5.1 CAUSES OF IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS

The Iraq-Kuwait crisis during the first half of August, 1990 and the instant and intense international response not only precipitated an unprecedented crisis but also caused far reaching convulsions at the international level. The crisis influenced and effected United Nations (UN) system and power equilibrium. The Iraq’s aggressive action in Kuwait had united the world against it and many of its neighbours namely Bahrain, Egypt, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE contributed to coalition efforts. The crisis deeply affected the existing social and economic structures of the region and the beyond. The crisis generated fresh challenges and prospect pertaining to the West Asia and Indian sub-continents.\(^1\) The crisis took place at an extremely important juncture for the oil industry: Demand was gradually catching up to the world production capacity—not only crude oil production capacity but refining capacity. The crisis presented an opportunity to the United States (US) and its allies (West) to physically and militarily control territories that hold 40% of the world’s proven reserves and control 45% of the world’s net oil exports.\(^2\) The relation between Kuwait and Iraq has never been remained smooth throughout the 20th century and the 1990 crisis was the Climax of (culmination of) long standing dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. For a better understanding of 1990 Iraq crisis it is necessary to look at relationship between Kuwait and Iraq in the recent past. The present chapter will analyse the historical evolution of the two states, Iraq recurring claims of Kuwait and Kuwait’s response.

Kuwait

The geographical and political entity of Kuwait dates back from about the middle of 18th century. In 1756 Sheikh Sabah bin Jabir established an autonomous Sheikhdom of Kuwait. The Sheikh belonged to the Anaiza...
tribe and he is generally considered founder of the Sabah dynasty. At the beginning of the 18th century several Anaiza tribe migrated from central Arabia to the more comfortable and hospitable shores of the Gulf and founded the city of Kuwait (Diminutive of the Arabic word kut meaning fortress), before that the territory was under the loosely controlled by the ottoman empire. Although it paid tribute to sultan of Turkey, it was not under any effective control during the period between (1756-1871). In 1871 the Turkish Governor of Baghdad, Midhat Pasha conferred the title of the Qaim Maqam (Sub-provincial Governor) on the Sheikh of Kuwait. Sheikh Abdullah Bin Sabah al Sabah accepted the status of Qaim Maqam within the Basra Province. In fact, prior to the last decade of the 19th century the relationship between Kuwait and Turkey was of nebulous character. The Seventh ruler of Kuwait Sheikh Mubarak As-Sabah who came to power in 1896 sought British protection against Turkey’s attempt at absorbing Kuwait. Finally on 23rd January, 1899 both Kuwait and Britain signed a secret exclusive Agreement. This agreement bound the Sheikh not to cede, sell, lease or mortgage any portion of its territory to any other power or governments without the prior consent of the British government. The British governments, in return, assured the Sheikh of their protection. With the turn of the century Kuwait faced encroachment of Germany, Turkey and Russia. But all were foiled by the British. The Anglo-Ottoman draft convention on the Persian Gulf Area of 29th July, 1913 provided for recognition by Turkey of the 1899 Anglo - Kuwait agreement, a pledge by Turkey not to disturb the status quo in Kuwait, and a demarcation of the Kuwait’s border with vilayet of Basra. Under the Agreement Island of Warbah, Bubiyan and Faylake were included in Kuwait territory. After the World War I, the Uqair convention of 2nd December 1922 settled Kuwait border with the Nejd. The northern border of Kuwait with Iraq –160 km long was defined in a friendly agreement in 1923. In 1932 the Iraq – Kuwait convention on boundaries further reinforced the understanding between them. Both Iraq and Kuwait confirmed the border as defined in the
Anglo-Ottoman convention of 1913 in different letters to the British political Resident in Kuwait.\textsuperscript{10} In 1951 the Kuwaiti government raised the question of demarcating its border with Iraq. This time Iraq showed its willingness to do so provide Kuwaiti surrender the Island of Warbah to Iraq. This was the first time the border question with Kuwait was linked with certain territorial adjustment by an Iraqi government. However, Kuwait refused to accept any change in the border or to part with Islands.\textsuperscript{11} Later in 1954; Iraq preferred a claim to about four (4) km. of the Khaur-al-Sabiya coastline, north of the Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan. In 1956, Kuwait rejected the proposal of the British government for leasing the Warbah Island to Iraq. Iraq in return, agreed to supply water to Kuwait from the Shatt-al-Arab.\textsuperscript{12} On June 19, 1961 Kuwait was proclaimed an independent state by the British government and the Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement of 1899 was abrogated and replaced by a new agreement, which envisaged bilateral relations based on “a Sprit of close friendship”, consultation on the matters of mutual concern; and British assistance if desired by Kuwait.\textsuperscript{13} The ruling Sheikh Abdullah al Sabah took the new title of Amir and was responsible for the conduct of countries internal and external Affairs.\textsuperscript{14}

Iraqi Prime Minister Abdul Kareem Qasim on 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1961 in broadcast of Radio, Baghdad challenge Kuwait’s independence and revived Iraqi sovereignty over it.\textsuperscript{15} The Iraqi claim was rejected by independent government of Kuwait which announced that it will defend its independent territorial integrity. The Kuwait government in a statement emphasized that Kuwait was an independent state with full sovereignty, recognised internationally, expressed confidence that Kuwait would have the supports of all friendly and peace loving countries especially the Arab States.\textsuperscript{16} The Iraqi government presented a memorandum to all diplomatic mission in Baghdad on 26\textsuperscript{th} June, 1961. The memorandum was based on three ground\textsuperscript{17}: (1) Archaeological ruins in Kuwait had closed resemblances and connection with those of Mesopotamia, (2) Kuwait was a part of
vilayet Basra during the Ottoman Empire rule and (3) Iraq is a successor state of the Ottoman Empire. However, the British intervention refrained Iraq from invading Kuwait. Later following intense Intra-Arab negotiations, mediation and bargaining Kuwait was recognised as an independent sovereign state and was admitted to the league of Arab State on 21th August 1961 as its eleventh member. And finally on May 1963 despite Iraqi objection Kuwait was admitted to the UN and became 111th member.\(^{18}\)

\textbf{Iraq}

The history of modern Iraq as a politically and geographically defined and demarcated state begins in 1920 when after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the three former vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra were amalgamated to form one single political entity.\(^{19}\) The allied victory in the World War–I gave them the power to divide the Arab lands between themselves. The allied powers, in the meeting at San Remo in April 1920 assigned the mandates of Iraq to Britain. At San Remo conference Britain gained control of Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and France gained control over Syria and Lebanon. Thereafter, the British created a monarchy in 1921 and installed Amir Faisal Bin- Hussein, son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, as the King of Iraq. The presence of British forces in Iraq led to a strong opposition from Iraqi Arab Nationalist. The British ruthlessly crushed Iraq Arab Nationalist opposition and established Hashemite monarchy in Iraq.\(^{20}\) Thus a new Arab state was created artificially and arbitrary in the West Asia during the age of European Imperialism. It may not be wronged to say that Iraq was also British creation like Kuwait. The grant of mandate to Britain in 1920 of Iraq was mere formalities in the process of legitimising British control. The demarcation of Iraq-Kuwait border on April 1923 by the British high commissioner for Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, giving Kuwait a coastline of 310 miles and allowing the much larger Iraq a mere 28 miles, was a deliberate attempt of the British to lay the basis of conflict between
Iraq and Kuwait. Britain drew the border between two countries and deliberately try to limit Iraq’s access to sea so that any future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain’s domination in the Persian Gulf.\textsuperscript{21} Iraq refused to accept the border and did not recognised the Kuwaiti government until 1963. After gaining independence from Britain in 1932 till the proclamation of Republic in 1958, various successive Iraqi governments have stake their claim over Kuwaiti territory in order to become free from geopolitical compulsions—from becoming a practically a land lock state. The geographical location of Iraq and its small opening to the sea forced Iraq to demand wider access to Gulf waters which it felt was essential for its survival and security. The overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq on 14\textsuperscript{th} July by an army Coup-d’etat was as significant an event as the 1952 Egyptian revolution. The Iraqi revolution changed the very basic politics of the Gulf region.\textsuperscript{22} During the first three years after the 1958 revolution, the Iraqi government made no claim to Kuwait. Moreover, in December 1958 Iraq expressed its desire to open an Iraqi consulate in Kuwait city. It appears that the relations between Kuwait and Iraq were normal. According to the Kuwaiti government publication, The Truth about the Crisis between Kuwait and Iraq, on many occasions Iraq emphasized Kuwait as an independent state not part of Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq also supported in favour of Kuwait joining a number of international organization.\textsuperscript{23} Apparently it seems that Kuwait continuous status as a protectorate of Britain insulated it from the Iraqi regime intervention. However, the abrogation of the Anglo- Kuwait agreement of 1899 perhaps encouraged Iraq to revive its claim over Kuwait. Qasim believed the 1899 agreement invalid because it was, in his opinion concluded secretly without prior authorization from the Ottoman Sultan.\textsuperscript{24}
1963 Coup

The relations between Iraq and Kuwait improved after the February 1963 coup to overthrow Qasim. The new Iraqi government headed by Abdul Salam Arif, realized the negative effects of isolation on account of Qasim’s regime regarding Kuwait, announced it recognitions of Kuwait’s independence on 4th October 1963.\(^{25}\) Arif categorically stated its intention to clear “The sullied atmosphere created by Qasim regime”. Kuwait quickly recognised the new regime to ease tensions with Iraq. The 1963 Coup brought the Baath Party and some other Nationalist groups in power. The new government during an official visit to Baghdad by a Kuwaiti delegation, formally recognized the independence and complete sovereignty of Kuwait, and announced that it would adhere to the border established in the exchange of letters in 1932.\(^{26}\) Thus Qasim’s historical claim to Kuwait was abandoned. Although apparently Iraq acknowledge its frontier with Kuwait, it did not acknowledge a specific border line. Iraq’s recognition of Kuwait was significant because it relinquished all Iraqi claims to Kuwait. The two countries agreed to exchange Ambassador to work for Arab unity. They also agreed to work establishing cultural, commercial, and economic corporation and exchange of technical information. The two states also agreed to set up a committee to deal with border issues. Also Iraq and Kuwait signed an economic agreement which virtually abolished custom duties on trade between them. Thus, economic relation between the two countries improved as trade increase and Kuwaiti public and private investments poured into Iraq.\(^{27}\) Although relation between Iraq and Kuwait improved, border question remained unresolved and continued to linger during the regimes of Abdul Salam Arif and Abdur Rehman Arif. From 1964 until 1967 joint Kuwait- Iraq committee met several times to discuss ways to demarcate the border but without success. Iraq made it known that its 1963 recognition of Kuwait should not be understood as an acceptance of current border demarcation between the two states.
Iraq insisted that it must be given two Islands namely Warbah and
Bubiyan before there could be a settlement of any outstanding border
dispute. During the negotiation Iraq is reported to have raised the question
of legality of the previous agreements and documents on the plea that
those were signed at a time when Iraq was still under the foreign
occupation and not free to negotiate. Iraq also stated that a border
adjustment in favour of Iraq was essential before Iraq could accept the
previous documents. Meanwhile Arif was killed in an Air-plane crash
and his brother col. Abdur Rehman Arif became president. During
Rehman’s period Kuwaiti border issue was not resolved. The committee
talks ended in a stalemate and in 1967 it was officially wind up.

In 1968 Baath assumed power in Iraq which added ideological,
political, geographical, economic, security and strategic dimensions to
Iraq’s border problem with Kuwait. During the tension between Iran and
Iraq in 1969, Iraq was allowed to station troops on the Kuwait side of the
border to protect the Iraqi port of Umm-al-Quasr. It seems that the
Kuwaiti goodwill was designed to improve its relation with Iraq and to
facilitate settlement of the border dispute. However, after the removal of
Iranian threat, Iraq continues to stay there. During 1970’s Iraq made many
attempts to convince Kuwait for ceding Bubiyan and Warbah Islands to it.
In 1971 Iraq proposed an agreements for the construction of oil terminal in
the deep waters along the Kuwaiti coast and in return Iraq would supply
fresh water from the Shatt-al-Arab to Kuwait through a pipeline. It was
hope that such functional cooperation would pave way for a harmonious
solution of the border problem. Kuwait however rejected Iraqi proposal
and refuse to cede. In March 1973 Iraq resorted to pressure tactics and
massed troops and erected military installation in the Kuwaiti outpost at
Al-Samita. Kuwait immediately protested against Iraqi move and asked it
to withdraw its troops from the Kuwaiti territory. The Iraqi government
however, replied that the border between them had not been yet agreed
upon. It was reported that Iran offered military support if Kuwait asked for it. Despite such bellicose posture Iraq eventually withdrew. It appears that the strong opposition of Saudi Arabia and Iran to Iraqi encroachment was pressing reason. In August, 1973 Kuwait made a fresh bid to reach a settlement of the border problems but Iraqis intransigence and their demand for Warbah and Bubiyan Islands scuttled the Kuwait’s attempt. The Kuwaiti government refuse to change the status quo and rejected Iraq’s demand. Iraqi Foreign Minister made it clear that Iraq could not be a “Gulf Power, without the Kuwaiti Island of Warbah and Buybian it was to give up” all of Kuwait in return for the Islands. It meant that Iraq had not renounced its claim over Kuwait despite having recognized its sovereignty and territorial integrity in 1963. Iraq in retaliation and on the pretext of meeting the Iranian threats moved its troops to Warbah and Bubiyan at the mouth of Shatt-al-Arab. The 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq removed the threats and Iraq to legitimise its ministry presence on Kuwaiti soil put the defence of Umm-al-Quasr port as next Iraqi justification. Iraq showed it readiness to accept the existing border status if Kuwait leased out the Islands of Warbah and Bubiyan to Iraq. Kuwait turned down the Iraqi offer and began to strengthen its military establishments on the Islands. However, border problem between Kuwait and Iraq could not be solved due to inflexible and rigid stands of Iraq and Kuwait. Iranian revolution and Iraq-Iran war changed the geopolitical environment in the Persian Gulf region. The new environment brought Iraq and Kuwait closer despite different ideological orientations. Both Iraq and Kuwait reached an understanding on confronting and containing Iran. Iraq’s war with Iran diverted Iraq attention away from Kuwait for a while. Iraq prioritized its national interests and determined that strengthening its relationship with Kuwait with the goal of receiving financial aid was indeed in Iraq’s national interest. The Kuwaiti felt that at least the threat from Baghdad had receded. Kuwait played an important role in helping Iraq’s war with Iran. Kuwait offered port facilities to Iraq for the shipments of military goods. In 1981
during the war President Saddam Hussein expressed his desire to control the two Island for five years.\textsuperscript{35} Iraq also eased its stance on the Islands instead of claiming them on a long term basins. However, Kuwait refused the Iraqi offer politely. During the war when Iranian forces entered Iraqi territory, Iraq once again raise the question of control over the Warbah and Bubiyan Islands for security and strategic reason. Kuwait eventually considering the situation relented and agreed to put three Islands of Kuwait- Warbah, Bubiyan and Faylake – under Iraqi control for security reasons. However, it may be said that this was the first \textit{defacto} step toward Iraq’s complete control over Kuwait.\textsuperscript{36} During war Iraq did not raise the question of demarcating its border with Kuwait. After the war Iraq and Kuwait agreed to demarcate the border and constitute a joint committee to undertake the task. But the Iraq insistence to transfer Bubiyan to it made the task difficult. Kuwait did not agree with Iraq conditional demarcation of border. Moreover during the war, under the banner of nationalism and solidarity, Kuwait extended massive financial help (12 billion dollar) to Iraq for its military and civilian purchases. In March 1989 Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed an agreements of non-aggression and military assistance. This encourages Kuwait to resolve the protracted border problem with Iraq. The crown prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad Abdullah of Kuwait visited Baghdad in September 1989 to negotiate and for resolution of the border problems.\textsuperscript{37} A number of issues were discussed, but the border dispute was left for later negotiations. Iraq agreed to supply Kuwait with 500 million of gallons of water daily, while Kuwait agreed to provide southern Iraq with electricity. Iraq appreciated Kuwait help and cooperation during its war with Iran. In September 1989 Amir of Kuwait visited Baghdad, and received the Al-Rafidan Medal, the highest Iraqi honour for his role in backing Iraq.\textsuperscript{38} After the cease-fire, Kuwaiti cooperation with Iraq appeared to increase despite the failure to settle the dispute over Bubiyan Island.

176
Prelude to Iraq-Kuwait Crisis

The Iraq–Kuwait crisis triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2nd August 1990 was the most important development which changed the political geography of the Gulf temporarily. The invasion was sudden took everybody surprise. The international Community reacted strongly to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, condemning Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and demanding immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops. There are several factors and causes for this conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. The 1990 Iraq-Kuwait crisis surfaced officially in 1990 when Saddam Hussein accused some Arab states of hurting Iraq by flooding world oil market, causing drop in oil prices. The eight years Iran-Iraq war ruined Iraq completely financially and it did face with acute economic crisis. A huge amount was required for reconstruction of the country. Economist estimation put the cost of construction at 230 billion dollars. This was a huge amount which Iraq was unable to meet towards the reconstruction of the country. Further, it needed an extra 10 billion dollars annually in addition to its annual oil revenue to cover it expanses of 12 billion dollars of civilian imports, 5 billion dollars of military imports, 5 billion dollar debt repayment, and billion of dollar transferred outside Iraq by foreign workers to their families. In addition to these Iraqis were sufferings shortages of many basic commodities. In fact, Iraq emerged from the Iraq – Iran war a crippled nation. The decline in oil prices had increase the burden on Iraqi economy, as oil exports consisted of 98% of total Iraqi exports. Iraq did not have the capital to pay for its development plans. Before its war with Iran, Iraq was having 37 billion dollars in reserves. After the Iran-Iraq war its heavy international debt had reached 80 billion dollars. Before the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, President Saddam Hussein admitted during his meeting with U.S Ambassador April Glaspie that Iraq came out of the war burden with 40 billion dollar in debt, excluding Arab states loan. In the wake of financial crisis Iraq wanted that the Arab
state should write-off the war times loans. Moreover, Iraq considered Kuwait responsible for its acute economic problems due to the Kuwaiti action of flooding the world market with oil and of stealing Iraqi oil from disputed border area.  

The Iraqi government did not have alternative resource to reduce dependency of oil and also lacked oil revenues to build strong economic structures to reduce imports of industrial and agriculture products. It had to pay 3 billion dollars in interest payments. Iraq was not able to pay this and try to reschedule some of these debts. In addition it was reported that during Arab summit meeting on 25 February 1990, Saddam Hussein asked president Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to tell the Saudi and other Gulf nations that he needed 30 billion dollars in fresh cash. “If they do not give Iraq this money, we will know how to get it”. Iraq needed money for its survival and for its struggle for reconstruction of country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Military Budget</th>
<th>% of Iraq’s GNP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>14,007</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>21,952</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>28,596</td>
<td>18.4</td>
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<td>23,506</td>
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<td>26.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>17,073</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>12,868</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10,720</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq was spending heavy on military built up to become a power in the region. By 1980 Iraq’s military spending absorbed 75% of its oil income. Between the period 1981 and 1985 military spending amounted to approximate 200 billion dollars, representing 245% of the oil revenues. Between 1985 and 1988 Iraq had bought 10% of all arms purchases worldwide. In the same way after the cease-fire Iraq spent about 41% of its earning on defence. The above table no. 5.1 explains Iraq’s military expenditure from 1981-1989. Before the invasion geopolitical considerations were in the minds of Iraqi military strategist and planners. The Iran–Iraq war demonstrated the vulnerability of the Iraq’s access to the Gulf. Iraq was needed concessions over the Warbah and Bubiyan Islands for improving its meagre access to Gulf water. It also wanted to exercise full control over the navigational approaches to the Khowr-Zhobeir on which it had plan to develop an alternative dry cargo port near Basra. This geographical limit completed Iraq to press Kuwait to lease the Islands so that it could have a wider geographical area to protect its main port, Basra. Iraq wanted to have an expanded sea-shore to facilitate its state and to strengthen its naval power in the Gulf. Indeed to ease its disadvantageous
of geographical position Iraq looked at Kuwait a way to compensate for the disadvantageous of being virtually landlocked. Further to support its action in Kuwait, Iraq Deputy Prime Minister Hammadi emphasizes the importance of expanding Iraq access to the Gulf. He also stated that the border issue, have not been a technical issue between the two states at any time, but to be in a position which it deserved historically and realistically to defend Pan-Arab security in this region. In fact this claim was to intimidate Kuwait to give concessions. By issuing this statement Iraq wanted to get support of Arab masses against Kuwait. There were reports that Iraq suggested Kuwait for signing non-aggression pact in return for certain concessions. The agreement as reported, would have given Iraq the whole of Rumaila oil field, the Warbah and Bubiyan Islands, and territory south of Umm-Qasr, enabling Iraq to build a canal as a part of a water project. As expected these terms were not acceptable to Kuwait which she refused forcefully.\textsuperscript{44}

As prelude to war, Iraq blamed Kuwait for undermining Iraq’s power and security. On May 30, 1990 in a closed session of an extraordinary Baghdad Arab Submit Saddam Hussein came out with his grievances against the Gulf oil States for not adhering OPEC quota and driving down oil prices. He presented the estimates of Iraq losses to the tune of 1 billion dollar a year for every single dollar drop in the price of a barrel of oil.\textsuperscript{45} He also asserted “... all our brothers are fully aware of our situation ... we have reached a point where we can no longer withstand pressure”.\textsuperscript{46} He emphasized that war was not only fought by soldiers and explosion but also by economic means. This was in fact a kind of war against Iraq, he warned. He in fact wanted to maintain oil prices at 25 dollar per barrel without any change in total production of OPEC. The two states (Kuwait and U.A.E) had indeed increase production level by 25%. Saddam stated that the move cost Iraq 14 thousand million dollar in lost oil revenue and he threaten to use force to halt over production. He
demanded that Kuwait and U.A.E pay compensation to Iraq for its losses. The situation in the Gulf further aggravated when Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of having stolen 2.4 billion dollars worth of Iraqi oil from Rumaila oil fields. He maintained Iraqi sovereignty over oil in the Rumaila oil field which extended 3.2 km into Kuwait. He also strongly believed in conspiracy theory that Kuwait and the U.S central intelligence agency (CIA) were working together to destabilize Iraq and to hurt its economy, because of Iraq support for the Palestinian cause and its power that could be used as a deterrent to Israel. The official newspaper Al-Thawrah on 23rd July 1990 claimed that “all major facts clearly confirmed that the rulers of Kuwait are part of a conspiracy against Iraq, and that they acted and move in coordination and in harmony with the American Zionist scheme” to launch a new aggression on Iraq. Saddam blamed Kuwait and U.A.E of becoming puppets of the imperialist-Zionist interest which wanted to conquer the Arab World. The famous Egyptian writer Mohammad Hasanayan Haykal in his book, “Illusion of Triumph: An Arab View of the Gulf War” mentioned that the Iraqi leadership genuinely believed the US, UK and Israel were part of plan to destroy Iraq. Saddam was pre-occupied with the notion that Western nations were treating Iraq as a new threat in the region. Even, Saddam was told by a friendly head of state of a Western decision to treat Iraq as a new threat in the region. The Western propaganda against Iraq about the Human rights violations further attest the conspiracy theory.

The Western press launched campaign against Iraq’s gross human rights violation and use of chemical weapons against Kurds. Voice of America in an Arabic programme accused Iraq for its record of human rights abuses, even the US State department annual human rights report criticise Iraq for human rights violations. The US congress passed the resolution in at prohibiting certain essential commodities from reaching Iraq. The British government seized and confiscated the shipments of the
Iraqi Super Gun. These developments convinced Iraqi leadership that Kuwait along with western states involved in a conspiracy to undermine Iraq’s power. Further the Iraqi president criticize the American policy against Iraq during his meeting with US Ambassador in Baghdad on 25th July 1990. He assailed the US for advising Gulf states to fear Iraq and to refuse any economic aid to it. He clearly mentioned that Iraq would not tolerate and allow anyone to hurt Iraqi pride or the Iraqi right to have a high standard of living. However, the relation between Iraq and the Western powers particularly with the US started deteriorating ever since Iran gate affairs when some US officials made a secrecte contact with Iran for arms during Iraq-Iran war in order to acquire the release of the American hostages in Lebanon. In addition, there were many statements by American officials claiming that the US was neutral on the issue and did not want to interfere in Arab-Arab conflict. Kuwait in response to Iraqi allegation wrote a letter to Secretary General Arab League. The letter emphasized the fact that Kuwait supported Iraq in its war with Iran, despite Iraq’s claim that Kuwait had sought to weaken it. Kuwait also pointed out that it tried continuously to demarcate the border with Iraq’s and end the problems, but Iraq had continue to refuse the call, although Iraq had made final demarcating of border with other Arab Nations. In fact in February 1990, Kuwait oil Minister Ali-Khalif-Al-Sabah admitted Kuwait’s over production( above quota) and mentioned that “our obligation to stay within the quota applies when the prices of OPEC are below 18 dollars per barrels”. Kuwait also officially admitted that its action was necessary to avoid energy switching in the oil consuming states if the prices were high. Kuwait’s oil Minister admittance further strengthened Iraqi believe about Kuwait’s involvement in weakening its economy and to check Iraq’s ability to play a regional role in the Gulf. Moreover, Kuwait’s continues demand for debt repayment had intensified Iraq’s suspicions that Kuwait was trying to weaken its economy. These were the important causative factors in the Iraqi invasion
Iraq considered the loans given it by the Gulf States as assistance not debt. Throughout the war Iraq argued that they were not only defending Iraq but also the entire Gulf states. President Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi official indicated that Iraq fought Iran on behalf of the Arab states, without Iraq the region would have been dominated by Iran and the Gulf states would lose their sovereignty or money in the confrontation. Iraq also made it clear to the Gulf states during Arab Summit in Baghdad of the economic war against Iraq. This pressure was significantly intensified in the post war era. In February, 1990 during the Arab Cooperation meeting in Amman President Saddam Hussein asking King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt to inform the Gulf States that Iraq was not only adamant about a complete moratorium on its war times loan but urgently require additional fund estimated at about 30 billion dollar for reconstruction and recovery of economy. He also threatened that he knows how to extract it. This threat was accompanied by Iraqi military manoeuvres in the neutral zone on the Kuwaiti border. The message was immediately passed to Saudi Arabia by Jordanian monarch. During the OPEC meeting at Geneva on July, 27 Iraq strongly opposed the raising of the quota and demanded the increase of price of oil from 18 dollar to 21 dollar a barrel. Iran and Libya supported Iraq during the meeting and agreed that production ceiling should not exceed 22 million barrels per day. The Iraqi Deputy Minister Taha Yaseen Ramadhan was far more auto spoken in his criticism of quota violation deploring such an act as detrimental to Iraqi interests.

However, Kuwait and the U.A.E did not take Saddam Hussein seriously, although he declared that he would used force if oil prices were not substantially increased. The matter escalated when Kuwait reminded Iraq for payment of war time loan. Consequently, this Kuwaiti policy aggravated Iraq and compelled Saddam to take the decision of invasion in conjunction with some other reasons. Iraq in order to recover
from the dire economic plight demanded: the raising of oil prices to over dollar 25 a barrel; the cessation of Kuwait’s theft of oil from the Iraqi Rumaila oil field and returned of 2.4 billion dollars stolen from Iraq, a complete moratorium on Iraq war times loan, and the formation of an Arab plan to the similar the Marshal plan. The crisis started to deepen when Kuwait started to press for the repayment of 12 billion dollar of Iraq war debts. In other to defuse the crisis several Arab leaders try to mediate between Iraq and Kuwait. Their efforts succeeded in reaching agreements between two sides to hold face to face talk in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Iraq increased its troops on the border to about 1 lakh. The Iraqi delegation to Jeddah talk was headed by the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Izzat Ibrahim. He presented for Iraqi demands on Kuwait to meet-(I) abiding by OPEC quota ,(II) Ceding the southern part of Rumaila oil field,(III) Writing- off the war debt and (IV) Compensation for oil markets losses as a result of oil price decline. The Kuwaiti delegation on the other was headed by crown prince Saad-al-Abdullah. He agreed to pay nine (9) billion dollar and to lease Warbah Island to Iraq as an outlet for the Rumaila oil field. Iraq refused the offer and demanded Bubiyan Island and compensation of its economic loss. The next day in order to settled the matter King Fahad announced the payment of extra billion dollar demanded by Iraq. Kuwait had put a condition that Iraq should abandon its territorial claim on Kuwait. The meeting ended in disarray without an agreed communiqué and very next day 2nd August, 1990 Iraqi forces entered Kuwait and on 8th August, 1990 declared its annexation. It seems that in Jeddah meeting Kuwait’s stand was conciliatory and compromising, and accepted some of the Iraqi demands while Iraq was firm and insisted that all of its demand be met. Diplomacy failed to settle the Iraqi Kuwaiti problem. It appears that Iraq was set to either have all of its demand satisfied or used power to achieve its goals. Iraq thought that war would be the easiest way to accomplish its ends. In fact, Iraq was misread by Kuwait and failed to grasp the seriousness of their situation.
The Kuwaiti leader misinterpreted the situation and considered Saddam’s demand as a bargaining tool rather than an ultimatum. They suspected that some concession might be necessary, but were determined to reduce to the barest minimum. The prevailing view within Kuwaiti leadership was therefore that surrender to such extortionist methods would only lead to unlimited demand in the future.

The US policy during the Iraq–Kuwait crisis was not clear rather confusing. The US prior to invasion of Kuwait by Iraq expressed its neutrality over Iraq–Kuwait border dispute. The US ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie gave Saddam an impression that the US had no wish to be embroiled in a inter Arab conflict, thus perhaps giving Saddam the green light invade to Kuwait. During the meeting with Saddam on 25th July 1990 she categorically mentioned “we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflict like your border disagreement with Kuwait”. This was no doubt the most crucial statement. According to an Iraqi transcript Saddam gave Glaspie a lengthy exposition of Iraq’s economic plight and his grievances against the Gulf States. He accused the US of supporting Kuwait’s economic war against Iraq. Glaspie, on the other, went out of the way to assure him of Washington’s goodwill. She did not admonish him when Saddam told her “if we are unable to find a solution then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death”. Glaspie also mentioned that the US Secretary of state’s James Baker, had directed US official spokespersons to emphasize that the US had no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflict. She during the discussion explained that his fears of an American conspiracy were completely unwarranted. On the contrary Glaspie assured US cooperation and administration efforts to block successive attempts by the congress to impose economic sanction on Iraq, but it also fully understood Hussein’s desperate need for funds and his desire for higher oil prices to strengthen Iraq’s economy. When Saddam Hussein stated his determination to ensure that Kuwait did not cheat on its oil quota, she mentioned
emphatically that “my own estimates after 25 years serving in the area is that your aim should receive strong supports from your brother Arabs”. This was an issue for the Arabs to solve among themselves. In addition Glaspie stated that Iraqi massive deployment in the South was not any of our business. During the meeting Saddam also told Glaspie that he was disturbed by the US media campaign against Iraq and also comparing the situation in Iraq with turmoil in Eastern Europe. Saddam complained that US encouraged Kuwait and the UAE to disregard Iraq’s rights when she said that the US would protect its friend. He warned the US that “if you use pressure we will deploy pressure and force.” Glaspie’s discussion with Saddam Hussein and the appeasing language she used were construed by Saddam as an American green light for a move against Kuwait. It appears that president Bush did not try to stop Iraq from invading Kuwait. The US and the West armed Iraq and encouraged Saddam to believe that he could conquer its neighbour without much of a response. American policy to Iraq misled Saddam to act contrary to international norms. Two weeks before the Iraqi invasion, the state department spokeswomen said that “we do not have any defence treaty with Kuwait, and there are no special defence or security commitment to Kuwait.” Further John Kelly Assistance Secretary of the State department said on 23rd July 1990, that “we have historically avoided taking a position on border dispute or internal OPEC deliberations”. These statements were made at a time of crisis and giving Saddam the impression that the invasion would be a low risk act. Moreover, perhaps these statements were taken by Iraq as facts or as official US policy on the crisis. This US apparent policy of non-intervention encouraged Iraq to move against Kuwait. It has been suggested by some Arab intellectual and as well as some Iraqi opposition that the US have laid down a trap for Iraq, tricking it into invading Kuwait.
5.2 OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT

The invasion of Kuwait began at 2 a.m. local time on 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 1990 as many as, 300 tanks and 100,000, troops moved rapidly into the Kuwait and the Iraqis were inside the Kuwait city by 7 a.m. local time. By mid–afternoon most of the city was under Iraqi control. The 20,000 strong Kuwaiti forces did not even offer token resistance while elements of the air force fled southwards. The ruler of Kuwait and most members of his government had fled before the invading Iraqi troops and with “Saudi acquiescence, had established a government-in exile” in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti Chief of Staff, General Mizyid Al- Sani, signed the emergency orders at 2.30 a.m. But first Kuwaiti unit became ready for fighting by 5.00 a.m. In the meantime, the Amir and the Crown prince left to Saudi Arabia. The rest of the Kuwaiti government followed them at 4.30 a.m. The invading army occupied Al- Ahmedi air base, south of Kuwait at 10.30 p.m. on 3rd August. The isolated Kuwaiti military resistance continued until 4\textsuperscript{th} August, when the last Kuwaiti military unit—the 15th Armoured—surrendered.\textsuperscript{62} The government of Iraq, in order to consolidated its position, increased its forces to about 150,000 in Kuwait. The occupation of Kuwait was completed within twenty–four hours to end the Kuwaiti formal resistance. Thus, the Kuwaiti forces did not demonstrate formal resistance in spite of billions of dollars spent on the Kuwaiti military establishment.\textsuperscript{63} On the 8 August, after six days of “belligerent rhetoric”, the Iraqi government announced the formal “annexation of Kuwait”, and at the end of the month Kuwait was officially declared as the 19\textsuperscript{th} Governorate (\textit{Liwa}) of Iraq.

In fact, Iraq had no definite plans with regard to Kuwait. First, Iraq claimed that its troops had entered Kuwait in response to appeals from a pro-Iraqi provisional Free Kuwait Government which had risen against the as-Sabah authorities.\textsuperscript{64} A new government dominated by Iraqis was installed in Kuwait and on 7\textsuperscript{th} August Kuwait was declared a republic. The next day i.e. on 8\textsuperscript{th} August, government of Iraq formally annexed Kuwait. Finally on 18th
August Kuwait was officially declared as the 19th province of Iraq and was renamed Saddamiyat al-Mitlaa, after portions of its territory along the former border with Iraq were integrated into the province of Basra.65

After the invasion the United States and Britain were quick in their response. And in just few hours they led the United Nations Security Council in adaptation Resolution 66066 which condemned the invasion and called for the Iraqi withdrawal. They also led European and Asian countries in freezing all Iraqi and Kuwait assets.

The response of the Arabs to the invasion was different. The Arab League held an emergency meeting on August 2nd without the adaptation of any resolutions, waiting for results King Hussain’s peace initiative. The Iraqi President called the King earlier in the day suggesting a mini-Summit to solve the problem. King Hussain flew to Cairo to get President Mubarak’s approval and the two of them called President Bush asking for 48 hours to end the crisis. President Bush did not waste any time, particularly after he had been “admonished” by Margaret Thatcher. The British Prime Minister, who had a pre-scheduled meeting with President Bush, told him that this was no time to go “Wobbly”. He called King Fahad and offered US aid if Iraqi troops did not stop at the border. On August 3rd, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John Kelly, sent a message to the Egyptian Foreign Minister threatening that the United States may stop the annual military assistance if Egypt did not take a firm stance on the Kuwaiti issue. As a result, President Mubarak issued a statement condemning the invasion.

On August 3rd, King Husain announced that Iraq agreed to start withdrawing troops from Kuwait on August 5. However, later the same day, in another emergency meeting of the Arab League, 14 Arab states followed Mubarak’s lead in condemning Iraq and calling for an immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The seven votes against that resolution were from Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Palestine Liberation organization (PLO), Sudan
and Yemen. On August 4th, President Bush called King Fahad to warn him that Iraqi troops were massed along the Saudi border. He offered Sending Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney, to Riyadh for talk about defending Saudi Arabia. On August 6, King Fahad agreed to receive American troops in his country, which became known as Operational Desert Shield. In the same day, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 imposing economic Sanctions on Iraq.

In the response to the arrival of the American troops in Saudi Arabia and to the UN economic sanctions, Iraq declared a union of Iraq and Kuwait on 9th August (which was altered to a formal annexation on August 28). On the same day, August 9, the Arab summit conference was held with 14 heads of states, chairman of the PLO, and five government representatives. President Mubarak forced a vote on a resolution that called for an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and the restoration of the Amir. The resolution also rejected annexation of Kuwait, supported the United Nations Economic sanctions, and called for the formation of an Arab “expeditionary force” to aid Saudi Arabia. The vote on the resolution divided the Arab states into three camps, one supporting Iraq, another supporting Kuwait, and a third was neutral. The twelve votes in favour of the resolution were those of Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria and the United Arab Emirates. The three votes against were those of Iraq, Libya and the PLO. The remaining six states were neither for nor against. Algeria, Jordan and Yemen abstained; Sudan and Mauritania expressed reservation; while Tunisia was absent from the meeting.
5.3 LIBERATION OF KUWAIT

On 2\textsuperscript{nd} August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to establish regional hegemony and to tide over a growing internal economic crisis. As the crisis unfolded several divisions of troops near its border with Kuwait deployed and demanded \textit{de facto} control of Bubiyan and Warbah Islands near Iraq’s port of Umm-Qasr. Eventually, Kuwait was completely unprepared when Saddam Hussein order his troops to invade the country. Iraqi forces took control of the entire country in just less than two days. Further within a week of occupying Kuwait, Iraq announced that it would annex Kuwait as its nineteenth province. The liberation of Kuwait by US took place just six days after Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, August 2\textsuperscript{nd} 1990, American forces began deploying to the Saudi Arabian desert. In the meantime, US diplomats, led by then Secretary of the State James Baker, were urging other nations to join a UN coalition and condemned Hussein’s invasion of its peaceful neighbour (Map: 5.1). On November 29, 1990, the UN Passed Resolution 678, which gave Iraq a withdrawal deadline of January 15, 1991. The resolution authorized “all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660.”

Finally, the US led Coalition forces, to join it in opposing Iraq’s aggression, consisting of forces from 34 countries (Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherland, New-Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Syria, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America)\textsuperscript{70} under the joint command of General Norman Schwarkopf and Prince Sultan Ibn Abdul Aziz, Defence Minister of Saudi Arabia were directed to undertake the military action necessary to achieve the objective of liberation of Kuwait. On 17\textsuperscript{th} January 1991, “Operation Desert Strom” began just before the midnight and straight away involved air and missile strike against Iraqi
forces in Kuwait and Iraq and at command and communication centres and other military targets in Iraq. (Map: 5.2) The decision to use force was taken by the United States after extensive consultations with members of coalition. The Secretary General was informed that it was being taken under Resolution 678, passed on 29th November 1990, which authorized “all necessary means” to implement the Councils Resolution about Kuwait if, by 15 January 1990, Iraq had not complied with them. There was no decision of the Security Council after 29th November either assessing the effect of the economic sanctions or authorizing the use of Military force. It means that sanction were being given the chance to take effect while necessary force to mount a successful action to free Kuwait was put in place. After the air offensive, diplomatic contacts with Baghdad continued but none of them resulted in obtaining from government of Iraq an undertaking which was satisfactory to the coalition.

On 16th January 1991 the US led an international coalition from US bases in Saudi Arabia to invade occupied Kuwait and Iraq. The US established a broad based international coalition to confront Iraq militarily and diplomatically and to defend the international principle of non-aggression. The coalition consisted of 34 countries (Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherland, New-Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Syria, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America). The war was financed by countries which were unable to sent troops. Japan and Germany made financial contributions totalling $ 10 billion and $ 6.6 billion respectively. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were the main donors. More than $53 billion was pledged and received. US troops represented 73% of the coalition’s 956,600 troops in Iraq. Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join. Some felt that the war was an internal Arab Affair, or did not want to increase US influences in West Asia. In the end, however, many
nations were persuaded by Iraq’s belligerence towards other Arab States, offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness, and threats with hold aid. John Pilger reported in the Guardian that UN war Resolution number 678 was achieve through campaign of bribery, blackmail and threats. Secretary of States James Beker bribed President Hosni Mubarak with 14 billion dollar in debt forgiveness in exchange for Egypt withholding opposition to the pending war on Iraq. Washington gave President Hafiz Al-Assad the green light to wipe out all opposition to Syrian rule in Lebanon, plus a billion dollars worth of arms. Iran was bribed with a US promise to draw its opposition to World Banks loans. Soviet Union was offered a billion dollars through Saudi Government before the Russian winter Set in to compensate for Soviet investment in Iraq. Another 3 billion dollars from other Gulf oil states was wired to Soviet government to secure outstanding Iraqi debts to U.S.S.R. Zaire non permanent member of the Security Council was offered undisclosed debts forgiveness and military equipment. Yemen was punished by suspending 70 million dollars US aid programme. It suddenly had problems with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 8 lakhs Yemeni workers were abruptly expelled from Saudi Arabia.75

Saddam Hussein in an attempt to open the coalition apart fired Scud missiles at both Saudi Arabia and Israel, which especially disrupted Israeli civilian life. Saddam’s strategy failed to split the coalition, because the Israeli government did not retaliate. By this tactic, Iraq tried to convince Arab countries that the coalition forces are fighting on Israel’s side. However, the coalition remained steadfast and united in its demand for an unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Iraqi ground forces also initiated a limited amount of ground fighting, occupying the Saudi border town of Khafji on January 30th before being driven back. One month into the air war, the Iraqi began negotiating with the Soviet Union over plan to withdraw from Kuwait. United States did not accept Iraqi proposal and said Iraq withdraw his
forces from Kuwait unconditioned. On 24th February 1991, the coalition launched its long anticipated land offensive. The bulk of the attack was in south western Iraq, where coalition forces first moved north, then turned east toward the Iraqi port of Al- Basra. This operation surrounded Kuwait, enclosing the Iraqi forces in southern Iraq, and allowed coalition forces to move up the coast and take Kuwait city. Some Iraqi unit resisted, but the coalition offensive advanced more quickly than expected, thousands of Iraqi troops surrendered. Many oil wells were set on fire, creating huge oil lakes, thick black smoke and other environmental damage. Two days after the ground war began; Iraq announced its intension of leaving Kuwait. America and International coalition forces accepted Saddam’s withdraw from Kuwait. Finally on March 3rd 1991 a cease-fire was reached between US led coalition forces and Iraq. The Gulf War was an unmatched success for coalition forces and verified the technological superiority both on land and sea of the American forces. It is well known fact the US decision to go to war against Iraq in 1991 was in fact a deliberate choice aimed at crippling Iraq’s military and economic infrastructure. The US had grown apprehensive over the emergence of Iraqi military power coupled with Iraqi efforts at modernization, including the creation of an impressive infrastructure and industrial and technological base. Iraq achieve all these due to the oil revenues which increased since its nationalization of oil companies in 1972. In fact, the destruction of Iraq’s military capability and its advanced infrastructure and served US- Israeli interest. Iraq’s military capability had posed a strategic threat to Israel domination in the area. During war the US allied forces destroyed most of the military infrastructure together with much of the civilian infrastructure through exhausted remote controlled precision bombings. This strategy was to enable Israel to become the strongest and dominant power in the region.

On 15th February 1991, Iraq announced that it was ready to accept UN Security Council Resolution and withdraw its forces from Kuwait.
This raised hopes that the war in the Gulf could be ended without any further bloodshed. The text was announced by the Ruling Revolutionary Command (RCC). It described this as a “necessary first step” which was “linked” to a number of other developments, including:

- A total cease-fire and the cancellation of all Security Council resolutions since the invasion of Kuwait.
- A withdrawal of all the coalition forces and material within one month of the cease-fire.
- Comprehensive UN guarantees of “Iraq’s historic rights on land and at sea”.
- Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the Golan Heights and South Lebanon and the application of UN resolutions similar to those adopted against Iraq if Israel refuses to do so.
- Political agreements in Kuwait “based upon the will of the people and their right to practice democracy and not on the basis of the rights acquired by the Al-Sabah family.”
- The cancellation of all debts owed by Iraq and other countries in the region which have suffered from the war to countries which have participated in the aggression.77

In the West, the initial reaction was deeply skeptical and within six hours after the announcement, US President George Bush had concluded “regrettably, the Iraqi statement now appears to be cruel a hoax”. The White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was “clearly trying to manipulate somebody here but it is not clear what his purpose is? 78

The dramatic announcement in Moscow on 22nd February 1991, that Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had given a “positive” response to peace proposals by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev climaxed a week
of “last-ditch” manoeuvring to avoid a full-scale ground offensive by the US-led coalition forces to liberate Kuwait. According to Soviet Spokesman, Vitaly Ignatenko, after “through discussion and exchange of views” the two sides came to the conclusion that it was possible “to find a way out of the military conflict in the Persian Gulf” along the following lines.\(^79\)

- Iraq announces a full, unconditional withdrawal of its forces from Kuwait.
- The withdrawal of forces will take place during a fixed period.
- Immediately after the cease-fire, all prisoners of war will be released.
- After the withdrawal of two-thirds of all the Iraqi forces, the economic sanctions envisaged by the UN will cease to apply.
- The withdrawal of the forces would be monitored by countries not taking part in the conflict, mandated to do so by the UN Security Council.
- After the withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait has ended the reasons for the corresponding Security Council resolutions will cease to exist, and therefore these resolutions will cease to be effective.

US President George Bush said that after examining the “Moscow Statement” and discussing it with my “Senior advisors” and after “extensive consultations” with our coalition partners, I have decided that the “time has come to make public with specificity just exactly what is required of Iraq if a ground war is to be avoided”. Most important, the coalition will give Saddam Hussein “until noon Saturday to do what he must do began his immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait”. We must hear publicly and authoritatively his acceptance of these terms.\(^80\)

On 24\(^\text{th}\) February 1991, after all the destruction which had taken place in Kuwait, and after the coalition ground offensive had begun to liberate Kuwait. The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, Mr. Churpin read
a statement. Indicating that the Soviet Foreign Government regretted that “a real chance to solve the conflict peacefully and achieve the goals set by UN Security Council resolutions has been missed”. On the evening of 25th February 1991, the “Iraqi Army began pulling out of Kuwait in a state of mounting panic”. The next day, the de facto withdrawal was made official by a “broadcast given by Saddam Hussein and the Kuwait Resistance movement” was in full control of the city. On February 27th, Iraq announced that it would unconditionally accept the UN Security Council’s 12 resolutions regarding the Gulf crisis.

On 27th February 1991, the US president, Mr. George Bush declared victory over Iraq and said: “Kuwait is liberated; Iraq’s army is defeated; our Military objectives are met”. This is not a time for excited happiness, certainly not a time to triumph, but it is a time of pride... this is a victory for all mankind and for the rule of law.

5.4 PRE IRAQ-WAR SITUATION

The success of operation desert created a new situation in Iraq. The retreat of the Iraqi army encouraged Shiite in the south and the Kurds in the north to revolt against Saddam regime, but Iraqi republican guard forcefully suppressed the uprising. The cease-fire agreement signed on March 2, 1991 stopped Iraq from flying war planes over the south but did not prevent the use of force, which became a significant factors in regime efforts to regain control. The decisive victory of allied forces failed to remove Saddam Hussein from power. During war the first Bush administration continuously encouraging the Iraqi military and Iraqi people for talking matters into their own hands. The United States came to the conclusion that the coalition would not support a March on Baghdad to overthrow Saddam regime. They were expecting that after having suffered a decisive military defeat Saddam Hussein would soon be overthrown by his own people. However, it did not happen, Saddam Hussein remained in power. The United States now decided to contain Saddam Hussein instead of
removing from power. Allied bombing caused major damaged to Iraq’s civilian infrastructure, including industrial base, electricity generation, water and sanitation facilities and killing over one lakh Iraqi people death. Despite concern about Iraqi civilian causalities and Iraq’s firing of scud missile at Israel, the Arab coalition held. On 3rd April 1991 a comprehensive cease-fire resolution was adopted and passed by the United Nations (UN 687). The resolution laid down the terms of cease-fire which include: elimination of Iraq’s programs for developing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons dismantlement of its long range missile, a system of inspections to verify complains, acceptance of United Nations demarcated Iraq- Kuwait border, payment of war compensation and the return of Kuwaiti property and business of war. In addition, resolution established restrictions on imports to Iraq expect for food, medicine, and essential supplies; banned military shipments to Iraq, and banned any Iraqi exports until Iraq destroyed its Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). This resolution (UN 687) formed the basis for most subsequent U.S action regarding Iraq.

After the cease-fire internal revolt started in Iraq. In the south the rebellious forces had gain control the some important towns but armed forces loyal to the government effectively crushed the rebellion in the south. Crucially there was no military intervention by the multinational force in support of the rebellion. Major shift in policy of U.S government appear to have been taken place. They considered, as reported, the support to the Shiite population as an unjustified interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Their principle aim was, as claimed, to prevent the disintegration of Iraq rather than to oust Saddam Hussein from power. However, to protect the Shiites in the south, US led coalition forces began “operation southern watch” and no-fly zones was established in the south up to the 30rd parallel in August 1992 and extended to the 30rd parallel close to Baghdad (Map:5.3). The purpose of the no-fly zone was to protect the civilian population.
The various Kurdish factions in the northern provinces of Iraq formed an alliance against the government. The newly formed Kurdistan Iraqi front insisted implementation of all the 15 article peace plan that had been concluded between Kurdish leader and the Iraqi government in 1970. They also established a unified anti-government movement by inviting the other groups oppose to the government. The Iraqi government deployed troops in the north to crush the uprising. This resulted in the mass exodus of the Kurds and created refugee problem. This major humanitarian disaster prompted the Gulf War coalition to send forces to secure a safe haven in the north-west corner of the Iraq. To protect the Kurdish in the north, coalition forces began “Operation Northern Watch” mission that set up a no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel of latitude, initially to protect allied force. The two no-fly zones were initially monitored by the U.S, Britain and France. This two no-fly zones were established to cripple the Iraqi air force. On several they occasion warned Iraq that any interference in relief operation north of latitude 36 would prompt military action. The UN Security Council too condemned the liberation of the Iraqi civilian populations in many parts of Iraq and demanded that Iraq “cease these repressions”. Soon United Nations took the change of Kurdish enclave along with other non-governmental organizations provide essential services in the Kurdish enclave. The U.S and Britain, however have consistently referred to United Nations Security Council 688 to justify the continued existence of and periodic bombing in the no-fly zones and as a further condition for the lifting of sanctions.

Since the Gulf War, U.S and human rights reports have mentioned that Iraq has continuously violated the human rights of its own people. In 1994 the Clinton administration contemplated presenting a case against Iraq to the international court of justice for abuses against the Shiites in southern Iran and Kurdish in the north.
(A) Weapon Inspections

Subsequent to the war the thirst of U.S policy was containment, consisting of U.S Security Council authorised weapon inspections, an international economic embargo, and U.S led enforcement of no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. To oversee Iraqi disarmament, United Nations established a special commission charged with monitoring destruction, removal, or neutralization of all Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. The commission known as United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) started inspecting Iraq’s programme for developing weapon for mass destruction. The Security Council also charged the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with nuclear capability and activity. The inspection team entered in Iraq in 1991 and succeeded in locating and destroying the majority of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction sites. Iraq agree to allow UN weapon inspector to search for and destroy suspected weapon of mass destruction under the terms of the armistice. The inspection process was frequently contested by the Iraqi government who considered it an attempt to subvert their national sovereignty and cripple the country through continued economic sanctions. The first executive chairman of UNSCOM was Rolf-Ekeus Aswede. Ekeus remained in the post until 1996 when he replaced by Richard Butler, an Australian diplomat and arms control expert.

The main cause of continued hostility between the U.S and Iraq was disagreement over the extent and need for continue UN inspections. The U.S and UN claimed that Iraq was not abiding and following the terms of agreement and were continuing to develop WMD. In April 1993, and September 1996 the U.S engaged in a series of sustained air strike against Iraq as punitive measures against the alleged violation in no-fly zones. Periodically the government of Iraq raised the objection against the way of inspections by the UN weapon inspectors and the U.S and UN
responded with threats and occasional bomb and missile attack. From 1994 a clear rift emerged among the five members of Security Council over the progress of the inspections. France and Russia wanted to reward Iraq for its confrontations and insisted for a road map toward the lifting of sanction, while the U.S and Britain refused to consider such measures. The rifts between the U.S and Britain on one side, and France and Russia on the other widen. In 1997 evidence showed that U.S and Israel had been involved in gathering information about Saddam Hussein’s movement in the course of UNSCOM inspections. Consequent upon Iraq lodged protest and did not allow American members within UNSCOM from conducting inspections. Tension escalated and on March 2nd, 1998 UN passed resolution 1154 and warned Iraq for stern action if it did not comply85. Iraq, however, ignored the UN’s warning and finally in December 1998 forced the UNSCOM inspectors to leave the country. The eviction of UNSCOM inspectors from the inspecting site and the end of Iraqi cooperation with the UNSCOM prompted the United States and Britain to launch operation desert fox on Iraq. In protest Saddam Hussein declared that Iraq would no longer recognised the validity of no-fly zones and would actively contest the allies for control of all Iraqi air-space. This has resulted in nearly continual combat in Iraqi air-space. Before the operation desert fox the final report of UNSCOM and IAEA stated that Iraq’s nuclear stocks were gone and suggested most of its long range delivery system had been destroyed. Russia recommended on the basis of this report that Iraq’s nuclear file is closed and sanctions be lifted, but Washington and London refused. The successive inspections process created crisis as Iraq did not allow the inspections of presidential site on the grounds on the sovereignty. However, UNSCOM continue to complain of Iraqi non-cooperation and pulled out of Iraq. In retaliation the U.S and Britain in December 1998 heavily bombed alleged weapon sites throughout southern and central Iraq. This attack known as ‘operation desert fox’ took place without Security Council authorization. A year after desert fox united nation passed resolution 1284 (December 17,
1999) and created a new inspections mission called United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) headed by Hans Blix. After that negotiation between Iraq and UN held over the readmission of inspectors but Iraq refuse to allow them until 2002\textsuperscript{86}.

Saddam Hussein’s decision regarding the weapon inspections created a new situation. United States now decided to remove Saddam Hussein by allocating 5 million dollar for the opposition (defector) and another 5 million to establish radio free Iraq to broadcast from Prague between 1991 and 1997. The U.S shifted the goals of sanctions to a policy of containment. From 1998 onwards a shift in U.S policy towards Iraq took place. In November 1998 President Clinton publicly declared that change of government in Iraq was an integral part of the US-Iraq policy. Clinton’s Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also stated that regime change was back on the US sanctions agenda. In United States various groups were extorting pressure on government for a more aggressive policy of regime change. The members of this group particularly Project for the New American Century (PNAC), a new conservative organization, wrote a letter to President Bill Clinton stating that policy of containment was not working. They suggested that the US should, in short-term, use military power to rid Iraq of chemical and biological weapons. They also emphasized downfall of Hussein regime through military force\textsuperscript{87}. During 1999-2000 some congressional members were disappointed by the inaction of the Clinton administration concerning the regime change in Iraq. They were also not satisfied about Clinton’s inability to provide lethal military equipment or combat training to opposition groups inside Iraq. The Clinton administration was of the view that the opposition group in Iraq was not organized enough to receive lethal military equipments or combat training. However, the regime change became the strategic goal when the congress passed the Iraq liberation Act in 1998 and budgeted 15 million dollar per year towards overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
(B) Regime Change and War of 2003

In 2000, George W. Bush of Republican Party elected President of the USA who assumed office January 20, 2001. The Bush administration with new conservative team insisted on a though line towards Iraq’s WMD and return of UN inspectors. The events of September 11, 2001 attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon aggravated the situation and provided Bush administration an opportunity to use force against Iraq. After the September 11, 2001 U.S policy on Iraq changed to an active regime change efforts. In his union address on January 29, 2002 President Bush labelled Iraq, Iran and North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” 88. Although the attack was attributed to the al-Qaida, there was a strong perception in different quarters within the George W. Bush administration that Iraq was linked to the attacks and the terrorist group behind them. It became increasingly apparent that the US intended to launch a renewed invasion of Iraq. In George W. Bush administration there existed different opinion about Iraq’s policy and regime changed. Secretary of State Colin Powell emphasized for the reenergizing sanction and inspections, the Hawks Dick Cheney and Secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld pushed for military option in Iraq. Deputy defence Secretary Wolfowitz asserted that the US needed to respond to September 11, 2001 attacks by ending states such as Iraq that supports terrorist group. The US government failed to provide any credible evidence regarding Iraq’s involvement in the attack of September 11, 2001 89. What caused for the concern in the corridors of the power was the possibility of rogue state like Iraq clandestinely providing weapon of mass destructions to al-Qaida or some other terrorist groups. But no plausible evidence has been produce so far to prove this. Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld and others promoted a new foreign policy strategy focusing on pre-emptive and use of military power multilateral or unilateral to preserves Washington super power status indefinitely. This strategy was prepared
even before the collapse of Soviet Union. However, after events of
September 11, 2001 the doctrine of pre-emptive became the stated policy of
the Bush administration. In September 2002 the Bush administration
published a documents entitled ‘national security strategy of the United
States’ which represented a more comprehensive plan for the use of
military against the states posing biological and chemical weapons.
According to the Dossier released by the British government in 2002 Iraq
earned and estimated 3 billion dollar in the illicit revenues in 2001 used
for developing weapon capability and other aggressive activities. President
Bush on September 20, 2001 in speech to the joint session of congress
stated “we will pursue nations that provide it or safe haven to terrorism”
every nation in every region, now has a decision to make either you are
with us or are with the terrorist. From this day forward, any nation that
continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United
States as a hostile regime. George W. Bush administration in fact from
start had projected Iraq as a possessor and proliferators of weapon of
mass destruction. Its official documents stated that Iraq was committed
to its missile programme and had hidden missile stock including scud
missile and was actively pursuing a nuclear weapon programme.
However, the US failed to release any official documents providing
evidence that link Saddam Hussein to al-Qaida or the World Trade
Centre attack. Now the US became more strident in its demands for the
return of UN inspectors to Iraq. Bush speech to the UN on September 12,
2002 suggested the UN for tough measures against Iraq to comply with
UN Security Council (UNSC) 687 resolution. He further warned unilateral
US action if the UN failed to do so. Iraq under pressure agreed to readmit
inspectors without conditions provided that no resolution was passed against
it.\textsuperscript{90}
The US and Britain obtained an initial resolution 1441 authorizing inspection after months of efforts regarding the re-admittance of the weapon inspector UNMOVIC and IAEA. The resolution demanded that Iraq must declare that all details of its weapons programme and provide immediate unconditional access to UNMOVIC and IAEA. The resolution did not authorize automatic use of force against Iraq. Other security council members Russia, France and China were reluctant to use of force against Iraq. They were remain committed to allowing UNMOVIC and IAEA to completes its works. Hans Blix in his first report highlighted Iraqi cooperation but mentioned the need of further examination and inspection. The second reports also contained the similar view and stated that Iraq although had no weapon of mass destructions, UNMOVIC doubted Iraq’s efforts to disarm. Mohammad Al-Baradei, head of the IAEA did not find any evidence that Iraq possessed nuclear capability. The US and Britain continue to assert the presence of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq. They also believed that Iraq had capability to produce nuclear arms. Rift emerged among the Security Council members regarding use of force against Iraq. France and Russia threatened to Veto any such resolution that would authorize use of force. Germany too declared that it would oppose any such move. France and Germany presented a counter proposal which focused on the step by step disarmament of Iraq. U.S and Britain face a difficult situation in their attempt to gain to popular support for military action against Iraq (Map: 5.4). The President Bush repeated his warnings that UN board “proved irrelevant to the problems of our time” if the Council did not deliver. He raised the question of the UN relevance. The Bush administration was continuously following the policy of regime changed and declared that the U.S would do with alone. Meanwhile, U.S congress had given President Bush authority to use military force to defend the national security of the United States against the continuous thread posed by Iraq (Map:5.5). However, Colin Powell presented proof on February 5th, 2003 in the UN Security Council that Iraq still produce and
held weapon for mass destructions. On 16\textsuperscript{th} March, 2003 submit meeting held with the leaders of U.S, Britain, Spain and Portuguese at Azores where use of force decided. On 17\textsuperscript{th} March President Bush made a speech against the non-cooperation of Iraq and issued a final ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his two sons to leave Iraq within 48 hours to avoid war\textsuperscript{97}. However, President Saddam Hussein refuse to comply with this demand instead issue warning against the attack. The next day weapon inspector and the UN staff were evacuated from Iraq.

Iraq however, denied the possession of nuclear weapon and wanted to solve the problem peacefully. It had got the support worldwide for a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Anti-war demonstrations were held worldwide in country such as France, China and Russia before the war. Moreover, Iraq foreign minister Naji Sabri stated that the U.S presented forge evidence about Iraq’s nuclear threat to the world and the U.S needed to present real and specific evidence. The Iraqi government further argued that the evidence about weapons of the mass destruction by the U.S Secretary of the state Colin Powell presented in the UN Security Council meeting was total lie and that such practice was against the fair the domestic and international opinion. Iraq also blamed that the U.S in effect made efforts to entice several UN members to supports the U.S position on Iraq. Iraq claimed that the U.S in fact damaged the internal democratic institutions and miss-guided several countries and also influence the international institutions. Iraq further mentioned in a letter to Security General of the UN that the U.S might use its technological security against Iraq in producing false evidence regarding WMD. Moreover, UN weapon inspectors had found no compelling evidence of such armaments. It appears that the U.S and Britain had already decided to attack Iraq if it failed to hand over to the UN weapons inspector the weapon of mass destruction that in their view Iraq possessed. They also blamed that Iraq had obtained uranium from Libya.
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91. No.89, p.487.
92. Ibid.
93. No.74, P.5&6.
94. No.86, p.12.
95. No.74.p.5-6.
96. No.88, p.18.
97. Ibid.
98. No.90.p.3.
Map No: 5.1
Gulf war 1991

Map: 5.2

Operation Desert Storm

Map: 5.3

No-Fly Zones (NFZ)

Map: 5.4
US and allied forces attacked on Iraq

Source: http://www.mysfera.biz/libraries/iraq_war-map
Map: 5.5
Iraq War 2003

Source: http://www.mysfera.biz/libaries/iraq_war-map