Kennedy's victory over Nixon in the American Presidential Elections in November 1960 was hailed in India. Nixon was viewed with suspicion by Indians, whereas Kennedy had already given many indications of his interest in and sympathy for their country. Hence period of the Kennedy administration was marked with great expectations of closer friendship both in India and in the United States.

Kennedy's interest in India dates back to 1945. It was based on Barbara Ward's appeal for increased American emphasis on India which had great effect on Kennedy. Reporting to the British audiences, he said: "when I asked Barbara Ward where the United States should concentrate in Asia, she said "India first, India second, India last." A short while later, Kennedy established a working liaison with the United States Centre for International Studies and worked for India.

As Senator, John F. Kennedy was instrumental in creating a
very favourable lobby for economic aid to India. He remained always in the forefront of every move to assist India, especially in the completion of its Five Year Plans. He pleaded, though unsuccessfully, with Senator J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, for a Development Loan Fund for India. Later he sided with Senator Johan Sherman Cooper in sending an international joint Mission in India. Mohd. Currim Chagla, Indian Ambassador in Washington, praised Kennedy for his interest in India and for his idealism matching that of Nehru.

Kennedy agreed that neutralism or non-alignment was 'inevitable' rather than 'immoral'. In this he was one of the very first American statesmen who recognized the value of non-alignment. In fact, he declared that neutralism had been "part of our history for over a hundred years." In defence of non-alignment, he said: "I never shared the feeling that there was something mysterious or wrong about neutralism." The sheet-anchor of his approach to international relations was to "make the world safe for diversity." Notwithstanding what the political beliefs of individual states were, they were not only tolerated but also encouraged to promote peace. In an address at
Princeton University on May 11, 1954, he cautioned the Americans that "the attitude of India, the key to Asia, because of her size, location and Nehru's prestige has been increasingly alienated through our political manoeuvres ....... and ......by our decision to arm her neighbour across a tense and suspicious border—Pakistan."6

This made India watch the elections of 1960 with close interest. Its sympathies were with the Democratic candidate, John Fitzgerald Kennedy. During the election campaign, Kennedy's popularity in India touched a high graph. His pictures displaying his handsome winning smile, his exuberant youth attracted everyone to him. He seemed to hold the promise of tomorrow and belonged to the best liberal traditions of the Democratic Party.

In his election campaign, too, his bias for India was quite evident. As President-elect, Kennedy reaffirmed his stand of all possible aid to the Third World in the shape of funds and economic and technical assistance. As President-elect, Kennedy assured to give maximum American help to India. He held the view that no struggle in the world deserved more time and attention of the American Government than the "battle" between India and China.
With the advent of Kennedy things began to change for India and the validity of non-alignment was accepted. In fact, America tended to acknowledge that non-alignment was not only good for India and the other countries but it had also helped greatly in maintaining world peace.7

Till Kennedy came to power, both the countries, on their part considered that theirs was the most righteous stand. They believed that the world was clearly divided between democracy and communism, and the freedom and expression of liberty of the individual. In this situation the Americans expected everyone having preference for democracy, to be with them. India, owing to its non-aligned policy wanted to develop relations with both the super powers, America and Russia. But America did not like this approach. In fact, the Americans accused India of having "gone over to communists." The American press, too, was very critical of the Indians. The New York Times termed Nehru as a "lost leader" referring to India's double standards and "immoral" non alignment. India, on the other hand, believed the Americans to be "imperialists, colour conscious, coldly calculating, rather than humanitarian",8 and that it was like replacing imperial and
The old image of America as the champion of liberty was now changed. It appeared as an upholder of reactionary and totalitarian regimes round the world like that of Franco, Salazar, Chiang, Ayub and others who were supporting and voting with them in the United Nations. The new countries of Asia and Africa knew that America was wanting to use them as pawns in her struggle for power against the Soviet Union. With these divergent posture, there was bound to be a rift between the two. But with Kennedy there came a refreshingly new change in the American foreign policy.

In his State of Union Message, he praised India. He sent Averell Hariman to India and there was great optimism. India now enthusiastically looked forward to the new change. In the eyes of the new administration under Kennedy, cultivation of friendship with India ranked high among the objectives. Prime Minister Nehru also remarked a number of times during 1961 that India-American relations were better than at any time in the past. However, on issues such as Kashmir, Berlin and general disarmament their different stands continued to plague the cordial
relations between the two nations. Some of these irritants were removed and relations were smoothened over when Prime Minister Nehru visited the United States and met President Kennedy. India's passionate devotion to peace and peaceful methods of approach to problems the world over came to be appreciated. Emergence of China as a powerful communist nation forced the American policy makers to be soft towards India.9

The "finest legacy" and the most "exciting venture", 10 that John F. Kennedy left to the world was the Peace Corps. It captured the public imagination. The Peace Corps comprised American individuals who wanted to serve the common man in his struggle for survival in the developing nations of the world. The idea of sending volunteers for social and religious work outside the country is an old one. Right from the time of Ashoka the Great, till today governments and private, social and religious institutions have been sending missionaries to help people of other countries to improve their moral and material way of living. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 had also mooted this idea but it was not well received. India was one of the first eleven countries to invite and receive Peace Corps volunteers.11 Having been
entrusted with the Directorship of the Peace Corps, Sargeant Shriver toured a number of countries—India, Pakistan, Burma, Malaya-(now called Malaysia), Thailand and the Phillipines.\textsuperscript{12} Being a weak in agriculture sector, Nehru gave his personal support for the Peace Corps and specifically asked Shriver to send agriculture extension volunteers to help meet India's food deficiency.\textsuperscript{13} Shriver also met the Agriculture Minister, S.K. Patil and discussed with him in detail the agricultural problem of India.

An agreement was made for the operation of Peace Corps in India between Indo-US on November 21, 1962. The agreement lays down the procedure for inviting volunteers and also regulating the facilities admissible to the members of the staff and volunteers assigned to India. In order to implement the provisions of the Agreement and also to make the day-to-day administrative arrangements, a post of Director of Peace Corps in India with the Central Office in New Delhi was created. Direction, supervision and control of the Peace Corps activities in India was put under the control of M. Butt, Joint Secretary in the Planning Commission.\textsuperscript{14} The Peace Corps volunteers brought idealism, science, and technology to the Indians at the grass-root level. It was indeed a
genuine partnership between India and the Americans. The idea of Peace Corps changed the image of the United States of America from "rich, selfish, callous, reactionary" to "the image of intelligence, reasonableness and honest firmness."\(^{15}\)

These first impressions remained among the masses of the Indian people. Most of them had probably heard of Kennedy more than of any other American but on the official level, disappointment soon set in. India's leaders were shocked by the Bay of Pigs fiasco. It was disturbed by the strained meeting of Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna and the flaring up of another Berlin crisis. During this the infamous Berlin Wall was erected by the Russians. Even the expected chemistry between Nehru and Kennedy, two great world leaders who were supposed to have so much common, did not withstand the test of personal contacts. Nehru's third official visit to the United States was, in November 1961. It was in almost every way a disappointment to both leaders. Arthur Schelesinger, Jr. records that Kennedy described his meetings with Nehru as a "disaster." Schelesinger observes: "Nehru, alas, was no longer the man he had once been."\(^{16}\) Tensions between India and the United States and between Nehru and
Kennedy mounted in the following month, when Indian troops entered the Portuguese-held territory of Goa and "liberated" it from Portuguese rule.

THE GOA ISSUE

The territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, situated on the Konkar-Bombay coast, occupying 1562 square miles of area and with a population of about 629978, had been under Portuguese domain since 1510. There were small enclaves like Dadra and Nagar Haveli too. On geographic, ethnic and cultural grounds, India claimed these territories and insisted on their incorporation in India. But the Government of Antonio Salazar of Portugal was not only determined to retain the colonies, but was also not prepared to negotiate about their merger into India. Even before independence, Indians had been repeatedly telling the world that our independence would be complete only with the withdrawal of the French and the Portuguese from India soil. In the interest of peace and in pursuance of its creed of non-violence, India had desisted from ousting the Portuguese by force. For years New Delhi argued in vain with Lisbon, through diplomatic channels, to do something. In fact, in order to negate the Indian effort to
negotiate the imperial structure of Portuguese possessions in India, on June 12, 1951 Portugal adopted a constitutional amendment which described her overseas territories in India as "province" and insisted that the territory of Goa was as much part of Portugal as Lisbon was.

Having a firm belief in the peaceful settlement of disputes, India established diplomatic relations with Portugal. It opened a legation in Lisbon in 1949 mainly for the purpose of concluding negotiations for the peaceful transfer of Portuguese territories in India. India also tried to internationalize the issue. It brought diplomatic pressure on Portugal in international conferences and in the United Nations but without success.

Exasperated by the attitude of the Salazar regime, in 1954, the Goan nationalists joined the Indian nationalists. They liberated the two small Portuguese enclaves viz., Dadra and Nagar Haveli and later formally integrated them with India in July-August, 1954. India renewed her efforts to negotiate the status of Portuguese possessions in India, but without any success. A fundamental change was brought in the situation in September 1954. Then NATO informed India that Portugal could ask the
North Atlantic Treaty Powers to consult on a threat to the security of Portuguese territories in India. However, India was also told that "Portugal could not, under the treaty expect the North Atlantic Powers to come to the defense of Goa ...". India was, thus, free from any fear of possible intervention by the NATO powers. Nehru commented: "I think it has been made fairly clear by responsible people that NATO alliance has little relevance to this question (of Goa) ... we may, therefore, set aside the NATO alliance." But this did not mean that India was spoiling for an armed intervention. In spite of the failure of "peaceful liberation" through satyagraha, and growing anti-Portugal feeling in India, Nehru, the apostle of peace, was reluctant to armed intervention. In August 1955, unarmed Indian satyagrahis tried to cross the Goan border. They were not only pushed back, but were also fired upon. More than 15 people were killed in Goan police firing. This was the limit. Consequently, India broke off her diplomatic relations with Portugal on August 19, 1955.

The attitude adopted by the foreign powers towards India's dispute with Portugal on the Goa issue exasperated the Indians because none of them supported India. In fact, the attitude of
support to Portugal and their views on Goa "a symbol of decadent colonialism," forced Nehru to remark in the Parliament in September 1955, that the Goa dispute "has become an acid test by which we can judge the policies of other countries." Russian reaction was more favourable. The two Russian leaders—Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin—on a visit to India in December 1955, gave all out support to India's demand for the merger of Portuguese possessions in India. The Ubduabs as a whole vociferously welcomed the Russian support to India's demand for the merger of Portuguese possessions in India. This enraged the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. He committed one of the greatest diplomatic blunders of his life in joining hands with Paulo Cunha, the Foreign Minister of Portugal, on a visit to the United States. In a joint statement on December 2, 1955. Dulles criticized the Russian leaders for the "various statements" made by them in their Asian tour regarding the "Portuguese Provinces" in India. Instead of using the word "colony" the word "province" was used by Dulles, i.e., accepting Goa as an integral part of Portugal. He further said that the statement was not "lightly issued", and that "all the world" regarded Goa as a Portuguese province. The American
Government tried to placate the Indian opinion. It tried to assure India and the Indians that the American Government has not changed her stance of neutrality on the Goan issue. But Nehru sought more than that from the United States "on matters crucial to India's domestic and international interests."26

Nehru, contend time and again that the dispute would be settled peacefully through negotiations only. It was only after August 1961 when "India's patience was exhausted" that he publicly declared that he could not "rule out" the use of armed force to settle the Goan dispute. India's use of force against Portugal was well defended by Anthony Wedgewood Benn in a letter to the Editor in The Guardian. He wrote :"Non-violence liberated India but it is of no use against the savagery of the Portuguese in Goa. ... As in Angola, force now offers the only hope for winning freedom."27

When India was poised for police action in Goa, Great Britain, the United States and the United Nations Secretary-General brought pressure upon India to abandon her plans of use of force in Goa and resort to negotiations. The American Ambassador in India, John Galbraith, persuaded Nehru
to postpone the attack in the hope that Portugal would agree to a negotiated settlement. President Kennedy in his letter to Nehru requested him to postpone the action for six months more. Having tried for nearly 14 years through diplomatic means to make Portugal see reason and having drawn a blank everytime, India was left with no option to resort to the use of arms. In a press conference Nehru made it clear that India derived no satisfaction in taking armed action "but the Portuguese ultimately left no choice open to us."  

Indian action in Goa, "Operation Vijay" began in the early morning of December 18, 1961 which resulted in world-wide reaction. While the Afro-Asian nations and the communists praised and supported India's action in Goa, the Western nations condemned it. The strongest criticism was that of the United States. It was vocalized in such terms as 'shock' and 'horror'. But this was more owing to pre-determined prejudice or perhaps outright hostility.

The Americans had always considered Goa to be a Portuguese colony. Way back in 1950 congressman Joseph N. Martin Jr. wrote to Secretary of State Dean Acheson on March 22,
1950 that Goa had been with the Portuguese for 500 years and more. "To take the territory of Goa away from a loyal ally and give it to a country with which it has had no legal believe India would be shorts sighted enough to as it....." He than appealed to the American Government "to use its great moral influence in world affairs to persuade India that its plans with respect to Goa should be abandoned in the interest of international justice." Portugal had been a loyal ally of the Americans during and after the Second World War. It was natural that any Indian policy which went against such an ally would not find favour with Washington.

After India took Goa by force in 1961, Adlai Stevednson, the great American Liberal, painted India as an aggressor in the United Nations. He made three very strong statements in the Security Council against India. First was made on December 18, 1961 wherein he denounced India's action to force as a violation of the UN charter. The second statement was made when moving the resolution deploiring the use of force by India, he called for immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian forces. He told the world that the failure of the United Nations's Council to call for a ceasefire was a "failure of the United Nations." In the third
statement which was the strongest he said that it is death of United Nations in case of failure of cease-fire. The western proposal for an immediate ceasefire was vetoed by the Soviet Union. After this veto by the Soviet Union, Stevenson told the Security Council that the United States reserved the right to ask for another session of the Security Council. His intention was to take the issue to the General Assembly under the special procedure set up by the "Uniting for Peace" in 1950. But the United States had to drop this knowing fully well that most of the Asian and African members having half of the assembly seats would not support United States proposal against India. The resolution "Uniting for Peace", in fact proved good against the misuse of Veto Power in the Security Council. The role of new nations has been well defined in the United Nations especially in the General Assembly where decisions were to be taken by majority.32

In January, 1962, Kennedy sent Henry Kissinger to India to study the situation after widespread criticism in the United States of America on India's action in Goa. Kissinger declared in New Delhi on January 6, 1962 that "we are not going to spite India because of Goa, in the matter of Kashmir dispute when it is raised
before the Security Council." He also said that the United States would be "most sympathetic" to whatever action India might take against China. The assessment of Kissinger and other United States observers was that United States ties with India should be strengthened. Concurring with this assessment the United States President saw the need to help India to achieve economic progress.33

Goa, Kashmir and Pakistan were all issues even Kennedy could not side-step. Although Kennedy began his short-term as President with the promise of closer cooperation with India, yet he soon became thoroughly disillusioned with India and solicitous towards Pakistan. Even when he gave aid to India, he doubted the wisdom of giving it. On September 12, 1963, two months before he was assassinated, at a press conference he said "The fact, of course, is we want to assist India, which may be attacked ... by China. So we do not want India to be helpless with half a billion people.... On the other hand, every thing we give to India adversely affects the balance of power with Pakistan which is a much smaller country. So we are dealing with a very very complicated problem because the hostility between them is so deep."34
THE CHINESE STAB IN THE BACK

In the wake of the Goan episode the Chinese stab in the back of India came about 1962. For sometime the matters were simmering between the two giants of Asia—India and China—the two numerically largest nations of the world. Initially they were expected to co-exist and live in peace and in a cordial spirit of Asian togetherness. However, they now confronted each other across the border.

When on October 20, 1962, the Chinese troops invaded India. This came as a complete surprise to most Indians. The Indian Government was not prepared for this either mentally or physically. Nehru and his Chief Adviser in foreign affairs, Krishna Menon had always led Indians to believe that China was an old trusted friend. He also held that only a capitalist country wanted colonies and markets and that since China was communist, it could not possibly have imperialistic ambitions.

When the Chinese incursions became serious and continuous, India, under pressure of these attacks, made unofficial approaches to the United States about the possibility of obtaining
military equipment. While the crisis was developing, Chester Bowles, the Under Secretary of State, assured India that the United States "would certainly support India if there was any aggression against her." India entered into an agreement with the Soviet Union for the purchase and manufacture of MIG-21 Jets in India. This caused great irritation in the United States. In fact, some of the critics of India in America wanted aid to India to be stopped immediately. But President Kennedy went out of his way to re-emphasize America support for India. In his August 22 News Conference, he said, that the fact that India was "going to attempt to maintain its freedom" was all the more important reason for American supporting India. This was "because if it (India) ever passed behind the Iron Curtain, if its present efforts to maintain democracy should fail, then I would think the cause of freedom would have been very adversely affected not only in Asia but all through the under-developed world." Kennedy did not agree with the American commentators that it was immoral to accept assistance from both, the United States and the communist sources.

American attitude towards the Sino-Indian border conflict
was one of ambivalence and criticism before 1962. The average Americans believed that the Sino-Indian border conflict was nothing but a part and parcel of world-wide communist conspiracy to spread communist influence and hence Russia was a partner of China. America soon realized that it was not so. The Soviet Union, in fact, was no partner to Chinese conspiracy against India. On the contrary, the Russians were giving all possible economic assistance to India.

American ambivalence was seen in another field also. Earlier, when the border conflict began assuming serious proportions, American Secretary of State, Christian Herter at a news conference on November 12, 1959, declared that they had no idea about the validity of Indian claims on the Indo-Chinese border. He said "we naturally presume that the claims made by the Indians are entirely valid claims but from the point of view of ... objective reading we have no basis to go on. We have only the word of a friend." But soon a change in the American attitude was seen when it said that his earlier stand related only the legalities of the claims made by the two countries. But the support to India was never open and free. India was puzzled and hurt by the American
stand, but took the remarks in its stride. The Americans continued
to maintain their stand, more so because the Nationalist Chinese in
Taiwan had supported the Chinese Communist stand on the
McMohan Line. However, the Americans soon realized the strength
of the Indian stand on the McMahon Line. Secretary of State Dean
Rusk on December 8, 1961 made a public statement that India’s border with China was "well-established in law, if not in every
locality demarcated exactly on the ground."37

The Goan issue and Krishna Menon's handling of the Indian
affairs in the United Nations had muddled the American public
opinion, besides enranging the official world of the United States.
Indo-American relations were poor at this time. There was only
one silver lining, viz., Nehru who enjoyed with the United States
Administration and with President Kennedy, a somewhat happier
relationship. Yet Indo-American relations had "gone up and down
like a yo-yo."38

On October 26, India declared a state of emergency. On the
same day Nehru wrote letters to heads of Governments seeking
"sympathy and support." In the meanwhile, fellow non-aligned
leader Nasser suggested that Afro-Asian nations mediate in the
dispute. Khrushchev suggested that acceptance of the Chinese offer for negotiations. Nehru was stung and he now turned to the United States for help. In spite of the Cuban tension, Kennedy received B.K. Nehru with Prime Minister Nehru’s cabled request for help. He explained India's need and also a desire to be kept out of an alliance or pact. President Kennedy assured the Indian Ambassador of all possible American "sympathy and support". He called the fighting on the Indian border "a very serious struggle." It was felt that this could lead to a full scale war. Galbraith showed all possible sympathy and encouragement to the India's stand and was most receptive to the Indian request for aid.

The US President Kennedy had assured to B.K. Nehru the Indian ambassador in Washington that he had no wish to take advantage of India's misfortune for the sake of coercing her into an alliance. He said: "We have often said that we accept India's policy (of non-alignment). We would not change our stand now." Washington had absolutely no desire to "exploit" this opportunity. The National Herald editorially commented that "the United States does not consider India's needs to be her opportunity." Kennedy promptly sent an enthusiastic reply to Nehru.
I know I can speak for my whole country when I say that our sympathy in this situation is wholeheartedly with you ... I want to give you support into as well as sympathy. And if you wish, my ambassador in New Delhi, can discuss with you and officials of your government what we can do to translate our support into terms that are practically most useful to you as soon as possible."\textsuperscript{40A}

Non-aligned India was and non-aligned it was determined to remain. Critics of India maintained that by accepting the Western military aid, India lost all pretensions of non-alignment. There was nothing derogatory in India receiving such help during a national crisis. National self-interest, integrity and security demanded this help. Nehru emphasized that acceptance of Western military aid did not mean entering into a military alliance. India maintained that non-alignment did not mean self-annihilation. "Short-term and limited arms aid cannot affect the firmly rooted policies of a vast country like India."\textsuperscript{40B}

President Kennedy and the American officials were repeatedly declaring their sympathy and appreciation of India's foreign policy of non-alignment. Way back in March, 1958, he had declared: "Let us not be confused by the talk of Indian
neutrality. Let us remember that our nation also during the period of its formative years adopted a policy of non-involvement in the 19th century."41 President Kennedy declared that it was in American interest to aid India in its development, and if this was not done, then India would go behind the Iron Curtain. If that were to happen, Kennedy said, "then the cause of freedom in a large and significant segment of the world would have suffered a serious reversal."42

**AMERICAN AID TO INDIA**

Economic and military aid has played a major role in the formulation of United States foreign policy. In fact, it has been an instrument of foreign policy which successive administration have made good use of to manipulate world events. As Kissinger has stated aid has taken the "form of intervention and by the claims of those who rely on the impacts of economic evolution, a kind of political manipulation."43

It was after an agonizing re-appraisal of India's political policies and defense requirements that Nehru made a formal request to President Kennedy for American military equipment to
beat back the Chinese aggression. Meanwhile, the issue of the Chinese aggression against India received attention in the United Nations where the American representative in the United Nation, Adlai Stevenson, called it "naked aggression." He declared that the Chinese action had confirmed that it was unfit for membership of the United Nations, towards whose charter she had shown "scorn".

The American reaction to India's call for help was swift and prompt. They treated weapons supply to India as "a matter of the highest urgency." In spite of Goa, Menon, non-alignment, and Nehru's failure to give a hint to Kennedy about his proposed action against Goa during his visit to the United States just six weeks earlier, President Kennedy had no hesitation in assuring him of all possible "support and sympathy." The State Department issued a statement on October, 31, 1962 in which it was underlined that "The decision to supply defensive assistance to India, response to Prime Minister Nehru's request, is prompted by a specific situation. That situation is created by massive Chinese Communist attacks on the Indian frontier. This pre-mediated Chinese Communist aggression is a serious development and is so
regarded by this government. In extending assistance to India, we are responding to an urgent need arising from a situation which is of concern not only to this country but to our allies as well."46

Galbraith, in a press conference on November 3, 1962 outlined the plans for aid. He later issued a statement clarifying the fact that the "military assistance which the United States was giving India was not intended to involve India in a military alliance or otherwise her policy of non-alignment." The help to India was purely "to help defend India’s independence."47 Commenting on the aid given to India, President Kennedy said: "We are anxious to help India maintain itself against an attack.... India is a key area of Asia.... It was attacked without warning after trying to follow a policy of friendship ... the balance of power of the world would be adversely affected if India should lose freedom."48 In order to find out the needs of India, President Kennedy declared that he was sending an American team to assess India’s need against communist aggression. He said: “In order to better assess Indian needs, we are sending a team to New Delhi.”49

President Kennedy realized that delay, any delay in despatching help would mean giving advantage to Peking. The
decision to airlift the equipment was taken immediately. The equipment was flown from its stocks at Rhine Maine in Germany even before an accord was reached on the question of payment.\textsuperscript{50} The State Department took Sino-India war was very seriously and assured full military aid to India in furtherance of their foreign policy's goal to contain communism. However, later, United States put a string on the military aid that aid would be used exclusively against Chinese. Pakistan, his ally in SEATO reminded her that the aid can be used against her also. Hence the string. India being a non-aligned country, also requested Soviet Union for help and Soviet Union being a true friend extended her help to India against China, her ally having same ideology.

The policy-makers in Washington were unsure of the type and volume of arms aid they should give to India and of the likely reactions of Pakistan and Congress. So the 26 member U.S. Fact Finding Mission was sent under the leadership of Averell Harriman.\textsuperscript{51} It consisted of Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs,\textsuperscript{52} General Paul D. Adams, Commander of the so-called 'Strike Command', a mobile force of Corps strength that would be called upon if American
ground forces should ever be needed in the defense of India. The delegation also consisted of Carl Kaysen of the White House Staff, Roger Hilsman, State Department Director of Intelligence and Research, and half a dozen other experts. They went to India in “The McNamara Special.” While the mission was making last minute preparations for leaving for India, Nehru made a renewed appeal for help. However, China declared a ‘unilateral cease-fire’. The Mission still left on November 21, and reached New Delhi on the evening of 22nd. They went straight to Nehru and discussed the Chinese attack and American responses. In the course of consultations, Nehru was assured of the American unstinted support. The next day the mission was split into the two groups under Paul Nitze and General Adams to study the military situation and visited the front to see the actual position of the Indian military and its equipment. The other group consisted of Harriman, Galbraith, Kaysen and Hilsman. It discussed matters with the civilians, i.e., various government officials and ministers. Harriman said that the United States recognized that the Chinese invasion of India threatened not only the freedom of India and of the entire sub-continent, but of the entire free world as well. It is
to maintain the democratic freedom of all against this totalitarian threat that the United States had gone to the aid of India.\textsuperscript{54}

When India asked for help the United States at once agreed to ship arms to India. Aware of the seriousness of the situation on the Sino-Indian border and in anticipation of the Indian demand, the United States prepared its own list of military items which India might need to fight the Chinese. This was done to save time. Galbraith also sent a report to President Kennedy recommending that the United States should give whatever arms and ammunition India needed on deferred payment terms. America was treating weapons supply to India as "a matter of highest urgency."\textsuperscript{54} Such was their readiness that all formalities on requests from India were completed within 24 hours and a crash programme of rushing supplies was made. Also a Consultative and Coordinating Council was formed, consisting of the United States, Britain and Canada to expedite arms supplies and also to see that duplication of supplies was prevented.\textsuperscript{55}

On November 2, 1962, an air lift arms to India began from Frankfurt. U.S. Air force carrying light infantry weapons and other equipments reached at the Dum Dum airport. General Robert
D. Foreman of the United States of America who accompanied the plane also assured that every three hours one plane carrying military equipments would arrive here. United States also sent a Military Mission to India with a view to knowing the further need. The Mission headed by General John E. Kelly and Colonel Amos (Joe) Jordan recommended to provide modern aircraft and radar network costing about 75 million a year for five years.57

The responses of American people towards India in the Sino-Indian war was heart-warming. They continuously were in touch by making private calls. Donations and clothing were also received. Even hundred of volunteers offered themselves to fight against China. Such type of sympathy naturally boosted the morale of Indian soldiers as well as the Government.

The Chinese resented the spontaneous American arms assistance to India. They took the line that “United States’ imperialism was seeking to expand and prolong the Sino-Indian conflict.”58 Meanwhile, after the two agreements were concluded in November, 1962 with the United States and Britain. President Kennedy and Prime Minister Mcmillan met at Nassau in the Bahamas on December 18-21, 1962. They discussed the
Sino-Indian war. The Nassau meeting was a failure for India because the military aid was cut down to only 120 million to be divided between the Americans and the British.

The Harriman mission returned to Washington on December 1 and reported to President Kennedy on December 3. Harriman reported that (a) the Indian-Chinese border conflict would be long and hard and (b) the United States would have to make a major decision on the amount and type of military aid to give to India.

Sandys reported to the House of Commons on December 3 that America and Britain would not give long term assistance to India, as long as a large part of the Indian army was posted along the Pakistan border instead of being deployed against the Chinese.60

Here, we may conclude that under the pressure of Pakistan, an ally in SEATO, USA and Britain changed their attitude to some extent.

**INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE UNITED STATES**

India’s relations with Pakistan were always strained. It presented a picture of cold war which occasionally turning into a
hot one. There has been continued ideological and political warfare leading to military hostilities in 1948 on the key issue of Kashmir. On the matter of Kashmir, President Kennedy was very much concerned. He wished that a solution be reached as soon as possible. He believed that the defense of the sub-continent could be possible only through re-conciliation between India and Pakistan. Pakistan had been making pro-Chinese noises which had forced India to maintain almost three divisions in the Pakistan border.61

The State Department in Washington had also realized that her ally of SEATO was speaking in favour of China, a communist country: Being a non-aligned though India was pro-Soviet, also a communist country, United States regarded her as a reasonable country.

Harriman and Sandys saw Nehru jointly on November 26 and the main burden of the talk was Pakistan and the problem of Kashmir. The Mission tried to persuade India to adopt a more flexible negotiating position over Kashmir. President Kennedy also wrote a letter to Pakistan's President General Ayub Khan on October 28, 1962 pressuring Pakistan in the context of the
situation faced by India on her frontier with China. He requested that Pakistan should do nothing which would embarrass India at this time of her crisis. Kennedy wrote that the Chinese invasion of India posed a common threat to the whole of the sub-continent including Pakistan. Therefore, it should not press its grievance against another country in the sub-continent at this critical period. Diplomatic pressure was also brought upon Pakistan by the United States and the United Kingdom. They urged it to make those assuring gestures which would enable India to divert forces deployed on Pakistan border to the frontiers menaced by China.62 When the American Ambassador in Pakistan, McConaughty, went with President Kennedy’s letter to Ayub, he showed his anger and bluntly told the Ambassador that he (Ayub) would not have time to read President’s letter for a week. He also complained of the Kashmir issue.63 When Ayub appeared to hesitate in responding to President Kennedy’s appeal, the American reaction was highly critical of Pakistan. It was only later that Pakistan agreed to the American suggestion. Behind Ayub’s agreement were a lot of activities by Galbraith, McConaughty and the State Department.64

United States’s pressure over Pakistan in favour of India
compelled Pakistan to think to develop special relations with USA especially during the Kennedy Administration whom Pakistan believed to be more sympathetic towards India. Pakistan also realized that United States’s policies in Asia were totally based on India. As a reaction to what the United States was doing for India, Fazlul Quader Chowdhry said in a broadcast that Pakistan should withdraw from the Western alliances of SEATO and CENTO.

In the past, the Americans had always blamed India for its unhappy relations with Pakistan. They had come to look upon Pakistan as a staunch anti-communist ally of the United States. In the process, they refused to accept India’s thesis that Pakistan’s main motivation was hatred towards India. Now that Pakistan was wooing China, the United States found herself compelled to doubt Pakistan’s position. It was now openly trading her north-western boundary and bringing pressure on the Americans and the British not to arm India. All this made it clear to the American that Pakistan was seeking all the American military assistance “to fight India; more than to fight international communism.”

The United States was mindful of her alliance with Pakistan. President Kennedy, therefore, assured the Pakistanis that all the
American help to India would in no way qualified "our commitment to Pakistan" and "we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan." But he also warned them that the "Chinese incursions into the sub-continent were a threat to Pakistan as well as India and both have a common interest in opposing it.... Our help to India in no way diminishes of qualifies our commitment to Pakistan...." Thus, while concluding the agreement, America made condition that the arms and military equipments India was receiving from the United States would be used only to repel the communist aggression, the Indian pledge was contained in an exchange of notes in Washington between B.K. Nehru and Phillips Talbot.

In spite of everything America assured Pakistan that its fear of the American arms being used against Pakistan was unfounded and that India would not "misuse" them if it did, the United States would immediately undertake "appropriate action." Let it be recalled that when the United States decided to give military aid to Pakistan in 1954, a similar assurance against aid being misused had been given to India. American assurance to Pakistan followed an exchange of letters between President Ayub and President Kennedy.
Not being able to tolerate American military aid to India, Pakistan let loose a campaign of hatred for India and America. Besides, many Americans believed that America should exert pressure on India to first settle the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan, rather than give military aid to India.

The Harriman and Sandy's mission also thought that there must be some sort of Indo-Pakistani settlement over Kashmir. They brought pressure on Nehru and extracted a promise from him to enter into negotiations with Pakistan. Nehru was, thus, compelled to talk and seek an "honourable and equitable settlement" on Kashmir and other related matters. Later, talking to Chester Bowles, Nehru asked him why the United States had attempted to use India's difficulties with China as a level to make concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir. Sorenson, in his book on Kennedy, writes that President did not like "Galbraith's suggestion of forcing the Indians to make a generous Kashmir offer by conditioning a large aid offer." Kennedy was right when he expressed his view that this would not work. Neither the Pakistanis were going to give such an assurance nor would the
Indians make concessions on Kashmir because he believed that both sides regarded Kashmir dispute as "more important ... than the struggle against the communists." The Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, to show Pakistani anger against American arms aid to India, used such undiplomatic language with President Kennedy that Kennedy coldly stood up and terminated the conversation.

In view of all this, President Kennedy in a letter to Ayub urged upon him to make friendly gestures to India in her hour of grave peril. It was suggested to Ayub that he should write to Nehru privately that Indian troops in Kashmir could be safely withdrawn to fight against the Chinese invaders. Kennedy felt that such an offer would win Indian goodwill and secure a more favourable response from India. The American Government also sought an assurance from New Delhi that it would respond with a meaningful gesture of conciliation towards Pakistan. Galbraith saw Nehru and emphasized upon him that conciliation was a two way traffic and hence it was necessary that India should try to solve the Kashmir issue. In a radio and television interview, President Kennedy said: "We would like to have them settle Kashmir. That is our view of
the best way to defend the sub-continent against communism."73 The Americans felt that it would be easier to face the Chinese if India and Pakistan were to “pull together” rather than keep arming on their border. Later, United States realized that the aid given to both the countries as a part of her foreign policy to contain communism will be used against to defend each other. On December 16, 1962 Harriman said: “It is going to be difficult for the United States to give military aid both to Pakistan and India if a considerable part of its is used to defend against each other. Some agreement must be reached to disengage these forces.”74

As a result of the pressure brought upon Nehru, India agreed to talk. India and Pakistan agreed on November 29 to confer on disputed Kashmir.75 This agreement was signed by Nehru in New Delhi and Ayub in Rawalpindi. Sandys and Harriman told Nehru that there was little hope of defending India so long as the Kashmir dispute continued. A Joint Communiqué was issued simultaneously at New Delhi and Rawalpindi. It said that Nehru and Ayub had agreed that “a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences on Kashmir and other related matters so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in
peace and friendship” and that India and Pakistan “have decided to start discussions at an early date .... initially at a ministerial level” and later Nehru and Ayub were to meet in “direct talks”.76

Talks began between Z.A. Bhutto and Swaran Singh in India and Pakistan alternatively but could not produce any result after six rounds of talks. The issue of kashmir was no issue at all because it was a part of Indian territory and no Indian would like to have negative talk over Kashmir. Pakistan wanted Kashmir, multi-muslims state, though it was never belonged to her. This was the main reason that till today hundreds rounds of talks have taken place but of no use. India was of the firm stand that no third party or mediator would be kept. In May 1963, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, persuaded Nehru to accept the association of a “third party” in the talks but nothing came out of this. By September, President Kennedy admitted that the Kashmir problem was “further from being settled today than it was six months ago.”77 Nehru did not like the whole exercise. He frankly said that “so far as we are concerned, while we are prepared for greater contacts and greater trade between Kashmir and Pakistan and for adjustments in the present cease-fire like which is not a very
sensible one, we are persuaded that any major change could be the ruin of the vale.”\textsuperscript{78}

**AIR DEFENSE PACT**

With the unilateral Chinese cease-fire, the emergency phase of American military aid to India came to an end. However, air defense was still a problem. In her flight with the Chinese, India had not made use of her air power because of the fear of retaliatory Chinese air attack on defenseless Indian cities especially Calcutta and New Delhi. When the situation was deteriorating and the Indian army was collapsing, India thought of using the air force. Therefore, on November 19, 1962 at the height of the Chinese onslaughts, Nehru made an urgent and specific request to President Kennedy for the immediate delivery of 14 squadrons of U.S. fighter planes to protect the northern Indian cities and to use the Indian planes to attack the long Chinese communication lines.\textsuperscript{79} The request was repeated on December 1 by India’s Ministry of External Affairs.\textsuperscript{80} But then came the cease-fire and no decision was taken on the Indian request.

In spite of the cease-fire, India felt that it was nothing but a
breathing time and that the Chinese would again attack India. There was nothing like an air-attack warning or radar system in India. The United States and Britain recognized the need for taking long-range measures to strengthen India’s defense capacity. Two main problems were involved. One was financing a large-scale purchase of military equipment for the Indian armed forces. India wanted to double the size of its defense forces and the second was concerning the emergency air defense measure in case the Chinese renewed their attacks. India also recognized the danger to Indian cities exposed to air attack and made a request to the Americans and the British to send some Joint Air Mission. In order to meet this emergency, a Commonwealth-United States Defense Mission visited India for a Joint Air Defense Plan. It arrived in New Delhi on January 30, 1963 to help plan the civilian air defense for India in case the Chinese renewed the attack. After long discussion on July 22, 1963, a Tripartite Agreement was arrived at. The Indian Foreign Ministry statement issued on July 22, 1963 said that New Delhi had accepted a United States-British plan to guard India against a possible “large-scale air attack by communist China.”80A
Being a non-aligned country, India was finding the whole thing distasteful. Nehru knew the help he was receiving from Anglo-American side was a bitter one and difficult to swallow. It was against the foreign policy to have military pact. India had been criticizing this point in terms of Pakistan. But national interest to save the border was more important at that time. In the meanwhile, a group of experts in special warfare came to India at India's request "to advise the Indian Army on the technique of special warfare."  

After Bowles arrival in India, he met Nehru and Chavan, the Defense Minister, and worked on a military aid budget for $75 million a year for five years. This was in addition to the aid already given in 1962 during the emergency. It was also hoped that Britain would also give an aid of about $15 to 20 millions annually. President Kennedy not only approved of it but also directed Bowles to seek the support of Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara before the meeting of the National Security Council could take place. President Kennedy also told Bowles that all possible military assistance would be given to India in spite of Pakistan. The meeting of the National Security Council was called for
Tuesday, November 26, 1963 but four days before the meeting could take place, on November 22, President Keneddy was assassinated.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND ECONOMIC AID TO INDIA

With Kennedy in power, non-aligned and the Third World received greater attention. He revised the Washington's earlier entire policy of "morally self-righteous and politically self-defeating" approach. Now he began the policy of economic aid coupled with military aid, if necessary. The United States now gave to the AID (Agency for International Development) India Consortium $1850 million besides the help under the PL-480. The benign aid to India was short lived. It suffered a set back because of political consideration. Nehru, at the Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned declared his opposition to "all tests at any time and in any place." Nehru failed to specify Soviet Union. The U.S. Congress was angry and there was opposition to economic aid to India. Though President Kennedy did not reduce the aid yet he declared that aid could be given to those allies "who have our view of the world crisis."
The straining of the relations became still aggravated when India took over Goa in December 1961. Right at this time India went in for the MIG deal with the Russians. The U.S. Foreign Relations Committee recommended a 25% cut in aid to India in May 1962. But India was not to be cowed down. Nehru declared: "If it (aid) means giving up independence ... (for) if we surrender our basic position now, we will have to surrender again."86 Nehru was very unhappy and questioned the American goodwill for India. The Sino-Indian War of October-November 1962 restored the goodwill, as nothing had till then.87

Kennedy believed in liberty and improving the economic condition of Asian countries by way of providing economic aid. In his first address as President he assured that the “people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them for whatever period is required—not because we seek their votes but because it is right. If a free society can not help the many who are poor, it can’t save the few who are rich.”88 He was of the view that “American interest would be best served by the development of strong and independent states.”89 In order to give effective aid he replaced the
Chief of International Cooperation Administrator James W. Riddleberger with Henry Labouisse who was extremely enthusiastic about aid to the Third World. Kennedy also made a change in the Director of Development Loan Fund. He now chose Frank Coffin, a Democratic Congressman from Maine. Kennedy created two task forces to be headed by Labouisse and Coffin to recommend new draft for foreign aid.

The aid to India was channeled through the Technical Cooperation Mission. The Development Loan Fund and Food for Peace Programme. In a message to the Congress, Kennedy proposed the integration of aid programme into one single administration including the TCM, ICA, DLF, PL-480 and the Export and Import Bank with a "carefully thought out plan tailored to meet its individual needs and resources." The legislation for this was submitted on May 29, 1960 to usher in the Decade of Development and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) which came into existence on November, 1961. The agency was created in order to make American Assistance available under one unified administration. It gave development loans and grants including for malaria eradication, small pox
eradication, higher education, dairy development, etc.

President Kennedy, thus, gave a new direction to American aid programmes. He now called for a change “to help make a historical demonstration that economic growth and political democracy can go hand in hand. An enlarged community of free, stable and self-reliant nations can reduce world tension and security,” and thereby promote the economic development of less developed countries and areas.”

The loans and credit granted by the United States AID were on very favourable terms—the period for repayment being long and the rate of interest low. In fact, President Kennedy believed that American aid to India was instituted to promote independence in economic field. This was clear reversal of the Dullesian Doctrine. Non-alignment was no more a bar to receive foreign economic aid.

President Kennedy made a clear distinction between military and non-military aspects of the aid programme. This enabled countries like India, which did not receive military aid, to receive foreign aid in non-military field. Kennedy arranged for
India a long-term borrowing the among involved came upto $4,805,000,000 though ultimately the aid was sanctioned $3,914,600,000 only. He considered his foreign aid measure as "probably the most vital legislation of this session of the Congress." Kennedy said: "This is a matter of the greatest national importance.... We cannot live in an isolated world ... and I would much rather give our assistance in this way —a large part of it consists of food, defense, support as well as long-term loans— than to have to send American boys to do it." He was against short-term credit. He was against reacting on an ad hoc basis and in a haphazard manner "to a crisis here and a crisis there, year by year, region by region." He further said: "This policy of suing money on a crisis basis from year to year wherever difficulty arises is expensive and ineffective. The heart of any solution must be a substantial long-term program of productive loans to under-developed areas from a fully capitalized central fund, capable of working with either independent nations or regional groupings .... one nation in particular stand out as the primary example of what I am urging, one nation of particular importance to the free world, and in particular need of long term development capital. That nation
is India, the hinge of fate of Asia."\textsuperscript{95} Earlier President Eisenhower also sought Congressional support for longer periods, but met with only partial success. Nixon also had favoured economic aid to India and he very aptly said: "to cut off aid or to put strings on it will not win India to our side. It is more likely to have the opposite effect. The people of India cherish their independence and they resent deeply"\textsuperscript{96} any attempt to intimidate them.

Kennedy had very positive and liberal attitude for giving aid to India. Sometimes because of anger with or as a reaction to Indian policies, the Senate and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reduced or scrapped the loans, as happened on May 12, 1962 when it reduced the economic aid on India's taking over of Goa. The American press and the people in general were very unhappy about the Indian action and its policies. Despite the Goa action, President Kennedy defended giving aid to India, even though it was receiving economic and military aid from the communists also. In reply to a question regarding aid to countries receiving American aid and still doing business with the communist countries. Kennedy said: "Well, I think that nearly every country that I know of engages in economic deals with the commu-
nist bloc ... so that I do not think it is a moral issue. I think we have to make a judgement as to what serves our interest, whether the country is attempting to maintain its freedom, whether the country pursuing policies which are not inimical to the long range interests of the United States."97 He added: "... I would say that at least in one country, which I assume you are thinking of ... if you are thinking of the question of India. While the matter of military assistance has not been settled as I understand it in India, most of their assistance in the past have come from the British, it is an extremely large country, 450 million, extremely important it is free, it is non-communist. It has indicated it is going to attempt to maintain its freedom and therefore, I think it is our interest to support it, because if it ever passed behind the Iron Curtain, if the present efforts to maintain democracy should fail, then I would think the cause of freedom would be very adversely affected not only in Asia but all through the under-developed world."98

Because of MIG deal, Goa and India's stand on Kashmir, Congress decided "to punish India by putting a ceiling on its economic aid allocations."99 India was beset not only with political troubles but was also facing a crisis in its Third Five Year Plan.
It was vitally dependent on Western aid. In view of the general interest in India's economic development, Kennedy was interested in seeing the success of the Third Five Year Plan launched on April 1, 1961. He regarded the plan as vitally important. "If successful", he said, the plan would make a "tremendous difference throughout the all Asia." There was a general feeling in America at this time that the economic aid given to India would not only strengthen its internal economy, but will also help themselves in maintaining their political freedom. The fear of communism was very much uppermost in the mind of the United States Administration. The aim of the United States aid was to improve the "climate of freedom". It was the biggest contributor to India's Third Five Year Plan.

In a message to the Congress President Kennedy talked of "Joint responsibility" of the United States and Europe to "less developed countries of the world," and "to ensure that their legitimate aspirations and requirements are fulfilled." He called for "open partnership" so as to "enable all free nations to share together the rewards of a wider economic choice for all." The United States then pledged $ 500,000,000 each year for India.
This was on the condition that other members of the six nations Consortium, excluding the World Bank made commitments for help. On April 15, 1962, in a speech in Trivendrum, Kerala, American Ambassador Galbraith announced that he had authorized loans to finance the $52,500,00 Pamba Kakki Hydro-electric project, which will more than double the existing supply of power for Kerala.

In 1962 American aid amounted to $4,000,000,000 spent on welfare projects, imports etc. America also lent $24,400,000 to develop and additional thermal power plant. This was to be repaid only after 10 years and it carried no interest. America also supplied about 4,000,000 tons of wheat and rice to India. American aid to India was spread over a wide field. It included several power plants, two coal washeries, a huge dam (Naga Arjun Sagar in Andhra Pradesh), fertilizer plant, automobile and truck plant, school for training of young workers for the care of bulldozers, steam shovels, Diesel Locomotive Factory at Banaras, etc. Everywhere the American aid was highly praised and appreciated. The United States Economic assistance helped India in power generation too. Experts for the Central Water and
Power Commission were also made available. The United States played a major role in the development of transportation, especially in the supply of locomotives and railway wagons, and provided foreign exchange for purchase of its requirements at global level. Road and air transport also received American aid. Vishakapatnam received assistance in enlarging its capacity. No single nation gave to India such big amounts as the United States gave for the development of its transport.

Though the American Government was munificent enough to give all possible economic aid to India, yet it was averse to any aid being given for public undertakings. A capitalist country as America was, it was averse to giving aid to public sector undertakings. To look into the matter of United States Aid, a new “Committee to strengthen the Security of the Free World” was appointed by President Kennedy on December 10, 1962. It was headed by General Lucius D. Clay. The Clay Committee Report under the title: “The Scope and Distribution of United States Military and Economic Assistance Programme,” was published in 1963.
The Clay Committee Report and the Hickenlooper amendment to the 1962 Aid Bill, called for suspension of all economic aid to nations which expropriated American business without due compensation. It was also recommended that no American economic aid be given for projects under public undertakings. The Report said: "United States should not aid a foreign government in projects establishing government owned industrial and commercial enterprises which compete with existing private endeavours." \[109\]

The Clay Committee Report also suggested that aid to India could be stepped up because "India has recently proved, however, that, it is determined to maintain its independence from communist domination. Together with our ally, Pakistan, it is the only area of South Asia able to offset the Red Chinese colossus." \[110\]

The Report went on to add that with India there is fair chance that the right kind of aid in the right quantities would enable a great nation to create the economically pluralist, progressive, relatively stable society which United States strategy envisaged." \[111\] The question of Bokaro Steel Mill in India was opposed on the ground of public sector versus private sector. India had asked for aid to
the tune of $512 million dollars. There was intense opposition to such aid. General Clay, who headed the Committee to review the AID programme decided that no aid could be given to India for Bokaro so long as it was in the public sector. In one of his numerous news conferences President Kennedy defended the setting up of the Bokaro Steel Plant in public sector. President Kennedy felt "... it would be a great mistake not to build it. India needs that steel." He maintained: "I would think we could assist if it meets what the economy of India requires. I must say that I don't quite get the logic of those who so vehemently oppose this very much needed project," then he countered the opposition to public sector by reminding the press of a loan of "hundreds of million dollars to Canada to join in the nationalization of the electric lights of Quebec." Despite President Kennedy's defense, the Senators continued to oppose any American aid for public sector undertakings. Seeing this trend of the Senators and the controversy that was raging there, India finally withdrew the request for aid to spare the United States "further embarrassment."

On April 2, 1963 in a message to the Congress, President
Kennedy said: "The wisdom of earlier United States aid in helping the Indian sub-continent's considerable fruitful efforts towards progress and stability can hardly now be in question." In July 1963 Galbraith announced a loan of $ 80 million for Tarapur Energy Plant. On October 21, 1963 India and the United States entered into an agreement for providing American loans of 39.6 million dollars to three state-owned projects in India. The largest loan out of this agreement was of 10 million dollars for Chandrapura Thermal Power Station in the Damodar Valley a United States aided project on the West Bengal-Bihar border. The second loan of 15.85 million dollars was the Indian railways and the third was for a roadways project in the Jharia coal fields.

During the Kennedy years, under PL-480 programme, India received near 1,500 million dollars of aid annually. This United States assistance went a long way in averting starvation when India was passing through an acute famine. Thus, United States of America certainly continued to play a crucial role in India's economic development.

Kennedy's approach to foreign policy and economic aid to the Third World was very sophisticated indeed. It was a
combination of help to communists, to non-aligned and to allies-in-arms. He simultaneously helped the private and the public sector, because he believed that "Every nation is free to shape its own economic institutions in accordance with its own national needs and will." In his final news conference before his assassination, he said: "These countries are poor, they are nationalists, they are proud, they in many cases radical. I don't think threats from Capital Hills bring the results which are frequently hoped.... I don't regard the struggle as over and I don't think it is probably going to be over for this century." Then he added: "I think it is a very dangerous untidy world. I think we will have to live with it."116

In sum nearly till the outbreak of the Korean war, United States did like to disburse her resources for any thing other than defense in Asia. It had always subordinated its aid programme to its national security consideration. It was only when the question of stemming the tide of communism arose, did the United States think of aid to India.
With the advent of Kennedy in power, there were certain misgivings and apprehensions in Pakistan. But President Kennedy hastened to allay them by extending an invitation to Ayub Khan to visit the States. He also sent Averall Harriman to Pakistan with a special message for Ayub Khan. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson also visited Pakistan and expressed full support for Pakistan. He assured their "steadfast friends that we are the kind of friends that are steadfast too." But the Pakistanis were not very happy because even the word ‘Kashmir” was not mentioned in the joint communique, issued at the time of departure of Vice-President Johnson from Pakistan. This was because President Kennedy had given this brief to Johnson only to “listen and learn” and convey to Pakistani view to him. During President Ayub’s visit to the United States, Kennedy agreed to impress on Nehru about Pakistan’s strong feelings on Kashmir and hence the “necessity” of a settlement of the Kashmir Dispute. When China invaded India, Washington to begin with tried to pressurize India to settle the Kashmir question with Pakistan. But later changed its attitude. This was considered a new trend in American policy towards
Pakistan and India. However, the Pakistanis were very unhappy over the munificent help given to India. They accused the United States of favouring India at the cost of close friend and ally.

During President Ayub's visit to the United States, he sought American support over Kashmir, but President Kennedy was not responsive to the Pakistani request. The Joint Communique issued at the end of Ayub's visit only mentioned American desire and hope for an early settlement. The utmost length to which President Kennedy went was the Americans backing for a UN supervised plebiscite in Kashmir.119

But bowing to the strong public sentiment in Pakistan, and Pakistan's request for a meeting of the Security Council on Kashmir against American advice, President Kennedy was persuaded to write letters to President Ayub and Prime Minister Nehru on January 16, 1961, offering mediation through a mutually acceptable person, who was to be Eugene Black.120 Nehru rejected the offer outright. He made it clear that know third party mediation was acceptable to India. He wrote: "A Third Party cannot come in where this issue of sovereignty is involved. In these matters only the two parties concerned can talk about it."121
President Kennedy did not like this attitude of India. Hence there occurred a slight cooling of relations between the two. This period witnessed the Indian action in Goa and Stevenson's bitter attack on India in December 1961. The press and the people alike criticized India's action and Nehru was accused of "double standards" and "hypocrisy". However, after this President Kennedy became cautious in his reference to India. Meanwhile, in the Security Council Debate, American Representative in the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson did not give any support to Pakistan. He only pleaded for a "high level conference between India and Pakistan, and reiterated support to UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. Meanwhile, Ireland's draft resolution of the Security Council was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The Pakistan Times commented: "We should spare our energy on getting angry with the Soviet Union for its veto. If there is any one to be angry with, it is our friends and allies. Not only have they done previously little to stand by us diplomatically, they were competing with the Soviet Union in wooing India."

American press showed public sympathy with Pakistan. They were critical of Nehru and India. The New York Times
commented: "there has been disapproval and disappointment at some actions India has taken recently, notably her .... refusal to reach settlement on the Kashmir issue." The "one of the most unpopular of world’s neutralists" and that Americans were "fed up" with him.

In the wake of American military aid to India, in January 1963 Nehru rejected Kennedy’s offer of help in settling the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. Nehru reiterated India’s stand that the dispute should be settled through direct negotiations between the two parties. He was unwilling to accept any form of intervention by a third party. The United States at this time gave all our support to the Security Council resolution to promote a settlement of the key dispute of Kashmir. To this Prime Minister Nehru complained vehemently and questioned American “goodwill” towards India generated during the 1962 Chinese War. He remarked that “all the good will built up over the years was washed out in one stroke”, by a “speech made and vote cast.” In the Lok Sabha debate he cautioned the United States that Kashmir was “flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone.” However, the Americans felt that unless India and Pakistan reached some sort of
settlement on Kashmir, peace and security in the sub-continent would never be possible. Hence the United States continued to bring pressure upon Nehru for talks on Kashmir. Towards this purpose, a conference of three American diplomats—Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, John Kenneth Galbraith, American Ambassador to India and Walter P. McNaughton, American Ambassador to Pakistan—was held in New Delhi at the end of January 1963 to consider possible solution of the Kashmir problem. The United States viewed its "Kashmir exercise" as their effort to improve Indo-Pakistan relations by removing the sore spot of Kashmir. The United States suggested the partition of Kashmir. Pakistan was not prepared to accept any partition proposal which would leave the Srinagar valley in Indian hands.\textsuperscript{129}

The United States and Britain, succeeded in pursuing India to negotiate a settlement of Kashmir problem, to the extent that an Indian proposal was given to Bhutto by the Indian Railway Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh. Herein, India was ready to shift area of considerable importance from Indian to Pakistani control leading to major revision of the cease-fire line. It was then
reported that the United States assured Pakistan that in her case, if Pakistan accepted the proposal then the United States would offer Pakistan massive economic aid to develop regions of Kashmir that would come under her control. The Dawn rejected the proposal on the plea that no plan would be acceptable to Pakistan unless the Pakistani flag would fly “over every house in Srinagar.”130 Pakistan’s proposal, according to the Indian delegate, was “asking for the whole state.”131 United States also proposed a top level meeting between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohd. Ayub Khan. Commenting on these talks Sardar Swaran Singh said that the talks would go on as long as necessary, to achieve “a final and honourable solution” to the Kashmir problem. In spite of six rounds of talks, nothing substantial emerged out of them because of Pakistan’s rigid attitude.

NEHRU IN THE UNITED STATES

Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, arrived at Idlewild air port on November 5, 1961. Others in the delegations included Mrs. Indira Gandhi, M.J. Desai, Foreign Secretary and Mr. and Mrs. B.K. Nehru. The meeting between Nehru and Kennedy was a symbolic meeting between the world’s largest democracy as
represented by India and the stronger democracy as represented by the United States.

Immediately after arrival, Nehru pointed out that India and the United States have no major outstanding problems or conflicts in between them. Rather they were both interested in preserving peace and democracy in the world. There were minor irritants or frictions which would be easily resolved. Nehru remarked: "We may have many things in common in our ideals and concepts ... we differ but this is a healthy sign." Speaking at the State Dinner given by President Kennedy, Nehru declared that past history, common objectives and ideals and the call of the future pushed India and the United States in the direction of friendship and cooperation. He said: "we may not agree with American people always, but you have always seemed in some ways nearer to us, near in certain ideals you hold and which are enshrined in our constitution." Saner elements in the two countries thought that in the best interest of the world and themselves, as far as possible, only points of agreements and mutual appreciation rather than spotlight difference, which were but natural between the two free democracies should be emphasized.
President Kennedy and his top advisors felt that India with its huge population and growing industrial base was perhaps the only country which could possibly stem the communist inroads in Asia and Africa. Among the neutral countries, Kennedy was interested the most in India. “India”, he said, “is one of the relatively few countries where full blooded democracy does flourish.” He regarded it as “the key area” in Asia. He believed that if India failed then China would win all Asia. Hence, Kennedy believed India to be “the hinge of fate in Asia.”

The American press hailed Nehru’s visit to the States and praised to Nehru for “his dedicated leadership.” The Washington Post called Nehru “the head of a nation towards which the American people have had the warmest and friendliest feelings.” The Post further declared Nehru as “outstanding among the leaders of the new nations that have emerged in this generation.” The New York Times welcomed Nehru as “the esteemed leader of a great and friendly nation.” The Denver Post called him “a temperate man.” The Newsweek wrote “Nehru is one of the twentieth century’s great tribunes, a seer of lofty philosophies.... He is indeed a great world statesman, a great charismatic leader,
perhaps a great thinker too." Nehru was, thus, welcomed as a renowned world statesman and chief architect of progress and stability in Asia. Kennedy had great respect for Nehru and especially his love of liberty. In answer to a question in “Meet the Press” session with press correspondents, he said: “there are areas where we differ, but I do not know any future in the world, as I have said on other occasions, who is more committed to individual liberty than Mr. Nehru.”

Immediately after his arrival Nehru had two rounds of talks with President Kennedy on Laos, South Vietnam and a special meeting of 90 minutes on South-East Asia. In one of the sessions of talks, Kennedy discussed ‘personalities involved in matters affecting our countries’, viz., V.K. Krishna Menon. President Kennedy spoke frankly to Nehru about Menon’s role in the United Nations and how the feelings in America were against the Defense Minister. Kennedy had considered Krishna Menon the “Dulles of Neutralism”. The News and World Report considered him to be “as being communist in all but name.” What hurt the Americans about Menon was his anti-American bent in his views. Nehru was surprised to note the controversial position of Menon.
Responding to American view, on his return to India, Nehru directed Krishna Menon to go to Washington and meet President Kennedy.¹⁴⁰

Nehru had a highly pleasant tour of the United States. But he was constantly on the alert to clarify and explain India’s point of view, especially India’s policy of non-alignment. This was essential because the American’s were perplexed and angry that they could not get the moral support of the uncommitted India for what they considered to be their righteous stand on Berlin, Vietnam, nuclear test ban, etc. One of the major issues responsible for creating some heat was India’s stand on nuclear tests. American’s were irritated at India’s role in equating Russian’s poisonous nuclear explosion in the air with the harmless underground nuclear tests of the United States. President Kennedy explained American position on many international issues which created misunderstandings between the two nations. Nehru agreed with Kennedy about West’s right of access to West Berlin, which Nehru thought must be guaranteed in any settlement with the Soviet Union. Kennedy regarded his talks with Nehru as “most valuable.”
Nehru’s visit to the United States restored the poise in Indo-American relations which had been clouded and poisoned by doubts, suspicions and irritations. It was felt that Nehru was able to explain successfully to the President—if not to all America—India’s approach to world affairs. He was successful in allaying American irritation over Indian attitude towards nuclear tests. President Kennedy at a news conference remarked that he felt that it was possible for the United States and India to disagree “in the framework of not charging each other with bad faith.”

One of the very important and positive achievement of Nehru’s meeting with Kennedy was the realization by both the leaders that “each other’s stand was not exclusive and that they could reach other on the same wave-length.” In the matter of the general economic well being of the people at large, Kennedy reaffirmed American interest in the success of India’s efforts for the well being of her people. The Joint Statement issued after the conclusion of Nehru’s visit stated that their talks were “pleasant and rewarding”, and “highly useful in the pursuit of their common objectives of an enduring world peace and enhanced understanding between the Government of India and the United
States”. The Joint Statement also expressed the view that “They intend to keep closely in touch with each other in the months ahead.”

On his return to India, Nehru told the Parliamentary members of the Congress Party that his talks with President Kennedy had been extremely cordial and the American were now appreciative India’s policies.

**MRS. JACQUELIN KENNEDY’S VISIT TO INDIA**

In November 1961, Prime Minister Nehru had invited Mrs. Jacquelin Kennedy to visit India. She was in India in March 1962 on a ten day semi-official visit. She reached Delhi on March 12 and received a tumultuous and glowing welcome. Prime Minister Nehru, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Mrs. Vijaya Laxmi Pandit, V.K. Krishna Menon, S.K. Patil, Mr. and Mrs. B.K. Nehru and Mrs. J.K. Galbraith received and greeted her at the airport.

All through her stay in India, Nehru scrupulously avoided politics in his talks with Mrs. Kennedy. He never mentioned a word about Goa, Kashmir or Pakistan. Nehru described her visit
as "very successful". If her visit did one thing then it was the removal of all "pique about Goa and re-established the process which was making the President so popular a figure throughout India."\textsuperscript{144} She was given a warm and affectionate send off by Nehru and others. When she left, she expressed "a feeling of affection for this country." She said she was leaving India with "gratitude and sadness." The Dawn underlined that one reason for the revival of friendship (after Goa) between India and the United States was the enormous successful visit to India paid by Mrs. Kennedy.\textsuperscript{145} It can also be said: "The underlying sympathy between India and the United States found eloquent expression in 1962 in the glow of warmth engendered by Mrs. Kennedy's spring visit to India."\textsuperscript{146}

India invited President Kennedy to visit India in November 1963. The invitation was delivered by D.N. Chatterjee, Indian Charge d'Affaires at Washington when he went with Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mrs. B.K. Nehru. Mrs. Gandhi paid a courtesy visit to the President. She was in the States on a six weeks lecture tour. President Kennedy's visit to India slated for the winter of 1963 was a certainty in view of the wide coverage, love and affection
shown to Mrs. Kennedy on her visit to India. But it never materialized due to the reason that the President Kennedy was assassinated.

Kennedy's assassination was widely mourned in India, both individually and nationally. Indians, the looked upon him a good friend who was genuinely interested in India and other developing countries. The change of leadership was now to one headed by a man who was believed to dislike Indians and to be a parochially minded American nationalist and so was most unwelcome. However, for the first year and a half of the Johnson administration, during which Jawaharlal Nehru died and Lal Bahadur Shastri became the Prime Minister, there were no major difficulties in Indo-American relations, even though the warmth that had often characterized them during the Kennedy years had gone.

In 1965 and 1966 major differences again arose, and another low point in Indo-US relations was reached. The year 1965 was a trying one for both countries. It was the year when American involvement in Vietnam greatly escalated, eventually with disastrous results. Additionally it was when India and Pakistan
went to war for the second time, again mainly because of Kashmir. In April, prior to the large scale fighting of August-September, Indian and Pakistani troops engaged in military skirmishes in the forbidding marshes of the Rann of Kutch. At that time the Indian government filed a formal protest. It charged the alleged use of American military equipment against India. In the same month, the White House announced unilateral postponeemnt of scheduled State visits by President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India, which were to take place on April 25-26 and June 2-3 respectively. Indians resented this decision, especially since it was announced so ungraciously, and apparently unilaterally. Treating India in the same manner as Pakistan. The postponement was widely criticized in the Indian Parliament and in the press. Indians believed that a major reason for the postponement was Johnson's indignation, almost to the level of a fancied personal affront, over continuing Indian criticism of United States policy in Vietnam.

During the Indo-Pakistan War of August-September 1965 India again protested, in stronger terms, to the United States on the use of American arms against India by Pakistan. It reminded the
Johnson administration that President Eisenhower, when he announced his decision to extend arms aid to Pakistan, had assured India that the arms would not be used against India, but if they were, the United States would take steps to prevent their misuse. The United States cut off its assistance to both India and Pakistan. However, this such an action had little impact on the course of the fighting but was greatly resented in India. The United States made some efforts at mediation which were hesitant and ineffective. It supported the United Nations resolution that brought the fighting to an end. The role of the Soviet Union during the fighting and after was more appreciated in India than that of the United States. In November, India and Pakistan accepted a Soviet offer to bring the two countries together in the Soviet City of Tashkent, not far from the sub-continent. This enhanced Soviet prestige in a great measure. This was confirmed by the Soviet role, and especially the role of Prime Minister Kosygin himself. He could successfully persuade the two countries, after tortuous negotiations and several seeming impasses, to agree to the so-called Tashkent Declaration. As time passed, however, the declaration was widely criticized in both countries, especially in
Pakistan, where Zulfikar Ali Bhutto led the attack. (It was less so in India, partly because Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had signed the Tashkent Declaration, died of a heart attack at Tashkent the day after the Declaration was signed. It was felt that any criticism of the Declaration, therefore, would be a reflection on a dead leader.
REFERENCES


6. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


15. Ibid.


17. Encyclopaedia Britannica, p.508.

18. The Portuguese first built a fortress at Diu in 1531. The territory was ceded to them by a treaty with the King of Gujarat in 1538. Goa was the first territorial possession of the Portuguese in India and Asia. Daman was conquered by Dom Constantine D.C. Branjanza, who reached Goa in 1558 and one of his earlier measures was to capture
19. Portugal took the case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague in 1955, its decision was in India’s favour in April 1960.


22. From 1951 to 1961—for almost seven years, India continued to make unsuccessful efforts for a peaceful transfer of Portuguese territories in India.

23. *Nehru’s Lok Sabha Speech on September 17, 1955. India’s Foreign Policy*, p.120.


25. *Ibid*. Also on December 15, 1961 the UN General Assembly rejected Portugal’s contention that her overseas territories were provinces. Portugal brushed aside the Assembly decision, remained obdurate and continued to crush the national movement in her colonies in India and Africa. *New York Times*, December 15 and 16, 1965.


28. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson during his May 1961 visit to India requested Nehru to delay all ideas of an attack, while American diplomats attempted to persuade to negotiate, but nothing came out of all this. Thus, the charge that India did not heed American advice is wrong because from May to December 1961 is a long period.


37. Ibid., October 14, 1962.
40. Ibid., Editorial.
40.A Norman D. Palmer, "India As A Factor in the United States Foreign Policy", International Studies, pp.49-68.
40.B Ibid.
42. The Hindu, August 24, 1962.
45. Ibid.
47. The Choice of Harriman was the highest expression of President Kennedy's personal interest.
48. He later on became Secretary of the Navy and then Deputy Secretary of Defence.
50. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
55. The Hindu, November 1, 1962.
58. Times of India, November 27, 1962.
60. Ibid., p.383.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
68. Hindustan Times, November 30, 1962. President Kennedy in a statement said: "In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with Pakistan.... Chinese incursions are a threat to Pakistan as well as India, and both have common interest in opposing it."
69. United States extended most selfless aid to India in the context of the Chinese attack it was only in the later stage after the cease fire that pressure was exerted on India.
70. Sorenson, op. cit., p.664.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
78. Ibid., p.339.
80. Ibid., p.438.
80A. Ibid., p.440
81. Ibid., p.473.
82. There was a change of Ambassador in the meanwhile. Bowles replaced Galbraith.
84. Congressional Record, 1961, pp.19893-97 and 20223.
85. Ibid.
86. Times of India, June 24, 1962.
87. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. Public Papers, p.3.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
103. Ibid., April 12, 1962.
107. 17 River Water Power Generation and Irrigation Projects received aid from the United States. Agriculture and Fertilizers Factories at Vishakapatnam, Trombay, Madras, Goa, Kandlila, Kalol etc. received American aid. Agricultural Universities in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh were established with American help.
110. Ibid.
111. Public Papers of President Kennedy, 1963, p.929.
112. Ibid.
114. Ibid., September 5, 6, and 11, 1963.
116. Ibid.
120. President of World Bank, who had earlier successfully mediated between India and Pakistan on Canal Water Dispute.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., June 24, 1962.
130. Ibid., February 9, 1963.
131. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
141. Ibid., November 12, 1961.
143. It can safely be commented that Nehru's visit to the United States was able to smooth off many irritations.