DHARMA

In his *Tantrasiddhānta Ratnāvali*, Chinnaswami Sastri presents Dharma (righteousness) and discusses the same in the light of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra. Dharma is the principal subject matter of the Mīmāṃsā system. It is clearly understood from the very first sutra of the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra.1 Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the founder of the Bhaṭṭamīmāṃsā contends that the very object or purpose of the Mīmāṃsā darsana is to state Dharma as the object of Mīmāṃsā.2 So, it is established that Dharma is the Principal topic of discussion in Mīmāṃsā Philosophy. Now a question automatically arises in one’s mind as to what is the definition of Dharma. In reply to this question we may refer to Jaimini, the founder of the Mīmāṃsā system. Jaimaini defines Dharma as that object which inspires a man for doing a work.3

1. athāto dharmajītyāṁ, MS, 1.1.1.

2. athāto dharmajītyāṁ sūtramādyamidoṁ kṛtam / dharmākhyāṁ viśayaṁ vaktūṁ mīmāṃsāśāyāṁ prayojanaṁ // SV, p.15.

3. codanālakṣaṇo’rtho dharmah, MS, 1.1.2
The word ‘Codanā’ is derived from the root ‘√cud’ with the suffix ‘yuc’. The meaning of the root ‘√cud’ is to inspire. The word ‘Codanā’ means thereby Vidhi. This is what is stated by Chinnaswami Sastri.

In this connection, Chinnaswami Sastri also refers to the *Tantravārtika* of Kumārila where it is stated that codanā, upadeśa, and vidhi are synonymous. Chinnaswami also maintains that the word ‘Codanā’ is bent upon Vidhi, Arthavāda, Mantra, Nāmadheya and thereby ultimately Codanā is bent upon veda only. Thus the word ‘codanā’ is known as prerañā and pravartana.

Chinnaswami Sastri, the meaning of the word Dharma is that which is not related to vice and is the means of attaining the desired object. In support of his statement, Chinnaswami refers to the *Tantravārtika* of Kumārila.

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4. codanā coupadesāśca vidhiścaikārthavāścinaḥ, as quoted in the TSR, p, 3.

5. athava codanāśabdo bidhyarthavādamantranāmadheyaśādhiḥrāno vedamātraparaḥ, Ibid. p. 3

6. phalato ' pi ca yatkarma nānarthenā anubadhyate / kevalpritiḥhetuvāt taddharma iti giyate // Ibid.
In his *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, Chinnaswami holds a discussion regarding the nature of Dharma (Dharmasvarūpa). Different scholars are of divergent opinion regarding Dharma. According to the Prabhākaras, Dharma is nothing but a synonym of Kārya and Niyoga etc. denoted by the suffixes lin etc. known as Apūrva produced by a Kriyā.7

According to the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas, Dharma is the quality of the self which is a synonym of virtue and vice produced from the injunctive and prohibited actions. The Sāṁkhya Philosophers except Dharma as the particular activity of the mind produced by the performance of sacrifices etc. According to the Bauddhas, Dharma is vāsanā produced by another knowledge. In Jaina Philosophy, the word Dharma indicates the molecules known as pudgala. In all the senses the use of the word Dharma is not seen in the vedas.8

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7. tatra bihitakriyājanyāḥ apūrvapadābhidheyo liñādyabhihitāḥ
   kāryaniyogādhyaparaparyāyo dharmāḥ................................. iti
   prabhākarāḥ, TSR, p.3

8. Ibid, P 4
In excepting the defining and nature of Dharma eight Sources are referred to by the author Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali. These are Vidhi, Arthvāda, Mantra, Smiti Ācār, Nāmadheya, Vākyaśeṣa and Śakti.9

Laugākṣi Bhāskara defines Dharma in a very simple manner. According to him, Dharma is nothing but the vedic rites.10 However, he explains the definition saying that Dharma is a desirable matter which in enjoined by the Veda and which has a purpose.11

9. tatra ca pramāṇāni – vidhyarthavādamantra
   smityācāranāmadheyavākyaśeṣa sāmarthyarūpāṇyaṣṭau, TSR, p, 4.

10. yāgādireva dharmaḥ, AS, p, 2

11. tallakṣanaṁ vedapratipādyah prayojanavadartho dharma iti, Ibid, p, 2
Bhāvanā (urge) as defined by the Bhāṭṭas is the stimulating activity for that which is to take place.\(^1\) According to the Prābhākaras, it is the activity of a person towards a certain course of action. That is to say, the injunctive affix in the word “yajeta” indicates that the person must put forth his effort towards a definite end. In addition to the Śābdi Bhāvanā both the schools of Mīmāṁsā accept another Bhāvanā called Ārthī Bhāvanā (objective urge).\(^2\) Of these two Bhāvanās, say the Kumārilas, the objective urge is common to all the verbs and the verbal urge is to be expressed by the Liṅ etc.\(^3\)

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1. bhāvaṇatvaṁ nāma bhavituh prayojakavyāppāratvam, MP, p.62.

2. iha hi liṅādiyukteṣu vākyeṣu dve bhāvane gamyete śabdātmikārthātmikā ceti. TV, p.114.

3. tattrārtha-bhāvanā sarvākhyātārthādharapā / anyā tu liṅādyabhidheyā.
   MM, p. 271.
It is necessary to explain the process of injunction by means of the injunctive sentence (Vidhivāyā). In the sentence “Svargakāmo Yajeta”, there are two properties of the root “yaje” (=to sacrifice), due to the affix “ta”: (1) “Ākhyātatva” (the character of the verb itself independently of affixes and terminations); and (2) “Lintva” (the lin affix). The character of the verb as such is common to all moods and tenses; end the affix lin characterizing the verb “Yajeta” connotes the ‘Ārthi (objective) Bhāvanā’, which consists of the active energy of the agent.

This “Bhāvanā” (Realisation or Bringing about) consists of three factors: (1) “What (Kīm)?” (2) “By what (kena)?” and (3) “How (Katham)?” To explain – on the utterance of the word “Yajeta,” the first connotation of the affix is that “one is to realise”; because, as a rule, the object denoted by the declensional affixes are construed with those connoted by the conjugational ones, and as such the latter are the more important of the two; and then again as the connotation of the affix is more important than the

4. sa ca' rthabhava kīṁ kena kathamiti arthavishīśa. AS, p.4
denotation of the root, it is only proper that we should, before all, have a conception of the connotation of the affix. Then the verb “to realize” being transitive, - inasmuch as it belongs to the same class of verbs as “Kr” (“to do”), - the next question that arises is – “What is the object of this realization?” In reply to this we have “Heaven”, as the object of realization, though expressed by another word, Though the “Sacrifice” (Yāga) is expressed by the same word as the “realization” (i.e., Yajeta), Yet it cannot be construed as the object of realization, because it is in itself extremely trouble some and is thus incapable of constituting the end most desirable by the agent. “Heaven”, on the contrary, consist in bliss, and as such can be the desired end; and hence it is that it is construed as the object of realization. Thus the final notion arrived at is - “One is to realize Heaven”. Then comes the question of the means – “by what (means) is Heaven to be realized? And in reply to this, we have the “Sacrifice”, expressed by the same word as the Bhāvanā” (i.e. “Yajeta”), presenting itself as the instrument (or means) of realization, - the meaning being, “one is to be realize Heaven by means of Sacrifices”. Then, lastly, comes the question of process – “How, by what process, is Heaven to be realized, by means of sacrifices?” In reply to this, we have s series of passages, laid down
the fact that Heaven is to be realized by means of sacrifices, by the perceptible help of the consecration of fire, the threshing of the corn, etc., and the imperceptible help of the “Prayājas” and other minor subsidiary sacrifices. Thus the “Consecration of fire” and the “Prayājas”, etc. come to be construed as constituting the details of Procedure (“Itikartavyatā”) which supplies the answer to the question – “How to realize?” As an example of this method of interpretation, in common parlance, we have the sentence “Desiring rice, one is to cook”, - where the optative affix (in “Pacet”) connotes realization, rice is the object (of realization), cooking is the means, and the blowing of the fire, etc., constitute the process; - the meaning of the whole sentence being, “one is to obtain rice by means of cooking, by the help of fire, etc.” The same process of interpretation applies to the Veda also.

This same optative affix also denotes the Śābdī (Verbal) Bhāvanā, which consists in urging or impelling one (towards action); Just as, in common parlance, on hearing the order of the preceptor – “fetch the cow,” – The disciple becomes engaged in fetching the cow.” We thus find that on account of this natural
concomitance, the recognition of some impelling agent is always the cause of an action. And, on a similar concomitance, is based the idea that the knowledge of the impelling agency is brought about on the hearing of the verb together with the optative affix. This denotability of "impelling" by the optative is accepted by ordinary people; and consequently we postulate a similar denotation in the case of the Veda also. The difference in the two cases, however, in this: The impulsion towards the "fetching of the cow" consists in the recognition of a particular intention on the part of the directing individual; in the case of the Veda, however, there being no directing personal agency, the impelling force resides solely in the optative affix, etc. It is for this reason that the "Bhāvanā" is characterized by the impelling agency residing in the word; and this is called "Pravartanā" or "Preranā" (impelling), inasmuch as it urges people to the performance of sacrifices, Homa, etc.

The "Śābdī Bhāvanā" (Verbal urge) is also made up of three constituent elements. In this case, the factor entering as the result is the "Ārthi Bhāvanā," consisting in the action of the agent. The instrumental factor is made up of the optative, etc.,
comprehended by a study (of the Veda); and the factor of procedure is supplied by the comprehension of the excellence of the action as delineated in the corroborative statement (Arthavāda). The form of the cognition of the “Verbal urge” may be thus briefly summed up: “Having acquired a certain amount of comprehending faculty by me by means of a systematic study of the Veda and its various appendages, the agents are to perform sacrifices, after having recognized the desirability of such performance through the optative affixes, etc., met with in the Veda, together with a knowledge of the excellence of the Actions delineated in the corroborative statement.” This performance constitutes “Action”, and hence the action of the agent is quite rightly said to the result of the “Verbal urge”.

The aforesaid “Verbal Urge” (Sābdī Bhāvanā) is not recognized as one to be performed in the “Jyotistoma” and the “Prātisvika”; Sacrifice though in both of these it appears in its proper form; - The reason for this being that it is the “Arthī Bhāvanā” itself that is therein recognized as one to be accomplished. The “Sābdī Bhāvanā”, however, is recognized as
one to be accomplished, in the passage “Svādhīyāyo dhyetavyaḥ.” It cannot be urged that this latter passage also is declaratory of the Ārthī Bhāvanā, because in this passage the “Ārthī Bhāvanā” itself appears in the form of the “Sābdī Bhāvanā”, residing in all the declaratory passages. The word “Adhyetavyaḥ” is made up of adhi+‘vī’ (to study) + tavya affix; and the object thereof is the “Svādhīya” which consequently is the primary factor; and “Adhyayana” being an embellishment of this, comes to be recognized as a “Guṇakarma” – like the “Sprinkling of water” on the corn.

Thus all “Sābdī Bhāvanās”, endowed with the three constituent parts, denoted by the optative verbs etc, appearing in the veda, are laid down such as being objects of performance; - the full significance of such “Sābdī Bhāvanā” being that – “the agents having acquired a full knowledge of the meaning of the optative, etc. appearing in the veda, aided by the recognition of excellence delineated in the Arthavāda passages, should thereby come to know of the necessity of the performance of the sacrifice, etc. with particular results, and should then become engaged in their
performance." Thus then, like the "Arthī Bhāvanā" the three factors of the "Śābdī Bhāvanā" are (1) the action of the agent, as the result. (2) the optative, etc. appearing in the Veda, as the instrument, and (3) the knowledge of excellency as the procedure. And it is solely owing to the peculiar character of the Injunction that even in this (Śābdī Bhāvanā) there is an appearance of such desirable ends as Heaven, etc, being the result thereof. If the sacrifice, etc, did not lead to the fulfillment of the agent's purpose, then no Injunctions could urge him to activity; and therefore such Injunctions lead to the fact of the sacrifice – which is the object of activity of the agent addressed by the Injunction being the means to the attainment of ends desired by the agent, such as Heaven and the like. Otherwise the Injunction would lose all its impelling force; inasmuch as the impelling consists only in the means of leading the agent to activity. In the case of the verbal affixes – such as those belonging to the First Preterite and the rest – there is no Injunction consisting of impelling; and as such there is no necessary rule as to the "Arthī Bhāvanā" pointing to the agent's purpose, as the object of realization.

"Bhāvanā" consists in the action of urging to the coming (result). This definition applies to the "Arthī Bhāvanā", because it
“consists in the action of urging to the coming result in the shape of Heaven, etc. It also applies to the “Sābdī Bhāvana”, inasmuch as this too consists of the action of urging to a coming result, in the shape of the activity of the agents.

Chinnaswami also presents the issue of Bhāvana in his work Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali after the Nyāyasudhā, a work on the Bhāṣya Mīmāṃsā. The idea and spirit of the nature of Bhāvana presented by him is same except that language is his own⁵. The Sābdī Bhāvana is Abhidhā Bhāvana according to Kumārila. To him, the suffixes ‘Liṅ’ etc. speak of Abhidhā Bhāvana⁶.

5. “yajet svargakāma” iti vākyaśravanās- amanantaraṁ vedastha liṅdiprertōḥaṁ yādīdiśkām karomi ityādiśrayavahāradārānācā ca vaidikaliṅdiniṣṭhāḥ pravartanāipraṇāmipaparimāṇaḥ puṇuṣapravṛtya-nukūla- vyāpāraḥ kascit kalpyate. sa ca puṇuṣapravṛtti-bhāvaṇānukūlatvāt bhāvaṇeti vaidikāśabdaniṣṭātvarācā ca sābdībhāvaṇeta vyavahṛtye. TSR, p.6

6. taduktaṁ viṁrtike – abhidhābhāvaṇāniṣṭhāhuranyāmeva liṅdīdayaḥ iti “liṅdībhāvaḥ saiva ca sābdabhaṇāni ityanena’pi tadevocye ṛte iti vada. Ibid, PP. 6-7
Laugākṣi Bhāskara in his *Arthasaṅgraha* and Kṛṣṇayājvan in his *Mīmāṁsāparibhāṣā* have discussed Bhāvanā in detail but in a difficult way, Chinnaswami, is, however, found to keep him away in detailing the issue of Bhāvanā.
The “Arthavāda” passages are not sufficient in themselves because they serve no independent purpose; but it is necessary that they should lead to knowledge resulting in some end; therefore their acceptability consists in their forming parts of the injunctory passages, through the glorification of the objects of injunction.

These are of four kinds: (1) “Nindā” (deprecation) (2) “Praśaṁśā” (glorification) (3) “Parakṛti” (the description of the doings of other persons) and (4) “Purākalpa” (citing foregone examples). As an example of “Nindā” we have the passage deprecating the giving of silver at a Sacrifice, on the ground of such gift leading to some calamity in the house of the performer within the year. “Praśaṁśā:” “His face shines, who thus knows, etc.” and “Vāyu is the speedy deity.”\(^1\) The “Parakṛti” Arthavāda is

1. vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭha devatā vāyumeva svena bhāgadheyenopadhāvati sa evaināṁ bhūtiṁ gamayati, TSR, p.8.
the passage purporting that such and such and action was performed by some other great man, e.g., “Agni desired, etc.” The “Purākalpa” is the passage describing previous events, e.g., “He cursed him, etc.” The Deprecating Arthavāda leads to the glorification of the action enjoined, by the deprecation of its opposite.

In the example cited above, the fact of silver having been produced out of the tears shed by Prajāpati sets aside that metal as useless, and by praising the non-giving of such silver, directly leads to the advisability of giving of other metals; and as such this instance in quite in keeping with the definition given. The Glorificatory Arthavāda e.g., the praising of vāyu - leads to the fact that “Vāyu being the speedy deity, he is the best suited to lead a sacrifice; hence the sacrifice having vāyu for its deity, in the best of all’; and this praise connects itself, by the glorification of the of the Deity forming part of the Injunction, with the passage directly enjoining such sacrifices. The “Parakṛte” Arthavādas e.g., “Agni desired, etc.” (agnirakāmayata) – points to be fact of the particular sacrifice having been performed by such a great personage as Agni; and hence the advisability of performing the action by other agents
also; and this praise connects itself by the glorification of the enjoined action, with the passage enjoining such an action. The other forms of Arthavāda are to be similarly explained. There are other purposes, too, of the Arthavāda, e.g., we have an injunction to the effect that ‘One is to put in wet pibbles.’ Here the word ‘Wet’ denotes simply some sort of liquid; and the doubt, as to what particular liquid material is to be used, is set aside by the glorification of clarified butter, in the passage “Tejo vai ghṛtam”; and thus this Arthavāda has its purpose in the setting of a doubtful point.

In the *Tantrasiddhānta-Ratnāvali*, Chinnaswami Sastri maintains that the Corroborative Statements (Arthavādas) sometimes directly praise the work to be done. Again there are some Corroborative Statements that they have their validity by way of appreciating the deity and the sacrificial commodity related to the sacrifice. Again there are some Arthavādas (Corroborative Statements) similar to the injunction (Vidhi). In this way, the Arthavādas are called Hetuvannigada. Thus there are three types of Arthavāda.\(^2\)

\(^2\) evaṁ traividhyamarthādam, TSR. p.9
The author of the *Tantrasiddhānta – Ratnāvali* again speaks of another three types of Arthavāda. These are Guṇavāda, Anuvāda and Bhūtārthavāda. Among these, that is Guṇavāda wherein there is the conveying of the contradictory sense attained through other source.

The Anuvāda type of Arthavāda is the statement relating to the object known through other source. An example of Anuvāda is cited by Chinnaswami Sastri as "Vāyu is the Speedy Deity".

A Bhūtārthavāda type of Arthavāda is that when there is the absence of the earlier two types of Arthavāda. An example of this type of Arthavāda is "Indro Vṛtramaham". In this way, Arthavāda is of three types and not mantra.

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3. virodhē guṇavādasyāḥ anuvādo' vadhārīte /
   bhūtārthavādāstaddāhānīt arthavādāstraśrīdhaṃ mataḥ // TSR, p.9.


5. pramāṇāntara adhīgatārtha viṣayakaḥ vacanamanuvādaḥ, Ibid, p.10

6. vāyurvai kṣepiṣṭha devatā, Ibid.

7. arthavādasyaiva hyanena traśīdhyamucyate, na to mantrasya, Ibid.
According to the author of the Śaktivāda, the Prābhākaras contend that the Arthavāda texts cannot be regarded as a trustworthy means of knowledge because they are inexpressive as in accordance with the Anvītabhidhāna theory of verbal knowledge. Only that sentence is really expressive which lays down something to be done (Kārya).