The relationship between India and the United States over the past four decades and a half has been one of ambivalence, fluctuation, and a curious rise and fall. With every major shift in their relationship, there have been attempts at the re-appraisals of Indo-US relations at the level of policy makers in both countries. However, in the whole corpus of literature on Indo-US relations, only very few studies as such have been done with some theoretical frame. The period of the study have been from 1960 to 1996 i.e. upto the Prime Ministership of Narsimha Rao. The year 1960 had been chosen especially because it was the year when the Kennedy era started and a hope in the mind of Indian people was aroused towards having relatively better relations with United States. The period upto Narsimha Rao was selected because at the time of registration for Ph.D in 1992, the phase of Narsimha Rao was continuing. Moreover, fast changes were taking place in the international relations with the end of cold war due to disintegration of Soviet Union.
In this study, the following hypotheses were to be tested:

1. That a power which has the potential to become a major power (initially within its regional context and later on globally) comes in conflict with a Super Power which has global interest. Super Power first seek satellization of a potential major power by offers of aid, trade etc. In case the potential major power resists, satellization the super power tries to contain it through a regional military balance by strengthening small states in the region and when even containment fails, the global power finally seeks accommodation with potential major power by accepting its legitimate sphere of influence.

2. That the USA has been willing to concede a lesser role to India on her (India’s_ actual capabilities (as perceived by the State Department) rather than on her potential (as envisioned by Indian leaders).

3. That the policy of a Super Power to accommodate a potential major power goes with the recognition that this power has already started emerging as a full-fledged major power and that it is no longer possible to contain it.
To test the above hypotheses, the study has applied broad theoretical and analytical concepts, to the specific bilateral relationship over the years. In completing this study, various Government documents, Reports (official, academic and Press) in addition to books and articles have been extensively consulted.

Before the Second World War, the United State was one of the several major powers, but after this war, she emerged as the mightiest military and economic global power. Once attained this position, she was naturally keen to retain it in the emerging international system. She endeavoured to extend her influence and control to the farthest corners of the globe.

The same aftermath of the Second World War which saw the United States emerging as a dominant global power, also saw India attaining her independence and being placed with a number of small independent states around her. Although India was poor economically and weak militarily in her immediate post-independence period, her sub-continental size, large population, rich natural resources base, and great historical past did influence her to aspire for major power status in the global power hierarchy. She tried to make up her economic and military
weakness by politically mobilizing other Asian and African nations, and by assuming for some time the leadership of the group of non-aligned nations.

India and United States being the largest and the strongest democracies respectively have much in common to aspire for good relations between the two countries. But there were many ups and down in their relationship over time due to differing perceptions and priority of interests with regard to achieving the goal of their foreign policies. After the Second World War, the avowed goal of American foreign policy was to contain communism in the South Asia because it perceived in Soviet Union a threat to her super power status. The U.S. felt that the latter could stop her from becoming a super power. Therefore, to contain the influence of Soviet Union, she tried to give all types of aid to those countries who needed it with a view to weaning them away from the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and as to fulfill the goal of her foreign policy. America was a strong economically, militarily and technologically and had every potential to become the Super Power. Soviet Union, too, was working over time to achieve parity with the United States. Since one of the objectives of the
foreign policy of the Soviet Union was to spread of communism, therefore, it also wanted India and other third world countries to become her ally. Hence the adversary relationship between United States and Soviet Union at the global level.

India, under the leadership of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru had adopted the foreign policy of non-alignment. Therefore, as non-aligned, India was an important country in South Asia for both of them. Besides, India was a democratic country and United States considered her neutral country in the first instance. There were many aspects which induced United States to have relations with India. But soon relationships with India suffered a setback owing to Pakistan which had agreed to provide military bases to United States became an important factor in Indo-U.S. relations.

India, Pakistan have been the important countries in South Asia for the United States. The latter wanted to have relations with both India and Pakistan if it was to succeed in achieving its professed goal of containment of communism.

China had become a strong country with definite interest in South Asia. To contain the influence of such a strong country, it
was necessary for United States to develop good relations with both India and Pakistan. But with Pakistan becoming a signatory to SEATO pact, became an important ally of the United States. In contrast since India remained non-aligned, kept her door open for America, Soviet Union and China.

As leader of the non-aligned group of countries under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru in the changed scenario, India came to occupy a prominent place in South Asia. America wanted to develop her relations with India because it did not want that India, USSR and China might get together and forge a common front against the former. If it happened, her goal of being a super power would not be achieved. For all the three together would pose a threat to the United States. United States always voted against India and in favour of Pakistan which virtually forced India to find in Soviet Union a trusted friend who would safeguard India's interests in the United Nations. On several issues, there appeared congruence between the perceptions interests standpoints of both India and Soviet Union in international fora. This resulted in an aggravation of misunderstanding about India's non-aligned position. A visible change took place in the United
States administration when China, a communist country attacked India in 1962. This led America to view India’s position more sympathetically and in proper light. So, America came to India’s help in the Sino-India War—partly owing her own foreign policy goal of containing communism in South Asia. India was yet an under-developed country and had achieved her independence only 15 years ago. She was weak economically as well as militarily and was deserving of all help to become a countervailing force vis-a-vis China.

But Pakistan was playing a double role. On the one hand, she was ally to the United States and on the other she was receiving military hardware and technology from China. China in helping Pakistan was to weaken India by putting it against her. In this context, United States was compelled also to develop relations with India because if her ally went with China, India would be relied upon to promote and safeguard her interest in the region especially against China. However, being a military ally America would not want to have cold relations with Pakistan.

One more aspect to develop relations with India is that she knew that India has achieved the status of nuclear country. China
is also having the same status. America does not want India and China work together. If they work together, her dream of becoming super power can not be achieved. Therefore, she is making relations with China also to some extent.

Another aspects which attracted United States towards India's liberalization policy. The size of the Indian market and its growth potential activated corporated America to seize the opportunity. During his visit to the United States in May 1994, Prime Minister Narsimha Rao sought to convey India's desire to enhance economic cooperation with America. Thus, Indo-US economic relations travelled from the "donor-recipient" relationship of the Cold War days to a relationship between two partners.

There are some other factors after the post-Cold War scenario which compelled United States to have a close tie with India although India has a non-aligned status.

The study (1960-1996) reveals that the United States and India came gradually to the beginnings of understanding. It virtually took a century and a half of relations, almost the era
1785-1914, when the American republic was moving slowly and then swiftly toward world leadership. It was a period when in India the first stirrings of independence were leading the nation toward massive revolt against the British rule. In the retrospect of our own time, half a century and more since the outbreak of the First World War in Europe, it was easy to see that Americans-Indian relations were almost bound to become closer as the world became closer knit. Besides another contributory factor was that the politics of Europe had led to the collapse of the influence of that hitherto politically dominant continent viz. Britain. These developments were only faintly discernible in 1914; the story of Indo-American relations had yet to enter its important phase. Meanwhile, all India was moving into a paroxysm of revolt against British rule.

The analysis of Indo-US relations during the pre-independence era rightly points out that Americans had come to believe that British were denying independence to India and that Indian masses were writhing under the British yoke. In keeping with their liberalism, Americans in general sympathised with Indian longings for freedom. The sympathy and interest of the
people of America in India was, however, academic, idealistic, and unofficial. The United States Government had little to do with it. The Second World War then transformed American interest to the official and diplomatic level.

So, Indians began to look to America for support in their struggle for independence against the British. Churchill was alarmed at this development. In keeping with his well-known stand that he had not become the King’s First Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire, Churchill came out with a British interpretation of the Charter. During a debate in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, he asserted that “the Joint Declaration” did not qualify in any way the various statements of policy, which had been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma and other parts of the British Empire. Since the United States did not openly repudiate Churchill’s interpretation, it acquiescence in the unilateral British interpretation at that time was seen as a blow to her anti-imperialist image in India.

The Indian henceforth suspected that British imperialism was being supported by the United States. The process of identi-
fying America as an imperialist power could be traced to this unhappy failure of the United States to take a stand. Cripps proposals lingered in the American mind, as a far-reaching step in the right direction which the Indian leaders had turned down. British propaganda henceforth harped on this theme, and clouded the official American attitude against the Indian nationalists.

It is clear from the analysis of the study that on the eve of the Quit India Movement, there was a shift in the American official and public attitude towards the Indian demand of independence. Early diplomatic support to her gave way to neutrality and non-intervention. The British exploited the change in the United States attitude. The Indians on their part felt disillusioned by this shift in the American attitude towards the Indian people. This went to strengthen their suspicion that the United States was supporting British imperialism.

A very pertinent fact which the study brings to the fore is that American sympathy and support for India reached its climax on September 29, 1942 when more than two thousand Americans applauded in Town Hall, New York when British policy in India was characterized as fantastic, barbaric, stupid and tory
imperialism by the speakers. The audience repeatedly shouted that India must be free. The meeting passed a resolution asking President Roosevelt to intervene to break the Indian deadlock. Keeping in view the state of public opinion in America, the United States Government too could not afford to remain non-interventionist. It decided to explore the feasibility of some agreement between the British and Indian leaders. William Phillips was chosen to serve as Personal Representative of the President and study the Indian situation on the spot, and suggest possible ways of resolving the deadlock. Thus, by the end of 1942, the United States had reverted to its earlier policy of diplomatic intervention in the Indian tangle. Except enlightening the President and the State Department, Phillips achieved no success in resolving the Indian deadlock, for “in India, Phillips encountered a stone wall.”

In fine, the story of American interest in the independence for India during the Second World War remains a tragedy of high intentions self-defeated. There was an inherent opposition between United States support to Britain as an ally and the espousal of Indian independence. It was difficult to reconcile
these two positions. The United States took every opportunity at the diplomatic level to impress upon the British that India must be free. The British resented this as unwarranted interference in their internal matters. The Indians condemned it as doing nothing. As the single most powerful nation on the globe, the United States could have done more particularly its being a co-author of the Atlantic Charter. By failing to force the British to act, the American statesmen imperilled the liberal image of their country in the world.

The study brings out that in the final phase of Indian struggle for freedom, and transfer of power, the United States Government merely kept itself informed of political developments in India. Generally, it supported the British policy of seeking a solution acceptable to all parties. The British, on their part, appreciated American sympathy and statements as helpful. They maintained liaison with the United States Government. Informal discussions between President Truman and the British Foreign Secretary were reported to have taken place during the latter's visit to the United States in December 1946. The day the British decision to hand over power by June 1948, was announced, the British Ambassador
Lord Inverchapel informed Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Three days later, Marshall expressed the hope that Indian political leaders would accept the British plan. When the agreement over partition was made public, the America's Department of State release dated June 10, 1947, welcomed the agreement. At the time of transfer of power, the United States Government scrupulously maintained neutrality between the Congress and the League. It kept its doors open for friendly relations with both the successor nations, India and Pakistan. President Truman extended identical congratulations to both the countries on the respective Independence Days and assured them that United States would be their "constant friend".

The exposition of Indo-US relations both before and after World War II highlights a very important fact that before the Second World War, the United States was only one of the several major powers, but emerged as the mightiest military and economic global power after it. This position she naturally wanted to retain in international system. With this end in view she endeavoured to extend her influence and control to the farthest corners of the globe. The same aftermath of the Second World War which saw
the United States emerging as a dominant global power, also saw India attaining her independence and being placed with a number of small independent states around her. Although India was poor economically and weak militarily in her immediate post-independence period, her sub-continental size, large population, rich natural resource base, and great historical past influenced her to aspire for major power status in the global power hierarchy. She tried to make up her economic and military weakness by politically mobilizing other Asian and African nations, and by assuming for sometime the leadership of the group of the non-aligned nations. The focus of the study all along has been relations between the United States and India—the former being the greatest World Power, and the latter a major Asian Power with potential for becoming a great Power.

The study points out that immediately after independence India faced problems of great magnitude in political and economic fields. The problems were further augmented by the desire to assume the leadership of Asia and to play pivotal role in the world affairs. At the same time the United States was also deeply involved in international affairs which cropped up from time to
time. Each was critical of the other. Thus, the attitude, aims and desires of the United States and India were not the same. The differences were obvious in political, economic and military fields of the two nations.

Despite the differences between the two countries, they always maintained a seemingly working relationship. The two considered each other as indispensable—as the two biggest democracies of the world. While India was the unquestioned leader of the non-aligned world, United States was the leader of the Western World and a hegemonic power in several regions. It was, therefore, necessary that the two nations maintained a clear liaison between them. Both appeared dedicated to common notions on democracy, liberty, equality and fraternity, independence and civil rights. One of the basic principles of India's foreign policy was its passionate belief and advocacy of peace. India being deeply committed to this goal, prompted it to oppose American militarism which went against its basic foreign policy aims of peace.

The study underlines that American foreign policy towards India has been marked by many ups and downs. Whereas, at one
time it was all sweet and good, but there were times also when they became sour. India and the United States failed to see eye to eye on numerous questions from the very beginning. These differences were striking particularly on communism and democracy, more so with the emergence of China as a Communist State. India as a counterpoise emerged as a decisive factor in world politics. Following the failure of American Policy in China, America looked to Nehru and India for leadership in Asia. They realized that a democratic India was a possible bulwark against China. Congress was being told that continued leadership of Nehru and India was the greatest single anti-communist force in Asia. “If Nehru failed, communism would take over.” Everyone realized that India was a growing force in world affairs. Frank Moraes had rightly commented, “If China proves that her system of government ensures economic security to the vast mass of her people without detracting greatly from their sense of freedom, Asia will be lost to communism. If India on the other hand demonstrates that democratic government can ensure not only economic security but individual liberty, then Asia will be won to democracy. That is why India’s role in Asia affairs is crucial and vital.”
Further the study highlights a significant fact that the United States was very keen on building up India and Japan as a counterweight to China in the 1950s and 1960s. It was in the interest of the United States to have made India as strong as possible. But on the Sino-Indian War of 1962, there were two different attitudes of United States. The first dealt with the emergency arms assistance and political support to India in response to an urgent appeal by the Government of India. And the second dealt with the American arms aid programme. Initially, the United States response was an attitude of non-involvement, if not general indifference. Indeed, it was not until the major clashes of October-November 1962 that the American administration reacted with deep concern and a sense of urgency. Facing with the rapid collapse of the military front in the North East Frontier region, New Delhi appealed to seek military equipment from the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Initially, on October 26, India sent a general appeal for “sympathy as well as support” to all governments.

The study brings out that even during Kennedy administration, there were some elements in the evolution of
America's "wait and see" approach. Kennedy had perceived India as the key area in Asia; he wanted it to win the political and economic race against China. But he was somewhat skeptical about Indian leadership. The Krishna Menon, the Goa episode, in particular, had minimised Kennedy's expectations regarding India's role in the "struggle for peace".

As revealed by the study, initially, the United States approach was continued aloofness. Though it "sympathized" with Indian concern about the "Integrity of its northern frontier". It was only later—when India had requested military aid—that the approach changed.

On August 8, 1962 that the American Ambassador to India unofficially signalled America's "full sympathy for India's predicament on the northern border" and also expressed "hope for a settlement and desire to do nothing that might prejudice it."

The United States arms aid policy was concerned with several factors: what the extent of arms aid to India should be how to expedite the arms supply; how to ensure that Pakistan would not create difficulties for India. It became obvious to New Delhi that
the United States Government was unwilling to support India’s defense programme beyond a marginal point. Some Kennedy White House aides felt that Nehru’s requests for all sorts of American arms, were rather “unrealistic”. They believed that the Kennedy administration had rendered more than enough assistance to quiet down the border. Hence anything over and above that level might cause a “real war” as well as “permanently alienate Pakistan”. This policy consensus finally persuaded President Kennedy to endorse only a modest United States commitment to India’s defense needs, despite the fact that the President favoured the view that the request for extensive arms aid provided an opportunity for closer association between India and the United States. With a moderate, friendly Kennedy ruling in the White House, this modest U.S. military aid to India continued until September 1965 when it was cancelled because of the Indo-Pak War.

The study rightly point out that at no point of time in the history of Indo-American relations had there been such bitter and intense differences as in 1971, on the issue of Bangladesh crisis. India and the United States viewed the Bangladesh crisis entirely
from two different angles. While India extended her whole-hearted support to the cause of freedom fighters, the U.S. Government sided with West Pakistan committing genocide in East Pakistan. The State Department in the United States not only avoided giving attention to Indian information and suggestions, but it also did not respond even to the public opinion, Press comments and criticism of leading Senators and Congressmen in United States itself.

The study underscores the point that since Pakistan's military strength was built largely with American assistance, the Government of India expected the United States to take special responsibility to ensure that it was not misused against India. It also suggested to this end that the United States should discontinue all further arms supplies to Pakistan till it stops military action in East Bengal. Though the US administration assured India that no arms were being supplied after March 25, 1971, the supply in some form or the other continued till November 8, 1971. In contrast, the US Government cancelled even the limited quantity of military equipment that was to be sold to India. This was followed by the suspension of general economic
and to India which was in the pipeline.

The study also underlines the fact that the United States and India held divergent views regarding Bangladeshi refugee problem in India. India wanted a political settlement with the elected leaders of East Bengal which would enable the refugees to go back to their homes in East Bengal as they were posing an intolerable strain on the economy of India and the stability and security of Indian borders. But the policy of US State Department was to treat the crisis as an internal affairs of Pakistan and the refugee problem in India as one which she should continue to bear indefinitely with restraint.

All these factors and Sino-Pak-US collaboration which emerged in this period led India to sign 20 years Treaty for Peace and Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR on August 9, 1971. This treaty represented a major setback for the US administration's policy in South Asia.

Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi visit to the Western Capitals including the United States urging Washington to prevail upon Yahya Khan to negotiate a settlement with Muzibur Rehman of
Bangladesh failed. Civil War in East Pakistan continued and the refugee problem in India remained unabated. The flames of Civil War started touching the Indian border. India and Pakistan alleged each other for crossing their border and finally India and Pakistan went on War in December 1971. The United States actions during the Bangladesh War clearly showed 'tilt' against India. United States tried to pressurise India by various diplomatic moves, and by forums like United Nations. Failing in their diplomatic moves, the US administration with held dollar 87 million economic aid to India. Not only this, the extreme low ebb was witnessed in Indo-US relations when United States 'Enterprise', a nuclear power aircraft carrier of the Seventh Fleet to sail towards Bay of Bengal.

It can rightly be said that the Indo-Pak War of 1971 widened the gulf between India and United States. The most serious problem between the two had been perceptual hiatus in this region. The emergence of an independent Bangladesh with the help of India left a deep scar on the relationship between the two. Consequently, India and the United States moved further apart early in 1972 when India established full-fledged Ambassadorial
ties with Vietnam. This was done at a time when the US, in order to bring Vietnam to its knees, was carrying on heavy bombardment on Vietnam along with blocking Vietnam's shores.

Notwithstanding the above major irritants, the Indo-US Relations were back to the normal track in 1972-74 when their relations improved somewhat. In 1972, the Nixon administration initiated a major review of its policy in South Asia, which soon led to a number of statements by the President and other top officials indicating a recognition of India's enhanced position to South Asia. They also showed a desire to improve relations with India while maintaining friendly ties with Pakistan. The American recognition to Bangladesh also helped to create the atmosphere for the easing of tension. Yet the relation between India and United States were not quiet smooth in this period. The American decision to supply arms to Pakistan which were suspended when the War broke out in 1971 worried India a lot and the Indian resentment was conveyed to the US administration through diplomatic channel. At the same time, the US released dollar 87.6 million of economic aid to India which had been suspended during the Indo-Pak War and promised that more aid would follow. It
looked quiet enigmatic why Washington had chosen to these two statements simultaneously. It was in American mind that India which was facing difficult economic situation if accepted aid then it would re-establish US policy of treating the two countries of the sub-continent on equal terms. Viewed in that context, Washington's dramatic moves were far from normalising relations and exercised a negative effect on Indo-American; relations.

The analysis of Indo-US relations during the period under review shows that the ups and downs were frequent. A noteworthy healthy event in this period was the signing of the PL-480 agreement on December 13 by the representatives of India and the United States. It was considered to be a major contribution towards building a new and more mature relationship between the two countries.

As a follow up firm steps were taken on both sides to seek workable accommodation but soon there appeared a new irritant. The Nuclear explosion at Pokhran on May 18, 1974 by India claimed to be a part of her research for peaceful purposes of nuclear energy but whose political fall out was not insignificant, further fanned misgivings.
Some less important events like India alleging CIA involvement in Jai Prakash led movement, Mrs. Gandhi’s statement regarding US bombing of North Vietnam etc., also contributed to further misgivings in Americans mind.

The study reveals that the year 1975 witnessed two major incidents that caused a marked deterioration in Indo-US relations. The first was the announcement that the United States was finally ending the embargo it had imposed in 1965 on the supply of arms and military equipment to India and Pakistan, and the second the proclamation of national emergency by Indian President on June 26, 1975 at the initiative of Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi.

The US decision to lift arms embargo was resented in India and Mrs. Gandhi in particular reacted sharply maintaining that this would hinder the process of normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan. The US decision to lift arms embargo in case of Pakistan was connected partly with their design to obtain military base in that country so that they could intervene in the littoral states if required, particularly in the countries producing oil.
The second cause of disagreement and friction was the proclamation of National Emergency in India. The US President’s critical comment at an informal Press Conference regarding India’s proclamation of emergency was severely criticised by the Indian official spokesman of India. Besides, while in general, the official US position was to refrain from open criticism of Mrs. Gandhi’s emergency rule, the US Press, Congress and other forums criticised it. This was interpreted as being done with blessings and moral support of the US administration.

The study points to another event of great importance in the sub-continent. This pertained to the coup in Bangladesh in which President Muziber Rehman was killed along with his family members. The unofficial Indian media alleged American involvement in Bangladesh affair. Although the visit of the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Y.B. Chavan to the United States tried to remove some misgivings, on the whole, the period witnessed little improvement in the Indo-US political relations.

Compelled by India’s internal problems, Mrs. Gandhi’s government veered towards the right in 1974-75. It was primarily due to economic necessities which forced India to move closer to
the path of multilateral development as also to financial institutions like the World Bank, and the IMF and to the United States. Trade between the two countries increased noticeably in 1975-76. In short, this phase in Indo-US relations were characterised by a strange ambivalence and ambiguity.

The study rightly highlights the fact that this ambivalence and ambiguity continued in dealings between Carter administration in the United States and Janata government in India. Both were installed in 1977 and raised hopes of dramatic changes in policy and a resulting improvement in bilateral relations. The Janata's electoral promises to restore democracy and 'genuine' non-alignment were commonly interpreted as overtures to the US. The Carter administration too came to power on a platform of change in both domestic and foreign policy, with heavy emphasis on human rights. It recognised the crucial importance of India to the success of such a new approach to the Third World and was prepared to take the initiative with New Delhi to overcome the inhibitions of the past.

One can arrive at a conclusion that a fruitful relationship between India and the USA could not mature because there was so
much meshing of expectations and no reconciliation of well-established national stances on vital issues. The nuclear issue could not be resolved by Carter and Desai despite their obvious desire to accommodate each other viewpoints. On economic issues, expectations on each side outstripped the other's capacity to meet them, whether in the amount of foreign assistance forthcoming from the US, or New Delhi's dismantling of domestic economic controls. In short, the dream of the most powerful and most populous democracies in the world working together remained at inspirational level only during 1977-79.

The fall of Janata Government in 1979 coincided with the new developments in Afghanistan which had the effect of according Pakistan a special role in US strategy and promoting a strong military relationship with her. This created further misgivings and had an adverse impact on Indo-US relations. India and United States entered a new cold phase of relationship with the coming up of the Republican Party to Power under the leadership of Ronald Reagan. Though in 1981-82, Mrs. Gandhi and President Reagan made efforts to patch up their differences, their meeting at Cancum produced smiles, if nothing else, which percolated
downwards. Their governments set about the task of improving bilateral relations by first limiting the effects of the existing damage and then seeking non-controversial areas of matching interests where cooperation could be encouraged. Mrs. Gandhi's state visit to the United States in the summer of 1982 generated most favourable publicity for India, though both the governments differed sharply on political and security issues.

The study shows that the Indo-US relations during Reagan administration soured mainly due to the US decision to supply arms to Pakistan. The Reagan administration explained India that induction of American arms into Pakistan was in the context of military presence of USSR in Afghanistan and consequent upon its menace to the security of the entire gulf region, and was no longer intended to weaken or alienate India. India was not convinced by the US logic nor were most of the Indians. They regarded United States arms deal to Pakistan as a simple case of the United States's seeking to undermine Indian position in the sub-continent.

Indo-US relations also soured in this period owing to new conditions laid by the US for supply of atomic fuel for the Tarapur Plant, and on the use of nuclear spent fuel. However, the supply
of Nuclear fuel was resolved to some extent under tripartite arrangement among India, US and France. Yet India and US still differed on the reprocessing of spent fuel.

In summing up, it can be said that during Reagan administration Indo-US relations definitely took a downward slide. Reagan special interest in building up Pakistan military strength forging securing ties with the latter, bringing it into security framework of the US and as such abetting in Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapon system as also arming Pakistan with NATO-model F-16 warplanes, proposed AWACs system and the like along with taking the stand that Pakistan faced security threat not only from the Soviets but India as well and refusal even to give assurance to India, unlike the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-1950s, that Pakistan would not be allowed to use US arms against India brought Indo-US relations to its lowest ebb since 1971. The evidences of the Sikh terrorists in India receiving training in terrorist activities in the United States camp in United States like Alabama and other US abettment and involvement in the Punjab affairs in India further soured Indo-US relations.
The study explains that Diego Garcia had been one of the most controversial issues in Indo-American relations. The Pentagon's plans to construct a sophisticated military base at Diego Garcia despite vehement protests by the Government of India and the littoral states made one feel that it might obstruct the process of normalization of Indo-American relations. The opposition by India to the construction of the base had little impact on the American Government. The Pentagon continued to deploy sophisticated military weapons in the region. The UN failure to declare Indian Ocean as a zone of peace also made the littoral and hinterland State feel that this region would continue to be a source of tension and conflict in times to come if American military base Diego Garcia was not cleared.

The other important issue to affect Indo-US relations had been the Nuclear issue. In August 1963, United States and India entered into a nuclear cooperation agreement to be effective for 30 years. Under the terms of this agreement, the two countries agreed to cooperate in the construction and operation of a civil atomic power station near Tarapur in Maharashtra State in India. It was also agreed that the US Atomic Energy Commission would sell to India
all its requirements of enriched uranium for use as fuel at the TAPS, and that during the period of the agreement, the US would supply low enriched uranium to Tarapur. Originally, the deliveries of nuclear fuel from the United States were to be made on demand. In 1978, however, the US Congress by legislation made it mandatory for the purchasers of nuclear fuel supplies and components after September 1980, to accept more stringent safeguards including the opening up of all nuclear establishments for international inspection. Under one pretext or another, the shipment of United States fuel for Tarapur was repeatedly delayed.

Steps taken to resolve the issue and as a result of protracted discussions between New Delhi and Washington, an agreement between Reagan and Mrs. Gandhi on the supply of nuclear fuel was reached. While keeping the 1963 Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation intact in all other aspects, the decision was reached that France, not the United States, would henceforth supply all needed enriched uranium to the Tarapur Plant. The supply of fuel to Tarapur from a country other than the United States was completely within the framework of the 1963 Accord. The
solution worked out to enable both the United States and India to survive the long-standing and serious rift.

The study brings out that the security interests of the United States and India met head-on in Southern Asia and differed drastically. The United States viewed to security interests in the region from a global perspective while India’s perception of the area emanated from a regional and national security standpoint.

Another factor which strained the Indo-US relations was the reported involvement of CIA in India’s domestic affairs. Several times this issue had been raised especially in the context of Punjab affairs in which India feared American involvement. Though every country has its own intelligence network, but no sovereign country will tolerate interference in its internal affairs by the intelligence activities of another nation. Not heeding this fact by the American Administration and not keeping in check such activities for the sake of better Indo-US ties proved a major irritant.

The economic relations between India and United States as pointed out by the study had been characterised by a high degree
of asymmetry. In terms of North-South relations, the US might be described as a leading nation of the North and India as the leading nation of the South, and their relations were more conflicting than cooperative owing to differing perspectives on economic and political matters. One reason for this was extreme imbalance of the place each had in the economic life of the other. For India, the US ranked as a major trading partner. The US also held second place as a source of private foreign capital invested in India. For the United States, on the other hand, trade with India was an almost insignificant fraction of its total foreign trade turnover of more than 240 billion dollars. Similarly, the less than half billion dollars of private US capital invested in India was but a miniscule in terms of total direct capital investment outside the US. Thus, bearing of India's economic stability and independence on US national interests was not always apparent in Washington. This is why America should be less willing to accommodate India's point of view in economic matters than of countries where the American financial stake was much higher.

In spite of divergence in most of the political economic and security issues, yet there were several other issues on which India and America had affinity of views.
The analysis of Indo-US economic relations helps one to hypothesise that India was a developing country and need US assistance to build its economy. United States, too, would understand the value of Indian market. While United States was single largest source of bilateral economic assistance to India, India, too, was the second largest single recipient of the United States official development assistance. Not only this, the United States could help India in the field of science and technology, where the Russians could help little. The collaboration between Ford Aero Space and Indian Space Research Organisation had resulted in designing multipurpose commercial Satellite known as INSAT-1B which covered 75% of the TV transmitters in India. In field of agriculture too, the United States had helped India a lot. India’s self-sufficiency in foodgrains on account of Green Revolution could be attributed to a great extent, to American assistance. In the field of trade, United States had been India’s main trading partner. In absolute terms, the volume of trade between India and America had been growing over time. Since 1077 the two way trade had doubled and now stood at dollar 3 billion.
Furthermore, the United States had also helped India in the times of famine and drought. During 1963-69, United States shipped 26 million tonnes of wheat to India which fed twelve per cent of the Indian population. The agreement on PL-480 Title II programme could also be viewed in this context.

The study indicates that Indo-US relations improved a lot under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Since the 1985, Rajiv-Reagan Summit, the bilateral relationship and cooperation had increased enormously. The United States, whose two way trade with India in 1985 itself stood at almost dollar 4000 million, had already become India’s largest trading partner. In three high technology categories—electronics, computers and tele-communication equipments—American exports to India increased by 47 per cent from dollar 149 million in 1985 to dollar 220 million in 1986 and the share of all high technology categories in what the US exports to India had nearly doubled.

During the second Rajiv-Reagan Summit in Washington of October 1987, things had improved farther. Cultural relations were improved in both the countries. Both countries sent their contingents of artists to show their cultures.
However, this improvement in Indo-US relations could be said to be quantitative rather than qualitative. The basic differences between them with regard to the perspective and content of their respective national interests in several vital areas continued to remain and there were not any good prospect of any significant change basically at least in the foreseeable future. In this respect, the greatest hurdle in the improvement in their relation was the United States increased involvement and policies with regard to West, South-West and South Asia in which Pakistan had been assigned a key role by the United States. This and the Pakistan factor had been the greatest and the most important element endangering Indo-US relations.

The study shows that the end of the Cold War following the collapse of Soviet Union induced new hopes that in a changed international environment both countries could start afresh and build closer bonds of friendship. The Reagan Administration showed flexibility in transferring some of the defence-related technologies. The Bush Administration invoked the Pressler Amendment against Pakistan on the one hand and tried to construct strategic relations with India through the Kickleighter
proposals on the other. India’s new economic policy opened the way for solid partnership. It was the time when Clinton moved into the Oval office as the first post-Cold War President in January 1993. India at that time was already a member of family of free market democracies under the leadership of Narsimha Rao and Dr. Manmohan Singh as the incharge of Finance portfolio. The economy was the central theme of President Bill Clinton’s election campaign. Mutuality of economic interests raised hopes that the Rao-Clinton governments would work in harmony. However, the Cold War mind-set was entrenched so deeply in the working and planning of United States Government that it could not instantly change its policies and act according to the transformed scenario. Provocative comments on Kashmir by Robin Raphel and the President himself, caused a dampening of mutual relations. Thus, there was no apparent improvement in Indo-US relations even in the changed international environment. The initial reactions of the State Department towards India’s economic liberalisation were also not very encouraging.

The study concludes that the divergent Indian and American perspectives on Kashmir and the American military aid programme
in Pakistan resulted in intense reactions from Indian publicists because they were directly connected with India’s security interests. The US linked Kashmir with issues of non-proliferation and human rights. India held the United States indirectly responsible for the explosive situation in the Valley. India considered Kashmir a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and was against third party meddling or mediation, whereas Pakistan desired mediation, more particularly American mediation, in resolving the Kashmir tangle.

In this connection, the passing of the Brown Amendment was not only a political and strategical setback for India but provoked a sense of pique in the otherwise improving Indo-US relations in the post-Cold War era.

The study points out that the Clinton Administration had accorded the highest priority to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy. The administration sought India’s approval of NPT through a carrot and stick policy. But, for idealistic as well as realistic reasons, India would not sign the NPT because it was seen to jeopardise its security interests. India being surrounded by nuclear weapon states—China, Pakistan, Russia
and the United States (Diego Gracia), pressing India to abandon its nuclear weapon option by taking into consideration only the Pak-threat and ignoring the threat posed by China was not acceptable to India and thus proved self-defeating for the United States.

However, under United States pressure, India did not deploy Prithvi and shelved IRBM Agni. Though it generated an ambience of seeming goodwill, it resulted in opening the way for America’s bullying tactics that the United States began to consider India as a soft state whose policies and programmes could be influenced through pressure ploys and coercive diplomacy.

But by not signing the discriminatory NPT, India not only retained its nuclear weapon option but also made it clear that it would not abandon its nuclear capabilities in view of its own security concerns in the region. Looking at the assertive and adament attitude of India, the United States announced a reversal of its nuclear policy vis-a-vis South Asia. The United States ceased its efforts to “roll back” India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear capability and insisted only that they to “cap” their nuclear capabilities at the current level.
The study brings out that now with Washington nuclear non-proliferation had become the biggest issue in the conflict between India and America. Both collided on CTBT negotiations and had taken divergent stands on FMCT. India announced that it would not sign CTBT or FMCT as the country’s security was of the topmost priority.

The study focusses on the fact that the United States was attracted towards India’s liberalization policy. The size of the Indian market and its growth potential activated corporated America to seize the opportunity. During Rao’s visit to the United States in May 1994, Prime Minister sought to convey India’s desire to enhance economic cooperation with America. Thus, Indo-US economic relations travelled from the “donor-recipient” relationship of the Cold War days to a relationship between two partners.

Despite the upswing trend in economic relations, India figures very low in United States global trade. The Indian Government and exporters felt that United States interest in India’s reforms was for self-promotion and not designed to encourage a bilateral economic relationship based on the principle
of mutuality and reciprocity.

After Rao's visit to Washington, a significant change in Indo-US relations was visible. Maturity and mutual trust gradually developed in the mutual relationship to a large extent.

During the visits of Commerce Secretary Brown and Defense Secretary Perry in January 1995, Washington evolved a new approach in its dealings with India. The cornerstone of this new approach was greater interaction with a wide range of people, politicians, journalists, academics, students, etc. to get a better feel of the general mood and public opinion on a variety of issues such as Kashmir, relations with Pakistan, the nuclear issue, economic reforms, etc.

The in-depth study of Indo-US relations during Clinton-Rao period reveals that there were large areas divergence as well as convergence. Some positive factors in bilateral relations were the common belief in democracy and human rights, India's economic reforms, concern over terrorism and drugs and narcotic trafficking. While the negative factors were the Kashmir issue, non-proliferation, technology denial to India, IPR and ecology.
The "third country" factor had always poisoned Indo-US relations—be it Pakistan, China or the Soviet Union.

Analysing relations between India and America, during the Rao-Clinton period, some may suggest that they were seen to be improving in the socio-economic sphere but continued to remain at a standstill in the strategic political field. But the relation between the two countries could not be examined in parts. It had to be considered in totality. Juxtaposing this convergence and divergence, a slight improvement, as compared to earlier administrations, in the list of covering interests was evident but still, the divergence overshadowed the convergence. For this situation, various factors were responsible. First, the image of the Cold war had not been totally wiped out from the minds of both countries. Second, both assumed conflicting role on issues of non-proliferation and the world economic order. Third, while one was a global player the other was a dominant regional player. One often found the other on the opposite side. Not withstanding these differences some ways of constructive engagement between the two countries were to be explored and pursued. Analysts argued that no single issue should be allowed to overwhelmingly affect
the overall Indo-US relationship. New Delhi must not interpret
every gesture of US-Pakistan friendship as evidence of malice
towards India. Various political observers and experts on Indo-US
relations have suggested that the changed international
circumstances warrant that India and the United States should
establish an intimate relationship. President Nixon who followed
anti policies during his regime, realised in the last days of his life,
that India and America should have cultivated more congenial
relations.

The study highlights that in essence, the policies of the
Clinton Administration towards India were a mixture of a
cooperative and a confrontational attitude. This type of approach
had been evident in Indo-US relations since 1947. Eminent
Journalist Giri Lal Jain called it a “Two-track Perspective”. This
“swing and shift” in relationship was clearly visible during the
Cold War. It still continues even during the post-Cold War period.
Indo-US ties, during the Clinton-Rao period could easily be
adjusted under this paradoxical paradigm.

The analysis of the Indo-US relationship, spanning half a
century, reveals that both failed to respect each other’s
sensitivities. If India could not understand the stress caused by the challenges facing the superpower, the US failed to understand the sentiments of a newly independent country facing new threats to its sovereignty. The main source of tension from the Indian perspective was the massive American economic and military assistance to Pakistan. America’s tilt towards Pakistan was clearly visible whether it was the question of Kashmir or the formation of Bangladesh. India’s leaning towards the USSR and the testing of a nuclear device in 1974 was considered the root cause of the downward spiral in Indo-US relations from the American perspective. The US sought to prevent India from emerging as a major power and continued arming Pakistan in order to counterbalance India. Occasional cooperation such as emerged in 1962 when it was attacked by a communist China or American economic assistance or food aid to India, could not diminish the feelings of irritation towards each other.