CHAPTER 4
ANUMĀNA (INFERENCE)

Anumāna means knowing after literally means knowledge (māna) after (anu) something. It is mediate knowledge derived through the medium of some other knowledge. But the derivation of such mediate knowledge always involves a psychological cum logical process. Therefore the word “Anumāna” is used for both the psychological -cum-logical process and the mediate knowledge derived from it. The mental process involved in inference is based on certain logical relations between different thoughts. The knowledge thus gained, that is inferential knowledge is called in Sanskrit anumiti, literally the consequent knowledge. It means the knowledge that is derived from the knowledge of an invariable relation between what is perceived and what is deduced. The Sanskrit term for this relation is Vyāpti (extension or pervasion) in western logic it is called ‘the invariable concomitance’. The core of inference is the knowledge of invariable concomitance (व्याप्ति) which is gained from experience. Anumāna denotes inferential knowledge but is generally used in the sense of its method or process. And it is distinguished from other mental process such as perception, recollection and imagination. The difference between perception and inference is that one is immediate and other is mediate.
Perception being immediate can refer only to the present, while inference may refer to the past and future also.

Anumāna is more thoroughly and elaborately discussed method of knowledge by Indian thinkers. It was the favorite subject of the Nyāya School. Actually it is an algebraic type of technical expression. The only systematic account of anumāna according to the Advaita School is to be found in the Vedicanta Paribhāṣā and its commentaries.

Inference is the distinctive cause of inferential cognition. The distinctive cause, or special instrument, of inference is the knowledge of the pervasion, vyāpti jñāna. Inferential cognition is generated by the knowledge of pervasion, Vyāpti. The difference between inference and reflective cognition, anuvyavasāya jñāna is that while in the former the inferential cognition is generated by the knowledge of pervasion functioning as cognition of pervasion it is not so in the latter. Vyāpti is the concomitance of the hētu and the sādhya. One sees smoke on the yonder hill, there is fire. Smoke is the liṅga and fire is the sādhya, since it is the object of the inferential cognition. The smoke is the (pervaded) vyāpya and fire is the (pervader) vyāpaka. When there is the cognition of characterization of the subject in the form “This has smoke” and when there is awakening of the residual impression generated by the experience “smoke is fire pervaded” there results the inferential knowledge “This hill is fiery”. While the distinctive cause of inferential cognition is the knowledge of pervasion, the
knowledge of pervasion is generated by residual impressions. Thus indirectly the residual impression of the experience of pervasion, as in the case of smoke in the hearth is the cause (करणम्) of inferential cognition. In fact, residual impression of the knowledge of pervasion is an intermediate operation (तत्संस्कारोऽवान्तरव्यापार:).

The distinctive cause of inferential cognition, of course, is the direct experience of the pervasion of fire and smoke in the kitchen when smoke is observed on the hill; the residual impressions of this direct experience are aroused. Here there is also the factor of the recollection of the pervasion (Vyāpti), which is the vyāptismṛti. But even when there is the recollection of the pervasion, only the residual impression there of is the cause of inferential cognition more over, if we accept recollection as the cause of the knowledge of pervasion of smoke by fire, we will have to accept that residual impressions, are the cause of recollection. The residual impression, when awakened, may lead to the recall (समरणम्) of the pervasion, but even without this recall. It may as aided by pakṣadharmatājñāna lead straight to inferential cognition. Thus while the distinctive cause, karāṇa of inferential cognition is the cognition of pervasion, the intermediate operation, vyāpāra is the residual impression or samskāra and the result is inferential cognition anumiti.

The Advaitin does not think, as the Naiyāyikas does, that liṅgaparāmāra has any part to play in inferential cognition, and he belives
that the complex of the synthetic cognition in the Nyāya Syllogism, known as the ‘Vyāptiviśiṣṭa paścadharmatājñānām is superfluous. According to the Naiyāyika on the contrary, there cannot be an inferential cognition without the parāmarṣajñāna. Even in cases where the anumiti appears to arise directly from vyāptijñāna and paścadharmatājñāna, there is the presence of parāmarśa, which is not noticed, in the quick transition of the mind from the stage of the paścadharmatā jñāna to anumiti.

The Nyāya Syllogism includes five steps for the conclusion, where as according to the Advaitins there are only three steps. As regards the fourth step of the Naiyāyikas, the Advaitins argue that it is not universal, and therefore not essential, though it may sometimes be present when the vyāpti is explicitly recollected. As regards the fifth step, the Advaitins say that it is altogether redundant. On seeing smoke on the hill, the impression of our past knowledge that every cases of smoke is a case of fire is reviewed, and we at once come to the conclusion that the hill is fiery. Through this psychological analysis we must agree that the account of the Advaitins is for more accurate than that of the Naiyāyikas.

It has been seen that according to the Advaitins inference takes place on the revival of the impressions of the previous knowledge of Vyāpti but must be a source of new knowledge. Because memory is caused by the revival of past impressions only, but inference is caused not by that alone; it has in addition other causes also. And hence the conclusion ‘the hill is fiery
is not therefore a mere reproduction of past knowledge, it is something new. Or inference takes place as follows. There is first the experience of smoke along with fire in the kitchen etc. Then there is the certainty as to the pervasion of smoke by fire. Then thirdly at a subsequent time there is the perception, the smoke on the hill. Then the residual impression of the original experience of the pervasion of smoke by fire is aroused, and consequently, there is the revival of the memory of pervasion. There is now the perception of the smoke, as qualified by the pervasion of the fire. This is called paramārśajñāna. After this there is the inferential knowledge “on yonder hill there is fire”. Accordingly paramārśajñāna in its general form is this. ‘The minor term ie, hill has smoke which is pervaded by fire.’

It is here that the Advaitin differs from the Naiyāyikas and says that the inferential cognition is secured even through the recollection resulting from the residual impression of the pervasion of smoke by fire together with the knowledge of the parāmarśa, therefore, is not essential for inference. One need not postulate an intermediate stage of reflective self-consciousness of the subject as cause for inferential cognition. The triyaliṅga parāmarśa or the correlation of the three terms ie major, minor and middle is not necessary. And they also argue that the vyāptismṛti or even samskārōdbodha is enough to produce the inferential cognition.

According to the Naiyāyikas inference is of two types – Swārthānumāna and parārthānumāna. And the Advaitins accepted the first
kind, ie the Swārthānumāna. The second kind – parārthānumāna includes five steps namely pratijñā, hētu, udāharaṇa upanaya and nigamana. But the Advaitins say that even for the purpose of demonstration the five steps are unnecessary. It is quite sufficient either to state the first three or the last three\(^{10}\). This view seems to be quite reasonable. The reduction of steps in no way affects the convincing character of the reasoning because either of the two groups contains a major and a minor premise. There is one thing more that is worth notice whether we take the first three or the last three; the udāharaṇa that is common to both is preserved. And the udāharaṇa is the characteristic keystone. It consists of the universal proposition supported by concrete examples.

In addition to the chief principles of classification svārtha and parārtha, the Naiyāyikas differentiated three kinds of inference namely, Kēvalānvayi, Kēvalavyatirēki and Anvayavyatirēki. Among the three kinds of inference, the first, the major term where of allows both anvaya and vyatirēka (ie. observation of agreement both in presence and in absence) as tests of the validity of the major premise, is called anvayavyatirēki. The second, the major term where of allows only anvaya (ie observation of agreement only in presence) is called Kēvalānvayi. The third, the exclusive major term where of allows only vyatirēka (i.e. observation of agreement only in absence is called kēvalavyatirēki). This is the Nyāya classification of inference.
The Advaitins do not accept this classification. As to the kēvalanvayi inference, they say that it is based on a wrong metaphysical presupposition. There can be no term, which are allpervasive and the absence of which cannot be found anywhere. Brahman as conceived by them excludes all predicates and the absence of the so-called all-pervasive major term (like knowledge) can be shown at least in Brahman. As to kēvalavyatirēki, the Advaitins argue that an inference is by conception process of reasoning based on an invariable concomitance between the middle and major term. An argument based on an invariable concomitance between the absence of the major term and the absence of the middle cannot, therefore be called an anumāna, though it may be a quite valid piece of knowledge. It should be given a separate name, arthāpatti. The rejection of the mixed type anvayavyatirēki follows directly from the principle on which kēvalavyatirēki is rejected. On the whole, therefore the Advaitins accept only one type of inference – ie anvayii – based an Affirmative Universal Major which is established through the method of agreement in presence coupled with non-observation of any exception. This is to be distinguished from the kēvalānvayi, where in the testing of the major through non-perception of any exception is not possible at all. This universal relation is arrived at “through the observation of agreement in presence between the middle and major terms with the non-observation of any contrary instance”\textsuperscript{12}. The absence of any contrary instance or of inconstancy of the hētu is a condition – president
in the Advaitic doctrine of the perception of vyāpti; as in the doctrine if the Naiyāyika. This fear of inconstancy, however, must be constructed as caution. This so because to know that there is no contradictory instance is to know the entire universe, which is in the nature of the case, impossible for any finite mind. There will be always something, which we do not know and which may necessitate the modification of what we know already. This liability to contradiction is the criterion by which the Advaitin measures the truth of things. This is in consonance with his largest theory of non-contradiction abādhitatva. What we experience is true only in so far as it is not sublated. What is given in experience, however much efficient practically it might be, is essence less, because it is ever subject to contradiction. What has its own nature is never subject to sublation. One cannot perhaps say that an analysis of the nature of things will give us truth and the why of universal relation, for the simple reason that the so-called things really have no nature of their own. The heat of the fire and the cold of the ice are not distinct in the ultimate analysis.

Even though we can argue that it is not a universal concomitance between the middle and the major term alone that can yield an anumāna. Some other universal concomitance also can lead to an inference, provided that it does not present any opposition to the universal concomitance between the middle and major terms. In that case the knowledge of a universal concomitance like “what ever is produced is non-eternal” (यदृकः कर्मसन्तान)
might also lead to inference, 'the hill is fiery' as there is no opposition between this universal and the universal 'what ever there is any smoke, there is fire.' For we never actually have such an inference in life. The testimony of self-consciousness be the ultimate judgement as to whether any inference actually takes place from a proposition or not. This is also says that there is no need of apprehending vyatireki anumāna because the Advaitins must necessarily give up his own theory of arthāpatti as a method of knowledge distinct from anumāna. Though the knowledge obtained through arthāpatti can be obtained through anumāna also, it does not necessarily follow it always so known. Here as elsewhere, the evidence of self-consciousness should decide what actually is the source of a particular knowledge. The existence of an object known through perception can also be known through inference. But that neither argues that perception is included in inference, nor shows that everywhere the existence of the object is actually known through inference. The distinction between arthāpatti and anumāna also is grounded on the testimony of self – consciousness; the one cannot therefore be reduced to the other. Thus the Advaitins can, accept the Nyāya classification of anumāna quite consistently with their own theory of arthāpatti.

As already said, the Advaitins do not object to the inclusion of kēvalānvayi within inference, but do so in the case of kēvalavyatirekī. They contend as we have seen, that no inference can take place with a universal
that states a relation between the absence of the major term and that of the middle. Hence there can be no such inference as a vyatireki type. The controversy ultimately concerns, therefore, the definition of an anumāna. The Advaitins insist that an inference is a process in which are infer the presence of the major term through a middle term and have to start, therefore, from the knowledge of an invariable concomitance between the middle and the major, and not of that between the absence of the major and the absence of the middle.

Pakṣatā (पक्षता)

There are two obvious psychological conditions that suggest themselves to everybody that inference takes place. The first is the absence of positive knowledge about what is to be inferred. We try to infer something when we are not certain about it. But on closer thinking it is found that though we lack certain knowledge about many things, we do not try to infer the existence or absence of all of them. Another condition should therefore be added to the first, and it should be said that we must not only be ignorant about a thing, but also have a positive desire or will to infer its presence or absence.

The alternative view that though there need not be doubt, there should be at least the absence of certainty or want of proof as a condition-precedent of inference is unassailable since in every operation of a means of proof
there is the acquisition of some novel knowledge which was not available earlier. Inference should give a new knowledge or information.

But some Indian logicians discover that the above psychological conditions represent only one of the many situations in which inference really takes place. The different combinations of the presence and the absence of these two factors namely want of certainty (निभ्याभाव or सिद्धाभाव) and the will to infer (अनुभवित्ता or विषयविष्ण) yield four possible alternatives.

1) Absence of certainty together with the will to infer.
2) Absence of certainty together with the absence of the will to infer.
3) Presence of certainty together with the will to infer.
4) Presence of certainty together with the absence of the will to infer.

Now of these, the first will certainty lead to an inference. The second appears to be unfavorable for inference. The presence of the will to infer as already seen appears to be essential. Inference takes place as involuntarily as the sudden perception of a thing. Thus inference may take place even in the absence of the will to infer, if there is want of certainty about a thing. Sidhānta Muktāvali says that doubt is not an essential precondition of inference, as many logicians think it to be. Because, we have no previous doubt in the above case as to whether clouds are present or not. But when on hearing the sudden roar of thunder we infer, the presence of clouds. The third alternative, namely, the presence of certainty coupled with the presence of the will to infer also appears to be unfavorable to inference. A person
who has obtained certain knowledge about the self from scriptures may yet try to know it also through inference. It is also found that logicians try to infer the existence of even those things that are immediately known by them through perception. No inference takes place, however, when the last alternative obtains i.e. when there are both certainty about a thing and the absence of the will to infer it. On the whole, therefore it is found, say the Naiyāyikas that in all cases except the fourth, inference can take place. The condition of inference is therefore, negatively expressed by them as the absence of the condition in which there are both certainty and want of the will to infer.

With regard to the knowledge of the self, the scriptures declare that, this knowledge is supreme and total. It destroys all doubts and dissolves all knots. If an inference is essential to verify the authenticity of the scripture with regard to the self, then, the self, it should be presumed, has not so far been attained, and one should be supposed to perish in doubt. So the Naiyāyika cannot cite the example of the seeker of self-employing inference to have certainty about the self-taught by scriptures. This entire thing considered, it is quite proper to accept as the basic conditions of inference, the absence of certainty and the will to infer.

Now this condition is described as the characteristic of the minor term of an inference and called therefore, pakṣatā (the quality of being a pakṣa). The Vedaṇṭaparībhāṣā does not discuss this topic of pakṣatā. But the Advaita
sidhi and following it the sidhi-vākyya, discuss it incidentally while establishing inferentially the falsity of the world. According to the Advaita sidhi, pakṣatā (or the condition which should characterize the minor term of a possible inference) is either a doubt that the major term characterizes the minor, or the absence of evidence showing the presence of the major in the minor. Another alternative definition of pakṣatā given by the Advaita Sidhi is the condition of being the object if some dispute (विवादिपनिविषयश्च). The second alternative has especially in view the case of a parārthānumāna, where the object of an inference is to settle a disputed point.

The gist of all definitions given by the Madhusūdanarasasvaty is that inference must have as its initiating condition either doubt, or at least want of knowledge about the thing to be inferred. The absence of certainty together with the will to infer and the absence of certitude accompanied by an absence of the will to infer, can be easily met by the Advaitins, because in both of these there is absence of certainty, which can only be either a case of doubt or a case of ignorance. So far therefore, the Advaitins are not at all handicapped by not citing the will to infer as a precondition of inference. In fact as the will to infer is not common to both these cases, it is seen to be so far only an accidental condition, not an essential one. But when we come to the third case, namely the presence of certitude accompanied by the will to infer, we find that the Advaitins definition fails to cover it. If there really is any inference in spite of certitude and if it is initiated only by a will to infer,
then the Advaitin is guilty both of making absence of certitude as an essential condition and of omitting the will factor. If inspite of certitude inference takes place, it may either be motiveless, or may have a motive other than the attainment of certitude, or may have the motive of the attainment of greater certitude. The third alternative deserves serious consideration. Even if we are certain about a thing we may, it may be said, want to be more certain about it. The possibility of increasing certainty about a thing is an article of popular faith. It makes sure doubly sure and takes a bond of faith. Enhancement of certainty implies that certainty admits of degrees. It may of course be said quite legitimately that even if truth may not admit of degrees, certainly may be greater or less, strong or faint. It is to be conceived that the difference is constituted by the greater certainty possessing a degree of certainty that the less certainty lacks. If that were the case, the inevitable conclusion is that before we employ an inference for obtaining greater certainty, there is an amount of certainty that is wanting. It is a case, therefore as much of the absence of certainty as of the presence of it. Moreover it is not the presence but the want of certainty that goads out will to infer, not in so far as we are certain of the thing, but in so far as we want to be certain about the thing by removing the absence of certainty. Want of certainty, in the form of doubt or ignorance, is therefore found to be the essential condition of inference, and the will to infer a casual factor. The Advaita view of pakṣatā is therefore sounder than the Nyāya one.
Establishment of the illusoriness of the world through inference

A syllogism establishing the illusoriness of the world is as follows.

1) Everything other than Brahman is illusory.

2) Because of otherness from Brahman.

3) And what is thus (other than Brahman) is illusory like nacre silver.\(^{17}\)

Here the opponent may say that there is no proper example of illusoriness the Advaitin has quoted nacre-silver as the example of such illusoriness. The opponent may deny the illusoriness of silver described by the Advaitin as indeterminable. Either the nacre-silver is wholly real or wholly unreal. Hence it cannot serve as an example. To this the Advaitin answers that the nacre silver is not real because it is sublated, and it is not unreal because it appears; its nature is indeterminable as either real or unreal. Secondly it may be objected that even granting the indeterminability of the nacre-silver “Bring other than Brahman” is not the determinant of illusoriness. The indeterminability follows from its being the nacre-silver. To this the Advaitins replies that the indeterminability is presented in a variety of instances like nacre-silver, rope-snake etc. which have nothing in common except that they are other than Brahman. So “Being other than Brahman” alone should be taken as the determinant of illusoriness for the reason of parsimony.\(^{18}\)
Vēdānta Paribhāṣa defines illusoriness as “the counter correlate of absolute non-existence in the locus of the presentation itself”. The following typical syllogism is offered as another proof for illusoriness. “This cloth is the counter correlate of absolute non-existence located in this thread; because of cloth ness, like another cloth”. Cisukha has said, “wholes counter correlates of absolute non-existence located in their own parts because of their wholeness like other wholes” Dharmarāja’s syllogism is given as follows.

1) Everything that is different from Brahman is illusory,
2) Because of difference from Brahman,
3) Like the shell-silver.

It is better in some respect than the syllogism. “The world is illusory, because it is perceptible like shell-silver”. The difficulties in this latter syllogism are enumerated through the mouth of the opponent. In this syllogism, in the minor term ‘world’ even Brahman is included and as such it is also subject to sublation (बहु). Just to avoid this one cannot so construe the term “world” as to mean ‘all the modifications’ (सब विकारः). Thus thinking that Brahman, being unmodifiable. Again shell-silver is given as example. But since shell-silver also is comprised within the minor term there is the fallacy of सत्साधनम्. Moreover illusoriness cannot be defined as the counter – correlate ness of absolute non-existence located in the substratum of the object connected with it (ie
illusoriness) (स्वसंसृत्यमानादिकरणनिद्वायततामानप्रतियोगितम). Nor can illusoriness be said to be the product of avidya because it will not apply to avidya itself, thereby committing the fallacy of too narrow a definition. Nor is it removability by knowledge (ज्ञाननिवर्यत्वम) because it is accepted by others that in spite of its being real, the world is removed by the knowledge of Brahman. Illusoriness cannot be defined as inexplicability (अनिवर्यनीयत्वम). Difference from existence cannot be the criterion of inexplicability. Inexplicability cannot be different from non-existence because it will include Brahman also and it cannot be different from both being and non-being, because there is no experience of such a thing. Brahman is free from the attributes of being and non-being. This perceptibility cannot mean ‘being pervaded by the fruit defined by knowledge’ (ज्ञानलक्षणफलव्यपायतम) because this definition will not be applicable to super sensuous things like merit and demerit. Merit and demerit are not objects of the कृतीवैचित्यम born of sense object contact. Nor the द्रष्यत्वा be said to be objectness of कृति because Brahman, though self-luminous is yet said to be an object of कृति i.e. अखण्डार्थकृति. Thus there could be no inference establishing illusoriness.

We can see some improvements in Dharmaśa's theory. The phrase “different from Brahman” is incorporated so as to exclude Brahman being part of the minor term. He incorporated the word ‘everything, to avoid the
defect of the example shell-silver. Thus the syllogism ‘everything that is different from Brahman is illusory, like the shell-silver. The shell-silver coinciding with the minor term is not a fault. Because the term ‘thou’ is non different from Brahman because of being of the definition ‘Existence’, ‘consciousness’, ‘bliss’ like Brahman itself, the minor term, itself is the example (अभेदानुभाने पक्ष एव दृष्टान्तः). The same line of criticism is adopted in case of other categories also like quality, action, generic character, inference etc. For example, of the quality it may be said in above manner. This colour (say red) of the cloth before me is the counter correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads. Since it is colour, like any other colour. The same can be urged against inherence (समवायम्) also as follows. Samavāya is the counter correlate of absolute non-existence located in these threads, since it is samavāya like that between clay and pot. Thus Brahman can be neither the locus of qualities nor an inherent cause. If it is said that if things like pot etc. are illusory there will be the sublation of the perception as ‘pot exists’. But the reality of the pot does not exist. In all perception the content is the substrate reality that is Brahman. And it is not a substance, according to the Advaitins. It is a subject beyond all qualities like colour etc.

The Advaitins alternatively recognize three grades of reality - पारमाधिकम् (absolute) व्यावहारिकम् (empirical) and प्रातिभासिकम् (phenomenal). The first is that of Brahman, the second is that of pot etc. and the third is that of nacre-silver.
While the phenomenal nacre-silver is sublated by the veridical cognition of
the shell, the empirical reality of shell and other things like that, being due to
nescience alone, are sublated by Brahman intuition alone. While, an
absolute reality is denied for pot etc. They are granted an empirical reality.
As such, therefore pot etc. can be the content for pot cognition. The
negation of pot etc. is not in respect of their own existence but only in respect
of their absolute reality. Thus there is no contradiction in the Advaitic
view that the world is illusory, and for this illusoriness there is possession as
counter – correlate of what is defined by absolute reality, as the qualification
of absolute non-existence.

Ānandabōdha gives the following syllogism in support of the
illusoriness of the world.

1) The world is illusory.
2) Because of inertness and objectness.
3) Like the perception of silver and dream.

It may be said: the middle term ‘Objectness’ for perception
really renders the inference invalid, because is the world that is the
‘object’ of perception may be real or unreal. If it is real, being an
object of perception, illusoriness cannot be inferred. And therefore
‘being an object of perception’ cannot be the middle term. If the
world were unreal, the hetu ‘objectness for perception’ will go without
a basis or locus. The example also will be rendered baseless. The
hētu moreover is inconstant in the case of the self which is also known and which, in that case, will become illusory. The first criticism referring to the middle term being refuted by the world of objects that is perceptible by valid means of knowledge, is groundless because it has been shown by Ānandabōdha that differential perception, when analysed, will turn out to be a baseless notion and thus illusory. Thus though there is the perception, the world given to perception is not real, just as the things given in the dream perception is not real, though perceived or as it happens in meditation where the senses do not operate out word.

With regard to the second criticism that if the world were unreal, the middle term and the example will have no locus at all, the Advaitin would say that he does not swear by the notion that in order to be an abode a thing should be real. It will suffice if there is the experience. The essence of an illusion is that it is immediately given in experience, incapable of being maintained by any proof. So absence of proof is no reason for saying that the world cannot be the basis or abode, and conversely, the world being an abode or locus is no reason why it should be real.

With regard to the self or Ātman, the Advaitin holds that the self does not depend on anything else for its manifestation. It is self-manifesting and self-established. It is not an object of perception like any other inert object.
The self cannot be the object of any mental perception for the reason that what is the subject can never be an object and be the cause of any psychosis having that as content. Because if cannot be known by the senses. If it is said that though the self be not an object of mental perception, still it cannot be independent of other objects for its luminosity, for it manifests itself in the cognitions of all objects that are dependent upon the sense organs etc, it is not so, because the self, through it experiences the fruit of the action means one's action has reference to something other than the agent only. The subject self is not an object, and an object is never a subject.

The self-revelatory nature of self is absolute and independent according to Prakāśātma in his Vivaraṇa (Citsukha formulates the definition of self-luminosity as that which is to be called immediate, at the same time not being an object of any cognition. And the self is nothing but this self-luminous consciousness. The self manifests itself in all operations of knowing without being an object of cognition. Self-luminosity cannot merely mean existence and illumination for this would be so wide as to include the Nyāya definition of self-luminosity according to which knowledge is known in introspection, and illumination is not its intrinsic character. Hence the existence and illumination must be the sovereign intrinsic character of consciousness. But in this case the consciousness will be both the knower and known at the same time.
Citsukha’s syllogism for the establishment of the self-luminosity is as follows.

Consciousness is self-luminous.
Because, it is of the nature of experience.

Like the pot.\(^30\)

Just as any property like whiteness is denied absolutely in a pot, which is black, knowability is totally denied in the self with the result that the unknowable self has to be self-luminous. The Naiyāyikas urge several objections to the syllogism proposed by Citsukha. Every attribute must have its locus in some substance. Self-luminosity is one such attribute and even while it is conceived it must be located in its locus, i.e., consciousness. Then an elaborate inference of that which is already conceived cannot be located in consciousness. On the other hand, if there were no such preconception, since no idea of the predicate could be there, the major itself becomes inconceivable and unproved. But self-luminosity is not inconceivable and though it is known, it is not so far known as related to its locus as its essence. Since knowability is denied in consciousness, self-luminosity is implied in it as its property. So it cannot be said that self-luminosity is unestablished.

To make the partially known completely established a syllogism is perfectly necessary.

According to the Advaitins cognitions also are self-luminous. The Naiyāyikas say that cognitions are not, self-luminous. But Ānandabodha in
Nyāyamakaranda ensures that cognitions, one has to concede are self-luminous and manifests them manifesting their contents. The self is of the nature of cognition and is never an object while the world is of just the opposite character and therefore illusory. Thus Ānandabodha establishes the illusoriness of the world by inference.

Five different definitions have been offered by the Advaitins for the concept or expression ‘illusoriness’ (मिथ्यात्म). \(^{31}\)

1) The absence of being as well as the absence of non-being (सत्यात्मन्द्वलं सति असत्यात्मन्द्वलं विषिद्वत्).

Replying Vyasatirtha, Madhusūdana observes that exclusion of being does not necessarily lead us to non-being. All that appears need not have being; but even appearances of something that has being. It is no argument against Advaita to say that it holds that what has no being cannot appear; for Advaita says only that appearances have a substrate, ie ‘Brahman.’

2) Denial at all times even where it appears to exist\(^{32}\).

Being, because it is being, can at no time be denied. Non-being, because it is non-being can at no time be denied. Only that which is indefinable as either being or non-being can at all times be denied. The denial of the indescribable illusion results or is the same as affirmation of Brahman. When the world appearance is denied as ‘there is no world appearance here’ (नेह नानास्ति किंचन) as there is no world-appearance anywhere else, the denial implies the absolute non-existence of world appearance.
This does not mean that the world is तुच्छ; for a तुच्छ can never appear for it to be denied.

3) Removability by knowledge (ज्ञाननिवर्त्तम) world – illusion is removed by true knowledge with its causal aspect and effect aspect. When a jar is destroyed with a heavy club, it is broken only in its effect aspect. The cause aspect, i.e. clay is there.33

4) Appearance in the locus of its own aspect । अर्थस्थितिः भौतिकत्वम् Madhusūdanāś defines existence as that which appears as existent through proofs not invalidated by defect. This definition has the purpose of excluding non-entities and Brahman from its scope. Non-entities do not appear; Brahman is never an object to any mind34.

From these points we can conclude that the establishment of Brahman (जीवमांस्कन्त्वम्) or the establishment of the illusoriness of the world the Advaitins depends mostly on inference. Actually the Advaitins differentiated from other schools of philosophy because of this distinguished theory of Brahman and illusoriness.
References.


2. Ibid. अनुमितिकरण अनुमानम् . अनुमितिकरण च व्यास्तिज्ञान्

3. Ibid. व्यास्तिज्ञानलेन

4. Ibid. P.93. व्यास्तिज्ञान अशेष - साध्यसमानाधिकरणरूपा , Tarkasaṅgraha P.91. साहवयनियमो व्यास्ति

5. Vēdānta Paribhāṣa P. 93.

6. Ibid P.53. तत्संकारस्य अनुमिति हेतुत्वेंत

7. Notes on Vēdānta Paribhāṣa P. 190.

8. Vēdāntaparibhāṣa. P.91. न तु मच्छे व्यास्तिकरणं तज्जनं विवव्याप्यधूमावनं - 
   इत्यत्थि विशेषणविशिष्टज्ञानं वा हेतुत्वेन कल्पनीयं, गौरवात् मानाभवाच

9. न तु तुलीयविज्ञापरस्यम्: अनुमिती करणम्  Ibid.

10. Ibid. P. 97.

11. Ibid.P.94.


13. Ibid. P. 268.


15. Anumānacintāmaṇi. P. 431. सिद्धश्वश्वाबिर्हस्यकृत साध्य प्रमाणाभावः

16. Advaita Sidhi P. 29. साध्यसन्देहवत्, साध्यगङ्गसमान भाववत्तवाद् वा

17. Ibid. P. 417.

18. Ibid. P. 98. युक्तिरूपय रज्जुरस्यर्दीनां मिथ्यावे ब्रह्मिन्त्रस्य शास्त्रानिन्थ लाभयेन प्रयोजनक्त्वात्
19. Vēdāntaparibhāsa. P. 98. स्वाभाविकतासम्बन्धितत्वात् अवस्थान्तरप्रतियोगितम्

20. Tatvapradīpikā. P. 40 verse 8, also Vēdāntaparibhāsa. P. 100.

21. Vēdāntaparibhāsa. P. 102. गुणाश्रयत्वं समवायिकारणं वा द्विविधमिति ते अवस्थानं


22. Ibid. P. 101. अविष्णुनिमित्तुमाय एवं तेन हितविशिष्टस्य धार्यं : सत्यवाचिस्थे

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25. Ibid. P. 124.

26. Ibid. P. 56. स्वप्नद्वायोपि तत्संभवात्

27. Ibid. P. 129. न चान्तरेण प्रामाणिकभावम् आश्रयानन्दितिविचारिकृतम् कुलधर्मम् : प्रसिद्धिग्राहण

उपयोगः

28. Ibid. P. 132. परस्मावेतेक्रियाकृतसाली हि कर्मेति.

29. Tatvapradīpikā. P. 196. अविश्वास सति अपरोक्षहर्षाद्योग्यतं स्वप्नप्रकाशक्षणम्

30. Ibid. अनुभूति : स्वप्नप्रकाश अनुभूतिविचार्येकं यथा घटः


32. Ibid. P. 53. प्रतिप्रथमधृती त्रैकालिक निषेध प्रतियोगितम्.

33. Ibid. P. 123.

34. Ibid. P. 143. स्वाभाविकघटनान्तरप्रतियोगितम्.