Upamāṇa (Comparison) as an independent source of valid knowledge is admitted by Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems of Indian Philosophy. The views of the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṃsakas are different fundamentally on the nature of Upamāṇa. There is, however, a minor difference between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā. According to Prābhākara, similarity(sādṛṣya) which is the object of Upamāṇa is an independent category not reducible to substance, quality, action and universal etc. But according to Kumārila, it is nothing but an assemblage of common features. The Advaita Vedānta view is, of course, identical with that of the Bhāṭṭas.¹

Śābar defines Upamāṇa as resemblance which brings about the knowledge of an object not in contact with the senses.²

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1. sādṛṣṭya-pramāṇa-karaṇam-upamāṇam, VP, p.104.
2. upamāṇamapi sādṛṣṭyasannikṣetṝṇe' rthe buddhimutpādayati, SB under MS, 1.1.5.
Kumārila defines it as the knowledge of similarity subsisting in a remembered object (e.g. a cow) with an object (e.g. a wild cow) perceived. This is the meaning—the cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow perceived in a forest at present.³ The Prābhākaras define Upāmāna as the knowledge of similarity as subsisting in an object not in contact with the sense-organs brought about by the perception of similarity in some other object which is perceived by the senses. For example, a person who perceived a cow in a town in the past, perceives a wild cow in a forest, perceives its similarity with the cow and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow.⁴ The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived cow is Upāmāna. Prābhākara’s view of Upāmāna is identical with that of Kumārila. Both regard similarity as an object of Upāmāna (comparison) and similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object is known by Upāmāna. But unlike the

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3. tasmādyat smaryate tasyāt sādṛṣṭyaṁ viśeṣitam /
   prayemupamānasya sādṛṣṭyaṁ vā tadanvitam // SV, Upamana, 37

Prābhākaras, the Bhātās do not regard ‘similarity’ as a distinct category. For, according to them, it is only a quality consisting in the fact of more than one object having the same set of qualities.\(^5\)

It may be stated here that in the system of Mīmāṃsā, Upamāna is a form of immediate inference in which from the similarity of A to B, We infer the similarity of B to A. In the Nyāya system, however, Upamāna is the means of knowing the denotation of an unfamiliar name and thus allied to the process of identification.\(^6\)

Kumārila speaks of the usefulness of Upamāna in the following manner:

The Upamāna is different from inference. The sentence containing the words ‘Agni’ etc. is not connected with the sentences beginning with saurya etc., but still by comparison it

\(^5\) ye tu sāmānyayogātiriktamanyadeva tattvāṁ ēṣādyam manyante, 
tēśāṁ prakārṣāprakārṣabhedaḥ kīmniṁmita, iti cintanīyaṁ, na ca 
tattvāntaratve pramāṇamapi kīncidastītyāṣṭamaṁ tāvat, SDK, pp.140 – 41.

\(^6\) EBM, p.294.
transfers its own details. Here lies the usefulness of comparison, where ‘Vṛihī’ is lost or not available ‘nivāra’ is accepted as a substitute on account of its similarity to ‘vṛihī’. Here also, upamāna serves a distinct purpose. In some cases, the similarity is understood through points similitude which are not strong and in other cases, it is clear that points of similitude being strong. The former, which is not clearly similar, is useless, because of its less. Similarity whereas the latter is accepted readily, and when it is once accepted, the other one is excluded in spite of its being taken into account.  

According to Pārthasārathi Miśra, Upamāna is the cognition that a formerly perceived object which is recollected at present bears resemblance to the object which is perceived at present. Unlike Śabaraswāmi, Pārthasārathi defines upamiti i.e., the result of upamāna (comparison). Thus upamāna is the knowledge

7. bhinnānumāṁāṇādupameyamuktā /
   sauryādi.................drṣṭam //
   sādṛṣṭyato................naḥ /
   prati........................nivārajāt̄au //
   tadapi phalamabhiṣṭam..........bādhaḥ //   SV, Upamana, 52-54

8. pūrvadrṣṭe smaryamāṇārthe
   drṣṭyamāṇārthasādṛṣṭyajñānāmupamānamam. SDK, p.140.
of similarity and upamītī also is the knowledge of similarity. But the difference between the two similarities is that the former is a perceptible similarity while the latter is not. In the example ‘The cow is like the wild cow’, the perceptible similarity to the cow existing in the wild cow is the means (upāmāna i.e., object with which compared) and the similarity to the wild cow existing in the cow is the resultant (upamītī). The wild cow is the subject and the cow is the counter correlative (pratiyogī) of the similarity existing in the wild cow. Sucarita Miśra, author of the Kāśīka on the Ślokavārtika, however, contends that Upāmāna is the cognition arising out of an observed similarity of the Counter-Corelative which is not perceived, as qualified by similarity, to the object which is perceived. What is perceived is that the wild cow is similar to the cow and this leads to the knowledge, that the cow is similar to the wild cow. In the judgement of perception, the wild cow is the subject and its similarity to the cow is the predicate, while in the judgement of Upamītī, the cow is the subject and its similarity to the wild cow is the predicate.9

9. KK on SV, upamāna 1.
Chinnaswami also deals with Upamāna in his *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali* in the light of the Bhaṭṭa school. Before defining Upamāna, he defines Upamiti as the knowledge of similarity of an object with the object seen before as recollection.\(^\text{10}\)

Upamāna is again, according to him, the means of the upamiti as in the case of seeing 'gavaya' which is like a cow.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) purvadṛṣṭे rthe śmaryamāṇे yaddṛṣṭyamāṇā-yaddṛṣṭyajñānaṁ sopamitiḥ. TSR, p.68.

\(^{11}\) tatkaraṇāṁ gavyapindadarśanam upamānam. Ibid.
Arthāpatti (Postulation) is one of the sources of valid knowledge in the system of Mīmāṃsā. It is the Mīmāṃsā school that for the first time recognizes the Arthāpatti (Presumption) as a separate pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge. It can be said here that both the sister schools of Mīmāṃsā namely Prābhākara and Bhaṭṭa admit Arthāpatti as a separate and independent pramāṇa. Later on, the Vedāntins who follow the Bhaṭṭas in their explanation (Vyavahāre Bhaṭṭanaya) accepted Arthāpatti as a pramāṇa.

The word ‘Arthāpatti’ can be derived as ‘arthasya bahissadbhāvasya āpattih kalpanā yasmāt sā’ rthāpattiriti’. Meaning thereby is—Arthāpatti is the assumption of something that exist outside. The word ‘Arthāpatti’ when derived may be both Bahuvrīhi and Śaṣṭhi Tatpurūṣa. As a form of the earlier, it refers to instrument and as a form of the latter, it refers to the result.¹

¹. Arthāpattisābdo’rthasyāpattih kalpanā yasmāt iti bahuvrīhisamāsena pramāṇaparah, arthasyāpattiriti śaṣṭhitatpuruṣamāsena ca phalaparāḥ – FN.1, PP., p.272.
According to the Bhāṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, when something is otherwise unintelligible, the assumption of what will make it intelligible is Arthāpatti and the claim to be the only correct definition of Arthāpatti as stated by Śabara.² Kumārila interpretes Śabara’s words as referring to two main types of Arthāpatti, viz. dṛṣṭārthāpatti or presumption from what is seen and śrutārthāpatti or presumption from what is heard. But Prābhākara does not accept Śrutārthāpatti. According to him, there is only dṛṣṭārthāpatti or presumption from the seen. Prābhākara explains that Śabara’s definition of Arthāpatti as that in Arthāpatti, a seen or heard fact is the means of knowing another fact which is inexplicable without the former.³ So the words ‘dṛṣṭaḥ-śruto vā’ in Śabara’s definition, says Prābhākara, do not appear to refer to two different forms of Arthāpatti as conceived by Kumārila. Śabara has cited only one example of Arthāpatti. But if he intended two forms of Arthāpatti, he should have cited two examples instead of one only. Let us here mention the definition of Arthāpatti as stated by

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2. anyathānupapttyā yudupapādakakalpanam /
   tadarthāpattirityevam lakṣaṇaṁ bhāsyabhāsitam // M.M. p. 118.

3. tasmāt dṛṣṭamadṛṣṭam vā jñātasambandhamevāgamyate
   anyathānupattyā. BR. p.113.
the Prābhākaras. Śālikanātha, the most celebrated writer of the Prābhākaras system has in his Prakaraṇapañcikā, defined Arthāpati in a very simple way. The definition says, in a case, where the well ascertained perception of a thing can not be explained without the assumption of another thing, then it is the assumption that makes Arthāpati. For example, when we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is not in the house, these two things, viz. ‘alive’ and ‘non-existence in the house’ can not be reconciled unless we assume his existence somewhere outside the house. Here, existence outside the house is called Arthāpati. The stock example of Arthāpati is “Pino Devadatta divā na bhuṅkte. Arthāt rātrau bhuṅkte.” (Devatta being fat does not eat in daytime, and so he must eat at night). Here, night eating is thus presumed on the ground of the known impossibility of remaining fat without eating. But this is accepted by the followers of Kumārila as an example of Śrutārthāpati.


Following the Bhattamimāṁsakas the author of the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali* discusses Arthāpatti. He defines Arthāpatti in a simple manner. To him, Arthāpatti is the presumption of the meaning of the known fact by another meaning without discussing the inconsistency. For example, even in the ascertainment of the living of Devadatta by other source, the assumption of the existence of the living man outside who is not present in the house is Arthāpatti. The author of the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali* also contends Arthāpatti is of two types namely Drśṭārthāpatti and Śrutārthāpatti. Example of the first one is ‘jibato Devadattasya grābhava’ and the example of the second one is in the utterance ‘the door’ in order to complete the

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7. pramitasyārthasya arthāntarena vinānapapattimālocya tadupapatyamarthasya kalpanāṁ yat sāarthāpattiḥ. TSR, p.69.

8. yathā pramāṇantarena devadattasya jīvane niścīte sati grhe’navasthetasya tasya jīvato bahirbhāvkalpanāṁ vinā jīvanamānupapaṇāṁ bhavaūti jīvanam bahirbhāvkalpayati sā arthāpatti. Ibid, p.69.

statement, i.e. the word ‘close’ is assumed. According to the author of the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, Arthāpatti is also found in the vedic sentences. For example in the sentence ‘viśvajita yajeta’ the word ‘svargakāma’ is assumed.

It has been stated that the Prābhākaras do not recognise Śrutārthāpatti. Sālikanātha has in his Prakaraṇapañcika, refuted the view of the Bhaṭṭas on Śrutārthāpatti. Sālikanātha says that what is presumed on hearing the sentence, ‘Devadatta who is fat does not eat during the day’ is the fact of eating at night instead of the sentence ‘he eats at night’. The inexplicability that is removed by the presumption consists in the conflict between fatness and fasting, not between the words ‘Devadatta is fat’ and ‘he does not eat in the day’. So, the conflict between two facts must be resolved by presuming another fact. Even when the words ‘eats at night’ are uttered after uttering the sentence ‘Devadatta who is fat does not

10. 'dvārānāhityuktau tasya saṃpūrṇatāśiddhayā 'saṃnbriyātāṃityādi śabdāntaraṁ śrataśabdaikadesatvena kalpyate. TSR, p.70

11. vede'pi 'viśvajitā yajeta' ityadau 'svargakāma' iti śrutaikadesavākyatvena kalpyamiti siddhārthāpattih. Ibid.
eat during the day’, the conflict arising in the mind of the person on hearing the latter sentence is not resolved if he does not know the meaning of the word ‘night’. Hence, it should be admitted that the immediate cause of resolving a conflict is the presumption of a fact or idea and not of words as stated by Kumārila.12 The Prābhākaras say that there is no Śruti-arthāpatti since what is to be assumed is only the sense or idea.13

It may be pointed out here that there is the severest contest centering round Arthāpatti between the two schools of Mīmāṃsā on one side and the Naiyāyikas and Sāṁkhyaitics on the other. The Naiyāyikas and Sāṁkhyaitics do not find it necessary to recognise Arthāpatti as a separate pramāṇa or source of valid knowledge. Both these two schools strongly contest and criticize the views of the Mīmāṃsakas and assert that the Arthāpatti can be included in inference (Anumāṇa) as the purpose of Arthāpatti can be served by inference only. According to the Naiyāyikas, the


13. vide, MM, p.130.
assumption of staying outside of a living being because of seeing his absence at home is inference only.\textsuperscript{14} The objections raised by the Naiyāyikas regarding inclusion of Arthāpatti in the list of pramāṇas, have been refuted by Śālikanātha in his \textit{Prakaraṇapañcika}. Again, the followers of the Sāṁkhya system, also contend that Arthāpatti can be included in inference. Vācaspati Miśra has clearly discussed at length, the Arthāpatti is not different from Anumāṇa.\textsuperscript{15} But, according to the Bhāṭṭas, the presumption lies, not is doubt, but in mental inconsistency between two well-ascertained facts, which inconsistency is removed by the cognition of third fact and it is this last cognition that constitutes presumption.\textsuperscript{16} The difference between Anumāṇa and Arthāpatti lies in that in Anumāṇa, there is no inconsistency between well-ascertained facts.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} \textit{asya arthāpatteranumāṇa evaṁantarbhāvavimeṣchanti naiyāyi\=kāḥ.} TSR, p.70.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} \textit{tathā ca sato gṛhābhāvadarsanena liṅgena bahirbhāvadarsanānaṁ namēva.} STK, p.194.
  \item \textsuperscript{16} \textit{na hi sandigdhe bahirbhāvabhāvyate kalpayitum.} Ibid, p.144.
\end{itemize}
The Bhatta School of Purvamimamsa and the Vedanta Systems admit Abhava as a source of knowledge (pramāṇa). They accept Abhava as a category (Padartha) also. So, they name Abhava-pramāṇa as Anupalabdhi Pramāṇa. Kumārila admits Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension) as the sixth independent Pramāṇa. The Naiyāyikas and the Prabhakaras reject it. The Naiyāyikas, like Kumārila admits Abhava (Non-existence) as an independent ontological category, but, they, unlike Kumārila, do not believe in non-apprehension as an independent source of knowledge to understand non-existence. According to them, non-existence is known either by perception or by inference according as the Correlate (Pratiyogī) of non-existence is a subject of perception or of inference. The same sense-organ which perceives any object, perceives its non-existence also and the same inference which infers the existence of any object, infers its non-existence also. Thus according to the Naiyāyikas, though non-existence as a separate category, non-apprehension as an independent source of knowledge (pramāṇa) is not necessary as its source. They reduce
non-apprehension either to perception or to inference. The Prābhākaras, on the other hand, do not admit non-existence itself as an independent category and hence have no need to accept non-apprehension as its source. When we say, “the jar is not on the ground” (bhūtale ghaṭo nāsti), all that we mean is that, if the jar were on the ground, we would perceive it there, but as a matter of fact, we see the ground alone. The seeing of the ground is mere perception and the further statement is merely a qualification of what is perceived in terms of something which, formerly seen along with it, is not now present.

According to Kumārila when the first five sources of knowledge viz. Pratyākṣa, Anumāna, Śāstra, Upamāna and Arthāpatti do not function towards bringing about the knowledge of the existence of a certain object, thus there comes to function the sixth means of knowledge which is known as Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension).¹ It is through this means of cognitions that the non-existence of things becomes known.² Non-apprehension is admitted for the perception of the non-existence of a thing.

1. SV, Abhāva, 1.
2. Ibid, 2.
As a follower of the Bhāṭa School of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, Chinnaswami Sastri also discusses Anupalabdhi in his *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*. We come across his discussion on Anupalabdhi in the first chapter of his book. He explains Anupalabdhi as the absence of apprehension or knowledge.

According to him, where the first five Pramanās viz, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna, Śāstra, Upamāna and Arthāpatti fail to give rise to knowledge, then comes the scope of Anupalabdhi. In support of his contention, Chinnaswami Sastri quotes Kumārila’s view. He considers as right the view of Kumārila on Abhāva. For, Abhāva is not accepted by sense-organ. Even in the absence of the function of sense-organ, there arises Abhāva.

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3. athedānīmanupalabdhiṁ nirūpayāmaḥ. TSR,p.70.
4. anupalabdhiṁāmopalabdhyabhāvaḥ. Ibid.
5. uktam hi vārtikakṛtā—
   pramāṇapaścakaṁ yatra vasturūpe na jāyate/
   vastusattavabodhārthāṁ tatrāsbhāvapramāṇatā// SV,76.
6. indriyavyāparabhāve’pi tadudayāt. TSR,p.71.
in places either in a positive (sadrūpa) or in a negative relation (asadrūpa) and it is only in the former case that they come within the purview of the senses, while in the negative case, the perception of the negative existence can only be had by a separate mode of movement of the mind which we designate as a separate Pramāṇa as Anupalabdhi.

Prābhākara Misra, however, maintains that non-perception of a visible object in a place is only the perception of the empty place and that therefore there is no need of admitting a separate Pramāṇa as Anupalabdhi. For, what is meant by empty space? If it is necessary that for the perception of the non-existence of a jar, there should be absolutely empty space before us, then if the place be occupied by a stone, we should not perceive the non-existence of the jar inasmuch as the place is not absolutely empty. If empty space is defined as that which is not associated with the jar, then the category of non-existence is practically admitted as a separate entity. To the Bhāṭṭas, Anupalabdhi is a separate pramāṇa by which the absence of a sensible object, non-
existence or and object can be comprehended. This is what is opined by Chinnaswami Sastri in his *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*. It may be added that the Vedāntins also admit Anupalabdhi as an independent source of knowledge.

7. tabasmādhirabhāṃvapatārthasya pūrvam sādhitavit tasya ca
pratyakṣādibhirgrahītaṃ sa kṣaṇavat
parīśedanupalabhigocaratvaratyupakṣaniyam.
atassiddhamanupalabdhiṃma sastham prāṇāṇam. TSR, p.71.