CHAPTER I
CRITICAL ANALYTICAL SURVEY TILL 1960

India and America have common democratic traditions and rule of law stand as an inspiration to millions of people in the world. They had closer and intimate mutual contact between them much before India attained her independence. "India and America have been linked ever since 1492, when Christopher Columbus sailing boldly over unknown seas in his search for a passage to India, discovered America. From time to time, some Indians—and some Englishmen—have been uncharitable enough to suggest that he went too far. In any event, five years later 'Vasco de Gama' embarked on another voyage that opened another way for Europeans to reach the wealth of the Indies."¹

It was nearly four centuries after Columbus’s historic voyages that significant links between India and America began to develop. With some exceptions, contacts were quite limited and superficial until World War II because India was not independent. Resultantly, no diplomatic relations could be developed. The
State Department used to conduct its business with India through the British Embassy in Washington and through the foreign office in London. The American officials in India were ineffective because their duties were so casual and their salaries so slight. As diplomatic representatives, they were almost nullities. American offices at India looked for trade and interests of Americans living in India only. American Officials were not satisfied with the conditions of service.2

Soon after the American Revolution, trade between Americans and Indians had started. American contact with India goes as far back as 1785 when the American ship, The Grand Turk sailed into Calcutta and American Merchant established contacts with the British and French commercial firms in India. The United States obtained from Britain special concessions for trade with India by entering into a Treaty with Britain in 1794.3 In this treaty, Article XIII provided that "the vessels belonging to the citizens of the United States of America shall be admitted and hospitably received in all the seaports and harbours of the British territories in the East Indies, and that the citizens of the said United States may freely carry on trade in all articles."4 In 1800, twelve U.S.
merchant ships laden with Indian goods left Calcutta for Boston. American imports from India in 1794 were valued at about $3 million. Thus the imports of Indian goods "laid the foundation of those great fortunes which constitute the origin of the wealth of so many of the older New England Families."\(^5\)

American missionaries formed another link between the United States and India. The educational and medical missionaries were more successful in India. Their distinguished record of service won them immense approbation, goodwill. They came into contact with all sections of Indians society. They possessed intellectual curiosity and endeavored to know India and Indians. They could counterbalance the disparaging notions of India spread by their evangelistic counterparts.\(^6\)

The role of American intellectuals was more important than that of traders and missionaries. Ralph Waldo Emerson in his early life too was repelled by popular Hinduism, its "immense goddery", "cruelty and sensuality". He was, however, impressed by the ancient Hindu texts. Gita impressed Emerson. "It was the first of books—it was as if an empire spoke to us."\(^7\) One of Emerson's poems, "Brahama", had its source in the idea gathered
from Vishnu Puran, the ancient Indian classic. His poem was an excellent expression of the Hindu conception of the absolute unity of man and nature. Thus, Emerson the poet and mystic gleaned what he willed from the Hindu Cosmic Brahman to enrich his idea of the 'Oversoul'. Karma, he called 'compensation', and Hindu Maya, as 'illusion'.

Another distinguished American, Henry David Thoreau, likewise, looked upon Indian books as a royal gift. "I cannot read a single sentence in the books of Hindoos" he wrote, "without being elevated. It has such a rhythm as the winds of the desert, such a tide as the Ganges and seems as superior to criticism as the Himmalah Mounts."  

Indic studies were introduced in the American universities during the middle of the nineteenth century. Edward Elbridge Salisbury, Professor of Sanskrit and Arabic at Yale(1841-54) laid the foundations of a distinguished scholarship for the study of Indian literature and languages. Salisbury trained the first great American Sanskritist, William Dwight Whitney, who succeeded Salisbury at Yale in 1854. Both produced the Edito Princeps of Atharva Veda. Whitney's contribution to indic studies was
tremendous. He published an index Verborum of the Atharva Veda (1881). He edited and translated Atharva Veda Pratisakhya (1862), the Taittiriya Pratisakhya (1881), the Sanskrit Grammar (1879). Added to these, major works were translations of Surya Siddhant and Atharva Veda, published after his death in 1905.  

At the political level, Washington took little interest in India because the American felt satisfied that in India the British were engaged in the task of civilizing the people of a backward area in a distant continent and there was no need for U.S. intervention.

Several other American universities patronized Indic studies. The Johns Hopkins University introduced Sanskrit studies and two of its professors, C.R. Lanman and Maurice Bloomfield made Hopkins a seat of Indological studies. Anand K. Coomeraswamy, as keeper of Indian Muhammadan Art at the Museum of Fine Arts at Boston (1917-47) greatly enriched the knowledge of American in Indian Art. His scholarly publications on Indian art, architecture, sculpture and painting were well received.

Despite such a rich and distinguished tradition of American
scholarship concerning Indian languages, culture and art, the American ideologists could not kindle popular interest. It was given to Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore and other Indians to arouse popular interest. They received a tremendous response during their visits to the U.S. They unfolded India's cultural greatness. Vivekananda's contribution was lasting. His Vedanta centres popularised Indian religion and philosophy. Vivekananda's claims that his "doctrines were well on the way to winning a majority of English speaking people and were flooding the world," were resented by American Churchmen. His claims were called "preposterous, simply silly." American called Hindu India "the most stupendous fortress and citadel of ancient error and idolatry in the world."

United States interest in Indian nationalism coincided with the emergence of America as a great power at the close of the nineteenth century. The anti-British and anti-colonial sentiments that lingered on in the United States, however, made many American politicians and intellectuals criticize the British Rule in India and express sympathy for Indians. William Jennings Bryan, thrice unsuccessful candidate for Presidency, and one of the
greatest American leaders of his time during the world tour stayed in India for a short period. On his return he published a pamphlet, British Rule in India (1906). It contained a realistic criticism of imperialism of India; "The trouble is that England acquired India for England's advantage, not for India's and that she holds India for England's benefit, not for India's. She administered India with an eye to England's interest and not Indians." Several other American offered scathing criticism of imperialism. They likened India to a "great estate owned by an absentee and alien landlord."

American-Indian relations were almost bound to become closer as the world became closer knot, and particularly with the politics of Europe leading to the collapse of influence of that hitherto politically dominant continent. These developments were only faintly discernible in 1914. The Indian-American relations had yet to enter its important phase. With all India's moving into a paroxysm of revolt against British Rule.

The First World War had seemed, for a while, like a temporary interlude in the essential isolation of the American republic. For a while after the war 1914-1918, the United States sought to take itself back to the nineteenth century. It began to
look at the world from the wisdom of founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington. But the world had not stood still, even within the United States. The American had won their own independence of the world. President Woodrow Wilson had announced that the world must be made safe for democracy. That phrase and many other of Wilson’s marvellous utterances about democracy and the mission of America, were to make Americans conscience-stricken at oppression everywhere, even in India.

The beginnings of American interest coincided with the growth of the extremist phase of Indian nationalism. American favoured the Swadesh and boycott movements. They likened them to their non-importation movements launched before the American Revolution. The terroristic and revolutionary phase was not welcome to them. The revolutionary activities in India culminating in political assassinations and murders aroused in them serious misgivings. The presence of few hundred Indians who settled on the American West Coast around 1900 did not help the U.S. to change its opinion of India. Their way of life did not inspire respect.
Furthermore, a group of revolutionaries who mostly hailed from the Punjab carried on an agitation to improve the living conditions of Indian. As early as 1910, in California, there was an organization called the Hindi Association, which later became the Ghadr Party, with headquarters in San Francisco. The association published a journal called Ghadr in Urdu and Punjabi. Har Dayal was its first editor. He incurred the wrath of the American police for speaking against the tyranny of the Tzar of Russia and had to finally leave America. The first conference of Indian revolutionaries abroad were held in February 1914 at Stockton in California. The Russians and Irish immigrants in the United States used to speak at the meetings held by the Ghadr Party. Indians were sore over the fact the United States had allowed itself to be bullied by the British government into taking severe action against Indian revolutionaries. Har Dayal's arrest was ordered. He absconded to Switzerland. A few radical Americans, however, supported the Indians and criticized their government's servile attitude towards the British.17

During the First World War, another Indian emigre, Lala Lajpat Rai, achieved better success in enlightening the American
public regarding India's political aspirations. He won over several American Congressmen and eminent figures. To carry on propaganda for the recognition of India's claim for Home Rule, Lala Lajpat Rai founded the India Home Rule League of America. The League was a well-organized institution. The League successfully countered propaganda carried on by the British publicists like Valentine Chirol. Its role in bringing Indian politics within the range of American understanding was noteworthy.

President Woodrow Wilson's idealistic enunciation of the doctrine of national self-determination, and its application in the post-war peace settlement, aroused Indian hope and expectation. The Indian leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak sought Wilson's support for India's freedom. When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted an inquiry into the right of self-determination for certain countries Lala Lajpat Rai appeared and presented a memorandum. Dudley Field Malone, an eminent American, helped in preparing this memorandum.

During the debate in the United States over ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, a few senators were critical of the British
rule in India. One of them Joseph I. France of Maryland, on October 9, 1919, observed that the U.S. should not sign the treaty which gave Britain the right to exploit India. George W. Norris of Nebraska defended the right of the people of India to freedom. He criticized the British government for refusing self-determination and self-government to India after such a valuable contribution during the war. In the House of Representatives, William E. Mason of Chicago likewise expressed hope for the self-determination of India.

In spite of the isolationist impulse after the war, United States interest in India did not diminish. The Montague-Chelmsford Reforms were initially well-received in America. The Americans considered them a step forward in the right direction. The Jallianwala Bagh tragedy sparked a reference in the Senate on February 27, 1920. Senator Norris inserted in the Congressional Record an article on the Amritsar Killings published in London by L.R. Murdoch, Staff Correspondent of the Universal News Service. The rise to prominence of Gandhi aroused still more interest. Americans recognized in Gandhi the symbol of Indian political awakening. His non-cooperation movement evoked many
articles in favour and against in the American press.

After the failure of the Non-Cooperation Movement Indian politics was marked by a stalemate. So did the American interest. It was only after the appointment and subsequently the visit of the Simon Commission that American interest was resurrected. The leading American newspapers gave wide publicity and coverage to the Commission's activities. There was a crystallization in India's favour. India was invited to be an original signatory to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, on the same footing as the self-governing British dominions. The American press hailed the historic announcement of Purna Swarajya (Complete independence) at the Lahore session of the Indian National Congress in 1929. The leading daily, the New York Times, graphically covered the speech of Jawaharlal Nehru, the President of the Congress at that session. Sherwood Eddy likened Nehru's attitude towards the British empire to that of Jefferson a century and more earlier. An Indian Independence League was formed at New York under the Chairmanship of T.H. Rezmie. It celebrated Indian Independence Day on January 26, 1930. Several Americans including Jebez T. Sunderland and Charles F. Andrews
participated in the celebrations, and hoisted the national flag. Senator John Blaine of Wisconsin moved a resolution in the Senate seeking United States recognition of Indian independence. The resolution was referred to the Foreign Relations Committee.25

The Civil Disobedience Movement of 1930 had a wider appeal. Hitherto critical or natural sections of American press now hailed the Indian national aspirations. During the Round Table Conferences in London, Roger Baldwin, a member of Civil Liberties Union, along with sixty-two Americans, sent a memorandum to the British Government beseeching grant of independence to India. The Government of India Act 1935, drawn after the labours of the Round Table Conferences, belied Indian hopes and aspirations. Americans upheld Nehru's characterization of this Act as a charter of slavery.26

Alarmed at the American sympathy for India, the British speeded up their propaganda. Freedom beneath the British flag, so argued the British publicists, had been the aim of British imperialism. To repudiate these apparently sound British arguments, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote two provocative articles: "Unity of India" and "Anxious India", for the leading American journals,
Foreign Affairs and Asia. From the articles, the Americans had come to believe that British were denying independence to India. In keeping with their liberalism, Americans in general sympathized with Indian longing for freedom. However, their sympathy and interest was academic, idealistic, and unofficial.

The Second World War gave a new turn to American interest in Indian Nationalism. India came to occupy a strategic position in the allied war effort against the Axis Powers. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December, 1941 and their thrust into South-East Asia, India suddenly became important to Washington. U.S. War supplies to China and the Soviet Union were going through India. There was serious apprehension in the minds of U.S. strategists that if India were to fall, the chances of defeating Japan would be reduced.

India was also vital for the United States against Japan. The Congress Party in its earliest reaction to the war had declared that "a free and independent India will gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defense against aggression". The United States Government, therefore, rightly concluded that Indian would cooperate better if they were assured of
independence at least after the war. The dual between British imperialism and Indian nationalism thus became one of the concerns of American diplomacy during the Second World War. In February, 1942, the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate criticized the Roosevelt administration for not making any effort to give guidance to Britain to free India. Some American newspapers were also critical of Washington's weak policy towards India. In a discussion in February, 1942 Roosevelt asked Winston Churchill about India's future political status. Churchill recorded later that he reacted so strongly that Roosevelt never raised the issue again.28

With the signing of the Atlantic Charter, the United States was openly committed to the cause of freedom to the colonies. As a statement of war aims, its Article 3 laid down "They respect the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived to them."29 Such an emphatic anti-imperialist stand was bound to affect the subject nations all over the world. India was thrilled at this United States commitment.30 Consequently, Indians
began to look to America for support in their struggle for independence against the British.

Churchill was alarmed at this development. Churchill came out with a British interpretation of the Charter. During a debate in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, he asserted that "the Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma and other parts of the British Empire." 31

The United States did not openly repudiate Churchill's interpretation. Its acquiescence in the unilateral British interpretation at that time was a blow to her anti-imperialist image in India. The Indians, henceforth, suspected that British imperialism was being supported by the United States. The process of dentifying America as an imperialist power can be traced to this unhappy failure of the United States to take a firm principled stand.

Roosevelt did advocate some amount of relaxation of the British hold on India. He drafted a letter to Churchill urging him
to take steps towards self-government for India. He said, "I wonder whether there is sufficient spirit to fight among the Indian people." He advised the British Government to give India dominion status under a temporary government consisting of not more than thirty or forty persons of different parties, castes, regions, and occupations so that Indian could become more loyal to the British empire and see the advantage of peaceful evolution over revolution.32

Roosevelt was concerned. He directed the American Ambassador, Winant, to discuss India with Churchill and explore what the Prime Minister thought about a new relation between Britain and India. W. Averell Harriman, the President's special representative in London, in the absence of Winant, discussed the Indian problem with Churchill on February 26, 1942. The Prime Minister showed every desire to keep Roosevelt informed. He apprised Harriman of political discussions going on in London about India. He promised to send a personal cable to President Roosevelt over the weekend.

The initial easy victories of Japan dealt a mortal blow to British prestige in India. Within three weeks of the fall of
Singapore, Hong Kong and Rangoon had surrendered. British naval losses were grievous. The Japanese Navy was, it seemed, free to enter the Bay of Bengal. The eastern coastline of India lay open to an invasion. United States anxiety over the radically changed conditions increased. The President felt it essential to have in India a representative who had a close recent contact with military affairs and was well-known to the armed forces. The choice fell on Colonel Louis Johnson, a former Assistant Secretary of war. He was appointed President's Personal Representative in India on March 11, 1942. He was directed to study the political situation.33

Colonel Johnson reached India during the deadlock over the proposals, on April 3, 1942. He took an active part to resolve the deadlock. He met the British Minister Cripps, the Viceroy, and General Sir Archibald Wavell. "For a week" so goes a contemporary account, "it looked as though the centre of gravity shifted from Cripps to Johnson, from London to New York, from Churchill to Roosevelt."34 Within a day Johnson realized the imminence of the failure of the Cripps Mission. He reported to the President that Cripps was advising the Prime Minister of three
possible courses and seeking his orders, namely: (a) no further concessions; (b) modification of the Draft Declaration by conceding defense to an Indian minister, if protected by agreement in writing that the Minister could take no action contrary to Empire war policy as exercised by the Commander-in-Chief; (c) convert the present Defense Ministry into a War Ministry, which would be left under the Commander-in-chief, and then create a new office of Minister Coordinator of Defense, placing under him relatively unimportant subjects like public relations, etc., and appointing an Indian thereto.

To save the Cripps Mission, Johnson pleaded that the President should intercede with Churchill without disclosing that he was aware of the Cripps advice to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet. Roosevelt did not concur with Johnson’s suggestion. He did not deem it desirable to undertake personal participation. He feared that if he interposed his views it would complicate the already complicated situation. At this stage, Johnson with the prior approval of Cripps placed another compromise amendment that come to be known as Johnson amendment. The Congress Party made some modification in the
The agreement over Johnson's formula with changed wordings was interpreted by Cripps as meaning the same thing as his original amendment.

The Congress Working Committee on April 10, 1942 finally rejected the Cripps Proposals. It delivered a copy of the resolution to Johnson who stayed in India till May 19, 1942. All his efforts to find amicable solution were of no avail. On his return to Washington, Johnson reported to the President, that the British Government had sabotaged the Cripps Mission. But the State Department officials did not fully share Johnson's assessment. The Americans continued to view this as a far-reaching step in the right direction which the Indian leaders had turned down. British propaganda, therefore, clouded the official American attitude against the Indian nationalists and nullified American sympathy and support for India.

The threat of the Quit India Movement were viewed with concern in the United States. Also Gandhi's statements and the Quit India demand were misunderstood and were construed as opposing United States war aims. Thus, on the eve of the Quit India Movement there took place a shift in the American official and
public attitude towards the Indian demand of independence.

Giving priority to defense over independence they argued that the Quit India movement meant a diminution of the British war efforts. In this regard, the American Press and public opinion concurred with the Administration's policy and thinking. The New York Times in its successive editorials condemned the Congress Party saying "Britain cannot tolerate anarchy in India while her own life is at stake, nor can we in this country urge her to do so."\textsuperscript{38}

With the stiffening of the American official and public attitude coupled with the presence of American troops in India, Indian suspicion were confirmed that Americans were behind British Imperialism. The public debate over the Indian situation in the American press was very much reflected in the Congress chambers. The climax of Congressional interest in India was witnessed on August 20, 1942 when Senator Reynolds of North Carolina initiated one of the most interesting and bitter Senate debates over the freedom for India. He asserted that the United States could aid in bringing about eternal peace by extending freedom—unqualified freedom—to the 370,000,000 to 400,000,000 people of India. In the context of the Atlantic
Charter, the United States could best show to the world its seriousness and good faith by calling upon its ally to grant immediate freedom to India. However, several Senators believed that taking up India's cause openly would disrupt relations with Britain.

Despite the Senate's reluctance to take a stand, the Quit India Movement seemed to have awakened the American conscience. For two years 1942-44, Americans publicists had continued to talk and write about the Indian situation. A genuine desire to know India and her people was quite evident in the American mind. This was a phase when several books intended to acquaint Americans with the Indian problem appeared in the United States.

Consequently, the United States Government could not remain indifferent and non-interventionist for long because of the vociferous public opinion in the country, nor could it afford to remain non-inter-ventionist. It decided to explore the feasibility of some agreement between the British and Indian leaders. William Phillips was chosen to serve as Personal Representative of the President he was desired to study the Indian situation on the spot, and suggest possible ways of resolving the deadlock. Thus,
by the end of 1942, the United States had reverted to its earlier policy of diplomatic intervention in the Indian situation.

Except for a few diehards, British Circles welcomed the appointment of Phillips. They showed cordiality to him during his two month stay in London before departure to India. Phillips' arrival in Delhi aroused the curiosity of the Indian people concerning the purpose of his mission. There was lot of hope and expectation. Phillips toured the Punjab. He went to Lahore, Amritsar and several villages. He talked to Muslims of all shades of opinion. Phillips' return from Punjab coincided with Gandhi's ultimatum to begin a fast in the jail from February 9, 1943.

The Gandhian fast resulted in bringing the United States prominently into the picture. The United States was taken to task for its silence and neutrality by the Indian Press. President Roosevelt and his Personal Representative in India, Phillips, became the target of attack for not uttering a word of protest to the British and for their cruel policy towards Gandhi. C. Rajagopalachari, the veteran Congress leader, emphasized upon Phillips the importance of the United States Government making its position clear. This was necessary to avoid the otherwise
inevitable conclusion in the Asiatic mind that the United States was collaborating with Great Britain in the crisis and had formed a White bloc.40

Indian public pressure on Phillips to do something to save Gandhi increased every day. He, therefore, sought permission of the State Department to authorize him to express American concern over the crisis and fear of Gandhi's death in order to correct the impression of American inactivity.41 The Department of State, to mollify the Indian opinion, advised Phillips to say that matters affecting the Indian situation were being dealt with by high officials of the American and British Governments. But this was hardly enough because it prevented Phillips from expressing sympathy for India. Accordingly, he wrote to the President about the Viceroy and his policy being the "chip of the old block that America knew something about in 1772."42

The momentary crisis ended as Gandhi completed the fast. Phillips resumed his tour of India, interrupted on account of Gandhi's fast and returned to Delhi on April 1, 1943. These travels convinced him that the key to the Indian crisis was in the hands of the British Government. Churchill alone could convince the
Indian people that the promise of their complete independence after the war was an iron-bound promise.

President Roosevelt desired that Phillips should return to Washington for consultations at the end of April, 1943. Before returning, Phillips desired to meet the Congress leaders Gandhi and Nehru. Earlier the Viceroy had turned down Phillips' request for a meeting with Gandhi. Without such a meeting his mission would remain one-sided and incomplete.43

Phillips left India on April 29, 1943 without meeting the Congress leaders. In his farewell, press conference he made the statement that "I should like to have met and talked with Mr. Gandhi. I requested the appropriate authorities for permission to do so and was informed that they were unable to grant the necessary facilities".44

On his return to Washington, Phillips met the President and gave orally his impressions on the Indian situation.45 He emphasized the need of a solemn British declaration to the effect that India would achieve independence at a specified date after the war and as a guarantee of good faith in this respect a provisional
representative coalition government would be established at the centre and limited power transferred it.  

President Roosevelt seemed to have concurred with Phillips' appraisal of the situation in India. He asked him to see Churchill who happened to be in Washington for 'Trident' and tell him frankly his impression. Phillips sensed Roosevelt's reluctance to talk to Churchill on Indian problem, for Churchill had earlier rebuffed him. Thus, ended the Phillips Mission to India. 

The United States' failure to influence British policy in India and assume active intervention in favour of India's freedom resulted in a considerable anti-American feeling among the Indians. The one almost unanimous hope in India that the United States would true to its liberal ideals enshrined in the Atlantic Charter exert pressure on Britain withered away. 

The British never accepted the unwarranted American advocacy of Indian cause. By the middle of 1944 the prospects of a United Nations victory lessened the tension in India by releasing Gandhi unconditionally. The Viceroy expected from Gandhi to produce constructive proposals. Before submitting the proposal
to the Viceroy, a meeting of Gandhi and Jinnah was arranged. Since Gandhi did not recognize the two-nation theory of Jinnah, the meeting was a failure.

Unfortunately, another irritant in Anglo-American relations at this time appeared owing to Drew Pearson, the famous American columnist, publishing extracts from a confidential communication dated May 14, 1943, from Phillips to Roosevelt, on the Indian situation. The publication caused a furore in England. The British Government protested to the State Department. It demanded a statement dissociating itself from the views expressed by Phillips in that communication. Among other things, the British were angry because of three points of that communication, to which they took strong exception. These were:

1. The unfair reference that Britain was going to give token assistance in the war against Japan.

2. Churchill's reference to the fact that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to India.

3. The damaging reference to the morale of Indian army.
The publication changed Phillips' relations with the British. He resigned. Chester Bowles had rightly remarked that "At the cost of his job, Phillips insisted that Britain and America could not expect India to serve as our ally against the Japanese and Germans unless she felt she was fighting for her independent future."48

With the end of the war in sight, there was visible decline in India's strategic importance. So was American interest in Indian independence. The Indian question was thrown into the background. Hull, the consistent advocate of India cause, retired with the conviction that "soon after the war ended India must, and would be granted independence."49 The Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, in a press statement on January 29, 1945, reaffirmed American interest in a general and subdued tone.

The story of American interest in the independence for India during the Second World War remains a tragedy of high intentions self-defeated. There was an inherent opposition between United States support to Britain as an ally and the espousal of Indian independence. It was difficult to reconcile these two position. The United States took every opportunity at the diplomatic level to impress upon the British that India must be free. The British
resented this as unwarranted interference in their internal matters. The Indians condemned it as doing nothing. By falling to force the British to act, the American statesmen imperilled the liberal image of their country in the world.

The Second World War buried British imperialism. It was hastened by the defeat of the Conservative Party at the British General elections of 1945, a few weeks after the surrender of Germany. Winston Churchill, the leader of the Conservative Party, had led Britain through the difficult war years. He had been the chief opponent of the nationalist cause in India during the war. The Labour Government which took office in July, 1945, favoured independence for India at an early date. The Leader of the Labour Party C.R. Attlee (elected as Prime Minister) had long been a member of the Simon Commission himself had long been interested in a solution of the problem. It is difficult to surmise the extent to which Attlee was influenced by the American administration’s general approach to the issue of imperialism. But the British Government appeared quite serious. It called for elections, both for the central and provincial assemblies in India. It further announced the intention of His Majesty’s Government to
convene, as soon as possible, after the elections, a constituent assembly for British India.

A dramatic change occurred in the Indian situation due to the impending elections. Both the parties—the Congress and the Muslims League—made elaborate preparations for contesting the elections. The British Government also decided to appoint a Parliamentary delegation of all parties, to visit India.

Several American supporters of Indian freedom—Pearl S. Buck, Louis Fischer, John Gunther, A. Phillips, Randolph, Emmanuel Celler, William Ernest Hocking, James Warbasse, Charles M. La Follette John childs, Oswald Garrison Villard, Mark Starr, John Haynes Holmes, Roger N. Baldwin, Harry W. Laidler, Lewis Corey, Arthur Garfield Hays and Bruce Bliven—in a cable urged Attlee to take action including formation of an interim national cabinet government in which the Viceroy should be given the status analogous to that of British King. Such a government then should call a convention to draft the national constitution. For without an Indian government there could be no successful constitutional convention. Earlier, the Congress of the United States of America had kept alive American interest in
Indian freedom. This was at a time when the American government had turned non-interventionist on account of the exigencies of the cold war. Congressmen Emmenuel Celler of New York, John M.Coffee of Washington, James G.Fulton of Pennsylvania and William Langer of North Dakota inserted in the Congressional Record several excerpts from their speeches on Indian freedom. Langer appended an open letter to British Prime Minister arguing for India’s immediate independence.

The elections were held in 1946 and the results were encouraging to the League. The League captured all Muslims seats in the Central Assembly and 428 out of 492 seats in the provincial assemblies. Its striking failure was in the North-West Frontier Province, a predominantly Muslims province of British India. G.E. Jones, correspondent of The New York Times commented on election results thus: "yet it is important to note that according to an independent compilation made by this writer the Muslim League candidates polled not more than 73 per cent of the Muslim popular vote in the Pakistan area. In one Pakistan province, North-West Frontier, it gained only 41 per cent of the Muslim Votes." Jones added that "the League's majority of 73 per
cent among the Muslims can hardly be said to indicate that the bulk of the population desires a separation from the rest of India.54

On March 23, 1946, Britain's Labour Government sent a Cabinet Mission to obtain the widest measure of agreement as to the method of framing a constitution and to create an executive council representing the major political parties in India.

The Cabinet Mission reached India in the last week of March 1946. It announced its proposals on May 10, 1946 which were a step in the right direction in that they honestly attempted to reconcile Hindu and Muslim interests. An embryonic form of Pakistan was not difficult to discern in the following proposals of the Mission.55

1. Creation of a loose federation in India in which the Union should have authority to control over only Foreign Affairs, Defense and Communication.

2. A Constituent Assembly for the Union of India elected by Provincial Assemblies voting separately by religious groups of provinces—two of the areas claimed by Pakistan in the east and the west and the third of the rest of the subcontinent.

The United States welcomed the proposals. Dean Acheson,
the Acting Secretary of State, appreciated them as a "constructive and statesmen like step to solve the Indian problem."\textsuperscript{56}

However, the elections to the Constituent Assembly resulted in an overwhelming majority for the Congress. Jinnah was alarmed at this "brute majority" of the Congress. He exhorted Muslims to resort to direct action to achieve Pakistan. The Muslims observed August 19, 1946 as Direct Action Day. Communal riots, mostly engineered by League, broke out. The great Calcutta killings, Noakhali and Tipperah riots organized by the Muslim League had repercussions in other parts.

During the communal frenzy, the establishment of an 'Interim Government' on August 24, 1946, with Nehru as its Vice-President, however, brought favourable comment from Dean Acheson, the Acting Secretary of State. "The Department has, of course, followed with great interest the negotiations which have been going for a political settlement in India and welcomes the announcements that a representative Executive Council, composed entirely of Indians, will take office on September 2.... The composition of the New Council makes it clear that members are entitled to speak on behalf of a great majority of the Indian
people. They have the best wishes of the United States in their efforts to effect a peaceful transition to complete freedom. It is regrettable that the Muslim League has not decided to participate but it is to be hoped that it may later find it possible to do so.

Within a few weeks the Viceroy succeeded in persuading the League to join the Interim Government. The League's intentions in doing so were not to make the Interim Cabinet function on the basis of Joint responsibility but to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. It aimed at securing Pakistan by using its position within the Government.

The New York Times, however, hailed it as "a political truce which may lead to important political developments." As there was no political agreement between the Congress and the League, this decision to enter the Government further complicated the problem. The representatives of the two parties found it virtually impossible to function in the same Government as a cohesive team. The League did not join the Constituent Assembly even though the Viceroy had suggested that the right policy for the League was to come into the Assembly and negotiate with the Congress and walk out if it did not feel satisfied. Jinnah reacted
by accusing the British Government of their plan to put the Muslims under the Hindu rule. The British felt that without the League, the Congress could not frame a constitution for the whole of India.  

So to forge cooperation between the Congress and the League, the British Government invited the leaders to London. The proposed London Conference from December 3 to 6, 1946 aroused American interest. Acheson instructed American Embassy in London to cable progress of negotiations using both British and Indian sources. The Department of State was deeply concerned at the serious deterioration in the Indian political situation. It believed that a halt in the constitutional progress would cause widespread chaos similar to China and could have worldwide repercussions. Acheson issued a statement on December 3, 1946 that "the United States awaits with deep concern the outcome of the current talks in London between the Indian political leaders and the British Government. I feel most strongly that it will be in the interest of India, as well as that of the whole world, for its leaders to grasp this opportunity to establish a stable and peaceful India." The talks at London failed. This was probably the last
British attempt to bring the Congress and the League together.

On February 20, 1947, British Government announced its intention to leave India before June 1948. The British statement also threatened that power would be transferred to Indian provinces if the situation so demanded. The announcement did not induce either the Congress or the League to come to terms even though the situation so demanded.

The British Government failed to persuade the two major communities, Hindu and Muslim to agree to share the responsibility for the governance of India. Shortly after this announcement large scale killings of Hindus took place. There was complete collapse of mutual confidence between the two sets of Indian political leaders. Against this background the Mountbatten plan for partition of India was evolved. This plan conceded a sovereign Pakistan and it also contemplated the partition of Bengal and the Punjab. This plan was agreed upon between the parties involved in the Indian constitutional tussle because in the light of prevailing situation of mutual distrust and large scale communal killings they felt that there was no alternative to partition.
The British Government formally announced its plan to partition India on June 3, 1947. Attlee believed that "new men were needed for a new policy." He replaced Wavell with Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Governor General of India, to expedite the transfer of power. The new Viceroy tried to reach an agreed solution and succeeded in securing agreement over partition. The procedural formalities were speedily completed. The Indian Independence Bill received Royal Assent on July 18, 1947. This decision was to be effective from August 15, 1947, when the British were to transfer power to the two Dominions of India and Pakistan.59

Thus, the brief survey brings out the fact that the US Government kept itself informed of the internal development in India. She had, in her own way, tried to influence the course of events in the sub-continent during and after the Second World War. Her interest was understandable because she had emerged as the greatest power in the world. She was keen to keep the Indian sub-continent under her influence because of its strategic location, tremendous manpower and economic resources. Her interest increased substantially when British withdrawal became
imminent. In defining and determining her relations with India, she could not fail to take into account the new political entity, Pakistan that had arisen.\textsuperscript{59A}

The United States policy towards the continent began on a cautious note. The U.S. wanted political stability, the end of communal riot in the Indian sub-continent so that she could formulate her idea in a clear atmosphere. This desire was reflected in the message sent by the U.S. President to the Governor-Generals of India and Pakistan, on the occasion of their emergence as Dominions on August 15, 1947.

Indo-U.S. relations have undergone a chequered development since Indian independence. While they reflected the "cooperative pattern" at times, the "oppositional pattern" has always existed with respect of certain issues. Two countries continuously cooperated due to certain shared objectives and historical experience. Both the democracies had faced the trauma of colonial and the struggle for independence. At the same time, both have shown their commitment to the democratic way of life. They also support certain common causes like the opposition to colonialism and racialism. These shared ideals would have
resulted in cordial relations between the United States and India if they had been insulated from the influence of the international set up.\textsuperscript{59B}

In the post World War II period the world witnessed the division of the world into two power blocs. Therefore, the emergence of India and Pakistan as independent states coincided with a growing concern of the United States to contain the spread of Soviet influence and her communist ideology. The United States was afraid that the Soviet Union would take full advantage of the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of the British from the east of Suez, which according to Dean Acheson, "created serious global imbalance." The United States also thought that the fragile economy of the Afro-Asian countries was best suited for breeding the communist ideology. The United States, therefore, devised a military alliance system to contain the possible Soviet expansion. In South Asia, Pakistan joined the United States sponsored military alliance (SEATO), while India, under Jawaharlal Nehru chose to remain non-aligned.\textsuperscript{59C}

India from the very beginning of her independence, was confronted with the problem of evolving a foreign policy
consistent with her national interests in the context of a world divided between the two contending blocs. The immediate impact of the hostile coalition of forces was felt by the Indian leaders. They, after decades of colonial rule, were eagerly looking forward to attaining a rightful and honoured placed for their country in the world. They wanted her to play a full and willing contribution to the promotion of world peace and the welfare of mankind. In that world of fear and suspicion of balance of power and sphere of influence, of cold war and military alliance, Indian approach to international affairs was marked with a sense of realism, grounded in the realities of her own situation as well as in the facts of political life around her. It is because of these factors that India chose the policy of non-alignment.

Non-alignment only meant that India would not align herself with the Great Power military blocs. Nehru, the leader of the then interim national government declared on September 7, 1946, "we propose, as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an even vaster scale...."
This, according to Nehru, by no means a neutral or negative approach to international affairs. It implied non-involvement in military and political groupings or blocs, but involvement, as fully as her circumstances permitted, in world affairs in the furtherance of world peace and freedom of colonial territories consistent with her own national interest.\textsuperscript{65} It was a positive policy of consciously and deliberately working for peace through mediation, moral pressure and through openly voicing opinions against steps which, according to her calculations, might lead to war.\textsuperscript{66} India believed that, when there were two warring factions, there must be somebody to act as a sort of "go between" or "mediator" between them.\textsuperscript{67}

On attaining independence, India inherited a weak colonial economy shattered by famine and the Second World War. What India needed most was peace and friendship with all nations so that she could devote herself to the task of building up her strength. Further weakened by partition followed by mass migration of refugees, India’s immediate problems were thus, food, clothing, education and health. India wanted to tackle these problems urgently and also to eradicate the social evils. Political freedom
would have no meaning of it was not accompanied by rapid improvement in her economic and social life.68

Hence, India took upon herself the role of a peace-maker and one of easing tension that might lead to war. India policy in Korea and in Indo-China in early 1950's supported this view. India believed that international disputes could be amicably and peacefully settled by discussion, negotiation and arbitration.69 India also believed that freedom, like peace, was indivisible and that there would be no peace if freedom was denied to a certain countries. India felt fully convinced that imperialism and colonialism impoverished their victims and destroyed their social and economic institution.70 India, therefore, supported the struggle against colonialism, particularly in Asia and Africa.

India also considered racialism to be another grave danger to peace because it offended the dignity of the human personality. There could be no freedom for any nation and no equality for Indians so long as racial discrimination continued in the world.71

The United States declared that it desired peaceful relations between India and Pakistan, but its actions left New Delhi in no
doubt about U.S. tilt towards Pakistan. The relationship between India and the U.S. soon became strained when the Kashmir issue was discussed in the United Nations. United States supported Pakistan, partly as a result of pressure from Britain. She took an unfriendly attitude towards India and wanted the UN Security Council not to sit in judgement over Pakistan's aggression but to decide on the terms of a plebiscite to determine whether the State should be part of India or Pakistan.

Democrate in Nehru assured to give the people of Kashmir the chance to decide the issue of accession to India "as soon as the invader had been driven from Kashmir soil." The U.S. insisted on India agreeing to a plebiscite, even though the other condition of vacation of aggression was not met.

It was obvious that the continued U.S. support to Pakistan was tied up with the American hope of acquiring military bases in the Pakistan held portion of Kashmir adjoining the Soviet Union and China. This appeared to be the principal reason for the major role the United States took in shaping the U.N. policy on Kashmir.
Another point on which early differences developed concerned Communist China. The People's Republic of China came into existence formally on October 1, 1949. India recognized China at the end of December, 1949. Fifteen days later, Great Britain, too, recognized Red China. This development augmented the strength and the influence of the Soviet Union in the South-East Asian region. It also threatened to affect smaller nations on the periphery like India and Pakistan.

In the process, the focus of United States Policy makers shifted to South Asia which was a region touching China on the northeast and the Soviet Union on the northwest. The Eisenhower administration made frantic efforts to involve nonaligned India in accepting the western defense perspective. But India refused to accept such views or join the western pacts. This single most fact angered many American administrators, which is evident from the reaction of the US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles who made cryptic comments, calling nonalignment as immoral. This was, a hint that the US considered those not with them as being against them. It was then that the US turned to Pakistan which was not earlier much known to American policy makers and still less its people.
The Pakistani gesture was warmly appreciated in contrast to India's professed policy of non-alignment, belonging to no camp, and of considering each issue as it arose on its own merits.\textsuperscript{74} India's refusal not to join the defense pact was an indication of her aspiration to assert her independence and also to insulate the South Asian region from the Cold War tension. However, the American action of arming Pakistan created apprehensions amongst Indians. They were occurred of double speak owing to their rahetoric to establish and support the cause of social order based on the principles of democracy.

The Indian refusal to accept the US defense pact left them with a concern for India's susceptibility on account of her fragile economy. The US feared that such a condition would lead India to fall an easy prey to the communist ideology. The American commitment was to stop any possible aggressive design by the Soviet Union on the "free world" Robert E. Osgood describes this commitment as an "obligation that the United States will use its military power overtly or covertly or by the threat to help other countries to use theirs for their specific purpose."\textsuperscript{75}
Pakistan's joined the US sponsored defense pacts such as SEATO and the CENTO. She dittoed the US policies towards Taiwan, Korea, Kashmir and the Chinese entry into the United Nations. These were some of the political issues on which serious differences arose between India and the United States in the 1950s. These differences took a turn for the worse when the US sponsored a resolution in the United Nations on the Kashmir issue, favouring Pakistan. The political friction reached its climax when the US decided to arm Pakistan. Reflecting on the course of Indo-American relations, Dana Adams Schmiat, a political commentator, wrote that since early 1953, friction between the US and India has been frequent.76

The two countries were in opposite camps on the question of China’s admission to the United Nations. India had historic ties with China, Nehru thought that the emergence of China as a unified country would change the balance of power in Asia.

Another instance of conflict was the US condemnation of India’s annexation of the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman and Diu. When the US raised the issue in the United Nations, India showed surprise and shock at this. India felt that she was justified
in eliminating the last of the colonial vestige from the Indian soil. India expected that since the US as a nation was founded through the elimination of colonial rule and, self-determination has been one of the pronounced goals of her foreign policy, she would applaud India's position. But the US was found to be more concerned about her NATO ally, Portugal, instead of honouring her commitment to anti-colonialism. The Goa issue amply illusprates the nature of American interest as well as her policy of according priorities to her security and strategic interests.

However, despite several apprehensions on the part of both the US and the Soviet Union, they extended economic, technological and scientific assistance to India. Though intermittently, India experienced joint threats from Pakistan and China and, indirectly from the US vis-a-vis, its security yet neither India nor the US were inclined to sever their relationship completely. The reason is that both, more or less, need each others' assistance but as this relationship was deeprooted in their respective national interests, there existed certain ups and downs.

The South Asia region, due mainly to its poverty, was considered most vulnerable for fermenting the communist
ideology. The Indian Ambassador to the US, Bengal Rama Rao, echoed Indian fears when he said, "The success of the Marshall Plan for Europe had made communism to turn towards the Far East particularly India." When India was facing a severe drought due to the failure of rains, it approached the US with a request for food aid. When the issue was debated in the US Congress, the general opinion was that such food aid would be only in exchange of certain minerals from India, such as sands, monozite, mica, magnanese, etc. most of which were used in the production of nuclear weapons. Nehru rejected the idea on the ground that India stands opposed to the export of material for making weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons. That apart, politically also India's stand on the Korean issue and her proposal and support for the admission of People's Republic of China into the United Nations, were not appreciated by the United States. Inspite of this, the US administration was successful in convincing the Congress to give food aid worth $ 190 million to India, thus, enabling India to import 2 million tons of wheat.

The food assistance programme to India was rationalized as means to plug any scope for the spread of the communist ideology.
As Chester Bowles recalls that the US aid was given to win friends in India and elsewhere. Precisely, this was part of the tactic used to attract India and was very much in line with the US approach to international problems. This reflected the rhetoric of the US aid that it was being given on moral and humanitarian grounds. The US economic aid was described as a "moral obligation which as the richest nation in history, are duty bound to assume."79 However, more than anything else, a deeper sense of US commitment to democracy and India's rejection also to join the Soviet camp, seemed to be the strong underlying factors behind the aid despite severe differences in political security matters.

To quote Chester Bowles "The objective of American aid to India is simple and straight forward. If India succeeds in her bold venture in development, it would have proved that under a wise and realistic leadership, democracy is more than an idealist vision. It is a social, economic and political system that can work dynamically for the benefit of all people."80

In this connection, Kenneth Keating, a former US Ambassador India also said, "Over and above self sufficiency in food and industrial growth and export rate, India has preserved the
immeasurable value of democracy. Freedom of the individual, a free press, an independent judiciary, an elected executives and legislature ...these valuable features of a democratic society have earned India a place of pride among the nations of the world. To developing countries, India is a beacon of hope and progress."

On the whole, the US economic assistance to India was viewed as a humanitarian gesture. It was interpreted as an effort in the promotion of democracy and, as a means of winning friends by the justifiable show of money power.

However, in the American official circules, it is always alleged that the Indians, failed to express gratitude towards the US food aid gesture for in just one decade, the US giving India aid worth Rs. 4,000 crores and 50 million tons of food. Yet, India and the US soon drifted apart. Some basic perceptions of Nehru made him side with both the Soviet Union and China on certain vital international matters which affected the US directly. He pleaded for a Chinese entry in the UN much more vigorously than even the Chinese themselves. He joined both the Soviets and the Chinese to downgrade the US as an "imperialist power". Hence, the need to fight against it on behalf of the dependent and emerging nations
of Africa and Asia. He feared that the economic and political power of the US may eventually make India a satellite of the West. Therefore, India's attitude on wide ranging world issues showed a bias in favour of the Soviet Union. Apprehensively, the US insistence on growth and development and offers of help were viewed with suspicion. They were regarded as an indirect interference. So the government machinery was alerted to resist all such pressures. India while still criticizing the US, kept pleading for its help.

No doubt, such differences between two independent nations, with divergent policy goals, were bound to exist. India's main charge was concerning the political and strategic policies pursued by the US in South Asia. The US military aid to Pakistan and its subsequent inclusion in the defense pacts against the Soviet Union and China came in direct collusion with the pronounced policy of India. Nehru strongly believed in disarmament, easing tensions, and peaceful coexistence by not joining any bloc. For Nehru, economic development was more important than militarization of the country. Arms to Pakistan therefore, meant triggering off an arms race in South Asia at the cost of the much
needed economic development. It also provided Pakistan with the courage to attempt to forcibly wrest Kashmir from India. This was an issue with which Indians were emotionally involved. Thus, the US arms to Pakistan were seen as arousing several sensitive issues which affected India's security, economic development, its secular polity, its democracy, social harmony, etc. These would severely disrupt the very foundations of India's statehood and survival. Hence, the sharp and critical Indian reaction to any US arms supplies to Pakistan.

The Republican administration followed an aggressive encirclement policy to contain the Soviets. The attempts to include India in this project by the Eisenhower-Dulles team failed to make any headway. Therefore, the encirclement of the Soviets included the US supplying Pakistan with enough arms. Though the US repeatedly assured that the arms would not be used against India, the failure of the US to keep its promises resulted in a situation where the names of the US weaponry such as the "Sabre Jet", "Patton Tanks" etc., became household names and people were identifying their killing capacity with the American nation itself. The actual cause of the 1965 war was the still unresolved Kashmir
issue. On this, both India and the US were quite on the opposite sides until the 1972 Shimla agreement whence the US started to talk of a bilateral settlement between India and Pakistan.

The US policy was, thus, entrenched around its security concern. However, during the sixties, two countries has been seeking to maintain a reasonable and favourable balance between the two. For instance, the US arms embargo following the 1965 war and its maintaining a low profile in its resolution, no doubt, facilitated the Tashkent agreement which was initiated by the Soviets. In fact, during this time both India and Pakistan were still receiving US arms—India on account of the Chinese aggression and Pakistan by virtue of its alliance with the US. Moreover, Sino-Pakistan ties were still in its embryonic stage. The Sino-Soviet rift had not yet developed into a serious issue. It was under such a circumstance that the US policy makers in Washington were insisting on a detente between India and Pakistan.
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