With the coming of the Republican Party to power under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, there were doubts in India that relations between the two countries might suffer a serious setback due to change in the U.S. Administration. Since non-alignment had been an objective of the India’s foreign policy, India did not find a prominent place on the Reagan Administration’s list of priorities. This was primarily due to Pakistan’s “front-line” status (since 1979). However, India was important in view of its growing significance on the international scene and the fear of its force being India into the Soviet camp. India, on its part, desired strong relations with the United States in the belief that it would prove fruitful in securing economic aid from international organisations. This would also help in promoting its development by technology transfers, and in reducing its dependence on the Soviet Union. But at the same time, each of them was also hesitant and suspicious of the other. Thus, the relations between the two democracies were
governed by some "positive forces" as well as "adverse ones".1

The "impasse on nuclear cooperation"2 had been major issue in the Indo-US relations since the seventies. The issue got greater importance in the eighties in view of the Reagan Administration's commitment to non-proliferation. But India's stand on Nuclear Non Proliferation Act of 1978 led to strain relations between India and America. Previously, U.S. had provided for a low-interest loan of $78 million for establishment of Nuclear Power Plant under Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between India and the United States on August 3, 1963 for thirty years. Under this agreement, the United States had acquired monopoly over the supply of fuel to the plant. In return, On January 27, 1971 India had entered into an agreement with U.S.A. to observe the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.3 However, this spirit of cooperation had ended with passage of the NNPT (1978). This was especially in view of India's sucessful nuclear explosion at Pokharan in May, 1974 which United States could not tolerate. Consequently, the United States threatened the termination of fuel supplies if India did not accept all the safeguards.4 India did not alter her stand by such threats. It
opposed the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the ground that it imposed restrictions on the non-nuclear weapon States which were not applicable on the nuclear States. It blamed the United States of attempting “monopolisation of nuclear energy” and suppression of its economic independence. This difference of approach which had started in 1978 continued during the Presidency of Mr. Reagan.

This disagreement along with announcement of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) on May 14, 1980 posed a barrier to further supplies of fuel to India. The NRC had announced that all shipments of fuel, after 10th March 1980, would require observance of “full scope safeguards” of the NNPT. On this declaration, the United States “withheld” a 19.8 tons consignment which was due in India between March and September 1981. It threatened the termination of fuel supplies if the NRC conditions were not fulfilled. The Indian officials issued a counter-threat, warning that they would end the observance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards by the Tarapur plant if the U.S. carried out its threat. While the ‘New York Times’ and ‘The Wall Street Journal’ referred to the Indian
stand as "nuclear blackmail", the Indians called the US threat a way of "blackmail" to end Indian independence.\textsuperscript{7A}

On April 16-17, 1981, India sent a high level delegation to Washington. This was headed by Mr. Eric Gonsalves, a Senior Diplomat and Dr. Homi Sethna, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission in view of the dire need of the fuel.\textsuperscript{8} The discussion ranged over a wide field. Special attention was given to two of the issues on which the United States and India had differed sharply. These were namely the issues of nuclear fuel shipment to the atomic plant at Tarapur and United States arms aid to Pakistan. The delegation clarified that India would be willing to continue the 1963 agreement as far as no "extraneous" conditions were applied. Their American counterparts, however, stated that further supplies did not appear possible after the NNPT. They, therefore, suggested "an amicable termination of the agreement." At this juncture, since reconciliation appeared to be difficult. India wanted to find a better solution. The United States was also worried of losing its credibility in the international arena. Therefore, several suggestions came forth from both sides. However, apparently, no progress could be made in reaching
agreement on these issues.

A major breakthrough took place during the official visit of Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, to Washington in July-August, 1982. During the negotiations it was agreed that fuel would be supplied to Tarapur by France. An official of the Reagan Administration clarified that it was not possible for the United States to supply the fuel and maintain nuclear relations, under the NNPT, with a country that had not adopted "full-scope safeguards". Though the President could utilize the waiver to the Act to secure an export licence, it would be difficult to secure the approval of the Congress. Thus, the two countries had worked out a compromise to enable the supply of fuel. President Reagan also gave her an assurance that arms supplied to Pakistan would not be used against India. It was too simplistic remark to be taken seriously. Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi reported that Pakistani rulers were acquiring weapons with the sole purpose of directing them against India as had been in the past. Mrs. Gandhi reiterated that India was not against the legitimate security build-up of Pakistan, but the induction of massive arms into it was what she objected. It was feared that this would, in her opinion, bolster up
war psychosis of its military ruling elites.

It is pertinent to note that President Reagan's invitation to President Zia had been but sequel to Mrs. Gandhi's visit. It was also indicative of America's serious concern about Pakistan's security affairs. Reagan's assurance of additional supply of Military weapons to Pakistan was being interpreted in New Delhi as a calculated move to counter India's defence and security preparedness. The Reagan Administration on its part explained to India that induction of American arms into Pakistan in the context of military presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This was also to be seen consequent upon its menace to the security of the entire Gulf region and was in no way intended to weaken or alienate India.

India was not convinced by the United States logic. To most of the Indians, the United States arms deal (especially F-16 aircraft) to Pakistan "is straight and simple case of the US seeking to undermine Indian hegemony in the sub-continent."11

This agreement had at least the effect of removing one major irritant in Indo-US relations. However, the success was marred by
the differing views of the Reagan Administration and the Indian Government in regard to the reprocessing of spent fuel. This issue of reprocessing continued to trouble the relations even after the 1982 agreement. After the agreement India claimed that no control could be exercised by the United States since it was no longer supplying the fuel. India was totally free to utilize the fuel coming from France without seeking the United States approval.12 The United States held an opposite view on the issue.

Another issue of supply of spare parts also posed a threat to Indo-U.S. relations. Since France compulsion was limited to the supply of fuel to India, it was of the view that the issue should be made settled between the two countries, India and the United States. While India expected America to continue supplying the parts, the United States was "reluctant" to continue the supply, as per the 1963 agreement.13 The relations became sore over the 1982 agreement which imposed the same safeguards on India as had been applied under the 1963 agreement. India did not accept the "full-scope safeguards" in accordance with the NNPT of 1978.14 The United States was unable to pressurize India to sign the NNPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) or accept the safeguards. This
failure constantly came in the way of better ties between two democracies.

The agreement of 1982 attracted severe criticism in both the countries. In America, the New York Times and the Washington Post viewed it as a "surrender by the Reagan Administration" since it went against the NNPT. In India also, Lok Sabha showed its dissatisfaction over the agreement. This was interpreted as a "means of demoralising" the Indian Scientists who were making efforts in creating mixed oxide (MOX) from plutonium, as a substitute fuel to end the monopoly of America in supplying the fuel.

Besides the discrepancies in the agreement, the nuclear irritant continued in Indo-US ties owing to their differing approaches. Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi as well as her successor, Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi made their sincere efforts to reduce the nuclear threat posed by the nuclear-weapon States. On the initiation of Mrs. Gandhi, Heads of Governments of India, Tanzania, Mexico, Argentina, Greece and Sweden met in New York in May 1984 to appeal to the super powers to move towards nuclear disarmament. A similar appeal was made by the
six nations on 28th January, 1985. In spite of the persistent requests by India, with the support of other NAM countries, no change was noticed in the United State policy. India was convinced that “nuclearization” of South Asia could be averted only by the reduction in the stocks of the super powers. India held them responsible for the increasing nuclear threat to the world. It opposed all types of proliferation-horizontal, spatical and vertical.

Mr. Natwar Singh, the Minister of State for External Affairs said in the General Assembly on 28th October, 1988 expressed his faith in nuclear disarmament, "If the world is to be made from nuclear destruction, nuclear weapons of all types and in all countries must be banned selectively. These should be used only for peaceful purposes." The United States, on its part, maintained its faith in the NNPT. It ignored India’s demand of similar restrictions being imposed on all nations. The two were, thus, unable to reconcile their differences and the nuclear irritant continued to sour Indo-US relations.

The fact of India being a non-aligned country had prevented herself to establish cooperative security ties or from joining any
United States sponsored alliance and condemning the communists as a "global military threat". Further, the United States terms of arms sales posed a barrier to their relations.

In order to end its "dependence on Moscow", the previous Indian Governments had made negotiations with the Carter Administration on arm deal. However, before the deal was finalised, the United States strategic perceptions were changed. This was primarily due to the Soviet entry into Afghanistan in December 1979. The negotiations were abruptly ended to October 1980 when former Defence Secretary, Mr. K.P.S. Menon, arrived in Washington to finalise the deal. The reason offered by India was that the United States manufacturers were not agreeable to the production of these arms in India, after the initial purchase from them. The one of the reasons which changed the American attitude towards South Asia was Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. So far, the United States interest in this region was low to the extent that her faithful ally Pakistan received a lukewarm treatment from the United States administration. The Pakistani connections were also strained on account of the John Glenn amendment. This amendment had called for suspension of
military and economic assistance to those countries which failed to adhere to the Symington amendment. Thus, in 1979, the United States cut off all aid to Pakistan. But Afghan Crisis suddenly brought a change in the United States attitude towards the region particularly towards Pakistan due to renewed security concerns. President Carter sought congressional approval to waive the requirement of the Symington amendment and to offer Pakistan $400 million towards economic and military assistance. In the new context India was not important for America because in her view Russia was a good friend of India and India will not oppose this move. Therefore, the talks on arms deal were foiled.

The Reagan Administration had a great ideological approach to both domestic and foreign policy issues. Reagan’s policy was occupied with the framing of an initiative to counter the Soviet Security threat in particular. Subsequently, he launched the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), a new economic recovery plan and open up a dialogue with the Southern bloc. This was done with a view to establishing better economic ties with the developing countries. As such, in South Asia, Reagan administration’s main focus was to enhance Pakistan’s military
strength by supplying modern equipment. This inductions of arms into Pakistan adversely affected Indo-U.S. relations.\textsuperscript{17}

The issue drew the attention at the time of Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to the United States in July 1982. The United States official were optimistic and thought that India’s antagonism over arms supplies to Pakistan had ended, “permitting Indian officials to take a more detached look at American arms.” Furthermore, the chances of success had increased due to the reduction of government controls on manufacturers and arms sales to foreign nations.\textsuperscript{18}

In spite of these views the United States offered to “consider any request for military equipment on a case by case basis.” At the same time the State Department was not hopeful of any request being presented.\textsuperscript{19} Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi also told the press that she was not carrying a “shopping list” for any defence equipment.\textsuperscript{20} Even in Washington when asked why India did not purchase U.S. weaponry, she told the newsmen on 30th July, 1982 that Indian always considered the cost and agreeability on technology transfer while making an arms deal. Besides these factors, at that time, India was not interested in any purchases
since "the basket is full" and Soviet supplies satisfactory.\textsuperscript{21}

Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi had always indicated that India had shown a preference for deals in which initial weapon purchase was "followed by part assembly and production of the weapon in India, finally leading to the acquisition of the complete technology of the weapons and the manufacture of all or most of the components and parts within India." The United States, however, did not accept these conditions. It had constantly feared that transfer of technology would result in it reaching the Soviets via India. The Indians did not believe that there was any such risk. They were also reluctant to accept the second condition of giving the United States the right of terminating any agreement. India's previous experience (in the case of Tarapur Plant) had made it cautious of such deals.

Furthermore, Indo-American relations were not improved by a succession of developments in the following months. Even the appointment of a very able career Foreign Service Officer (FSO), Harry Barnes, as the new US ambassador was viewed with some reservations in India. The George Griffin case created new tensions between the two countries, although efforts were made in
both to down play the issue. Griffin, a senior FSO, who had previously held important assignments in South Asia was barred by the Indian government from assuming the post of political counsellor in the American Embassy in New Delhi. Griffin was rejected because of allegations that he had been involved with dissident Bangladeshi groups during a tour of duty in Calcutta 10 years ago. In retaliation for the barring of Griffin, the United States government refused to accept the appointment of an Indian FSO the post of Political Counsellor in the Indian Embassy in Washington.

In September and October 1981, both India and the United States made several efforts to reverse the obvious deterioration in their relations. Mrs. Gandhi and Ronald Reagan met for the first time, at the Cancum Summit meeting in Mexico. They seemed to get along well personally and to share a desire to improve the Indo-American relationship. But two United States actions in the final months of 1981 were particularly resented in India. They were the vote in the United States Senate on October 22, through an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1980, to cut off aid to India or Pakistan if either country detonated a nuclear device.
The second was the United States opposition to a proposed International Monetary Fund loan of dollar 5.8 billion—the largest loan request ever considered by the International Monetary Fund—that was approved on November 10, in spite of the negative vote of the American representative.21A

Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's criticized United States role of global "policemanship" constituted a mild rebuff to the United States. She, however, conceded that there was still scope for general withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan provided both the super powers conceded to bartering away something with one another.

Indira Gandhi's visit as an 'adventure' in search of 'understanding' and friendship was, literally speaking, more adventurous and less reassuring to India's national interests. One by-product of her visit to the United States was an increase in Indo-American cooperation in the fields of science and technology, and education and culture.

Although the search for improvement continued, more than two years' hard work had not produced any concrete results. Mrs.
Gandhi’s assassination on October 31 sent shock waves throughout the world. In the judgement of many Americans, Mrs. Gandhi was biased against the Western Powers. Therefore, they now expected much more from the newly installed Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

Thus, Indo-US ties could not make progress during the tenure of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. On the eve of her assassination, the United States put the entire blame on India. The Indian Government, on its part, regarded the “administrative requirements” on the deals as “an artful disguise for influencing Indian policy." Since India refused to curtail its liberty and the United States was not ready to alter its stand, the relations did not register much progress. They remained limited to small training programmes and officer exchanges.

With the succeeding of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, as the Prime Minister, and with the change of administration, the Reagan administration proposed the transfer of technology and supply of arms. But Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was not inclined to accept the offer since the United States could alter its terms at any time and there was no guarantee of spare parts’ supply. Objection was also raised
at the regulation of foreign military sales that prohibited refunds of payment if the contract was terminated by the United States. In spite of these doubts, Indian interest in cultivating relations was indicated by the visit of the Indian Defence Minister with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi to U.S.A. in 1985 and Mr. Gandhi’s meeting with Reagan and Defence Secretary, Mr. Weinberger, during the same visit.

Dr. V.S. Arunachalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Ministry, with senior officials visited United States of America in August, 1985 also met Mr. Weinbergfer, Mr.Robert Mc. Farlance, President’s National Security Adviser, and other defence officials. The team also visited the aircraft and electronic industry establishments in U.S.A. During the visit a deal was finalised for the sale of General Electric Company (GEC) F-404 jet engine to India. It was the first deal since the termination of aid during the 1965 Indo-Pak war and was a significant development in their defence relations.25

Another significant development was the working out of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). On October 11, 1984, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) had issued Decision
Directive (NSDD) 147, to communicate to all related establishments the significance of having India on their side. It suggested the technology transfers as means of developing closer relations. Subsequently, a U.S. team visited India to sign a MOU on the transfer of technology. During the visit of Commerce Secretary, Mr. Malcolm Baldrige, to India, agreements were finalised to prevent technology from passing into other countries. It was to ensure that they were used only for the purpose approved and restrict to the users. It became operational in May 1985. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi welcomed it as "an important indicator of improved relations with the United States."  

In pursuance of this policy of technology transfer, in February 1986, a Pentagon team, headed by Mr. Talbott Lindstrom, Deputy Under Secretary for Research and Engineering, visited India to ascertain its ability to utilize military technology. It discussed the United States plan of helping India in developing a light combat aircraft for the 1990s, a main battle tank, and a facility for testing conventional missiles. Its report formed the guideline for future discussions.
In spite of this atmosphere of cordiality, Northrop a United States firm, found it difficult to obtain the Pantagon’s permission to discuss technical cooperation with India on the development of the F-20, “a cheaper alternative to the F-16”. Though the licence to give technical documentation to India was granted in September 1986, the delay reflected that the U.S. suspicions had not ended. The Indian doubts also persisted in view of the continued U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan, especially the suggestion of the sale of AWACS by Mr. Casper Weinberger.28

With balance of payments and foreign exchange problems, it was thought necessary for India to cultivate economic relations with the United States.29 These could be substantially controlled if Indo-US economic ties were furthered. Secondly, this would also help in securing loans from international institutions like the World Bank. It was conceded that the Indian goals could not be achieved in the first term of the Reagan Administration since India and the United States did not share “a sense of similar urgency” to further their relations. This was because security factors prevailed over the economic ones.
Another obstruction in the path of Indo-US relations was the United States stand that India should seek "loans from the marketplace," private investors and commercial banks, rather than from governmental and inter-governmental agencies. In pursuance of this objective, the United States encouraged private investors and initiative. The administration, in its bid to promote "private capitalism" and "deregulate, denationalize, decentralize" the economy of India, obstructed the loans to India from international organisations.

India had applied for a loan to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to solve its trade-deficit and balance of payments problems and to meet the heavy expenditure on imported energy. In the first year of office, the Reagan administration strongly opposed the loan. In spite of the opposition, IMF had sanctioned $5.8 billion SDR credit on November 10, 1981. The opposition, however, strained the Indo-US relations. Another, United States action which added to the tension was the use of veto by the United States Senate on October 22, 1981, on the bill proposing the termination of aid to India or Pakistan, if any of them detonated a nuclear device.
However, the visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in July 1982 to Washington was significant with regards to economic considerations. The United States was informed about the attempts being made by India to further development. In response, the Reagan Administration also stated its commitment to support India in its economic development. Accordingly, the United States granted Rs. 78.2 crores as development assistance for three projects on August 21, 1982. A textile agreement was also signed between India and the United States in December 1982, in the same spirit of cooperation. A similar trend was witnessed in 1983.

In June 1983, an agreement for an agricultural research project was signed between India and the United States. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also sanctioned $10 million, second trenches of a $30 million Housing Guarantee Loan Programme to the Housing Development Finance Corporation (HFDC) of India. With all these economic support, Indian economy’s performance was described as “excellent” by the Aid India Consortium in its conference held at Paris in 1984. As a result, the four members and the World Bank promised $4 billion in
concessional aid to India. The American contribution of $192 million was the second largest.\textsuperscript{35}

In spite of these aid programmes, the relations remained disturbed because a much larger amount of aid was reaching Pakistan. Along with this the United States acceptance to postpone the payments of debts by Pakistan and the refusal of a similar request by India had contributed to the deterioration of Indo-US ties. Secondly, the United States was accused of adopting an "anti-India stance" in the international economic institutions like the IMF, the Asian Development Bank, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development etc. Since the United States was a major contributor in various institutions, it was utilizing the resulting influence to have such terms imposed on India as were detrimental to her interests and "to demand from India the reconstruction of its economy for long term, in particular to promote private investment."\textsuperscript{36}

A significant reversal of the above trend was witnessed in the second term of the Reagan Administration and the Prime Ministership of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. Due to the changed global perspective, the United States attitude became more "supportive"
of India. It acknowledged the Indian requirement of loans on softer terms from the World Bank.

In the 1985 Budget, India was the second largest recipient of aid, after Pakistan in South Asia. It received $180.1 million as compared to $212.3 million provided to Pakistan. This elevation of bilateral aid beyond "the early donor-recipient relationship" was welcomed in India. This happened because the United States realised the significance of India, and made attempts to utilize Indian technological expertise. In 1986, as a consequence, the programme for the Advancement of Commercial Technology (PACT) was initiated. However, aid given by the USA directly was gradually reduced. The United States which considered to be the India's largest donor among the non-communist countries became the ninth largest donor by April, 1988. The United States explained the cuts as resulting from the "pressure to reduce the Federal Budget." But such excuses were not given credence by the Indians especially when aid to Pakistan was continued.

However, the United States aid for joint projects continued till the end of the Reagan term. On October 5, 1988, the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the United State
Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly initiated a $21.66 million seven year project for the development of the system for preserving and utilizing plant genetic resources in India. In November 1988, the United States Department of Agriculture gave a grant of Rs. 7.7 lakhs to the National Centre for Insect Pest Management in Bangelore. Thus, the U.S. continued to play an important part in the economic development of India, though purely in terms of the direct aid it showed a reduction.38

In the early eighties the trade relations between India and the United States improved to a great extent. This was due to the economic reforms which moved India away from its "socialist and restrictive trade practices." The Import policy was liberalised (a process initiated in 1978) and the export of certain U.S. goods and services was encouraged. These changes increased the two-way trade between India and the United States.39 By 1983, the Indo-US trade had reached the $4 million marks but the 'trade balance' continued to be in the favour of the United States.

During this phase India faced severe competition from Taiwan, Singapore, China, South Korea and Mexico in all major categories of items exported to the United States—gems, crude
oil, footwear, textile manufactures and garments. Secondly, the presence of certain restrictions also obstructed an improvement in trade relations. Thus, the trade relations, during the term of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, were not as good as had been anticipated. The Indian exports to the United States showed only a slow growth while the Indian imports showed a decline between 1984 to 1986.40

A major breakthrough in Indo-US relations came about owing to a change in the U.S. tax laws in 1986. It contributed to negotiations over an agreement related to the avoidance of double taxation. This tax agreement would encourage increased U.S. investments in India. However, differences on the issue of royalties and fee for technical services continued to come in the way of agreement in January 1989.41 Though the Reagan Administration contributed greatly towards the agreement, it was not finalised till the end of its tenure.

The liberalisation of Indian economic policies by the Congress Government encouraged U.S. investment in India. Though the investment environment had improved, to a certain extent, the United States businessmen were unaware of the progress made in
India. The Industrial tragedy in Bhopal, in December 1984 “put an additional damper on the enthusiasm” of investors. In spite of the reforms, the bureaucratic procedures were still viewed as “restrictive and the investment climate as uncertain.” To ractify these impression, the United States administration encouraged U.S. firms “to take advantage of new opportunities in India which are the result of improved business climate there.

The investment environment improved further after Mr. Rajiv Gandhi introduced fundamental reforms in governmental regulations and reduction in bureaucratic red-tapism. Consequently, U.S. Direct investment in India increased from $7.5 million in 1984 to $33.2 million in a year reach a total of $500 million by 1986. The Festival of India also provided for the arrangement of discussions on the economic policy. In October 1986, sixty U.S. and Indian economic specialists met at a Boston University Conference on Indian Economy. These developments led to an enthusiasm among the U.S. firms “to make a long term commitment to the Indian economy” and increased “their confidence in India’s economic prospects”. With this rise in U.S. investment in India, a similar increase was witnessed in the Indian
investment in the United States, especially in banking, hotels and computer manufacturing. Indian firms were able to repatriate foreign exchange to India and provide "benefits of their particular expertise" to USA. Thus, the Indo-US economic ties were strengthened due to the changed investment environment.

In the eighties progress was witnessed in Indo-US cooperation in the field of science and technology. The Science and Technology Initiative (STI) and the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) contributed immensely to this success which was also witnessed in the joint Indo-US programmes for scientific development.

The STI (Science and Technology Initiative) was initiated in 1982 during the visit of Mrs. Indira Gandhi to the United States, for a period of three years. It worked successfully in areas of health, agriculture, biomass, monsoon and solid state science and engineering. Joint ventures were also initiated in high technology areas like electronics, computers, precision instrumentation and software development.

However, this cooperation under the STI was threatened by
the United States insistence on a change in Indian patents law. In Indian law only process patents are allowed for food, medicine, drugs and chemicals. Limited product patents for seven or fourteen years can be provided for some items. Atomic energy and living organisms cannot be patented. The U.S. law, on the other hand, permits the patenting of everything. The U.S. wanted India to introduce product patents in all categories and extend their duration. The Indian scientists, however, advised that this would not be in the interest of the country, since it could even prevent the manufacturers from using alternative procedures. The patents law would prevent the use of new research findings for the country by perpetuating monopolies.

The United States increased its insistence on Indian acceptance of new patents law soon after the renewal of STI in 1985. And also when the STI was to be renewed three years later in 1988. The United States Trade Representative, Mr. Michael Smith, warned the Indian Commerce Secretary, Mr. A.N. Verma, on July 30, 1988, that trade relations would suffer if the issue was not settled to the United States satisfaction. In a letter to Prime Minister Mr. Gandhi, President Reagan had warned that the visit
of the Science Adviser, Dr. William R. Graham, to India would be postponed for the third time and also "hinted at other sanctions."  

The Indian indecision about the patents law led to the delay in the visit of Dr. Graham to New Delhi. He finally arrived on October 5, 1988 to formalise the extension of STI, which had been agreed to during the visit of Mr. Gandhi in 1987 to Washington. It indicated that India had accommodated its stand to enable the renewal of the STI and to prevent any increase in tensions in the Indo-US relations.

India and the United States had participated in various joint projects during the eighties. Their cooperation in space programmes was witnessed in the INSAT-1 series communication satellites. These were mainly American-built satellites based on Indian specifications. Though the Challenger tragedy prevented the launching of the INSAT-IC, the INSAT I-B and INSAT I-D were successfully launched by American space shuttle. In a similar spirit of cooperation, they agreed on October 12, 1998 to work towards developing a device to check nuclear radiation hazards from outside.
Another significant achievement was that for the first time the Atlantic Ocean Region (AOR) satellite was utilized by the Videsh Sanchar Nigam (VSN) to provide direct dialling facility to the United States in January 1989. The United States also decided to set up technological parks in India to receive high technology from the United States and distribute it to the Indian companies, along with ideas and marketing sources.

Thus, the two democracies showed a similarity of purpose in the field of scientific cooperation. This cooperation, thus, became a major 'positive aspect' of Indo-US relations.

Another notable reason why India's relations with the Reagan Administration followed a downward trend was due to the alleged U.S. support to the Sikh extremists, who propagated the formation of Khalistan. The United States was charged of instigating the Sikhs after Operation Blue Star and the deployment of the army in the Golden Temple in June 1984. Though no official charge was levied on the United States Indian antagonism was aroused when the Khalistan leader, Mr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan, who had earlier announced on the BBC that Mrs. Gandhi would be assassinated,
was allowed to take refuge in the United States, despite Indian protests.\textsuperscript{50} The issue reached its climax at the time of the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. A section of the Indian press, public and some foreign nations put the blame on the United States since it did not appear to be an “immediate sudden act of some irrational persons.”\textsuperscript{51}

Even after Mr. Rajiv Gandhi took over as the Prime Minister the problem of Sikh extremists in Punjab continued and Mr. Gandhi made oblique references to ‘external intervention’. The United States denied having any connection with the terrorists. Soon after the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi; Mr. Ronald Reagan expressed his concern over the growing terrorism in India. He promised his administration’s support in apprehending the Sikh terrorists and exchanging information about them.\textsuperscript{52} This pledge was fulfilled in the significant arrest of U.S.-based Sikh extremists who had planned the assassination of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and other Indian politicians. The ‘Sting’ operation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) foiled the assassination attempt called the ‘Gandhi Plot’. This was a significant contribution to Indo-U.S. relations, especially in view of Indian suspicions.\textsuperscript{53} Inspite of the
cordiality caused by the arrests, the suspicions of India were not totally suppressed. The United States, however, continued to apparently affirm its opposition of terrorist activities.

Thus, while the United States continuously attempted to convince India that it was not supportive of the extremists, however, the Indian doubts persisted.

In the period from 1981 to 1989 the most significant events, which greatly contributed to Indo-U.S. relations were the Festival of America (1983-1985) and the Festival of India (1985-86). In the 1983-85 period the Festival of America was organised in India. Though it was on a modest scale as compared to the Festival of India, it was successful in bringing the United States arts to the Indian public. On June 13, 1985, an eighteen month long Festival of India was inaugurated by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. It was the largest festival of any country to be organized in America. The Festival was intended to arouse greater interest in Indian arts, literature and movies as well as promote tourism, investment and trade. It was an effective way of reaching the United States public and altering its opinion of India. Another significant "non-official" cultural event was the release of Sir Richard Attenborough's film 'Gandhi'.
The three-hour film, based on the life and contributions of Mahatma Gandhi to the independence movement, had a tremendous impact on the United States public. Thus, the eighties witnessed strong Indo-US ties primarily in the cultural field. The uniqueness of the culture of one country served to attract the attention of the other and drew the two closer.

Also there were a large number of visits of important dignitaries to both the countries during the Reagan Presidency. In spite of some shortcomings, each brought in its wake the hope of an improvement in Indo-US relations. However, the first visit by an official of the Reagan Administration did not raise any such hopes. Mrs. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the United States Representatives to the United Nations, has always been regarded in India as "hardliner" in those U.S. policies which were unacceptable to India. Thus, her visit appeared to be an "unfortunate choice," specially since it was the first contact between the Reagan Administration and India.  

Then came the appointment of a career Foreign Service Officer (FSO), Mr. Harry Barnes, as the United States Ambassador to India. India had "some reservations" about it. The Reagan
Administration had gone against the previous practice by sending a career FSO and not a ‘distinguished private citizen’. The Indian government saw these acts as the administration’s attempts to downgrade the relations with India.56

On November 3, 1981, when India rejected appointment of Mr. George B. Griffin as the Political Counsellor in the United States Embassy, the relations suffered a further deterioration.57 This was followed by the United States refusal to accept the appointment of an Indian FSO to the post of Political Counsellor in the Indian Embassy in Washington. This retaliatory step added to the elements of friction.58

A new trend was seen in the diplomatic relations when Mrs. Gandhi paid a “peace and goodwill” visit to the United States (27th July to 5th August, 1982).59 Mrs. Gandhi described her visit as “an adventure in friendship and understanding.60

Mr. Ronald Reagan reiterated the sentiment. He cited some international issues on which both shared common views. These included an early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, peace in the Indian Ocean, settlement of the Iran-Iraq crisis and
establishment of peace in the Middle East. Reagan expressed the hope that “during this visit, we can weave together all these threads of common interest into a new and better understanding between our two countries.” A number of bilateral, regional and global issues were discussed during the visit.

The official interpretation in India was that the visit of Mrs. Gandhi had succeeded in its basic aim of creating a “better understanding of India in the United States”, though as a result of it the foreign policies of both the countries had not undergone any changes. Even the United States acknowledged the change in the relations in the aftermath of Mrs. Gandhi visit although during the visit, Mrs. Gandhi did not succeed in convincing the United States to stop arms supplies to Pakistan or from decreasing its contributions to the World Bank.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, visited India in 1983. The avowed purpose of this visit was to work out ways of improving Indo-U.S. relation and to preside over the meeting of the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission. A section of the Indian press anticipated that the visit would be a “non-starter” for it was taking place “at a time when much of the warmth and
mutual admiration generated during Prime Minister Gandhi’s trip to Washington last year has dissipated.” At the same time, the two nations had not succeeded in settling the issues of arms supplies to Pakistan, supply of spare parts for Tarapur, and the U.S. attitude on World Bank assistance for India. As anticipated, these differences came in the way of talks. However, one important achievement was the announcement by Mr. Shultz that the United States was prepared to supply the spare parts for the Tarapur Atomic Reactor, which India was not able to secure from other countries.63

In May 1984, Mr. George Bush, the Vice-President of U.S.A. visited New Delhi. The visit was intended “to administer some tranquiliser to those Indians within and outside the Government who had started seeing an American hand behind each and every of the many clouds which currently cast darkening shadows on the Indian political scene.”64 The visit succeeded in preventing Indian accusations for sometime, but did not alter the United States administration’s policy or present any “promises for the future.”65

The visit by George Bush was followed, in May 1985, by the visit of the United States Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Maloolm
Baldridge. He came to India "to convey to Prime Minister Gandhi the President's interest in improved relations and explore with him ways and means to strengthen bilateral trade and investment."\textsuperscript{65A}

Another prominent visitor to India during Mr. Reagan's tenure was Mr. Stephen Solarz, the Chairman of the House of Representatives' Sub Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Mr. Solarz visited New Delhi and Punjab in January 1989 to study the Sikh problem,\textsuperscript{66} and find a solution to it as also to express United States concern over nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

At the invitation of President Reagan, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi visited the United States from June 11 to 15, 1985. Though Mr. Gandhi did not intend ending the traditional ties with the Soviet Union, he also wanted to win the United States cooperation. With this view, Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Reagan discussed various international issues and reaffirmed their will to "enhance their mutual understanding". They accorded special importance to nuclear disarmaments, the South Asian regional situation,\textsuperscript{67} and the bilateral issues.

An important outcome of the visit was the approval of a
collaborative India-World Bank-USAID national social forestry project to help the conservation and expansion of India's forest resources. It also led to a favourable turn in Indo-U.S. relations, because the shared perceptions of the two leaders. This finally led to a "meeting of minds" conducive to the solution of bilateral and global problems. The visit was a success due to the recognition of India's growing economic, military and commercial strength. Secondly, the United States appreciated the political stability in India and its commitment to democracy.

However, Mr. Gandhi was openly critical of the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars programme, its arms-supply to Pakistan, waiver to the Symington Amendment, and the Afghan policy. Though issues of conflict were reduced to a 'minimum position' there was no hope of a major breakthrough since Mr. Gandhi had retained the services of the advisers as well as the foreign policy of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. Another minor irritant described as "a gross discourtesy" by the Indian Embassy at Washington, was the invitation of Mr. Ganga Singh Dhillon, a Khalistan propagandist, by the National Press Club, on the day Mr. Gandhi arrived in the United States.
The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi paid a second visit to the United States in October 1987. His visit and talks with Mr. Ronald Reagan reflected the desire of both the countries to improve their relations, in spite of their differences over the Afghan crisis and the consequent aid to Pakistan. The visit indicated that India had reduced its suspicions of America and was ready to let the United States become “more involved in the sub continent’s affairs.” This change was witnessed in the conclusion of the two agreements for the sale of a super computer and the joint production of a light combat aircraft. However, India continued to be concerned over the nuclear programme of Pakistan and wanted the United States to take effective steps to check it. Indian hopes were belied by Mr. Reagan. He stated that the aid package to Pakistan was likely to be renewed, though the request for early warning radar planes would not be fulfilled. Thus, a successful visit was once again marred by the 'Pakistan factor'.

In mid-March 1986, the United States Attorney General, Mr. Edwin Messe III and the Head of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration (USDEA), Mr. John C. Lawn visited New Delhi. Their visit brought to the forefront a new area of
Indo-U.S. cooperation—narcotics. The visit resulted in the establishment of a joint working party, comprising of Indian and United States Officials, to check the flow of drugs from India to the United States. Thus, the visit and the consequent establishment of the working group led to Indo-U.S. cooperation in this humanitarian mission.

A new phase was initiated in the defence relations between India and the United States by the visit of United States Defence Secretary, Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger in October, 1986. Mr. Weinberger's stated aim was to inform India of the United States "desire for basically reduced tensions whenever we find them". He emphasized that "friendship for India is perfectly compatible with the continuation of our friendship for Pakistan and for China." He presented the United States offer of providing weapon systems to India, and even expressed the possibility of "coproduction agreements." However, much to the satisfaction of India, he expressed his confidence in the Indian desire "to protect any technologies that they were given or that were transferred to them and not have them go out into unfriendly hands."
The next U.S. Defence Secretary, Mr. Frank Carlucci, visited India in the first week of April 1988. During his visit, a request was made by India for United States assistance and technical designs for the development of its third aircraft carrier, which was to be nuclear-powered and expected to be launched in 1995. Though no concrete results emerged, the visit was significant in that it was the second time during the Reagan Presidency that a Secretary of Defence had visited India. It indicated that the United States was anxious to work out a compromise in its 'global perceptions' and India's 'regional aspirations'.

Thus, the various visits may not have all succeeded in creating cordial relations, but the continuous process of high level contacts indicated the desire for better relations on the part of both India & United States.
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