CHAPTER - I
INTRODUCTION

Nature of Philosophy:

Philosophy is termed as *Darśana* in India as it aims at knowledge of truth. In its widest etymological sense, *darśana* is a subtle and pervasive branch of knowledge, which implies a theoretic pursuit of ultimate truth. The purpose of philosophy is an insight into the nature of the whole reality, that is why philosophy is termed as *Darśana*. The term *Darśana*¹ is derived from the root *dṛś* which means 'vision' and also 'instrument of vision,' which stands for the direct, immediate and intuitive vision of Reality². The key-note of Indian philosophy is 'see the self'³. The word *Darśana* in the sense of true philosophic knowledge has its earliest use in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* of Kaṇāda⁴. *Darśana* is not a mere speculative or intellectual pursuit of pleasure, it is a direct God intuition (*Īśvarānubhūti*) or it is to see God face to face. So, philosophy in India means to see God to get a

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2. a) *dṛṣyate yathārthatattvamanena iti darśanam*. SKD.
   b) *dṛṣyate jñāyate anena iti darśanam*.
   c) *dṛṣyate sūkṣṭā kriyate ātmā anena iti darśanam*.
Darśana of God, the Absolute and to have a direct experience of the Brahman or Ātman. In Indian tradition Darśana functions as a system of knowledge of reality. A system is a set of ideas or concepts which are interrelated so as to serve as an adequate explanation of reality. Generally it stands for critical expositions, logical inquiry or insight of soul. Basically philosophy consists of three parts, viz., (i) epistemology i.e. theory of knowledge. (ii) ontology i.e. theory of reality and (iii) axiology i.e. theory of values.

It can not be denied that all philosophies of both the East and the West are unanimous about achieving the highest value of philosophy. But their conceptions and interpretations of the ultimate value differ from one another. Even, there are different interpretations of different systems in Indian philosophy about the highest achievement of life.

In spite of many different viewpoints and interpretations in different philosophical schools, the real spirit of philosophy is not affected, because although their definitions of prime object and standpoints differ, but their goal of attaining freedom from the bondage of ignorance is one and the same. The intuitive thinkers of Indian philosophical thoughts repeatedly advised people to have direct knowledge or immediate experience of the highest truth which
means realization of the Absolute. Therefore, when we discuss these schools of philosophy, then we discuss and analyzes different ways for realizing the ultimate reality of the universe which is the *summum bonum* of human life.

Indian philosophical systems have been divided into two classes, viz., *āstika* and *nāstika*. The term *āstika* derived from the term *asti* with suffix *man* literally, means theist or one who believes in God while the word *nāstika* means atheist or one who does not believe in God. But in Indian philosophy these words denote believer and non-believer respectively in the testimony of Vedas\(^5\). The term *nāstika* is used in various senses: (i) one who disregards the Vedas,\(^6\) (ii) one who denies the existence of the other world (*nāstiparalokah*)—this is the view of grammarians like Patañjali, Kātyāta, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭoṭī Dīkṣita and others.\(^7\) (iii) one who does not believe in the transmigration of *jīva*, or (iv) one who denies the existence of

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5. veda prāmāṇyavādī (āstikāḥ), vedaprāmāṇyavādī (nāstikāḥ). SKD., p. 96, and p. 519.

6. yavamanyate te mule hetuśāstrāśrayad dvijah/
   sa sādhubhirbahiśkāryyondvamānandakaḥ// Manu., 2.11.

7. Aṣṭādhyāyī - 4.4.60 - asti iti asya matiḥ āstikāḥ.
   nāsti iti asya matiḥ nāstikāḥ. MB.
   paralokāḥ asti iti matir yasya sa āstikāḥ, tadviparītāḥ nāstikāḥ— Pradīpa,
   paralokāḥ asit iti yasya matir asti sa āstikāḥ, tadviparītāḥ nāstikāḥ—Kāśikā,
   asti paralokāḥ ityevāṁ matir yasya sa āstikāḥ, nāsti iti matir yasya sa nāstikāḥ. SIK.
Isvara. Thus āstika means orthodox school and nāstika means heterodox school. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are the six orthodox schools whereas Cārvāka, Bāuddha and Jaina are the three heterodox schools. According to Indian philosophy these six orthodox schools are called Saḍdarśana or six systems of Indian philosophy. Among these systems, some affinity in thought and doctrines have traditionally been recognised as three pairs of allied systems (saṁānatantrāṇi).

Nature of Knowledge:

In the context of philosophical investigations, knowledge may be roughly called convictions regarding reality. It is the basis of all practical activities. Knowledge is termed as buddhi (understanding or convictions), upalabdhi (apprehension), pratyaya (concepts), judgment, awareness and cognition or cognizance which are synonymous to each other. In general, these convictions again may be brought under the broad heading of jñāna which denotes all kinds of knowledge-true or false.

In Indian theory of knowledge or ‘epistemology’, the term jñāna has a wide range of application, viz, sensation, perception, self-awareness, inference, argument, verbal cognition, doubt, illusion, memory etc. The epistemology is a branch of critical philosophy; it is
investigating the nature and criteria of knowledge and manner with regard to episteme or knowledge. The term epistemology, thus, means the science or theory of knowledge. Epistemology, therefore, may be called as that nature, conditions and factors, the limits and validity of knowledge. Epistemology is criticism of knowledge and hence knowledge is one for the main objects of philosophy.

Etymologically the term jñāna captures the sense of knowledge. In philosophical theories knowledge signifies valid cognition. While in psychology knowledge is understood in a wide sense so as to comprise both true and false. In logic and so also in philosophy, knowledge is understood in a narrow sense and is limited to the definite and assured cognition of an object which is also true. In Advaita Vedanta jñāna is used to mean both absolute knowledge (svarūpa jñāna) and relative or empirical, pragmatic (vṛttijñāna) knowledge. Different systems of Indian philosophy have adopted divergent attitude towards the theory of knowledge.

**Nyāya Theory of Knowledge:**

According to the Nyāya, knowledge is the manifestation of objects. It is revealatory of the reality (arthaprakāśa). Knowledge is an accidental quality of the self and there is a complete difference

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8. The Problems of Philosophy, pp.58-60.
between the self and its knowledge. In the *Nyāyasūtra*, Gautama refers to knowledge with the term *buddhi* and contends that the term *upalabdhi* and *jñāna* are its synonyms. Vātsyāyana, a commentator of Gautama’s *Nyāyasūtra* holds that the means of knowledge have reference to an object (*arthavad*), for it is only when objects are cognised by means of them, then it is possible to make an effort to achieve them. He analyses knowledge into: (i) the knower (*pramātr*), discard and object; (ii) the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that by means of which the object is known; (iii) the cognised object (*prameya*); and (iv) the form of cognition (*pramiti*) which constitutes the knowledge of the object (*arthavijñāna*). It is asserted that a knowledge of the real nature of an object depends upon these four factors. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a later Naiyāyika holds that knowledge is a quality of the self and refers to *jñāna* as *guna*. So, knowledge means apprehension or awareness of objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa considers Gautama’s use of the terms *jñāna* and *upalabdhi* as definitive synonyms of *buddhi* sufficient for understanding the nature of knowledge. He asserts that *buddhi* is knowledge and not an instrument of knowledge. Knowledge, although is not an activity of

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9. buddhiḥ upalabdhirjñānam iti arthāntaram. NS., 1.1.15.
10. HIE., p.235.
11. paryāyaprayogasyaiva lakṣaṇasamatvāt. NM., II-58.
any kind, is still a transient phenomenon as it appears from three tenses of the verb ‘to know’. It is a dated event which is to be regarded as a quality and so can be perceived like physical qualities. Just as physical qualities are perceived by their special sense organs, so knowledge is perceived by the internal sense called mānasā. According to Vācaspati Miśra knowledge as an attribute of the self is always directed to objects. It always refers beyond itself, i.e. to objects outside of and different from itself. Knowledge is never self manifested. In the Tarkakaumudi, knowledge consists simply in manifestation (prakāśa) of objects.

According to Nyāya, knowledge (buddhi) is regarded as the ground of what may be called behaviour or contact of a living being. A living creature behaves differently in relation to different objects because it somehow knows them to be different. Hence knowledge is that kind of awareness which is meant when, by introspection, one says ‘I am knowing’. Annam Bhaṭṭa clearly mentions that buddhi is knowledge itself and not an instrument of knowledge.

12. Ibid.
13. vijñānamanātmasaṁvedanam. NVTT., p.4.
15. TS., p.32.
**Vaiśeṣika Theory of Knowledge:**

In the Vaiśeṣika system, knowledge or buddhi (cognition) is taken to mean the same thing as upalabdhi (apprehension), jñāna (knowledge) and pratyaya (cognisance). The Vaiśeṣikas describe padartha as an object of valid knowledge (pramitivisaya). Kaṇāda enlists buddhi amongst the qualities\(^{17}\). Praśastapāda adds one more word to the list of synonyms of buddhi as stated by Gautama and calls it pratyaya\(^{18}\). Knowledge is a term implying as understanding (buddhi), apprehension (upalabdhi)\(^{19}\), concepts, judgment awareness and cognition or cognizance which are synonymous with each other. Just as the light of a lamp shows physical things, so knowledge illuminates all the objects come before it. Udayana defines knowledge in his *Kiranavali* as knowledge is that on the presence of which there is an anuvyavasāya\(^{20}\) in self like ‘I know’.

**Sāṁkhya -Yoga Theory of Knowledge:**

According to the system of Sāṁkhya-Yoga, knowledge is a mode of buddhi. According to them puruṣa is immutable and conscious. Pain and pleasure, etc. belong to buddhi which is an

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17. VS., I. 1.6.
18. NK.,p.171.
19. buddhirupalabdhir jñānarth pratyaya iti paryayaḥ. PB., p.410.
evolutes of prakṛti. Knowledge is a mode of buddhi which transforms itself into the shape of the object that is cognising. Though the puruṣa is inactive due to the indiscrimination and intelligence of buddhi, activising of puruṣa takes place and the phenomenon of cognition arises as a result.

In the Sāṁkhyasūtra, Kapila defines that knowledge as an event brought into being by subject-object-synthesis. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, is of opinion that when an object comes into contact with the sense-organ the buddhi becomes modified into the form of the object. Due to preponderance of sattva in buddhi, it reflects the self and appears to be conscious, as a mirror reflects the light and becomes illuminating. Next, buddhi, which is modified into the form of the object is reflected back in the self, and the modification becomes manifested. Without this mutual reflection, the apparent experiences of pleasure and pain in the self, which is pure consciousness and free from pleasure and pain, cannot be explained.

In the Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī, Vācaspati Miśra’s view on knowledge is that the self is by nature inactive. All activity belongs to prakṛti. Yet the self due to its proximity is reflected in buddhi and through non-discrimination indentifies itself with the modes of

buddhi and thinks itself to be the knower. When an object comes into contact with the sense-organ, it produces certain modifications in the sense-organ. These modifications are analysed by the mind and are presented to buddhi which becomes modified or transformed into the form of the object. Buddhi, being unconscious in nature, cannot by itself know the object. But as buddhi possesses an excess of sattva in it, it reflects the consciousness of the self and appears as if conscious. With the reflection of consciousness of the self in buddhi, the unconscious modification of buddhi into the form of the object becomes illuminated into a conscious state of perception. This is called knowledge. Just as a mirror, due to reflection of light in it, appears to have the light within it, in the same manner, buddhi due to a natural excess of sattva in it, reflects the consciousness of the self or puruṣa and illuminates or cognizes the object.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa repudiates the Śaṅkhya view vehemently on the ground that as physical qualities are perceived by the sense-organs, knowledge is perceived by manas. Knowledge is the property of the immaterial substance, i.e. the soul. The soul acquires this property in its bodily setting and that is why buddhi is said to be the quality of the soul. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa points out that if the Śaṅkhyaśas themselves, hold buddhi and puruṣa as two distinct entities, then it is an error to
impose the properties of *buddhi* on *puruṣa* and vice versa. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa arrives at the conclusion that the Sāṅkhyaśas have committed this mistake due to their belief in *satkāryavāda*\textsuperscript{22}. Moreover, the Sāṅkhya view that knowledge is a substantive mode of matter makes knowledge material, whereas the fact is that knowledge is formless and matter is never without a form. So, like other Naiyāyikas, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is of the view that knowledge is a quality of the soul. It is not the instrument as the Sāṅkhyaśas hold it to be. Since the instrumentality is ascribed to the mind, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa asserts that *buddhi* is knowledge and not an instrument of knowledge. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika logicians also hold the same view.

**Mīmāṁsā Theory of Knowledge:**

According to Mīmāṁsakas knowledge is an activity of mind with regard to an object. They hold that the function of knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself\textsuperscript{23}. Prabhākara Miśra is an advocate of *tripūtisatāṁvit*, according to which the knower, the known and the knowledge are given simultaneously in every act of cognition. Knowledge reveals itself as well as the knower and the known. In the consciousness, ‘I know this’, we have the three presentation of the ‘I’

\textsuperscript{22} SK., kā.10.

\textsuperscript{23} pratītiḥ vāstvāntarapraṇāśasvabhāva. ŚV., Niralambanavāda. 44.
or that subject (*ahamvitti*), ‘this’ or the object (*viṣayavitti*), and the conscious awareness (*svasainvitti*). All consciousness is at the same time self-consciousness as well as object-consciousness. In all knowledge the self is known directly through the agency and the contact of the mind. But there is not always a direct knowledge of the object. Knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination, and does not stand in need of any other thing to manifest it. Knowledge or cognition is, therefore, said to be self-apprehended. The knowing self and the known object are not of the nature of light. So knowledge does not require the aid of something which is of the nature of light. Knowledge is self-illumined and is neither perceived as object, nor known by another knowledge. If knowledge is known as an object, then each individual knowledge may require another knowledge to know it, and so on *ad infinitum* (without limit).

But Kumārila Bhaṭṭa denies Prābhākaras view of knowledge. According to him knowledge is not self-revealing. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa admits the independent existence of external objects. Every act of knowledge implies certain relationship between the knower and the known which involves some activity on the part of the knower. Knowledge reveals the object, but cannot reveal itself. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa knowledge is not directly known, but is inferred
from the knownness (jñātata) of the object produced by knowledge. It is to be noted that generally knowledge is neither a mode nor a substance but a kind of activity or function (kriyā). Hence Pārthaśārathi Miśra holds that knowledge is an activity, a transitive process.24

The Bhāṭṭas define valid knowledge as that which being free from difference apprehends thing not already apprehended25. Ganganath Jha is of the opinion that the Bhāṭṭas do not accept the definition of valid cognition given by the Prābhākaras and that the definition of the Bhāṭṭas is subversive of the self validity (svatah-prāmāṇya) of cognition which forms the very keystone of Mīmāṁsā.26 This doctrine or theory of the self-validity of knowledge forms the cornerstone on which the entire structure of the system of Mīmāṁsā is based. Validity means the certitude of truth. The system of Mīmāṁsā asserts that all cognitions but remembrance are valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth and neither it depends on any other extraneous condition nor any other knowledge for its validity.

24. jñānakriyā hi sakarmikā. ŚD., p.56.
26. PSP., pp. 21-22.
It may be added here that the Mīmāṃsakas uphold the theory of *svatah prāmāṇya* or the theory of self validity of intrinsic validity of knowledge. According to this theory all knowledge is valid by itself. It is not validated by any other knowledge. Its validity arises from those causes from which knowledge itself arises. It is not due to any other extraneous condition. Both Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara Mīśra admit the intrinsic validity of knowledge. According to Prabhākara Mīśra, all cognitions as ‘cognitions’ are valid\(^27\). The invalidity of the cognitions is because of their disagreement with the real nature of their objects.

As rightly observed by Ganganath Jha, if the validity of cognitions depends not upon its own nature but on such extraneous circumstance as the absence of discrepancies and the previous non-apprehension of the object, then there would be its self-validity\(^28\). It is of course, true that errors, remembrances, apprehension and other instances of cognition are all valid as cognitions. Even if a cognition is found not to be in agreement with the real state of things, the cognition as cognition cannot but be accepted as valid. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the validity of knowledge consists in its

\[\text{27. yathārthaḥ sarvameveha vijñānmiti siddhayeh/}
\text{prabhākaraguruḥbhāvah saṁiśeṇaḥ prakāśyate// PP., 3.1.}
\]
\[\text{28. cf. EPSP., p. 13.}\]
apprehending an object, it is set aside by such discrepancies as its disagreement with the real nature of an object\textsuperscript{29}. All knowledge is, therefore, presumably valid and our normal life runs smooth due to this belief.

The Mīmāṃsakas advocate the theory of self-validity of knowledge both in respect of its origin (\textit{utpatti}) and ascertainment (\textit{jñāpti}). The validity of knowledge arises together with that knowledge and it is also known as soon as that knowledge is known. The validity of knowledge and knowledge of that validity arise together with that knowledge and from those conditions that lead to that knowledge. So, the validity is not due to any external or extraneous condition and it does not require any verification for it by anything else\textsuperscript{30}. The theory of self validity of knowledge is advocated in the above two aspects.

As rightly observed by Ganganath Jha, the reason why the Mīmāṃsakas lay stress upon the theory of self-validity of cognitions derived from the Vedas would not be valid or reliable as the reliability of all verbal cognition is dependent upon the veracity of the

\textsuperscript{29} tasmād bodhātmakatvena prāptā buddheḥ pramāṇatā/
arthānyathātvahetūṭhadoṣajñānād apodyate// ŚV., 2.53.

\textsuperscript{30} prakāśastu prakāśātmakatvahnānyamapekṣate. kiṁcasvata eva yadupapādyate, na tatra parāpekṣā yuktā. PP., pp.172-73.
person using the word and the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit of an author for the Vedas, hence the Vedas could not be reliable. This would strike at the very foundation of the structure of the Pīrvamīmāṃsā\textsuperscript{31}. Moreover, if all cognitions were not inherently valid then wherefrom could we have confidence in our own cognitions? Even in respect of its being one which is found subsequently to be not in consonance with the reality, the cognition as cognition remains valid.

Murāri Miśra founder of ‘Miśramata’ school of Mīmāṃsā holds that knowledge is grasped by an anuvyavasāya. However, according to all of them intrinsic validity belongs to all sources of right knowledge. For example, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that for a causal efficacy by itself non-existent cannot be produced by another\textsuperscript{32}.

**Vedānta Theory of Knowledge:**

According to Vedānta system, knowledge is the very stuff of the self. There is no difference between the self and knowledge. The self is knowledge and as such Śaṅkara rejects the distinction between the substance and attribute. Substance and its quality are identical in the same as fire and its heat are identical. Thus there is no difference between the self and the knowledge. The Vedāntins holds that

\textsuperscript{31} vide, PIS., p. 71.

\textsuperscript{32} svatah sarva-pramāṇāṇāṁ prāmāṇyam iti gamyate// na hi svato’ sati saktih kartumanyena śakyte // ŠV., 2.47.
knowledge arises when there is a modification (vṛtti) of mind (antahkarana) in the form of the object. It is an expression of pure consciousness through the mental mode (antahkarana-vṛtti) corresponding to the object. Being thus illumined, the mental mode manifests the object to the self. Primarily, knowledge is pure consciousness. Its expression through the mental mode is secondarily called knowledge. It is the sense of this mode of consciousness (vṛtti-caitanya or vṛttijñāna) that the term knowledge (jñāna) is generally used. The same basic consciousness assumes various forms through different mental modes corresponding to different objects. Thus, a person has knowledge in many forms: (i) knowledge of a thing, e.g., tree, house, horse etc. (ii) knowledge of an attribute, e.g., redness, beauty, roundness etc. (iii) knowledge of an action, e.g., flow, flight, blow. Like the varied knowledge of external objects there is also varied knowledge of mental states, such as happiness fear, love, imagination, memory. By taking the forms of diverse objects mind causes variations in knowledge or consciousness, but does not generate it.

According to the system of Advaita Vedānta, knowledge as self-shining consciousness is the very essence or substance of the self (ātmā) and not its attribute. Knowledge as it is, cannot be regarded as
a quality inherent in mind, for mind is by nature devoid of consciousness. Nor can knowledge be characterized as a mental state or function, which is an object of cognition. Mental states and functions are not conscious in themselves. They are illuminated by the witness-self (sākṣī-caitanya). Knowledge as pure consciousness cannot be defined as subject-object relation which is manifested by it. It precedes all relation. Hence according to Advaita Vedānta, knowledge in its narrower sense stands for pure awareness i.e. self-knowledge.

There are two kinds of knowledge given by Advaita Vedānta viz. svarūpa-jñāna and vṛtti-jñāna. Svarūpa-jñāna means as we go on tracing the true nature of knowledge. The true nature of knowledge is that it is eternal, self-evident and undifferentiated unity. Vṛtti-jñāna is relative to its object. It is produced by the operation of sense organs, and so on, when the conditions that bring it about are favourable. It disappears when its function is over. It is a state of antahkaraṇa and in some cases the state of avidyā is also called vṛtti. Hence vṛtti is of two kinds: antahkaraṅavṛtti and avidyāvṛtti.

Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja takes knowledge as an essential quality of the self. The self is not, as the Advaitins say, itself
knowledge but is qualified by knowledge. Knowledge is not the essence of the self, but an attribute owned by the self\textsuperscript{33}.

**Four Basic Factors: Pramā, Pramātā, Prameya and Pramāṇa:**

The concept of pramā, pramātā, prameya and pramāṇa are included in Nyāya epistemology\textsuperscript{34}. In Indian epistemology prameya means the knowable, the object to be known. The word prameya is the object that is rightly known. It is a object, to which the process of knowledge refers or to which it is directed. The prameya are strictly correlative factors involved in all knowledge. Prameya which is generally translated as the object of cognition, means that which is measurable or even measured. Pramātā means the knower or the cognizer of the valid knowledge. Pramātā is a first necessary factor of pramā or valid knowledge. It is the self conceived as an intelligent agent. It is also independent in the sense that it exists for itself and is an end to itself. Pramā is unerring knowledge and the other three (pramātā, prameya and pramāṇa) are the necessary factors of pramā.

**The Nature of Pramā:**

According to Indian philosophy the valid knowledge is called pramā or yathārthajñāna i.e. true knowledge. Regarding the real

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\item[33.] NTK., p. 18.
\item[34.] pramāṇāri pramātā-prameya pramitirīti caturvargenaiva vyavahāraḥ parisamāpyate. NVTT., under NS., 1.1.1.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
nature of *prama* there are different views in Indian philosophy. Philosophically the term *prama* includes all cases of true presentational knowledge of objects. The word *prama* is sometimes used as synonymous for the world *jñāna* which is translated in English as knowledge. But the word *jñāna* is sometimes used in the sense of cognition, in which case it is quiet concisely to say that there is a *bhramajñāna* or false or illusory cognition. But since the root *mā* or *prama* is a synonym of the root *jñā* the ambiguity in respect of the root *jñā* also occurs in respect of the root *mā*, with a prefix *pra* and *tāp*. Etymologically the term *pra* means ‘well exact’ and *mā* means ‘measured’.

The word *prama* is different from invalid knowledge. Different systems of Indian philosophy have expressed divergent opinions with regard to the nature of *prama*. Prof. D.M. Datta holds that *prama* is a cognition having the two-fold characteristics of truth and novelty (*ābhādhitatva* or *yathārthatya* and *anadhigatatva*), and that as regards the first characteristic-truth-all school of Indian philosophy are unanimous\(^3\). Here simply refer to the different views on the nature of valid knowledge given by philosophers of different systems.

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35. Six Ways of Knowing, p.20.
Nyāya View of Valid Knowledge:

In the Nyāya system, prama is a definite and assert knowledge of an object which is true and presentational in character. So, valid knowledge is an apprehension produced by an object. Vātsyāyana a commentator of Nyāyasūtra, defines valid knowledge as the cognition of an object in something in which it is, that is, the cognition of an object as it really is. Uddyotakara accepts the same definition of prama given by Vātsyāyana. A later Naiyāyika like Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, defines valid knowledge as that knowledge of objects which is free from doubt and illusion. It means valid knowledge is an apprehension of some object which is doubtless and non-erroneous. Describing the process of valid knowledge Jayanta Bhaṭṭa opines that memory is not valid and that it is excluded from valid knowledge by the inclusion of the word arthopalabdhi in the definition. So, according to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, valid knowledge is an apprehension produced by an object. The later Naiyāyikas, however, define valid knowledge as true experience and they opposed experience to memory by asserting that an experience is different from memory.

36. yad tasminstāditi tadvyabhicāri, yattu tasminstaditi tadavyavicāri pratyakṣamiti. NBh., 1.1.4.
37. abyabhicāriṇīmasandigdhāmarthopalabdhiṁ bidadhati. NM., I-20.
The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika defines pramā as the knowledge of the
generic nature as abiding in its own subject\textsuperscript{38}.

Gaṅgeśa the founder of Navya-Nyāya school holds that valid
knowledge is that which informs us of the existence of something in a
place where it really exists.\textsuperscript{39} Śivāditya defines pramā as the
apprehension of the real nature of an object.\textsuperscript{40} Udayana defines pramā
as the true ascertainment of an object. Others define it as the true
apprehension of an object\textsuperscript{41}. According to Annam Bhaṭṭa, who makes
it clear that what we call yathārtha is otherwise known as pramā.\textsuperscript{42}
Viśvanātha, another later Naiyāyika, has defined pramā as bhrama-

bhīnna\textsuperscript{43}, i.e. different from invalid knowledge. The word bhrama
usually denotes an illusory knowledge, but in the sense of apramā in
general, is not to be confined to denoting illusion alone.

It appears from this that pramā has three main characteristics
viz., (i) assuredness (ii) truth and (iii) presentativeness. As to the first
characteristic of pramā it is a definite categorical assertion as

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\item \textsuperscript{38} tadvati tat-prakārakaṁ jñānaṁ pramā. atadvati tatprakārakaṁ jñānaṁ
apramā. tadabhāvavatī tat prakārakaṁ jñānaṁ apramā. IEP., p.9.
\item \textsuperscript{39} yatra yad asti tatra tasyānubhaṅgaḥ pramā. TC., p. 401.
\item \textsuperscript{40} tattvānubhaṅgaḥ pramā. SP., p.59.
\item \textsuperscript{41} mitiḥ samyak-paricchittih. NKS.,IV.5.
\item \textsuperscript{42} tadbhāti tatprakārakānubhaṅgaḥ yathārthaḥ yathā rajate edāṁ, rajatamiti
jñānaṁ, saiba pratyayuchyate. TS., p.23.
\item \textsuperscript{43} bhrama bhinnantu jñānamatrocye pramā. BP., v. 134.
\end{itemize}
distinguished from all indefinite, problematic and hypothetical knowledge. In *pramā*, there is a feeling of assurance or conviction in what is known. So valid knowledge is always connected with a firm belief. All assurances or firm beliefs, however, are not *pramā*. In illusion we firmly believe in what is false. *Pramā* implies something more than a subjective certainty.

The second characteristic of *pramā* is that it is true or unerring (*yathārtha*) knowledge. Knowledge is true when it is not contradicted by its object (*arthāvyabhicārī*). This means that knowledge is true when it reveals its object with that nature and attribute which abide in it despite all changes of time, place and other conditions. What is once true of an object is always true of it, devoid of space and time. To know a thing truly is to know it as characterized by what is characteristic of it (*tadvati tatprakāraka*). Hence according to Nyāya, the truth of knowledge consists in its correspondence of facts.

The third characteristic of *pramā* is presentativeness. According to it, *pramā* is not only a true and an assured cognition, but also a presentational cognition (*anubhava*). Otherwise, memory will have to be regarded as *pramā*. Hence the Naiyāyikas hold that *pramā* is a presentational cognition (*anubhava*), in which there is a

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44. NVTT., pp. 5-21.
characterisation, in thought, of the object as it is in reality (yathārtha), as well as a definite assurance of its being objectively valid (asan digdha)\textsuperscript{45}.

**Vaiśeṣika View of Valid Knowledge:**

In the Vaiśeṣika system, valid knowledge is not defined. Even the great commentator Praśastapāda does not define valid knowledge in his bhāṣya on Vaiśeṣikasūtra. But Praśastapāda makes a distinction between vidyā and avidyā\textsuperscript{46}. Vidyā includes perception, inference, ārṣa and memory. Avidyā includes doubt, illusion, indefinite cognition and dream. Śrīdhara in his bhāṣya, however defines vidyā as a firm, uncontradicted and definite cognition\textsuperscript{47}. To be precise, vidyā means valid knowledge and by avidyā, invalid knowledge is understood. The above definition refers to an additional mark of valid knowledge, that is, adhyavasāya. It is meant to exclude anadhyavasāya or indefinite cognition such as ‘what this may be’, which lacks assurance like doubt but which differs from the latter in that the object regarding which an indefinite cognition arises is not known in two or more conflicting ways. Under avidyā, Praśastapāda divides sanśaya (doubt), viparyaya (error), anadhyavasāya and

\textsuperscript{45} NTK., p. 52.

\textsuperscript{46} samāsato dve vidye-vidyā cāvidyā ceti. PB., p. 170.

\textsuperscript{47} niḥsandigdhāvādhitādhyavasāyātmikā prafītirvidyā. NK., p. 169.
svapna (dream). Again valid knowledge is of four kinds viz, perception, inference, memory and the supernatural knowledge of the sages (ārṣa)\(^ {48} \). As against the Prabhākaras, the Vaiśeṣikas accepts smṛti as valid knowledge. But Śrīdhara distinguishes vidyā from pramāṇa. According to him, memory is vidyā or valid cognition but not a pramāṇa because it reveals an object as past and as already known\(^ {49} \). In this respect, Śrīdhara appears to be influenced by the Nyāya view. But if his view is accepted as a correct interpretation of the bhāṣya of Praśastapāda, it is practically same as the Bhāṭṭa view of valid knowledge as a definite, true and new cognition\(^ {50} \).

With the above views of valid knowledge given by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, it regards that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika’s realistic definitions of pramāṇa are based upon dualistic metaphysics. They presuppose the existence of the knowing self and the known object. And they recognize the correspondence between the pramāṇa and the prameya. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not define the exact nature of the correspondence between the two. It is a fact of experience and so cannot be challenged. It is proved by its practical usefulness. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is practical in its attitude towards the

\(^{48}\) pramāṇaṁ smṛtih sandeho vipāyasyaśceti caturvidhaṁ jñāṇam.----- tatra bhramasandehajñāne ayathārthe. As quoted in Nyā.S. under PP., p. 302.

\(^{49}\) NK., p.253.

\(^{50}\) EBP., p.84.
problem of epistemology. The extra-mental reality is a fact of experience. It is real, and so cannot be idealized. It is exactly represented by valid knowledge. And this correspondence too between pramā and prameya is a fact of experience. It cannot be explained away. It is proved only by its pragmatic utility.

**Sāmkhya-Yoga View of Valid Knowledge:**

In the Sāmkhya system of thought, puruṣa is considered as immutable and imprudent and when buddhi or intellect conceives the reflection of puruṣa and the form of the object is revealed, then this revelations is named as pramā. The Sāmkhyaśūtra of Kapila defines valid knowledge as determination (paricchitti) of an object which is not previously cognised\(^{51}\). Vijñānabhikṣu defines pramā as the reflection of buddhi having the form of object into puruṣa\(^{52}\). Vijñānabhikṣu further suggests that buddhivṛtti may also be taken as pramā. It is also stated that when the result of knowledge is considered to be in buddhi, pramā will be sense-object contact and when the result of knowledge is considered to be in puruṣa, pramā will be the function of buddhi\(^{53}\).

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51. dvayorekatarasya vyasyasannikṣṭārdāparicchitih pramā tat sādhakatamaṁ yat tat trividhaṁ pramaṇam. SS., 1.87.
52. SPB., under Ibid.
53. Ibid.
According to the Sāṃkhya, buddhi or cognition takes a form of the object and so, the truth of a cognition consists in its being a faithful copy of the object. Valid knowledge has correspondence to its object in the sense in which a true copy has it to its original. Aniruddha in his Sāṃkhyaśāstra-vṛtti interpreted Kapila’s definition of pramā differently. According to Aniruddha, in Kapila’s definition, the term dvayoh refers to sense and object, in the case of sense-cognition and ekatarasya to a mark or a word, in the case of inference of verbal cognition. In place of vā api, he reads ca api and takes asannikṛṣṭartha-parichhittih to mean ‘the determination of objects not previously determined. Thus the meaning of the first clause, according to Aniruddha pramā is the determination of undetermined objects as the result of both (the sense and the object), (in the case of perception) and of either of the two (a mark or a word), (in the case of inference and verbal cognition).

It is to be noted that in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophy, valid knowledge carries different meanings than in other philosophies. The Sāṃkhyaśas hold that valid knowledge is the reflection of the self-intelligent puruṣa (conscious self) in the mental mode (buddhivṛtti)

54. HIE., p.190.
55. Ibid.
corresponding to the object and, therefore, self-manifest\textsuperscript{56}. The Sāṁkhyaśas describe that \textit{puruṣa} is immutable and imprudent. When \textit{buddhi} or intellect conceives the reflection of \textit{puruṣa} and the form of the object is revealed, then this revelation is named \textit{pramā}.

In the \textit{Sāṁkhyakārikā}, Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not give the definition of \textit{pramā}. Vācaspati Miśra in his commentary \textit{Sāṁkhyaatattvakaumudī} defines valid knowledge as the function of the \textit{citta} that apprehends an object which is undoubted, real and unknown\textsuperscript{57}. Vācaspati Miśra further gives an alternate definition of \textit{pramā} as apprehension (\textit{bodha}) of \textit{puruṣa} which forms the result of \textit{pramāṇa}\textsuperscript{58}. As a matter of fact, \textit{pramā} or \textit{bodha} of \textit{puruṣa} is further stated to be of the form of the favour rendered to sentient faculty\textsuperscript{59}.

\textbf{Mīmāṁsā View of Valid Knowledge :}

The Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrvamīmāṁsā, considers the correspondence to the object, novelty and non-contradictoriness as the test of validity. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa defines valid knowledge as a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of

\textsuperscript{56} vide. SK., kā. 4. and, YS., I.6.
\textsuperscript{57} taccā’sandīgdhāvipārītānadhigataviśayā cittavṛttiḥ. STK., under SK., kā.5.
\textsuperscript{58} asandīgdhāvipārītānadhigataviśayā cittavṛttiḥ, bodhaśca pauruṣeya phalam pramā. STK., under SK., kā.4.
\textsuperscript{59} STK., under SK., kā.5.
confirmation by other cognitions.\textsuperscript{60} It may be pointed out here that Kumarila Bhaṭṭa and his followers use the term pramāṇa for valid knowledge and prāmāṇya in the sense of validity. Umbeka, a great commentator of Ślokavārttika uses the words na visaṅvādamṛcchati in the place of nāpi saṅvādamṛcchati in the definition of valid knowledge given by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The word drdha in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s definition of valid knowledge excludes doubt (saṁśaya) from valid knowledge. Nārāyaṇa a follower of Bhāṭṭamāṁśā defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of a unknown real object\textsuperscript{61}.

In the Śāstradīpikā, Pārthasārathi Miśra defines valid knowledge as the knowledge which represents the real nature of an object which was not attained earlier and which is not contradicted by subletting knowledge\textsuperscript{62}. Pārthasārathi Miśra mentions\textsuperscript{63} three distinctive features of valid knowledge, viz., (i) its object is not remembered as having been previously known (ii) it conforms to the real nature of its object and (iii) there is a feeling of conviction regarding its conformity or agreement with the real object. Thus

\textsuperscript{60} tasmād drdhaṁ yadutpannam nāpi saṅvādamṛcchati/
   jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṁ tat pramāṇariṇi pratiyatāṁ// ŚV., 2.80.

\textsuperscript{61} pramaṁ caññāta tatvārtha-jñānam. MM., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{62} kāraṇadośavādhakajñānaraḥhitam’grhitagrāhi jñānaṁ pramāṇamiti.
   ŚD., p. 123.

\textsuperscript{63} NRM., p. 35.
noum, non-contradictoriness and truth are the three essential marks of valid knowledge. The Bhāṭṭas like most of other schools admits two kinds of valid knowledge, that is immediate (aparokṣa) and mediate (parokṣa). Valid knowledge is one which produces some new information about something, not contradicted by any other knowledge and not yielded by defective conditions such as defective sense-organs in the case of perceptual knowledge, fallacious premise in the case of inference, etc. According to Umbeka the word drdha excludes doubt from valid knowledge and the word na visamvādamrcchati (which is not contradicted by other cognitions) excludes error or illusion.

According to the Bhāttamārūnsakas, a knowledge cannot be valid unless it adds something to our present stock of information. As a matter of fact, validity consists in discovering new objects. So, according to them, valid knowledge should be essentially useful and hence it must reveal something new. A question may arise here as whether continuous perception of something be treated as valid or not. Whether the perception reveals in the subsequent moments be different from what it revealed in first moment. Whether these will be invalid or not. In answer to these questions the Bhāṭṭas say that newness marks every one of these cognitions, because though the
object of all such cognitions is identically the same, yet it is cognised as existing in a different moment of time. Therefore, continuous perception is not excluded when valid knowledge is defined as the cognition of a previously unknown real object\(^{64}\).

Śālikānātha Miśra, the celebrated writer of the Prābhākaramāṁśā refutes Bhāṭṭas definition of valid knowledge on the ground that the definition is not tenable in respect of continuous cognitions\(^{65}\). Again the word \textit{drdhha} in the definition of valid knowledge given by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa is also useless as the word is included to exclude doubt from valid knowledge. Doubt is already excluded when valid knowledge is said to be an apprehension of the previously unapprehended\(^{66}\). Thus the word \textit{avisāṅvādi} in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa’s definition of valid knowledge is also not necessary as all knowledge except memory is true\(^{67}\).

\begin{itemize}
\item \(^{64}\) tasmād ‘yathārthhamagrīta-grāhī jñānair pramāṇair’ iti vaktavyam,
\item dhārāvāhīkeśvapsvyaṣottarottareṣāṁ kālāntarasarīṁbandhāsya-grhitasya grahaṇād yuktair prāmāṇyam. MS., 1.1.5.
\item \(^{65}\) nāpi drdhhamavisāṅvādyagṛhitārthagṛhāhakair pramāṇamiti pramāṇalakṣaṇamupapadayate. PP., p. 119.
\item \(^{66}\) api ca drdhhamiti kiriṇ nivarttyam? sarśaṣayaṁ jñānamiti cet, kaḥ punarayaṁ sarśaṣayaḥ?....”prāmāṇyarīṁ nirastamiti kiriṇ drdhagrahaṇēna. ibid., pp. 120-122.
\item \(^{67}\) avisāṅvādigrāhāṇamāpī sarva jñānānāmarthāvyabhicārādavīṣeṣakam. Ibid., p. 122.
\end{itemize}
According to the Prābhākaras all knowledge is valid. Experience is valid knowledge, and knowledge other than memory is experience\textsuperscript{68}. It may be stated here that Prābhākaras definition of valid knowledge is the same as that of the later Naiyāyikas except that Prabhākara does not include the term \textit{yathārtha} in the definition. Śālikānātha Miśra the polemical writer of the Prābhākara school defines valid knowledge as experience totally different from remembrance which is not valid inasmuch as it stands in need of a previous knowledge, being as it is, a knowledge which is produced only by the impressions left by some previous experience\textsuperscript{69}. According to Śālikānātha Miśra, the need of a previous experience is the cause of the invalidity of remembrance. By this statement, it is clearly implied that previous non-experience of the object is a condition of validity. In a continuous perception, the later cognitions arising out of sense-object contact, like the first cognition, are different from remembrance and as such they come to be regarded as valid. The definition of remembrance given by Śālikānātha Miśra above, does not apply to recognition (\textit{pratyabhijñā}) as recognition is not produced only by impressions left by previous cognition.

\textsuperscript{68} anubhūtiḥ pramāṇaṁ sa śmrteranyā. PP., 5.1.

\textsuperscript{69} anubhūtiḥ pramāṇaṁ sa śmrteranyā śmrṭiḥ punah/pūrvavi jñānasamāskāramātrajan jñānamucyate // na pramāṇaṁ śmrṭiḥ pūrvapratiputterapekṣaṇāt. PP., 5.1-2.
It may be pointed out here that both the schools of Mīmāṃsā accept the condition of not being apprehended in case of valid knowledge. The difference, however, between them is that while the Bhāṭṭas impose two conditions viz., absence of discrepancies and the previous non-apprehension of the object, the Prābhākaras impose only the previous non-apprehension. Both the schools, however, do not accept remembrance as valid knowledge. However, there seems a difference of opinion between them regarding such a wrong knowledge as that of silver in conch-shell. According to the Bhāṭṭas 'idam rajatam' (this is silver) is only one cognition. But for the Prābhākaras, there are two cognitions in it. One is an apprehension and the other is a remembrance. As rightly observed by Ganganath Jha, the judgment or idea resulting from the cognition ‘this is silver’ when referring to the shell, contains not one but two cognitions one pertaining to ‘silver’ and the other to ‘this’ and of these two, the idea of ‘silver’ is a case of mere remembrance and so because of its being not an apprehension, it cannot be treated as valid. The other factor in the idea i.e., idea of, ‘this’, however, is of the nature of an apprehension and hence, it is treated as valid. As stated by

70. rajatamidamiti nedamekarān vijnānānāṁ, kintu dve ete vijnāne grahaṇasmaranarupe. PP., p. 120.
71. idamiti vijnānamanubhavarūpaṁ pramāṇamisyata eva. ibid.
Ganganath Jha, in dream-cognition also, even though things are only remembered, yet they appeal as if they were actually apprehended at the time and what occurs is that the factor of having been apprehended at some previous time, is lost sight of. It is this last factor only that differentiates what is remembered from what is apprehended. Then regarding the agency that excites the impression, the exciting of which is needed for all remembrance. This is supplied by some unseen agency' which guides the percipient in their earthly sojourn. If the time during which he sleeps is one at which he is destined to experience, pleasure, the unseen agency of his destiny awakens the impressions that bring to his mind pleasant memories and so for pain also. This pleasure or pain so far as the actual feeding is concerned, is as real as any that is experienced during waking consciousness72.

Pārthasārathi Miśra finds some inconsistencies in Prabhākara Miśra's view of valid knowledge. According to the definition of Prabhākara Miśra, a dream-cognition which arises solely out of mental impressions, is valid. But this cannot be consistent with his view that a dream-cognition is valid so far as the elements of cognition and the cogniser in it are concerned. According to

72. PSP., p. 31.
Prabhākara Miśra, in all cognitions of whatever status the Self and the
cognition are, dream-cognition is also a cognition. If according to
Prabhākara Miśra, a dream cognition being memory in respect of its
object and anubhūti in respect of its form and the cogniser, is partly
valid and partly invalid, then recognition too involving an element of
memory or remembrance and an element of anubhūti must be partly
valid and partly invalid73.

**Vedānta View of Valid Knowledge:**

Śaṅkara the founder of Advaita Vedānta holds that valid
knowledge is produced by the means of knowledge, which has for its
object the real nature of an existent object. It can not be made or
unmade by the empirical self. It is determined by the object. It does
not depend upon the command of the self. The knowledge which
corresponds with the real nature of its object is valid74. Correspondence is the test of absolute truth or Brahman ought to be
known by valid knowledge because it is the highest Good75. The
knowledge of Brahman is valid, because it corresponds with its real

73. tadidāriṃ svapnadarśane tāvadavyāpakam, saṁskāramātrajasyāpi jñānasya
svarūpe, kartari ca prāṁśyamiṣṭam bhavatām. SDK., p. 72.
74. bhūtavastuviśayānāṁ prāṁśyānī vastutantrān. Sb., I. 1.2.,
jñānaṁ tu pramāṇajanyāṁ, yathāvastuviśayānī ca, na hi tat puruṣatantryāṁ,
vastutantrāṁ eva hi tat. Ibid. III. 2.21.
75. Ibid. I.1.2.
nature. Integral experience is determined by the real nature of Brahman\textsuperscript{76}. The scripture gives the knowledge of Brahman. It dispels avidyā. Though the validity of the scripture is self-certifying, it can be known by the pragmatic test of its fruitful consequence\textsuperscript{77}. Dharmarājadhvaryu a staunch follower of Śaṅkara holds that valid knowledge is that knowledge when an object which is not known earlier and which is not contradicted\textsuperscript{78}. The Vedāntins do not accept novelty as an essential factor for valid knowledge. Nor do they oppose the view of considering novelty as a mark of valid knowledge. Thus Dharmarājadhvaryu gives two alternative definitions of pramā with and without novelty as a mark of valid knowledge\textsuperscript{79}. In the Bhāmatī on Brahmasūtra, Vācaspati Miśra defines valid knowledge as that knowledge which is not previously known and is also not contradicted\textsuperscript{80}.

\textsuperscript{76} brahmavijñānaṁ api vastutantraṁ eva bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt. Ibid.I. 1.2. samyagdarśane vastutantratvāt jñānasya. Ibid. IV 1.7.
\textsuperscript{77} ātmavijñānasya phalaparyantatvāt na tadviṣayasya śāstrasya prāmāṇyaṁ śakyarn pratyākhyātum. Ibid I. 1.4.
\textsuperscript{78} pramāṭtvamanadhigatāvādhitaviṣayajñānattvam. VP., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{79} tatra smṛityāvṛttarāṁ pramāṭtvamanadhigatābādhitaviṣayajñānattvam, smṛtisādhāraṇaṁ tvābdhita viṣayajñānattvam. VP., p. 4.
\textsuperscript{80} abādhitā anadhigata asandigda bodhojanakattvaṁ hi pramāṇattvaṁ pramāṇāṇāṁ. Bh., 1.1.4.
In the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Uttaraṁīmāṁsā, Rāmānuja holds that the validity of knowledge consists of both the faithfulness to the object and prompting to the fruitful activity. Viśiṣṭādvaita’s definition of valid knowledge namely, knowledge which is consistent with the usage as it can at best be a description of pramā and it does not bring out the essence of pramā. Śrīnivāsa a follower of Rāmānuja’s school defines valid knowledge as the knowledge, which apprehends an object as it really exists, and which prompts fruitful activity.\(^{81}\)

According to the Dvaita school of Uttaraṁīmāṁsā, Madhva accepts conformity of knowledge to the object as a mark of pramā. Madhva defines valid knowledge as that which corresponds of its object.\(^{82}\) Jayatīrtha a follower of Dvaita school also defines valid knowledge as the knowledge of an object as it really is in the temporal order and the spatial order with its important qualities and relations to other things. Human knowledge is always limited and cannot exhaustibly apprehend all the relations and qualities of its object; but that does not make it invalid. The Dvaitādvaita\(^{83}\) and the

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81. yathavasthitavyavahārānugunānāṁ jñānāṁ pramā. YMD., p.3.
82. yathārtiyāṁ eva mānātvam. AV., p. 178.
83. yathārtajñānāṁ pramā, tadvatī tatprakārakattvāṁ yathārthattvāṁ. cf. UIP., p.4.
Śuddhādvaita\textsuperscript{84} school of Uttaramīmāṁsā also accept conformity of knowledge to the object as a mark of valid knowledge.

It is to be pointed here that recognition of novelty as an essential factor of valid knowledge further enquires about the inclusion of persistent knowledge of the same object (\emph{dhāravāhika jñāna}) into the valid knowledge, because the persistent knowledge is considered as a form of valid knowledge by all schools of Indian philosophy\textsuperscript{85}.

\textbf{The Nature of Pramāṇa :}

The \emph{pramāṇa} is the second basic factor of the theory of knowledge. Correct knowledge of a matter or an object to be known depends on the means or sources of valid knowledge. \emph{Pramāṇa} is one of the important tenets of the systems of Indian philosophy. Derivatively \emph{pramāṇa} means the instrument of valid knowledge.

\emph{Pramāṇa} is also a technical term of Indian philosophy. In Indian epistemology \emph{pramāṇa} is a method to know about the subject and object. The term \emph{pramāṇa} is derived from the root \emph{mā} with a prefix \emph{pra} and suffix \emph{lyut} (\emph{pra+mā+ lyut}). The root \emph{mā}, with prefix \emph{pra} (i.e. \emph{pra+mā}) means to know rightly. The suffix \emph{lyut} being the

\textsuperscript{84} niścayo yathārthānuvabah. ayameva prameṭi vyavahṛyate yāthārthyaṁ cărthānativartītvaṁ. PRK.,p.18.
\textsuperscript{85} SYE., p. 65.
instrumental, *pramāṇa* means the instrument by which something is rightly known. Vātsyāyana a later Naiyāyika puts it that the *pramāṇas* being the instruments of right knowledge is to be understood by the etymological analysis (*nirvacana*) of epithet (i.e. *pramāṇa* itself). The word *pramāṇa* signifies the instrument because (it is derived as) 'by this is rightly known' (*pramīyate anena*)\(^86\).

In Sanskrit, *pramāṇa* signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired. *Pramāṇa* is the cause of valid cognition of objects inasmuch as it gives us a knowledge of objects as they really are and exist in themselves\(^87\). *Pramāṇa* has a real correspondence with objects in the sense that the nature and attributes of objects, is revealed by *pramāṇa*, uncontradictorily true of them, despite all variations in time, place and other conditions\(^88\). *Pramāṇa* is taken to mean the entire complex or collocation of all the specific physical and psychological conditions (*bodhābodhasvabhāva sāmagrī*) that are actually operative in bringing about a valid and assured condition of object (*pramāṇa*). In this sense the final definition of *pramāṇa* is that it is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and the object, which does not normally fail to produce

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86. Vbh., 1.1. 13.
87. Ibid.
88. NVTT., 1.1.1.
valid knowledge. Pramāṇa is not only instrument of knowledge but also it is a way of cognition. Though all the systems of Indian philosophy accept pramāṇa as the karaṇa or the extraordinary means of pramāṇa yet there is difference of opinions about the characteristics of karaṇa or pramāṇa. There is however, a marked difference of opinion regarding the exact nature of pramāṇa amongst the philosophers. Let us briefly consider below the different views of pramāṇa.

Nyāya View of Pramāṇa:

In the Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, the definition of pramāṇa is not given. Gautama simply enumerates four means of knowledge. But Vātsyāyana a commentator of Nyāyasūtra analyses the nature of pramāṇa. According to Vātsyāyana pramāṇa is the cause of apprehension of object. Vātsyāyana holds that the means of knowledge have reference to an object, for it is only when objects are cognized by means of them, that it is possible to mark an effort to

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89. NM., p. 15.
90. avisambadi vijnanam pramanamiti sougatah /anubhutiḥ pramāṇarthāḥ sā
   smṛtiranyeti kecana //ajñātacaratavārthaniścāyakamathāpare/
   prameyavyāptamapare pramāṇamiti manvate/ /
   pramāṇiyatasāmārgūḥ pramāṇarthāḥ kecidūcire. TR., 5-7.
91. upalabdhiḥhetupramāṇam. NBh., 1.1.1.
achieve them. Uddyotakara, an old Naiyāyika, repeats Vātsyāyana’s views in somewhat clarifying manner and has not added anything substantial in the already existing etymology based definition of pramāṇa extended by Vātsyāyana. According to him, cause of knowledge (upalabdhihetu) is called pramāṇa. Pramāṇa is the unique operative cause (karaṇa) of right knowledge. Pramāṇa is the complex of specific conditions, other than the subject and the object, which do not normally fail to produce valid knowledge.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa defines pramāṇa as the extra-ordinary cause of right knowledge. Pramāṇa is that collocation of conscious as well as unconscious factors which results in producing such an apprehension of knowable objects i.e. different from illusion and doubt. Hence, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa defines pramāṇa as the complex of all the conscious and non-conscious conditions that are operative in bringing about a valid knowledge of objects. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s definition of pramāṇa consists in the synthesis of all the relevant and essential features of pramāṇa as well.

92. pramāṇato’ rtha-pratipattau pravr̥tti-sāmarthyaḥ arthavat prāmaṇam. NBh.,1.1.1.
93. cf. NM., p. 15.
94. avyabhicārīṇaṁ asandigdhāṁ arthropalabdhiṁ vidadhatī bodha-bodhāsvabhāvāḥ sāmagrī prāmaṇam. NM., I-12. or kartṛkarma vilakṣaṇa saṁśaya viparyayaraḥitārthībodhā vidhayinī bodhābodhāsvabhāvāḥ sāmagrī prāmaṇam. NM., I-14.
It is to be pointed here that Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s definiton of \textit{pramāṇa} has deeply influenced the accounts of later Naiyāyikas and the syncretists. The modern Naiyāyikas like Keśava Miśra and Annam Bhaṭṭa define \textit{pramāṇa} as the instrument or means of valid knowledge or right cognition\textsuperscript{95}. In this definition Śivāditya clearly adopts the term \textit{sāmagrī} and explains it as the totality of causes without which the effect is never produced\textsuperscript{96}.

\textbf{Vaiśeṣika View of \textit{Pramāṇa}}:

In the \textit{Vaiśeṣikasūtra}, Kaṇāda, who occupies the first place in the traceable history of the epistemological tradition has stated that the general definition of \textit{pramāṇa} should be based on the principle that the cause of cognition should be free from defects\textsuperscript{97}. Praśastapāda includes perception, inference and ārśa under \textit{vidyā}, and illusion, etc., under \textit{avidyā}. But there is no clear-cut definition of \textit{pramāṇa} in \textit{Praśastapādabhāṣya}. Śrīdhara refers to an additional characteristic \textit{adhyavasāya} meaning that \textit{vidyā} is a definite cognition\textsuperscript{98}. But Śrīdhara creates confusion by including memory under \textit{vidyā}. Sarṅkara Miśra, in his \textit{Upaskāra} on the \textit{Vaiśeṣikasūtra}, however,

\textsuperscript{95} pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇam. TB., p.7.
\textsuperscript{96} kāryāyogavyavacchinā sāmagrī pramāṇam. SP., p.137.
\textsuperscript{97} aduṣṭaṁ vidyā. VS., 9.2. 12.
\textsuperscript{98} NK., p.172.
seems to be less ambiguous when he asserts that a pramāṇa is that which produces true knowledge. The Vaiśeṣika system describes pramāṇa as the unique operative cause of both true presentational knowledge and memory. It would take memory as a distinct pramāṇa or method of knowledge like perception and inference.

The Śāṅkhyā View of Pramāṇa:

The Śāṅkhyās concept of pramāṇa is different from all these systems of Indian philosophy. In the Śāṅkhyasūtra, Kapila defines pramāṇa as that which is most conductive to the pramāṇa. Again it is defined as the determination of an object which is not previously cognized by either of the two. In the Śāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya on Śāṅkhyasūtra, Vijnānabhikṣu further explains that the expression asannikṛṣṭa (not previously cognised) excludes memory, the term artha excludes mistake or illusion (bhrama) and the term paricchitti excludes doubt from the domain of pramāṇa. The complete definition comes to mean that the pramāṇa is the novel knowledge of a real object.

The part of the definition ‘not cognized by either of the two’ is

99. VSU., p.224.
100. smṛtyanubhasādhāraṇaṁ pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇam. TK., p.6.
101. SYE., p.70.
102. dvayorekatarasya vā'pyasannikṛṣṭārthaparicchittih pramāṇaḥ tat sādhakaṁ yat tat trividhaṁ pramāṇam. SS., 1.87.
103. smṛtvīvāntarātyānadhigateti, bhramavyāvartanāya vastviti samśayavyāvartanāya tvavadhāraṇamiti. SPB., 1.87.
subject to manifold interpretation. Aniruddha in his *Sāṃkhyaśāstra-vrtti* interprets it as not cognized either through the presence of the two, viz. the sense and the object, a case of direct means of knowledge or through the presence of one, viz. a word (*śabda*) in the case of inference and verbal testimony\(^{104}\). Thus, the *pramāṇa*, according to Aniruddha comes to mean the cognition of an uncognized object\(^{105}\).

Vijñānabhinikṣu defines *pramāṇa* as the *vṛtti* of buddhi and the *pramāṇa* as the reflection of the buddhi having the form of the object into *puruṣa* \(^{106}\). Vijñānabhinikṣu further suggests that buddhivṛtti may also be taken as *pramāṇa*. He clarifies thus: when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in the buddhi, the *pramāṇa* will be the sense-object contact, etc. and when the result of knowledge is considered to be located in *puruṣa*, the *pramāṇa* will be the function of buddhi\(^{107}\). As a matter of fact, *puruṣa* is the witness of knowledge and not a real cognize\(^{108}\). Vijñānabhinikṣu also

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104. dvayoritī indriyārthavidyamāṇayoh pratyakṣe, ekatarasya vā’pīti
vidyamāṇasya liṅgasya śabdasya vānumāne śabda ca. SSV., 1.87.
105. etenānavāgatārthantr pramāṇamāntyuktam. Ibid. 1.87.
106. ...... pramāṇaṃ vṛttireva naḥ, pramārthākāravṛttīnāṁ cetane
prativimbanam. SPB., Ibid.
107. yadi pramārūparāḥ phalaṁ puruṣaniṣṭhamātramucyate tadā
buddhivṛttireva pramāṇaṁ, yadi ca buddhiniṣṭhamātramucyate
tada tūktendriyasannikārṣādireva pramāṇam. SPB., 1.87.
108. puruṣastu pramāsākṣyeva na pramāteti. Ibid. 1.87.
makes it clear that the use of *pramāṇa* with reference to the senses, etc. is always indirect\textsuperscript{109}. The statement of Vījnānabhikṣu requires further clarification: The *kāraṇa* can be defined in two ways: (i) the cause which is peculiar and operative, and (ii) the cause which is invariable and immediately followed by the product. The former definition applies to the material object as *kāraṇa* while the latter definition implies the intermediate operation as *kāraṇa*. Vījnānabhikṣu favours the second meaning of *kāraṇa* because the acceptance of first will imply the *buddhi* as a *kāraṇa* of *pramāṇa* and it would contradict the earlier authorities like Patañjali and Isvarakṛṣṇa who consider function of the *buddhi* as *kāraṇa* of *pramāṇa*. However, Vījnānabhikṣu favours the theory of considering the operation of *buddhi* as the *pramāṇa* and the *pramāṇa* as located in the *puruṣa*. Vījnānabhikṣu quotes the authority of Vyāsadeva that *pramāṇa* is the *bodha* located in the *puruṣa*. He further argues that it is right to consider the knowledge as located in *puruṣa* because it is held in the Sāṅkhya that the operation of organs is to serve the purpose of *puruṣa*\textsuperscript{110}. He further quotes the authority of Vyāsadeva that the

\textsuperscript{109} caksurādiśu tu pramāṇavyavahāraḥ paraṁparaiva sarvatheti bhāvaḥ. Ibid.1.87.

\textsuperscript{110} pātañjalabhāṣye tu vyāsadevaiḥ puruṣaṁśiṭḥabodhaḥ prametyuktaḥ, puruṣārtham eva karoṇāṁ pravṛttyā phalasya puruṣaṁśiṭḥatāyā evaucityāt, ato’ trāpi sa eva mukhyāḥ siddāntaḥ.Ibid.
purusa is the pratisarhvādi of buddhi, which according to him means that purusa is the location of the reflection of the saṁvedana of buddhi. This also holds that Vijñānabhikṣu does not go against the immutable and the all-pervasive nature of the purusa. The purusa knows the object only through the buddhi with which he is associated and knows the object reflected into the buddhi which is reflected back into the purusa. As such it does not involve the undesirable contingency of knowledge of everything at all times. The purusa is unattached and as such it does not undergo modification into the form of the object. The reflection is really a modification of buddhi and is reflected into the purusa just as the object gets reflected into the water but does not bring about change in it.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not define pramāna explicitly in his Sāṁkhyakārikā though he used the term pramāna. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, simply maintains pramāna as that which brings about the condition of objects. He defines buddhi as ascertainment of an object. In the Sāṁkhya-tattvakaumudi, Vācaspati Miśra defines pramāna as modification of the citta, having a content free from all that is

111. yogabhāṣyaṇcabuddhēḥ pratisaṁvedo puruṣa iti pratidhvaniyat pratisaṁvedaḥ saṁvedana-prativimbastasyāśraya ityartaḥ. Ibid. 1.87.
112. pratimvimbaśca buddhereva pariṇāmavišeṣo vimbākāro jalādigata iti mantavyam. Ibid. 1.87.
113. prameyasiddhiḥ pramanādhiḥ. SK., kā. 4.
114. adhyavasāyo buddhiḥ. SK., kā. 23.
erroneous⁵. It is a functioning of the intellect, which is free from doubt and self-contradiction, and has for its object something unknown⁶. This knowledge belongs to some person; the result of it is right cognition; and the means of acquiring it is the pramāṇa. This description of pramāṇa precludes the application of the name to such cognition as is the result of doubt, error and memory. The Yuktidīpīkā on Śāṅkhya-kārikā describes that since the citta is one, the pramāṇa is also one only⁷.

But Naiyāyika criticizes the Śāṅkhyas’s doctrine of pramāṇa. According to Śāṅkhyas that in which the cognition appears or that which is transformed into the form of an object is unintelligent and material buddhi, while that to which the object of knowledge is presented is the intelligent self (purusa); the former is the pramāṇa, while the consciousness of the purusa, which is due to the reflection of the unintelligent psychic mode on it, is valid knowledge (pramā), so that the pramāṇa and the pramā do not inhere in the same substratum⁸.

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⁵ 115. asandigdhāviparītādhigatavīṣayā cittavṛttiḥ, bodhaśca puruṣeyah phalaṁ pramā, tatasādhanaṁ pramāṇām. STK., under SK., kā.4.
⁶ 116. taccā’ sandigdhāviparītādhyagatavīṣayā cittavṛttiḥ. Ibid.
⁷ 117. tadekaṁ eva, buddherekattvābhṛṣṭvam. YD., under SK., kā. 4.
⁸ 118. jñānānādi-dharmayogāḥ pramāṇāṁ pumasi na vidyate tat phalaṁ, arthardurśanaṁ buddhau nāstū tu bhinnādhiścaraṇatvaṁ pramāṇa phalayoḥ. NM., p.15.
Yoga View of Pramāṇa:

In the Yogasūtra, Patañjali holds that pramāṇa is the function of citta\textsuperscript{119}. Patañjali, however, shows the superiority of yogic practices and consequently the yogic perception acquired through them over the ordinary means of knowledge. Patañjali says that the buddhi through the discipline of Yoga gets truth-bearing knowledge (rtambharā) having no trace of wrong or perverted knowledge\textsuperscript{120}. This knowledge comprehends the particularity (viśeṣa) residing in the puruṣa or in the subtle elements, which is not known through any of the worldly means of knowledge\textsuperscript{121}. Vyāsadeva in his Yogabhāṣya remarks that pramāṇa apprehends a real object (bhūtārtha viśaya) in opposition to erroneous knowledge which is later on contradicted by the former\textsuperscript{122}. In the view of Śrīkṛṣṇa Vallabhācārya adds that when both the function of buddhi and the apprehension of puruṣa are said to be prama, the pramāṇa will be both function of buddhi and the function of the sense-organ\textsuperscript{123}. Puruṣa is never direct cogniser but it is the witness of prama. Hence it is to be noted that the Saṁkhya and

\textsuperscript{119} pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ. YS., I.6.
\textsuperscript{120} rtambharā tatra prajñā. YS., I.48.
\textsuperscript{121} sa viśeṣo bhavati -bhūtāsūkṣmagato vā puruṣagato vā.YB., I.49
\textsuperscript{122} bhūtārthaviśayayavatpramāṇasya, tatra pramāṇena vādhanampramāṇasya 
\textsuperscript{123} Kir., on YS.,1.7.
Yoga systems offer an original definition of *pramāṇa* as the function of the *buddhi* or *citta*.

**Mīmāṃsā view of pramāṇa:**

According to Mīmāṃsakas *pramāṇa* is the measure, the form that is the measure of reality and so the ways or the means of valid cognition. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *pramāṇa* is a definite and assured cognition of object which does not require confirmation by other cognition\(^{124}\). Umbeka a staunch follower of Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas maintains that the term *drdha* and *aviśamvāda* exclude doubt and error respectively from valid knowledge\(^{125}\). The Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas regard cognition as a means (*pramāṇa*) and apprehendedness (*fñātata*) in the object of cognition produced by the cognition as the result (*phala*) of *pramāṇa*. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa cognition is of the nature of activity, and as activity is always inferred from its result (*phala*), the activity of cognition or cognitive activity is inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness or manifestness (*prākātya*) in the nature of its object, and this inferable cognitive activity is the instrument of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*)\(^{126}\).

\(^{124}\) *tasmād drdhaṁ yadutpannaṁ nāpi saṁbādamṛcchatī / jñānāntareṇa vijñānaṁ tatpramāṇaṁ pramīyatām* // ŚV., II.80.

\(^{125}\) *drdhamityanena saṁśāyasya vyudāsaḥ, yadutpanamityanupapattaiḥ na visambādamṛcchatītī viparyayasya*. SVTT., II.80.cf.ITK.,p. 45.

\(^{126}\) *phalānumeyo jñāna - vyāpāraḥ prāmaṇam.* Ibid. p. 17.
According to Bhāṭṭas *pramāṇa* is that which gives new knowledge i.e. a true knowledge of the past. *Pramāṇa* is the means of acquiring knowledge and so must lead to the acquisition of such knowledge as is not yet attained but is still to be acquired. The method of knowledge, therefore, must be concerned in knowing what has not been previously known. It follows from this that memory (*smṛti*) cannot be *pramāṇa* or true knowledge, insofar as it is not a new experience. It has no new contents but refers only to the already acquired contents of knowledge. Hence Pārthasārathī Miśra defines *pramāṇa* as the cognition of an object which has not already been cognized which is free from contradiction and the causes of which are free from defects. Briefly speaking, according to the Bhāṭṭas, a *pramāṇa* is a method of cognition of an unknown object which is not liable to be sublated by subsequent experience.

According to the Prābhākaramīṁāṁśā direct and immediate apprehension (*anubhūti*) is called *pramāṇa*. Śālikānātha Miśra states that valid knowledge is an experience, which is different from memory. It is not inferred from its result in the form of apprehendedness. It is self-luminous. A cognition directly reveals

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129. *kāraṇadoṣabādhakajñānaraḥ itam agrhīta-grāhi jñānaṁ pramāṇam iti*. Ibid.
itself and the cognizing self as the subject of cognition or cognizer. It sometimes directly reveals its objects as in perception and sometimes indirectly as in inference and other kinds of knowledge.

**Vedānta view of pramāṇa:**

The school of Advaita Vedānta also regards cognition as the pramāṇa. In fact, according to Śaṅkara the fourfold distinction of pramātā, pramāṇa, pramiti, and prameya is within the eternal consciousness modalized by different determinants. One and the same eternal consciousness or Brahman is differentiated into four kinds of consciousness by four different determinants or limiting conditions (upādhi). The cognizing self (pramātā) is the consciousness determined by the internal organ (antahkaraṇa) which is a modification of nescience. The instrument of valid knowledge (pramāṇa) is the consciousness determined by the mental mode or function of the internal organ. The object of valid knowledge (prameya) is the consciousness determined by an empirical object. And the result of the act of valid knowledge (pramiti) is the consciousness manifested by the apprehending mental mode or function of the internal organ (antahkaraṇa)\textsuperscript{131}.

\textsuperscript{131} ekameva caitanyaṁ upādhi-bhedācaturvidhaṁ, tatrāntahkaraṇa- viśiṣṭa- caitanyaṁ pramātṛ caitanyaṁ. antahkaraṇa-vṛttyavaccinna-caitanyaṁ viṣaya-caitanyaṁ. antahkaraṇa-vṛttya-bhivyakta-caitanyaṁ phala- caitanyaṁ. ACK., pp.130-33. Also, VP., pp. 55-56.
According to the Advaita Vedānta the translucent mobile internal organ (antahkarana) moves out through the channel of the external sense-organs to an object and is transformed into the form of the object. This moving out of the antahkarana from the psycho-physical organism to the object is called the vṛtti or mode of the antahkarana, it is an apprehending mental mode; it stands between the organism and the extra-organic object. The so-called object too veils the eternal consciousness. And this veil of nescience is broken by the apprehending mental mode which manifests the consciousness in the object. Now, the consciousness which is determined by the internal organ (antahkarana) is called the pramātā. The consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode standing between the organism and the extra-organic object is called the pramāṇa. The consciousness determined or veiled by the extra-organic empirical object is the prameya. And the consciousness manifested by the apprehending metal mode, which was so long veiled by the empirical object is called the pramīṭa. Vidyārāṇya a follower of Advaita Vedānta holds that pramāṇa is the means that leads to right knowledge. According to him, this right knowledge is non-contradictedness.

132. cf. IEP.,p.8.
133. satyattvari bādharāhityam. PD., III. 29.
The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja defines pramā is that knowledge which is consistent with the actual usage (yathāvasthitavyavahārānuguna). Every case of right knowledge is produced. Its proximate cause is called pramāṇa. In the Yatīnramatadīpikā of Śrīnivāsa, also maintained that the instrument of valid knowledge is called pramāṇa.

Madhva the propounder of the Dvaita school of Vedānta, defines pramāṇa as valid knowledge which is in accord with the real nature of its object. It makes an object known as it is in itself. It makes the object known either directly or indirectly through the medium of some other knowledge. According to Madhva, there are two kinds of valid knowledge viz. kevalapramāṇa i.e. direct and immediate intuition of object, and anupramāna i.e. the instrument or means of valid knowledge. There are four kinds of kevalapramāṇa—
(i) the knowledge of the Lord. (ii) the knowledge of the Lakṣmi, his consort, (iii) the knowledge of yogin and, (iv) the knowledge of an ordinary person. There are three kinds of anupramāṇa: perception, inference and verbal testimony.

135. sadhakatam karanam, atiśayitaḥ saadhakarīn saadhakatamam. yasmin sati abilambena jñānamutpadyate tad ‘atiśayitam’ ityuccyate, tena pramākaraṇam pramāṇamiti siddham. YMD., p.8.
Puruṣottama Prasāda Vaiśnava a follower of Nimbārka school of Vedānta defines pramāṇa as a means of valid knowledge. Truth of knowledge consists in the harmony of knowledge with its object\textsuperscript{136}.

The Number of Pramāṇas According to Different Systems:

The schools of ancient Indian philosophy are not unanimous in their choice of the pramāṇas. In the matter of recognizing different pramāṇas, different schools of Indian philosophy adopted divergent schemes. The number of pramāṇas accepted by them vary from one to eight. The Cārvākas or the materialists recognize perception (pratyakṣa) only as a single means of knowledge. The Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas add inference (anumāna) to perception, the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga philosophers accept verbal testimony (śabda) along with the earlier two, some of the Naiyāyikas add comparison (upamāna) to the earlier three, the Prabhakaramīṁāṁsakas admit all these four by adding postulation (arthāpatti) to them, the Bhāttamīṁāṁsakas and the Vedāntins recognize six pramāṇas as they add non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) to the above. The Paurāṇikas admit above six with the addition of sambhava

\textsuperscript{136} tatbati tatprakārakatvaṁ yathārthhattvam. cf. A History of Indian Philosophy by Jadunath Sinha, Vol. IV, p.347.
(probability or inclusion) and aitihya (tradition or rumour). Some Täntrikas recognize cestā (indication) also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Others add pratibhā (vivid imagination) as a source of valid knowledge to the list and thus the total number of pramanās are ten.

The different pramanās in short are as follows:

1. Pratyakṣa (perception):

Knowledge which is produced by the contact of a sense-organ with an object. Perception gives a direct knowledge of reality, because by it we directly apprehend the reality, whereas other means give only an indirect knowledge. For example, when a jar directly comes in contact with the sense-organ, i.e. eye, there arises perceptual knowledge of jar.

2. Anumāna (inference):

Anumāna means literally measuring after something. Anumāna depends on previous experiences. This knowledge follows other knowledge, e.g., where there is smoke there is fire. The term

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137. pratyakṣamekaṁ cārvākāḥ, kaṇḍāda-sugatau punaḥ / anumāṇaṁ ca taccātha sāṁkhyaḥ śabdāṇaṁ ca te api // nyāyaikadesino’ pyevamupamānaṁ ca kecana / arthāpattai sahātāni catvāryāha prabhākaraḥ // abhāva saṁsthānyetāni bhātiṁa vedāntinastathā / saṁbhavaitihayuktāni tāni paurāṇikā jaguriti //TR., as quoted in NSM., p.260.
anumāna is derived from anu followed by the root mā with the suffix lyut. Māna means an apprehension or a way of apprehension of an object and the prefix anu denotes after. So, the result of such knowledge is called anumiti which is the knowledge of an object due to a previous knowledge of some mark having the universal relation with the sādhyā and being present in the pakṣa and anumītītva is a kind of genus or universal. Hence, inferential knowledge is produced not by direct apprehension but by means of knowledge of proban and that of the universal relation with the inferred object. Inferential knowledge is definite knowledge produced by knowing the special coherence or proban concerning the major term that resides in doubtful substratum of major term to one who previously grasped coherence.

3. Upamāna (comparison):

The knowledge of similarity is generated by upamāna. A person who has already seen a cow goes to the forest. There he sees a gavaya and cognizes that the gavaya is like a cow. Then he realizes the similarity of the cow with the gavaya thus: “our cow is like this..."
gavaya”. This knowledge of similarity is the result of upamāna. Here the instrument of knowledge is the knowledge of similarity of the gavaya with the cow, and the resultant knowledge is the similarity of the cow with the gavaya.

The word upamāna has been variously translated as comparison, analogy, identification, knowledge by similarity and knowledge by assimilation etc. It is derived from the word upa meaning sādṛśy or similarity and māna meaning cognition (upa mā+ lyut). Hence upamāna derivatively means the knowledge of the similarity between two things.

4. Śabda (verbal testimony):

Etymologically the word śabda means sound (dhvani). Śabda literally means verbal knowledge. It is the knowledge of objects derived from words or sentences. In the domain of linguistics again, the word śabda is found to be used to signify a pada (word). A pada, however, consists of certain letter or letters (varna). A letter is undoubtedly a special kind of sound. So even in linguistics śabda keeps in fact its basic character of being a sound. The word śabda

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142. gavayaniṣṭha-gosādṛśyajñānaṁ karaṇaṁ, goniṣṭha-gavyasaṅdṛśya jñānaṁ phalam. Ibid., p. 142.
143. kastarhi śabdaḥ...tasmaḥdvaniḥ śabdaḥ. MBh., 1.1.1.
144. varaṇātmakānāṁ śabdānāṁ..... smāharaṁ padam. MM., p.226.
again is technically used in the school of Nyāya in the sense of a pramāṇavākya. A sentence is undoubtedly a specific collection of words. So a sentence is inevitably a special collection of sounds, i.e. mutually related articulate sounds. This śabda in its basic character of dhvani is a guṇa (quality) and not a dravya (substance). Being a guṇa, it must belong to a substratum, the substratum to which śabda belongs to the ākāśa. Epistemologically śabda refers to a source of knowledge namely verbal testimony (śabdapramāṇa). It consists in the assertion of a trustworthy person145. All verbal knowledge, however, is not valid. A verbal statement is valid when it comes from a person who knows the truth and speaks the truth about anything for the guidance of other persons. But it is a matter of common observation that a sentence or a statement is not sufficient to denote any knowledge of things. Nor the mere perception of words of a sentence does give any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meaning that he acquires the knowledge of a verbal statement. Hence śabda or testimony as a source of valid knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person146.

145. āptapadeśah śabda. NS., 1.1.7.
146. vākyārthajñānārī śabdajñānam.TS.,p.73.
5. Arthāpatti (postulation):

*Arthāpatti* is the presumption of something for the explanation of a known fact. When one notices apparent contradiction in various forms of knowledge he presumes something to remove the apparent contradiction in it. What is presumed is said to be a distinct source of knowledge, e.g. when a particular person named Caitra known to be alive is not found in his house it is assumed that he must be somewhere outside.

The word *arthāpatti* can be derived as ‘*arthasya bahissadbhāvasya āppattih kalpanā yasmāt sā*’ *rthāpattiriti.*’ Meaning thereby is postulation is the assumption of something that exists outside. The word *arthāpatti* when derived may be both *Bahuvrīhi* and *Ṣaṭṭhītatpuruṣa* compound. As a form of the former, it refers to the instrument and as a form of the latter it refers to the result.

6. Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension):

Knowledge by which we immediately cognize the non-existence of an object is *arthāpatti* e.g. absence of rainfall indicates that the connection of cloud and the wind has not happened.

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147. *arthāpattiśabdo’ rthasyāpattih kalpanā yasmāt iti bahuvrīhisamāsena pramāṇaparaḥ, arthasyāpattiriti ṣaṭṭhītatpuruṣamāsena ca phalaparaḥ.*

FN., 1, PP., p. 272.
7. *Sāṁbhava* (probability):

The Paurāṇikas are the propounders of *sāṁbhava* as an independent means of knowledge. If one says that he has a hundred rupees in his pocket, listening this the listeners remark that it is highly probable that he has ten rupees in his pocket. The Paurāṇikas call this process of knowing as *sāṁbhava*.

8. *Aitihya* (tradition):

The Paurāṇikas are the propounders of *aitihya* as an independent means of knowledge. 'There is a ghost in this tree'— is an example provided to explain the nature of *aitihya*.

9. *Cēṣṭā* (indication):

Some Tāṇtrikas recognize *cēṣṭā* also in addition to the above as the source of valid knowledge. Thus, by the movement of the hand one can make another understand 'to go', or 'to come' or by raising a finger or fingers one can make another understand, the numerical number 'one', 'two', 'three', etc.

10. *Pratibhā* (imagination or intuition):

Some thinkers consider *pratibhā* as one of the valid means of knowledge. One who has repeatedly experienced the particular objects as giving rise to pleasure, fear, etc. that knowledge of that object arises merely through utterance of the word denoting that
object even without the presence of that object. This is imagination. For example, when it is stated that a tiger lives here, the action as sweating and trembling body takes place merely through the earlier practice even without the presence of external objects. Again some thinkers consider pratibhā as the power of immediate understanding of something without conscious reasoning or study. It is a conviction of certainty that comes quite suddenly and instantly.\(^{148}\)

**AN EXHAUSTIVE NOTE ON PERCEPTION OR THE TERM PRATYAKŠA:**

In Indian epistemology, two words are used to mean knowledge. They are jñāna and pramā. Jñāna means all kinds of knowledge, true or false. When reality reveals true knowledge it is called pramā or valid knowledge. Sources of right knowledge or means of cognition\(^{149}\) are essential for the establishment of a valid knowledge. In this point almost all the thinkers of Indian systems are unanimous. But regarding the number of pramāṇas they are different. Yet it is interesting that all the schools of Indian philosophy both āstika and nāstika are unanimous about perception or pratyakṣa

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148. SYE,,pp.82-83.
pramāṇa as the first and foremost of all the pramāṇas\textsuperscript{150}. Perception is the primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid knowledge and it is universally recognized. Perception is most powerful among the means of valid knowledge, because it gives a direct or immediate knowledge of reality of an object and therefore is the root of all other pramāṇas. The Naiyāyikas describe that perception is not the only source of our knowledge, but it is the basis of the other sources or means of knowledge. Hence, it has been said that all the other means of knowledge presupposes perception and must be based on knowledge derived from perception\textsuperscript{151}. Perception is the basis on which we have a knowledge of other truths by inference as well as by comparison and testimony. Perception is the final test of all knowledge. One may question the truth of the knowledge derived from inference, testimony, etc. but the truth of perception is in a way beyond question. Perceptual verification is thus the final test of all other knowledge and as such, perception is the chief of all the sources of human knowledge\textsuperscript{152}. It is widely accepted by all the philosophical systems since all the systems have to support their theories through perception in the arena of epistemological investigation. The very

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{150} pratyakṣasya pramāṇeṣu jyeṣṭhaḥvāditi. VP., p.6.
  \item \textsuperscript{151} sarvaprāmaṇāṇāṁ pratyakṣapūrvavakatvā. NVTT., 1.1.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{152} sa ceyāṁ pramītiḥ pratyakṣaparā. NBh., 1.1.3.
\end{itemize}
simple but correct definition of perception has been given by Šālikānātha Miśra when he says that perception is the direct apprehension\textsuperscript{153}. The philosophers of Sāmkhya-Yoga system have stated that perception has been treated as superior to all other forms of valid knowledge and they assign the following reasons—(i) perception as a form of valid knowledge has been accepted by all logicians, and (ii) other valid forms of knowledge presuppose perception whereas perception presupposes none of them.

Perception is generally defined in terms of resultant knowledge. They have qualified this knowledge with certain characteristics in accordance with their metaphysical presuppositions. These qualifications variously spoken with it are unerring and pertaining to the unique, particular, immediate or direct. The term \textit{pratyakṣa} consists of two parts—\textit{prati} and \textit{aksi}, \textit{prati} means before or near or related to and \textit{aksi} means eye. In the Jaina philosophy the word \textit{akṣa} means the self or \textit{jīva}, that knows all objects in space and time\textsuperscript{154}. But all the other systems of Indian philosophy mean by the word \textit{akṣa indriya} or sense-organ, and thus they understand by \textit{pratyakṣa} the knowledge which is derived from the sense-

\textsuperscript{153} sākṣatprañāth. PP., 5.125.
The process through which immediate knowledge of an object arises or the instrument by which the object is conceived, is also called *pratyakṣa*. That is why perception is sometimes defined in terms of the process as well as instrument therein.

Perception in ordinary language means the direct knowledge of the objective world. It is direct in the sense that of all the modes of knowledge here alone reality is given with the least interference of mind and mental creations. The Jainas, thinking that interference of mind is inevitable in any perception, regard perception as an indirect or mediate mode of knowledge. They say that even in perception proper reality is known through the medium of mind and sense organs, therefore it is not immediate knowledge of reality. The Buddhists, propose that since perception means the direct knowledge of reality, it should be the purest knowledge where reality is known as it is in itself. Hence perception for them would be a knowledge which is devoid of all the interference of mind. All the other schools of Indian philosophy think that meditation of mind and sense organs which is inevitable and hence common to all forms of knowledge, must also be present in perception. Therefore for them ordinary usage about perception is a correct statement.

155. aksasyaśāksasya prativiṣayāṁ vṛttih pratyakṣam. NBh., 1.1.3.
The Nyāya school of Indian philosophy accepts more or less the Vaiśeṣika conception of reality but its important contribution lies in its highly elaborate and logical formulations of the theory of knowledge. The other school, Pūrvamāṁsā, is also concerned with the theory of knowledge. The minimum requirement for perception to arise is that the object should come in contact with sense-organs. No perception can take place in the absence of sense-object contact.

The claim of primacy and significance of perception as a foundational mode of knowing can hardly be a matter of dispute and disagreement as all other modes of knowing like inference seem to originate in perception and find their ultimate validation in perception. It cannot be denied that all cognitive processes in the empirical sphere begin with perception but there may be difference of opinion whether they end up in perception.

There can again be no unanimity in regarding empirical perception as the sole variety of perception. In spiritual, mystical, religious and some schools of moral thinking, there has been an acceptance of trans-empirical perception. In fact, there have been claims that this alone is genuine and truly veracious perception. However, as a worldly being, our main concern is with empirical perception, which may be the subject matter of our deliberations,
though some references to the trans-empirical may not be ruled out. Without denying the validity of trans-empirical perceptions that are intuitive realizations of a higher type available only to realize souls, it must be pointed out that they are beyond the ken of our thought and language. They are to be experienced and not to be analyzed or deliberated upon.

The role of perception in cognizing the reality has always been regarded as inevitable and valuable. Through perception alone the reality is said to be directly apprehended. It has been a perennial human quest to know the reality as it is. That is why, truth-claim is built in knowledge-claim. But the basic epistemological issue has been substantiation of truth-claim. The entire exercise of pramāṇa śāstra or epistemology has been undertaken precisely for this purpose. It has been argued that in perceptual cognition truth-claim can be self-substantiated but in the face of the possibility, or rather actual and painful experience of perceptual errors, this claim gets falsified. We do say, “pratyakṣe kim pramāṇam?” i.e., what is the need for evidencing truth in perception as it is self-evidencing, but at the same time we do doubt the verdicts of our own perceptions.

In contemporary psychology and epistemology, perception is the apprehension of ordinary sense-objects, such as trees, house,
chairs, etc., on the occasion of sensory stimulation. Perception is distinguished, on the one hand, from sensation and on the other hand, from higher ideational processes of imagination, remembrance, conception and reasoning. The percept or vehicle of perception consists of actually given sense qualities supplemented by imaginatively supplied qualities which on the basis of earlier experience are ascribed to the perceived object.

According to some thinkers perception means that which is present in our senses towards suitable objects. The object of immediate knowledge must be something existing (sat). So that the perception is the means of justifying our belief in the existence of the physical object such as books, pens which are perceived with the assistance of our senses when such an object is related to any of the sense-organs, there arises in the soul an immediate knowledge about it. This type of knowledge is called pratyakṣa (perception). The knowledge of perception comes from two sources. It comes from our objective observation of how it occurs in an individual as inferred from our behaviour and secondly perception is got from our own subjective experiences. In any study of perceptual experience the organism is inalienably involved so that any such investigation itself involves perceptual experiences.
Perception may be facilitated or inhibited and directed towards particular features of the environment, in accordance with knowledge, experience, interests and motives of particular persons. But it would seem that it may also be related to other aspects of the personality, to modes of perceiving which are based on general characteristics of the personality not specifically related to particular experiences, interests or motives.

Perception is directly related to the necessity of maintaining contact with the environment and adopting behaviour to environmental change. The perceptual capacities seem to function in such a manner as to produce rapid reaction to change, whereas in an unchanging environment they may cease to operate effectively.

Perception is a transcendental source of knowledge, because practically speaking it gives no knowledge at all. Usually the word perception means knowledge derived through all sensations. Another perception is the attribute of the self. The western philosopher like Kant said that knowledge involves both sensation and conception. ‘Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty’. Perception is a complex process of experience involving both sensation and conception.
In Western philosophy, the validity of perception as a source of knowledge is rather overstressed by the empiricists and some modern realists. According to them, the truth of perception is unquestionable and self-evident. Thus, J.S. Mill remarks: whatever is known to us by consciousness (intuition), is known beyond possibility of question. What one sees or feels, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one sees or feels”156." So, W.T. Mervin also thinks that 'perception is the ultimate crucial test, and as such, it does not presuppose into own possibility. It simply is, and the man who questions it assumes it in order to do the questioning157. Similarly Russell tells us repeatedly that the truths of perception are self-evident truths, for which we require no test at all158. The great philosopher 'Gobson defines perception that 'perception is a function of stimulation and that this stimulation contains all the necessary information to determine perception.'

Thus it can be said that perception is one of the basic and immediate instruments of knowledge for man. It is knowledge derived through senses and acted on by the cortex, illumined by the consciousness principle. Perception does not depend on previous

156. System of Logic. cf.NTK., p. 100.
158. Problems of Philosophy, Ch. XI. p. 72. Ibid.
knowledge, as other instruments of knowledge such as inference and verbal testimony do. In perception we have just to open our eyes and we see the object and have the experience. Perceptual experience (despite illusions and hallucinations) carries for many of us the air of certain knowledge, immediately, felt, which dispels doubts. Hence perception is the primary and basic instruments among the knowledge. Normal perceptual knowledge is confined to sense range. We can not perceive what is in the past. This is the limitation of perception.