CHAPTER THREE

PRAMĀṆA

In Indian Philosophy, the topics are broadly discussed in three different areas namely Epistemology (theory of knowledge), Metaphysics or Ontology and Ethics. Pramāṇa (source of knowledge) comes under Epistemology. In Epistemology four factors are important. They are Pramā or Pramiti, Pramāṇa, Prameya and Pramātā. Pramā is the knowledge itself. Pramāṇa is means or source of knowledge. Prameya is the object of knowledge. Pramātā is the subject or agent. Epistemology comes first because it is Pramāṇa with the help of which one can have the knowledge of an object. The confirmation or establishment of an object depends on Pramāṇa.¹ The word ‘Pramā’ is used to mean valid knowledge (Yathārthaṁjñāna). It is the manifestation of an object as it is.² And Pramāṇa is the instrument of valid knowledge.

¹ prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi, SK, 4.
² yathārthaṁnubhavaḥ pramā, TSR, p.4
In the first Chapter of the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, Mahāmahopādhyāya Chinnaswami Sastri also discusses Pramāṇa. And he maintains that Pramāṇa is the means of valid knowledge. This definition of Pramāṇa is common to some of the schools of Indian Philosophy. In Nyāya and Vedānta also this definition of Pramāṇa is found. However, in Prabhakara Mīmāṃsā, we find the definition of Pramāṇa in a different manner.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa defines Pramāṇa as a firm or assured cognition of objects which does not stand in need of confirmation by other cognitions.

Pārthasarathi Miśra defines Pramāṇa as the apprehension of an object not previously apprehended which is devoid of defects in its source and is not contradicted by any other knowledge.

---

3. pramākaraṇaṁ pramāṇam, TSR, p. 32
4. tasmiaddrdaṁ yadutpannaṁ naṁpi saṁvādamṛcchati/
   jñānāntarena vijñānaṁ tat pramāṇaṁ pratiyatāṁ// SV, 2/80
5. kāraṇaḥdṛṣṭādhaḥkājñānaraḥhitamaghraḥḥṛṣṭaḥjñānaṁ pramāṇamiti
   pramālaṁṣaṁaṁ sūcitam. SDK under MS, 1.15, p. 71.
Śālikanātha Miśra, the celebrated writer of the Prābhākara Mīmāṁsā defines Pramāṇa as experience. It is different for memory. Memory is again the cognition that arises from the impressions caused by previous experience.\(^6\)

Chinnaswami Sastri explains Pramāṇa (valid knowledge) as knowledge relating to an object as it is not known.\(^7\) Thus in his opinion Pramāṇa is that which produces knowledge of an object which is unknown and uninterrupted.\(^8\) This definition of Pramāṇa given by Chinnaswami Sastri is similar to the definition of Pramāṇa given in the *Vedānta-Paribhāṣā* of Dharmarājādīhvānindra. It may be stated here that Vedānta follows the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsā in respect of practical use.\(^9\)

\(^6\) \(\text{anubhūtih pramāṇaḥ sā śmṛteranyā śmṛtiḥ punah} / \text{pūrvavi jñānasaṁskāramātraṇajñānamucyate} //\)
\(\text{na pramāṇaṁ śmṛtiḥ pūrvapratipattirapekṣaṇāṁ. PP, 5/1-2.}\)

\(^7\) \(\text{pramāṇa ca' jñātayathavasthitavastuvishayakaṁ jñānaṁ, TSR, p. 32.}\)

\(^8\) \(\text{evaṁca' nadḥigataṁ bādhāṁ thavishayakajñānaṁ siddhaṁ pramāṇamiti} \text{ Siddhaṁ. Ibid.}\)

\(^9\) \(\text{vyavahāre bhāṭṭānayaḥ, oft – quoted.}\)

36
In the definition of Pramāṇa here, the word ‘Anadhigata’ (Ajñāta) is used to give up smṛti and anuvāda. Again the word ‘Yathāvasthita’ in the definition of pramāṇa is used to exclude bhrama (illusion) and saṃśaya (doubt). At the end of the discussion on Pramāṇa Chinnaswami Sastri again ascertains his definition of Pramāṇa by way of repeating the definition of Pramāṇa.

Different Systems of Indian Philosophy are not unanimous regarding the nature and number of the sources of valid knowledge (Pramāṇa). As a matter of fact, the number of Pramāṇas admitted in various schools differs from one to eight. In the system of Cārvāka, there is only one Pramāṇa and that is Pratyakṣa (perception). The Vaiśeṣikas and the Bauddhas admit two Pramāṇas Viz, Pratyakṣa and Anumāṇa (Inference). The Sāṁkhyya system accepts only three Pramāṇas viz, Pratyakṣa, Anumāṇa and Āptavacana or Śabda (Verbal testimony). The Naiyāyikas admit four Pramāṇas adding Upamāṇa (Comparison) to the earlier three.

10. TSR, p.32
11. Ibid.
Pramāṇas. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsākas add one more Pramāṇa called Arthāpatti (Postulation) to these four. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta recognize the above five with the addition of Anupalabdhī (non-apprehension) to them. The Paurāṇikas admit the above six with the addition of Saṃbhava (Possibility) and Aitihya (Tradition).\textsuperscript{12} These sources are necessary for the establishment of a valid knowledge.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{verbatim}
12. pratyakṣamekam cāravākaḥ kaṇḍēdasugatau punah /
anumāṇam taccātha sāṅkhyāḥ śabdāṁca ta ubhe //
nyāyaikadesino' pyevam upamāṇanāṁ ca kecana /
arthāpattī sahaitani catvāryāṁḥ prabhākarah //
abhāvaḥ saṣṭhānyetāḥ bhāṭṭāḥ vedāntinastathā //
saṃbhavaitihyayuktāḥ aṣṭau paurāṇikāḥ jaguḥ //

TRA as quoted in NSM, p.260.
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
13. (i) māṁśiddhināṁ meyasiddhiḥ. SDB, p. 235.
(ii) laksanapramāṇabhyaḥ hi vastusiddhiḥ, RBB, p. 2.
(iii) prameyasiddhiḥ pramāṇāddhi. SK, 4
\end{verbatim}
Different School of Indian Philosophy recognizes different number of Pramāṇas. In Mīmāṁsā Philosophy particularly Bhāṭṭas admit six Pramāṇas namely, Pratyakṣa, Anumāṇa, Sastra, Upamāṇa, Arthāpatti and Anupalabdhi. But on the other hand the Prābhākaras accept five pramāṇas excluding Anupalabdhi. Both Kamārila and Prābhākara regard knowledge itself as Pramāṇa or source of knowledge.

Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa as the primary source of valid knowledge is accepted by most of the philosophical system both vedic and non-vedic. In the field of the epistemological investigation, perception preceds all other sources of valid knowledge. It is first and foremost of all the sources of valid knowledge as it is the most powerful, most fundamental and root of all other sources.¹ Hence, all the philosophers utilizing

1. (i) pratyakṣasya sarvapramāṇeṣu, jyeṣṭhavāt, VP, p.7.
   (ii) sarvapramāṇānāṁ pratyakṣapūrvvakatvāt, NVTT under NS, 1.1.3.
epistemology to prove or the explain their metaphysical investigations support their theories with the help of perception. Pratyakṣa (Perception) gives a direct knowledge of reality whereas the other sources indirect knowledge. Prabhākara Miśra contends that perception apprehends the form of object and Inference apprehends merely its existence.² The superiority of perception over other sources of knowledge consists in that it gives a first hand and detailed information about reality.

Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is generally defined in terms of resultant knowledge. They have qualified this knowledge with certain characteristics in accordance with their metaphysical presuppositions. These qualifications variously spoken with it are unerring and pertaining to the unique, particular, immediate or direct. Śabar-Svāmī, the great commentator of the Mīmāṁsā System says that Pratyakṣa (Perception) is presupposed by inference, comparison and postulation.³

2. yatra hi viṣayasya svarūpaṁ paricchidyate tatsaṅvedya mucyate, BR, p. 83.
3. pratyakṣapūrvakatvāccānumānopamānārthāpattināmapyakārāṇatvam. SB under MS, 1.1.4.
The term ‘Pratyakṣa’ contains two parts viz., ‘Prati’ meaning near or before and ‘Aksi’ meaning eye. So, it means the process with the help of which immediate knowledge of an object arises or it means the instrument by which the object is conceived.

There is difference of opinion among the different systems, regarding the definition of Perception (Pratyakṣa). In Cārvāka philosophy, Pratyakṣa-pramāṇa is the only source of valid knowledge. External perception and the Internal perception are the two broad divisions of perception. External perception is that immediate knowledge which arises out of the contact of senses and the objects. Again, an Internal perception is the immediate perception of the mental states like pleasure, pain etc. The Internal perception depends on External perception. The world of Perception is, according to the cārvākas, the only reality. Hence, they do not believe in the reality of the heaven and liberation as these are not the object of our Perception.4

Like other systems of Indian philosophy, the system of Mīmāṁsā also takes up Perception in dealing with their

4. na savargo nāpavargo vā naivātmā pāralaukikah. SDS, p.5.
epistemology. Jaimini, the propounder of this system, accepts three sources of valid knowledge namely Pratyakṣa (Perception), Anumāna (Inference) and Sabda (verbal testimony).  

The Fourth Sutra  \(^6\) of the first Chapter of the *Mīmāṃsā* Sūtra of Jaimini is the basis of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa’s theory of Perception. Kumārila defines Pratyakṣa as a knowledge which is the result of the right functioning of the sense-organs with reference to their objects.  \(^7\) The later Bhāṭṭas, Chidananda and Nārāyana define Pratyakṣa as the Valid knowledge arising from sense contact.  \(^8\) The system of *Mīmāṃsā* broadly agrees with the Nyāya system in its view of perception. The self comes into contact with the mind. The mind comes into contact with sense-organ and the sense organ comes into contact with the external object.

---

5. IP, Vol-1 p. 278  
6. satsaṁprayrge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṁ buddhijanma tat 

pratyakṣaṁanimittaṁ vidyāmānopalambhanāt. MS, 1.1.4.  
7. SV, pp. 38-9  
8. tatra indriyārthasannikarṣaṁāṁ pramāṇaṁ pratyakṣaṁ. MM, p.11.
The difference between the two systems we can see is that the Mimamsakas regard the auditory organ as proceeding from space and the Naiyayikas regard it as proceeding from other. So, Kumārila is inclined to define Perception in terms of contact. According to him, the ‘Sam’ in the word ‘Saṁprayoga’ occurring in the MS. 1.1.4 is used to mean ‘right’ (Samyak) and it serves to preclude all faulty ‘Prayoga’. By ‘Prayoga’ he means the function of the sense-organs with reference to their objects. In the case of cognition of silver in the Conch-Shell, the function of the sense-organ of eyes is faulty and so, this type of cognition becomes precluded by the prefix ‘Sam’. Thus the MS, 1.1.4 may be taken to mean the statement of the definition of Perception. In this way, Kumārila Bhāṣṭa’s interpretation of the above Sūtra states that the Sūtra gives the definition of perception as the cognition of a person brought about by the correct functioning of his sense-organs.

9. samyagarthe ca saṁśabdo duśprayoganiśr̥ṣaṇah/
   prayoga indriyāṇāṁ ca vyāpāro'rttheṣu kathyate//
   duṣṭatvāt-chhuktikāprayogo vāryate rajatekṣaṇāt/
The whole process in Pratyakṣa (Perception) is divided into two forms rather stages. They are Nirvikalpaka (Interminate) and Savikalpaka (Determinate). The former proceeds the latter and the latter is more advanced than the former. The Nirvikalpaka (Interminate) perception refers to apprehension at the stage of the senses. An object is apprehended vaguely by the sense as a ‘Thing’. That is to say, Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa (perception) that arises immediately after the contact of a sense-organ with some object is Nirvikalpaka type of perception. The word ‘Nirvikalpaka’ means devoid of determinations (Vikalpaśunya). Vikalpa means the property of discriminating like the universal etc. and when the vikalpa goes away, then it is called Nirvikalpaka.10 Kumārila states that the cognition that appears first is a simple or mere perception (Ālocana) called non-determinate pertaining the object itself pure

10- tatra vikalpo nāma-bhedako dharman jatyādi,... .............................. nirgato vikapo xasminnirvikalpakam. prathamamakṣa
sannipātotpannamapātajamāṃ vastumātragrāḥakamāṃ.
vikalpāvasthaḥprāgavastham nirvikalpakam.

and simple like the idea in the mind of the infant, dumb and the like.\textsuperscript{11} In this cognition neither the generic attribute nor the differentia is presented to consciousness; all that is present there is the individual wherein these two subsist. Śālikarātha uses the terms ‘Savikalpā’ and ‘Avikalpā’ to mean ‘Savikalpaka’ and ‘Nirvikalpaka’ types of Pratyakṣa (Perception).\textsuperscript{12} After the indeterminate perception, when the sense-object contact still continues, the object is determined as belonging to a particular class or as possessing some qualities etc, then the perception becomes determinate (Savikalpaka).\textsuperscript{13} According to Śālikarātha, the determinate perception is that which apprehends the object as actually being an individual possessed of specific features and the indeterminate perception is that which the apprehends only the nature of the object.\textsuperscript{14}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{11} asti hyālocaṇajñānaṁ prathamaṁ nirvikalpakaṁ. // SV. 4.112.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} savikalpā vikalpa ca pratyakṣa-buddhiṣyate, PP, p 160.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} yattu tadanantaram śabdasmaraṇasahakṛtaṁ
    jātyādiśiṣṭavastu viṣayaṁ rakto’ yanāṁ ‘ghato’ yan
    ityādiṣṭavakti jñānaṁ tatsavikalpakaṁ. MM, p. 20
  \item \textsuperscript{14} aśdyā viśiṣṭaviṣayaṁ svarupaviṣayetarā. PP, p. 161
\end{itemize}
The earliest use of the word ‘Ālocaṇā’ used by Kumārila also to mean Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa is seen in the Praśastapādabhāṣya. From this, it appears that earlier philosophers were conscious of the two forms of Pratyakṣa though clear and detailed description of them was attempted for the first time by Kumārila.

The Bhāṭtas and the Sāṁkhyaits maintain that both Nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and Savikapaka (determinate) Pratyakṣa are equally valid and are necessary modes of perceptual knowledge. By indeterminate they mean that cognition which spontaneously arises at the first moment of contact between the sense and the object. It is a knowledge of the object as one individual whole of generic and specific attributes. There is no differentiation between the universal and the particular that are combined in the body of the individual. Hence there is only an

15. taddhi dravyādiṣu.................................

dharmādīsāmagrye ca svarupālocamātram, PPB, p. 443.

Also NK under PPB. p. 446.

15. SDK, p. 59.
apprehension of the individual as an indefinite object, but no
definite understanding of it as this or that kind of object.

In his Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali, Chinnaswami Sastri
defines Pratyakṣa (perception) in a different manner. Though the
spirit of the definition is same steel the way of defining it is
different. He defines Pratyakṣa as- ‘Viṣayendrisaṁprayogajnyāṁ
jñānaṁ partyakṣam.’

The meaning hereby is – Perception is the knowledge
produced by the used of sense organs with the object. Here the seen
that Chinnaswami Sastri has used the word ‘Saṁprayoga’ instead
of Sannikarṣa. However, he has explained the word ‘Saṁprayoga’
as direct connection.17

Like other philosophers Chinnaswami Sastri also shows
two types of Pratyakṣa (Perception). They are Nirvikalpaka and
Savikalpaka.18 Nirvikalpaka (Indeterminate perception) is define

17. saṁprayogāśca sākṣātsambandhaḥ. TSR, p. 32.
18. tacca pratyakṣaṁ dvividham-nirvikalpakan savikalpakaṁ
TSR, p. 32

47
Chinnaswami as a knowledge of devoid of śabda (word) and which leads to only the nature of an object or a thing that arises after the contact with sense-organs. In case of Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa there is no assumption of the generic attribute, quality and action.

Therefore, an Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa is an empty knowledge of the generic attribute etc.¹⁹ On the other hand Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa (determinati perception) is the knowledge or object with its characteristic or salient features of an object such as generic attribute etc.²⁰ Chinnaswami also says that a Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa is not accepted by the Baudhas. But they only believed in Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa.

---

¹⁹ tatrendriyasannikarṣanantarameva viṣayasvarī—pamatragṛhi
śabdāṅgamaśāṇīyaṁ yatsasmugdhyākāraṁ jñāṇaṁ jāyate
tannirvikalpakam. TSR, p.32.

²⁰ yattu tadanantaram śabdasmaranāsahakṛtaṁ jatyādiśiṣṭavastu
viṣayaṁ ‘gauriyaṁ’ ‘raktasyaṁ’ ityādiśiṣṭaviśiṣṭaṁ
tatkalpanāviśiṣṭatvaṁ savikalpakamityucyate. Ibid, p.32.
It is perhaps because of their admitting the theory of momentariness (Kṣanikatvavāda), the Baudhas do not accept Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa. Again some Grammarians believe only in Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa and not Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa. They hold the opposite view of Baudhas. But Chinnaswami Sastri opine that both the views of the Baudhas and Grāmmārians are improper. It is because in common parlance Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa can not be hidden. But as ascertained by Chinnaswami the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṁsakas admit both Nirvikalpaka and Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa. In support of this statement, we may refer to the words of Kumārila Bhāṭṭa.

21. bauddhāḥ nirvikalpakamevecchanti, na savikalpakam.
   kecičaṭhādiṣṭāssavikalpakamevecchanti, na nirvikalpakam.
   tadubhayamapyaśaṅgtaṃ. savikalpakasya - lokasiddhasya'
   pahnotumaśaṅkyatvāt. TSR. p. 33.

22. asti hyaśocanajñānaviṣṭaḥ prathāṁ nirvikalpakam/
   bālamūkāḥdivijñānavasadvipaḥ suddhavastujam//
   na viśeṣo na saṁśayaṁ tadāṇāṁnuḥbhūyate/
   tayoṛūdhāḥrabdhūtā tu vyaktirevā' basiye// SV, 4. 112.
According to Chinnaswami Sastri, in case of Savikalpaka Pratyakṣa there are five types of knowledge. They are relating to (i) Jāti (generic attribute), (ii) Dravya (substance), (iii) Gūṇa (quality), (iv) Karma (action) and (v) Nāma (name). For example, this is a cow is a case of jāti. He has a stick is a case of dravya. This is blue is a case of guṇa. He is a cook is an example of karma. He is devadatta is an example of nāma. This is what is stated by Chinnaswami Sastri about Pratyakṣa.

23. savikalpaka pāñcādhā vikalpo bhavati- jāti-dravya-guṇa- karma- nāmabhiḥ. TSR. p. 34.
In the Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali, Chinnaswami Sastri discusses Padārtha (Categories) just after the Pratyakṣa Pramāṇa. Padārthas are called Prameyas. Padārtha literally means the meaning of a word. (padasya artha padārtha). It is an object of knowledge and capable of being named. It is knowable and namable. Padārtha is an object of valid knowledge. As a matter of fact, Padārtha is namability whatever has a name is a Padārtha (Abhidheyaḥ Padārtha Sāmānyalakṣaṇam).

Simply speaking Padārthas mean things of the world or categories. In Bhaṭṭa School of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, five Padārthas are recognised. They are Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karma (action), Sāmānya (general attribute) and Abhāva (non-existence). However, Chinnaswami Sastri contends that there are six Padārthas admitted in the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. The sixth Padārtha is Śakti (potency). But as we know Śakti is admitted only in the

1. dravyagusakarmasāmānyasāktyabhāvāḥ sat padārthāḥ, TSR, p. 38.
Prabhakara Mīmāṁsā where eight Padārthas are accepted. The Padārthas, according to Bhāṭṭa School are Dravya (substance), Guṇa (quality), Karma (action), Sāmānyya (general attribute) and Abhāva (non-existence).

In the Prabhakara School, Abhāva is not accepted in a Padārtha. Other Padārthas of the Bhāṭṭas accepted in Prabhakara System are Samavāya (inherence), Śakti (potency), Saṁkhya (number) and Śādṛṣya (similarity).²

A Substance is define as that resorting to quantity. A quantity is smallest and biggest etc.³ But in Nyāya-vaiśeṣika Philosophy, a substance is that which has quality and action (guṇakarmabaddh dravyam).

Chinnaswami says that there are eleven types of Dravyas (Substances) in the Bhāṭṭa School. These eleven Dravyas are Pṛthivi or Kṣiti (earth), Apa (water), Teja (fire), Vāyu (air), Ākāśa

² dravyaguṇakarmaśāṁyaśamavayāśaktisamavahyāśāṁyāḥ śānti pṛthādṛṣṭau(padārthāḥ)abhyupagacchanti, TSR,p.38.
³ tatra parimāṇaḥ yo dravyaḥ. Parimāṇaḥ sūtraḥ nutva mahattvādi.

Ibid,p.38.
(ether), Kāla (time), Dik (direction or space), Ātmā (soul), Manas (mind), Sabda (sound), and Tama (darkness). 

But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, there are nine Dravyas (Substances). They do not admit Sabda (sound) and Tama (darkness) as separate Dravya (Substance).

According to the Prābhākara, however, there are nine Dravyas (Substances) as admitted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system.

Kumārila is credited with admitting also the substantiality of darkness (Tama) and sound (Sabda). Of these, earth (Kṣiti), water (Apa), fire (Teja) and air (Marut) all possess colour and tangibility, an accordingly are the objects of the senses of sight and touch but only when in non-atomic form. The other five substances can not be regarded as perceptible—since, they can not be seen or touched and therefore are only inferred to exist. In the case of ether the apparent whiteness of it is due to particles of fire in it, while the

4. tacca dravyam pr-thivyaptejovāyavākāśa-kāladi gātmanam abdatam orupena ika-dāravidham. TSR, p.38.
darkness of night is not a substance, nor is it a quality; if it were a quality it would be perceptible by day also, and therefore must be deemed to be merely absence of light. A variant of this doctrine in the school of Prabhākara declares darkness to be the absence of the knowledge of light.

Kumārila Claims darkness as a substance, because it is blue in colour and moves, these two facts being necessarily attributed to some substance, but the Nyāya denies these facts. Pointing out that a colour can be perceived only in light, and darkness is experienced when there is no light Śridhara again suggests that darkness is the imposition of blue colour on something else. The necessity of inferring ether arises from the nature of sound, which must be provided with a substratum; unlike Kumārila, Prabhākara sees no sufficient ground to give to sound the rank of a distinct substance, a position which has obvious difficulties in a system which allots so pre-eminent a place to the world.
Chinnaswami Sastri describes पङ्खी (earth) in his तात्क्रमिता-रत्नःवली, His definition of पङ्खी is similar and common to other systems. According to him, पङ्खी is that which has smell. पङ्खी is also in the form of महि, महिद्धरा and महिरुषा and in the form of body, smell and sense-organ. Chinnaswami also contends that सरिर (body) is of four types namely जरायुजा (which is born from womb), अंधाजा (that which is born from egg), स्वेदाज (that which is born from perspiration) and उद्धिज्जा (that which born from earth). Man, deer etc. are जरायुजा सरिरा, Bird etc. is the example of अंधाजा शरिरा, Mosquito etc. is the example of स्वेदाज शरिरा, while trees etc. are the example of उद्धिज्जा शरिरा.

---

5. तत्र गांधवति पङ्खी, TSR, p. 38

6. साह महि-महिद्धरा-महिरुषादिपा शरिरग्रहणपेड्रीपा ca. Ibid.

7. तत्ता सरिरां चतुर्विद्धाम् जरायुजां जरायुजां अंधाजां स्वेदाजां उद्धिज्जां। मानुष्यां मानुष्याः स्वेदाङ्गां। मकरां मकरां। उद्धिज्जां। udbhijja udbhijja sarira sarira. Ibid,p. 39.
The Prabhakaras, however, admit only first three types of body and not the last one that is Udbhijja.\textsuperscript{8}

**APA**

The second type of Dravya (Substance) is Apa or Jala (water). Chinnaswami Sastri describes Jala in the light of the Vaiśeṣikas. Accordingly water has white colour, sweet taste and cold touch as also oiliness. Its liquidity is said to be natural. According to him, water is also substratum.\textsuperscript{9}

In clarified butter etc. also, the oiliness is that of the water which is in it; for water is the inherent cause of oiliness. Hence, we must understand that oiliness is in water alone. Its liquidity, etc. – Being natural liquidity (dravatva) is a generic attribute that is established by perception; and the determinant of the causality of what is characterised by it is water-hood alone. In oil etc. also the

\textsuperscript{8} prabhākaras tu trividhameva śariramaṇagī kurvanti, na caturthamuddhiṣjam. TSR, p.39.

\textsuperscript{9} sāṁsiddhikadravyatvāddhikaraṇam jalam. Ibid.
liquidity is that of water. According to Chinnaswami Sastri, it is in the form of lake, sea etc. and it is in the form of sense-organ of taste.¹⁰

TEJA

The third type of Dravya is Teja (fire). It is defined as that which possess the hot touch.¹¹ Hotness (usnatva) is a particular generic attribute abiding in touch, the existence of which is established by perception. Fire is in the form of the sun, moon, star and agni etc. and it is in form of sense-organ of eyes.¹²

VĀYU

The fourth type of Dravya is Vāyu (Air). Chinnaswami explains Vāyu (air) as that which has the quality of touch. Even in the state of its having no form,¹³ it is in the form of wind and thunderbolt etc. and it has skin as the sense organ.¹⁴

¹⁰. tacca saritsamudrasaraḥkarakādirūpaṁ rasanendriyarūpaṁca. TSR,p.39.
¹¹. usnasparsavattejah.Ibid.p.39.
¹². tatsuryacandranakṣṭrāṅgayādirūpaṁ, cakṣurindriya-rūpaṁca. Ibid.
¹³. arūpātve sati sparśavān vāyuḥ, Ibid.
¹⁴. sa jhījhaṁmandaniścāsavātādirūpaḥ. Ibid.
water and fire, air also perceptible. Vāyu has a zigzag motion and is to be known as indicated by touch. It is also stated to be eternal like earth, water and fire. Vāyu is perceptible because it is perceived in the trembling of the trees. Again, it is because we say cool air, hot air, big air. Therefore as the Skin is perceived so the air. Air is the cause of holding the body and as such air is called breath (Prāṇa). That breath is five-fold and sometimes ten fold due to its difference of function.\(^{15}\) It is five-fold because, it is divided into Prāṇa, Apāna, Vyāna, Udāna and Samāna. It becomes ten with the addition of the five presiding deities namely Nāga, Kūrma, Kṛkara, Devadatta and Dhanañjaya.\(^{16}\)

\[\text{ĀKĀŚA}\]

The fifth variety of Ākaśa (ether) which is defined by A. Chinnaswami Sastri as the resort of specific vacuum.\(^{17}\) Ākaśa (ether) is eternal, one and all-pervading but owing to differences in

\(^{15}\text{sa eva vyāpārabhedāt pāṇcadvā daśadvā cocyte. TSR, p.40.}\)

\(^{16}\text{nāgakūrmakṛkaradevadattadhanāñjayaśubddasadvā. Ibid.}\)

\(^{17}\text{visiśṭāvakāśāyā ākaśah. Ibid.}\)
its limiting adjunct (Upādhi), it becomes different i.e. it takes the form of ether in a jar, ether in a room etc.\textsuperscript{18}

Chinnaswami refutes the definition of Ākāśa as the quality of sound since sound is a substance.\textsuperscript{19} The definition of ether as having sound as the special quality is accepted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.\textsuperscript{20}

**KĀLA**

After Ākāśa, Chinnaswami Sastri determines Kāla (Time). According to him, Kāla (time) is the substratum of all and it is also eternal and one only.\textsuperscript{21} The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, however, defines Kāla as the cause of things that are

18. ekassarvavyāpi sannapi upādhibhedāt ghatākāsāṁ-thākāśādibhedavyāvahāraṁ bhajate. TSR, p.40.


20. (a) ākāśasya tu vijñeyo šābdo vaiśeṣiko guṇah. BP, K, 44.
    (b) šabdaguṇamākāśakam. TS, p. 17.

21. sarvādhāraḥ kālaḥ, so'pi vibhureka eva. TSR, p.40
produced and is stated to be the substratum of the universe.\textsuperscript{22} Of course we do not find any difference. The spirit of the two definition is almost same. Chinnaswami also refers to different types of Kāla such as Nimeṣa (second), Kaṣṭha, Muhūrta (moment), Ahorātra (day-night), Māsa (month) and Samīvatsara (year).

**Dīk**

The seventh substance is Dīk (relative space). In Mīmāṃsā, it is one and eternal.\textsuperscript{23} It is that substance by virtue of which things are perceived as being on the right, left, east west, upwards and downwards. It may be added that Raghunātha Siromāṇi, the most brilliant exponent of the new school of logic, does not admit space to be different God. Space, though one, it is spoken of as the east etc. Owing to its different limiting adjuncts (Upādhi).\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} janyāṇāṁ janakah kālo jagatāṁśārayo mataḥ. BP, K.45.

\textsuperscript{23} evarn digapi ekā nityā ca. TSR, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{24} param pūrvāparadivyavahāramupādihvāśat karaṇaśāṣkulyavacchedāśca srotasāṁvin labhate. Ibid.
Ātmā (soul) is, according to Chinnaswami Sastri, the resort or shelter of consciousness and is different from the body, sense-organs, knowledge and happiness. Ātmā is eternal and it deserves enjoyment heaven and liberation. In Mīmāṁsā, it is said that Ātmā is different from body. It is additional. Therefore, Ātmā is to be understood to take resort to something different from the body.

According to the Mīmāṁsā philosophy, Ātmā is to be established as different from pleasure etc. it is different from happiness etc. Rather Ātmā is to be ascertained as the substratum of the knowledge of pleasure and pain etc. Ātmā is different from each and everybody and it is vast and eternal. Ātmā is also different from body.

25. "atma caitanyasraya. sa ca dehendriyajñānasukhebhyo vyatiricyate. TSR, p.41.
27. atastesam sariratiriktena kenacida&ayena bhavyam. sa eva dehatirikta ātmā. Ibid.
29. ‘eko devassarvabhūteśu guṇaḥhaḥ’ ‘eka eva hi bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitāḥ. Ibid.
The Nyāya- Vaiśeṣikas maintain that the generic attribute ‘soul-hood’ is inferred as the determinate of the inherent causality of pleasure, pain etc. That generic attribute does not abide in god. The body has no sentiency, for it is not found in the dead bodies.\(^{30}\)

Chinnaswami Sastri in his *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali* contends that Ātmā is the agent or enjoyer.\(^{31}\) In support of his assertion, he has referred to the Śrimad Bhāgavat Gīta where Ātmā is stated to be eternal or all pervading and it is firm and immovable.\(^{32}\)

### TAMA

Tama (darkness) is admitted as an independent Dravya in Mīmāṃsā Philosophy. It is in the form of darkness having the absence of light accepted only by the sense-orgen of eyes.\(^{33}\) But as

---

31. *ata ātmaiva kartā bhoktā ca*. TSR, p. 43.
32. “*nityassarvagatassthiśnuracalo’yaṁ sanātanaḥ*." Ibid, p. 43.
33. *cakṣurmātrigrāhīyaṁ śīlokābhāvapraṇāyaṁ, yakṣṇūraparṁ tamaḥ*. Ibid.
opined by Chinnaswami, Tama is in the form of existence not in the form of the absence of light (Āloka). For, Tama is manifested as qualified by guṇa (quality) and karma (action).

**GUṆA**

Guṇa (quality) is the second Padārtha (category) admitted by the Mīmāṃsakas and other systems of Indian Philosophy. While the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept twenty four types of Guṇa, the Mīmāṃsakas accept twenty one types of Guṇa. In the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, there is no mention of Prthakatva (separateness), Dharma (righteousness) and Adharma (vice).

34. tattu bhāvarūpameva, na tu nyāyamata ivā lokaḥbhāvarūpam. TSR, p.43.

35. gunakarmaviśīṣṭatayā praṇīyammāṇatvāt. Ibid, p.43.

36. te tu
rūparasagandhasaṁśaṁkhyāparimāṇasaṁśaṁyogavibhāgaraṇatvāparatvāgu-
rutvadraṁvatvāsabuddhisukhaducchādvesaprāktaḥadhvanisamśaṁskārabhed-
ādekaviṁśatīḥ. Ibid, p.44.
Like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, the Mīmāṁsakas also include Karma (action) in the list of categories as defined by Chinnaswami Sastri. Karma is the object of knowledge of movement.\(^{37}\)

According to the Kumārila Bhṛṭṭa also defines Karma like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as movement (calanātmaka). However, according to him, Karma is one and perceptible. But according to the Prābhākaras, Karma is not perception but inference.\(^{38}\)

In Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems of philosophy, Karma is of five types. These are Utkṣepaṇa (throwing up), Apakṣepaṇa (throwing down), Ākuṅcaṇa (contraction), Prasāraṇa (expansion) and Gamaṇa (motion).\(^{39}\)

---

37. (a) taccalatitipratyayavisayah. TSR, p.52.
(b) calanātmakāṁ karmaḥ. TS, p.10.
38. prābhākarastu karma na pratyakṣam, kintu
Sanñyogavibhāṣyāṁmeva’numeyam. TSR,p.52.
39. utkṣepaṇaṁ tato’pakṣepaṇaṁākucācaṇaṁ tathā / 
prasāraṇaṁ ca gamaṇaṁ karmaṇyayetāni pañci ca // BP, 1.6.
JĀTI

Jāti or Sāmānya (universal) is the fourth Padārtha admitted by the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā also admits Jāti as a Padārtha. Jāti is also termed Ākṛti also. Simply speaking, Jāti means class, community, generality and universal.

There is difference of opinion among philosophers regarding the exact character of ‘Jāti’: (1) according to some the notion of Jāti is purely imaginary, illusory; (2) according to others it is real entity, but not a part from the individuals wherein it subsists, and as such is cognizable only along with these latter; (3) others again hold that it has a real existence of its own, apart from the individuals comprising it, and its existence can be cognized through inference; (4) lastly, according to some, it is different as well as non-different from the individuals comprising it, and is apprehended by perception.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Jāti is eternity coupled with inherence in many things. It is of two kinds Parā (superior) and Aparā (inferior). Existence which abides in the triad
viz. substance, quality and action is called Superior. Opposite of the superior is the Inferior.  

Chinnaswami Sastri in the first Pariccheda of his *Tantrasiddhānta- Ratnāvali* presence view of Kumārila on Jāti. According to the Kumārila Bhāṭṭa, Jāti exists in vyākti (individual). It is eternal, perceptible and present in a whole. Jāti is in the form of Śāmānya (generality) like cow-hood, manhood etc. Manhood or cow-hood represents a class or whole. It is eternal but man and cows are particulars and are temporary. While Jāti is one, Vyākti is many. Thus, there are two things. Jāti is one but abides in many.

According to the Chinnaswami Sastri, Jāti or Śāmānya is of two types- Mahāśāmānya and Avāntarasāmānya.

---

40. parabhinnā tu yā jātīḥ saivāparatayocyate. BP, 1.9.

41. jātīrvyaktigataḥ nityāḥ pratyakṣāḥ sarvagāḥ pi vā / vyaktitādītmyamanāpanāḥ vyaktyabhivyaktisālinī // TSR, p.53.

42. sa ca śāmānyākāro gotvādijātīḥ. Ibid, p.53.
A Mahāsāmānyā is as good as parasāmānyā and it exists in substance, quality, action and class.\textsuperscript{43} Again Avāntarasāmānyā exists in the substances and it is opposite to Mahāsāmānyā. For example, Śabdātva, Brahmanātva etc.\textsuperscript{44}

The Prābhākaras maintains that Jāti is something real, distinct from the individuals which are its substrata, receptacle and it is perceptible by the sense- organs.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{ŚAKTI}

Śakti (power or potency) is the fifth category as stated by Chinnaswami Sastri in the third Prakāśa (section) of the first

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43} sa ca - dvidhiḥ-mahāśāmānyāśvāntarasāmānyānyabheden. tatra
dravyaguṇakarmāśāmānyeṣu caturṣvāpyi mahāśāmānyayeṇ vartate
sattāparaparyāyam. TSR, p.53.
\item \textsuperscript{44} avāntarasāmānyantu dravyādiṣu vartate dravyatvādikam. anayaiva diśa
śabdātavrahmanātvaśādikamapi śādhanīyam pratyakṣagamyānca.
Ibid, p.54.
\item \textsuperscript{45} jātirāśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣaḥśādīnagocarā. PP (jāti niranāya prakaraṇa),
K.1.
\end{itemize}
Sakti is admitted by both the schools of Mimamsa viz, Bhatta and Prabhakara. The Nyaya-Vaiśeṣikas do not admit Sakti as a Padarth. But the Mīmāṃsakas say that it has to be accepted as Padarth. For instance, fire (Agni) in the immediate vicinity of a particular kind of gem and the like does not burn, but it burns when it is free from that. Here it is inferred that the gem etc. destroys that power of fire which helps combust on whereas the presence of a stimulating gem on the removal of the previous gem generates it.

Sakti as contended by Chinnaswami Sastri is of two types namely Laukika and Vaidika. Laukika type of Sakti is the burning capacity that abides in fire. Vaidika type of Sakti is, on the other hand, the power of generating the heaven (i.e. result) of the sacrifices. Both the types of Sakti are presumed by postulation.

46. atha Saktiḥ sā'pi padarthantaram. TSR, p.54.
47. sa ca laukikavaidikabhedena dvividhaḥ. idyāḥ agnyādīgataḥ dāhakatvādi Saktiḥ. dvitiyāḥ tu yārgaḍīmānāṁ svargādīśdhanatvaṁ Saktiḥ. Ibid.
48. ubhayamaparyarthāpatti kalpyate. Ibid.
In Mīmāṁsā System, Apūrva is admitted as a connecting link between the sacrifices that are destroyed quickly and the result heaven etc. that takes place at a latter time. The power of the sacrifices is called by the term “Apūrva”\(^{49}\). Śakti is inferred by the Kārya (result).

**ABHĀVA**

Abhāva (non-existence) as a Padārtha (Category) is admitted in the Bhatta School of Mīmāṁsā. This is negative and relative in its conception. In the case of an object where the other categories do not function towards the comprehension of the existence of that object, then there is non-existence as the sole means of knowledge. It deserves mention that the problem of non-existence (Abhāva) is of great interest in Indian Philosophy. Kumārila and his followers whose philosophy hold that non-existence appears as an intuition with reference to the object negated where there are no means of ordinary cognition (Pramāṇa) leading to prove the existence of that object. They maintain that the notion “it is not existence” (idam nāsti) cannot be due to perception

---

49. Āgādhaṣaśaktirapūrvapadābhidyā. TSR, p.55.
For, there is no contact here with the sense-organ and the object. So non-existence is to be admitted as cognized by a separate and independent process of knowledge. The Naiyāyikas, however, say that the perception of non-existence (iha ghaṭo nāsti) is a unitary perception of one whole just as any perception of positive existence (for example, there is jar on the ground) is.

As a follower of the Bhāṭṭamimāṇsā Chinnaswami Sastri also deals with Abhāva in the 3rd Section of the first Pariccheda of his *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*. He defines Abhāva as the object of knowledge as it is not or it does not exist.⁵⁰ Abhāva is four kinds. They are Prāgabhāva (Prior non-existence), Dhvamsābhāva (Subsequent non-existence), Atyantābhāva (Absolute non-existence) and Anyonyābhāva (mutual non-existence).⁵¹ Prāgabhāva is the non-existence of an object before its production. The Dhvamsābhāva is the non-existence of an object after its destruction. An Atyantābhāva is the absence of a relation between two objects in the past, present and the future. The Anyonyābhāva

---

⁵⁰. nastīti pratyayaviśayō'bhāvaḥ. TSR, p.55.

⁵¹. sa caturvidhah – prāgabhāvaḥ, dhvamsābhāvaḥ, atyantābhāvo' nyonyābhāvasaḥceti. Ibid
is the non-existence of an object as another thing which is different from it. Chinnaswami, however, does not present any definition of the three kinds of Abhava, but he explains them with examples. He only defines Anyonyabhava. The non-existence of curd in milk is Pragabhava.\textsuperscript{52} Again the non-existence of milk in the curd is called Dhaṃsabhava.\textsuperscript{53} The object of knowledge regarding this is not this is called mutual non-existence. For instance, the non-existence of a horse in a cow.\textsuperscript{54} The non-existence of the horns in hare is the absolute non-existence. This non-existence is found in all three tenses. Hence, the form of air is absolute non-existence.\textsuperscript{55}

The Prabhakara Mimamsakas do not accept Abhava as a category. According to them the knowledge of the non-existence is nothing but the knowledge of the ground i.e. the substratum.

\textsuperscript{52} kṣire yo dadhyābḥavaḥ sa prāgābhavaḥ. TSR, p.55.

\textsuperscript{53} dadhni ca yo’bhāvaḥ payasaḥ sa pradhavaṁśābhavaḥ. Ibid, p.55.

\textsuperscript{54} idamidam neti pratītiṣayo’nyonyābhavaḥ, gaviyo’svādyābhavaḥ so’ nyonyābhavaḥ. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} yatra’ dhikaraṇe yasya kālatraye’ pyabhāvassō tyantābhavaḥ. Yathā vāyau rūpātīantābhavaḥ. Ibid.
(Adhikaraṇa). Hence, due to the non-existence of something other than the ground the source of knowledge called Anupalabdhi should not be accepted. This is what the Prābhākaras contend. It may be pointed out here that the Bhāṭṭa-mīmāṃsakas explain Abhāva similarly as the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas do.