CHAPTER III

CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN YOGACARA BUDDHISM
- AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL VIEW
Epistemology is that branch of philosophy which investigates the nature, criteria and validity of knowledge. In simple words, it is the philosophy of knowledge. Epistemology, therefore, is concerned with the nature, conditions, factors as well as the limits and validity of knowledge. All philosophy must include it as an integral part. Dr. Ward says, "The systemic reflection concerning knowledge and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science is what is called epistemology". Again, epistemology and metaphysics are intimately related to each other and one cannot stand without the other. The former enquires into the general conditions of the validity of knowledge. It is the theory of knowing. Metaphysics, on the other hand, is the theory of being or reality. Also, epistemology is the fundamental basis and groundwork of metaphysics. It precedes Metaphysics, since we cannot investigate the ultimate nature of the reality without prior criticism of the organ of knowledge. Epistemology is concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It cannot enquire into the validity of knowledge without enquiring into the nature of the reality comprehended by knowledge. The nature of the reality is investigated by metaphysics. So, epistemology is closely connected with metaphysics.
Indian epistemology involves four basic factors:

1. The *pramata* – the knower or the cognizer of valid knowledge.
2. The *prameya* – the knowable, the object known, the object of valid knowledge.
3. The *pramana* – the chief instrument or organ of knowing the source of valid knowledge.
4. The *prama* or *pramiti* – the valid knowledge of the object

In philosophical investigation, knowledge may roughly be called conviction regarding reality. It is the basis of all practical activities. The function of knowledge is to illuminate things other than itself. Knowledge refers to an object that is known and it always belongs to a subject that knows. No knowledge exists independently by itself without implying a knower and a thing known. Knowledge is the property of self. It is *buddhi* (understanding), *upalabdhi* (apprehension), *pratyaya* (concepts), judgement, awareness and cognition or cognizance which is synonymous to each other\(^3\). In Indian epistemology, two terms are used to mean knowledge – *jnana* and *prama*.

The term *jnana* comes from the root *'jna'* which means ‘to know’. *Jnana* means all kinds of knowledge – true or false. When reality reveals true knowledge it is called *prama* (valid knowledge) and when this revelation is false it is called *aprama*. The term *prama* is derived from the root *'ma'* with a prefix *'pra'* and *'tap'* which means valid knowledge. Nagesa defines valid knowledge as novel knowledge agreeing with its object (*avisamvadijnana*). The word
prama is used only in the sense of true knowledge or Yatharthajnana i.e it is used to denote knowledge from the psychological standpoint that helps in cognizing an object with its real character. Knowledge, in the Upanishadic age, was not only metaphysical but also of many other kinds. In Advita Vedanta, jnana is used to mean both absolute knowledge (swarupa jnana) and relative or empirical knowledge (vrtti jnana). But, the Advaita declares that the so called vrtti jnana is not eligible for the title jnana unless it is illuminated by the principle of consciousness viz. Brahman (or atman)

The word knowledge has different uses. It may mean acquaintance of some kind, or knowing how, or 'knowledge in the propositional sense', viz. 'I know that'. This is akin to savikalpajnana (determinate knowledge) of Indian philosophy. The word 'knowledge' is generally employed in the 'propositional sense' which means that it has for its object some 'proposition'. To know is to assert truly that the proposition is known. Every piece of knowledge is propositional and that proposition must be true. Knowledge, therefore, involves three factors –

(i) The proposition is true.
(ii) The proposition is believed to be true.
(iii) The knower has some evidence for believing the proposition.

These three factors show that knowledge involves 'Knowledge of knowledge'. It is truism to say that knowledge in this sense is always the knowledge of some object, the problem of the knowledge of knowledge is thus
inter-related with the problem of the nature of the object known and of the relation of the object to knowledge. Further, if 'knowing' involves 'knowing the object (viz. proposition) as true', 'a belief regarding the truth' and 'knowledge of the evidence of such belief', then the problem of knowing that one knows is entailed by the problem of knowing the nature of the known. One does not know that his knowledge is true or false, unless he knows that he knows. In other words, one is aware of one's own or someone else's knowledge, because some object is revealed through knowledge. The revelation of knowledge logically pre-supposes the existence of knowledge by way of revealing some object.

There are diverse views among the different systems of philosophy towards the theory of knowledge. Here we shall briefly touch on the Nyaya and the Advaita Vedanta and discuss the Yogacara view in some detail.

The Nyaya holds that knowledge is a product of the contact of mind with the self. They say that knowledge is a property of self or atman. For them, knowledge or buddhi (cognition) means the same thing as upalabdhi (apprehension), jnana (knowledge) and pratyaya. According to the Naiyaikas, knowledge is an attribute to self. It is not a substance, since it cannot be the stuff or the constitutive stuff of anything, nor is the permanent substratum of certain recognized and variant properties. For the Naiyaika, knowledge consists simply in the manifestation of objects. It is revelatory of the reality (arthaparakasa). Knowledge is the apprehension of objects.
For the Naiyaikas, valid knowledge is an apprehension of some objects which is doubtless and non-erroneous. It is certain (asandigdha) and true (yatharthta) presentation (upasthiti) of an object. Valid knowledge is an experience of things as they are (yatharthta). So the validity of knowledge consists of the objectivity or the faithfulness of the knowledge towards the object. The prama is the knowledge which predicates something of a property really possessed by it. It is prama that exclude all kinds of non-valid knowledge such as memory, doubt, error, hypothetical arguments, etc. Memory is excluded because it is not presentational (anubhava). Doubt and the rest are excluded either because they are not true or because they are not definite and assured cognitions.

As a realist, the Naiyaikas says that knowledge is essentially of an object (savisaya). It is formless (nirakara) and is not self-luminous (paraprakasa). The Naiyaikas states that Savisayatva of knowledge means that knowledge never exist without being related to some object. According to Nyaya, knowledge, though nirakara and essentially different from its object, is yet related (due to its nature) to its object. The light of a lamp, for example, never assumes the akara (content) of the object revealed through it. Again, the light of a lamp is never known to exist without being related to some object like kerosene. So, for them, every piece of knowledge must have some object. For the Naiyaikas knowledge does not assume the form (akara) of the object and it is essentially different from object. Therefore knowledge is nirakara. According to them, although knowledge is contentless (nirakara), it is never objectless (nirvisaya).
According to Nyaya, from the Vijnanavadin point of view (which will be discussed subsequently in this chapter) all different objects are essentially of the Nature of knowledge and are, therefore, fundamentally one. The Nyaya contends that if the object were a mere content of knowledge, then all knowledge would have the form like "knowledge is yellow" or "I am yellow" instead of "This is yellow" or "That is yellow". For them the object known is experienced, not as a content of knowledge, but as external and independent of knowledge. Knowledge is not apprehended when an external object is known.

The Nyaya contends that the Vijnanavadin's alleged law of co-apprehension (sahopalambhaniyam) becomes meaningless if knowledge and object are considered to be essentially identical. The word 'saha' means 'togetherness of two things'. The word 'sahopalambha' (co-apprehension) then proves that the objects apprehended together are different.

If knowledge is considered as sakara and svaprakasa then all knowledge has to be considered as immediate. The universally acknowledged distinction between mediate and immediate knowledge becomes inadmissible. Inference cannot be considered as a separate pramana, if its mediacy cannot be maintained. If inference is to be maintained as a pramana, it must be considered to be savisaya.

Again the Nyaya states that if knowledge is both sakara and svapraksa, it has to be supposed as being related to itself in the act of revealing object or
itself. But the revelation either of knowledge itself or of an object logically involves the duality of the revealer (prakasaka) and the revealed (prakasya).

The Nyaya thinks that all objects should be supposed, from the Vijnanavadin's point of view, to be apprehended in an identical manner and in the same locus. Nyaya states that if all the objects are identical with knowledge then any object may be the object (visaya) of any knowledge. Hence different objects are apprehended simultaneously in one knowledge e.g. 'table, chair and ink-pot'. It is not possible and Nyaya contends that objects must be admitted to be external to knowledge in order to justify this simultaneous knowledge of different objects. The table is not apprehended as chair or as ink-pot, nor is anything else experienced as any other thing in such simultaneous knowledge. Therefore, Nyaya thinks that these un-contradicted facts of experience establish the difference of knowledge and object.

According to Nyaya, knowledge is essentially of an object and to prove this view, they have put forward the following arguments:

1. Our immediate experience confirms that knowledge is a transitive act and therefore it always has some object external to itself.

2. The differences of objects of knowledge and of knowledge, the knower and the known are experienced as real. Knowledge is
determined by its object. The determinateness of knowledge enlists its savisayatva.

3. The fact that simultaneous cognition (samuhalamvanajnana) of several objects is mutually different proves the difference of knowledge and object. If the objects were not essentially different from such knowledge, they would not have been apprehended as mutually different.

4. The different knowledge caused by different conditions, viz. sense, sense-object contact, light, sense-light contact and the object, reveal their objects only. This is due to the fact that knowledge reveals its karmakaraka (accusative) i.e. the 'object' alone. Revelation of an object that essentially differs from knowledge follows from the essence of both knowledge and object.

5. For the Nyaya, the object is external and independent of knowledge. That the object is external to knowledge is proved by the fact that there may be much different knowledge of the same kind (e.g. perceptual) which have the same object but which belong to different knowers.
6. The alleged negation of the external object by the Vijnanavadin and the Advaitin logically implies the superimposition of externality on the real locus i.e. knowledge. The external object *(pratiyogin)* must be considered as essentially different from its knowledge *(anuyogin)*. The negation of external object therefore proves the **savisayatva** of knowledge.

7. Nobody feels that the object of knowledge is a mere content of knowledge because the form of knowledge like ‘this is blue’ or ‘that is yellow’ proves that the object is revealed by knowledge and is independent of knowledge.

8. The Naiyaikas argues that recognition also proves the **Savisayatva** of knowledge because recognition proves the unknown existence of the previously known object.

9. The ordinary linguistic usages of words like ‘I’, ‘mine’, ‘that’, ‘it’, etc. prove the essential difference of the things denoted by such words. If knowledge were not **savisaya**, such usages and the different practical behaviors resulting from them would be inexplicable.
10. Savisayatavada alone can explain the distinction between prama and aprama. The Naiyaika states that mere non-contradiction or practical efficiency cannot account this difference.

11. The knowledge caused by the utterance of the word void (sunya) would not take place if knowledge were not savisaya. For them 'knowledge of void' is nothing but the knowledge of absence of something in some locus.

The Naiyaika maintains that though knowledge must have some object, it is not self-luminous. For them knowledge is Paraprakasa. They think that knowledge is known as an act of inner perception (anuvyavasaya). The Naiyaika states that if being essentially luminous means 'the capacity to reveal something' then it is not acceptable to them. This is because, according to Naiyaika, knowledge remains self-unrevealing, when an object is revealed through it. The object is known through knowledge. The eye, for example, is not revealed when colour (rupa) is revealed through it. In other words, knowledge of colour does not reveal its revealer i.e. the eye. The Naiyaika also states that not only the eye, but any other sense organ, having the capacity to reveal itself, should be considered as essentially self-luminous. But no sense organ reveals itself while revealing an object. They argue that 'being essentially luminous' does not mean knowledge itself. The Naiyaika, therefore, concludes that nothing is proved as self-luminous (svaprapakasa).
Existence and non-existence are to be determined on the basis of (valid) means of knowledge. Of all the means of knowledge (direct), perception is the best. We will now examine in detail about the sources of knowledge which presents a major obstacle in our understanding of Epistemology. Sources of right knowledge or means of cognition are essential for the establishment of a valid knowledge. Knowledge is regarded to be valid if it makes us reach the object pointed by it and if it is not contradicted by subsequent action. The source of valid knowledge is called pramana. Pramana is defined as the karana or the extraordinary cause of a prama or right knowledge. There cannot be any right understanding of things except by means of pramana.

The Naiyaikas define pramana as the unique operative cause (karana) of right knowledge. They explain the term karana in the sense that is most conducive to the production of effect. There is a difference of opinion regarding the nature of karana between the old and the modern Naiyaikas. For the old Naiyaikas, the karana is the nature of the substance while, the modern Naiyaikas define karana as the cause which is invariably and immediately followed by the product. For example, in the case of cutting the wood with an axe, the karana in the ancient Naiyaikas is the axe itself. For the modern Naiyaikas, it is the operation of the axe.

The Nyaya system also believes that there are four distinct and independent sources of knowledge – perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Of these, perception is the most primary and fundamental. It gives us the knowledge of what is directly presented to the sense but we do not require
any testimony or inference for the knowledge of it. The Naiyaikas observe that perception is the final test of all knowledge. We may know the same thing by means of testimony, inference and perception. But the truth of knowledge derived from testimony and inference remain doubted. However, the truth of perception is beyond doubt. For example, the existence of fire at a distant place may be known from the testimony of a reliable person. It may also be known by inference from the observed smoke as a mark of fire. Moreover, if we go to the place from where smoke issues forth, then we can directly perceive the fire on the spot. It is clear that from perception we get better confirmation than testimony and inference. Therefore, perceptual verification is the final test of all other knowledge.

According to the Naiyaikas, perception is the ultimate ground of all knowledge. Though all knowledge does not arise from perception, yet it is the basis of the other sources of knowledge. Again, all other sources of knowledge presuppose perception and are derived from perception. The Nyaya says that perception is the basis on which we have knowledge of other truths by inference as well as by comparison and testimony. Inference as a method of knowledge depends on perception. Hence, inference is defined as that knowledge which must be preceded by perception (talpurvakam). Observation of a mark is the first step of inference. Similarly, comparison or upamana as a method of naming depends on perception of similarity between two objects. In the same way sabda or testimony depends on perception. This is because it is the visual or auditory perception of written or spoken words, and such words come from a person who has a direct or intuitive knowledge of the truths communicated by
him. So, we see that perceptual knowledge is the ultimate ground of all other knowledge.

The old school of Naiyaika defines *pratyaksa* in terms of sense object contact, i.e. *indriyarthasan nikarsa*. For them, perception is the valid knowledge which is produced by the contact of the sense organ with an object. The older Naiyaika also states that perception is that cognition which is distinguished from feeling and volition. But the Navya-Naiyaika differs from the old definition of perception in terms of sense object contact. Gangesa, the father of Navya Nyaya objected this definition. Firstly, he opposed that, this definition applies to inference and memory as forms of knowledge in which there is sense object contact. Again, the old Nyaya School states that, the mind which is an internal sense is operative and related to the object known through memory or inference. Secondly, if there can be no perception without sense object contact then it is not a sensuous cognition in any sense. Thirdly, it is objected that cognition of the self and pleasure, pain, etc. are not covered in this definition.

To remove these drawbacks, the Navya-Naiyaika proposes to define perception as immediate knowledge. They say that immediacy (*saksatkaritvam*) is the common character of all perception. Perception, like the visual, auditory, etc. are connected with the feeling that something is immediately known by the subject or the knower. The modern Naiyaikas give another definition — Perception is knowledge which is not brought about by the instrumentality of any antecedent knowledge. This definition applies to all cases of perception, human or divines. It excludes all other kinds of knowledge such as inference,
comparison and testimony. Inference is due to previous knowledge of a
universal relation between two things (vyaptijnana). Upamana or comparison is
the knowledge of similarity between two things (sadrsyajnana). Knowledge, by
testimony, is brought about by the understanding of the meaning of words
(padajnana). So, in all cases, memory depends for its origin on some direct
experience in the past (purvanubhava). But, only in the case of perception, our
knowledge is not caused by previous experience. Again it cannot be said that
perception is entirely undermined by previous experience. Hence, perception is
determined by previous experience.

Inference is the second source of knowledge. It is the reliable cause of
indirect, veridical cognition. In Indian Philosophy, inference is known as
'anumana', which is a Sanskrit word. Both these words are used in the same
sense because it is a kind of knowledge which we get after some other
knowledge or perception. According to Western Philosophy, inference is the
mental process of passing from one or more propositions or premises to
another proposition, which is justified or inferred by the premises. From this
definition, it is clear that firstly, in inference, we pass from the known to the
unknown and secondly, an inference requires more than one proposition as we
are to proceed from one or more propositions which are new to us. It is called
the conclusion of inference.

Gautama defines anumana as a knowledge preceded by perception. In
his 'Nyaya Sutra' Gautama has defined inference (anumana) as – “Atha
tatpurvakam trividhanumanam purvat sesavat samanyoto drastam”⁸. That is,
after having defined the pratyaksa pramana, inference is being defined as knowledge which is preceded by pratyaksa.

Vatsyayana explains this definition of anumana in Nyaya Sutra, "This perception is twofold - firstly, the perception of the invariable relation between the proban and the probandum (vyapti), and secondly, the perception of the proban. The proban means the linga in the real reason or hetu employed in the inferential process. The probandum or linga is the object actually inferred through the proban". The meaning of proban as employed here is the real reason (hetu) as actually employed in the influential process. The probandum means the object actually employed in it. Whenever there is the proban, there is the probandum. The proban is pervaded (vyapya) and the probandum is the pervade (vyapaka). The probandum is also the relation of the pervaded and the pervader (vyapya vyapakabhava). This means that the object of inference is some fact which follows from some other fact because of the universal relation between the two. In the proposition, "Where there is smoke, there is fire", smoke is the proban and fire is the probandum. There cannot be any smoke in the absence of fire. Thus, Vatsyayana defines inference as the knowledge of an object (lingi) through the previous knowledge of some sign or mark (linga). But mere knowledge or mark cannot account for inference. We may perceive some smoke on the hill, which serves as sign (linga) in the inference of fire from smoke. But mere perception of the smoke cannot bring about the inference of fire. This perception (linga) must be related to something which is inferred (sadhya). This relation is known as the invariable concomitance or vyapti between the mark (linga or hetu) and the sadhya or lingi.
The Naiyaiyikas prefer to use *anumana* as the instrument of inferential cognition or "*anumitikarana*". They hold that influence is the specific cause of inferential cognition. Moreover, the Naiyaiyikas defined *anumana* as the knowledge of an object, not by direct observation, but by means of the knowledge of a *linga* or sign and that of its universal relation (*vyapti*) with the inferred object. The object of inference is some fact which follows from some other fact because of a universal relation between the two. According to them in *anumana* we arrive at the knowledge of an object through the medium of two acts of knowledge or proposition.

The Advaitin maintains that pure knowledge is related to nothing other than itself. For them knowledge and existence are synonymous expressions. The real would be existent and known independent of knowledge. Sankara regards that knowledge is produced and destroyed. When knowledge is produced, the *Atman* is modified by the act of knowledge and becomes determinate and qualified (*savisessa*). For him, when knowledge is destroyed, it is divested of knowledge, and becomes a mere indeterminate and unqualified substance.

The Advaita Vedanta defines *prama* as the un-contradicted knowledge of an object\(^9\). Dharmarajadhvarindra in his *Vedanta Praribhasa* has defined *prama* (valid knowledge) as a cognition which is previously not cognized and is not contradicted. He puts forward an alternative definition – valid knowledge is that
which apprehends an object that is not already known (anadhigata) and that which is not contradicted (abadhita).

The Advaita Vedanta says that knowledge is essentially nirvisaya (object-less). Knowledge alone is real, while everything else is false. The false does not mean ‘fictitious’ like sky-flower. The Advaitin argues that any knowledge alleged to be essentially ‘of some object’ assumes the form like there is a pot, or the jar is perceived. The object is apprehended as being associated with existence and knowledge is this situation. The existence that is felt to persist in different knowledge is real; on the other hand, the differences not being persistent are not real. The individual differences establish the falsity of the object of knowledge. For instance, in the illusion of rope-snake, the rope being the persistent substrate in which snake is perceived, is real. While the snake, whose existence is not continuous, is false. The false is superimposed on the real. Such apprehension is due to superimposition, by imagination or ignorance (avidya) of the unreal on the real. So, any empirical object, though unreal is known by being superimposed through imagination on the real locus of knowledge. Knowledge has no object, but being persistently present in all knowledge-situation, is the only reality. Hence, it is considered by the Advaitin to be objectless and content less.

According to the Advaitins, knowledge is one and eternal. It is related to nothing other than itself. They argue that the different knowledge of different objects is actually not different. Knowledge is essentially one. But, they appear
to be different due to the different objects viz. sound, smell, etc. The knowledge of sound is not different from the knowledge of touch; for knowledgehood is present in both. Different knowledge, being knowledge (or having knowledgehood) are essentially identical; for nothing can be different with itself.

The Advaita Vedanta supports the fact that knowledge is self-luminous (svaprakasatavada) and self-valid. Knowledge does not depend for its existence (or revelation) on anything other than itself. It reveals itself as soon as it exists and reveals some object. Knowledge is the ground of its object's revelation and use. An object after being known is used with a sense of certitude and this logically presupposes a sense of certitude regarding the knowledge of the object. The revelation and use of object is clear that knowledge is self-luminous.

The Advaita Vedanta defines pramana as the operative cause (karana) of prama or true knowledge. They define prama in two ways. First, prama means that true knowledge is un-contradicted and original e.g. it gives us new information. Secondly, prama is taken to mean un-contradicted knowledge of objects.

Early Advaitins refer to three sources of knowledge – perception, inference and scriptural testimony. Later, writers like Dharmarajadharindra add comparison, implication and negation. Among these, perception has special prominence because it is the origin of other sources of knowledge (It is a type of knowledge whose instrumental cause is not knowledge but in case of inference, comparison or spiritual testimony, etc. we have as our data knowledge of
premises or of similarity or of significance of words). We know objects better by perception than others. So, perception is established as a matter of all sources of knowledge.

In the Advaita Vedanta, as a means of pramana, perception (pratyaksa) is the unique operative cause i.e. karana of right knowledge. In this respect, the sense organs constitute the karana or the unique cause of perceptual knowledge. So, Pratyaksa is defined as immediate and timeless knowledge (caitanya). In Advaita Vedanta, perception is nothing but pure consciousness which refers to the instrument of valid perceptual knowledge. This type of immediate knowledge is the self itself because it is only in the self where lies pure immediacy of knowledge. The senses are the karana or the unique cause of perception as immediate knowledge as far as the mental modification. It is antah-karanavritti which manifests caitanya, due to the function of the sense organs. The antah-karana (mind) goes out through the sense organ which is in contact with a present perceptible object and becomes so modified that it assumes the form of the object itself. The mind is a material principle and so it is quite possible for it to move and attain the dimension of the object of perception. It is clear that perception is the immediate knowledge in which the mental modification is non-different (abhinna) from the object. Thus, it is defined as direct awareness. For that reason, it is said that all the other methods of knowledge presupposes perception and must be based on knowledge derived from perception.
Illusion is an epistemological concept. Almost all systems of Indian philosophy have accepted error (vipanyaya) or illusion as a form of invalid knowledge (aprama). It may be taken as a reverse of valid knowledge (prama), which is the presentation of an object, as what it really is (tattvanubhava). While erroneous knowledge is the cognition of an object as what it really is not (atattvajnana). It is an illusionary perception of one thing as another or it is an erroneous cognition of one thing as another, and therefore it is called error. Error has been described as wrong apprehension (mithyopalabdhi) in which an object is taken for what is not (atasminstaditi pratyayah)\textsuperscript{13}.

The Naiyaikas hold that all error is subjective. Vatsyayana says, "What is set aside by true knowledge is the wrong apprehension, not the object"\textsuperscript{14}. Uddotkara observes, "The object all the while remains what it actually is; in regard to the flickering rays of the sun, when there arises the cognition of water, there is no error in the object, it is not that the rays are not rays, or that the flickering is not flickering. The error lies in the cognition, as it is the cognition, which instead of appearing as the cognition of the flickering rays, appears as the flickering of water i.e. as the cognition of a thing as something which it is not"\textsuperscript{15}. All erroneous cognition has some basis in reality. Vatsyayana therefore says, "No wrong apprehension is entirely baseless"\textsuperscript{16}. Dharmottara defines 'illusion' as the factor of knowledge which contradicts the underlying essence of reality which possesses efficiency. Kamalasila and Vintadeva take the term illusion in the sense of inconsistency.
The Nyaya advocates *anyathatkhyati* theory of error. It is the theory of misapprehension. According to this theory, an illusion is the misapprehension of one thing as another thing. It is manifestation of a real object in the form of a different object. There is no error in the simple apprehension (*alocana*) of object. The error lies not in the indeterminate perception of the given but in the determinate perception of it as worked up and modified by some representative elements.

There is no doubt that there is the attribution (*aropa*) of false character to a perceived fact in illusion. But the questions that arise are, "How do we come to ascribe the false character? How does this false character appear as something actually perceived in illusion?" The Nyaya maintains that an illusion experience is a single perception. It is not a complex of perception and recollection of their distinction blurred by the obscuration of memory as Prabhakara thinks. A.C. Ewing says, "The difficulty in the case of perception is not the mere fact of error, but the demand that we should hold both that what we immediately perceived is numerically identical with a physical object or a part of such an object and yet that is quite different"\(^\text{17}\). Therefore, we have to explain the perceptual character of illusion to explain illusion. We should not try to explain it away. The Naiyāikas hold that we perceive an object which is white. It is seen that whiteness is common quality of both nacre and silver. Owing to some defects in the eye, we do not perceive the distinctive quality of the nacre. We miss the distinctive quality due to the defect.
The Nyaya School holds that the object of illusion is only one which appears in a different form. It is the misapprehension of the real form of the object. The Nyaya theory of illusion is known as *Anyathakhyati*. It means that one thing is mistaken for another. This means that one reality is mistaken reality (*Sadanturam Sadanratmana grhyate*)\(^{18}\). According to Nyaya, an erroneous cognition is presentational in character and has some basis in facts. These facts being misrelated and misplaced, error becomes a false apprehension of the real.

Modern school like Gangesa and others discuss that one thing is mistaken for another in a different way. They interpret that real objects which does not have a certain attribute is mistaken in an extraordinary perception as having that attributes which exists elsewhere (*tadabhavavat vastutadavat jnayayate*)\(^{19}\). This is the Nyaya theory of *viparitakhyati*. It maintains that illusion lies in the misapprehension of one thing for another. According to the Nyaya, illusion consists of cognizing the object as otherwise. It is due to the defective sense organ. It is cognized because it is not non-existent. Moreover it is not existent, because it is sublated in the form ‘this is not silver’. But, the Buddhism and the Advaita Vedanta opposes the Nyaya theory of error.

The Advaita Vedanta maintains that the object of illusion is neither real nor unreal nor both. It is different from both existent and non-existent (*sadasadvi-laksana*). The error vanishes when we get true knowledge of the object. The knowledge of the silver vanishes when the knowledge of shell arrives. The sublating experience shows that the object of illusion is not existent.
or real. It would not have been sublated and contradicted if it had been real or existent. Secondly, it appears in experience, so it is not unreal or non-existent. What is totally non-existent can never appear in experience like the sky-lotus. Thirdly, it cannot be said to be both real and unreal. A thing is not both real and unreal at the same time. So, it is contradicted. Therefore, that silver is illusion is really indeterminable as real or unreal. It can be said that the object of illusion cannot be logically defined as real or unreal. So, the Advaita Vedanta theory of error is known as Anirvacaniyakhyali.

The Advaitin holds their theory of illusion, criticizing all other theories of error. The Nyaya theory hold that something else (silver) is regarded as the object of illusion. But this contention, according to the Advaitins, cannot be accepted. If something else is the object of illusion it cannot be called the illusion of silver. The object of perception cannot be said to be something else other than what it is perceived. The Naiyayikas held elaborate illusion with the help of extraordinary sense object contact. The distinct object is perceived through the extraordinary sense-object contact. This theory for the Advaitin is untenable, because in illusion 'silver' is experienced 'here and now' and not in a distant place. The Advaitins regard that illusion is produced by the present object so it is presentative.

The Nyaya refutes the Advaitin's theory of illusion. According to Advaita the object of illusion is indefinable. The object of illusion is neither real nor unreal nor both. In illusion, a snake is perceived and sublated and cannot be definable. The Naiyaikas hold that the Anirvacaniyakhyati cannot explain the
sublation. The Nyaya points out that the silver exists somewhere else but is sublated here and now when we realize that 'this is not silver', it is not the knowledge of silver which is sublated here. On the other hand, it is silver itself. If the knowledge of silver too is sublated, then the known fruit of knowledge too would have to be taken as nonexistent and the sublating cognition will be without any basis. Consequently, nothing will be sublated. Thus, only what is obtained through knowledge is sublated.

Moreover, the Advaitin maintains that the illusion is indefinable, because it is neither real nor unreal. The illusionary snake is neither absolutely real nor unreal since it is perceived for the time being and is sublated later on. From this, we cannot say that illusion is inexplicable. Even if this theory is accepted the inexpicability remains as it is. That which is different from the absolutely unreal e.g. a hare's horn cannot be perceived and that is different from the absolutely real e.g. the self cannot be sublated. Hence the illusionary snake, which is different from absolutely real and the absolutely unreal, can neither be perceived nor sublated, whereas it is actually perceived and sublated.

Buddhism states that knowledge is in harmony with its object. This can be known if knowledge leads the knower to the actual attainment of the object. Knowledge does not produce its objects and induces the knower to attain it. For Buddhism, the truth of knowledge consists of its practical value (arthakriyakarityam). They define prama as the knowledge that is capable of successful volition in the revealing of an object or as knowledge which helps reach the object revealed by it. For them, valid knowledge is that which is not...
contradicted. In Buddhism, it is clear that the validity of knowledge depends upon the success in the practical activity.

Early Buddhist epistemology held knowledge to be a compound phenomenon which can be analyzed into a number of elements simultaneously emerging into existence. The Sautrantika is Sakarajnanavadin and is yet a realist. Because, for them, object could have no identity with knowledge and the object is extraneous to knowledge. The Sautrantika contends that knowledge and object are different entity. An object is known when it is related to knowledge that is essentially nirakara; this relation is called subject-object relation (visaya-visayibhavasamvandha). Nor can the Sautrantika admit any causal relation between knowledge and object. Everything is momentary and causal relation can exist only between objects occurring successively. According to them, an object of knowledge (visaya) is that which confers its content (akara) on the knowledge.

The Vijnanavada thinks that the Sautrantika position is not tenable, for if knowledge is considered to be sakara, the external object cannot be admitted. The Sautrantika regards that neither can knowledge be object (grahya) nor can the object be a subject of knowledge (grahaka). They are arguing for the reality of the external object. But the external object cannot be known directly; it can be known through the content that is revealed in knowledge. For them the object is extraneous to knowledge. The Sautrantika upholds both the Sakaratva and Savisayatva of knowledge. The Vijnanavadin contends that the object is essentially of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge is Sakara. They uphold the
Sakaratva of knowledge mainly on the ground that it explains the relation of knowledge and object. The existence of an object is always known and proved only through knowledge; hence it cannot be independent of knowledge. For the Vijnanavadin, to be an object is to be an object of knowledge. Knowledge cannot, on the contrary, occur or exist without having some object of its own. Knowledge means knowledge of some object. If the object is considered as other and independent of knowledge then it can never be known.

According to Vijnanavada, the object is essentially of the nature of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be considered as formless (contentless). Knowledge has some content (sakara). They stated that an object is revealed not as something different from knowledge, but as the content (form) of knowledge. The existence of an object is always known and proved only through knowledge, and hence it cannot be independent of knowledge.

The Vijnanavadin is against all the epistemological realism because the realist contends (already discussed earlier in this chapter) that knowledge and object are different. They say that an object is known when it is related to knowledge. It is essentially nirakara and this relation is called subject-object relation (visaya-visayibhasamvandha). The nirakaravadin contends that knowledge is objective (savisya) or that the object is different from knowledge. The Vijnanavadin does not support this view and argues that an object is revealed not as something different from knowledge, but as the content of knowledge. They stated that knowledge and object are not different, rather they are essentially identical. The essential identity of knowledge and the object is
proved through their invariable co-apprehension (sahopalambhaniyamat). The word ‘sahopalambha’ means that knowledge is identical with the object that appears as the object (visaya) “of” or as extraneous to that knowledge. One who knows knowledge also knows its object and vice-versa. It is not possible that an object is known and its knowledge is not. Hence, “the blue” and “knowledge of blue” are essentially identical, for they are apprehended invariably together. The distinction naively made between the percept and its content is illusory. The two moons that are perceived under certain abnormal circumstances are really not two, but one. For the Vijnanavadin, things are not essentially identical or one cannot be known together and one is never known without the other. This proves that knowledge and object are essentially identical.

The Vijnanavadin attempts to establish the sakaratva of knowledge or the essential identity between knowledge and object on the basis of “sahopalambha niyama” (co-apprehension). According to it, knowledge and object are related to one another; neither does the object exist without being known to exist; nor does knowledge occur without having some object. Knowledge always appears as revealing a content of its own (sakara). Knowledge is never known as nirakara.

The Vijnanavadin says that the essence of object is knowledge. The object cannot be considered as external to knowledge. It is nothing but cognition. So that knowledge to exist is to reveal some object and by revealing
some object knowledge also reveals itself. The object belongs to the essence of knowledge that reveals it and is therefore sakara. Thus, they declare that knowledge and object are essentially identical. The Vijnanavadin also says that the relation between two essentially different things is not possible. Knowledge can reveal that alone which is essentially identical with it. The nirakaravadin (one who holds that knowledge reveals an object external to it and does not have its own form) argues that knowledge is different object. But the Vijnanavadin is against this view and states that knowledge can never reveal itself if it is not revealing object.

The Vijnanavadin maintains that knowledge has not only a form but it also is self-luminous. If it were not so it would not have revealed an object. For them, knowledge cannot depend for its revelation on any other luminous thing. Knowledge is never an un-manifested state. It is described by them as Svasamvit (self-knowledge), because object is identical with knowledge. For the Vijnanavadin knowledge is known by itself. This view is also supported by the Jains, the Prabakara-mimamsakas, the Samkhya-Yoga and the Advaita Vedantins. Knowledge is of the nature of light or illumination. As the nature of light, it does not require anything to manifest. Knowledge, by nature, is self-revealing (svayamprakasa) in the sense that it is not in need of anything else to reveal or to know itself. It is never an object of knowledge nor is it known by any other knowledge. If it is known as an object then it may require knowledge to know it and so on. That is why they opine that knowledge is self-luminous.
Paraprakasatavadin holds that knowledge is not self-luminous i.e. it is illumined by others. It regards that a non-luminous thing e.g. eyes illuminate everything but itself remain certain. The Vijnanavadin rejects the Paraprakasatavadin view. They remarks that the eye or any other sense organ is not luminous and hence it can never be said to reveal the object. Again the Paraprakasatavadin argues that the essence of knowledge is the revelation of object and not of itself on the ground of externality or independence of the object. But the Vijnanavadin states that an object is essentially of the nature of knowledge. The object is known to exist only through knowledge. For Vijnanavadin knowledge is essentially luminous; for that it can reveal object and luminous knowledge cannot depend for its existence and revelation on anything external.

The Paraprakasatavadin contends that the object is essentially different from knowledge. As against this view, the Vijnanavadin states that an object could never be known if it were different from the knowledge. The non-luminous objects cannot be related to knowledge. Knowledge is sakara and the object is not external to it. Any object whenever known, is known as the content of knowledge. The essence of object should therefore be admitted to the content of knowledge. The Vijnanavadin argues against the externality or independence of object. For them, object is essentially of the nature of knowledge. If the object is extraneous to knowledge it can never be known.
The Vijnanavadin Svaprakasatavada (self-luminous) follows the denial of Savisayatavada which states that the object is other than and is independent of knowledge. According to Vijnanavadin, knowledge and the object are identical and the object is not extraneous to knowledge. One who knows knowledge also knows its object. It is not possible that an object is known and its knowledge is not. Knowledge and object are always known together and one is never known without the other. It cannot be known through another piece of knowledge. It is self-luminous because the object is revealed through it and this is because of its self-luminosity. So the Vijnanavadin thinks that the object is nothing but a content of knowledge. The object though essentially luminous is not self-luminous like knowledge. The object appears to have luminous essence (as the content of knowledge) only by being a part of knowledge but not vice-versa. Knowledge alone is real, and everything is unreal from an ultimate point of view. The Vijnanavadin argues that knowledge must be considered as essentially luminous otherwise no object would be revealed by it. If it remains unrevealed while revealing its object, it must be due to its essential self-luminosity. In that case, revelation of an object through knowledge is not possible. Again, the distinctions between prama and aprama and the ignorant and omniscient, etc. cannot be maintained if knowledge ever remains unknown. Knowledge therefore should be considered as Svaprakasa (self-luminous).

The Vijnanavadin and the Naiyaikas does not accept the Advaita view that knowledge is objectless. The Vijnanavadin, though does not support savisayata, also does not contend for the objectless of knowledge. They do not
deny the objective reference of knowledge. The Naiyaika also argue that knowledge though content-less is never objectless (niavisaya). The nirakaratva (contentless) of knowledge means that it never assumes that for the object to be known, it has to become essentially identical with knowledge. The Naiyaika regards that the savisayatva of knowledge means knowledge never exist without being related to some new object. For them knowledge is an object.

The Vijnanavadin and the Naiyaika state that, if knowledge is nirvisaya, it cannot be considered as pramana. This is because pramana refers to a knower and a known. Again, if the reality of knowledge is to be proved, then knowledge must be considered as Savisaya (knowledge is essentially of an object). The indeterminate and objectless (nirvisaya) cannot be proved. To deny the object of knowledge leads to the denial of the reality of knowledge.

The Vijnanavadin and the Naiyaika also state that if knowledge is not considered as being ever a cognition (due to determinate-ness and savisayatva of knowledge), then it becomes as unreal as the fictitious. For them, denial of the savisayatva of knowledge leads to the denial of the reality of knowledge.

The Nyaya realism opposes the idealism of the Vijnanavadin and of the Advaitins. The Nyaya contends for the Savisayatva and Nirakaratva of knowledge while the Vijnanavadin argues for the Sakaratva of knowledge. If knowledge is savisaya, i.e. reveals as extraneous and independent object, it (knowledge) has to be considered as nirakara. In other words, the realist
contends that object is not an *akara* (content) of the knowledge revealing it. On the other hand, the idealist argues that object is *akara* of knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, is *sakara*. The object is, in other words, a 'creation' or an 'expression' of knowledge. The Advaitin agrees with the Vijnanavadin on this point. But, from empirical point of view, the Advaita consider knowledge to be *savisaya*. The Vijnanavadin does not accept the *savisayatva* of knowledge even from an empirical point of view. Empirically, knowledge is *sakara*. Actually both think that transcendentally, the object is nothing but the 'creation' or 'expression' of knowledge.

The early Buddhists define *pramana* as un-contradicted experience. They consider knowledge to be right knowledge when the following criteria are fulfilled. Firstly, a right knowledge makes us reach the object indicated by it\(^26\). However, even if the object indicated is not achieved, still the knowledge will be considered right if we have reasonable ground to explain it. Kamalasila says, "Knowledge is valid which refers to a possible successful action though not to its actual achievement"\(^28\). For example, after any injury the wound will heal, this is right knowledge. However if the patient has diabetes, the same wound will not heal easily. Here the knowledge is right even though the object is not achieved.

Another criterion of right knowledge is its capacity of producing the effect attributed to it. For example, fire is real as it is capable of burning, cooking and lighting. The fire, which is incapable of having these functions, is unreal. It is clear that the Buddhists generally take the truth of knowledge to consist in its
capacity to produce successful activity. Prama or true knowledge is harmonious in the sense that there is no conflict between the cognition of an object and the practical activity to obtain it. For them, prama is practically useful knowledge and pramana is the source of that knowledge.

The early Buddhist maintains that there are two characteristics of reality - one which is directly apprehended and the other which is indirectly conceived. That which is directly perceived is called object of perception, while, that which is indirectly present is called the object of inference. The object of sense perception is localized in space and time in particular area, but that of inference is conceived through the mark and becomes localized afterwards. Hence, the object indicated can come only through sense perception and inference. Therefore the validity of our knowledge depends upon two sources - perception and inference. This is also supported by Dharmakirti and Dignaga.

The other schools of Indian Philosophy do not accept followed Dignaga's view of only two sources of knowledge. They widely differ in this point. The Carvakas believe perception to be the only source of knowledge. The early Vaisesikas believed in perception and inference. However, their view of perception and inference is not the same as Buddhist view. The Samkhya believed in perception, inference and testimony. The Naiyaika adds 'analogy' as the fourth source of valid knowledge. The Prabhakara Mimamsaka adds 'presumption' while Bhatta Mimamsaka adds 'non-apprehension' to the list of sources of knowledge. In short, perception, inference, verbal testimony,
analogy, presumption and non-apprehension are generally considered as the six sources of valid knowledge. The Advaita Vedanta recognizes all of them as right sources of knowledge. Some theistic Vedantin schools makes some more addition, like – ratiocination, probability, tradition, intuition and negation. But the Buddhist thinkers thought that these other sources of knowledge are actually included in perception or inference. They are not separate sources of knowledge. To prove this fact, the different pramanas (sources of knowledge) and their validity as sources of right knowledge are examined below.

**Verbal testimony (sabda):** The verbal cognition is regarded as a separate source of knowledge because knowledge cannot be derived from sense-perception as its objects are beyond senses. Knowledge cannot be derived from an inference because it lacks all the characteristics of an inferential cognition\(^{30}\). It depends on reliable authority or trust-worthy person\(^{31}\). The trustworthiness of verbal cognition can be explained under eternal sentence and a reliable person. The eternal sentence means one that does not proceed from a human source. It may be capable or incapable of bringing about its cognition at all times. Again, if a sentence is eternal, and does not emanate from a person, it is not possible for it to give any kind of knowledge at all because knowledge is invariably associated only with persons. If knowledge is derived from a trustworthy person, it cannot be a separate source of knowledge. The man is found to be true when his statements have been corroborated in actual life. Hence, his belief is based on an inference. This shows that the verbal testimony of a trustworthy person is included in inference.
The Buddhist logician like Dignaga also believes that 'verbal cognition' is not a separate source of knowledge; it is either a form of perception or inference. They point out that there is no relation of a word and an external object referring to it. If there were a relation between them, it would be either identity (tadatmya) or causality (tadupatti). A relation of identity is called oneness and if oneness is accepted among the two distinct objects, then a cow and a horse would be one. Again, there is no relation of causality between a word and an object. This is because there is neither a positive relation of agreement between word and object relationship nor a negative relation. For example, a pot is produced with a lump of clay, a stick, water, wheel, etc. without the operation of words. Dignaga states that if sabda means the statement of trustworthy persons, it is reduced to inference. Again if it is used to prove that these are actual facts corresponding to a statement then it is reduced to perception. So, verbal testimony cannot be regarded as a separate source of knowledge. It is either a form of perception or inference.

**Analogy:** The knowledge of similarity is generated by analogy. The analogy apprehends an entirely new object which is not previously apprehended. Knowledge arises from the presence of some common factors in a thing that was experienced previously in another thing. For instance, when we see at first a 'gavaya' we remember the features of a cow which we have often seen and compare the common features of the gavaya with those of a cow and conclude that it is a gavaya. The Mimamsa holds 'analogy' as a separate source of knowledge. However, as it is entirely devoid of the function of the sense-organs,
it cannot be called sense-perception. For them, analogy apprehends in entirely new object which is not previously apprehended. For instance, before the perception of a 'gavaya' its similarity with a cow is not apprehended at all. Kumarila also states that analogy is different from sense-perception and is not a separate source of knowledge.

But the Buddhist analysis shows that analogy is also not a separate source of knowledge. It is a case of perception. The above example leads us to the conclusion that the man distinguishes the 'gavaya' from the cow on the basis of some characteristics which are not present in the cow. This apprehension is obtained with the help of his sense-organs. Hence, this mode of apprehension is perceptual. So, analogy is not distinct from perception. Dignaga maintains that analogy is only the 'perception of likeness' and is not distinct from perception and testimony. He says that when a person perceives a cow and a gavaya he apprehends the likeness between the two. When he is told about the likeness between a cow and a gavaya, he also remembers that some qualities of the cow are present in the gavaya and some other qualities are absent. So, Dignaga says that analogy is not different from perception and testimony.

Presumption (arthapatti): Presumption consists of presuming some unperceived fact in order to reconcile inconsistency in the perceived facts. For instance, if it is found that Devadutta, who is alive, is not seen in his house, his non-existence in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere
outside the house. The word ‘Arthapatti’ can be derived as “arthasya bahissadbhavasya apattih yasmat sa rthapattiriti” which means postulation is the assumption of something which exists outside. Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other in their views on postulation. According to him, there is doubt regarding the truth of the two perceived facts which cannot be reconciled with each other. But Kumarila states that there is no element of doubt in case of postulation. He says that we perceive the absence of Devadutta from his house. We certainly know that he is alive. In order to reconcile these two well known and undoubted facts, we assume that he has gone out of his house. Thus, according to Kumarila, the basis of postulation lies not in a doubt, but in the mutual irreconcilability or inconstancy between two well ascertained things.

But, the Buddhist criticized the view of a presumption and found that it is not different from perception or inference. For them, presumption is based upon negation which does not give certainty. They argue that the absence of Devadatta from the house does not provide the conclusion that he is outside his house. He might not be in the samsara at all. Moreover negation is a kind of inference. So, presumption based upon negation is nothing but inference.

**Ratiocination and Probability:** Some philosophers regard these two as separate source of knowledge. But Kumarila included them in inference. They are infact, a different type of inference. The example of Ratiocination is like when ‘A’ comes ‘B’ is there. ‘A’ does not come when ‘B’ is not there. That
means ‘A’ precedes ‘B’. This ratiocination is an inference based on inference. So, it cannot be taken as a separate source of knowledge.

Again, Probability is nothing but a kind of inference. It brings about the cognition of the components of an aggregate after the aggregate is known. For example, if one says that he has rupees hundred in his pocket, the listener remark that it is highly probable that he has ten ten-rupee notes in his pocket. So, the members of the aggregate are the cause of the idea of the aggregate. From the idea of the aggregate we infer the idea of its component parts. Thus, it is inference and not a separate source of knowledge.

**Tradition and Intuition:** The Pauranikas are the profounders that tradition (aitihya) is an independent source of knowledge. Tradition is that means of cognition whose original promulgator cannot be traced, but which has come through a long continued assertion. For example, “a ghost resides in a banyan tree”.

Intuition is that cognition which indicates the existence or non-existence of things and which appears suddenly without any restriction of time or place. When a mother has the notion ‘my daughter will come today’ and she does not come, it is a case of intuition. Here, cognition comes suddenly without any restriction of time or place.
Santaraksita says that tradition and intuition are found to be false. They cannot give certainty and therefore cannot be a valid source of knowledge. They are also nothing but perception or inference. Therefore, they are not a separate true source of knowledge.

From the above discussion, it can be concluded that except perception and inference, other sources of knowledge are contradicted by experience. They are not apprehension of an un-apprehended object. So, they cannot be regarded as a source of valid knowledge. Perception and inference are the only sources of knowledge.

Perception is called the direct means of knowledge, while the indirect one is inference. Buddhists believe in the theory of "Pramana-Vyavastha" or "The limitations of means of knowledge". This theory is a great contribution of Buddhist to epistemology. This theory states that there are two means of knowledge – perception and inference. Perception is the back-bone of not only the theory of Pramana-Vyavastha, but also the whole of Epistemology. Let us now discuss these two sources of knowledge.

Perception is the primary and fundamental source of valid knowledge and this is universally recognized. It is the basis on which we have knowledge of other truths by inference as well as by comparison and testimony. It gives us direct or immediate knowledge of reality of an object; therefore it is the root of all other pramanas. The European Philosopher W.T. Mervin says, "Perception is
the ultimate crucial test, and as such, it does not presuppose its own probability. It simply is, and the man who questions assumes it in order to do the questioning. Russel also states, “Truth of perception are self evident truths, for which we require no tests at all.”

Many Philosophic systems define perception as knowledge due to sense object contact. In the Vaisesika Philosophy, perception is described as knowledge which is conditioned by the senses. The Samkhya Yoga system also defines perception in terms of sense stimulation. In the Samkhya-Sutra, perception is defined as cognition which describes the form of an object as related to it. Isvarakrsna considers perception as determinate cognition of an object. He used the term Drsta instead of perception. According to Samkhya, perception is the direct cognition of an object by a sense when the two come in contact with each other. Similar view is held by the Yoga system, which emphasizes that perception is specially cognition of the particularity of an object. In the Mimamsa system, Jaimini defines perception as the cognition which is produced by the efficient contact of the sense with their object. The Bhatta school of Mimamsa also defines perception in this way. Again, the Prabhakara School also defined perception as the direct cognition of an object. Perception is the intuitive knowledge that we may have of the subject and the object of knowledge and knowledge itself. For them every act of perception consists of three aspects of consciousness viz. the perception of the knowing self, the known object and knowledge itself. This is designated as the Triputi Pratyaksavada of Prabhakara.
In the early Buddhism, the concept of perception is very simple. Perception involves the participation of at least three things – an object, an organ and pure consciousness. The perceptual cognition originates depending upon its proper object and sense organ. The Vaibhasikas opine that the object, the sense organs and the perceptual cognition arise simultaneously. They say that lamp is the cause of light but both of them are simultaneous. The Vaibhasikas view that a thing can be perceived because it is present along with its cognition.

The Vaibhasikas hold that we have an immediate and direct apprehension of the nature of things as they are in themselves. We are directly aware of the external material objects and therefore the senses provide us with reliable knowledge. Sensory awareness is closely related to perceptual and conceptual knowledge. The Vaibhasika held immediate apprehension and inference as the means providing us with valid knowledge. For the Vaibhasikas, mind is not just an entity confined to unveiling the meanings of messages received by the sense-organs, but an originative activity which arises along with various psychological activities. In the latter, mind can be said to be operative as in rapport with the external world.

The Vaibhasika establishes three types of direct knowledge. The first is immediate sensory apprehension which is bereft of intellectual characterization. It apprehends the individual existence of the objects perceived. In this type of immediate apprehension, we are able to see colour forms and hear sounds.
The other two are intellectual apprehension and mystical apprehension. It transcends the realm of concept and is not restricted to sensory apprehension.

The Sautrantika criticizes the Vaibhasika concept that lamp is the cause of light. For them, the perception of an object arises when the object has already been destroyed. For them, what is directly perceived in the cognition is representation or the copy of an object and not the object itself; the object is perceived, rather inferred through this copy.

For the Vaibhasika, sense-data are non-mental and it would be simple to call them physical, while the Sautrantika sense-data are not non-mental. According to H.H. Price, “The sense-data of a phenomenalist are neither mental nor physical; they cannot be said to be effects of certain causes nor are they real”\(^n\)\(^37\). For the Vaibhasika, perception consists of perceiving non-mental phenomena-\( \text{rupa} \), which may be called sensibility. Their difference can be exemplified with the perception of a patch of blue. In perceiving a patch of blue, what actually transpires is a cluster of atoms which is nominally existent is perceived. Atoms themselves are not perceived. But the patch of blue is not figment of the mind and in this sense it can be said to the status of objectivity. But, for the Sautrantikas, though the patch of blue is caused by the blue atoms in the external world, yet it is the subject’s awareness. It is not ‘out there’. The reality cannot be the status of objectivity. It can be said to have been foisted on the atoms by an act of mind (\( \text{citta} \)).
This theory of perception is logically and elaborately discussed in the Yogacara school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. If the object is not seen at all, how it is possible to perceive and what actually is perception. Yogacara says that perception takes place by thought consciousness. The etymological meaning of the term pratyaksa of Dignaga is found in his book Nyayamukha. He states that pratyaksa is so named because it occurs in close connection with (prati) each sense faculty (aksas). This interpretation is based upon the Abhidharmic doctrine that perception, though occasioned by senses and object, is named after the senses which are its specific cause (asadharana hetu).

Dignaga defines perception as “A cognition free from conceptual construction (kalpanapodha) and unassociated with name, universal, substance, quality and action”\(^3\). According to Dignaga the perception of a snake in a rope or of water in a desert is not perception at all. It is a construction of our imagination. In the same way, our perception which involves the association with name and genus etc. is not a perception. For instance, when we perceive a cow and say ‘it is brown’ or ‘it is white’, it is not perception. Rather, it is simply a description of its general characteristics which are found in other cows as well. In perception, we perceive a cow which cannot be compared or contrasted with another. For him, it cannot be associated with a class character and cannot be designated by a name. It is a self-conscious process which determines the object and confirms to the unique individual nature of the object even without attributing a name or a colour to it.
Dharmakirti added the term 'non-erroneous' (abhrantam) to the definition put forward by Dignaga. He considers cognition as free from conceptual construction (kalpa) and errors. According to him, when a thing is perceived the totality of its attributes is perceived. He defines 'non-illusiveness' as not contradicted by that underlying essence of reality possesses efficiency. He exemplifies this by – the water which does not quench our thirst is no water; the fire which does not burn our body is no fire. It denotes the knowledge which is not at variance with the direct reality. Dharmakirti inserts the adjective 'non-illusiveness' in order to distinguish perception from illusion and hallucination. Dignaga holds illusion to be mental. But Dharmakirti's concept of perception is devoid of all mental and sensuous illusions which are caused by colour blindness, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, sickness or other causes. For him, knowledge is directly produced from un-defective sense-organs, and is free from all kinds of mental and sensuous illusions. Illusions and hallucinations resemble perception but they are contradicted by their subsequent experiences and are incapable of producing any results. However, perception is different from such experiences. They are non-contradicted by their subsequent experiences and are also effective in producing result. Hence, Dharmakirti inserts the attribute non-illusive (adhrantam) in his definition of perception.

However, Dignaga dropped the characteristic of non-illusiveness from his definition of perception. For him, the entire empirical world as interconnected of substance and its qualification and the inferential knowledge founded upon it which is construction of our mind. So, there is no reference to an external
existence and non-existence. He also states that such construction as 'this is a tree' or 'this is a patch of colour' do not come under the domain of perception, but on the other hand they are within the purview of indirect knowledge or inference. Hence it is unnecessary to say that perception is non-illusive.

Dignaga refutes the Nyaya sutra definition of perception. The Nyaya sutra defines perception as that cognition which is produced by the contact of sense and object, which is inexpressible (avyapadisya), non-erroneous (avyabhicarin); and of a determinate nature (vyavasayatmaka). Dignaga says that there is no possibility that perception can ever be in regard to the erroneous object, because an erroneous cognition necessarily has an object, an illusion, which is produced by the mind (manobhranti). Moreover, Dignaga says that the term vyavasanyatmaka is improper for defining perception, for it implies ascertainment, which is not possible without the use of universe. So it will not be possible to differentiate from indirect knowledge. In this regard the Naiyaikas held that the terms avyapadesya, avyabhicarin and vyavasayatmaka are mentioned in the sutra to describe the nature of perception which is acceptable.

The Naiyaikas say that perception is the expression of cognition which is produced by the contact of sense and object. They maintain that all five senses come into direct contact with their objects i.e. they are the prapyakarin. But, Dignaga states that the two of the external sense - visual and auditory, and the internal sense (manas) functions without direct contact with their objects (aprapyakarin). He also says that these senses perceive objects larger than
themselves (adhikagrahana) and are operative even from a considerable distance (santaragrahan).

Dignaga and Dharmakirti attempted to establish that perception is indeterminate in nature. They do not accept the determinate knowledge as perception. The determinate perception involves relation between things already apprehended. It starts on the presupposition that there are some factors which are to be related. The indeterminate perception is an antecedent and indispensable condition for a determinate perception. For Dignaga, indeterminate perception was caused by a pure object while there was mental factor involved in the determinate knowledge. But the Buddhist logician Dignaga and Dharmakirti does not accept the determinate knowledge (savikalpa) as perception. For Dignaga perception cannot be determinate. If it is determinate it is conceptual or inferential knowledge.

Dharmakirti also states that perception never involves thought or ideation or determination. Whatever cognition is determinate or involves thought is never generated directly by the external object and hence could not be considered to be a case of perception. Dharmakirti maintains that determinate perception does not require an external object for its emergence. It requires only the recollection of a convention. For him, perception does not require the memory of a convention; but it requires, for its emergence, only the proper sense organ and the proper external object. Thus, perception cannot be determinate. For Dignaga, determinate perception means judgement arising in the wake of pratyaksa which is kalpanapodha but not a pramana. Moreover, determinate
perception enables one to determine (adhyavasaya) a real object. So, it is not perception.

It is necessary to know the relation of perception to its object for a proper study of the Dignaga-Dharmakirti school's theory of perception. To hint at the object of perception, Dignaga has quoted the following passage from the Abhidharmasutra – "A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue, but he does not know that it is blue; of the object he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is".

Dignaga holds that the object of perception is svalaksana or unique particular. It is beyond understanding or thought. The categories of thought i.e. name, universal, action, etc. do not characterize it. It represents a single moment. It is unique. It is the basis of our empirical knowledge. For Dignaga, svalaksana is the unique essence of a thing, a positive entity which cannot be expressed in negative terms, a pure object free from all qualifications or adjectives. According to him, svalaksana is beyond space and time (disakalananugata).

Again, Dharmakirti also regards that the object of perception is a unique particular (svalaksana). The essence of unique particular is not shared by others, nor is it pervasive spatially or temporally. Hence, recognition or synthetic cognition is not possible at all in connection with the unique particular.

Dharmakirti defines particular as something whose mental image varies according to its nearness and remoteness. The object of perception, being
unique particular, could not be capable of coalescence with verbal. Only a mental construction is capable of being associated with words. Dharmakirti concludes that the object of perception is not the object of conceptual construction.

Vacaspiti Mishra holds that Svalaksana stands for the nature of an object which is exclusive of the homogeneous and heterogeneous objects. For Santaraksita, it is a unique particular which is beyond imagination and speech. After Vacaspiti, Moksakaragupta says that it is the extreme particular, which means that the characteristic of an object determined in space and time is distinct from both homogeneous and heterogeneous classes. But the Svalaksana of Dignaga stands for an entirely different meaning. It is neither an individual nor a universal because both are relative terms and are the creation of our language. It is neither an attribute of an object like redness or blueness nor an object itself like a tomato or a potato. It is not only shorn of all qualities, but is also shorn of duration in terms of time and space. It is differentiated and distinguished from everything in the world. Simply, it is unique, unrelated, self-characterized real, which have nothing in common with other such moments.

Here, a question arises - Why is 'particular' alone the object of perception? The particular is capable of evoking mental image and so it is regarded as the object of perception. Hence, whatever is capable of evoking mental image must be an object of perception. Particular is the object of cognition which produces a vivid flash of consciousness when it is near and a dim one when it is at a distance. This particular is not in need of a universal to
denote its subsistence. The reality is extreme particular. For Dignaga, categories are mere thought constructions. He denies the category of universal because it is the imagination of our intellect. Universal is not capable of producing any effect. Hence, it is not real. Dharmakirti also says that universals are construction of our imagination. They are formed to express the activities which are associated with particular things. The reality of universal is the result of an illusion which is generated by well established linguistic usage or practice. Further, the existence of universals cannot be inferred from the idea of universals. Therefore, they do not denote any objective reality of things. But, 'universals' are incapable of evoking images. They are themselves thought-constructions. Again, every particular is not the object of perception but only that which is capable of producing an effect and that which is consistent with normal human experience. Thus, only that water is real which quenches our thirst and only that fire is real that burns our finger or cooks our food.

However, the Advaitins maintain that particulars cannot be the object of perception. For them, the knowledge of particulars depends upon the knowledge of their mutual differentiation or exclusiveness. This differentiation is a property which is conceived by imagination and the object of the understanding. So, the Advaitins say that particular cannot be object of perception. They also maintain that universals cannot be the object of perception because they are also formed by understanding. Therefore, the Advaitins say that the object of perception is 'pure being' or 'existence'.
The Advaitins' view is rejected by the realists. The realists argue that 'mere existence' cannot be the object of perception. The Jain philosophers say that the object of perception is 'universal' or 'samanya'. For them, the particular is an attribute of the universal substantive, which, on the other hand is capable of being perceived independently of all particular. So, universal is the object of perception. But, Kumarila Bhatta says that there is no difference between the universal and particular in perception. The object of perception can neither be universal nor particular. According to him, the object of perception is 'vyakti' or 'individual' which is the substratum of particulars and universals. The Mimamsa, Naiyaikas and Vaisesikas maintained that the object of perception is both the particular as well as the universal. For them, there is no difference between the particulars and the universals. They are unrelated and undifferentiated. The Realists put forward an example – though the particular 'cow' and the 'universal cowhood' both constitutes of the object 'cow' which we perceived, but they are not perceived or related with one another as substantive and attribute.

Dignaga and Dharmakirti say that svalaksanas are not the individual or vyaktis of Kumarila. They are not particulars as contrasted with universals. Rather, they are unique particular and are beyond all comparison and contrast. They are self-revealing sense data. These particulars are not like the particulars of Nyaya, Vaibhasika and Mimamsa. In Nyaya Vaisasika, particulars are contrasted or related with universals. They are categorized and are objects of understanding. On the other hand Svalaksanas are categorized. This can be compared with Russel's view of knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. This is because perception is known by acquaintance. We have
acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of influence or any knowledge of truths. For instance, in the presence of my pen, I am acquainted with the sense data that make up the appearance of my pen, e.g. colour, shape, etc. Later on we come to the knowledge of the pen which is knowledge by description. According to Russel, there is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the pen. All our knowledge of the pen is really knowledge of truths and the actual thing i.e. the pen is, strictly speaking, not known to us at all.

Another misconception is to treat Svalaksana as transcendental and comparable to Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’. Dignaga-Dharmakirti’s svalaksana is not transcendental, for it is not beyond experience, especially in perception. Again Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself’ is unknown and unknowable. But, Dignaga affirmatively maintains that svalaksana is cognizable when he says that these sense-cognitions take a particular (svalaksana) as their object in so far as it is the form of a component substance or dravya-svalaksana. Dignaga-Dharmakirti’s svalaksanas are not thing in themselves of Kant. The basic difference between Dignaga-Dharmakirti and Kant is that the former maintain the two distinct sources of knowledge, while the latter holds that knowledge is a joint product of perception and inference, to account for knowledge as synthetic apriori.

Dharmakirti recognizes four types of perception – (i) sense perception (Indriya-Prtyaksa) (ii) mental perception (manasa) (iii) self-cognition (svasamvedana) and (iv) yogic perception. These are described in details below.
Sense perception (Indriya-Prtyaksa): When an object is apprehended with the help of sense-organs, it is known as sense-perception. There is no conceptual element. It is the cognition which depends on the activity of the senses alone. Dignaga-Dharmakirti also remarks that senses (aksas) are the indicators (gamakas) of perception. Sense-perception is that stage which is devoid of every kind of imagination. Dharmakirti says, “After the sense perception we begin to think such a kind of thing, e.g. a blue patch was perceived by us and a particular kind of image caused by that object begins to appear but such imagination had not emerged at the first moment of perception”\textsuperscript{41}. So, for him the stage of first-apprehension antecedent to the stage of imagination is the sense-perception. Indriya pratyaksa is of five types:

1. Visual sense perception: It is the apprehension of an object through the eyes, e.g. the perception of colour.
2. Auditory sense perception: It is the apprehension of an object through ears, e.g. the perception of music.
3. Olfactory sense perception: It is the apprehension of an object through nose, e.g. smelling of perfume.
4. Flavorous sense perception: It is the apprehension of an object through tongue, e.g. taste of butter.
5. Tactile sense perception: It is the apprehension of an object through skin, e.g. touching of a pen with the hand.

Mental perception (manasa): It is non-constructive and non-conceptual inner knowledge which is possessed regarding the feelings of the object. Simply, it is
that form of consciousness which arises from the preceding moment of sensation. For Dharmakirti, mental perception is "conditioned by the immediately preceding perception and its causa materialis, i.e. the immediately preceding homogenous cause (samanantara pratyaya)"42.

According to Dignaga, mental perception has two aspects – (i) external, and (ii) internal. Jinenrdabudhi calls the former artha-samvitti and the latter rugade svasamvitti. Dignaga mentions the reason for his acceptance of this type of perception which is found in the metaphysical scheme of the Sarvastivadin. The Sarvastivadins included manovijnana and manovijnana dhatu in their list of seventy-five categories into which the whole province of knowledge and reality was grouped. Again, it is stated in the Nyaya-bindu-tika tippnani that the conception of manovijnana as a type of perception was a necessary deduction from the import of a scriptural text which declares, "Colour is cognized, o' monk, by two fold cognition, the sense-perception and the mental perception induced by it"43.

Buddhism believes, "What is real is momentary". The mental perception is not exceptional. If it is not flux then there will be no possibility of illusion and all knowledge will be valid. But in experience we have wrong knowledge; we have illusions e.g. the vision of a snake instead of a piece of rope, the vision of double moon, etc. Therefore, we have to believe that mental perception is not static, it is momentary.

**Self-cognition (svasamvedana):** Apart from mental perception of external objects, Dignaga provide its internal counterpart in which the perceiver is aware
of his own mental states such as pleasure, pain, etc. The self consciousness of the mental states in terms of the feeling of pleasure, pain, anger, etc. is called self-cognition (svasamvedana). Self-cognition or the feeling of desire and aversion is one kind of direct knowledge. Dharmakirti states that the cognition has own form (svakara) along with object (arthakara) and therefore that cognition is cognized by itself\textsuperscript{44}. Thus, Dharmakirti says, "All cognition (citta) and mental states (caitta) are self-cognized"\textsuperscript{45}. Thus self-cognition is part of each cognition and mental state which is unique and free from conceptual construction. Therefore it is a form of perception\textsuperscript{46}.

The Realists reject the Yogacara analysis of self-cognition. Mimamsa and Nyaya Vaisesika maintain that self-cognition is indirect knowledge. Here self cognition is simply a mental phenomenon which arises when the object comes in contact with the subject. However, in Yogacara there is no mental phenomenon which could be unconsciousness of its own self.

**Yogic perception:** The yogic perception is the source of revealing all the objects, physical and mental, past and future, hidden and visible which are beyond the limits of the intellect of ordinary human beings. It may be defined as, "The cognition which arises out of the contemplation of things and free from conceptual content of error"\textsuperscript{47}. Dharmakirti states, "It is the perception which is produced from the sub-culminated state of deep meditation on transcendental reality"\textsuperscript{48}. Dharmottara says that when concentrative contemplation (bhavana) reaches the point of perfection, mystics have a vivid vision of objects as they were lying behind a transparent wall of mica. The cognitions of mystics are
perceptual in character because they are direct, distinct and devoid of subjective images.

The yogic perception cannot be regarded as a kind of perception. This is because, in yogic perception, there is no sense contact with the object that is an ingredient of perception.

The Buddhist inference is not like the Realist's theory of inference. They said inference is understand, judgment or imagination. Hence it is mediate knowledge. Aksapada defines inference as "Knowledge which is preceded by perception and which is of three kinds – apriori, aposteriori and commonly seen"49. The same definition with a little difference is given by Nagarjuna in the Upayahrdayam50. Vatsyayana, amending this definition, says "Inference is the knowledge of an object through the previous knowledge of some sign or mark"50. The Buddhist logicians accept the definition of inference in terms of mark or middle term. The definition given by Vatsyayana was further amended by Dignaga in his doctrine of the three aspects of the middle term. Dignaga states that anumana is the cognition of an object through its mark. He further adds that this mark has three aspects. Thus, for him, inference is knowledge of an object through a mark that has three aspects.

Dharmakirti and Dharmotara also include the three aspects of mark into the definition of inference. These three aspects of a mark are: the presence of the middle term in the subject of anumana, its presence in the similar instances and its absence in the dissimilar instances. The Buddhist logicians Dignaga and Dharmakirti were innovated by the idealistic theory of inference and
differentiated it from the realistic theory of sensation or perception. The Buddhist logicians hold an idealistic theory of inference whereas the Nyaya-Vaisesika logicians hold realistic theory of inference.

Vasubandhu is the first logician who defines inference as the cognition of an object which is inseparably connected with another object by a person who knows about it from perception. He is also the first Indian logician who refutes the role of example or drṣṭanta in inference and clearly laid down the principle of internal inseparability or invariability. Vasubandhu says that the bahirvyāpṭi or external invariability is illustrated by the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire which is seen in kitchen. This is established on the evidence of perception. While the internal invariability or antarvyāpṭi is formulated by understanding, there is no cognition of kitchen in the formulation of vyāpṭī.

Dignaga says that the object of inference is an ideal construction. The universal relation between the proban and the probandum has no reference to an external existence and non-existence. Thus for him the relation of logical reason does not depend upon external reality but on the relation of attribute and the thing which is a product of mind. The principle of generalization or vyāpṭī is derived from observation which is not precondition of our thinking and cannot explain the problem of induction and cannot provide the rule of induction. Because, according to Buddhist logicians, all ideas are mental and the principle of generalization is also mental. Here we find a similarity between the problem of generalization (antarvyāpṭi) in Buddhist logic and the problem of induction posed by Hume in western logic. Hume reduced the principle of generalization
for the association of ideas and undermined its apriori character. According to Dignaga, inference is based upon the apriori principles which are not derived from observation but pervade all mental construction.

Inference does not refer to any external reality. It proceeds on the ideal construction of the attributive. In Buddhist logic what is inferred is neither a substance nor an attribute nor their connection but the qualification of the substantive by each attribute. The substantive, the contributive and their relation are all ideal construction. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers failed to understand their ideal character and committed a fallacy which may be termed as the fallacy of illegitimate physicalism.

Again, the Buddhist theory of inference which is based on ideal relation is called by modern logicians as 'logical relations'. The Vaisesika philosophers based inference upon four real relation which are causation (karya), inherence (samavaya), conjunction (samYoga) and contradiction. The Buddhist logicians have rejected the theory of real relations. Dharmakirti, in his "Tract on Relations" has criticized the Realist's theory of relation. For Indian Realist, relations are immediately perceived by sense-organs. So, they are real as the objects of perception. Realists say that there must be a relation between two objects; otherwise it is not possible to deduce the presence of another. They give the example — the knowledge of fire is known through the mark of smoke because there is real relation between fire and smoke. Therefore, Uddyotakara maintains "The perception of the connection of an object with its mark is the first act of sense perception, from which inference proceeds." But, the Buddhist
logicians are against this Realists' view and said that the ultimate reality is 'extreme particular', which cannot be related. Rather, the relations are creations of our imaginations which are conceived within space, time and identity and produce no distinct image upon our mind. Therefore, it is absurd to believe in their reality. Thus, Dharmakirti says that inference is based upon three relations – ideality, causality and negation. Identity is a logical construction and plays its role in our constructed world. It arises from the neglect of differences that obtain between things. Frequent occurrence of similar cognition gives rise to the idea that the things are identical. Identity is a necessary relation. It is a mental category without which no concept is possible. It is formative of all concepts.

There are three different concepts of the doctrine of causality – Abhidharmika, Madhyamika and Yogacara (idealistic). According to the Abhidharmika concept, causality means the production of one fact on the existence of a number of causes and conditions. It is a temporal sequence which takes place between things that necessarily succeed their preceding ones. The occurrence of an event or the production of an effect guarantees the presence of the totality of its causes and conditions. The Madhyamika rejected the Abhidharmika view and states that causality does not mean temporal sequence of things but the essential dependence of things. The objects of the world are not real by themselves. They are independent and relative. Everything is dependent, nothing is thus intrinsically real. While, for the idealist, causality does not mean temporal sequence of object because according to them objects do not exist. It means the sequence of the moments of consciousness or ideas. For them, causal connections are neither real nor unreal. They are ideal.
According to the Buddhist logicians negation is an objective reality. It is simply a subjective idea which denotes the non-existence of a thing at a particular place and time. The object which is not present at one place is present at another place. Therefore, it is perceptible through sense-organ and is not a separate source of knowledge.

Though the modern logic has gone ahead of Buddhist logic, yet, it is significant that Buddhists were the first logicians who started investigation into the logical properties of relation and distinguished logical relations from real relations.

According to Yogacara, illusion is the superimposition of the form of knowledge on the so-called external object which is not real. For, the real is only the momentary knowledge. So illusion is purely subjective hallucination. For instance, in the nacre silver illusion the subjective silver form of cognition appears as the form of an external object. Dignaga holds that 'illusions' are purely mental. They have their locus in understanding. They cannot have their origin in the sense perception. For him, illusion is actually wrong judgment regarding reality: Hence they must be conceptual or mental. Dignaga says that just as there are fallacies of reason, there are also fallacies of perception. But they are not perception; they simply appear like perceptions. Dharmakirti also says that error is produced by a wrong interpretation of the sense-data by the intellect.

The Madhyamika advocates the theory of the apprehension of the non-existent object, which is known as Asatkhyati. The Madhyamika negates all
existence. They state that nothing is real in this phenomenal world. They hold that illusion consists of the manifestation of the non-existent as existent. For instance, in the illusionary cognition of a shell as a piece of silver, neither the shell nor the piece of silver is real. The silver is unreal, because it is sublated at the disappearance of the illusion. The cognition of silver in the shell is erroneous because it manifests the non-existent silver as existent. Actually in the illusionary experience no object (niralmbana) is found. The rays of the sun cannot be the object of illusion since in that case the cognition would not be illusionary, but valid, representing the real nature of the external stimulus. Hence, illusion is objectless (Niralambanam Viparyajnanam)⁶⁶. However, the Madhyamika says that all is-void. So, in the 'shell-silver' illusion neither the shell nor the silver is real. It is an apprehension of the unreal as real.

The Naiyaikas refute this view of the Madhyamikas. They maintain that the illusion of silver is not entirely baseless. It cannot arise out of nothing what is absolutely non-existent less not produce even the wrong cognition of silver. The illusion of silver is due to something in the nature of the shell. Generally it occurs in connection with a shell, but not with everything. Moreover, the Madhyamika School maintains that there is no such thing as external or internal. Everything is void (sunya). In the 'rope snake' illusion, both rope and snake are unreal. Then, how the rope appears to be a snake? No unreal object can appear to be real. The sky-lotus can never be real. Jayanta declares that "an absolutely unreal object" has place neither in the world of theory nor in the world of practice⁵⁷.
The opinion of Yogacara School is that the entire world is an illusion. They hold that everything is thought image. Nothing is real except consciousness or mind. This idealist theory is known as self-apprehension. The Yogacara states that all objects are mental. There is no extra mental reality. Just as man with defective sense-organs sees the vision of double moon, or a moving circle in a firebrand or the fatamorgana in a desert; in the same way the ignorant man, who has not attained the absolute wisdom, sees the vision of diverse colours and forms and acts on the presumption that they are real. These various objects are illusive. Actually they are projections of the mind and appear as something external. In fact, the whole universe and its inhabitants are the creation of the mind. So, mind is the fountain head of all visible things. Thus the Vijnanavadins maintain that cognition is not different from its objects. For them illusion consists of all illegitimate process of projection of subjective ideas as objective and extra-mental facts.

There arises a question – How does the illusionary perception of silver arise? The Yogacara states that, silver is in form of subjective idea which wrongly appears to be objective fact. This is due to the sub-consciousness impression (vasana) of silver. This sub-consciousness impression is beginningless (anadi) and is the outcome of nescience (avidya). Dr. B.N. Singh rightly points out that it is due to this beginningless sub consciousness impression that we have an idea of silver in our mind. The idea of silver arises wrongly as object silver. The beginningless series of impressions is purely subjective. Thus, illusion is not produced by an external object in contact with sense-organs. It is a subjective notion which is a projection of our mind.
There is a difference between the Madhyamika and the Yogacara School. In the former, in error, the non-existent appears to be existent. In the latter, in error, the subjective idea appears as an objective fact. Again, according to the Madhyamika, there is no reality at all, but in Yogacara, reality is mental. Only idea is existent which is cognized wrongly.

In the ideology of the Yogacara School there are two kinds of illusion. They are called anubhava vasana (empirical illusion) and anadi vasana or avidya vasana (transcendental). Examples of the moving tree, the vision of mirage, the vision of double moon are nothing but the empirical illusion. In the same way the objects of dream which satisfy our desires and give us pleasure are illusions. Again, from transcendental point of view the visions of standing tree, of real water, of the rope, of the single moon and of the white conch-shell are illusions. Just as the object of dream satisfy our object of food and drink, so long as we are not awakened, in the same way, the objects of the visible world also satisfy our desires and are real as long as we are sleeping under the veil of ignorance. The Yogacara holds that illusory cognition is produced by vasana, which arises in the beginningless series of transcendental illusion. For instance, the illusion of silver in the mother of pearl is produced by the impression of silver which arises in the beginningless series of transcendental illusion or ignorance. It is produced by an earlier impression of silver and so on. Thus, the cognition of silver is the result of impressions which are subjective. The doctrine of transcendental illusion does not mean that the objects cannot be described as existent or non-existent. They fall beyond the categories of our
understanding and therefore they are described as illusion. In reality they are indescribable.

The Naiyaikas also refute the Yogacara theory of illusion. Jayanta refutes this theory on the ground that if it is accepted, there will be no difference between knowledge and the subject and the object of knowledge. Since, for them everything is an idea and in that case, instead of speaking as 'this is silver' one could even speak 'I am silver'\(^58\). Secondly, the Yogacara cannot explain the sublated form of cognition. We have the cognition of 'this is silver' in illusion. This illusion is contradicted in the sublated cognition 'this is not silver'. Now, this refers to the internal object and is not contradicted. Naiyaikas remark that if there is no external object, then what does 'this' refers to?

The Yogacara maintains that all cognitions cognize only their own forms and not objects. If cognition cognizes its own forms, there would be no distinction between illusory and valid cognition. Illusion, as a form of invalid cognition, cognizes its own form as the valid cognition. Now, how do we distinguish between the two? Jayanta finds out some confusion in the Yogacara theory of illusion. According to this theory, a mental idea is perceived as an extra-mental object in illusion. It indicates one thing as mistaken for another. This is nothing but a case of misapprehension (\textit{anyathakhyati}) of the Nyaya School.

The Yogacara asserts that the knowledge of the world which arises through perception is not true knowledge of things. The whole phenomenal world is illusory and has no existence. The illusion is not produced by an
external object in contact with sense-organs. It is subjective notion which is a projection of our mind. Hence the Yogacara maintains that the appearance of the world is of transcendental illusion, which does not mean that the world is a vacuity or a mere zero. It simply means that the objects cannot be described as existent or non-existent. They fall beyond the categories of our understanding and therefore, they are described as illusion. In reality they are indescribable.
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