CHAPTER III

INDIRA GANDHI FIRST PHASE OF POWER
AND JANATA RULE

Mrs. Indira Gandhi was elected so as to succeed Lal Bahadur Shastri as Prime Minister in January 1966. The United States, like other countries and the Indians themselves, was cautious in its appraisal of the likely course of the policy initiatives of the new administration. In March, 1966 India was quite critical of a U.S. announcement of a decision to resume sales of certain 'non-lethal' military equipment to India and Pakistan which Pakistan had been trying to persuade the United States. India opposed this move, for it would benefit Pakistan more than India.

In the same month, however, Mrs. Gandhi made an 11-day State visit to the United States, at the invitation of President Johnson. This visit was deemed a success in both countries. Both Mrs. Gandhi and Johnson were on their good terms. Mrs. Gandhi called Johnson "a man of peace", and Johnson was reported to be impressed by Mrs. Gandhi. According to an Indian newspaper, Johnson said that of all the 21 visits by Heads of State or
Government during his administration, "The Indian meeting was the most satisfying.... No meeting had accomplished so much for so many". At a White House dinner in honour of Mrs. Gandhi, Johnson proposed that Indo-U.S. Educational Foundation be established, to be financed mainly from counterpart funds credited to the U.S. Government from the rupees that had accumulated from the sale of PL 480 shipments of food grains. Mrs. Gandhi professed to welcome the proposal, and it was incorporated in the joint communique that was issued at the end of her visit. But when she returned to India, the proposal met with a great deal of opposition. In July, 1966, by mutual consent the much-publicized plan was quietly shelved.

One concrete outcome of the visit was that immediately after her visit, President Johnson asked Congress to approve an emergency shipment of 3.5 million tons of food grains to India which was experiencing a serious food shortage. In addition he agreed to the 6.5 million tons that had already been approved for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966. Before the end of May, the Congress approved this request.
Two other events in 1966 created a great deal of resentment in India toward the United States. For some time, the World Bank, in which the United States had a major voice, and the American government had been advising India to devalue the rupee. Their plea was that this currency was greatly over valued and, therefore, particularly weak in world markets. Some of Mrs. Gandhi's economic advisers also made the same recommendations. With great reluctance, Mrs. Gandhi yielded to these pressures from within and without. Resultantly on June 5, 1966, the Indian government announced a huge devaluation—36.5 per cent—of the rupee. This was a case where Mrs Gandhi was persuaded and influenced, to take a step that she did not want to take. Unfortunately this step turned out to be a near disaster from India's point of view. The increased attractiveness of India's exports was more than offset by the rise in the costs of imports and in prices of many essentials in India. Neither the World Bank nor the International Monetary Fund nor the United States nor any other country gave the kind of extra assistance to India that Mrs. Gandhi and Indians generally had been led to expect. Hence, Mrs. Gandhi herself came under considerable criticism in India for the
drastic devaluation and its consequences, and so were the United States and the World Bank. The experience apparently strengthened Mrs. Gandhi's resolve to resist American and other foreign influence and to emphasize a policy of nationalistic self-reliance.

An even greater strain on Indo-American relations came in the fall of 1966 was the American Policy on Vietnam. President Johnson, Piqued by Indian criticism of his policy in Vietnam, in reaction to a reference to "imperialists in South Asia" in a joint communique signed by Mrs. Gandhi at the end of a State visit to the Soviet Union in July, applied a so-called "short-tether" policy to U.S. grain shipments to India, even though India was experiencing a severe drought and an accompanying shortage of food. His "stated aim was to keep recipients on a short leash in order to force their attentions towards domestic agriculture" and "to force other countries to share the burden of food-aid for India". But this crude attempt to influence India to change its attitude toward U.S. actions in Vietnam and to change its development programme proved counter productive. Instead it served to stir up widespread anti-American sentiment in India.
In early 1967, the government of India "began to sign economic cooperation pacts and trade protocols with Soviet block nations", and "Indo-Americans grew increasingly distant." President Johnson was further offended by India's criticisms of Israel during the six-day Arab-Israeli War. The official greeting that the Indian government sent to Ho Chi Minh on his seventy-seven birthday, and by Mrs. Gandhi's presence in Moscow for the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Russian Revolution further estranged relations. This was evident from the fact that Johnson's "short-tether" policy regarding food shipments in India was continued. The late 1960s, on the whole was not a good period in Indo-American relations. Despite the U.S. aid to India reached all time high, yet it was made available erratically. The period saw considerable criticism and obvious influence attempts.

India's relations with the United States have had seen many ups and downs, but the two countries were never before so acrimoniously divided as in 1971. Never before 1971 had the U.S. accused India of aggression with such vehemence and rancor. The American protest when India took Goa in 1961 was mild compared
to its denunciation of India in 1971. No President before Nixon had devoted fourteen pages of his annual report to Congress to accuse India of aggression and justify his action against her. Never before had Washington favored Pakistan with such total disregard for Indian sentiments and expressed in the military balance "decisively towards India."4

The strained relations were due to Soviet influence over India. Despite India professing the policy of non-alignment. U.S. did not like the attitude of India. That is why it thought to develop relations with Pakistan, to contain the communism in South Asia. It also saw that its claim to primacy was being challenged by the Soviet Union. It, therefore, decided to oppose what it chose to characterize as the threat of Soviet expansionism. After the emergence of People’s Republic of China and the long and bitter war in Korea, it extended its policy of containment to Asia. This policy had been propounded earlier in the context of Europe. India strongly disagreed with the U.S. on their assessment and opposed the extension of cold war to Asia. India also vehemently disagreed with the American policy towards the problem of colonialism in Asia. It differed on many issues relating to the Korean War. It
opposed the U.S.-sponsored Japanese Peace Treaty on the ground that it was linked with the Mutual Defense Treaty. Under this the U.S. retained the right to have military bases on Japanese soil. U.S. policy in Asia was determined within the context of the cold war and was sustained and supported by the predominance of U.S. power.  

The crisis in South Asia in 1971 led to the worsts period of strain in Indo-American relations. This was an outcome of a number of developments in 1970 which affected relations. Official and unofficial opinion in the United States was highly critical of the nationalization of India's biggest banks in the summer of 1969. Therefore, it welcomed the decision of the Indian Supreme Court, on February 11, 1970, that the Bank Nationalization Act was unconstitutional. But the government immediately renationalized the banks by Ordinance, and this action was soon approved by the Indian Parliament.

At about the same time, another action by the Indian government created an additional strain in Indo-American relations. This concerned the building of an unauthorized cultural centre in Trivandrum, the capital of the South Indian state of
Kerala by the Soviet Union in December 1969. The Indian Government decreed that foreign governments with diplomatic representation in India wouldn’t be allowed to maintain cultural centre outside of the cities where their diplomatic missions (including consulates) were located. In February 1970, the U.S. Government was instructed to close down its cultural centers in five States capitals—Bangalore, Hyderabad, Lucknow, Patna and Trivandrum within 90 days. The United States rejected an Indian Government proposal to take over and operate these centers and closed them immediately. The Indian government’s explanation varied from the insistence of Foreign Minister Swaran Singh that the order was issued not to curtail cultural contacts but to improve their quality. It was charged that the United States had been using the centers for “undesirable” political activities. The situation was worsened because the United States had been made the major victim of an unauthorized action by the Soviets in Trivandrum.

The other two incidents in October 1970—one rather major and one quite minor—added new strains. First was concerning the United States move towards arms sales to Pakistan, which had
been largely suspended since 1965. In October this rumour became a reality, although the ban on arms sales was to be lifted only to a limited degree. This was described as a "one time limited exception." In India, the U.S. decision was sharply criticized by the government officials, in the press, and by large segments of articulate Indian opinion. The other incident of October related to Mrs. Gandhi's visit to New York to take part in the 25th anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly. On October 23, the Indian Foreign Ministry expressed displeasure because the U.S. Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, did not go to the New Delhi airport to see off Mrs. Gandhi. Furthermore, no high ranking U.S. official came to welcome her when she landed at John F. Kennedy airport.

It might be recalled that the U.S. had enlisted in Pakistan as a member of its anti-communist alliance system in the mid fifties. It gave a heavy dose of military equipment and training, even though it was India, not Pakistan, which had preserved and promoted the value system of the "free world" for which America was ostensibly fighting against communism. The U.S. did little to prevent these arms from being used against India in the 1965 Indo-
Pak war. Over the years, a sentimental relationship of sorts has developed between America and Pakistan which blinded the former to the realities of the South Asian situation in 1971. 

In December 16, 1970, a joint announcement by the United States and Great Britain to build a joint air and radio communication base on Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago, in the middle of the Indian Ocean, more than 1,000 miles south of the southern tip of India. Construction was scheduled to start in March 1971, a fateful month for India and Pakistan. The announcement foreshadowed the later development of Diego Garcia as a major American air and naval base in the Indian Ocean. It created increased friction and disagreements between the United States of India.

Indo-American relations became bitter in 1971 on the issue of Bangladesh crisis. The crisis was viewed from two entirely different angles. While India extended her whole-hearted support to the cause of freedom fighters, the U.S. Government sided with West Pakistan committing brutal genocide in East Pakistan. India unsuccessfully tried her best to persuade the United States to take
the right stand. The United States Department continued its military supplies to Yahya regime knowing the fact that American weapons were being used against East Bangalis. In fact "at no period in the history of Indo-American relations there has been such intensive Indian effort at contact and communication with the United States as in 1971. Through every stage of the crisis on the sub-continent, India kept up a constant supply of information to the United States through the Indian Embassy in Washington and U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. This was done through letters written at the highest levels on important developments and through invitations to the United States leaders to visit the sub-continent and see the situation for themselves.

Since Pakistan's military strength was built up very largely with American assistance, the Government of India pointed out that the United States had a special responsibility to ensure that it was not misused. It suggested that the United States should discontinue all further arms supplies to Pakistan till it stopped its military action in East Bengal. Both the United States Senate and the House of the Representatives had approved amendments to the Foreign Assistance Bill. These amendments forbade economic
and military assistance to the Government of Pakistan.

Though the United States Administration assured India that no arms were being supplied after March 25, 1971, the supply in some form or the other continued till November 8, 1971. In contrast, the United States Government acted with alacrity in respect of even the limited quantity of military equipment that was to be sold to India. On December 1, they announced the cancellation of all ammunition list licences for India. This was followed in less than a week by suspension of general economic aid to India which was in the pipeline but not yet covered by irrevocable letters of credit.¹³

Differences between the United States and India were not only on the United States military aid to Pakistan, the refugee problem in India was also one of the major issues on which the two countries had divergent views. India pointed out that the United States should persuade the Yahya regime to come to a political settlement with the elected leaders of East Bengal. This would enable the refugees to go back to their homes in East Bengal. The refugees were posing an intolerable strain on the economy of India. They were posing challenge to the stability and security of
Indian borders. But the policy of the United States Department was to treat the crisis as an internal affairs of Pakistan and refugee problem in India as one which she should continue to bear indefinitely with restraint. Not a word of public condemnation came from the U.S. Government on the inhuman atrocities of the Pakistani forces in East Bengal, although the United States Press reported them more widely and thoroughly than any other Press in the world.

During External Affairs Minister’s visit to United States in June 1971, Swaran Singh, in his address to the National Press Club Luncheon, gave a hint to drastic action on India’s part when he remarked: “India would not sit idly if the edifice of our political stability and economic wellbeing is threatened.”

Charles Bray, the United States Department spokesman, said while speaking on the talks Swaran Singh had with President Nixon and the Secretary of State, William Rogers, that the United States officials “welcomed the restraint India has shown in dealing with the East Bengal refugee problem and expressed the hope that restraint would be shown on both sides.”
During his visit to New Delhi in July 1971, while recognizing the need for "a reasonable political solution", Kissinger did not spell out the ideas of the United States Administration, reported Times of India. He gave no assurance either about stopping further United States arms aid to Pakistan or about bringing pressure on the Pakistan Government for a political settlement on Bangla Desh. He even declined a suggestion to visit the refugees on the plea that he was "very busy". The Statesman criticized editorially: "Dr. Henry Kissinger's visit has neither cast any new light on Indo-United States relations nor alleviated the tension that has developed between the two countries."

When all efforts failed, the External Affairs Ministry of India asked (on July 24, 1971) American Ambassador Keating in India to explain United States collusion with Pakistan and "the recent double thinking," and double talk of Nixon Administration on the issue of Bangladesh. External Affairs Ministry itself expressed grave concern over the somewhat inhibited open collaboration between Washington and Islamabad resulting indeeeping the tragedy in Bangladesh. He was told that India could not quite comprehend the United States ambivalence in the
matter. On the one hand, the Nixon Administration armed Pakistan to continue the genocide and on the other, it was losing sleep over the plight of refugees.20

On August 6, 1971 in Washington, Senator Kennedy assailed the President Nixon's statement opposing a House of Representatives measure cutting off economic and military aid to the West Pakistan Government, until the situation returned to normal in East Bengal. He, moreover, charged the Nixon Administration with following a politically oriented and senseless policy toward the East Bengal refugee problem. In his view "it made nonsense" to provide the West Pakistan Government with military supplies which help create refugees, while spending millions of dollars to aid those refugees."21

While addressing a crowded press conference at the conclusion of "his series of talks with Indian leaders including Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, he forth rightly stated on August 16, 1971 that Pakistan was committing genocide in East Bengal. It was his firm conviction was that all the refugees who had fled away from their country had the over whelming desire that they should be free from Pakistan’s rule. "There is no exception to
this”, and “the United States support to Pakistan is difficult to understand.”22

In the wake of the Sino-American joint front on the question of Indo-Pakistan hostilities on Bangladesh issue, India’s diplomatic success and farsightedness was evidence by Indo-Soviet Treaty for Peace, Co-operation and Friendship signed on August 9, 1971, by which American was taken a back. It was clear that the Treaty represented a setback for the U.S. Administration’s policy in South Asia.23

Officially, the United States Government was assured by Ambassador L.K. Jha when he met United State Secretary of State William Rogers on August 12, 1971 that “the Treaty contains nothing in letter or spirit which may adversely affect its relations with America.” Nor was the treaty was not aimed at any other country including Pakistan, and that it merely formalized the friendly relationship between India and Soviet Union on a long term basis.24 However, Mr. Rogers was curious about its impact on India’s policy of non-alignment. India’s Ambassador reminded Rogers that the Treaty did not bring India in a “network of alliances.”25 Though apparently Rogers did not offer any criticism
of the Treaty it, the fact remains that the United States Government had reservations and doubts about it.

In the circumstances created by the United States tacit support to Pakistan and massive advent of refugees to India from East Bangal, the requests of the United States Government to India for restraint in the build-up of troops on both sides of the Indo-Pakistan border were sharply rejected. India viewed it as emanating from an ardent desire to help the Yahya regime. India was not the first in moving troops to the border.26

When all other efforts failed, the Indian Prime Minister undertook a visit to Western Capitals, to persuade the Governments of the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and others to prevail upon Yahya Khan to negotiate a settlement with Sheikh Mujibur Rehman of Bangladesh. Her visit to the United States was really a unique measure of modern statesmanship.27

During her discussions with President Nixon Mrs. Gandhi made it clear that India never wanted war with Pakistan. But at the same time, India could not ignore Pakistan's war like postures.28
Mrs. Gandhi also described her meeting with Nixon as useful. "I think the President knows what we think in India and I have appreciation of his views." She declined once again to have United Nations observers on Indian territory. In her view the question was "how to bring peace to East Bengal".29

Mrs. Gandhi’s visit to the United States of America made it clear to the Nixon Administration that India would not allow itself to be pushed about but safeguard her security interest against all odds.30 Apparently, the Government of the United States ended all shipments of military aid to Pakistan and informed the Government of India about it. But it was not so in the reality.31

On her return to India, Smt. Gandhi was understood to have told the opposition party leaders that the United States of America did not want to get involved in any Indo-Pakistan confrontation. The plea given was that it thought that a war in the sub-continent might lead to Russian involvement making the situation more complicated. She was also reported to have said that "the United States of America will not supply arms to Pindi even indirectly."32 But her thinking went wrong and the United States supported Pakistan in all the ways when war broke out in December 1971.
It is pertinent to note that the visits of Indira Gandhi and other leaders to the western capitals did not prove of much use in arriving at a political settlement of the problem. Civil War started touching the borders of India. This commenced towards the end of October 1971 when the Pakistani troops started shelling Agartala airport. This incident led to exchange of fire between the Pakistani troops and Indian Border Security Forces. The firing into Indian territory continued and several causalities occurred. The Pakistan Government, apprehending the outbreak of war with India, started mobilizing troops on Indo-Pakistan border in the West also. While India’s permanent Representative at the U.N., Samar Sen, clarified that the Pakistan troops fired in early November 1971 at several towns in the eastern sector, the Pakistan side alleged that Indian armed forces launched an attack on November 21, on the south-eastern sector of East-Pakistan. On November 22, 1971, President Yahya ordered the leading of torpedo tubes in the U.S. loaned submarine (USS Diable) “G Hazi” and on November 23 declared a state of emergency in Pakistan. In a note the Government of Pakistan said: “We have been attacked by India. We are fighting back....” Even after the
visit of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to Washington, there occurred
know change in the attitude of the Nixon Administration did not
change its attitude and made no efforts to arrange a political
settlement in Pakistan. The officials in the State Department and
the White House remained unmoved in regard to the growing tense
situation on the Indian sub-continent.

That the situation was becoming critical was apparent when
the Indian Prime Minister told the Rajya Sabha that "the very
presence of Pakistani troops in Bangladesh is a threat to our own
security.... We cannot allow the annihilation of the people next
door...."38 On December 3, 1971, at about 4.45 P.M. Pakistani Air
Force planes crossed into India at numerous points. They
bombarded Pathankot, Amritsar, Srinagar, Avantipur (in Kashmir
Valley), Halwara and Faridkot air bases in Western sector of
India.39 The Prime Minister in a broadcast to the nation said:

Today a war in Bangladesh has become a war on India. This
imposes on me, my Government and the people of India,
great responsibility. We have no other option but to put our
country on a war-footing. Our jawans and forces are
mobilizing for the defense of the country. We are prepared
for any eventuality.40
Indira Gandhi made it clear that India would not submit to any outside pressures and would not withdraw forces from the border and that "we could do whatever was in India's national interest."

The Nixon Administration had tried hard to persuade the Indian Prime Minister to refrain from engaging in military action which effort ended in failure. The reason was that the Pakistani air attacks had precipitated the crisis. The United States requested for the Security Council emergency meeting on December 4, to examine the deteriorating situation resulting in armed clashes between India and Pakistan. In this move she was supported by a few other countries such as Argentina, Belgium, Britain, Italy, Japan, Nicaragua and Somalia. At the Security Council which met on December 4, 1971, U. Thant, stated before the Security Council that the situation on the Indian sub-continent was a very real threat to peace and security. He called upon the members and the parties involved to control the situation. George Bush, U.S. Ambassador accused India of repeated incursions across the border of East Pakistan. He also came up with a draft resolution embodying the following:
1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2. Calls for an immediate withdrawal of armed personnel present on the territory of the other to their own sides;

3. Authorizes the Secretary General at the request of the Government of India or Pakistan to place observers along the India-Pakistan borders to report on the implementation of the cease-fire and troops withdrawals, drawing as necessary on UN Military Observance Group for India and Pakistan;

4. Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts towards the creation of a climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

5. Calls upon all States to refrain from any action that would endanger peace in the area;

6. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General offering good offices to secure and maintain peace in the sub-continent.

7. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this Resolution.
The Resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Representatives of the Soviet Union and Italy also introduced other draft resolutions which was also vetoed. Due to the deadlock in the Security Council, no action could be taken. Taking advantage of the "Unity for Peace" resolution of November 4, 1950, the Somalian representative called for an emergency session of the General Assembly. It introduced a draft resolution which states as follows:

"Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its permanent members at the 1606th and 1607th meetings of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security ... decides to refer the question.... to the twentysixth session of the General Assembly. This resolution was not opposed by the representatives of any nation."}

The representatives of Somalia, Argentina, Belgium, Burundi, Italy, Japan, Nicargua, Sierra Leone and Somalia after listening the fiery speeches of the Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh introduced another draft resolution which called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops from both sides.
But the Indian Government refused to implement it.

The U.S. professed to be unhappy over India defying the General Assembly Resolution. President Nixon withheld $ 87 million economic aid to India. Commenting over this move, the State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray stated that the U.S.A. did not like that the economic aid be utilized for sustaining war efforts of India. Also India was branded as the "aggressor" by the Nixon Administration. However these moves did not deflect India's course of military action against Pakistan and the fighting continued. Within three days of fighting, the Pakistanis suffered heavy losses. On December 6, the Government of India extended diplomatic recognition to Bangladesh and the Prime Minister's recognition to Bangladesh and the Prime Minister's announcement in Parliament was hailed with enthusiastic cheers from all quarters. Realizing that the Pakistani troops in the East were doomed, the U.S. called for another meeting of the Security Council. At the meeting the US representative Bush stated:

"... In view of India's defiance of world opinion expressed by such a overwhelming majority, the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East
Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops, a continuation of the war would take on increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a Member State of the United Nations..."\n
He introduced a draft resolution calling upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take measures for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. It further called upon the member States to cooperate with the United Nations Secretary General in relieving the distress of the refugees. This resolution was also vetoed by the Representative of Soviet Union.\n
When the U.S. diplomatic efforts to end the Indo-Pak conflict had failed, President Nixon ordered 'Enterprise' a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the Seventh Fleet to sail towards the Bay of Bengal. This was done to overawe and browbeat India to end the military operations against Pakistan. But this tactic did not achieve the desired result and the Indian armed forces continued their march towards Dacca. With all hopes of facing the Indian onslaught gone, the Commander General A.A.A. Nazi of Pakistani troops asked India to ceasefire. This was done through the U.S. Consul General in Calcutta. The Indian leaders readily accepted this request of the Pakistani General.
After the surrender of the Pakistani troops in the Eastern Sector, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered on December 16 a unilateral cease-fire on the western front. This gesture was welcomed by Yahya Khan who declared....” India has made an offer of ceasefire on the western front, Pakistan is already committed to a ceasefire along with other consequential steps.... In keeping with the foregoing and in the interest of peace I have responded to the Indian offer and have ordered my armed forces to ceasefire from 2.30 P.M.”

Thus the war ended on December 17, 1971 resulting in the liberation of Bangla Desh from the clutches of the military rulers. The end of the Indo-Pakistan conflict was hailed in the official circles in Washington. Ronald Ziegler, the White House Spokesman said, “We welcome the agreement by India and Pakistan to end hostilities. That agreement has come about, we feel in response to the call by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations.”

In the Indo-Pak war, one found a clear tilt on the par of the Nixon Administration. It was evident in not pressuring President Yahya Khan to seek a political settlement of the conflict with
Bangladesh. It was also in not extending adequate supply and foodstuff for the assistance and relief to millions of refugees who entered into the Indian territory. Above all, it was also visible in supporting Yahya's military action in East Pakistan which evoked sharp criticism and denunciation from some members of the Senate. Many newspapers and publicmen also criticized the Nixon Administration for its pro-Pakistan stance and supported India's stand through their speeches in University Seminars and letters to editors in various American and Indian dailies and magazines.

To sum up, one could say that the Bangladesh struggle and subsequently, the Indo-Pakistan war were among the few important issues in American politics and diplomacy on which the Administration and the public opinion differed considerably.

Here, a question might be posed as to why a country like the United States which championed the cause of democracy, freedom, liberalism and which played a leading role in the drafting of the Charter of the Human Rights closed its eyes to this bloodbath. Apparently, the answer appears to be the following:
First, the important events which took place in the late 1960's and early 1970's in world politics influenced the mind of President Nixon and his aides considerably. First the emergence of China as a nuclear power and an important force in Asia. Failure of the Washington Administration to reach a reapproachment with Peking and how their repeated gestures were rebuffed by the rulers of Communist China. Following the same lines of policy, Nixon also tried to build up bridges of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. Accordingly, the American President thought of making a trip of Peking. In this he utilized Pakistan's President service to get him the invitation. One major factor was Nixon proposed trip to China for which he needed Pakistan's help for arranging the same. Therefore he never wanted to cause any displeasure to China and thus put in jeopardy any chances of improvement of her relations with that country. The fact is underlined by C.L. Sulzberger, a columnist of the New York Times:

"Among other things, Nixon relied on Pakistan to help to arrange the President's Peking trip. Moreover, since Pakistan has become an inferential, if by no means a formal ally of China during the 10 years ... it was held necessary by
Washington to signal support of Pakistan in its recent war with India to assure that nothing might interrupt the Nixon visit.\textsuperscript{48}

This appeared to be a very significant factor in influencing Nixon’s attitude vis-a-vis the developments on the Indian subcontinent.

The second explanation could be that the Nixon Administration wanted to avoid instability in the sub-continent. Because right from the days of the US entering into military alliance with Pakistan in 1954, Washington had adopted an attitude of balancing Pakistan against India. This was done with a view to lessening the influence of the Communist powers in this area. The policy makers in Washington felt that Bangladesh, a child of India’s creation, if and when formed, would be a non-aligned country. It would not be as much a sphere of influence as a united Pakistan. Moreover, the non-alignment policy was never appreciated by the conservatives in America including Nixon. A former Secretary of State, John F. Dulles called it an “immoral policy”. It was probably also thought that an independent Bangladesh would be more inclined towards India
and Soviet Union than towards China and the United States. This was obviously not a very pleasant situation for the United States.

A third explanation for Nixon's attitude towards the development in Pakistan was that the US did not like the dismemberment of Pakistan. Since 1954 when the defense pact was signed between the United States and Pakistan, the latter had been lending support to American on vital issues of international politics both in and outside the United Nations. However, there were occasions of friction also. Yet another reason was that India in the days of Nehru and his successors had been claiming to follow a policy of non-alignment. This on several occasions led her to take an attitude which was considered in Washington as hostile to its interests. As a result even the American critics of Nixon's attitude to the developments in Bangladesh were in agreements with the Administration. They were convinced that Pakistan as a sovereign united and independent country should continue to exist.

Finally, the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation that India signed with the Soviet Union on August 9, 1971 also appeared to have hardened the attitude of the Nixon
Administration to the emergence of Bangla desh as a separate Independent country. This treaty made clear that India was moving closer and closer to the Soviet Union whose influence in Asia was increasing. This was going to disturb the balance of power greatly to the disadvantage of the United States. To avert this eventuality, the unity of Pakistan was deemed necessary in the larger interest of the United States.

The political fallout from the strained relations between the United States and India in 1971 continued well into 1973. Early in 1972, the Nixon administration initiated a major review of its policy in South Asia. In his message to the Congress on “US Foreign Policy for the 1970s”, submitted in February, President Nixon expressed his willingness to enter into a “serious dialogue” with India with a view to improving relations. But he attached a variety of conditions to that offer. Some of them the Indian government regarded as improper or even insulting. Moreover, Nixon's interpretation of the crisis in South Asia in the previous year and the US motives for the policies it followed, aroused fresh resentment in India. Also during February, in a news conference on the eve of his historic mission to China, he said that US policy
in the sub-continent would be “pro-Indian, pro-Bangladesh, pro-Pakistan, but mostly propeace,”49 a play on words that did nothing to increase his credibility in India.

Indians followed the course of Nixon’s visit to China with considerable apprehension. While the President was in Peking, Mrs. Gandhi told a correspondent for the New York Times that in her view US policy toward Indians changed when its policy toward China changed. On February 21, she said that “Indian would not be bound by any decision” made in Peking by Nixon and the Chinese leaders “which seeks to dictate terms to Asian countries.” India feared that the Shanghai Communique, issued at the end of Nixon’s visit to China, would lead to a dangerous collaboration of the signatories at the expense of India and other Asian countries. They were particularly alarmed by and resentful of a reference in the communique to the intention of the two countries to follow separate but overlapping policies in South Asia. Most disturbing was an appeal to India and Pakistan to withdrew their troops from Jammu and Kashmir and continue to observe the cease-fire called for in a resolution of the United Nations Security Council of December 21, 1971.50
There was a number of factors in the post-1971 Situation which necessitated the U.S. to change its attitude. First was the changed balance of power in the region in favor of India as a result of the outcome of the 1971 war and a corresponding decline in the size and stature of Pakistan. Second, a decline in respect for Pakistan in deference to American policy opinion as expressed in the US Congress and the Communication India, that Pakistan had committed criminal acts in Bangladesh. Third there was a great deal of uncertainty about prospects of political and economic stability in Pakistan. Fourth, the Jack Anderson disclosures had caused some embarrassment in Washington, and there was a realization in some quarters that U.S. had not been fair to India in December 1971. This led to efforts to restore the “tilt” to the extent it had been unfavorable to India.

In March, after several weeks of hesitation, the United States extended diplomatic recognition to the government of Bangladesh. In the same month, India and Bangladesh signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. On that occasion, according to a summary in the New York Times, Mrs. Gandhi said that “if US policy after continues in its present pattern it will not be a
policy of peace in the subcontinent,” and the US policies in South Asia “have not stood the test of time.” At about the same time, the United States and India desired to place their relations on a better footing, while lending support to the conclusion of the New York Times on June 18.

In the fall of 1972 charges were made that the CIA was meddling in the internal affairs of India and trying to stir up trouble inside the country and in the subcontinent. These charges had been frequently made but this time so vehemently that US Secretary of State William Rogers brought the matter to the attention of Swaran Singh, India’s Minister for External Affairs, at a personal meeting in New York. Mrs. Gandhi herself gave credence to these charges. She often hinted as she did on November 11, that “some foreign powers” were busily engaged in operations in India and the subcontinent.

The commencement of the year 1973 witnessed a desire on the part of both the countries to forgive and forget the past and start Indo-US relations on a new note of optimism. Senator Charles Mathias (Republican) of Maryland said in Delhi on 27th January that Indo-American relations had been complicated by external
situations like the Vietnam war and the conflict over Bangladesh. He wanted to forget this as the past, and move to the future. He further assured that Vietnam as one of the causes of tension between the two democracies, had been eliminated and as far as Bangladesh was concerned, the US accepted the verdict of history and was now assisting its reconstruction. Likewise, the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 had lost its significance for America after the SALT treaty with the Soviet Union, President Nixon visit to Moscow and the massive American wheat sale to the USSR. The American Senator observed that there were feelings of mutuality on both sides. He hoped that neither would wait too long for the other and do something for improving relations.

An unexpected chill again temporarily crept into Indo-US relations following Mrs. Gandhi’s sharp criticism of the US at the one Asia Assembly in New Delhi February 6. Among other things, she made two remarks in regard to American policy in Vietnam which particularly offended many in the State Department. State Department spokesman Bray said that Mrs. Gandhi’s statement “contradicts the recent communications from New Delhi suggesting a desire to improve the relationship between the two
However, the mini-crisis in Indo-American relations was blown over by Mrs. Gandhi's statement at Kathmandu (Nepal) on February 9, when she was there on an official visit. Addressing a meeting of the Nepal Council of World Affairs, she said that her earlier remarks about Vietnam were not aimed at any particular country. Thus, the misunderstanding which had crept in Indo-US relations was, to a great extent, removed.

On March 12, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Joseph Sisco gave a testimony before a Congressional Committee in which he disclosed that the question of resuming arms sales to Pakistan was "under very active review at the moment." India was worried over this development. It communicated to the US administration the the country's concern at the latter's intent to reopen the pipeline for arms deliveries to Pakistan. The proposed aid was bound to promote a fresh arms race in the subcontinent. It would have the effect of draining off the slender resources of the countries in the region, besides undoing the gains, however, modest, achieved by the Simla Agreement towards normalization and peace. Ironically, on the one hand, America
showed its concern over the arms race in the region, and on the other, it planned to initiate fresh military supplies to Pakistan, for which there was no justification.

The appointment of Mr. Daniel P. Moynihan, a Liberal Harvard Professor, in place of Mr. Kenneth Keating, as Ambassador to India was a new development. Ambassador Moynihan’s contribution in settling some pending political questions between the two countries, and in promoting greater cultural and intellectual contacts between them could not be ignored.60

America’s new ambassador Daniel Moynihan met Mrs. Gandhi on March 15, 1973. He told her that the US had taken a ‘conscious decision’ not to supply any more lethal arms to countries in the Indian subcontinent.61 This was to soothe the ruffled feelings of Indians. But the same day there was a report from Washington that President Nixon defended his decision to resume military aid to Pakistan. He said that it was absurd to suggest that Pakistan was a military threat to India. He told a press conference that in resuming shipments to Pakistan, the US was carrying out some contractual commitments it had made during
the Indo-Pak war.\textsuperscript{61A}

Within hours of the assurance came another announcement from Washington releasing the US dollar 87.6 million of economic aid to India which stood suspended during the Indo-Pak war. Also there were indications that more aid would follow.\textsuperscript{62} Despite the assurance conveyed to the Prime Minister by ambassador Moynihan, Mrs. Gandhi made it clear to him that so long as the US continued its policy of balancing Pakistan with India there was little likelihood of establishing the type of relationship that Moynihan had anticipated in his first public statement on arrival in India or the sentiments he had expressed in the speech while presenting credential to the President.\textsuperscript{63}

Three factor seemed to determine the acceptance of US economic assistance to India. The first was that the Government was committed to a policy of zero aid by the end of the Fifth Plan, if not earlier. If, therefore, aid was to be accepted over the next five years there was no reason to exclude US aid if provided on earlier conditions. Secondly, that it was to be made available on suitable terms and conditions and for those projects which needed to be covered by external credits. Thirdly, in negotiating any new
or resumed US economic assistance programme, the government should be assured that, once committed, the aid would flow. It would not be subject to stop-go interruptions on political considerations as had happened on two occasions in the past. These conditions were laid down in view of the past unpleasant relations between the two countries. However, in spite of the aid implications normal relations between India and the US remained far from being cordial. Apparently, the Indian government seemed to have become much too dependent on aid, including PL-484. As a result, the US administration had assumed that India would be ever politically obliged to it for the benefits it was receiving.

Another evidence of American efforts to restore the “tilt” was its persistent rejection until recently of Pakistan’s request for lifting the arms embargo imposed ten years ago. Such a request was apparently made soon after Mr. Bhutto took over as President and then as Prime Minister of Pakistan early in 1972. While Pakistani pressure in this regard was kept up, the U.S. Government did not yield. This was possibly in deference to Indian sensitivity on this question, among other reasons.

The two top officials of the United States State
Department—Kenneth Rusk, Deputy Secretary of State and Joseph Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia were in Delhi on 20 and 21 April, 1973 to have a 'meaningful dialogue' with the officials of the Government of India. A week after the visit of Rusk and Sisco, the US Under Secretary of the Treasury, Paul A. Volcker arrived in India. Volcker’s visit was a worldwide drive launched by Nixon to strengthen the dollar and stabilize the American balance of payments. The US was evidently anxious to enlist the cooperation of developing countries like India in working out a new international monetary system in the light of the stand taken by India at several monetary conferences held in the past.

On May 3, 1973, President Nixon issued the annual 'State of the World' message to the Congress which among other things contained the clearest statement yet made on the totality of Indo-US relations. He described India thrice in the statement as a 'major power.' He conceded that since the 1971 crisis India had emerged as a 'major power'.

As regards relations with India, Nixon said that the high level discussions that had taken place "hitherto during the year and
the constructive attitude displayed by both-sides had laid the foundation for an improvement in relations." He took note of his differences with India in 1971. He said that these differences "have injected a healthy realism and maturity into the Indo-US relationship." He pledged "We want to join with India in a mature relationship founded on equality, reciprocity and mutual interests, reflecting India's stature as a great free nation."67

President Nixon's statement also contained some assurances which were about American association with other groupings, Nixon assured that the US wouldn't join any grouping or pursue any policies directed against India. Finally, Nixon spoke about the economic assistance to India. Commensurate with India's desire to become economically self-reliant, Nixon believed that there was scope for devising a new framework of economic relations. He favoured a fruitful dialogue on the role of US economic assistance, trade relations and other world trade and monetary issue that affected India.

A few inferences can be drawn from the message Nixon sent to the Congress. It appeared from his statement that President Nixon had come to reconcile himself to India's emergence as a
'major power' in the region and had even lectured to it about how to play its new role. He advised India to show restraint on its dealings with the smaller nations of the region.

After a four week wait India's ambassador, T.N. Kaul presented his credentials to the President on June 14. He was the third of the seven who were received by the President at a brief White House Ceremony. He was warmly welcomed and referred to as 'as old friend' by the President.

When Mrs. Gandhi visited Lake Placid on June 21 taking a break off during her Canadian tour to meet one of her old teachers, Mrs. Kyle, Nixon sent Moynihan along with other protocol officials to receive her. Moynihan himself handed over to Mrs. Gandhi the letter from Nixon welcoming her to US territory. She immediately reciprocated Nixon's sentiments in a letter which ambassador Kaul carried with him to hand it over to the American President. Mrs. Gandhi's prompt reply was understood to be in the same friendly spirit as the letter she had received from Nixon.

On September 28, 1973, the Senate voted to prevent the administration from agreeing to settle an Indian debt US dollar
3000 million worth of rupees for less than the full amount unless Congress agreed to such a step. In the last week of September, Swaran Singh, External Affairs Minister went to attend the UN Session. At the request of Dr. Kissinger he went to Washington to have talks with him. Swaran Singh assured his host that every one in India was desirous of improving relations with the US. The Indian people were not inclined by nature to dwell on the past, but to view the future with optimism. Kissinger accepted the assurance and assured Swaran Singh that the Nixon administration did not subscribe to the Pakistani concept of military parity with India.69

Another issue that came in for discussion was the PL-480 rupee loan. On this problem Dr. Kissinger assured India’s External Affairs Minister that whatever agreement was reached between New Delhi and Washington would be implemented. On his return to India on October 10, Swaran Singh gave his impressions of his meeting with Kissinger. “There was a reasonably good chance of Indo-American relations stabilizing at a mature level”, he said.70
An important event of the year was the signing of the PL-480 agreement on December 13, 1973 in Delhi by the representatives of India and the U.S. It was considered to be a major contribution towards building a new and more mature relationship between the two countries. The PL-480 was enacted by the US Congress in 1954. It permitted the US to supply foodgrains to India on commercial terms which meant that India could pay for these foodgrains primarily in rupee rather than in dollars at a low rate of interest.\(^7\)

In having agreed to write off nearly two-thirds of the massive debt under PL-480, the US was regarded to have made a generous gesture to this country. It was hoped that the agreement had suitably prepared the ground for Dr. Kissinger's proposed visit to India in early 1974 under take further discussions of other bilateral and more general foreign policy issues. It was expected to help to forge a new relationship that would be more balanced and mature and therefore, more stable than before.\(^7\)

These developments, some of them originating in 1972 and some in 1973, had their full impact felt by 1974. The scenario in 1974 was changing, so far as it concerned the formulation of US
attitude towards South Asia. The United States had come to perceive the South Asian scene in 1974 differently from that it had in 1972. To begin with, one must note the developments in Pakistan which in two years had made rapid strides, both politically and economically. Pakistan, at last, was able to evolve a constitution which has a fairly large national consensus behind it. This in 1972 appeared to be a doubtful possibility. In this constitution, Pakistan had resolved the question of the nature of the political system, and the quantum of provincial autonomy which were extremely controversial issues. Besides, Pakistan had exhibited the capability not only to survive economically, but also to develop at a rate faster than some neighbouring countries. In essential commodities like foodgrains, Pakistan was much more comfortably placed than even India. Pakistan’s exports went up even as compared to pre-1971 figures when Pakistan was united Pakistan. Now Pakistan seemed no longer a doubtful factor in the South Asian situation. It deserved much more serious attention in 1974 than in 1972, as far as the U.S. was concerned.73

Pakistan had also improved its position internationally. Pakistan’s relation with China had not been affected seriously by
the 1971 crisis, although Mr. Bhutto once obliquely expressed dissatisfaction with lack of tangible support by China in 1971. But exchange of high level visits between the two countries soon put their relations on an even keel. What was more important, however, from Pakistan's point of view was an early normalization of Pakistan's relations with the Soviet Union. Earlier Mr. Bhutto, after assuming power, had described that country mainly responsible for the defeat of Pakistan in 1971. Round about this time, the Soviet Union resumed the support of technical and economic aid which had been suspended in 1971, including that for the prestigious Karachi Steel Mill.

Equally noteworthy was Pakistan's diplomacy vis-a-vis the Muslim world. Pakistan devoted special attention to the Muslim countries of West Asia and Africa after 1971. It was partly an attempt to create an area of influence in West Asia, after it had experienced a diminution of its power and position in South Asia. It was also partly an effort to cultivate political and military support against India vis-a-vis whom its capability had deteriorated. The crowing glory of Pakistan's efforts in the direction was the successful holding of the Second Islamic
Summit in Lahore in February 1974. Still more significant from the standpoint of Pakistan’s foreign policy was the progress made in the normalization of relations with India and Bangladesh. With in three years of deadly war, the rate of normalization with former adversaries was impressive. It was a measure of the maturity of Pakistani leaders under the stewardship of Mr. Bhutto, a very intelligent diplomat, that its territories in adverse possession by India were returned.

As compared with Pakistan, which, during the last two and a half years, had significant improved its image in the world, India's image in the world in the middle of 1974 presented a dismal picture. A general shortage of essential commodities, including foodgrains, and a fast rising price level, had created conditions of unrest and agitation in the whole country. Coupled with this was a crisis of legitimacy which enveloped the Congress party regime. A wide-spread demand for dismissal of Congress Chief Ministers in some States like Gujarat and Bihar was articulated. This was done on the plea that their corrupt behaviour no longer entitled them to rule.
Presumably, a number of elements of Indian foreign policy were evaluated and criticized in the United States in 1974. In the light of this picture. This criticism was reflection of the changing American attitude towards India and Pakistan. But one sign of the growing cordial relations between the two countries was witnessed when the Indian government approved the proposal of American Ambassador, Moynihan to send 50 volunteers of Peace Corps to work in rural areas. The Peace Corps started in 1961 by President Kennedy was intended to spread American skill and idealism in the developing countries. In the midst of such encouraging events an unpleasant incident took place. While Mc George Bundy, President of Ford Foundation, addressed a meeting at the India International Centre on February 19, uproarious scenes marred this peaceful meeting when Bundy gave an assertive reply to a youth’s question on how ‘dhatura’—infested wheat ‘fit for pigs’ had been distributed in India under American auspices. He reminded the youth that PL-480 funds were used to feed the Indian masses but such a laconic reply did not go long to satisfy any one in the audience.75

However, India, on the official level, continued with its
move for a marked improvement in Indo-US relations by responding positively to the conciliatory gestures from Washington. In America also efforts were made to see that conditions were created in which Indo-US relations were set in motion towards normalization. On January 29, 1974, testifying before a sub-committee of the House of Representatives, Moynihan urged the Congress to approve the recently concluded Indo-US agreement on the disposal of PL-480 funds.

India’s nuclear underground explosion in May 18, 1974 caused unpleasant reactions in America. It triggered a new move in Congress to cancel a US dollar 75 million development loan to India proposed by the Nixon Administration in the foreign aid bill. India’s test also brought into focus a new insistence by Pakistan that the US resume shipment of arms to that country.

Addressing a news conferences on June 6, 1974, Kissinger said that the Indian nuclear test would not upset the balance of power in the region since India’s resources would be relatively limited, nor would it affect Indo-American relations. “Nevertheless”, he said, “we are opposed to proliferation”. But what later Kissinger said disturbed India. He was reported to have
said that nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes could be carried out only by nuclear weapon states. To Indians such a statement appeared very odd as it led to the ridiculous proposition that even if a state did not want to acquire weapons it could not go in for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Such an attitude stemmed from the discriminatory non-proliferation treaty. On the whole it may be observed that America's official reaction to the detonation by India of a nuclear device had been restrained.

The final denouncement of Water Gate which had brought about the ignominious downfall of Nixon. This evoked mixed reaction in Delhi. It was presumed in both the countries that Nixon's resignation would not affect Indo-American relations in any way. Rather the feeling was that Nixon's successor might pursue the objective of putting relations between the two big democracies on a sound footing with greater zeal than he had shown.

President Gerald Ford was sworn in on August 10, 1974. As a matter of diplomatic courtesy he was heartily greeted by the Indian President. Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi in her message said that India looked to the further strengthening of the
friendly relations between the two countries. President Ford sent a personal message to her stressing the importance he attached to continuous good relations. These acts of courtesy, no doubt, created a sense of relief in India but it was premature to attach too much significance to these.

However, it was well realized in India that Nixon’s successor would take his own time to review American foreign policy. The main thing was to decide on the priority on which improvement of relations with India would depend. On August 21, 1974, Indian ambassador T.N. Kaul met President Ford. He gave him a letter from Mrs. Gandhi inviting him to visit India. Ford who had already accepted the invitation when he was the Vice-President. Now he assured Mr. Kaul that he had accepted the renewed invitation in principle and that Kissinger during his forthcoming visit would work out details of the President’s visit. He also sought to assure Mrs. Gandhi of his sincere desire to improve relations with India. He hoped to make a fresh start towards greater understanding and greater contacts between the two countries.
A major policy statement on Indo-US relations, the first of its kind, was made on September 19 by the new Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Alfred L. Atherton. While testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, Mr. Atherton that the US recognized India as "one of the major forces in the developing world and as a country whose growth and stability are absolutely essential to the peace and stability of South Asia. No one should doubt that we wish India well," he reaffirmed. Atherton further asserted that the atmosphere surrounding Indo-American relations 'has improved significantly' in the last 18 months. He emphasized that the US had joined with the Government of India in a conscious search for the framework of what has come to be called a more 'mature' relationship. He assured that the US was now engaged in a continuing and serious dialogue with the Indian government. He trusted and hoped that this would result in putting relationship of the two countries on a solid long-range footing based on equality, reciprocity and mutual interests.

On September 19, 1974, President Ford met Swaran Singh for 45 minutes. The meeting marked the beginning of a serious
high level efforts to place Indo-US relations on a firm basis. This was because all those differences which marred the relations between the two countries such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, by this time were out of the way. There were once strong differences of policy over China but there has been a dramatic change in Washington’s attitude towards Peking. The question of US arms supplies to Pakistan did not figure especially in the talks. The reason was that the US had already assured India that there would be no change in the current arms policy in the sub-continent. All this provided a happy setting for new initiatives to promote goodwill between India and the United States.

After Kissinger’s visit to India was informally announced, the two sides lost no opportunity in expressing goodwill for each other. This was done with the object to create a psychological atmosphere intended to improve chances of his visit and making it a success. On July 16, 1974, T.N. Kaul gave a dinner in honour of the Senate minority leader, Hugh Scot (Republican). Kissinger assured that his visit would accelerate improvement in Indo-American relations. Kissinger concluded by saying: “Having overcome many difficulties we (India and the America) can build
an increasingly creative future."

At a time when the Government of India was doing its best to create a proper climate for Kissinger’s visit there came disclosure of the CIA’s sinister activities in Chile which had culminated in the assassination of Dr. Salvador Allende and installation of a military regime there. It was strongly suspected that Washington may have had similar plan for India also. To clarify his position vis-a-vis India, Kissinger gave a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 19 assuring that any American official who is brought to my attention for indulging in any political activity whatsoever will be immediately removed.

However, this unhappy episode caused much concern in India. Kissinger arrived in New Delhi on October 27 from Moscow on a 3-day official visit “with anticipation and with optimism” that his talks with Indian leaders would strengthen Indo-US relations to the mutual benefit of the two countries.

Kissinger’s visit to India was the first by any high ranking official since 1971. But his assignment was all the more tricky.
For he was found to be involved in much that India objected to. He was seen as the main architect of the 'tilt' towards Pakistan in the Bangladesh War and in the CIA's covert activities in Chile. He had also spoken out bluntly against India's underground explosion. His thesis that only established nuclear powers can claim to draw a real distinction between peaceful and war-like explosions evoked strong reactions in India. Nothing could be calculated to anger the Indians more than this thesis which according to Indian interpretation, led to the ridiculous proposition that if a state did not want to acquire nuclear weapons it could not go in for peaceful explosions.83

But on arrival in India Kissinger took an altogether different line on India's nuclear intentions. This was because he wanted to set up a new relationship with India. At a meeting of the Indian Council of World Affairs he accepted India as a 'peaceful' nuclear power and a potential exporter of nuclear technology. He appealed to India to join his 'global effort' at restraint in the export of nuclear materials and technology.

On October 27, 1974 a Joint Communiqué was issued which underlined that "both sides agreed it was in the interest of all the
region to live in peace and harmony on the basis of sovereign
equality and without intervention by outside powers or attempt by
such powers to gain position of special prestige in the region."83A
The Communique categorically said that the central purpose of the
US Secretary of State’s visit was to promote and strengthen the
Indo-US bilateral relations. The communique stated in a
forthright manner: “The cordial and frank nature of the discussion
during the Secretary’s visit reflected the desire and interest of both
countries in broadening the basis for their relationship and
strengthening the many contacts and ties between the Indian and
American people.”83B

A concrete result of the visit of Henry Kissinger was that an
Indo-US Joint Commission was set up. Its objective was to
promote and oversee mutual interests in some key areas of Indo-
US relations’ which were now emerging from a period of acrimony
and mistrust.84 There would be three sub-commissions to deal
with economic and commercial matters, science and technology
and education and cultural activities. The trade between the two
countries had to be expanded and diversified. It was expected to
reach a much higher figure than Rs.700 crores on which it had
remained stationary for the past several years. It was expected that the Commission would grow into a welcome influence in several areas. This was without having to excite fears of American domination of Indian affairs as had happened in the past.

To keep up the continuity of high-level Indo-American exchanges initiated by Kissinger's successful trip to Delhi, the Indian Ambassador, T.N. Kaul got back to Washington to initiate the follow-up discussion with the relevant agencies of the US government for getting the three sub-commissions of the Indo-American joint commission to get into full swing in their respective spheres.

On December 12, 1974, it was announced in Washington that William B. Saxebe, the Attorney-General of the US would succeed Daniel P. Moynihan, who was relinquishing his post in February 1975 as the American ambassador in India. In making this appointment, President Ford maintained the tradition of sending only well-known public figures instead of career diplomats to man the post in Delhi. As

In fine, Indo-US relations were back to the normal track, and improved somewhat in 1972-74. Among the developments which
helped were Nixon's statement recognizing India as a major power in South Asia, US recognition of Bangladesh government and US release of economic aid to India which had been suspended during Indo-Pak War. All these moves helped to create the atmosphere for the dissipation of tension to an extent. Moreover, signing of PL-480 agreement between US and India was another step towards building a new and more mature relationship between the two countries. However, various factors which pointed to strained relationship between the two countries due to the US decision to supply arms to Pakistan, US criticism of India's nuclear explosion at Pokhran, and US bombing of North Vietnam. However, the fact is that during 1972-74 the two countries were seriously trying to establish normal and more mature relationship based on mutuality of interest.

The year 1975 witnessed two major incidents that caused a marked deterioration in Indo-US relations. The first was the announcement on February 24 that the United States was finally ending the embargo it had imposed in 1965 on the supply of arms and military equipment to India and Pakistan and the second was the proclamation of National Emergency by Indian President on
June 26 at the initiative of Mrs. Gandhi.

It was the explosion of an atomic device by India in May 1974 which spurred Pakistan to impress upon the United States the need to lift the arms embargo which it was argued in effect, a discrimination against a steadfast ally. Furthermore, due to the financial assistance Pakistan was getting from its rich friends in West Asia, they were in a position to tell the Americans that their country was not asking for a grant of arms, but was willing to pay hard cash for its purchases.

As a result of the assessment of its own needs and Pakistan's policy of pressure and persuasion, the United States finally decided to lift the embargo on sale of arms to Pakistan on February 25, 1975. The State Department made it clear that the United States would ensure that the sale of arms to Pakistan did not contribute to an intensification of arms race in the subcontinent. Moreover an assurance was given that it would not do anything to upset the strategic balance in the region where it recognized the pre-eminent position of India.

The Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi reacted sharply and
told the Rajya Sabha that the US action amounted to the "reopening of the old wounds." It amounted to impeding the process of healing and normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. She said that it was "totally spurious to argue that arms should be supplied to Pakistan because we in India are developing a self-sufficient defense industry."  

In the same vein, Y.B. Chavan also told the Rajya Sabha that the arguments advanced by USA for resuming arms supplies to Pakistan "were untenable and invalid and their creditability is not likely to be accepted in this country." If USA wanted peace in the world, then this was not the way. "Either they are deceiving themselves or they are deceiving us," was his blunt judgement.

The second cause of disagreement and friction was the proclamation of internal emergency. On June 26, 1975 by the President of India at the initiative of Mrs. Gandhi, proclaimed a national emergency. In an unusual comment at an informal press conference the US President (ad interim) Gerald Ford said that "it was very sad that 600 million people have lost what they had since mid-1940s as I recall, and I think it is a very sad development and I hope that in time there could be a restoration of democratic
processes as we know them in the US. Ford’s comments were not only extraordinary but were bound to create hard feelings in New Delhi. An External Affairs Ministry’s spokesman reacting to the US President’s comments expressed amazement that the US President should have chosen to comment on the internal affairs of a friendly country without due appreciation of the issues involved. There were many aspects of internal politics of America, he added, in which it was possible to comment, including the situation about civil liberties and the extra-ordinary powers exercised by the executive under certain circumstances, but the accepted norms and courtesies of international relations did not permit of an official comment from outside countries.

During the long period of emergency rule, from June 1975 until January 1977, when some of the severest restrictions were lifted and March 1977, when Mrs. Gandhi and her party were overwhelmingly defeated in the Sixth General Elections, relations between the United States and India remained officially correct but became noticeably cooler.

The problem of meeting the challenges posed by the emergency to the makers of India’s foreign policy was
complicated by an unexpected destabilising development in the Indian subcontinent. Hardly had six weeks passed since the Presidential Proclamation of a state of emergency throughout India when, in the early hours of August 15, the 'armed forces' carried out a coup d'état in Bangladesh.

It was suspected that the United States of America was had involvement in the development in Bangladesh. On September 3, the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger sent a congratulatory message to his new counterpart in Bangladesh, Abuy Sayeed Choudhry. Kissinger said that he hoped to work with him 'in continued warm and friendly relations'. Reports of US involvement had at first looked biased. Later developments, however, lent them respectability. For instance, when the leaders of the August Coup, Major Farooq and others, deemed it expedient to flee Bangladesh, it was in Pakistan and the United States that they sought asylum. Naturally, India felt deeply concerned about this involvement by United States in Bangladesh.

The overall impact of the Emergency in India and the developments in Bangladesh on Indo-US relations was rather adverse. The Government of India and the Leaders did not like the
US reaction to the Emergency. Furthermore they suspected a US involvement in Bangladesh. Yet they handled Indo-US relations coolly and carefully. In an unusual gesture Prime Minister Indira Gandhi accepted a dinner invitation from the US Ambassador to India, William Saxbe, in the last week of August. The meeting of the Indo-US Joint Commission and External Affairs Minister Chavan’s visit to the United States in the first week of October took place as scheduled. On an earlier occasion, i.e., in March 1975, India had asked for a postponement of a meeting of the Indo-US Joint Commission with a view to expressing its unhappiness over the US decision of the previous month to lift the embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan.

In the fall of 1976, India named an ambassador to China for the first time in 15 years and an ambassador to Pakistan after a lapse of five years. T.N.Kaul returned to India after serving for three and a half years as India’s ambassador to the United States. He was promptly replaced by an equally senior diplomat, Kewal Singh. All of these moves were favourably regarded in the United States. In November 1976, William Saxbe left India after serving for less than two years as US ambassador.
The Carter administration were not that prompt in appointing a successor for several months. The long delay in replacing Saxbe was criticized in India. This amply demonstrated the low priority that India occupied in official US thinking.

The spring of 1977 witnessed important political changes. It saw new directions in domestic and foreign policy in both the United States and India. This paved the way for significant improvements in Indo-American relations. In January Jimmy Carter became President of the United States. He appointed Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brazezinski, National Security Advisor. In India, a new party—The Janata Party led by Morarji Desai, assumed power in New Delhi. Atal Behari Vajpayee, a former Jana Sangh leader and a strong critic of several aspects of India’s non-alignment and Nuclear Policy, took over as the new Minister for External Affairs.

The Janata victory at the polls was widely hailed by the US public and the Press. The Carter Administration called the Janata Party’s victory a ‘noteworthy’ example of the reassertion of democracy. Washington expected a major shift in Indian foreign policy after the momentous political changes. These expectations
got a great stimulus when the new Prime Minister of India, Morarji Desai, declared on March 24, 1977, in his first Press Conference that "his government would pursue a policy of proper non-alignment." He stated that his government would not have "special relations with any country."

In America also, Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee, on March 30 voted for repeal of anti-Indian amendment adopted by American Congress in 1974 in reaction to India's nuclear explosion. Both Desai and Carter tried to establish a rapport by personal correspondence. The Carter Administration showed full satisfaction with the direction of non-alignment as professed by the Janata Party. It showed interest in resuming bilateral aid to India.

In July, 1977, the Congress voted to make up to dollar 60 million available to India for a grain shortage programme and other agricultural programmes. This action was particularly appreciated in India because neither the Indian nor the American government had requested for it. It was a foreunner of the resumption of bilateral economic aid by the United States to India. It had been initiated after a lapse of seven years in 1978.
In May 1977, India welcomed the appointment of Dr. Robert Goheen as the New US ambassador. Goheen had been born in India, on missionary parents. He was known to be especially interested in India. On July 23, 1977, the US Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher visited New Delhi. He had talks with External Affairs Minister, Vajpayee and Finance Minister, H.M. Patel on bilateral and international questions. In New Delhi, he stated that the United States was prepared to resume its bilateral economic aid to India. In addition he favoured keeping up the current level of International Development Assistance (IDA) through the World Bank and other international financial institutions.

Joseph Nye, US Under Secretary of State for Security, Science and Technology, visited India in the first week of August 1977. After meeting Prime Minister Desai in New Delhi, Nye said that there was now a “good climate in Indo-US relations” for considering further supplies of enriched uranium to the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS).

A few weeks later, in the beginning of October, 1977, Indo-US relations were marked by three important events—the
announcement of a visit by President Carter to India in the last week of November the appointment of Nani Palkhiwala as the New Indian Ambassador in Washington, and External Affairs Minister Vajpayee’s visit to the United States as leader of the Indian delegation to the Thirty-Second Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

In September 1977, Nani Palkhiwala succeeded Kewal Singh as India’s ambassador to the United States. This appointment was welcomed in the United States, in both official and unofficial circles. During his visit to the United States for UNSA Session, Vajpayee met President Carter in New York at a dinner hosted by the US President for visiting Asian Foreign Ministers on October 5, 1977. On September 30, he addressed the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on the “Democratic and Social Revolution in India and Foreign Policy”. He took the opportunity to recall the deep bonds between India and the United States. Paying tribute to President Carter (and the late President John F. Kennedy), he added: "There is undoubtedly a feeling in India that the United States under President Carter pulsates today with a new idealism and inspiration which recalls the days when President Kennedy
held this in his office.... It is for these reasons of a new democratic faith and enlightened international perspective in both that countries that we welcome and look forward to the forthcoming visit of President Carter to our country." 

There was also exchange of high level visits between the two countries. These visits culminated in the visit of the US President, Jimmy Carter, to India from January 1 to 3, 1978. The visit was of special significance. For it had came long after the Nixon's 'tilt' which had vitiated Indo-US relations in the post-1971 phase. The two leaders exchanged views on a wide range of bilateral and international issues. These included inter alia, prospects of increased Indo-US cooperation, the nuclear question, the West Asian problem, the Indian Ocean, the North-South Dialogue, and the situation in Africa.

Bilaterally, the two leaders expressed support for the Indo-US Joint Commission. As far the nuclear issue, Desai reiterated India's opposition to a blanket acceptance of safeguards, but agreed with Carter on the need for nuclear disarmament. He reiterated India's unwillingness to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, notwithstanding its unilateral pledge
not to make nuclear weapons, and to accept the US proposition that all atomic installations should be opened to international inspection. Despite differences over the nature of safeguards and the pattern of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the two sides ended their 2-Day talks on a note of optimism. They hoped for a new era of mutual trust and confidence between the two countries and the development of a "personal and spiritual rapport."95A

In his Address to Members of Parliament on January 2, 1978, President Carter announced that his talks with Desaion increased cooperation in the nuclear field had resulted in an agreement on the supply of 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Plant against the application of the Government of India which had been pending with the US administration. Another was about the supply of shipments of heavy water from US reserves to help the country tide over the immediate crisis in the heavy water plant of Baroda. President Carter also sought to identify areas whereby better Indo-US relations could be promoted. These were research in agricultural production, creation of an international food reserve, help in solving the problem of drought.
Meanwhile, the Indo-US Joint Commission met on January 3, 1978 under the leadership of Vajpayee and Vance. It took a number of decisions to intensify cooperation between the two countries in the spheres of agriculture, culture, education, industry and science and technology.

At the conclusion of Carter's visit, the two leaders signed a Joint Declaration placing on record the shared belief of the two countries that a "co-operative and stable world order depends on the right of each people to determine its own form of government and each nation its own politics, social and economic policies."

The Delhi Declaration further stated that the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons needed to be contained and called for efforts to reduce eventually to culminate the nuclear stockpiles. Contrary to expectations in certain circles, the Declaration did not spell out any specific issue or area of cooperation between the two countries or raise any bilateral issue other than the shared belief of the two countries in democratic values and human freedom.

Carter's brief visit created an unmistakable atmosphere of goodwill. It had the effect of delimiting certain areas of
cooperation that would make for closer ties between the two countries. Yet differences over the key issue of nuclear research and testing remained unsettled. The main achievement of the visit lay in arresting the drift in Indo-US relations. Besides it helped in establishing a dialogue between the two countries at the highest level. It was clear that notwithstanding India's unilateral declaration to refrain from carrying out any nuclear explosion even for peaceful purposes, the United States was not willing to abide by its commitment to supply enriched uranium for the Tarapur Plant on a long-term basis. Even the promised shipment of 7.6 tonnes of enriched uranium failed to arrive on time. On April 24, 1978, External Affairs Minister Vajpayee stated in New York that the process of Indo-US normalization, which had gained momentum with Carter's visit, had received a 'setback.' The principal reason given was the delay 'in the shipment of the promised nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Plant. He expressed surprise that in spite of Desai's unequivocal statement about not going in for nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes, the United States should insist on "full scope safeguards."'96

Prime Minister Desai visited the United States in June 1978
and discussed with President Carter a variety of bilateral and
global issues of common concern. He devoted special attention to
the question of peace and security. The two leaders welcomed the
increasing trade and cooperation between their two countries and
the work of the Indo-US Joint Commission. They also noted with
satisfaction the initiative taken by the Indo-US Business Council
in the matter of promoting cooperation between India and US
Companies in third world countries. They further reviewed the
progress of discussions between their two Governments on joint
projects in agricultural research and solar technology. While they
welcomed the successful conclusion of negotiations on
multi-lateral trade, they also agreed on the desirability of fighting
protectionism. Desai pointed out that there was no conflict or
clash of fundamental interest between the two countries. He held
the view that Indo-US relations were "so much closer than they
have been for some time in the past." He further hoped that in
view of the dialogue going on, minor differences over the nuclear
issue would not come in the way of good relations.

The Joint communique issued at the end of Desai’s visit
stated that both the leaders had extensive and highly useful
discussions on Indo-US nuclear cooperation and the statutory regulations affecting continued supply by the United States of enriched uranium to India. Both sides agreed to continue the dialogue on the issue. The US President pledged to "make every effort consistent with American law to maintain fuel supplies for Tarapur and continue nuclear cooperation with India." At the end of his visit, Prime Minister Desai and President Carter, in a joint communique stated that there had been a significant improvement in Indo-US relations during the past year.

On August 26, 1978, America resumed development assistance to India with a commitment of 60 million covered by three separate agreements signed in New Delhi.98

The Janata Government claimed that there had been an improvement in India's relations with the United States. It held that the United States had not broken its contractual obligations regarding the supply of nuclear fuel to the Tarapur Power Plant. And yet the issue of supply of nuclear fuel continued to bedevil relations between the two countries.

The US Government conveyed to the Government of India
through the Ambassador in Washington, in January 1979, that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was expected to clear India's application for the import of 16.5 tonnes of enriched uranium for the Tarapur Plant soon. The matter was taken up again at the Fourth Session of the Indo-US Joint Commission held in Washington in the last week of April, 1979. The Indian side was led by External Affairs Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, and the US side by Orus Vance. Although it was decided to set up a Sub-Commission on agriculture, the problem of nuclear fuel for Tarapur did not yield solution. Vajpayee expressed the hope that the United States would honour the terms of the bilateral Indo-US agreement and continue fuel supplies even beyond 1980.

Clarifying India's stand, Vajpayee while supporting the idea of non-proliferation wanted a halt to both vertical and horizontal proliferation. However, the restatement of India's principled stand could hardly be expected to bring about a change in the US attitude. The stalemate continued in the months that followed.

The increasing American naval presence and militarization of the Indian Ocean area was another major area of discord. When Morarji Desai paid a state visit to America in June, 1978, he raised
the question of American naval presence in Indian Ocean with President Jimmy Carter. Both countries differed on this ‘issue-area’. This difference became clear from the joint communique issued on June 15, 1978. While “Desai expressed the hope that the talks between the USA and the Soviet Union would result in the eventual removal of all great powers military presence in the Indian Ocean,” the American side talked of stabilization of the military presence of the super powers in the Indian Ocean.

Differences on nuclear issues continued to bedevil Indo-American relations throughout the rest of 1978 and 1979. Prime Minister Desai often repeated his aversion to the nuclear build-up of the super power and his pledge that India would never enter the nuclear weapon race. However, he refused to make any formal commitment to this effect, until and unless the nuclear powers began significant reductions in their own nuclear arsenals. He continued to rebuff US efforts to persuade India to accept full-scope safeguards before the grace period of the US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act expired. However, his own political position was seriously undermined by disagreement among the top leaders of the Janata Party. These differences became so serious
that the coalition began to fall apart. In June 1979, Morar Ji Desai was forced to resign as Prime Minister.

In short, during the Janata rule in India and Carter Administration in America, a fruitful relationship could not mature even though there were high expectations on either side. There was no reconciliation of well established national stances on vital issues. The nuclear issue could not be resolved by Carter and Desai despite their obvious desire to accommodate each other's viewpoints. On economic issues, expectations on each side outstripped the other's capacity to meet them. This was both in the amount of foreign assistance forthcoming from the US and New Delhi's dismantling of domestic economic controls. The dream of the most powerful and the most populous democracies in the world working together remained at the inspirational level only and could not make such headway in tangible terms.
REFERENCES

1. The Times of India, April 4, 1966.


3. Ibid., p.233.


7. Ibid., October 9 and 11, 1970.


11. See Ambassador Agha Halaly's statement on ABC AL interview on August 15,1971—"The Pakistan army was equipped with American weapons almost exclusively".


13. Ibid.


25. Ibid.
29. Times of India, November 6, 1971.
30. Ibid., November 9, 1971.
34. Times of India, November 25, 1971.
35. Hindustan Times, February 27, 1971.
38. Ibid., December 1, 1971.
40. Ibid., December 4, 1971.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., Provisional Verbatim Record of the Sixteen Hundred and
Eleven Meeting, S/PV, 1611, December 12, 1971, p.11.

45. Ibid., Provisional Verbatim Record of the Sixteen Hundred and Thirteenth Meeting, S/PV, 1613, December 13, 1971, pp.118-120.


54. Ibid.


59. Ibid.


61A. Ibid.


63. Ibid.


66. Ibid.

74. Ibid.
75. Times of India, February 20, 1974.
76. Hindu, October 17, 1974.
77. Hindustan Times, August 9, 1974.
78. Indian Express, August 22, 1974.
82. Hindustan Times, October 27, 1974.
83B. Ibid.
84. Indian Express, October 30, 1974.
86. Times of India, February 6, 1975.
87. Hindustan Times, February 27, 1975.
89. Indian Express, September 18, 1975.
90. Times of India, September 19, 1975.
91. Indian Express, November 6, 1975.
94A. Times of India, August 5, 1977