existent identity of silver with such a nacre is apprehended.

Madhva’s doctrine is not identical with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of anyathākhyāti. The Naiyāyika holds that in the illusion ‘this is silver’ a nacre is misapprehended as silver which exists elsewhere, for instance, in a jeweler’s shop. Madhva does not deny that silver existing elsewhere, which was perceived in the past, and which left an impression, is remotely responsible for the illusion. But the present nacre cannot be misperceived as that silver. Madhva defines that the silver that is perceived in a nacre is existing elsewhere, which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika asserts.

Dvaitādvaita Theory of Error:

It is to be noted here the Dvaitādvaita school of Nimbārka also advocate the theory of satkhyāti. Nimbārka borrowed from the view of Rāmānuja that all cognitions are valid, because all entities are of the nature of Brahman. Though God, souls, and physical things are real, all cognitions are not valid. Some do not represent the real nature of their objects. They are false. Because all are of the nature of Brahman, they are real: this argument is invalid. All are not Brahman, but derive their existence from Brahman. They are not identical with
Brahman. The doctrine of satkhyāti makes error; illusion, and doubt impossible. But these are facts of experience. These cannot be explained away. The Nimbārka’s definition of validity of knowledge as it is representing the real nature of its object resembles the Nyāya definition of it. It resembles Veṅkaṭanātha’s realistic definition also. Only it does not state the pragmatic test of truth. Both the schools of Nimbārka and the Rāmānuja advocate the doctrine of intrinsic validity of knowledge (svatahprāmāṇya), like Śaṅkara. But the former regards the absence of defects also to be a condition of validity, and thus compromises the doctrine of intrinsic validity of knowledge.¹¹¹

Śuddhādvaita Vedānta Theory of Invalid Knowledge:

In the Śuddhādvaita school of Vallabha, determinate knowledge can be of five kinds, viz., saṁśaya (doubt), (ii) viparyaya (error), (iii) niścaya (right knowledge), (iv) smṛti (memory) and (v) svapna (dream).¹¹²

According to Vallabha’s school, doubt is defined as the apprehension of two or more opposite attributes or characters in the

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same object\textsuperscript{113}. Error is defined as the apprehension of external objects other than those with which the senses are in contact. \textit{Niścaya} means right apprehension of objects; such an apprehension must be distinguished from memory, because apprehension (\textit{anubhava}) always means the intuition of an object, while memory is purely internal though produced by a previous apprehension. Such a right knowledge can be perception, inference, verbal knowledge, and analogy (\textit{upamiti}, which arises through the senses associated with a knowledge of similarity)\textsuperscript{114}. Puruṣottama Mahārāja the follower of Vallabha, holds that this right knowledge can be of two kinds: perception (\textit{pratyakṣa}) and that which is not perception (\textit{parokṣa}). Memory is defined as knowledge which is produced neither by sleep nor by external objects, but by past impressions, which consist of the subtle existence of previous apprehensions. Dream-experiences are special creations, and should therefore be distinguished from the world of things of ordinary experience; they are out of and through \textit{māyā} by God. This is indeed different from the view of Madhva; for according to him the dream-appearances are without any stuff and should not be regarded as creations; they are mere illusions produced

\textsuperscript{113} ekasmin dharmini vīruddhanāṇākotyavagdhi jñānaṁ saṁsāyam. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} sādṛṣyādi-sahakṛtendriyārtha-saṁsargajanyā. Ibid.
by thought. The dream-appearances being creations according to Vallabha, their knowledge is also to be regarded as real. Dreamless sleep is a special class of dream-experience in which the self manifests itself. Reflection (as synthesis or analysis, or by the methods of agreement and difference, or as mental doubt, or meditation) is included within memory. Shame, fear (*hṛi, bhī*), etc., are the functions of egoism and not cognitive states. Recognition is regarded as right knowledge (*niścaya*).