CHAPTER - IV

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1. LAW OF CAUSATION

There can be no event without a cause. Whatever has a beginning must be brought about by a prior event. "Every phenomenon which has a beginning must have a cause,"1 There can be no uncaused events. There are no miracles in nature. We speak of change owing to our ignorance of cause. All phenomena are determined by their causes. Nature is a system of changing events which are causally determined by other events. Nature is not a chaos of unconnected spontaneous events. The law of causation means that the same cause must produce the same effect under the same circumstances. This is called the uniformity of causation.

Causal relations, like spatial and temporal ones, seem to be present among all objects of experience. With regard to any particular object of the world, it may be said that it is related to other objects as both a cause and an effect. On the one hand it arises out of certain conditions and is related to them as their effect. We cannot think of any physical object which has not the cause-effect relation to other objects. Everything in this universe must have a cause and everything must be the cause of certain effects. Again, the totality of all objects of the physical world is regarded as one endless chain of causes and effects. Any activity or change in anything of the world has its effects on all other things.

Thus, the world is regarded as one system of many inter-related objects. Again the whole world is also regarded as evolved by some ultimate cause, which though not caused, is related to the world as cause to effect. The relation of cause and effect seems to be constituted of things or objects of experience. Whatever exists must be in some time and place and be related to other things by way of cause and effect.

2. SĀM KHYA THEORY OF CAUSATION- SATKĀRYAVĀDA

The fundamental question involved in any theory of causation in Indian philosophy is: Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause? Here two different theories of causation are found among the Indian thinkers. These theories are called *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*. *Satkāryavāda* means the effect pre­exists in the cause and *asatkāryavāda* means the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Hinayāna Buddhism, Materialism and some followers of Mīmāṃsā believe in *asatkāryavāda*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory is also known as *Arambhavāda*, i.e. the view that production is a new beginning. Materialism believes in *svabhāvavāda*; Hinayāna Buddhism in *Anitya-paramāṇuvāda* or *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda*. On the other hand, the *satkāryavādins* believe that the effect is not a new creation, but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause.

The Sāmkhya theory of causation is quite opposed to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is called *Satkāryavāda*. The word ‘*satkārya*’ means all cause really exists in the effect concerned and on the other hand that all effect exists in the form of a capacity in the cause concerned.  

The Śāṃkhyya theory of evolution of the cosmos out of Prakṛti is based upon its theory of causation. According to the Śāṃkhyya philosophy, the effect pre-exists in the cause in a potential condition; the effect is a modification (parināma), manifestation, development, or redistribution of the cause. The effect is not a new beginning. It is not an entirely new creation. It is not non-existent in the cause. It exists in its cause in a latent form even before its production. According to Śāṃkhyya, the effect is only a transformation of material cause and is thus identical in substance. Applying this theory, Śāṃkhyya maintains that all material effects are modifications of Prakṛti. They pre-exist in the eternal bosom of Prakṛti and simply come out of it at the time of creation and return at the time of dissolution. There is neither new production nor destruction. The effect and the cause are equally real, the former being a modification of the latter. Vacaspati Miśra said that the 'existent' (effect) emanates from the 'existent' (cause) 3. S. Mookherji also reiterates that production is nothing but manifestation. 4

The Śāṃkhyya offers some arguments to prove the pre-existence of the effect in the cause. 5 In the Śāṃkhyakarikā, Isvarakṛṣṇa has forwarded the following arguments:

(i) Asadakaranāt

The effect must pre-exist in cause, since that which does not exist cannot by any means be brought into existence. If the effect is not previously present in the cause, it becomes a mere non-entity like the here’s horn or the sky-flower and can never be produced. Blue cannot be made into yellow even by a thousand

3. sataḥ sat jayate. STK on SK, 9
4. History of Philosophy-Eastern and Western, Mookherji, S., P. 247
5. asadakaranadupadahagrahanat sarvasambhavabhavat / saktasya sakyakaranat karanabhava vacca satkarya//SK, 9

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artists. If the effect is produced out of nothing, then any effect could come out of any cause. As that is not the case, we are to admit that the effect exists beforehand in the cause.6

(ii) Upādānagrahaṇaṁ

In producing a thing, one has to take the proper materials out of which only that thing can be produced. Curd cannot be produced from water. For producing curd we must take milk.7 Vacaspati Miśra maintains that upādāna means cause and grahaṇa means relation.8 The effect has a fixed relation to its cause. Relation is not possible with a non-existent thing. Hence, the effect is sat (existent) before its production.

(iii) Sarvasaṁbhava-bhāvāvāt

Everything cannot be produced out of everything. If the cause is not related with the effect, everything can be produced from everything else. This suggests that the effect, before its manifestation is implicit in its material cause.9

(iv) Saṅktasya Śākyakaranaṁ

Only an efficient cause can produce that for which it is potent. This again means that the effect, before its manifestation, is potentially contained in its material cause. Production is only an actualization of the potential.10

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6. asat cet kāraṇavyāparityat pūrvar dhāryaṁ, nāsyā sattvaṁ kartuṁ keriapi sākyaih, na hi nilam śilpiśahasrenapi pitam kartuṁ sākyate .......... asataḥ karane tu na nidarsanāṁ kinti ca. STK on Ibid.
7. iha loke yo yenārthi sa tadupādānagrahaṇaṁ karoti, dadhyarthi kṣirasya na tu jalesa. GB on SK, 9.
8. upādānāṁ karāṇīni, teṣāṁ grahaṇāṁ, kāryaṁ sambandhaṁ. STK on SK, 9.
9. asaṁbaddhaṁ janyatve, asaṁbaddhatvāvīśeṣeṇa sarvarāṁ kāryajātaṁ sarvasnāṁ bhavet. na caitadasti, tasmānasaṁbaddhaṁasaṁbaddhaṁ janyate api tu sarvaṁ sāṁbaddhaṁ sarvadhena janyata iti. Ibid.
10. sa śaktīḥ śaktakāraṇāśrayā sarvatra vā syāt ................. saṁbaddhatve nāsa sāṁbaddhaṁ iti sat kāryaṁ. Ibid.
The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. As the cause is existent, so the effect must also be existent. The cause and the effect are the implicit and the explicit stages of the same process. The Sāṁkhyists forward the following proofs to establish the non-difference of the effects from the cause:

(i) The *kārya* is not different from its material cause, since it is a property of the cause and inheres in it. A cloth is not different from the threads which constitute it, because it is a property of the threads. If an object is different from another in essence, it can never be its property. A cow is different from a horse, and so cannot be the property of the latter. But a cloth inheres in the threads, and so does not differ from them in essence.\(^\text{11}\)

(ii) There is the causal relation between the material cause and the effect. So, they are not different from each other in essence. The causal relation can never subsist between two objects which essentially differ from each other. But there is the causal relation between a cloth and the threads. So, they cannot differ from each other in essence.\(^\text{12}\)

(iii) If two objects are different from each other they can be conjoined with each other, e.g. a pool and a berry. And they can exist separately, from each other. But there is neither conjunction, of a cloth with the constituent threads,

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11. *kāryasya kāraṇābhedaśaḍhanāni* .................. na paṭaṣṭantubhyo bhidyate, tantudharmatvāt. iha yat yato bhidyate tat tasya dharman na bhavati, yathā gaurāṣvāya dharmaśca paṭaṣṭantūnām, tasmāṁnārthāntaram. Ibid.

12. *upādānopaṭeyabhāvaśca nārthāntaratvāṁ tantupaṭayoh* ......................... upādānopaṭeyabhāvaśca tantupaṭayoh. Ibid.
nor separate existence of them. So, they cannot be different from each other in essence.\(^{13}\)

(iv) The material cause and the effect are identical with each other in essence, because there is equality in their weight. The weight of threads and the cloth are equal in weight. When there is difference in weight then there may be difference of the things. But as the weight of the cause and the effect are same, so it conclusively proves the essential identity between the material cause and the effect. Cause and effect are different states of one and the same substance.\(^{14}\) So, they are not distinct from each other. Their distinction is based on our particular interests. A jar can hold water, but a lump of clay cannot. They are distinct from each other because they serve different purposes, but they are not distinct from each other in their essential nature.\(^{15}\)

The Naiyāyikas try to prove the difference between the cause and the effect on the basis of origination, destruction, usage, serving different purposes etc. But Vacaspati Misra points out that these cannot prove the distinction between the cause and the effect, because all the said differences can be explained and reconciled by attributing the notions to the appearance and disappearance of certain factors. For instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear being contracted into its body and appear on emerging from it, but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from or destroyed by, the tortoise; in the same manner,

\(^{13}\) narthāntaratvāṁ tantupatayoh, saṁyogāprāptyabhāvāt. arthāntaratve hi saṁyogo drṣṭo
............ aprāptirvā .... na ceha saṁyogāprāpti, tasmānnaṁarthāntaratvamiti. Ibid.

\(^{14}\) patastantubhyo na bhidyate, gurutvāntarakāryā grahaṇat. iha yat yasmādbhinnan, tāt
 tasmāt tasya gurutvāntaranā kāryāṁ gṛhyate ................. tasmādabhināḥtantubhyaḥ
 paṭa iti. tānyetāṁyabhedasādhanānyayavītiṁi ...... evamabhede siddhe, tantava eva tena
tenā samsthānabhedena pariṇaṁ paṭo, na tantubhyo ’rthāntaranā paṭah. Ibid.

\(^{15}\) tānyetāṁyabhedasādhanānyayavītiṁi. Ibid.
the jar, the crown and other things, which are only particular modifications of
clay, gold and so forth, are said to be produced on emanating and appearing from
clay etc., and to be destroyed on entering in to them again and disappearing. As
a matter of fact, however, there can be no ‘production or birth for what is ‘non-
existent’ ‘destruction’ for what is ‘existent’. As the Tortoise is not different from
its appearing and disappearing limbs, in the same way the jar, the crown and other
products are not different from clay, gold and so forth.\textsuperscript{16}

As for the difference in the useful purpose served, Vacaspati says, that
also does not establish the difference between the cause and the effect; because
one and the same thing is found to serve several useful purposes; for instance, the
single thing, fire, serves the purposes of burning, cooking and lighting. As a
matter of fact, any variation of functions cannot be a ground of difference; because
we find that the functions of the same thing with their operating collectively or
severally. For instance, in case of the bearers of a palanquin each individual
bearer may perform the function of indicating the path, but not that of carrying
the palanquin, while collectively, they can carry the palanquin. In the same manner,
even though the yarns severally do not serve the purpose of covering yet on
combining and thereby appearing in the form of the cloth, they can serve the
purpose of covering.\textsuperscript{17}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[16.] yathā kūrmāḥ svāvāyavebhyaḥ saṅkocaviṅkāśibhyo na bhinnāḥ, evaṁ ghatamukutaḥdayo’pi
mṛtsuvamaṇḍibhya na bhinnāḥ. Ibid.
\item[17.] na cārthakriyābhedo’pi bhedamapādayati, ekasyāpi nānārthakriya darsanāt. yathālka
eva vahnidhārakaḥ pācakaḥ prakāśakasceti. nāpyarthakriyāvyavasthā vastubbhed hetuḥ,
tesāmeva samasta vyastānārthakriyāvyavasthādāsanaḥ. yathā pratyekāṁ vistayo
vartmadarsānalakṣāparthakriyāṁ kuruṇtī, na tu śibikāvahanam. militāṣṭu
śibikāmudvahante, evaṁ tantavāḥ pratyekāṁ prāvaranamakurvaṇa api militā
āvirbhuta-pāthaśabdhavāḥ prāvarisyante. Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
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In the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra*, arguments in support of *Satkāryavāda* are also found which are in fact, not different from the above mentioned arguments. Thus, it is said in the *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* that effect pre-exists in its cause because there can be no production of what did not exist before. Moreover, there must be some determinate material cause for every product, all things are not produced in all places, at all times.\(^{18}\)

3. TWO TYPES OF CAUSE

The Sāṁkhya recognizes two kinds of causes: material cause and efficient cause. The material cause enters into the constitution of the effect and contains the potentiality of being reproduced in the form of the effect. The efficient cause exerts an extraneous influence on the effect, co-operates with the causal power inherent in the material cause and liberates it, “Gold which is the material cause of an ornament, enters into its constitutions, and continues to be operative as long as the ornament lasts, and after its destruction it relapses into the potential condition again. But the activity of the goldsmith is the efficient cause of the ornament, because it liberates the causal energy inherent in the material cause, and because it actualizes the potentiality of the effect; its causality ceases with the production of the ornament.”\(^{19}\)

Two kinds of effects are also distinguished, when the quality of a thing changes, we have a case of *dharma parināma*; when the potential becomes actual and the change is only external, we have a case of *lakṣaṇa-parināma*. The change

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of state due to mere lapse of time is avasthaparîñama.\textsuperscript{20} Change is taking place everywhere and at every moment. All things and states, outward and inward are subject to this law of change.\textsuperscript{21}

4. THE STAGES OF EVOLUTION:

Evolution is a gradual improvement of the simple, homogeneous and indefinite to the complex, heterogeneous and definite. According to philosopher Conger, evolution implies four fundamental notions. These are: change in time, serial order, inherent causes and creative synthesis.\textsuperscript{22} The definition of evolution is given by Herbert Spencer "an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion during which matter passes from an indefinite, incorrect homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."\textsuperscript{23} P. K. Sasidharan Nair says, "Evolution means the gradual development, parinama of the variety of categories from prakṛti and this is a course from the real to reality and is neither arbitrary nor irregular. It is governed by an immanent idea that brings about the emergence of various orders of existence from prakṛti to mahābhūtas."\textsuperscript{24}

The process of creation from Prakṛti, once its equilibrium has been upset, is called 'evolution' by the Sāṅkhya philosophers. The Sāṅkhya theory of evolution is a metaphysical theory. Referring to the opinion of T.M.P. Mahadevan Dale Riepe justifies the view that Sāṅkhya evolution is not like biological theories of

\textsuperscript{20} Yogabhāṣya, 3.13.
\textsuperscript{21} SS, 1.121.
\textsuperscript{22} Cf. Introduction To Philosophy, Sinha, J.N., P. 133.
\textsuperscript{23} Vide, Sinha, J.N. Introduction To Philosophy, P. 133.
\textsuperscript{24} Sasidharan Nair, P.K., The Sāṅkhya System, P. 41.
evolution, particularly Darwinian. The reasons are: "(1) *prakriti* does not evolve like the forms of life that biological evolution speaks about, since it is unlike anything discussed in the biological theory ...... (2) *prakriti* can scarcely struggle and evolve in any environment, since it itself is the environment; (3) in comparing the evolutes of Sāṁkhya with those in the biological theory, there appears to be no greater coherence in the later evolutes of Sāṁkhya, whereas there does appear to be in the Darwinian scheme. It might be further pointed out that the Sāṁkhya theory does not explain anything in the sense of showing the how of things nor does it enable us to predict or control events."  

As has been pointed out above, according to the Sāṁkhya philosophy, the meaning of evolution is not a new creation. Creation is only the manifestation. It is only the transformation. It has already been said that before creation, *Prakṛti* exists in a state of equilibrium. But, when *Prakṛti* comes in contact with the *Puruṣas*, this equilibrium is disturbed and then *Prakṛti* evolves into this world. Therefore *Prakṛti* is the fundamental substance which is responsible for the evolution. Hence, the relation between *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* is the cause of the world’s evolution, which is the most important and perplexing point of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. Though *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are distinct and opposed to each other in nature yet their contact is essential to evolve the present world. Evolution of the world cannot be due to the *Prakṛti* alone because it is unconscious and nor can it be due to the *Puruṣa* alone, because it is conscious and inactive.  

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evolution of the world. Dr. K.P. Sinha observes that there is such a harmony between the Prakṛti and Puruṣa in nature that the movements of Prakṛti are invariably adopted to the needs of the Puruṣas. When the merits and demerits of the Puruṣas require that there should be a world for their enjoyment, Prakṛti evolves into the world. But when the Puruṣas collectively require that there should be a recess, Prakṛti dissolves all the evolutes into its bosom. This is not the ultimate end of Prakṛti. It performs this process of creation and dissolution with the opinion that the Puruṣas can, in the end, discriminate themselves from the not-self and, can thereby, attain liberation. For giving rise to the discriminative knowledge of the Puruṣa, Prakṛti requires to be known to it. In the Sāmkhyakārikā, Isvarakṛṣṇa says that Prakṛti and Puruṣas come in contact with each other because Prakṛti needs to be known by the Puruṣa (darsanārtham) and Puruṣa needs to attain liberation (kaivalyārtham). Isvarakṛṣṇa illustrated the union of Prakṛti and Puruṣa with the example of lame man and blind man. Non-intelligent Prakṛti requires the help of intelligent Puruṣa to guide her activity. Each one requires the help of the other. Individually they are not capable of achieving anything. In the case of lame man and blind man if the lame man places the blind man on his shoulders then being guided by the direction of the lame man who can see but cannot walk, the blind man who cannot see but can walk, reaches the destination. In this way their union serves their purpose. Likewise, Puruṣa and Prakṛti also create this universe.

27. Indian Theories of Creation : A synthesis, Sinha, Dr. K.P., Pp. 10-11.
29. paṅgavandhavadubhavorapi saṁyogastatkṛtaḥ sargah/ Ibid.
5. THE EVOLUTES

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, Mahat (the great) or Buddhi is the first product of Prakṛti. Mahat produces ahamkāra (ego). Ahamkāra is the principle of individuation. Vaikārika or sāttvika, bhūtādi or tāmasa and taijasa or rājasa are the three kinds of ahamkāra. Mind or manas is produced from the sāttvika ahamkāra. Besides manas the sāttvika ahamkāra produces the five sensory-organs (pañcajñānendriya) and the five motor organs (karmendriya). The pañcajñānendriyas are srotram (ear), tvak (skin), cakṣuḥ (eye), jihvā (tongue) and ghrāṇāṁ or nāsikā (nose). Again, vāk (speech), pāṇi (hand) pāda (feet), pāyu (anas) and upastha (genital) are the five motor organs. The five tanmātras (subtle elements) are produced from tāmasa ahamkāra. The pañcatanmātras are śābda (sound), sparśa (touch), rūpa (colour), rasa (taste) and gandha (smell). Again the five mahābhūtas (the gross elements) i.e. ākāśa (ether), vāyu (air), teja (fire), ap (water) and prthivi (earth) are produced from the five tanmātras respectively. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, evolution is the play of these twenty-four principles. Among these twenty-four principles, Prakṛti is not produced from anything else i.e. it is not a product of anything. So, Prakṛti is not a vikṛti (effect). But Prakṛti is the origin of all; it is the root cause of this universe. Mahat, ahamkāra and the five tanmātras are both causes and effects. They are both productions and productive. The five sensory organs, the

30. pradhanad buddhirutpadyate. GB on Ibid., 3
31. saivahamkaramutpadayati. Ibid.
32. buddhindriyani caksuh srotraghanarasanatvagakhani // SK, 26.
33. prakṛtermahamstato' hankarastmad ganasca sōdasakah / tasmadapi sōdasakatpancabhyah pance bhūtani // Ibid., 22.
five motor organs, mind and the five gross elements are the effects because these are the products only. But these are not cause because nothing is produced from them. It has already been said that Prakṛti evolves the world of objects when it comes into relation with the Puruṣa while Puruṣa is a mere spectator. Puruṣa is the twenty-fifth category of Sāṁkhya philosophy. But Puruṣa is untouched in this evolution. Puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect.34

We have already mentioned above that mahat is produced from Prakṛti and the five tanmātras are produced from ahamkāra. But some of the ancient teachers of Sāṁkhya are found to differ in their conception of the order to evolution. They opine that Pradhāna firstly produces a vague and indistinct principle and mahat is produced from this principle.35 Again, Vindhyavāsin opines that ahamkāra and the five tanmātras are produced from mahat.36 The view of Vindhyavāsin is also supported by the Yogabhaṣya.37 In another place of Yogabhaṣya, Vyāsa describes the five tanmātras to be the evolutes of ahamkāra.38

Again, Yuktidipikā refers to one Patanjali, who is not in favour of counting ahamkāra as a separate category. According to him, egoism or the notion of ‘I-ness’ belongs to mahat.39 This teacher appears to be different from the author of

34. mūlaprakṛtiravikṛtirmahadādyāḥ prakṛtvikṛtayāḥ sapta / śodasaśakastu vikāro na prakṛtir vikṛtīḥ purusah // Ibid., 3
35. kecidāhuh- pradhānādaṇḍidasyaśasyavārapam tattvāntaramutpadyate. tato mahaniti. YDi on SK, 22.
36. ahamkaratpancatanmatrāṇītīrme mahātaḥ sādaviśēṣāh śriyante pāncatanmātṛāṇīyaharmāṅkāraścetī- Vindhyavāsimatam. Ibid.
37. ete sattāmātrasatmano mahātaḥ sādaviśēṣāsparipāmāḥ. Yogabhaṣya, 2. 19.
38. pārthivasyānoh gandhatanmātraṁ sūkṣmo visayaḥ, āpyasya rasatanmātraṁ, tajjasasya rūpatanmātraṁ, vāyaviyasya sparśatanmātraṁ, ākāsasya sābdatanmātram, tesaṁmahāṃkārāḥ, asyaśāpi ligamātraṁ sūkṣmo viṣayaḥ. Ibid, 1.45
39. evam tarhi naivāhanmāṅkāro vidyata iti patanjali. mahato' smiprathyayarpattrābhhyupagamāt. YDi on SK, 3.
In describing the production of tanmatras S.N. Dasgupta 
holds that śabda or ākāśa (the sound potential) is first generated 
directly from the bhūtādi. Secondly, the sparśa or the vāyu (touch-potential) is 
generated by the union of a unit of tamas from bhūtādi with the ākāśa tanmātra. Thirdly, 
the rūpa or teja (colour-potential) is generated similarly by the accretion of a unit of tamas from 
bhūtādi. Next comes the rasa or ap (test-potential) which is generated by the union of a unit of tamas from 
bhūtādi. This ap tanmātra again by its union with a unit of tamas from bhūtādi 
produces the gandha tanmātra or prthivi (smell-potential). 40 Most interestingly 
unlike other teachers of Sāmkhya philosophy, Pañcādhikarana, who was a teacher of Sāmkhya philosophy, 
holds that the five mahābhūtas produced the indriyas or organs. 41

The whole course of evolution from Prakṛti to the gross physical elements are divided into 
two stages. One is pratyayasarga or buddhisarga (psychical) and the other is tanmātrasarga or bhautikasarga (physical). 42 Generally pratyaya means knowledge. According to Gauḍapāda here the word pratyaya stands for buddhi (intellect). 43 Vācaspati Misra also supports the view of Gauḍapāda. He maintains that pratyaya is that by which anything is known i.e., buddhi and pratyayasarga is the creation of that buddhi. 44 In the pratyayasarga stage appears buddhi (intellect), ahaṁkara (ego) and the eleven organs i.e. pañcājñānendriya, pañčakarmendriya and manas. On the otherhand, the term bhautika means

40. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.1, Dasgupta, S.N., P. 252
41. ahaṁkārdindriyaṁiti sarve, bhautikāndriyaṁiti pañcādhikaranamamamam, YDi on SK, 22.
42. SK, 52; Indian Philosophy, Sharma. R.N., P. 204.
43. pratyayo buddhirityukta. GB on SK 46.
44. pratiyate’neneti pratyayo buddhiḥ, tasya sargah. STK on SK, 46
This bhautikasarga may be regarded as the phase of the liṅga-sarga. The five tanmātras (subtle elements), the five mahābhūtas (gross elements) and their products appeared in the tanmātrasarga or bhautikasarga of evolution. The tanmātras are not perceived to the ordinary individuals. So, these are called āviseṣa i.e., devoid of specific perceptible characters. The mahābhūtas (gross elements) and their products are called visēṣa (specific). Pleasure, pain and attachment are the characters of the physical elements and their products. In this respect, Vacaspati Misra opines that among the gross elements, ākāśa etc., some abounding in the sattvaguna, are calm, pleasing, illuminating and buoyant, others abounding in the rajoguna are turbulent, painful and unstable; the rest abounding in tamoguna are deluded, confounded and sluggish. Vīseṣa or the specific are divided into three kinds viz., (i) suksmaśarīra or liṅgasarīra (the subtle body), (ii) sthūlasarīra (the gross body born of parents) and (iii) the gross elements (prabhūta). Among these three kinds the suksmaśarīra is eternal or everlasting and the sthūlasarīra is perishable. The gross body is composed of the five gross elements (pancamaḥabhūta). The subtle body or suksmaśarīra is the combination of buddhi, ahaṃkāra the five sense organs,

46. tanmātranyavisekastebhyo bhūtāṇi pāṇca pāṇcabhyah/ ete sr̥tva visēṣah sansā ṣanta gorasaḥ mudhāṣca // SK, 38
   Cf. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, chatterjee, Satischandra & Datta, Dhirendramohan, P. 273.
47. yasmādakāsaḍisu sthūleṣu sattvapradhānatayā kecicchāntah sukhaḥ, prakāśa laghavah, kecidrajahpradhānatayā ghorah dukkhah anavasthitah, kecittamahpradhānatayā mudhā viṣannā guravah te 'mi parasparavyāvṛtya' nubhuyamāṇa 'vīseṣah'. STKonSK, 38.
48. suksma mātāpitrjāh sahaprabhūtaistridhā vīseṣah syuh/
   suksmāstesam niyata, mātāpitrjā nivartante // SK, 39.
the five motor organs, mind and the five subtle elements (tanmātras). The sthūlaśarīra is the support of the subtle body. The intellect, ego and the organs cannot function without physical basis. According to Vacaspati Miśra there are only these two kinds of bodies as mentioned before. Vijñānabhikṣu, however, thinks that there is a third kind of body called the adhiśthāna body which supports the subtle one when it passes from one gross body into another. In the Saṃkhya karikā, Iśvāraṅkṣṇa says that Puruṣa remains associated with the subtle body, he becomes engaged in one or other of the classes of embodiments as a result of which he has to experience misery arising out of decay and death and whenever he is dissociated from the same, he becomes free and never re-enters into the whirlpool of existence.

**Mahat or Buddhi (The Great or Intellect)**

The course of evolution, according to the Saṃkhya system follows a definite order. Mahat or buddhi is the first product of Prakṛti. The definition of mahat is given by Iśvāraṅkṣṇa in his Saṃkhya karikā as that which is determinative. The word adhyavasāya is derived from the root so with the prefix adhi and ava. Here it can mean ‘attemp’, ‘effort’, ‘exertion’, ‘perseverance’ etc. and buddhi is derived from budh ‘to know’. The word adhyavasāya is used with reference to one whose buddhi is controlled properly directed and is determinate.

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49. mahadādisūkṣmaparyantarā, Ibid, 40; buddhirahamkāromana iti, pañcatañmatraṇī sūkṣmaparyantarām tanmātraparyantarām saṁsaratī. GB on SK 40
50. SK, 40; GB on it; SS, 3.1-17
51. STK on SK; 38; SKI, Mainkar, T.G., P.149
52. SPB on SS, 3.11
53. SK, 55
54. adhyavasāyo buddhi. Ibid, 23.
Adhyavasāya also means strenuous effort.\textsuperscript{56} Prof. Lassens translates it as ‘intentio’,\textsuperscript{57} and Colebrooke as ‘ascertainment’.\textsuperscript{58} St. Hillaire’s interpretation of the word agrees with the comment made by Gauḍapāda.\textsuperscript{59} Adhyavasāya is also synonym of utsāha.\textsuperscript{60} According to John Davies; it is its secondary meaning. Primarily it means a defining or distinguishing act. He explains intellect thus “Intelect (buddhi) is then, in the system of Kapila, the faculty or organ by which outward objects are presented to the view of the soul in their proper and definite form.”\textsuperscript{61} Mahat is the germ of this vast world of objects including intellect, ego and mind. Hence, it is also known as Jagatvīja (seed of world).\textsuperscript{62} In its psychological aspect, it is called buddhi or the intellect because it is the source of all knowledge of the human being. The same view is upheld by Vijnānabhikṣu.\textsuperscript{63} Here, the term is used to mean cosmic intelligence. In this instance, intelligence is understood as the capacity to expand, reveal and ascertain. It is the first appearance in the universe, the order that fulfills the ultimate destiny of nature, the first birth of intelligence. But, it is not the source of conscious or luminous. It is the foundation of the intelligence of the individual. Pressure is laid on the psychological aspect of mahat in the Sāṁkhya system. Again in the Sāṁkhya-sāra, Vijnānabhikṣu has said that mahat arises from the Pradhāna which is also called buddhi. Here the term buddhi stands for knowledge, detachment and lordly powers.

\textsuperscript{56} SKI, Davies, John, P. 38.
\textsuperscript{57} SKI, Mainkar, T.G., P. 110.
\textsuperscript{58} SKI, Davies, John, P. 38.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study}, Sengupta, Dr. Anima, P. 120.
\textsuperscript{63} mahadākhyamādyānāṁ kāryyaṁ, tanmanāṁ. SS, 1.71.
which, form the form of the *buddhi* dominating in *sattva*.  

It is a well-known fact that when a man has to do anything, then what he does is to examine critically the situation. After that he considers over it. He regards himself as entitled to do it. At last he makes up his mind that he should do it and then he does it. *Buddhi* consists in the conception that ‘this should be done’. It belongs to and forms the characteristic function of the Great principle. In *Indian Philosophy and Religion*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *manas* are described as the three psychological aspects of knowing, willing and feeling. In the ‘Introduction’ of *Tattvakaumudi*, Ganganath Jha opines that the Sāmkhya *buddhi* is not mere will as like the western psychological will. Sāmkhya *buddhi* is will and intellect combined. For in the opinion of Western psychologists belonging to the Kantian school, “Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictates of intelligence.” Isvarakṛṣṇa also points out that the external organs together with the mind and *ahamkāra*, being different modifications of the *guna*, having first illuminated the whole of the *Prāṇa*’s purpose, present it to the will. *Buddhi* is the helper of *Prāṇa* to get the purpose of the *Prāṇa*.

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64. prakṛteḥ sakāśād buddhyākhyam mahattatvāṁ jāyate. SaS, 1.3
65. STK on SK, 23.
66. Max Muller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, P. 246
68. *Sāmkhya-Tattva-Kaumudi*, Jha, Ganganath, P. 35 (Introduction)
69. ete pradīpakaṁ te prasāparavilakṣanā guruvaṁ saṁśayaḥ / kṛtvam puruṣasyārdham prakāśya buddhau pravacchanti // sarvam pratyupabhogam yaśmat puruṣasya sādhayoḥ buddhiḥ / saiva ca visiṣṭaḥ punah pradharanapuruṣaṁ tāṁ prakṛteḥ samśayaḥ // SaS, 133.
Buddhi is the substratum of memories and not ahamkāra or manas. It is the substratum of all sāmskāras. Specially, when the knowledge of tattva is produced then the ahamkāra and the mind are destroyed, but then also there remains the memory of Puruṣa. Thinking (cītā) also proves the preponderance of buddhi. Meditative thinking is the greatest of all vṛttis. Mind preponderates through organs like eyes etc., ahamkāra preponderates through mind and buddhi through ahamkāra. Hence it is clear that preponderance of buddhi is established on all the karaṇas (organs).

Some of the commentators suppose buddhi to be the seat of volitions, which, however, is not the case. Kapila did not attribute volition to intellect or buddhi, he assigns to it some other properties. When Kapila says that the soul is inactive, he is bound to assign qualities or states which are connected with our active life to buddhi. When the sattvaguna preponderates in the mahattattva then this state is called sāttvika state. Virtue (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), detachment (vairāgya) and excellence (aishvarya) are the four attributes or bhāvas of the sāttvika form of mahat or buddhi. But when sattvaguna is influenced by tamas, it has opposite attributes like vice (adharma), ignorance (ajñāna), attachment (avairāgya) and imperfection (anaisvarya). Improvement of sāttvika buddhi results in the formation of a virtuous nature, while the increase

70. tatha'seṣasamāskarādharatvat SS. 2.42
71. SPB on Ibid.
72. smṛtya'numānacca, SS, 2.43; cītā vṛttirhidhyānākiya sarvavṛttibhyā sreṣṭhā SPB on it, 2.43
73. āpeksiko guṇapradhānabāvah, kriyāvisesati. SS, 2.45; SPB on SS 2.45
74. SKI, Davies, John, P. 38
75. adhyavasayo buddhidharmo jñānam virāga aishvaryam / sāttvikametadrupam tamasasamsādviṇparyastam // SK, 23
of tāmasika properties in the buddhi results in the formation of a vicious nature, which brings a man down to the level of a lower animal.

In the classical Sāṁkhya, mahat is, indeed, a phase in the cosmic growth and it is accepted in the cosmic sense. It is not individual or particular. The mahat includes within it the individual buddhis of all the Puruṣas. It is, therefore universal in this sense. The energy of the physical world is also included in it.\(^\text{76}\)

Prof. S.N. Dasgupta remarks “looked at from this point of view, it has the widest and most universal existence comprising all creation and is thus called mahat. It is called liṅga (sign) as the other later existences or evolutes give us the ground of inferring the Prakṛti which is called alīṅga, i.e. of which no liṅga or characteristic may be affirmed.”\(^\text{77}\) Senses and the mind function for the buddhi (intellect). But buddhi (intellect) functions directly for the Puruṣa.

\textit{Ahaṁkāra} (Ego)

Ahaṁkāra is the second product of evolution which is produced from mahat. The term ahaṁkāra has various synonyms viz., abhimāna, abhimant; ahaṁkṛti, prajñāpti etc. The first three connote its functions, the fourth its individuating creative function.\(^\text{78}\) There is no doubt that ahaṁkāra is a more determinate form of mahat, but nevertheless, it remains integrated in all its three forms within mahat, from which, it has been generated.\(^\text{79}\) Ahaṁkāra produces the notion of the ‘I’ and ‘mine’ i.e. the ego-sense. Hence it is said that ahaṁkāra is ego-sense (abhimān).\(^\text{80}\)

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76. *The Evolution of the Sāṁkhya School of Thought*, Sengupta, Dr. Anima, P. 156
77. Dasgupta, S.N., *History of Indian Philosophy*, P. 249
80. abhimāno ‘haṁkāraḥ’ / SK, 24
identity and, for all empirical purposes, stands for the experiencer; it brings about awareness like ‘I exist’ and ‘I know’. In the Śāmkhyasūtra, Vijnānabhiṣku also gives the definition of ahaṁkāra. According to him, ahaṁkāra is that which egotises or creates the ‘I’ of which the function is abhimāna or self assumption.\(^{82}\)

As stated by Vijnānabhiṣku in his Śāmkhyasūtra, the egoism arises from the great element just as a branch from the sprout. Since it performs the function of ideation, it is termed as ahaṁkāra, just like the designation of Kumbhakāra (potter)\(^{83}\) who produces a pot. There is no difference between the functioning and its agent. It is better to understand it as abhimānavṛtti while the agent is automatically included in it.

Ahaṁkāra is conceived as the material substance and while buddhi is more cognitive in effect, ahaṁkāra seems to be more practical or experimental. The psychological aspects, the function of ahaṁkāra is abhimāna. Karttṛtva (agency) belongs to it and not to the Puruṣa.\(^{84}\) According to Vijnānabhiṣku, ahaṁkāra is the internal substance whose vṛtti (function) is the abhimāna.\(^{85}\) We infer the existence of ahaṁkāra from its effects.\(^{86}\) Ahaṁkāra is regarded as a substance, since it is the material cause of other substances. The Puruṣa identifies itself with the acts of Prakṛti through ahaṁkāra. It passes to the self the sensations and suggestions of action communicated to it through manas. So, it helps in the formation of concepts and decisions. It is not what individualises the universal

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82. yah saḥ aham karotiti ahaṁkāraḥ. SPB on SS, 1.72
83. mahattatvādahamkāra utpadyate. aṁkurāt śakñāvat. tasya ca'bhimanānavṛttikatvādahamkārasamajñā kumbhakārasamajñāvat. SaS,3 (Purvabhāga)
84. SS, 6.54;SPB on it; Cf. *Indian Philosophy*, Radhakrishnan, S., P. 268
85. ahaṁkārasca'bhimanānavṛttikamantahkaranandarvayām. SPB on SS, 1.63
86. ahamkārasyānumānena bodha.Ibid.
consciousness, since the individuality is already there according to the Sāṁkhya. It individualises the impressions that come from the outer world. The process in this regard is like this: at first we perceive the objects through our senses. After that the mind reflects on them and determines them specifically. They are referred to the principle of ego-hood which is the principle of integration. At last, they are determined by buddhi which hands them over to the self. When ahaṁkāra is dominated by the aspect of sattva, we do good work; when by rajas, evil ones; and when by tamas indifferent ones. In dreamless sleep the function of ahaṁkāra may be absent, but the desires and the tendencies are all there.  

On the basis of preponderance of the three guṇas, ahaṁkāra is divided into three kinds. They are: Vaikārika or Sāttvika, Taijasa or Rājas and Bhūtādi or Tāmasa. It is called Vaikārika or Sāttvika, when the sattvaguna dominates the rajas and tāmas. It is called Taijasa or Rājasa, when rajoṇa dominates the sattva and tāmas. And it is called Bhūtādi or Tāmasa, when sattva and rajoṇa are dominated by tamoguna and the tamoguna preponderates in ahaṁkāra.

Eleven sense organs and the five tanmātras are produced from ahaṁkāra. From ahaṁkāra in its sāttvika aspect, comes eleven organs. On the other hand, from ahaṁkāra in its tāmasa aspect comes the five subtle elements. The rājas ahaṁkāra is concerned in both the sāttvika and tāmasika ahaṁkāra and supplies the necessary energy for the change of sattva and tāmas into their products.  

The interpretation of Vacaspati Misra is that the eleven sense organs, being illuminative and boyant is said to abound in the sattvaguna. It proceeds from the

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87. SPB on SS, 1.63
88. sattvika ekādaśakah pravartate vaikṛtadahamkārat/
   bhūtādestanātraḥ sa tāmasastajjasādubhayam//SK, 25
Vaikṛta ahamkāra. From the ahamkāra as dominated by the tamoguna proceeds the set of the first elementary substances. That means: though the ahamkāra is one and uniform; yet by reason of the domination or suppression of one or other of these gunas it evolves products of diverse kinds. It is only when sattva and tamas are energised and moved by the rajoguna that they perform their functions. Thus the rajoguna is instrumental in their evolving of the sets of products mentioned above, through the exciting of activity of the other two gunas. It is not true that the rajoguna serves no useful purpose. Vijñānabhikṣu’s view in this respect is slightly different, although this difference is not of much significance for the purpose of understanding the general trend of evolution. According to him, manas alone springs forth from sāttvika ahamkāra and other sense organs are derived from rajasa ahamkāra. The five tāmasa ahamkāra.

The general (saṃanya) and specific (visēsa) are the two forms of ahamkāra as expounded in the commentary Yuktidipika of Sāṁkhyakārikā. ‘I’ (ahām) is the general form of ahamkāra and ‘I exist in sabda’, ‘I exist in rūpa’ etc. are the special form of ahamkāra. We can summere the series of evolutes from ahamkāra of Śaṅkhya philosophy with the words of Dr. Anima Sen Gupta: “In fact, buddhi cannot really act without a distinction of the universe into subject and object and this distinction is to be made by ahamkāra. Hence, the palpitating

89. STK on SK, 25.
90. sāttvikamekāsakaṁ pravartate vaikṛtādaḥahamkārat, SS, 2,18; ekādasaśām pūraṣamekāsakaṁ manah sodasātmagānaṃmadhye sāttvikam, atatāt vaikṛtā sāttvikāhamkārajayate. SPB on it
91. yasyāmāsmirpratyayasya visēsagrahaṇam bhavati-sābde ‘hamsparse’ ‘ham- rūpe’ ‘ham- rase’ ‘ham- gandhe’ hamiti. YDi on SK, 24
mahat changes into ahamkāra, which in the first moment of evolution appears as a mere general state of undifferentiated subjectivity and objectivity; and then a part of this undifferentiated mass under the predominating influence of sattva, develops into specific organs of individuals along with the definite sense of individuality (individual ego-sense). The remaining portion comes under the influence of tamas and is called the bhūtādi and this part becomes the basis of the objective world.”

Manas (Mind):

Manas or mind is the fifth principle of the evolution of Prakṛti. Manas arises from the sāttvika ahamkāra is the subtle and central sense organ. It can come into contact with the several sense organs at the same time. Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that manas partakes of the nature of both i.e. sensory and motor organs. In this respect, Vacaspati Misra explains that mind is an organ of sensation as well as one of action; since the eye and the other sensory organs, as well as speech and other motor organs are able to operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the mind.

The author of the Samkhya Karikā also points out that it has the function of both volition and sensation. Vacaspati Misra explains that when a certain object has been just vaguely apprehended by a sense-organ as ‘a thing’, there follows the definite cognition in the form of ‘it is such and such a thing, not that’. The perception of definite properties as belonging to a thing apprehended is done

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92. Sengupta, Dr. Anima, Classical Sāṁkhya: A Critical Study, P. 125
93. ubhayatmakatmanah manah ...... SK, 27
94. mana ubhayatmakanam, buddhindriyanam karmendriyanam ca caksuradinam vāgadinam ca mano’ dhīsthitānāmeva svasvavisāyesu pravṛttih. STK on Ibid.
95. samkalpakamindriyaṁca sādharmyāt / SK. 27
through the mind. A question arises here thus: As Mahat and ahamkāra have specific functions, so also the case with the mind. Hence, mind cannot be an indriya just like Mahat and Ahaṃkāra. To this Vacaspati replies that it is a sense in as much as it is an immediate effect of sāttvika ahaṃkāra which is the definition of a sense. The variety of organs is due to specific variations in the modifications of the constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas. The diversity in the products is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the shape of unseen force which brings about the experiences due to the perception of sound and other objects of sense. The unseen force also is only a modification of these guṇas.

Mind is different from manas. Mahat is classified as an evolvent, i.e., it is produced and produces new forms of being. On the other hand manas is an evolute, that is, it is produced, but does not produce new forms of being.

Dr. K.P. Sinha said, "the mind is generally called antahkāraṇa or the internal organ of the self. On this point, our view is this that, the mind, holding an intermediary position between matter and consciousness, possesses the characteristics of both these elements. When we emphasise the element of matter, we call it internal organ, and when we emphasise the element of consciousness, we call it the self or I." In this regard Ganganath Jha opines, "The function of this principle, Mind, is technically called in Sāṃkhya ‘reflection’. When we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are indefinite and without qualifications .......... This indefinite and vague impression is

96. STK on Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Hindu Philosophy, Bernard, Theos, P. 78
100. Sinha, K. P., Reflexions on Indian Philosophy, P. 166
soon rendered definite; and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the ‘reflection’ of the Mind. This process follows so quickly that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it."\(^{101}\)

**Indriyas (Organs)**

The next ten principles are called *indriyas*, which are divided into two groups viz. *jñānendriya* and *karmendriya*. The five knowing senses or powers of cognition are called *jñānendriyas*, and the five working senses or capacities for action are called *karmendriyas*. These powers are evolved to construct the world as a system of purposes or objects of desire. The five *jñānendriyas* are *caksuḥ* (eye), *śrotā* (ear), *nāsika* (nose), *jiḥvā* (tongue) and *tvak* (skin) and the *karmendriyas* are *vāk* (speech) *pāṇi* (hand), *pāda* (feet), *pāyu* (anus) and *upastha* (genital.)\(^{102}\) The definition of *indriyas* is given by Vācaspati Misra in his commentary *Sāṁkhya-tattvakaumudi*. According to him, the sense-organs and the motor-organs, both are called ‘*indriya*’ because they are the signs of the Spirit (*Indra*).\(^{103}\) The eye is the organ for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving smell, the tongue for perceiving taste and the skin for feeling touch.\(^{104}\) The five motor-organs (*Karmendriyas*) have the functions of speech, movement, excretion and reproduction.\(^{105}\)

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102. buddhindriyāṇi caksuḥ śrotāgraṇārāṇaśatanvagākhyāṇi / vākpaṇipādaśāryupasthāṇi karmendriyāṇi gātulyaḥ // SK, 26
103. ubhayamapyetadindrasyātmanascīkṣhitadindriyamucyate. STK on Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. STK on SK, 28.
Tanmatras (Subtle elements)

The next five principles are called the tanmatras which are produced from tāmasa ahaṁkāra. The sound (śabda), touch (sparśa), colour (rupa), taste (rasa) and smell (gandha) are the five tanmatras which are the objects of the five sense organs. From the subtle element of sound arises the element of ether (ākāśa) together with the quality of sound. From the touch (sparśa) combined with the essence of sound, arises the gross element of air (vāyu) together with the qualities of sound and touch. From the tanmatra of colour (rupa) combined with sound and touch, arises the element of fire (tejā) together with the qualities of sound, touch, and colour. Again from the tanmatra of taste (rasa) combined with sound, touch and colour arises the element of water (ap) together with the qualities of sound, touch, colour and taste. And lastly, from the tanmatra of smell (gandha) combined with sound, touch, colour and taste arises the element of earth (prthīvī) together with the qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. This same view is upheld by Varsaganya in the Yuktidipika and Vyāsa in his commentary Yogabhāṣya on Yogasūtra. The Vedāntins also upheld the similar view about the tanmatras as is evident from the Vidyāranyamuni in his work Pancadasī. S.N. Dasgupta describes beautifully this process. He says “the sound potential, with accretion of rudiment matter
from bhūtādi generates the ākāśa-atom. The touch potentials combine with the vibratory particles (sound-potential) to generate the vāyu-atom. The light-and-heat potentials combine with touch-potentials and sound potentials to produce the tejas-atom. The taste-potentials combine with light-and-heat potentials, touch-potentials and sound-potentials to generate the ap-atom and the smell-potentials combine with the preceding potentials to generate the earth-atom.\textsuperscript{112}

These tanmātras are imperceptible to ordinary beings because these are very small or minute. These invisible tanmātras are inferred from visible objects, though they are said to be open to the perception of the yogis. Therefore, in the Sāmkhya philosophy the five tanmātras are said to be generic.

**Mahābhūtas (Gross-Elements)**

The five mahābhūtas are the last principles of the evolution of Sāmkhya philosophy. The mahābhūtas are called specific (vīśeṣa), which are produced from the five tanmātras.\textsuperscript{113} Prthivi (earth), ap (water) tejas (fire), vāyu (air) and ākāṣa or vyoma (sky) are the five mahābhūtas. These are the effects of the five tanmātras i.e. prthivi is produced from gandha tanmātra. So, it is the effect of gandha. Rasa produces ap and ap is the effect of rasa. Tejas is produced from rūpa. Vāyu is the effect of sparsā. Again sābda produces ākāṣa. It is the effect of sābda.\textsuperscript{114}

According to the Sāmkhya school, evolutionary passes from the subtle to the gross. After the emergence of the gross elements, the process of evolution

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\textsuperscript{112} Dasgupta, S.N., *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Pp. 252-253

\textsuperscript{113} SK, 38

\textsuperscript{114} GB on Ibid., 3
stops in the sense that the *pañcabhautic* changes are simply changes from gross to more gross.\textsuperscript{115} In the phenomenal world all *vyaktas* are said to be the modifications of these principles and not the creation of anything new.

6. RADHANATH PHUKAN ON THE THEORY OF CAUSATION

Radhanath Phukan has discussed the theory of causation as expounded by the Śāṅkhya teachers in his *Śāṅkhya-dārsāna*. He follows the views of the traditional *Śāṅkhya-cāryas*, but has recorded some difference of opinion in this respect.

Phukan asserts that there can be no effect without cause and this effect must always remain beforehand in the cause in an unmanifested (*Avyakta*) state. Effect is revealed or manifested (*vyakta*) by causal activity in proper time. Explaining the reasons forwarded by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Radhanath Phukan said that nothing can be produced out of a non-existent thing. There are three types of objects viz., (i) *sat* (existent), (ii) *sadasat* (existent and non-existent both) and (iii) *asat* (non-existent)\textsuperscript{116}. That object is called *sat* which remains without modification. Brahma and *mūla prakṛti* is the *sat* in the transcendental level. Here, the word ‘*mūla*’ means *avvyakṛta*\textsuperscript{117}.

Again, that object is called *sadasat* which can be modified, does not remain the same all the time or different people realise it differently at different stages. It is empirically existent. In this world, all objects are *sadasat*\textsuperscript{118}.

And, that object is *asat* which is devoid of existence. It is not an object

\textsuperscript{115} Classical *Śāṅkhya*: A Critical Study, Sengupta, Dr. Anima, P. 127

\textsuperscript{116} SD, Phukan, Radhanath, P. 335

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
of knowledge and is never revealed to the senses. For example the sky flower, son of a barren woman are asat. Asat is totally imaginary; it is neither an entity, nor positive nor negative.\textsuperscript{119} It can not be the cause of any effect. If the effect is not previously present in the cause, it becomes a mere non-entity. Actually Phukan established that the world exists in the root cause Avyakta before the creation of the world. Hence, the world is the modification of Avyakta.\textsuperscript{120}

Supporting the view of Isvarakṛṣṇa, Radhanath Phukan explains the second argument i.e., in producing any thing, one has to have recourse to the proper materials out of which only that thing can be produced.\textsuperscript{121}

Another point is that the effect always exists in latent form in its cause, otherwise, it would be possible to produce any thing from everything. But it is a common sense fact that everything is not possible to produce from every object. However, although Phukan has forwarded the above argument in support of Isvarakṛṣṇa, it is not his actual view. In his view, everything being produced from the one root cause all things can be produced from everything else. This is clear from his note under karika IX of the Sāṃkhya-kārikā. In support of his view he also refers to the words of Pañcasikha. Pañcasikha in his Bhāṣya on the Sāṃkhya-sūtra says, “Sarvaṁ sarvātmakam iti sāṃkhya-siddhāntaḥ. Kasmāt mūlakāranasya ekātvāt.” (That means everything is of the nature of everything because the root cause is one.) Hence, according to Phukan, it is possible to produce all things from everything else. Phukan also points out that this can be

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{121} SKI, Phukan, Radhanath, P. 595
supported by modern science also. In his words, “It is interesting to note that this is also the finding of modern science. Jeans says: “The whole universe is an organization and its present state is an effect of its antecedent state and the cause of the state which is to follow.”\(^{122}\)

Radhanath Phukan also pointed out that there is no difference between cause and effect. Because this universe is going on in a disciplined way from beginningless time. “... everything has a cause. The cause and its effect always coexist even before the latter becomes known or visible. Nothing happens by chance.”\(^{123}\) So, Phukan said that the effect existed and exists in its cause. The cause and effect are *sat*.\(^{124}\) The whole universe is a continuous process of change of causes into their effects. According to the Saṁkhya the world is thus *sat* or existent.

### 7. PHUKAN’S VIEW REGARDING THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE

Now, let us see what the cause of creation is, according to Radhanath Phukan. In this context, he maintains that the union of the *Puruṣa* and *Prakṛti* is the cause of the world which is called *Avyakta*.\(^{125}\) It is the state of before creation. This is the state when *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* are united together in one entity. In Radhanath Phukan’s view, *Avyakta* is not the unconscious *Prakṛti*. He says, “This state of union is the *Avyakta* stage in this union it is not possible to point out the *Puruṣa* or the *Prakṛti* as an individual entity. *Avyakta* evidently refers to the state

\(^{122}\) Ibid., P. 596n
\(^{123}\) Ibid., P. 596
\(^{124}\) SD, Phukan, Radhanath, P. 356
\(^{125}\) Ibid.
before the creation." Thus, Phukan said that *Avyakta*, the ultimate cause of the universe is neither the *Purusa*, nor the *Prakṛti* alone but the combination of the two. In this respect, Radhanath Phukan refers to the view of Gauḍapāda, Vacaspati Misra and the *Gītā* “Creation is due to the union of the two. The matter is made clear by the *Gītā* (Chapter XIV, 8). Vacaspati himself states that the union of *Prakṛti* and *Purusa* is without beginning and end and that the creation of the universe is due to this”¹²⁷ The *Gītā* declares, “My primordial Nature, known as the great Brahma, is the womb of all creatures; in that womb I place the seed of all life. The creation of all beings follows from that union of Matter and Spirit, O Arjuna. Of all embodied beings that appear in all the species of various kinds, Arjuna, Prakṛti or Nature is the conceiving Mother, while I am the seed-giving Father.”¹²⁸ Thus we find that Radhanath Phukan’s view about the ultimate cause of the universe is somewhat different from accepted Sāṁkhya view.

8. THE EVOLUTES: PHUKAN’S VIEW

Radhanath Phukan’s view on the evolution of the twenty three *tattvas* including *mahattattva, ahamkāratattva* etc. is not different from the actual Sāṁkhya view. But his explanation of the different *tattvas* require special consideration. First of all, according to him the *Mahattattva* of Sāṁkhya philosophy is the *Hiranyagarbha* or *Virāt-Purusa* of the *Purāṇas*.¹²⁹ He maintains that this is a stage of Collective Ego.¹³⁰ According to Sāṁkhya philosophy, creation

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126. Phukan, Radhanath, SKI, P. 582
127. Ibid.
129. SKI, Phukan, Radhanath, P. 578.
130. Ibid., P. 579.
starts when there is action in the gunas, when the equipoise of the gunas is disturbed. Before that Prakṛti and Puruṣa remain in union which is the state of Avyakta (unmanifest) as has been mentioned before. As soon as creation begins Prakṛti and Puruṣas become manifest. At the earliest stage of creation, says Radhanath, Puruṣa is in a state which may be described as a trance or stupefaction. "The Puruṣa is stupefied, as it were, by the wiles of Prakṛti,............ At this stage, the Puruṣa remains latent in the Prakṛti. Strictly speaking, there is no sense in saying that the Puruṣa remains latent in the Prakṛti, but I am forced to use this expression for want of a better one. At this stage in the process of creation there was neither time nor space and so how can we think of two different things existing independently at that stage?" In this stage there is also no plurality of the Puruṣa as there is no idea of separateness or plurality in the absence of the concept of space. The individual souls are not separate at this stage. Prakṛti and the aggregate of Puruṣa remain in a state of coalescence. This is according to Radhanath, what is called Mahattattva. Thus he says, "All that they insist on is that just before creation everything in the Universe, animate or inanimate, is in the Mahattattva in an inchoate state, collectively, without any sort of individuality. On creation, all these become manifest in different forms." 131 In this stage there is also no plurality of the Puruṣa as there is no idea of separateness or plurality in the absence of the concept of space. The individual souls are not separate at this stage. Prakṛti and the aggregate of Puruṣa remain in a state of coalescence. This is according to Radhanath, what is called Mahattattva. Thus he says, "All that they insist on is that just before creation everything in the Universe, animate or inanimate, is in the Mahattattva in an inchoate state, collectively, without any sort of individuality. On creation, all these become manifest in different forms." 132

The next stage of creation is the stage of Ahaṃkāra-tattva in Sāṁkhya philosophy. Radhanath describes this stage as stage where the idea of individuality in the Puruṣas emerge for the first time. Thus an idea of separate individual existence succeeds the Collective Ego. He maintains that "This idea of individuality is at the root of the concepts of Space and Time. 'I am an individual (Puruṣa)'

131. Ibid., P.578.
132. Ibid.
implies two concepts, namely, (1) first, that ‘I am’, i.e., ‘I always exist’ this leads
to the concept of Time, and (2) secondly, ‘I am different from others’- which
leads to the concept of Space.”

Then Radhanath describes the evolution of other principles from the
_Ahamkāra_ as we find in the Sāmkhya philosophy. After describing the dicholomous
evolution of the Indriyas and the _tanmātras_ Radhanath comes to the conclusion
that the sense-world and the gross- energy are mutually, convertible. He says,
“According to Sāmkhya, therefore, thoughts and emotion of the sense-world, and
gross energy (Tanmātras) of the physical world, are in substance one and the
same thing, having emanated from the same source. They are, therefore, mutually
convertible. We can convert thought into energy or energy into thought, just as
we can convert light into electricity, and vice-versa.”

Phukan has also explained the terms _viśeṣa_ and _avīseṣa_ in his own way.
_Aviśeṣa_ is the common element of many things. _Viśeṣa_ is the element of a thing.
When the action of the three _guna_ s is very momentary then we cannot have any
feeling or the knowledge of the world etc. These very momentary actions are the
_avīseṣa pāñcatanmātra_, said by Phukan.

Radhanath Phukan illustrated the theory of creation or evolution with the
help of ‘the second Law of ‘Thermo-dynamics’. According to modern science,
“energy can only move forward and never backward with time, Entropy increases,
never does it decrease”. Entropy corresponds to change from organized state
towards disorganization. According to Phukan, there is no end to the transformation

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133. Ibid, P. 579
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid., P. 609.
136. Ibid., P. 575.
of Ātma is constituted of three guṇas and this transformation has an object. The main purpose of this action or transformation is bhoga and apavarga of Purusa. Beginning with gross mattes and going slowly up until it reaches the three great Modes of action of Prakṛti, the Sāṁkhya philosophy shows that the whole creation is the work of Prakṛti a transformation of the three guṇas from a highly organized state to a completely disorganized one.

From the above discussion we can say that the process of creation in Sāṁkhya philosophy has got an important place in Indian philosophy. A real transformation of the material cause leads to the concept of Prakṛti as the root cause of the world of objects. All worldly effects are latent in the root cause of this world. Again, when Prakṛti comes in contact with the Purusas then the equilibrium state of Prakṛti is disturbed and then Prakṛti evolves into this world.

Phukan also maintains that there is no difference between the cause and the effect. Because this universe is going on in a disciplined way from beginningless time. It is also found from our fore going discussion that Radhanath takes the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti as the ultimate cause of the universe and not the Prakṛti only. In his view Avyakta, the ultimate cause of Sāṁkhya philosophy is not the Prakṛti, but the union of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. In other respects of evolution there is not much difference of Radhanath’s view from that of the traditional Sāṁkhya view. Moreover, as has been his speciality, Radhanath shows the similarity of the Sāṁkhya view of evolution with modern science. This aspect will be discussed more elaborately by us in a subsequent chapter.