CHAPTER 3

PERCEPTION IN ADVAITA VEDĀNTA

(प्रत्यक्षप्रामाणम्)

The word Vēdānta means the end of Vēdas or the upaniṣadic portions of the Vēdas. It is believed that the propounder of Vēdānta philosophy is Bādarāyaṇa. The system of Vēdānta has been one of the most significant schools of thought, which has exercised a pervasive and unmitigated influence on Indian mode of thinking, and way of living. In modern times its influence spread beyond India and cast its impact on Europe and America and elsewhere. This demonstrates the inherent strength and logical tenability of Vēdānta as a system of philosophy.

The Vēdāntic philosophy has its springs in the Upaniṣads. But later on the Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa and the Bhagavadgītā put forth its classical exposition. The three together constitute the foundational texts of Vēdānta technically known as Prasthānatraya. The upaniṣads are regarded as Sūtriprasthāna i.e. revealed texts. The Bhagavadgītā is known as Smṛtiprasthāna as it is an expression of the Divine in human form. The Brahmasūtras are accepted as Sūtraprasthāna or Nyāyaprasthāna because this gives a logical and rational exposition of the Vēdantic thought.
The pramāṇas accepted by the Vēdānta philosophy is six in number. They are perception, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, presumption and non-cognition. But here we have to take into account that the number of pramāṇas in different schools of Vēdānta is also different. For eg. Like the Naiyāyikas the Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Rāmānuja accepts only four pramāṇas. Anyhow the supreme reality of Vēdānta philosophy can be attained only through pramāṇas.

Of all the methods of knowledge perception is most important and it is the most fundamental. It supplies the foundation stone to the philosophy of the world. We find that, a theory of the world either starts with a theory of perception, or if it starts somewhere else, it has to offer a satisfactory account of perception that fits in with its assumptions. In India almost every school of philosophy has its own theory of perception. As regards the exact definition of pratyakṣa however, there is a marked divergence of opinions among the different schools of philosophy.

Pratyakṣa, as viewed by the Buddhists, is an unerring knowledge of the unique particular. We have further the case majority of views, which consider perception as knowledge arising out of the contact of sense with an object\(^1\). The view of Prābhākaras and the Vēdāntins and also section of Naiyāyikas perception is characterised as immediate knowledge\(^2\). The more popular and general view is that; pratyakṣa should be defined as that knowledge derived from the contact of senses with an object\(^3\). Goutama,
Kanāda and Kumarillabhaṭṭa and a great majority of other thinkers subscribe
to this view. All of them agree with this point, though they differ as to other
details, e.g. some think that the word pratyakṣa should be confined only to
uncontradicted knowledge⁴ (अव्यावधारित्तान) while others think that this
qualification is necessary and that pratyakṣa should be used as a generic
name for perceptual knowledge as well as perceptual errors. This view is
considered to be unsatisfactory by a third class of thinkers, the Prābhākaras,
Gaṅgeśa and the Advaitins. The objection of Gaṅgeśa and the solution
offered might be summed up thus: - The definition of pratyakṣa as
knowledge obtained directly through the contact of a sense with an object is
too wide, because this definition would apply even to the cases of inference
and memory. To avoid this circle we have to define perception in some
other way. Perception may be safely defined as immediate knowledge⁵. Or
it may be defined negatively as knowledge that is not derived through the
active agency of other knowledge. Inference is not immediate knowledge; it
is derived from previous knowledge. So also is memory. And when
perception is thus determined we may define sense in relation to perception.

The Advaitins, while agreeing that perception is immediate
consciousness differ from most other schools of thinkers on one essential
point. Perception cannot be defined in terms of sense activity owing to the
difficulty already mentioned, yet wherever there is perception, external on
internal, the activity of some sense external or internal must be thought
responsible for it. But the Advaitins think that this is not true. There is no
necessary connection between perception and the activity of senses.

It is necessary to understand the perception we have to discuss
the role of sense in this process. According to Budhism, “Indriyas or senses
are the gōlakas or sense orifices – the eyes, the ears, the nose etc as visible to
us,” the Mīmāṁsakas say that, “An Indriya as sense is not the visible
physiological organ, but is a peculiar capacity (शक्ति) of the organs”. Most
other philosophers hold that an indriya is neither the organ itself nor its
capacity, but is altogether a different substance (इत्यय) having its local in the
visible sense organ. So an indriya is not being identified either with a sense
organ or with the capacity of the sense organ.

According to the Naiyāyikas;” we have already stated that the process
of perception takes place the soul come into contact with the mind and mind
to the senses and sense to the objects. However in receiving an impression
an indriya or sense must came in to actual contact with its object. If all the
senses including even those of touch and taste, could precise objects without
coming in to actual contact with them are would have been able to have the
touch and taste of distant object. But if it held that not all but only the visual
and auditory senses can receive impressions without actually reaching the
object. Then it has to be explained why we should not see a signal or hear a
sound even after it has vanished. So it is reasonable to think that it is
necessary for every one of the senses to reach the object and have contact
with it, in order that the object can be perceived at all. This theory is stated by saying that, every indriya is präpyaka (capable of working only on reading the object).  

The Naiyāyikas think that sound travels in waves and there by reaches the ears. But the Vēdāntins hold that it is the sense that goes out to meet the sound-producing object. For they think that if sound itself came to meet the sense of hearing it would be impossible to distinguish the distance and direction of different sounds and locate their sources extremely in space of all sounds we would then say that they exist in our ears. What we think however is that we have the sound say of a distant drum not the sound of our ears? It is reasonable therefore to think that the imperceptible sense of hearing goes out to reach the object as in the case of sight.

THE ROLE OF MIND IN PERCEPTION

The Sanskrit word ‘manas’ is translated in English as mind. It stands for mental states and functions. According to Naiyāyikas it is conceived as a positive substance as well as an instrument- an internal sense through which we attend to inner and outer objects. The rational activities of the mind such as memory, comparison etc. are ascribed to the self-ātman. Most of the orthodox school agrees in regarding manas as the internal organ of perception (अन्तरविद्यम) through which are directly know for instance, pleasure and pain and other mental states. Consciousness is an attribute of ātman alone; mind is an instrument only like the eyes, ears etc. But as mind has the
authority of the ten indriyas it is called \textit{उन्मात्मकभित्रियम्}. Through its instrumentality, the \textit{ātman} obtains the knowledge of objects. \textit{Kanāda} states that the proof of the existence of manas can be obtained from the fact that in case of absent-mindedness we do not get knowledge, although an object an external sense and the self are all present to co-operate with one another. This shows that the activity of some organ of attention is necessary for the production of knowledge. This inner organ is the Manas. \textit{Sāṅkara} also accepts this argument.\textsuperscript{10}

The \textit{Vedāntic} view of mind is difficult from those of other schools it is not an independent reality. It is not regarded as a fundamental substance. It is only one of the many aspects or functions of \textit{antaḥkaraṇa}, which is the generic term that would correspond to the word mind. Secondly most of the \textit{Vedāntins} say that manas is not an indriya or sense organ. Thirdly it is not regarded as an invisible infinitesimal substance (as in the \textit{Nyāya}) but is considered to be medium dimension. These above points require special consideration. The \textit{Vivaraṇakāra} and \textit{Vedāntaparibhāṣa} divide four different aspects or functions for the \textit{antaḥkaraṇa}, manas, budhi, ahaṅkāra and citta. Manas represent the indecisive state of \textit{antaḥkaraṇa} or mind as found for instance, when we cannot ascertain whether an object is this or that. Budhi stands for \textit{antaḥkaraṇa} in its state of decision as when we decisively know a thing as ‘this’. Ahaṅkāra is the state of \textit{antaḥkaraṇa} having some reference to the self, as in the judgment ‘I am happy’. Citta is \textit{antaḥkaraṇa} in its state
of remembering, i.e. referring to a past event. Pancadași differentiates antahkaraṇa as manas and budhi. The author of Pancadași opines citta as included in manas and ahaṅkāra in budhi. Vēdāntasāra is similar to this concept, but according to it ahaṅkāra is subsumed under manas and citta under budhi. According to Śaṅkara, antahkaraṇa is a product of nescience (अविद्या) pervades the entire body inhabiting it and is clear like a mirror. It can be realized that the Vēdāntins accepted the meanings and functions of manas similar to budhi. But opinions differ as to exact meanings of citta and their relations to the other two functions. It should also be noted that in certain connections manas is also used in a wide sense as synonym for antahkaraṇa. But the most important thing to understand in this connection is the Vēdāntic idea of the nature of manas or antahkaraṇa. Naiyāyikas consider manas as a dravya, a spiritual entity. According to the Advaitins self or ātman is the only independent reality and ahaṅkāra is a product of the beginningless nescience. The play of ahaṅkāra dominates all our knowledge feelings and actions. This is evident from the use of I (अहं) that makes the stages waking and dreaming. Fortunately however we have our dreamless sleep and such a deep sleep we do not experience the obsession of our habitual egotism or ahaṅkāra. We do not distinguish ourselves from any notSelf. The dualism of I and not I (अहं, इत्य) vanishes altogether. The absence of egotism (ाहंकारम्) the dualistic objective knowledge that mark the activity of antahkaraṇa show that clearly in susūpti (dreamless sleep). If ajñāna perished altogether we
should have a memory of omniscience. As we return from dreamless sleep
to dreams or to the waking stage, confusion comes back and with it antahkaraṇa reappears.\(^{12}\)

Others hold the antahkaraṇa or mind to be independent of, and also as
real as, the ātman or the self, the Advaitins think it is derived from the primal
illusion or ajñāna from which the self-suffered. Ahaṅ kāra has no existence
independently of the self, and even as dependent on the self. According to
Vedāntins and other orthodox thinkers, mind is not Self and it is
unconscious. But others consider determinate knowledge, desire, volition
and memory to attributes or functions of ātman, the Vedāntins think they are
the functions neither of the ātman itself, which is pure determinate
consciousness, only of antahkaraṇa which is a mode of ajñāna; they are
regarded as products of the mutual association (अध्यास) between ātman and
antahkaraṇa which is responsible for all determinate activities.

There is a little difference of opinion as to the proof of the existence of
mind. The Vedāntins (non-Advaitins) prove its existence by inference. But
according to the Advaitins mind is directly perceived. In their view
antahkaraṇa is but a mode of ajñāna and ajñāna is directly revealed to the
self in dreamless sleep, and even in waking life in our experience of general
ignorance. Besides pleasure, the self directly knows pains and other modes
of the antahkaraṇa. In the Brahmasūtras, however we come across an
attempt at proving the existence of antahkaraṇa.\(^{13}\) It is said that if the self,
the senses and objects were the only three factors in knowledge, knowledge would be present always or never, so long as all these three are constantly present to co-operate together. As this is not the case as knowledge sometimes takes place and sometimes does not, in spite of the presence of these factors – we are forced to admit the existence of a fourth variable factor – which is the mind. Mind is an internal sense organ and it is conceived as the karaṇa or the instrumental cause of perception.

Even among the Vedaṇtins there are some who do not regard manas or antahkaraṇa is an indriya or an instrument of this subject. In the Upaniṣads, the manas is mentioned in many places as distinct from the indriya. In the Kaṭhopaṇiṣad, for instance, it is said: ‘higher than the indriyas are the subtle elements, and higher than these is the mind’\(^\text{14}\). Again in another place, the self is compared to a charioteer, the body to the chariot, the intellect to the driver, the manas to the reins and the indriya to the horses.\(^\text{15}\) In the Muṇḍakopaṇiṣad also it is said: ‘From this are derived the vital air (प्राण) the mind and all the indriyas.’\(^\text{16}\) The Vedaṇtins as is well known primarily count upon the testimony of the upaniṣads. They sometimes call in the evidence of the śṛutis but only because they think that they faithfully represent the views of the revealed text. Śaṅkara while commenting on the Brahmaṇḍastra\(^\text{17}\) incidently states that though according to the Śruti mind is not as indriya. It can be seen that Śaṅkara also is in favour of the view of the
śrīṁśās that manas is an indriya. The author of Pancadasī also mentions manas as an internal sense organ. 18

The author of Vēdānta Paribhāṣa rejects this view, and according to him antaḥkaraṇa cannot be regarded as an indriya. 19 He author of Vivāraṇā also holds this view. Here we should understand the meaning of indriya.

The etymologies of indriya are,

1) इ प्रतिद्वन्द्वीति इति इन्द्रिया: (Which running towards the objects).

2) इन्द्रे आत्मा स येन ईर्यते तदिन्त्रियम् (The soul is the Indra, by which he moves).

3) इन्द्रयित्रित्रजुष्टम् (Thought by Indra). 20

These three etymologies prove that indriya is used in a wide sense of a karaṇa – an instrument of knowledge. In this general sense there may not be much objection to calling mind, an indriya. It is used in the sense of an instrumental cause of perceptual knowledge. The Naiyāyikas and many others think that the self through the instrumentality of the mind perceives pleasures pains etc, and consequently mind is an indriya. The function of mind is not exhausted in internal perception alone. Its activities are present in external perception, as well as in inference, imagination, memory etc. Where we cannot regard mind as an indriya, in part it is an indriya and in part it is not. But it is difficult to say that the acquiring of knowledge is possible without considering mind as an indriya or knowledge is impossible without the help of the mind. Anyhow an indriya is defined as the source of
immediate knowledge and immediate knowledge as that derived through an indriya. Therefore perception is derivable only through sense.

In the Vēdāntic theory knowledge or consciousness, as we have said, it is not a product. The antahkaraṇa can thus be regarded only as a factor in the modification of the already existing consciousness, and not as an instrument in the generation of knowledge.

According to the Vēdāntins, in the perception of an external object, the mind goes out to the object through the indriyas, the senses. The senses, therefore act as the vehicle of the movement of manas towards the object. But the mere fact of antahkaraṇa assuming the form of the object does not explain the knowledge of the object. Antahkaraṇa as we have seen is unconscious. So the modification of antahkaraṇa by itself cannot amount to knowledge. The Vṛtti or mode of antahkaraṇa is illuminated by the ātman, the cit, which is there as the observer (साधिक) of all changes. In all empirical experiences the antahkaraṇa and the ātman remain identified or fused together. Hence the change of antahkaraṇa can enjoy the light of the self that is indistinguishably identified with it and thus knowledge becomes possible.

In this process of perception, there are three points that require special consideration.

1) The going out of the mind to the object

2) Antahkaraṇa’s assuming to the form of the object.

3) The relation of Vṛtti to its object with the self.
The Vedantic view that mind goes out to meet its object in perception is therefore, not at all reasonable, supported as it is by common sense as well as philosophical speculation. The second point to be noted is the Vedantic statement that the mind takes the form of the object on meeting it. And according to the Vedantins, the antahkaraṇa may be regarded as an instrumental and intermediate principle standing midway between the object and the self. When we perceive an object the image or the antahkaraṇa Vṛtti is found to possess the form of the object perceived in the past, and it is through this mode (बृत्ति) that we remember the object. And it is possible that there is a certain principle that somehow records the form of the object when presented to sense, and it is through a reproduction of this record that we can call back to mind in the form of the object at a subsequent moment. Antahkaraṇa would then be identical with this inner principle. It appears that the Vedantic theory on the perception of an object is not at all reasonable. Thus we should realize that the antahkaraṇa functions not only in perception and memory, but also in other forms of mental dealing with objects, such as judging, inferring, forming ideas on the basis of words heard and so on. In every one of these cases there is an objective mode of the mind (अन्तकरणवृत्ति).

There is controversy over the nature of manas on both sides. But it all devolves upon the sense in which we use the word sense – organ. Vācaspati’s argument that manas is the instrument for internal perception
and that, therefore, it is a sense organ, cannot easily be set aside. According to the Advaitins, the antahkaraṇa is inert as much as the sense organs. The conscious element, in the whole process belongs only to the self. Commenting on Ajātasaṭru’s question to Gārgya in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka upaniṣad, Śaṅkara states that in the context, ‘consciousness’ is the intellect or mind, which is only an instrument of knowledge and in refuting the materialist in the same Upaniṣad. Śaṅkara is firm that mind also being an object like colour, etc cannot be the agent of vision. It is only through the mind that one sees and hears. But this one is the self, not the mind. Just as an emerald or any precious gem dropped in to the milk for testing imparts its luster to that milk, so does the luminous self imports to the organs and intellect. In this sense, then antaḥkaraṇa is an instrument. As such in the matter of the experiences of pleasure and pain, it alone can be the sense, if sense be the name for it. But then, while the sense organs are merely the gateways, antaḥkaraṇa being of the nature of light, goes forth to reach the object of perception and is active. So we should say, while the sense organs do not know, the internal organ knows, and also knows itself, though ultimately it is illumined by the consciousness self alone. But, then, consciousness – self is the knower only when it is conditioned by the antaḥkaraṇa. When a person is asleep all the functions of mind, which is a particular limiting adjunct of the self, are withdrawn and there is consequently no knowing. In dream, objects perceived though the senses are
not operative. Śaṅkara writes that dream also is a kind of perception. For all practical purposes, the internal organ is its own instrument.

As a conclusion it can be said that antaḥkaraṇa is an instrument for internal perception, though not a sense organ in the sense of a gateway or sense-orifice for external perception. And that the sense organs are merely sense-orifices has not been accepted by the Advaitins and it is said that sight is of the nature of light, as much as antaḥkaraṇa and sense of hearing goes out as the antaḥkaraṇa does. If sense means the instrument of knowing, as it very much seems to mean in Advaita, then antaḥkaraṇa, as the name implies, is a sense.

THE PLACE AND THE FUNCTION OF THE SELF IN PERCEPTION

Perception involves a relation between the knowing self and its object. The conception of this relation is determined by the conceptions of the self and of the object. The individual self is found to be all pervasive or infinite, but not the creator or cause of the objective world. It may be said that the ego or the knowing self is not merely universal, but is also the ground of the objective world, though the self is independent of its object, the object entirely depends on the self for its existence; that if the self is really infinite there cannot be an objective world independent and outside of the self. Here it is necessary to pursue the relation of the self with the object and with the process of sense perception. The objective world comes to acquire an existence outside and independent of the individual self. Thus the perception
of an object means that a connection previously non-existent is set up between the knowing self and its object. The connection is established through the mediating principle, the antahkaraṇa. The individual self, in spite of its universality lights up only those objects, which appear to it through the medium of the antahkaraṇa. On being aware of an object for the first time the self remembers that it was not aware of it before. The memory clearly implies that even before the presentation of the object there was a consciousness of its non-presentation to consciousness. Thus the self may be said to be always aware of all objects, both presented and not presented to consciousness. Hence the Viṣṇudāntic dictum every thing is lite up by the witnessing consciousness either as known or as unknown.

When we are aware of an object, there illustrated in the distinct experiences, which we have for instance.

1) In trying to imagine a face without success.

2) In successfully imagining it and

3) In perceiving it.

At the first stage of awareness the face is only a possible object, objectively of the face a mere promise. The face is therefore an object that is getting unknown. At the second stage the possibility is clearly demonstrated. At the third and last stage the promise of objectivity is actually realized, in perception. These conditions are going out of the senses and through then of the antahkaraṇa to the object and so forth. As
the antahkarna assumes the form of the object, the self-identified with the antahkarna comes to have a direct tinge of the object. This objective tinge of the subject is called ciduparāga (the tinging of the pure consciousness) and it is held that the necessity of the going out of the antahkaraṇa lies in effecting this tinge (विद्वस्तम). This then is the significance of the perceptive process in the second view.

Every Vedāntin agrees that all knowledge present the self-shining transcendent light of consciousness, which imparts to the object its character of immediacy. Consciousness in this aspect is called Sākṣin or the witness. It is so called because it is conceived as the impartial spectator, which takes no part in the ever changing. Process of knowledge, but only lights it up or passively witnesses it. However the individualized self or consciousness may appear to be it yet retains this aspect of transcendence. Even the Vedāntic opinions are different; It is found that the perception takes place only when the object is brought in to connection with the self or the witnessing consciousness, either by the revelation of an identity between the two through a removal of the differentiating factors or the tinging of the self with the form of the object, or by the removal of the veil of ignorance that hangs between the self and the object. The nature of the relation that is established between the witnessing consciousness or the self as the passive observer (साशिष्ठ) and the object perceived are admitted by all to be one of adhyāsa (erroneous identification) of the one with the other.
Advaita Vedāntins hold that thoughts as well as material objects are derived from a common stuff, called caitanya (consciousness). They also hold that the subject (प्रमाण) the object (विषय) and knowledge (ज्ञान) are all only differentiates of the same caitanya. They also credit neither objects nor our thoughts of them with the reality of self-subsisting entities. To escape from this confusion, they conclude that the evolution of the phenomena of thoughts and objects from the same caitanya is inexplicable (अनिष्टचनीयम्).

And the Vedāntins declare that thoughts and objects are the two most obvious popular categories of existence – are not ultimately real and possess only a practical value. They declare firmly that the ultimate reality is immediately, present to consciousness (साक्षत् अपरोक्षत् ज्ञात) and calmly assert that the falsity of the entities of popular belief is only an anticipation or promise which can be realized after a sustained effort (साधनम्) of recovering from the hypnotic spell under the influence of which the world has come to appear as such. Thus, according to Vedāntins in general, must be in every perception having some connection shown between the objects and witnessing Self or Sākṣin.

As to the immediacy of an element of knowledge (प्राचार्यः) we must remember that according to the Vedāntins as to many other thinkers, knowledge as knowledge or as a mental act is always immediate. Even as inference or a mere idea, must be regarded as immediate (प्रत्ययम्) or self-evident as an act or mental process. The ordinary distinction between
mediate and immediate knowledge altogether vanishes when knowledge is looked upon from this point of view.

According to Vēdāntaparibhāṣā consciousness the reality underlying every thing – is empirically delimited in three ways, as knower (प्रभावता) knowing process (प्रमाणम) and the object known (विषयम) the object is immediately known when the inner organ (अन्तकरणम) flowing through a sense out to the object assumes its form and removes thereby the separation between the knower and the known. As the same process leads also to the unification of the knowing process and the object, this knowledge also becomes immediate.\(^{27}\)

All these discussions point that the self in its transcendent aspect of self-shining caitanya is responsible for the immediacy that we experiences in perception; that it is the light of the self-luminous self which imparts immediacy to the object and the knowledge of the object.

**KINDS OF PERCEPTION**

In Indian philosophy perception is of two fold, external and internal.\(^{28}\) Perception by any of the five sensory organs (of hearing, sight, touch, taste and smell) is external. Mental perception (of pain or pleasure of knowledge or ignorance of love or hate, and so forth) is internal.

Sense perception is the natural and direct way of knowing external things. It leads to immediate cognition. According to Vēdāntaparibhāṣa sense perception is not the only way to immediate cognition.
Vēdāntaparibhāṣa also says that the immediacy of knowledge does not rest on its being caused by the sense organs\textsuperscript{29}. Western philosophy also recognized this view, according to Hobhouse, “the immediacy of cognition, and not sense operation is the intrinsic characteristic of perceptual knowledge”. \textsuperscript{30} He also says “If we inquire into the common character uniting ideas of both kinds (simple ideas of sensation and reflection) we shall find it not in their dependence on any sense organ or any special kind of physiological stimulus, but in their immediate presence to consciousness”\textsuperscript{31}. Prābhākaramīnāmsakas say that perception is immediate cognition. (साक्ष्यम् प्रतीति: प्रत्यक्षम्). Advaita Vēdānta accepts this definition. Perception is therefore the primary source of human knowledge.

The Nyāya School defines that, perception is the knowledge, which is caused by the contact of an organ (indriyas) with its object and is infallible\textsuperscript{32}. Advaita Vēdānta does not accept the Nyāya definition, which does not include internal perception, unless mind is considered instrument as an organ (indriya). According to the Advaitins, mind is not the instrument of internal perception as an organ though the Nyāya School considers it as such.

A person concurrently observes two distinct orders of facts. On the one hand he perceives external things and events and on the other, internal states and functions, such as pain and pleasure, love and hate, knowledge and ignorance, concentration and distraction, memory and loss of memory and so on. It is true that external objects are observable by all, where as the internal
occurrence are subjective and private. Yet it cannot be divided that both are facts of normal experience and have to be recognized as criteria of reality.

Perception is considered external or internal according to, as the object of cognition is external or internal. External objects are those that can be perceived by the sense organs. In this sense respiratory and other organs with the body including their functions are external. A brain surgeon can watch with his eyes a patient's cerebral movements, but not his mental operations. The former are therefore external while the latter are internal. What is physical and not perceptible to the senses can thus, be distinguished from the physical objects and their properties as internal.

Internal perception is again two fold:

1) Relative to the perceiving self and
2) Relative to the states of the mind.

In experiencing happiness, which is a state of the mind, a person is aware of himself as its experience as is evident from such expressions as 'I feel happy', 'I am happy'. But he ascribes to himself the mental states, although he is distinct from it as its experience. Every individual is more or less aware of himself as a doer and as an experiencer. This means that he is aware of the empirical self, the ego, but not of the changeless luminous self ever district from the psychophysical adjunct as its witness.

According to the Upaniṣads, the all-pervading supreme Self is non-dual, non-relational consciousness that is the Brahman. The realization of
this identity is the culmination or the end of knowledge and not its means. So the intuitive perception of the self as Brahman beyond all distinction (अपरोक्षत्वानुपूर्ति) is not counted in Vēdānta as a pramāṇa.

According to the Advaitins, the mental states like pleasure, pain etc. is illuminated directly by the self without any intermediary. So they are said to be manifested by the Witness Self-alone (केवलसाक्षिभाषयम्) that is unaided by any agency. It means in internal perception the mind and the sense organs do not serve as instruments of knowledge as in the perception of the external objects nor is any mental operation in the form of inference involved in it. According to Patanjali, the modifications of mind are invariably known because their master the witness self (पूर्वः) is changeless. The Self is even present and illumines all external and internal objects of knowledge. The known is self-manifest and is more than known, without being an object of knowledge. Thus perceptual knowledge has three distinct phases.

1) Regarding the physical object,
2) Regarding the mental states,
3) Regarding the knowing self.

Then we have seen perception is again divided into two – Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka. It is held by Naiyāyikas that when perception takes place that very first moment is called Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa. There we do not have the knowledge of an object characterized by any predicate or character for instance, ‘this is a pot’ but approached some un related elements, like pot
ness, blueness etc. and then we have a pratyakṣa – savikalpaka and in this stage we have the determinate or relational knowledge of the object, for instance, the pot is produced by clay etc. Pārthaśāradhīmiśra one of the Mīmāṃsakas in his Sastradipīkā holds that in the nirvikalapaka stage the object is indefinite (पुष्प) and multiform (अनेकाकार) whereas in the latter stage it becomes definite and presents only one form.34

According to the Vēdāntins, knowledge is Savikalpaka, it consists of the predication of one content to another in a substantive – adjective way. But knowledge in which such a relation is absent in Nirvikalpaka. And concerning Nirvikalpaka they maintain that the substantive – adjective relation is absent in the content of Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa should not necessarily be confined to the prejudgment stage because they think that among judgements themselves there are some which exhibits all the marks of a Nirvikalpaka jñāna and that these Nirvikalpaka judgements can even be expressed in language. Illustration of such perceptual judgments is to be found in cases of the recognition of an identity arising from the perception of an object for a second time. When perceiving a man for the second time we say, ‘This is the Dēvadatta’ we have a perceptual knowledge or judgment that is Nirvikalpaka, since the predicate here bears an adjectival relation to the subject. Though we primarily start here with two different contents, we finally arrive at an identity through the negation of the difference between the two. Totally it asserts an identity, not any adjectival relation. Hence it
can certainly be called Nirvikalpaka. There is a question arising, ‘why, is such knowledge called perceptual? Is it not rather a case of recognition or memory? To this Vēdāntins reply that as the judgment is based here on the perception of the object, there is no reason why we should not call it perceptual. In other words the identity as asserted in this case is neither remembered nor inferred but directly perceived, just as the man is perceived. The form of judgment expressing a remembered identity would resemble “the man whom I saw yesterday is the same as the man whom I saw the day before”. It may be objected that even the judgment “This is Dēvadatta” though based on the perception of Dēvadatta, is partially based on memory. The judgment would not be possible if we did not remember that particular man with some particular attributes and that he was called Dēvadatta. We may answer this objection by saying that the dependence on memory, found in this particular case, can be shown to exist in most perception, it is therefore no peculiar feature, that may be regarded as vitiating this particular kind of perception and not affecting other kinds. Giving Nirvikalpaka, its proper meaning, there is no difficulty in thinking of a recognition judgment like ‘this is that Dēvadatta as expressing a Nirvikalpaka perception.

But we cannot find any definite statement whether or not the Vēdāntins believe in the existence of the Nirvikalpaka stage as received by the Naiyāyikas. The Vēdāntins are found neither to refute nor to support the
contentions of other schools as to the existence of a primary awareness of an indeterminate or unmeaning object prior to the developed perception of it.

According to the Vēdāntins all perceptions except those that constitute identity judgments came under the Savikalpaka class. Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṁsakas say that Savikalpaka is a development out of the Nirvikalpaka stage. But we know the Vēdāntins do not agree with this. For the identity judgment “This is Dēvadatta” which Vēdāntins consider to be an example of the Nirvikalpaka type, really follows the determinate perception of the man Dēvadatta. Thus we have here the case of a Savikalpaka perception preceding and not succeeding a Nirvikalpaka one. To enquire about the objects of Savikalpaka perception from the Vēdāntic point of view, then we have to enquire about the objects of all perceptions except those of identity. The form of an object and also its colour, touch, smell, taste and sound can be immediately perceived. The antaḥkaraṇa can approach these objects through the five senses, and consequently there is no difficulty in perceiving them. As regards the knowledge of the weight (gūruṭva) of an object also, there is a general agreement between the Vēdāntins and most other schools. The weight of an object is held to be always inferred (nītyanumāram) and never perceived. The reason for such a view is to be found in the fact that Indian thinkers recognize only five senses (indriyas) of external perception and the muscular sense of modern psychology is not considered to be a sense at all.
The weight of an object comes, therefore to be inferred from the fact of its falling down when left unsupported.

According to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas time cannot be an object of perception. For them a substance to be perceptible must possess a non-infinitesimal dimension (महत्वम्) and a manifest form (उद्भूतमस्तवम्). For instance atoms cannot be perceived, because they are of the infinitesimal order of dimension. Again other, time etc cannot be perceived because they lack visible forms. The Vēdāntins however hold that the formless character of time is no hindrance of its being perceived. According to them, the conditions of perception, as laid down by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems need prove no stumbling block. That time is immediately perceived is an undoubted fact. On seeing a pot we say ‘we see the pot now’. We cannot explain the quality of the present ness (वर्त्तमानत्वम्) of the object, pot in any way other than by holding that time-quality as directly revealed through the sense of perception as the pot itself. This direct inexplicable experience enables us to conclude that time is an object of perception and that its perception can take place through the senses.36 If time were not perceived along with the perception of the object, we should always doubt whether our knowledge were about a present past or future object (न सोफःस्ति प्रत्यये लोके यत्र कालो न भासते).

Time as perceived is not thought of either as an empty form, which all events have been abstracted, nor as the series of events present, past and future stretching from infinity to infinity. It is absurd to think that some
conceived in any one of these ways should be directly perceived through the senses. The time that is said to be perceived is the present time, which subsists in the object as an element qualifying it. It is not reasonable therefore, to think that time as a quality of the perceived object is revealed to us through all the senses, which are thought responsible for the perception of the object itself.

Vēdāntins hold that time as present is immediately apprehended. And when an object is apprehended through any sense, its time-character also may be similarly apprehended. Sadānanda an Advaitin says in his Advaitabrahmasidhi, that time is perceived through all senses.\(^{37}\) Vēdāntaparibhaṣa says that the present, past etc. can be experience of the ‘now’ is not succeeded by an experience of the ‘then’ – so long in other words as the self judges it to endure.\(^ {38}\) The views of the Vēdāntins regarding the perception of universal is almost similar to the Naiyāyikas, that some where they differ from those of the Naiyayikas. The Naiyayikas differentiates two kinds of perceptions namely ordinary and extra ordinary (लोकिकेः अलोकिकेः च). And they differentiate six kinds of ordinary relation (सत्त्रिकर्मं) between object and sense for the perception of six kind of objects namely संयोगम्, समुक्तसमवायम्, संयुक्तसमबतसमवायम्, समवायम्, समबतसमवायम् and विशेषविशेषायायम्.\(^ {39}\) Regarding this view, the Vēdāntins say that all the objects that are held to perceivable are also perceivable. Substance like a pot and the qualities belonging to it are held to be directly perceived. The universal,
potness, in the substance, pot as also the universal, blueness, in the quality, blue is also perceived. Sound is perceived of course; so also the universal, soundness inhering in it. Vedic object, however to the perception of non-existence, and assert that the knowledge of non-existence is a quite unique kind of knowledge that has to be classed apart. As to Samavāya the Vedāntins do not admits its existence at all.

We have to note, however that even in the preceding instances, where the Vedāntins agree with the Naiyāyikas with regard to the perceivability of the object, they do not admit the Nyāya account of the nature of the relations obtaining between the particular senses and the objects.

The Naiyāyikas differentiates each and every worldly thing into seven categories like substance, quality etc. But the Vedāntins do not accept this Nyāya view of entities. In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya Śaṅkara criticizes this theory in detail and establishes the view that an attribute, an action, a universal, particularity etc. exist in the substance not as discrete entities, but as elements or aspects which are not distinct from the substance. And the Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas think that attributes and substance, actions and substance, universals and particulars are held together through another entity, namely the relation of inference or Samavāya. Śaṅkara says that it is difficult to define the conception of this new relation. According to him, these relations, like attributes and their substance etc. are for too intimate to
be classed with the ordinary relation of samyoga. We can never experience or even think of an attribute apart from a substance.

As a matter of fact an attribute is always experienced as inseparable from a substance. It is trace that they are distinguished admits Śaṅkara, in words. But that shows a difference only in meaning and not in existence the same objects says Śaṅkara may be called by different names according to its many internal and external aspects. The identical individual, Deśadatta may be differently called a man, a Brāhmaṇa a youth etc. If the attributes and substance, universals and particulars are found to be inseparable in existence there is no necessity whatever for the conception of the foreign entity of a Samavāya relation for holding them together. On the contrary it is reasonable to think that attributes of universals etc. are identical with the substance in which they are experienced to reside. The conception of a relation like Samavāya exists independently of the terms presents other difficulties also. If a relation is an independent an entity as the terms related there arises the necessity of a second relation to connect the first relation with each of the terms and the second relation may similarity be shown to require a third, and that a fourth and so on. Thus the logical analysis of the conception of a relation as a co-ordinate entity leads as to an infinite regress (अन्तस्था). According to the Naiyāyikas a thing can no longer be viewed as a mistake of independent entities. It is one whole, which presents the different aspects of attributes universals actions etc. under different organizations (संस्थान) so the
conception of Samavāya is super structure of Nyāya philosophy. This is how Śaṅkara reflects the Nyāya theory of entities and propounds his own view from the Vēdāntic standpoint. And we are aware that the arrangements advanced by things refute the realistic theories of things and relations held by the Naiyāyikas. From this discussion it is generally known that while idealists stand for the internality of all relations realistic object to this position and favour, the externality of relations.

Vēdāntins agreeing with the Naiyāyikas on the perceivability of universals, attribute etc. differs from then on the point of the relationship of these objects with sense. The view of the six kinds of contact संकर्षण, which are found the Naiyāyikas hold in order to explain the perception of different kinds of object substance, quality, universals etc. appears to be quite necessary as soon as the Nyāya view of things is abandoned. According to their own conception the Vēdāntins find that one kind of contact which takesplace between a substance and its particular sense is sufficient to explain the perception of universal, qualities relation etc. that are indistinguishably identical with the substance. But there a problem arises if universals qualities etc. are identical in existence with the substance and if the same kind of contact be through responsible for the perception of all these aspects of the substance we cannot perceive all the aspects of a things every time that are perceive it. The Vēdāntic solution is to saying that the cause of the perception of a thing is not merely the contact of the sense with the thing.
There is also the factor of the antahkaraṇa assuming its form. Thus inspite of sense contact a thing may not be perceived if antahkaraṇa does not assume its form. That is to say if a thing has different number of aspects that do not necessarily become objects of perception only those aspects will be perceived to which attention may be directed at that particular time.

Regarding perception of a universal, Naiyāyikas say that it has an external timeless reality. It bears to the many particulars a relation of inherence- samavāya. The Vēdāntins do not believe either in the eternity of a universal or it’s inhering as a discrete entity in the particulars. According to them, a universal tableness is nothing but the common attributes अनुगत्यम of the many particular tables. So the relation between the universal and the particular is nothing but identity. The perception of the universal tableness is then nothing but the perception of those attributes of the table, which are common to all other tables of experience. It is a perception of the table itself and does not imply any additional mysterious relation (between itself and the sense) like inherence in the conjoined (संयुक्तसमवायम्) as the Naiyāyikas think.

According to the Naiyāyikas the objects of perception in the group of attributes and action are separateness (पृथक्तम्) number (संख्या) conjunction (संयोगम्) etc. But the Vēdāntins would (except ŚrīHarṣa and Citsukhācārya) not object to the perceivabality of most of these attributes and actions. As to the perception of the attributes, difference however Vēdāntins would not
agree with the Naiyāyikas, since they think that non-existence as well as difference is known through a distinct method of knowledge called anupalabdhi.

Regarding the knowledge of similarity the Vēdāntins hold that this also can be perceived under certain conditions. Knowledge of similarities of perceptual only when the subject judged to be similar is itself objects of perception. For eg. If on perceiving a cow we know that this cow is similar to another cow we perceived in the past then our knowledge that the first cow we have seen is similar to the first cow is not held to be a case of perception as the second cow is not itself perceived. This latter knowledge is classed apart as a distinct kind of knowledge called upamāna.

To conclude the result of this section we may roughly say the according to the Vēdāntins, a substance is perceived and along with it and as inseparably identified with it we perceived universal (i.e. common attributes) relations (of samyoga type) similarity (as possessed) by the perceived object) and may other attributes of the substance which are ordinary through to be perceptible by other philophers. This view is one which can be gathered from the writings of Saṅkara and the majority of his followers but there are a few Vēdāntins like the author of ज्ञानशुद्धिः who would apply a destructive dialectic to show that even in perception we have nothing more than a knowledge of pure being (तत्त्वात्मक)
We have discussed the objects that are regarded by the Advaitins as immediately known through perception, determinate and indeterminate\textsuperscript{42}. This really completes the Advaita account of perceptible things. Still further discussion under this topic is necessary to consider the cases of objects, which some later Naiyāyikas regard as immediately perceived, though the Advaitins do not accept their view. These Naiyāyikas, as aloukika pratyakṣa or extra ordinary perception, describe these cases.

The Naiyāyikas divided perception into two class- ordinary (लोकिकम्) and extra ordinary (अलोकिकम्). The extra ordinary perception is again divided in to three namely सामान्यलक्षण, ज्ञानलक्षण and योगज we take up सामान्या लक्षणa first. Some Naiyāyikas (such as the authors of Tatwacintāmaṇi, Bhāṣāparichēda etc.) hold that we perceive not a vyakti or individual, but also a class of individuals.\textsuperscript{43} In perceiving a pot we perceive the universal potness (the generic property of pots) as characterizing the particular pot. This perception of the universal potness, amounts, according to these thinkers, to the perception of all pots as possessing this universal. We find therefore that in perceiving a particular, we virtually perceiving also all particulars of that class. In such a case, then the perceptual knowledge of the universal (सामान्यज्ञान) does the duty of sense contact (प्रत्यासत्ति) in causing the immediate knowledge of the class. Hence this kind of perception is named Sāmānyalaksāṇa pratyāsatti, which literally means contact through the knowledge of the universal.
The Naiyāyikas and some other thinkers believe that through concentration a Yōgin can achieve the supernatural faculty of perceiving all things, concealed, distant, and infinitely small. Such a perception obtained without the help of a sense organ is called Yōgaja pratyakṣa or Yōgi pratyakṣa. The Advaitins disregard such yōgic discipline as harmful to the higher pursuit of Brahman. Moreover they do not admit the possibility of external perception without sense activity.

The Advaitins dismiss all the argument put forward in support of Sāmānana lakṣaṇa, and maintain that there is no fact of experience, to explain which we may be compelled to admit the theory that in the perception of an object presented to sense we also perceive all other un-presented members of that class. To admit such a theory, the Advaitins think, to ignore the vast distinction that exist between immediate and mediate knowledge.

Let us consider the second type Jñānalakṣaṇa of extra ordinary perception, in which illustrate the immediate knowledge of object not presented to sense. For instance when seeing a piece of sandalwood at a distance, we can realize its fragrance also. Actually we may not smell the fragrance. How does the immediate knowledge of fragrance arise? There is no ordinary sense contact. In such a case, then we must suppose that the sight of the sandal vividly reviews the memory of its fragrance perceived in the past, and the fragrance appears to be immediately felt. We find then, that the revived knowledge (ज्ञानम्) officiates here for sense contact in causing the
immediacy of the object. The perception of illusory objects is also explained with this theory of Jñānalakṣaṇa by the Naiyāyikas. The sight of a rope in twilight revives vividly by its similarity the idea of snake hood perceived in the past in real snakes. This vivid memory causes an apparent immediacy and the illusion of the rope as a snake.

It should be observed that in each of these cases of extra-ordinary perception – Śāṃyālakṣaṇa and Jñānalakṣaṇa the knowledge (ज्ञान) of some universal does the duty of sense contact in order to cause perception; in the former case the agent is the perceptual knowledge of a universal which inheres in the object to be perceived, and in the latter it is the reproduced knowledge of the very object to be perceived. So the difference between these two cases lies in the fact that, while in the former the knowledge, acts as the agent, leads to the perception of the locus (e.g. all individuals like cows) in which the perceived universal (e.g. cowhood) remains in the latter case the knowledge (e.g. the memory of fragrance) acting as the agent, leads to the perception of its own object (e.g. fragrance).

The Advaitins do not accept the Nyāya theory of Jñānalakṣaṇa. As we have just seen the theory of Jñānalakṣaṇa is advanced by the Naiyāyikas to explain two kinds of facts – one represented by cases like that of the perception of fragrance in a distant sandal and the other by cases of perceptual error. The Advaitins hold that each of these two types of cases can be explained in a different way, which makes the Nyāya theory
unnecessary. The first type of cases really comes under inference and not at all under perception. In judging the fragrance of a distant piece of sandal, we really infer the existence of fragrance from the fact of its being sandal. If the perception of the sandal and the previous knowledge that sandal is fragrant, can be thought of as leading to the perception of the non-sensed fragrance, nothing can prevent us from thinking that even in cases of inference. Such as the knowledge of fire from the perception of smoke, we do not really infer the smoke but perceive it. For is there not a similar perception (viz. of the smoke) and a pre-existing knowledge (viz. that smoke is always attended by fire)? It follows therefore that the theory of Jñānalakṣaṇa removes the distinctions between perception and inference — a distinction that the Naiyāyikas, try to preserve as much as any other school.

As to the second class of facts (namely cases of false perception), the Advaitins say that the theory of Jñānalakṣaṇa does not satisfactorily explain the immediacy of the illusory object. The perception of the tortuous length may, on the basis of similarity, revive the memory of a snake. But how this memory (or recollection of snakehood) can amount to the perception of the snake is not explained by the Nyāya theory. There is a vast difference between recollection and perception, which cannot be so easily ignored. This explanation of illusion is not sufficient. For this purpose we must admit that in illusion the object is somehow presented directly. On those grounds the Advaitins argue that since the theory of Jñānalakṣaṇa doesn’t really
explain either of the two kinds of facts it seeks to explain, it must be rejected as altogether unjustifiable.

As a conclusion it should be noticed that where as the existence of the first kind of extra ordinary perception (viz. members of the class) must be ascertained logically as being necessary for the explanation of the possibility of inference etc. The existence of the second kind (ज्ञानलक्षणम्) must be ascertained by a direct appeal to experience. Regarding the fragrance of the unsmelt sandal, such a judgment (yonder sandal is fragrant) is the expression of an immediate feeling, and if immediacy is regarded as the essence of perception, then we can hardly reject the Naiyāyikas contention that there is perception of the unsmelt fragrance as well.

It is true that, we often pass such a judgment, as ‘yonder sandal is fragrant’. This judgment seems to imply immediate knowledge of fragrance. But the question can still be asked. Does such a judgment really stand criticism? Does it remain unchallenged or uncontradicted when it is further subjected to scrutiny? To the reply to this question will certainly be in the negative. When we ask ourselves, on subsequent reflection, where are really had any immediate feeling of fragrance just as we had smelling the sandal in the past, we find that we lack the memory of any such feeling, which alone can enable us to answer the question in the affirmative. In fact such reflective criticism invariably withdraws from our first judgments the warrant for immediacy. We feel that the sandal was not really felt to be
fragrant. In other words we find that the judgment ‘yonder sandal is fragrant’, the fragrant sandal cannot be maintained to be derived from any immediate perceptual feeling. It must therefore be admitted that a judgment of the type ‘yonder sandal is fragrant’ must be derived from some non-immediate i.e. mediate source. The justification of the possibility of such a judgment may force us to admit the agency of an implicit inference – an inference of which we are not directly conscious, but the existence of which can be logically as curtained through another inference.

In this analysis be satisfactory the Nyāya view of Jñānalaksana can hardly be thought to be tenable. On the contrary we must admit that the Advaitins who consider Jñānalaksana to be a case of inference are nearer the truth.

The Naiyāyikas and many other Indian philosophers speak of Manas as the internal sense organ (ान्तरिक्यं). According to them, therefore an internal perception is one that takes place through the instrumentality of this internal sense – manas. The objects of internal perception, according to the Naiyāyikas are pleasure-pain (सुखदच्यो) desire (हेमा) hatred (क्रिमि) knowledge (मति) will or effort (कृति).

The Advaitins while generally arguing with these thinkers as to the direct awareness of these internal states differ from them on some essential points. Advaitins except those who belong to a school of Vācaspatimisra do not regard manas or antahkaraṇa as an organ. According to them therefore,
perception does not take place through the instrumentality of manas as an organ. They think that the conditions of perception in these cases are exactly similar to the cases of external perception. The condition of the perception of an object is that an identity should be established between the object and the antahkaraṇa, which assumes the form of the object. Now while in external perception, the object is something other than the antahkaraṇa and antahkaraṇa has to go out to the object and assumes its form, in the case of internal perception the object is identical with the antahkaraṇa itself (since pleasure etc are but states of antahkaraṇa) and consequently the antahkaraṇa that is already identical with the object, which is its own self, has not to go out to any foreign object through a sense. It is therefore a limiting case of the ordinary process of perception – a case in which the antahkaraṇa vṛttī and the object are one and the same.⁴⁷

Perceptual consciousness as we have seen is not regarded by the Advaitins to be a result of the interaction of a sense and its object. According to the Advaitins, immediacy is but the ever-perfect light of the Self, as reflected against the inert antahkaraṇa. The light of the Self is only revealed through the antahkaraṇa as the background and cannot therefore be said to be generated by any interaction. The object whose form the antahkaraṇa takes revealed through the light of the cit or the self. This form may be the form of a foreign object, or may be the form of the antahkaraṇa itself, according as the object is external or internal, but that makes no
difference to the question of immediacy. When the object lighted by the self is a state of antahkaraṇa itself (e.g. pleasure, pain etc) the object is described by the Advaitins as being Kēvalasākṣābhāṣya (i.e. illuminated or revealed by the witnessing Self-alone). This means that is such a case there is no instrumentality of any foreign source such as a sense organ, an inference etc. Among the objects of internal perception the Naiyāyikas include the Self-Ātman – as well. But they think that the Self as such, i.e. Stripped of all predicates or objectives cannot be perceived. The Ātman is perceived only as the subject of a judgment, the predicate of which is it perceptible. Such perceptions are found in experiences like ‘I am happy, I am sorry’ (where happiness, sorrow etc. are perceptible).

The Advaitins do not believe in such intersection of the self. The Self-immediacy itself and it is through its light that then things are revealed. It is self-shining and the idea of its being an object of any kind of knowledge -- in retrospection or retrospection – is absurd. The ‘I’ (मै) that is known as ‘happy’ or ‘sorry’ is not the Self (आत्मा) in its purity, it is a fictitious limited Self which appears thus to be an object of consciousness.

Another problem that the Vēdāntins faced is regarding the origination of knowledge. According to the Budhistic idealist, knowledge and the object of knowledge are indistinguishable from each other, they are known together. For eg. Blue is not different from conscious of blue. If then knowledge and its object are identical, knowledge of knowledge is nothing
neither more nor less than, the knowledge of the object. According to Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of an object as distinct from the knowledge of that knowledge as possible. They hold that it is not a fact that the knowledge of an object is known simultaneously with the object. We perceived the pot first, and it is only by an act of reflection at a subsequent moment (अनुभवतत्त्वम्) that we become aware of the knowledge of the pot. The Bhāṭṭamāṁsakas say that the knowledge of the object, pot is not perceived even at any subsequent moment. Knowledge is never immediately known, either at the time the object is so known or at any subsequent moment of reflection. “Just as the tip of a finger cannot touch itself”. Knowledge is known however through inference. In order to explain the quality of knowledge (ज्ञात्वत्त्वम्) abiding in an object that as known previously. We must suppose, for want of any other explanation, that there was such a thing as the knowledge of the object. Knowledge therefore is never known directly, it is inferred from the quality of knowledge that is found to exist in the object in such an experience as the pot is known. The Advaitins do not accept any of these positions against the Bhāṭṭas they urge that the Bhāṭṭas seem to think that, as a result of the knowing activity of the self the object (the pot) comes to acquire the quality of being known which is similar to its other qualities of size, colour etc, and the knowledge of the pot is to be inferred from this objective quality (viz. knowledge). But this theory is unintelligible, because we cannot understand how the knowing activity of the self should be
able to endow the object with a quality of know ness which is to be conceived as objective like the spatial properties of the object – its colour, size etc. The Vēdāntins hold that the knowledge is the activity of the Self, and get the result of the activity (viz. knowness) is an objective characteristic on a par with colour, size etc. The result of the activity of the self must be regarded, as being in the Self and not in the object; that is it must be subjective and not objective. The attempt to infer the knowledge of an object from any objective characteristic of the object itself is, therefore doomed to failure.

As against the Naiyāyikas the Advaitins argue that the theory that knowledge is known in a subsequent reflective knowledge involves a great difficulty. To suppose one knowledge to be the object of another knowledge is to hold that two states of knowledge exist together at the same time, which is inconceivable. But there is also another difficulty. The Naiyāyikas is known as an abject, is a self conscious judgment of the form ‘I know the pot’ (ध्वन्तमहे जानामि) or what is the same “I am possessed of the knowledge of the pot” (ध्वन्तज्ञानप्रभवम् ). In such a case the knowledge (of the pot) comes to be perceived as a quality interring in the self. The self is directly perceived, and knowledge is perceived indirectly through the perception of the self. The relation between the perceiving mind and this knowledge known falls within the class of Samyuktasamavāya inference in the conjoined according to the Naiyāyikas. For in this case there is first a direct connection of the mind
with the self and then through the Self with the knowledge inhering in it. But this account of the \textit{Naiy\=yikas} does not satisfactorily explain the knowledge of knowledge. The Self according to the \textit{Naiy\=yikas} has many qualities, inhering in it and all of them are not held to be perceived in the perception of the Self; for instance infinitude, which according to the \textit{Naiy\=yikas} is an attribute of self is not necessarily perceived, therefore in the perception of the self, it is of little help to say that knowledge is perceived as being an attribute of the perceived self. For even then, to answer the question, why the attribute knowledge should be perceivable, when as some other attributes of the self are not perceivable, the \textit{Naiy\=yikas} must say, “Because knowledge is an attribute, the nature of which is to be perceived”. If so the \textit{V\=ed\=antins} ask, what error is there in supposing that it is the very nature of knowledge to reveal itself or to be self-manifest?\textsuperscript{54} As the \textit{Naiy\=yikas} are ultimately compelled to say that knowledge is perceived, not because it is an attribute of the Self but because it is the nature of knowledge to be perceivable, they gain little by resorting to be round about way of explaining that knowledge is perceived as an attribute inhering in the self, which is perceived by the mind.

Thus in rejecting the views of the \textit{Bh\=attas}, and the \textit{Naiy\=yikas}, the \textit{V\=ed\=antins} themselves hold that it is the nature of knowledge to be self manifest. It is unnecessary, therefore, either to infer its existence or to perceive it in subsequent knowledge. When the pot is known, the knowledge
of the pot also becomes manifest at that very moment. The self-manifesting nature of knowledge is regarded by Vēdāntins to be a unique subjective characteristic, which therefore cannot be classed under immediacy (प्रत्यक्षत्वम्) as pertaining to objects. Things like pots are perceived (प्रत्यक्ष) as objects but knowledge (प्रज्ञति) being self-manifest (स्वप्रक्ष्यतम्) cannot be regarded as an object of perception (प्रत्यक्ष).

According to the Prābhākaras also the nature of knowledge is Self-manifesting. The Vēdāntins agree with this concept. Knowledge and its abject are directly opposite characteristics, neither of which can be reduced to the other according to the Budhists. They also say that knowledge and its object are identical. On this point the Advaitins support the Prābhākaras, who criticize the Budhists by saying that the simultaneity of awareness does not argue identity of existence and that the very fact that the Budhists hold knowledge and the known to be identical pre-supposes that even to them the two are some how known to be distinct. Were they experienced as wholly identical they could not even speak of the two.55

The condition of the immediacy of the knowledge of a pot the author of Vēdānta Paribhāṣa is that the anthāḥkaraṇa should go out, through a sense, to the object, pot, to assume its form. Inferential knowledge of a pot does not fulfill this condition, and so it is mediate. If knowledge is self-manifest, how can it some times be mediate? To answer the question the Advaitins primarily start with the theory that every knowledge, whether perceptual or
inferential, has a subjective side of pure perceptual or inferential, has a subjective side of pure awareness (Cit or Samvit) which is the life and core of the self (that is to say no mediation is necessary) and consequently knowledge must necessarily be immediate or self-manifest. But there is another side to knowledge in which reference to the object is all-important. It is from this side that we divide knowledge in to two classes, immediate and mediate, though from the former point of view knowledge can be said only to be immediate. Now from this point of view, knowledge being about an object is immediate or mediate according as the object is known immediately or mediatory. Knowledge of the pot, from this objective standpoint can be said to be immediate when the condition, referred to above, is satisfied and the object is related to the subject thereby. Thus this condition does not conflict with the fundamental Vēdāntic position that knowledge in its subjective aspect (विज्ञान) is immediate or self-manifest, so long as we remember the two aspects of knowledge, the subjective consciousness, which is self-manifest, and the objective mode (वृत्ति), which is illumined by the former.

Regarding the self-manifesting character of knowledge, there arises another difficulty. We sometimes say that ‘He knows that he knows it’. If such phrases express our experience faithfully, we must say that knowledge is sometimes known and sometimes not known. According to the self-manifesting nature of knowledge, how can we reconcile? In reply to this
question, it may be pointed out that this popular usage may be considered to subvert the self-manifest ness of knowledge, only if it can be shown that they prove that we may know a thing, and yet may not know that we know the thing exactly as it is known. For e.g. it has to be shown that we may know ‘A’ as characterized by ‘X’ and yet may not know that we know ‘A’ as characterized by ‘X’. It will not affect the theory of self-manifest ness.

CONCLUSION.

From the above discussions, we realize that knowledge, like a light reveals the object as well as itself. Thus the direct awareness of knowledge as pre supposed by the memory of knowledge, is nothing but the self-revelation of knowledge. In reality, however knowledge neither needs to be, nor can be, an object either of itself or of any other knowledge. Self-manifest of knowledge means that knowledge can behave as being immediate without being an object of knowledge. This would be an exact rendering of the explanation of the term ‘Svaprakāṣṭatwa’ (self-manifestness) as given by the Advaitins —(अवेदान्वे सति अपरोक्ष्यवहारयोग्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वम्, चित्तुर्मी) ⁵⁶.
References.

1. Nyāyasūtras I.1.4.


3. Nyāyasūtras I. 1.4. शास्त्रिक्षणसन्त्रिकर्मश्चान्त

4. Ibid.

5. व्यविष्ण्णामावृत्ति.P.28.सन्त्रिकर्मवादरहस्यम् । 'प्रत्यक्ष साक्षात्कारित्वं लक्षणम् ।

6. Both are from Vivaraṇa prameya saṅgra ha p. 185-187.

7. Ibid.P. 188.


10. Commentary on Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad 1.5.3.


13. Brahmaṣūtras. 2.3.32.

14. Kaṭhōpaniṣad. 3.10.

15. Ibid. 3.4.

16. Muṇḍakōpaniṣad. 2.1.3.

17. Brahmaṣūtra.2.4.17.


22. Ibid. IV. 36.
26. Vivaraṇa prameyasaṅgraha P. 13. सर्व वस्तु ज्ञाततया वा अज्ञाततया वा सामसिद्धवाचान्यस्य विषय एव।
29. Vēdānta Paribhāṣa. P.44.
31. Ibid.
33. Yōgasūtram.
34. Sāstradīpika. P.164
35. Vēdānta Paribhāṣa P. 43. तत्र सत्विकल्पं वेशश्वेत्यवाचाहि ज्ञानम। यथा घटमहं जानामि।
निर्विकल्पं तु संसर्गवाचाहि ज्ञानं यथा सो अस्य देवता:
40. Brahmaśūtrabhaṣya(2.2.17).
41. Ibid. 2.2.17.

42. Chapter.2. P.70-77.

43. Tattvacintāmaṇi.- अनुमान्त्वर्णम् P. P-283 –293, Bhāṣāparichēda Kārikā-64.

44. Ibid. Kārika- 65 and Muktāvali on the same.


46. Ibid.

47. Vēdānta Paribhāṣā. P. 29.

48. Ibid. P.72. न हि वृत्ति विना साक्षिपत्यलं केवलसाक्षिपत्यलं, किन्तु इन्द्रियानुभावविद्यमानव्यापारं अन्तर्यण साक्षिपत्यलं

49. Sidhāntamuktāvali. Kārika.49.

50. Sarvadarsanasāṃgraham. P.126.

51. सहोपलथमनियमात् अथेवो नीतत्त्वियो: Sastradīpikā. P.56.

52. Vivaraṇapramēya Sāṅgrah. P.55.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Prakaraṇapancika. P. 60.

56. Citsukhi P.163