Anumāna (Inference) is the second source of valid knowledge and the most valuable contribution that the Nyāya System makes is on this subject. Indian Logicians attach much importance to inference chiefly because it is accepted as a means of valid knowledge by all the systems except Cārvāka and hence every system tries to discuss it in the light of its own metaphysical basis and secondly because it serves as the most authentic source of knowledge of objects. Anumāna is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is knowledge which arises after (Anu) other knowledge. It is the knowledge through other. The “other” is variously interpreted as perceptive knowledge of probans.

Anumāna must be as accepted as an independent means of knowledge even by the Cārvākas who do not accept it. The denial of Anumāna (Inference) by the Cārvākas themselves imply the acceptance of inference because the denial is through the inference itself.
Anumāṇa as a source of valid knowledge is the source of our knowing through the medium of a sign or mark that a thing has a certain character. In it, we arrive at the knowledge of an object through the medium of two acts of knowledge or propositions.

All the systems of Indian Philosophy agree in accepting that Anumāṇa is a process of arriving at the truth not by direct observation but by the means of natural relation between two things. It has been already stated that Cārvākas do not consider the validity of Anumāṇa. In the Mahābhārata, it is stated the Cārvākas do not treat Anumāṇa and Āgama as pramāṇas. Both Anumāṇa and Āgama are based on perception and this is why the Cārvākas do not consider them as the source of valid knowledge.¹ According to the Mahābhārata, these philosophers do not admit Anumāṇa as pramāṇa for another important reason. The reason is that they can not assert the validity of the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) which plays the most significant role in case of Anumāṇa (Inference).² The Cārvākas do not consider the invariable

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1. pratyakṣaḥ hyetayormūlam..............................................................

........................................na kīficana. Mbh, Śānti, 218–27

2. Ibid
concomitance as infallible. So, they do not admit Anumāṇa as a source of knowledge.³

Anumāṇa may be for one’s own self (Svārthānumāṇa) or the sake of convincing others (Parārthānumāṇa).⁴ Another classification of Anumāṇa is given by Viśvanātha. According to this classification, Anumāṇa is of three kinds namely Kevalānvayi, Kevalavyatireki and Anvayvyatireki.⁵

In the Vedānta System, Anumāṇa is that which is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance which is its instrumental course.⁶ When there is the knowledge that the minor term possesses the attribute as in the proposition ‘the hill is smoke’

3. anumāṇena yad gatiṣṭhidarśanānaṁ tadapi asti lakṣaṇe jñāpake hetu..........................vyabhicāradarśanat...........................


5. NSM, p.77.

6. anumitipramāṇakaranaṁanumāṇam. anumitiśca vyāptijñānatvena
vyāptijñānajanyā. VP, p.86.
and also an awakening of the mental impression due to previous presentative knowledge in the form 'smoke is invariably accompanied by fire', there results the inference 'the hill is on fire'. According to the Advaita Vedānta, Anumāna is of one kind. It is Anvayi and depends upon the agreement in presence between the probans and the probandum. The Advaitins reject the three kinds of Anumāna accepted by the Navya-Naiyāyikas. The Advaitins admit inference for one's own sake and inference for others. The former is caused by sub-conscious impression of Vyapti. The latter consists of three members which may be either proposition, reason and example or example, application and conclusion.

The System of Mīmāṁsā also deals with Anumāna as an independent or separate source of valid knowledge. Both Kumārila and Prābhākara accept Śabara's definition as the basis of their theories of Anumāna. Śabara defines Anumāna (inference) in this way-when a certain fixed or permanent relation has been known to

7. taccānumāननामनामवायिरिक्तपामकामेवा. na tu kevalāनवायिः..............

ःMahābhāṣya

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8. IP, p.494.
subsist between two things so that if we perceive any of these things we have an idea of the other thing and this latter cognition is called inferential. That is to say, the cognition of the permanent relation between two things helps in the inferential cognition by affording to the agent the idea of the other member when one member is cognized. When the observer perceives a certain thing and remembers the permanent relation that it has been known to bear to another thing, the recalled idea of the relation presents to the mind the apprehension of the other member of the relation and the name given to this apprehension is Anumāna.

Kumārila shows four alternatives of the compound word 'jñātasambandhasya' in the definition of Anumāna. Firstly, it may be explained as referring to the person who knows the relationship well i.e., the invariable concomitance between two things e.g., smoke and fire.

9. anumānānaḥ jñātasambandhasyaikadeśadarsanadeśāntare
   sannikṛṣṭeḥ rthe buddhiḥ. SB under MS,1.1.5.

10. jñātāḥ sambandhaniyamo yasya tasyaikadeśasya
darśanadeśāntare sannikṛṣṭeḥ rthe ya’ buddhiḥ, sā’ numānāmityarthah. PP, p.196.
Secondly, it may be explained as referring to the substratum (ekadesina) where the relationship of smoke and fire is apprehended. There are many places where smoke and fire are seen together.

Thirdly, the word 'jnātasambandhasya' may mean simply a known relationship and the word 'ekadesa' will mean a member of this relationship. According to this explanation, Anumāna is the cognition of the second member, e.g., fire, of a known relationship resulting from the perception of the first member i.e. smoke.

Fourthly, the word may be taken to refer to both the Liṅga and the Lingin taken together the relationship of which is known.11

The Bhāṛtamāṁśakas, however, do not admit that action (karma) is that which has had its specific character not perceived (Adṛṣṭasvalakṣaṇa) as it can be perceived. To explain-the knowledge that ‘He is going’ is dependent on the Anvaya and Vyatireka and that is the proof of the perceptibility of an action.

11. SV, anumāna, 2-3.
This is what Maṇḍana Miśra states while rejecting the view of the Prabhākaras. According to Maṇḍana Miśra, an action can not be inferred but perceived. It is because an action is not permanent. But Śālikanātha reject the view of Maṇḍana because in the event of the substance having gone the specific character as additional to both conjunction and disjunction can not be known by perception. The knowledge ‘He is going’ depends on the inferred action of both conjunction and disjunction. Nandiśvara also is of the same view that an action is inferential only and not perceptible.

12. atra kaścidāha-na karmadrśtasvalakṣaṇaṁ, prayākṣatvāt karmaṇaḥ----
------------------------tathāhi-yā gacchatyamiti pratītiḥ------------------------
pratyākṣatve pramanām. PP, p.215.

13. na ca karmaṇumātuṁ śakyate. taddhi na nityam, saṁyogavibhāgayoḥ
sarvadod ayaprasakteḥ. Ibid, p216.

14. tadidamasaṁram-pratyakṣeno gacchati dravye,
samyogavibhāgaṁtuviveśeśanupalabdheḥ yastvayaṁ gacchaṁi
drīṇyayaḥ sa saṁyogavibhāganumatakriyābalambanaḥ. Ibid, pp.216-17

15. ato'numeyavā kriyā kiṁ tarhi kriyānumāne liṅgam?
vibhāgapūrvakāḥ saṁyogah. PV, p.35.
Vyāpti and Pakṣadharmaṭā are the grounds for the operation of Anumāṇa. Smoke is perceived on the hill and the fire is inferred. But Anumāṇa takes place only when the universal relation between smoke and fire is already known. This relation called Vyāpti,16 between the Middle and Major terms is the important ground for the operation of Anumāṇa (inference). But the conclusion drawn in inference follows from both Vyāpti and Pakṣadharmaṭā jointly. The presence of the Middle term in the Minor term is called Pakṣadharmaṭā. The knowledge of Pakṣadharmaṭā as qualified by vyāpti is called Parāmarśa.17 According to the Bhattas, vyāpti is a natural relation and the state of being natural is the absence of the state of being devoid of eliminable condition (Upādhi). The relation between smoke and fire is natural i.e. devoid of any Upādhi. Again Upādhi is that which is co-extensive than the Śādhana.18 Upādhi literally means

16. yatra yatra dhūmāstaṭra tatrāṅgiriti sāhacaryāniyamо vyāptih. TS, p. 49.

17. vyāpyasya parvātādivṛttitvam pakṣadharmaṭā.
vyāptiviśīṣṭapakṣadharmaṭājñānaṁ parāmarśaḥ. Ibid, pp, 47-50.

18. svabhāvīvikāḥ sambandho vyāptih, svabhāvīvikatvāṁ copādhiraḥityaṁ
upādhiriti ca sādhyaṁ sāṅkṣerit prayojakaṁ hetvantām. MM, pp, 31-32.
an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is always an
unnecessary condition.

According to Kumārila, Vyāpti (invariable concomitance)
is known through repeated observation. So, it is a necessary
relation generally between two universals, but sometimes between
two particulars also, e.g., between Kṛṣṭikā and Rohini.¹⁹ A frequent
observation of two things together is not only the means of
knowing invariable concomitant. When two things are known to be
related together in some places and there is no experience of their
dissociation, then the invariable concomitance is established.
Vyāpti (invariable concomitance), according to Kumārila, is
induction per simple enumeration. He admits that invariable
concomitance which is the ground of inference is a necessary
proposition. The necessary relation of smoke with fire implies that
not only the observed cases of smoke are the cases of fire, but that
all past, present and future cases of smoke are cases of fire.
Kumārila, no doubt, says that invariable concomitance (Vyāpti) is
known from some cases of concomitance, but this is what everyone

¹⁹. SV, Anumāna, 14.
says, because the observation of all the past, present and future cases is humanly impossible.

In the fourth Prakāśa of the first Pariccheda of the Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali, Chinnaswami Sastri discusses Anumāna in his own language in Sanskrit and is in lucid form. While defining and explaining Anumāna (inference), he has used the word ‘Anumiti’ in instead of ‘Anumāna’. According to him, Anumāna is not capable of conveying the idea of Dharma and Adharma. He maintains that Anumiti is that knowledge of the object which is not near due to the perception of the minor terms of the two natural and invariable relations.

For example, the knowledge of unseen fire seen through the perception of smoke on the hill etc. Smoke (Dhūma) is vyāpya

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20. evamanumānamapi na śaknoti dharmādharmaśvavabodhayitum. TSR,p.57.

21. tathāhi-svābhāvika-niyata-saṁbandhayoh dvayorvyāpyasya darśanāt asannikṣṭtarthe'rthe yajjaśānaṁ a ś'numitiḥ. Ibid.-
and vyāpya is not existent in many places and not for long. For example, smoke does not exist in water etc where there is no fire.\textsuperscript{22} But on the other hand, Vyāpaka i.e. Agni is existent in many places and is for long time.\textsuperscript{23} In support of his assertion, Chinnaswami quotes a verse from the Ślokavārttika of Kumārila in which there is the mention of vyāpya and vyāpaka.\textsuperscript{24}

It may be noted here that in the Ślokavārttika, two types of Vyāpti namely Samavyāpti and Viṣamavyāpti are shown. Where Sādhya (fire) and Hetu (smoke) have the same existence of time and place, that is called Samavyāpti. On the other hand, Viṣamavyāpti is that where there is the different between the Sādhya and Hetu regarding their existence in respect of place and time.\textsuperscript{25} According to the Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali, Vyāpti is the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} vyāpyam adhikadesakālāvṛtti----------------------jaladau na vartate. TSR, p.57.
\item \textsuperscript{23} vyāpakamadhikadesakālāvṛtti.Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{24} yo yasya deśakālābhyām samo nyūno’pi vā bhavet /

sa vyāpyo vyāpakastasya samo vā’pyadhiko’pi vā //Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\end{itemize}

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principle of relation (sambandha niyama). A Niyama (Principle) is nothing but the co-existence of sign (Liṅga) with the Major term (Liṅgī) in respect of place and time of the perceived objects.\(^{26}\) According to Chinnaswami, Vyāpti, Niyama ,Avyabhicāra and Avinābhāva are synonymous. Again Niyamyāṁ, Gamakāṁ, Liṅgarāṁ, Sādhanaṁ and Hetu are synonymous.\(^{27}\)

In the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, Chinnaswami Sastri, refers to two types of Vyāpti namely Anvayavyāpyi and Vyatirekavyāpti.\(^{28}\) And example of Anvayavyāpti is where there is smoke there is fire.\(^{29}\) Again where there is the absence of fire there is no smoke.\(^{30}\) According to *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, the Hetu characterized by Vyāpti is of three types. They are

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26. sambandhaniyamo vyāptih. ko nāma niyamaḥ? dṛṣyamaneṣu
desakaḷādiṣu yo liṅgasya liṅginā saḥabhaḥvau sa eva niyamaḥ.

TSR, p.58.

27. Ibid.

28. sa ca vyāptirdvividhā-anvayavyāptih, vyātirekavyāptiriti. Ibid.

29. yathā-yatra yatra dhūmastatra tatra vahnirityanvayavyāptih. Ibid

30. yathā-yatra yatra gnyabhāvastatra tatra dhūṁabhāva iti. Ibid.
Anvayavyātireki, Kevalānvayi and Kevalavyātireki. An Anvayavyātireki type of Hetu is that which has both the types of Vyāpti. Again the Kevalānvayi type of Hetu is that which has only Anvayavyāpti and not Vyātirekavyāpti. For example, a jar is namable because it is an knowable (prameya). Again the Kevalavyātireki type of Hetu is that where there is no Anvayavyāpti but only Vyātirekavyāpti. For example, earth is different from other substances because it has smell. In the system of Mīmāṃsā, the joint operation of Anvaya and Vyatireka Vyāpti is not the cause of inference but they are separately the cause of Anumāna. Therefore, they are alternatives. This is stated by Chinnaswami in his work.

31. TSR, p.59.

32. yatra tu anvayavyāptirnā'asti kevalam vyatirekavyāptireva'sti sa kevalavyātirekī. yāthā-prṇ-thivī ītarbhedavatī, gandhavatvāt iti. Ibid.

33. idamatra'vadheyam-mīmāṃsakamate anvayavyāptivyatirekavyaptyorna samuccityā'numitikāraṇatā, kintu pṛthak pṛthageva. ata eva tayorvaikalpikatvatam. Ibid.
The most commonly recognised kinds of Anumāna are two viz., Svārthānumāna (the inference for oneself) and Parārthānumāna (the inference for others). The *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, like other works of other systems, mentions two types of Anumāna. They are Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna. Where one having seen the Hetu infers the object to be accomplished through the recollection of Vyāpti is called Svārthānumāna. Again when one utters a sentence to make others understand the self-determine object with the help of inference that is called Parārthānumāna.\(^{34}\) As rightly observed by Chinnaswami Sastri, the sentence that is uttered in the Svārthānumāna contains five members according to the Naiyāyikas. These five factors are- Pratijñā (assertion), Hetu (cause), Udāharana (example), Upanaya (reaffirmation) and Nigamana (final conclusion).\(^{35}\) These are the

\[
\begin{align*}
34. & \text{ yatra } svayameva \ hetuṁ \ dṛṣṭvā \ vyāptīśadismaraṇena} \\
& \text{sādhyamanuminoti, tatasvārthānumānam. yatra } tu \\
& \text{svapratipannamarthamannumāṇena paraṁ bodhayitum} \\
& \text{vākyamuccāryate, tatparārthānumānam. TSR, p.60.}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
35. & \text{ tacca } .vākyaṁ pañcāvayavam-} \\
& \text{pratijñāhetuśadaharanopanayanigamanabaddhamiti naiyāyikāḥ.}
\end{align*}
\]

*Ibid, p.60.*
five members (Pañcāvayavam) of a syllogism. However, the Mīmāṁsakas believed only three members of a syllogism. They are either the first three or last three members.36

The Mīmāṁsakas accept three types of fallacies37 (Hetvābhāsa) in stead of five fallacies accepted by the Naiyāyikas. The word Hetvābhāsa is explained as hetorābhāsā hetvābhāsāḥ. Meaning there by is the defect in the Hetu (hetudoṣa). Fallacies are, therefore asiddha (unproved probans). The five kinds of Hetvābhāsas are Asiddha, Viruddha, Anaikāntika, Kālātyayāpadiṣṭa and Prakaraṇasama. Chinnaswami Sastri uses the word Asiddhi instead of Asiddha. According to Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali, Asiddhi is again of five types. They are- (i) Svarūpasiddhiḥ, (ii) Sambandhāsiddhiḥ, (iii) Vyātirekāsiddhiḥ, (iv) Āśrayāsiddhiḥ and (v) Vyāptyasiddhiḥ.

36. tacca trayāṁ pratijñāhetūdāharāṣṭrāpāṁ udāharāṇopanayani-gamanarūpaṁ vā. tatraḥ'dyaṁ yathā-parvato vahnimāṁ dhūmavatvāt, yo yo dhūmavān sa so’gnimāṁ, yathā mahānasaḥ iti. dvitiyāṁ yathā-yo yo dhūmavān sa so’gnimāṁ yatha mahānasaḥ. dhūmavāṁca’yaṁ parvataḥ. tathā ca’yamiti. TSR, p.60.

37. asiddhiranaikāntikatvaṁ, bādhakatvaṁceti trayo hetvābhāsāḥ. Ibid,p.61.
Sabdapramāṇa (Verbal Testimony) occupies the third position in serial order in the list of the sources of valid knowledge discussed in the works of the Mīmāṁsā philosophy. In this regard, both the Schools of Mīmāṁsā differ from the Naiyāyikas and the Vedāntins who place Upamāṇa before the Sabdapramāṇa.\(^1\) Again the system of Mīmāṁsā calls Verbal Testimony as Sabda (śāstra). It is an important source of knowledge. The importance of Sabdapramāṇa becomes obvious when we imagine a person deprived of all contacts with other persons and books in which case, he would simply be reduced to the level of a brute. This Testimony has been admitted as an independent source of knowledge by all Indian philosophers except the Cārvākas, the Baudhās and the Vaiśeṣikas. Sabdapramāṇa is of great importance in the system of Mīmāṁsā. Testimony is the verbal authority.

\(^1\) \text{anumanataḥ parastādupamāṇaṁ varṇayanti tarkavidaḥ} / \text{vādiparigrabhūmnā vayāṁ tu śabdaṁ puraskurmaḥ} // MM, p.95
Following the Bhāṭṭa principle, Chinnaswami also discusses Śabdapramāṇa after Anumāna.²

Kumarila divides testimony into Personal (Pauruṣeya) and Impersonal (Apauruṣeya). The former is the testimony of the trustworthy person (Āptavākyya) and the latter is the testimony of the Veda (Vedavākyya).³ It is valid in itself. It has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of the person.

Chinnaswami Sastri, however uses Śabdapramāṇa instead of Śabdapramāṇa. This Śabdapramāṇa is used as Sastrapramāṇa by the earlier Mīmāṁśakas including Śabarśwāmi.

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2. yadyapi anumāṇanirūpaṇaṁ tārīkairupamāṇameva nirūpitam,
tathapi mīmāṁsaṅkāṅmupamāṇāpekṣaya śabdapramāṇyasya mukhya--
------śabdaniṁrūpaṇameva kriyate. TSR, p. 63.

3. tacca dvividhaṁ – pauruṣeyam – apauruṣeyam ceti. tatra
pauruṣeyamāptavākyam. apauruṣeyam ca vedavākyam. SDK,p.134.
Chinnaswami in his *Tantrasiddhānta- Ratnāvali* discusses the process of verbal cognition (*Śābdabodha*) like the *Bhāsāparicceda*. In the content of *Śābdabodha*, the knowledge of pada is the instrument, recollection of the meanings of work is the operation (*vyāpāra*) and *Śābdabodha* itself is the result (*phala*).\(^4\) The meaning of a sentence which is in the form of mutual relation appears through Saṁsarga maryada. According to the Naiyāyikas, in *Śābdabodha* the knowledge of a work or the words to be known (*jñayamāna*) becomes the instrument, but Chinnaswami has refuted the view in his *Tantrasiddhānta- Ratnāvali*. For the padas become exhausted through conveying their meanings. In support of his assertion, Chinnaswami refers to the words of Sabarswāmi.\(^5\)

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4. (a) atra padajñānaṁ karaṇam, padārthāsmṛtiravāntarāvyaśāraḥ,

Śābdabodhaḥ phalam. TSR,p.63.
(b) padajñānaṁ tu karaṇam, dvāram tatra padārthadhīhy/

Śābdabodhaḥ phalam tatra, saktidhiḥ sahakāriṇī.// BP,k.81.

5. “padāni hi svāṁ svamarthamabhidhāya nibṛttavyāśāraḥ, athedāṁ padārthā avagataśsanto vākyārthāṁ gamayanti”. SB, Vākyādikaraṇa as stated in TSR,p.64.
Therefore, on the strength of words of Bhāṣya the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas, content that the meanings of words denoted by the words lead to the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence through lakṣaṇā. This is what is known as the theory of Abhihitānvayavāda (theory of the correlation of the expressed) according to the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas. According to this theory, the words convey only the individual word-meanings which, in their turn, come to be mutually related. Through the meanings of individual words can also be comprehended separately as far as the sentence meaning is concerned, it result from the association of word-meanings constituting the sentence. This makes it clear that the meanings of all the words are responsible for the total meaning of a sentence. This theory of Abhihitānvaya is accepted by the Bhāṭṭamīmāṃsakas.

6. atassiddham padairabhīhitīḥ padārthā lakṣaṇayāḥ
vākyārthamavabodhyantiti. TSR, p. 64.

7. tenātra padāvagatīḥ punah padārthā mitho’nvayaṁ yānti/
ityevamabhīhitānvayasiddhānto darśito’msadādinātām.// MM, 90.

8. so’yamabhīhitānvayavādo bhāṭṭasammataḥ. TSR, p. 64.
After presenting the theory of Abhihitānvyāvāda in his *Tratrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, Chinnaswami refers to the theory of Anvītabhidhāna of the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā. According to the theory of Anvītabhidhāna, a word express its meaning as connected with some acts to the done (kārya). The words in a sentence convey their meanings in relation to the meanings of other words. Thus according to the Prabhākaras, the words in a sentence have the double function of giving their individual as well as the construed meanings. In other words, the theory of the Prabhākaras contends that both the individual word-meanings and their mutual relation are conveyed by the words constituting a sentence. This means that a word has no separate existence and it always conveys a complete meaning only in relation with the other words. Every word, therefore, expresses its meaning as connected with an action which is denoted by other word, and these cumulative expressions of all the words in a sentence are called Anvītabhidhāna. Thus in an expression viz., “Bring the Cow”

9. prabhākarastu- anvītabhidhānamicchanti. TSR,p.64
10. yato'nviteṣu vyutapatteranvitā arthāh
    padairabhidhiyante‘to’nvitārthaparānī padāṇyeva vākyamiti
    tīkākāramatānuvartinaḥ. NK under NRM, p.97.
(gāmānaya) the word ‘gām’ does not properly mean ‘cowness’ (gotva), but ‘anayanānvita gotva’ (the genus cow as connected with the act of bringing).

The Anvitābhidhāna of the Prābhākaras is refuted by Chinnaswami Sastri for there is the involvement of assuming many denotative capacity (śakti) in respect of the meanings of the words in a sentence.\(^1\) Therefore, according to him theory of expression of the correlated (Anvitābhidhānavāda) does not stand to reason.\(^2\)

There are three causes of verbal cognition (Śabdabodha karaṇāni). These are dealt with by Chinnaswami Sastri in his Tantrsiddhānta-Ratnāvali. These three causes are Ākāṅkṣā (expectancy), Yogyatā (compatibility) and Āsatti (proximity).

\(^{11}\) tadidamasāram-‘padānāṁ padārthe vākyārthe cetyanekāśaktikalpanāprasaṅgat. TSR, p. 64.

\(^{12}\) ato na’nvitābhidhānam yuktamityanyatra vistarāḥ. Ibid, p. 64.
Amongst all the three conditions, the greatest linguistic importance has to be given to Ākāṅkṣā. According to the Mīmāṃsakas, it is Ākāṅkṣā on the basis of which one can understand the syntactic unity of a sentence. Ākāṅkṣā is the most important and well-comprehensive of all the factors. The literal meaning of the word ‘Ākāṅkṣā’ is the desire on the part of the listener to know other words or their meaning to complete the sense.

Ākāṅkṣā is the enquiry of a person into another meaning and that enquiry arises due to the non-completion of the entire denotation or sometimes only of a denotable. In is because of the fact that when only one word like ‘dvāram’ (door) is used, there will be no denotation at all. Ākāṅkṣā consists in a word not being

13. atrocyate-abhidhānīparyavasānam,abhidheya-paryavasānānca
jijñāsodaye nibandhanam. PP, p. 386.
able to convey a complete sense in the absence of another word. A
word is said to have Ākāṅkṣā for another, if it cannot, without the
latter, produce knowledge of its inter-relation in an utterance. In a
language, certain words necessarily require certain other words to
complete the sense. For example, a verb like ‘bring’ has
expectancy for a word denoting some object.¹⁴

   The Mīmāṁsakas explain Ākāṅkṣā not only on the basis
of syntactic incompleteness of the sentence, but also on the basis of
the psychological incompleteness of the idea.¹⁵

   Sālikanātha Miśra, the polemical writer of the Prābhākara
Mīmāṁsā maintains that Ākāṅkṣā does not arise at once in respect
of all the counter correlatives (Pratiyogī), but it arises according to
the particular order in which the causes occur. In this context,
Sālikanātha refers to three essential psychological Ākāṅkṣās which
are towards (i) Viṣaya or the act enjoined; (ii) Karana or the means

¹⁴. kriyāsravane kārakasya kārakasravane kriyāyāḥ. IVP,iv.3.
¹⁵. anvitasyāmidhānārthamuktārthaghatanāya vā/
   prātiyogini jiśāṣā yā sākāṅkṣeti giyate// PP,p.387.
of performing the act and (iii) Niyojya\textsuperscript{16} who performs the act. Thus is the expression like 'viśvajitā' yajeta' (one should perform the viśvajit sacrifice), as there is no mention of the Niyojya, the expression i.e. the sentence is incomplete and as such there arises Ākāṅkṣā towards a word conveying the Niyojya i.e. a person like Devadatta. Who is desirous of attaining haven without whom the act cannot be performed.

**YOGYATĀ**

Another condition for understanding the Sentence-meaning is Yogyatā (Compatibility). It is the logical compatibility or consistency of the words in a sentence for mutual relation.\textsuperscript{17} According to Śālikanātha Miśra, Yogyatā is that which is capable of making a relation.\textsuperscript{18}

The Mīmāṃsakas of the Prābhākara School accept Yogyatā as the Suitability of the words to have Syntactical relation

\textsuperscript{16} niyojyaḥ sa ca kāryaṁ yaḥ svakiyatvenā budhyate.PP,p.391.

\textsuperscript{17} (a) arthābādho yogyatā. TS,p.29.
(b) parasparānvayaprayojakadharmavattvam. PLM,p.26.

\textsuperscript{18} kim punaridaṁ yogyatvam nāmaśyat sambandhārhatvam. PP,p.425.
with other words of the same sentence. The knowledge of this Yogyatā occurs in the mind of the speaker and the listener in a particular context on the strength of the previous experience of seeing the words to be in such relations. Yogyatā demands the words in a sentence to have competence for mutual relation. In the sentence "jalena sīncati" (He sprinkles it with water), there is Yogyatā of the meaning since sprinkling is generally done with a liquid thing like water and there is nothing incompatible between the idea of sprinkling and water. But in case of a sentence like "Vahninā Sīncati" (He sprinkles it with fire), there is no yogyatā since the idea of sprinkling is something incongruous with that of fire.

The Mīmāṁsakas of the Bhāṭa School admit Yogyatā as an essential factior of understanding the meaning of a sentence.\(^\text{19}\) as they contend that there can be no knowledge of the meaning of a sentence like "agninā sīncati" (He sprinkles it with water) obviously for the lack of compatibility between the words "agninā" and "sīncati."\(^\text{20}\)

\(^{19}\) tatparyāviṣayasaṁsargābādho yogyatā. TSR,p.65.

\(^{20}\) agninā sīncatyādāvayogyāṁmanvayāt yogyātāpi parigṛāhyā. MM,p.99.
The third factor for understanding the Sentence-meaning is Asatti or Sannidhi (Contiguity). It is a condition that the words in a Sentence should be contiguous in time.\textsuperscript{21} This contiguity or proximity is the uninterrupted utterance of the words when they are in juxtaposition.

Kumārila Bhāṭṭa explains Sannidhi as the continuous moving about of the words or their meaning in the mind. Śālikanātha also explains it in the same way.\textsuperscript{22} The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsakas understand Sannidhi as the immediate association of the idea of the meaning of a related word. They do not favour the definition of Sannidhi as the proximity of word. While the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas understand Sannidhi as the contiguity of a word or

\textsuperscript{21} (a) padānāmabilambenoccāraṇāṁ sannidhīḥ. TS,p.30.
(b) avyavadhānena padajanyapadārthopasthitirāsattih. TSR,p.65.
(c) āsattiścavyavadhānena padajanyapadārthopasthitih. VP,p.99.

\textsuperscript{22} atha sannidhiṁ kah? Yasyārthasya śravanāṁākaṅkhāyogyatābhyaśmarth-
āntare buddhiviparivṛttih. PP,p.389.
the idea of the words, the Māṁsakas of the Prābhākara School accept it only as the contiguity of the idea of the meaning of a word. According to Śālikanātha, contiguity caused by the words only is not the auxiliary cause in respect of the knowledge (of the Sentence-meaning). According to the Naiyāyikas, Tatparya (the intention of the speaker) is the fourth requisite factor for understanding the Sentence-meaning. But the Māṁsakas use Tatparya for the purport of a passage dealing with a topic, and refer to six Lingas or indications by which it could be obtained objectively without any reference to the speaker or the author. These lingas are: (a) consistency in the meaning between introduction and conclusion; (b) repetition of the main topic; (c) the novelty of the Subject matter; (d) the result; (e) corroborative statement and (f) arguments in support of the main topic.

Moreover, according to the Māṁsakas, in respect of a Sentence also, the Tatparya meant by it can be studied objectively

24. upakramopasamharau abhyaso’purvata phalam/
arthavādopapatti ca liṅgaṁ tātparyanirṛaye// NK,p.714.
without any reference to the intention of the speaker. They hold that the Tatparya of a Sentence is found only is the Vidheya portion.\(^{25}\)

Chinnaswami Sastri also refers to Vṛtti (Function) which is nothing but the state of understanding of the meaning of words.\(^{26}\) Vṛtti is of three types namely, Abhidhā (Primary denotation), Lakṣaṇā (Implication) and Gauṇi (Suggestion).\(^{27}\)

**ABHIDHĀ**

Abhidhā (Primary denotation) is the principal function of the words in respect of their own meanings.\(^{28}\) Abhidhā is nothing but the Sakti.\(^{29}\) when we hear a word like ‘cow’ befor we can have the idea of any particular cow, it is the universal common attribute of ‘cowness’ that we understand. The exact nature of the primary

\(^{25}\) yadeva vidheyaṁ tatraiva tatparyam.KP,v.47.

\(^{26}\) padāntōṁ svārtabodhakatā vṛttiḥ. TSR,p.66.

\(^{27}\) स च त्रिधाः-अभिधाः,लक्षानाः,गाँवि त्विन्म्.Ibid.p.66.

\(^{28}\) tatra abhidhā nāma-padāntōṁ svārtthe mukhyā vṛttiḥ.Ibid.

\(^{29}\) saiva śaktirityucyate. Ibid.
meaning of word like ‘cow’ has been discussed in almost all the systems of Indian philosophy and in this regard we find different theories regarding the primary signification of a word. The problem is whether a word, through Śakti, implies a Jāti (certain genetic meaning) or the idea of vyākti (a particular object) or an Ākṛti (a configuration) one more than one of these entities. This has become a controversial issue amongst the scholars who can be broadly divided into seven groups in this regards: (1) Ākṛtivādi, (2) Jātivādi, (3) Vyaktivādi, (4) Jātyākṛti-Vyaktivādi, (5) Jātivisiṣṭavyaktivādi, (6) Apohavādi and (7) Jātyadivādi.

**LAKṢAṆĀ**

Lakṣaṇā (Implication) is also a Śabda-śakti. It is discussed by the Ālaṅkārikas and by many philosophers of Indian philosophy.

Śālikanātha, the polemical writer of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā defines a Lakṣaṇā that as which is reported to for conveying a new sense that comes to have a syntactical relation in respect of the sentence meaning and that which is obtained on the
strength of its relation with the primary meaning (Abhidhā), when there is a failure of logical connection of the primary meaning in the sentence-meaning.\(^{30}\) When there is the inconsistency in the syntactical relation of the primary meanings of the individual words, then it is the Lakṣaṇā that removes the inconsistency (Anupapatti). According to the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā, Anupapatti is only the impossibility of establishing the logical connection in a sentence. Lakṣaṇā occurs only where there is the question of discarding of primary meaning. In Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā, every sentence-meaning is a meaning conveyed by Lakṣaṇā.\(^{31}\) In the expression ‘gaṅgāyāṁ ghoṣha’ (there is a cowhered colony in the Ganges), there is Lakṣaṇā primary meaning which is called ‘svārtha’ (own meaning of a word).

Anupapatti and sambandha (relationship between the primary and the secondary meanings) are the two factors for determining the function of Lakṣaṇā, The Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā believes only in Anupapatti as the Lakṣaṇabīja (ground for Lakṣaṇā).

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30. vācyasyārthasya vakyaṁ arthe sambandhānupapattitah/
tatsambandhavaśaprāptasyānvayāllakṣaṇocayate// PP,p.398.

31. vākyārthe lakṣyamāṇo hi sarvatraiveti nassthitih,BT.
Anupapatti of the primary meaning in the context is an essential condition for Lakṣaṇā since no recourse to a secondary meaning is necessary so long as primary meaning itself serves the context. The natural and direct relation of a word is with its primary meaning and it is this primary meaning that comes to our min as soon as we hear the word. It is only when this meanings brings about some resistance to the understanding of the sentence owing to its unsuitability in the context that we try to explain it with the help of Lakṣaṇā. Sabarsvāmin points out that it is to be resorted to only when the direct meaning of the word is totally impossible in the context and whenever the direct statement and the implied meaning are in conflict, preference should be given to the former.32

According to Sabarasvāmin, Lakṣaṇā is based on usage in everyday life. Sometimes, the newly assumed meaning becomes so prominent through usage that the primary meaning of the word is not normally noticed except by the grammarians.33

32. śrutilakṣaṇāviśaye ca śrutijñayasi. SB under MS,4.3.26.
33. lakṣaṇā iti ceda varaṁ lakṣaṇā kalpitā....................... laukikī hi lakṣaṇā. SB under MS.1.2.13.
Lakṣaṇā can be classified from various points of view: (a) on the basis of the nature of relation between the primary and the actual referents, (b) on the basis of the intensity of that relation and (c) by the degree of distinction between the two.

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas accept another Lakṣaṇā called Nirudhā Lakṣaṇā These Nirudhā Lakṣaṇās express the secondary sense as if it were the primary meaning itself and that in the case of modern and newly made Lakṣaṇās, some are possible, but some are impossible as they are not allowed by usage.34 In case of this type of Lakṣaṇā, the real meaning is as good as the primary meaning itself and there is no need for inconstituency of the original meaning or any special motive to sanction its usage.

GAUNĪ VṚTTI

Gaunī Vṛtti (secondary denotation) is admitted by the Mīmāṁsakas as a separate Vṛtti (function) in stead of recognizing

34. nirūdhāḥ lakṣaṇāḥ kāścit sāmarthyādabhidhānavaḥ//
kriyante sāmpratāṁ kāścit kāścitraiva tvaśaktitah// TV,p.681.
it is as a type of Laksana.\textsuperscript{35} This, they do, because they think that Laksana is competent to bring only the object into light which bears an intimate connection with the thing signified through denotation. Kumārila states that when the acceptance of a primary meaning comes to the impossible being opposed to our ordinary sources of valid knowledge such as perception etc. then that function which brings an idea related with the expressed one is regarder as Laksana and the other function which conveys the sense of an object connected with its attributes signified through Laksana is called Gaunī Vṛtti. Gaunī Vṛtti is also admitted in the corroborative statement (Arthavāda).

PADA

Pada (word) plays an important role in verbal comprehension (Śābdabodha). It serves as an instrument (Karana). A Pada is that which is capable of making a relation or that which has denotative capacity (Śakti).\textsuperscript{36} A Pada is divided into three types

\begin{flushright}
35. abhidheyāvinābhūte pravṛttir lakṣaneṣyate/

lakṣamāṇanagnairīyogād vṛṭteriṣṭā tu gaunatā// TV under MS, 1.4.22.

36. śaktaṁ padam.NSM,p.412.
\end{flushright}
according to the different ways in which their meaning is determined. They are Rūḍha, Yaugika and Yogarūḍha.  

RūḍHA

That is called a Rūḍha (conventional) word which conveys the meaning with its total power. In this case, the meaning of the word is determined by whole word independently. For the example- ghaṭaḥ (a jar).

YAUGIKA

When a word retains that signification which belongs to it according to its etymology, then it is called a yaugika Pada (derivative). Its meaning is determined by those of its component parts as it does not signify anything more or less than the meanings of its parts (avayava). For example- pācakah (a cook). Here the meaning of the word is known from the verbal root

37. tacca padaṁ trividhaṁ-rūḍhaṁ,yaugikaṁ,yogarūḍhaṁ ceti. TSR,p.67.


‘v pac’ (to cook) and the suffix ‘nvul’ (aka) signifying the agent (kartā) of the action.

YOGARŪDHHA

When the meaning determined by the whole word taken together agrees with that determined by the parts, then it is called yogarūḍha (derivative-conventiona). Here both the derivative and conventional meaning coincide and refer to the same thing. Thus it is partly derivative and partly conventional.40 For example-pankaja (a lotus). Pankaja means a lotus by convention and also means that which grows in mud (panke jātaye) and a lotus is also a thing that grows in mud. So both the meanings are applicable to the lotus. But the conventional meaning is more powerful than the etylogical meaning. These are the three types of Pada in Mimāṃsā.

40. avayava/aktyupodavalitasamudāyaśaṅkyārthaprañātijanakah\n
yogarūḍham.Ibid

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